

THE AFGHAN INTERIM AUTHORITY (AIA)
SECURITY, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
FRAMEWORK AND FUTURE PROGRAMME

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Introduction

At the informal meeting on security in Tokyo in January, organized by Ambassador Dobbins, the scale and nature of the security problems facing Afghanistan were clearly outlined. Since then we have had the opportunity to discuss security sector issues with the United Nations, ISAF and the government of the United States and have produced this plan to address the unique set of challenges to security which the Afghan people face.

We want to join the international community in a partnership in battling terrorism, drug producers and smugglers, denying them the ability to operate on Afghan soil. We want to establish the rule of law, build a stable and secure political order and above all create the security conditions necessary to enable the huge reconstruction effort to begin. We are extremely grateful to the international community for providing an International Security Assistance Force for Kabul but we realize that responsibility for our security cannot be borne indefinitely by the international community and know that we must create the capacity to confront the challenges posed by the threats to our security ourselves. The Bonn Agreement places great emphasis on the role that the Afghans must play to ensure security and stability in Afghanistan. This will be a formidable task but with your assistance we are ready to meet the challenge.

The next few months are a critical period that will shape Afghanistan's future. We will continue to work energetically for our country's rehabilitation and transition from war to peace and want to consolidate and build on our achievements so far, but our success or failure to achieve this hinges, to a large part, on the security conditions across Afghanistan.

It must not be forgotten that we continue to face some formidable threats. Foremost amongst these is the continuing presence of Al Qaeda and former Taliban forces and the potential for other terrorist groups to use the remote parts of the country as a haven. Our 7000km long porous border provides opportunities for smugglers to move drugs, arms and contraband while the failure so far to expand the control of the central government means that regional informal armed groups still hold sway in some parts of country.

Politically we are now approaching a crucial juncture. In June the Loya Jirga will select a Transitional Administration, which will govern the country for up to two years elections are held. For this government to be credible, effective and to act with authority, it is vital that it is able to address potential threats, spreading its influence from Kabul and developing links and bonds between the center and the country's thirty-two provinces. The new Transitional Administration must be able to stop the resurgence of extremism, which the international community has done so much to help eradicate, and unite the country under the control of a single government and centrally controlled administration.

Chapter I

Security:

We are aware that time is short and know that we must make use of this unique opportunity in Afghanistan's history to take advantage of our people's overwhelming desire for peace after two decades of division and war. They are impatient for change and positive results but the peace is not yet secured and security remains their predominant concern. Currently it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate issues relating to security from those relating to political, social, and economic development. The most basic function of a state, after all, is to assure the security of its citizens from outside aggression or internal injustice. The fear is that every gain in health, education, reconstruction or human rights could be lost if security across the country and a stable and secure political order cannot be guaranteed. In a complex post-conflict situation, such as Afghanistan, proper management of the security sector is the first and necessary step to reconciliation and reconstruction; indeed managing this sector may be considered the first reconstruction project. Supporting these new security structures is essential if we are to safeguard the large and generous investment pledged by donors and institute the rule of law and the development of democratic institutions. Failure to do so could critically impede or even reverse the Bonn peace process.

Building A New Afghan National Army and Security Force:

To meet these challenges and address these threats we need to create professional, ethnically balanced, broad based and centrally trained armed forces. Legitimate civilian control and accountability over the armed forces will be established through the creation of a defense council, established by law, composed of a broad section of the leadership of the government and the army. It will be chaired by the head of the government who would have overall command over the forces in the country. Appointments to the new national army, especially that of senior commanders, will be vetted by the defense council to ensure that balance and neutrality are maintained.

We recognize that large numbers of fighters with personal weapons do not make an army. We want a modern army, which is cost-effective, well led, efficient and integrated. To effectively counter the threats, which we have outlined, we believe that we need armed forces of 80,000, made up of an army of 60,000, an air force of 8,000 and border guards comprising 12,000. These forces will be defensive in nature and be a symbol and source of national unity, stability, and pride. They will be respectful of human rights and comply with international law. The focus of the armed forces will be internal; to secure the borders establish and assist in the maintenance of security and to conduct counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations in support of the Ministry of Interior. The new armed forces will be a national asset able to provide support to the civil authorities during emergencies and assist in disaster relief, reconstruction and the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The new national army of 60,000 will be centrally controlled and consist of a 6,000 strong, multi-ethnic, quick reaction Corps, based in Kabul, and seven Corps,

with 6000 men each, based in the regions. A combat support division and a combat service support division, each with 6,000 men, will also be based in the Capital. Skilled, centrally controlled administrative staff will link the regions using sound IT and communications systems. A multi-ethnic general staff will be built up at the Ministry of Defense in Kabul as well as a transparent administrative system capable of financial planning and managing a modern army. An efficient financial structure will be required to manage short and long-term budgeting and resource control. In the regions, civil and military command will be separated and provincial governors will not be allowed to control the armed forces in their area. The multi-ethnic, mobile, light brigade, based in Kabul, will be able to use its newly acquired professional ethos to good effect in varied peacekeeping scenarios.

Training of the new armed forces:

Training of this new army will start as a partnership between the United States and us, who have generously offered to organize and administer training courses over an eighteen-month period. With US assistance, recruits will be selected from across the country and brought to Kabul and formed into new ethnically balanced units for the ten-week course before being posted with their units around the country. Some of the recruits will be taken from existing military units; others will have had no previous experience of having served in a formal armed group. Over the course of the eighteen-month US led programme some 16,350 soldiers will be trained for service in the regular army and 4,800 for the border forces. Judging from the experience of the ISAF trained first battalion of the National Guard, the courses in Kabul will inculcate a sense of national identity, and regional influences will gradually dissipate over time.

A programme to ‘train the trainers’ will enable the Afghans to gradually take over the operation of the training programmes ensuring that the courses will continue to run after the United States army has completed its eighteen month initial commitment. A team of Afghan instructors needed to train one battalion will be trained up alongside every new battalion under the US scheme, enabling the training programme for the envisaged armed forces of 80,000, army and border guards to be greatly accelerated. The Afghan Ministry of Defense has identified ten buildings, which can be used for training purposes in Kabul, and estimates repair costs of \$3,25 million to set up the facilities. Training and equipping of each new battalion of 600 men will cost \$567,727 (excluding salaries). Total basic training for the remainder of the armed forces, excluding the US component, will therefore cost around \$48,114,863. However this does not take into account specialized training of the air force together with armored and artillery units. The demand for the training courses will outstrip the supply and some units after being formed for service as part of the new national army will have to wait for a period of months before going to Kabul for the main training programme. The instructors can run regional schemes during this time from the ‘train the trainers’ package to give preliminary training before the main Kabul course.

We estimate that there are some 70,000 soldiers and 75,000 police currently in the country. Our initial estimates are that roughly 30,000 from the Army and 44,400 from the police will be eligible for demobilization over a five-year period. However, a rapid increase in our national capacity to train a professional army and police will substantially reduce the retention period of potential candidates for demobilization in

the police and army. Furthermore, with the establishment of a national demobilization programme, we anticipate that the rate of retention of soldiers and police not chosen in the new formations will accelerate considerably, if only to allow combatants take advantage of a growing economy and integration back into their own communities.

Key to the success of the new army will be the selection process. The process from its inception must establish a reputation for transparency, diversity, and unity. The international community must assist the government in managing and supporting a non-partisan recruitment process through selection centers in the various regions. These centers will register combatants and select, with the assistance of military recruitment specialists, those who will join the new armed forces, and those who will be demobilized. Only those qualifying will be admitted to the new army. Candidates will be selected for recruitment in their home regions but will be trained centrally in Kabul. Selection of those people to join the new armed forces will be completed by July 2003.

Professional armed forces need to be paid and controlled by the central government in order to break the cycle of control by warlords and regional armies, which has afflicted Afghanistan over the past decade. We understand that there will always be a limit on the resources available, from both the government of Afghanistan and external donors, to pay for the armed forces. It is important to remember that while a considerable slice of the money available in the short term will be used for reorganizing, training and equipping the new armed forces, long-term sustainability of the forces is also an essential requirement. The recurrent costs of maintaining an effective capability, year on year, needs to be acknowledged from the start when the new armed forces are designed.

We will need to help in funding the new Afghan armed forces in this critical initial period until we are able to generate enough revenue to support ourselves. We understand that funding of the military needs to be totally transparent and funded through the central government's budget. We therefore, welcome assistance from the United Nations to manage a Trust Fund on behalf of the donors, to ensure accountability and the requisite confidence building measures, to establish new standards of performance and professionalism for the National Army.

As mentioned earlier the government does not intend to maintain large formations of candidates for demobilization. It envisages a short period of no more than one year for the transitional support of \$20 per month for those selected for demobilization. Recruits and the newly trained armed forces will receive \$30.

We plan to establish a single government procurement process that is transparent both to donors and operate according to international standards. It will be the sole agency to provide equipment and support services to the military.

The new armed forces will require substantial investment if they are to operate as a modern army. This cannot be achieved quickly given the limited resources we currently possess. The immediate need is to organise train and pay the army, whilst concurrently transferring the remaining soldiers to civilian life. For this initial period, the forces will make best use of existing stocks of equipment and ammunition, investing where possible in key technologies such as communications. Pay scales

must reflect the comparative norms across Afghan society, sufficient to attract and retain the right quality people.

Item	Payment Schedule	Cost
Salaries of Armed Forces (including command and headquarter staff)	Recurrent	\$ 50,000,000
Training and Basic Equipment for all new armed forces (excluding those trained by the US)	Fixed (small recurrent costs to train new intake after 80,000 have been trained)	\$ 48,114,863
Administrative, living and medical Costs	Recurrent	\$ 40,000,000
Refurbishment of the Barracks and Training Areas	Fixed	\$ 80,000,000
Cost of supporting 74,000 demobilized police and army personnel for one year	Fixed	\$17,760,000
TOTAL		\$ 235,874,863

Chapter II

A FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Traditional Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration assumptions do not apply to the situation in Afghanistan. The unique circumstances of years of insecurity and war that the Afghans have faced, and the consequence of people pursuing alternative means of protection, has led to a complex web of protection patronage and exploitation; the effects of which have produced lack of trust and political fragmentation. Ordinary Afghans across the country have united and are convinced that soldiers would be willing to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life if they were presented with a reasonable economic alternative. We believe that a combination of economic investment, in communities and a programme for Reintegration and Demobilization would accelerate the resumption of economic activities and contribute greatly to security of the country.

It is becoming more and more apparent that alternative sources of income need to be found for the Mujahideen and the large number of armed men in Afghanistan to enable the Bonn process to be taken forward. There is already evidence that some soldiers and armed militias have started to resort to crime and lots more say that they plan to do so, in order to survive, because they feel that there is no future for them and no evidence of a peace dividend, providing them with jobs and an alternative to life in the army.

The requirement for Demobilization and Reintegration will increase, as training of the new Afghan army gets under way. ISAF and US initiatives on army training could ironically create a security problem rather than solve one if soldiers not admitted into the army join informal armed groups who offer them money, leading to an increase in warlordism. This will increase the problems the Interim Administration has in wresting power back to the center from commanders in the regions.

Current combatants will require different kinds of support: they need to be reintegrated back into to their communities, and be seen to bring back economic programmes to the community they left, if only to minimize competition over marginal resources within their communities. These forces presently include organized elements under clear command and control of regional power brokers, or irregular combatants.

The focus of national demobilization and reintegration efforts will be on organized regular forces and irregular combatants and veterans. The exact number of combatants in each of these categories is unknown. For planning purposes however regular forces, those that are uniformed and/or under clear command and control structures, and with livelihoods tied to the military establishment, are currently estimated at some **75,000 men**. While another **100,000** irregular militia combatants and war veterans dispersed throughout the country also require assistance of some kind. Although others have taken part in the conflict, including those who joined

quickly organized *lashkars* or tribal military forces, these one-time unpaid combatants will be encompassed within community development programmes and be absorbed into jobs as overall economic growth takes place, and will not benefit from demobilization and reintegration.

Some intake of current combatants into the future **new national Afghan armed forces of 80,000**, including 8,000 air force and 12,000 border guards, is expected. However, given the efforts being made to restructure and create a professional army, and the need to make the entire security sector more representative of the population, including women, **30,000 soldiers** plus **44,400** police will be discharged over a period of one year. To facilitate their re-entry into civilian life, demobilization and reintegration assistance will need to be provided. Another **100,000 irregular militia members and other former combatants** require recognition and reintegration assistance for a longer period. Special attention will be required to meet the needs of child soldiers¹. All warring factions throughout the civil war in Afghanistan have used minors as soldiers. Young people often enlisted because it was the only option for survival. As a result they missed out on an education and will need to attain livelihood skills that will enable them to sustain themselves once they leave the military. Assistance programmes to help combatants with disabilities will also need to be identified, with international partners.

Economic Environment and Possible Absorption

The Afghan economy is a fraction of its pre-war level. Drought has compounded the already declining agricultural and livestock production. Trade is expected to drive growth in the post-war economy, and there are hopes that foreign investments will create new opportunities. While many obstacles lie ahead due to the extensive socio-economic damage, the Afghan society now has unprecedented opportunity to recover and develop. Key to achieving such a change will be the diversion of significant assets and human resources from war to social and economic development purposes.

The informal economy is picking up fast in the urban centers, and cross border trade is growing steadily. The rural areas are also beginning to recover and will be further revived following the return of refugees and IDPs along with provision of reconstruction assistance. With continuing growth in the dynamic informal sectors, AIA expects the larger part of the ex-combatants to spontaneously trickle back into mainstream economic activities at an increasing rate. Those who have no or little productive or employment background, however, are expected to need assistance to be absorbed. However, key to the effort in reintegration will be the capacity creation to address employment policies ensure demobilized soldiers and policemen benefit from both the short and long-term employment opportunities.

¹ Child soldier refers to any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any regular or irregular, armed force or group. This includes all child or adolescent participants regardless of function. Cooks, porters, messengers, those recruited for sexual purposes and other support functions are included as well as those considered combatants. This includes those forcibly recruited as well as those who join voluntarily.

The Bonn Agreement has set the stage to address the formidable task of the recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Afghans themselves will drive the process, and provide the necessary leadership. Several strategic sectors have been prioritized for assistance, and vital projects are being prepared to support the recovery effort. Urgency should be given to those with high potential for labor intensity to provide quick employment opportunities. Key projects include assistance to recovery and employment generation; public roads, irrigation and water/sanitation rehabilitation; assistance to alternative livelihood strategies; support to community improvement and empowerment and assistance to skills development. They will contribute to improving the employment market in the short term while having longer-term impact within their respective sectors. While a large number of ex-combatants may potentially be employed by such projects in the short term, we believe that their key significance would be their contribution to economic recovery and thus permanent employment opportunities.

Strategy and Framework

The Interim Administration's approach to demobilization and reintegration will support the process of building representative, ethnically balanced new Afghan armed forces, under strong democratic control and civilian oversight. Supported strongly by public opinion, it will support security and development more broadly by reducing the numbers of combatants and armed elements within society. The programme will assist in meeting the special needs of demobilized combatants and veterans through transitional livelihood support, small enterprise development, vocational and other training, leading to on-going employment and productive activities. Psychosocial interventions should be imbedded in these services. Special assistance will be provided to groups with special needs including combatants with disabilities and communities whose members were rendered physically disabled, as a result of the years of conflict, and those affected by HIV/AIDS.

The demobilization and reintegration of children associated with the fighting forces must be prioritized due to the volatility of this group and the likelihood that they will rearm. This has to be reflected in a separate yet closely linked process. To build a sustainable peace, the successful integration of the young "ex-combatants" into peacetime society must begin at the community level. In order to be effective, the programme should target the conditions that made enlistment the only option for young people, addressing the psychological and social reasons as well as the economic ones.

The framework will build on existing opportunities in the short term, such as the building of barracks, or participation in mine clearance activities, and over the longer-term work *through* existing vocational training, or infrastructure projects. The timing of the demobilization and reintegration exercise will be closely linked to the selection process around the formation of the new army, with excess numbers of troops being separated and channelled into a demobilization and reintegration programme. Such discharges are envisaged to take place in stages, as the new armed forces assume a more professional and representative role in addressing the security needs of the country. The demobilization process will therefore need to focus on regular soldiers and their families or war-widows, with special emphasis on child

soldiers, at the outset, before broadening out support to include other categories of combatants and veterans.

The government must implement the demobilization and reintegration programme with international assistance. Through partnering, in each step of the process, with capable and responsive international organizations and NGOs, existing capacities will be built upon, and enhanced. Ownership of the programme is key to the government's efforts to ensure a smooth and seamless transition as the demobilization and reintegration capacities are put in place. Given the tight budgetary situation in Afghanistan, the process must focus on opportunities for ex-combatants rather than on entitlements. This approach will put a premium on ex-combatants own initiatives to pursue options provided by the increasingly powerful market forces in Afghanistan. However, in the short-term, targeted assistance including short-term employment programmes using **labor-based methodologies** will be necessary to bridge and enable entry into long-term employment and reintegration into their communities.

To avoid unrealistic expectations and rumors of the AIA's plans for demobilization, there must be an action plan to keep combatants, and society informed through media and information campaigns, about the programme at different stages of implementation. Reintegration assistance will be compatible with assistance to other target groups and communities, including internally displaced and refugees to avoid perceptions of favoritism. In the process, the government's capacities will be built so that it can provide a base for support to other programmes and activities, to serve affected groups such as IDP's and returning refugees. While general awareness of a demobilization and reintegration process will be disseminated through mass media, further awareness will be promoted through a series of workshops with implementing partners such as the key ministries and staff at central and regional levels, partners organizations and the communities of return.

The demobilization and integration process should be imbedded in the country's longer-term reconstruction and development framework, and involve close communication with local and traditional authorities. International technical and financial support will be requested to assist Afghan counterparts at all levels. A National Commission with a defined sunset clause, made up of key ministries at the technical level and the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), will be established by the AIA to lead, co-ordinate and ensure the transparency and accountability of this process. Co-ordination with international donors and organizations working in Afghanistan will be ensured through an overall Advisory Committee consisting of key ministers, including ministers of defense and interior, as well as representatives of donors and implementing partners.

The National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDR) will guide the Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (ADRP). A National Co-ordination Office, headed by a Commissioner who will report to the NCDR, will lead the ADRP. The national outreach of the programme will include the establishment of Regional Support Units (RSU's) in key parts of the country. Qualified ex-combatants will staff these as much as possible. The Commissioner will hold the equivalent of ministerial rank to ensure its autonomy, mandate, and function. The Ministry of Defense and Interior will be responsible respectively for dealing with

all issues pertaining to the discharge process (army and police), including the exchange of information on the process to all relevant stakeholders. Technical assistance will be provided to the NCDR to support the work of the commission, however, the NCDR will be completely run and managed by Afghans for Afghans. The Co-ordination Office will set up working groups with ex-combatants, government and partner organizations on specific topics such as child soldiers and the disabled with to ensure programme cohesion and attention to special target groups.

The planning for the ADRP will take into account the need to ensure a seamless transition from relief to recovery. Humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes should be used to the extent possible as assets for recovery. The ex-combatants, for example, can be employed short term in labor-intensive programming such as irrigation and rural development, road building and other infrastructure development. These programmes would offer opportunities for young people to serve as apprentices so as to facilitate their entry into the labor force. Other interventions will be identified to address broad reintegration needs at community level. Implementation of ADRP will be contracted out to various ministries, agencies, private sector, and other partners according to their comparative advantage, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness.

Chapter III

Implementation Framework

The Afghan Demobilization Reintegration Programme (ADRP) will make benefits and opportunities available to ex-combatants, increasing the possibilities for speedy economic and social reintegration.

While we believe this process has an open time frame linked to the overall economic development in the country, the measures presented will facilitate a process by enabling ex-combatants to regain access to civilian forms of work and social status. Structures for this programme will be established in such a way as to ensure sustainability of benefits to affected groups. The programme will assist two groups regular combatants, militia combatants and veteran groups.

Category 1: Regular Combatants

The main emphasis of ADRP will be on regular combatants, estimated at 30,000 army and 44,400 police or category 1 beneficiaries. Criteria for full demobilization and reintegration support under ADRP will include:

1. Official identification of the soldier/combatant (as defined by criteria established by AIA, in co-operation with UNAMA, multinational forces and other members of the international community);
2. Discharge because individual is in excess to the needs of the new Afghan armed forces or police, or does not qualify for placement within the army or police through the recruitment/selection process, including the disabled and over age;
3. Voluntary separation;
4. Eligibility requirements that take account of the special situation of child soldiers. Child soldiers will be eligible for support irrespective of their demobilization status.
5. Over the short term (from discharge), ADRP will provide orientation to regular combatants (Category 1), offering limited transitional livelihood assistance, and exploring immediate opportunities for reintegration of the most qualified individuals in areas such as mine action. Within a period of 3 months, former combatants requiring further assistance will be required to report to their ADRP Regional Support Units (RSU) for referral to labor intensive employment projects, provision of in-depth vocational training needs, and any specific counseling services. After a period of 10 months, individuals will again report to the RSU for long-term placement assistance, access to micro projects for business start-up including micro-credit, or further training. In certain cases at the outset it may be possible to place ex-combatants into longer-term schemes, such as mine clearance.

To avoid any semblance of unsustainable entitlements and the dangers that they would pose to finding alternative livelihoods, benefits (reinsertion package, training, employment etc.) provided by the ADRP will need to be carefully designed². Their cumulative value will be linked to the equivalent of army and civil service salaries to encourage ex-combatants to move into new opportunities in the private sector. This trend is expected to increase exponentially with the improving economic environment.

Combatants selected for demobilization will not be cantoned for long periods but assembled in established discharge centers for a brief period, for medical screening and orientation to prepare them for a return to civilian life. Under-age regular combatants will be referred to the special program for child soldiers upon discharge. Efforts will be made to ensure their immediate return to their home areas and that economic assistance will be provided to their families and communities.

Category 2: Irregular Militia Combatants and Veterans

Irregular militia combatants and veterans, known as Category 2 beneficiaries, who are estimated at 100,000, will also be assisted by ADRP. Preliminary assessments indicate that the majority of the under-age combatants fall into this category. Criteria for a streamlined package of assistance for irregular militia combatants and war veterans as well as the community-based programmes for child soldiers will include:

1. Official certification (according to criteria established by the AIA and Interim Government, including community level consultation).
2. Voluntary surrender of military arms and any ammunition (certificate of compliance from the government).
3. Being a member of an irregular force not included in the current Afghan Army, including veterans from the liberation struggle against foreign occupation.
4. All those currently below the age of 18 who were under the command structure of any of the fighting forces will be eligible for child soldier reintegration programmes regardless of military affiliation, function and ethnicity.

Discharge and Transition to Home Communities

The discharge process is limited to Category 1 ex-combatants and it is tied to their actual demobilization, the managed collection, and disposal of their arms and physical separation from army units. During the quartering period, for Category 1 ex-combatants, a thorough registration exercise will be conducted in every assembly point and information will be provided to all concerned on the forthcoming process. The brief quartering of troops will allow for the identification of hidden and non-hidden vulnerable groups, such as war disabled, traumatized soldiers, and child soldiers. Once identified, their needs will be addressed through targeted programmes when they leave the army.

² Package being designed tailored to the specific needs of the ex-combatants, comparable to the scale of assistance given to other groups such as returnees and the internally displaced.

During quartering, programme implementers will carry out public awareness campaigns and civic education initiatives to the benefit of the demobilized. These could possibly be extended to include the broader public. Also, sector specific Category 1 initiatives would be implemented in conjunction with the medical assessment and health counseling, with particular attention to Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) and HIV/AIDS.

ADRP discharge activities must fit within the overall transition framework as part of a broader strategy. For this, the timing, size, and sequencing of demobilization will require careful planning. A well thought-out calendar will take into consideration policy, programming, logistical and symbolic and cultural considerations, and be carried out with the full engagement of all stakeholders.

Generally, on any given discharge day, the following sequence of events will take place:

- on the basis of the registration carried out in the quartering period the ex-combatants will receive IRRS identification card making them eligible for further reintegration measures;
- symbolic events will mark the separation from military service such as handing out/awarding of diplomas or other commemorative materials.
- Information will be provided on the availability of referral services in the areas of return through the IRRS and other mechanisms.

Afghanistan Demobilization & Reintegration Programme (ADRP) Information Registration & Referral Service (IRRS)		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px; text-align: center;">Eligibility Card</div>	Name <input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>	
	Province/District <input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>	
	DOB <input style="width: 50%;" type="text"/>	ID # <input style="width: 50%;" type="text"/>
	Signature <input style="width: 100%; height: 40px;" type="text"/>	

To provide “breathing space” for parallel reintegration initiatives, security and other reform mechanisms, the discharge process will be accompanied by the provision of “transitional livelihood benefits”. These will cushion the return of ex-combatants to their communities and meet their and their families’ immediate needs prior to addressing longer-term strategies for economic livelihood.

These benefits will include the following:

- civilian clothing,
- transportation of areas of resettlement/destination;
- departure packages (food/hygiene items);

This transitional component of the programme will only be made available to those decommissioning regular forces that have yet to separate from their army units. The main part of the ADRP will focus on the provision of balanced reintegration measures to engage former combatants, helping them to enhance their adaptive capacities through education and economic opportunities. Information, Registration

and Referral Services (IRRS) will be the system that would be set in place for this purpose. These services will be a part of the Regional Support Units (RSUs).

The IRRS will operate through networking with service providers, mapping opportunities in the public and private sectors, and channeling ex-combatants towards these opportunities. When a shortage of offers seriously affect programme delivery, the IRRS through the Regional Support Unit (RSU) can inject programme resources to stimulate the creation and availability of reintegration opportunities in particularly neglected and unattended areas.

The IRRS will operate out of eight Regional Support Units (RSUs) established countrywide for this purpose. These units will act as an effective management structure that will integrate the activities of all other relevant stakeholders involved in facilitating support to the ex-combatants, their dependants, and their communities of absorption.

To ensure that a rapid response can be given to projects that need to be funded for the re-establishment of sustainable income-generating opportunities, the NCDR will establish the guidelines and criteria for the nature and modalities of projects to be implemented under the Reintegration Fund (RF). Within this context, funds will be allocated to the RSU's through the IRRS up to an agreed ceiling, with projects above the established threshold being referred to the NCDR for final consideration, prior to approval and implementation.

The IRRS component of the RSUs will consist of the following:

1. Information and Registration

This exercise has a number of purposes:

- **identification and issuance of identity documents;**
- **socio-economic survey, mapping out reintegration opportunities;**
- **profile assessment and skills inventory of ex-combatants**
- **provision of information to ex combatants on their reintegration options**
- **identification of ex combatants with special needs**
- **creation and implementation of an effective monitoring, tracking and reporting system**

Registration services will be undertaken in a decentralized manner through the RSU's, that will offer an over-the-counter service. In addition to this and where needed, mobile teams may travel to designated communities to register Category 1 and 2 beneficiaries to the programme.

The registration activities will generate the following results:

- Encoding of the profiles of the ex-combatants into a database that will be established and maintained for that purpose.
- Establishment of a comprehensive socio-demographic profile of the ex-combatant population in Afghanistan, including data on the demographic, economic, ethnic, and social composition of the beneficiaries.
- Production of individual and group profiles that will be updated and matched to other available socio-economic and employment opportunities for sustainable return to civilian life.
- Plan the development of vocational training and employment strategies in accordance with factual data on the composition, background and orientation of the beneficiaries

2. Referral

The referral component of the RSUs will function as the link between ex-combatants registered under the program, and those private actors within the community at large who have socio-economic opportunities into which the beneficiaries can be placed. This will entail working together with local partners – business, NGOs at all levels, community groups, small enterprises and others, to facilitate the identification and creation of new opportunities within the general framework of the on-going reconstruction process and efforts to strengthen the local economies. The following elements are envisaged:

- **Referral to short term employment projects**

Using labor-intensive approaches a number of reconstruction projects can be executed by ex combatants providing them with a short period of salary and creating cash flow into the communities, which will also assist social reintegration and reconciliation.

- **Referral to existing opportunities**

Matching potential employers' openings with appropriate skills. Placement of skilled ex-combatants in public administration, reconstruction programmes, and other formal employment programmes.

- **Referral to training and education**

Identify appropriate training possibilities including enrollment into educational institutions.

- **Referral to specialized organizations assisting small enterprise start-ups**

Individuals and groups will be assisted to design business plans and as appropriate receive business training, and receive financial support through micro finance institutions.

3. Additional Services

Specifically, the ARP will use the IRRS at the community level, to identify obstacles to reintegration faced by the ex-combatants' reintegration and will work at providing solutions by:

- Creating a peaceful environment by promoting successful reintegration stories.
- Soliciting the business community to actively participate in hiring former combatants including the public sector, the communities of resettlement, as well as other relevant stakeholders on the transformation process tied to the process of demobilization and reintegration.
- Counseling individuals on needs and concerns of the demobilized combatants with regards to the post-military and civilian life.
- Making available a Reintegration Fund (RF) through the eight RSU's to facilitate the accelerated creation of income-generating opportunities such as self-employment, on-the-job training, agriculture, micro-credit and reconstruction, to name a few.

4. Health Services

The demobilization and reintegration process will include the screening and treatment of sexually transmitted infections and other diseases. The ADRP information and counseling services will also include awareness raising and sensitization on HIV/AIDS. It will attempt to get the religious communities on board, so that they support the action and do not contradict the awareness messages. For Category 1 combatants, medical screening and information will take place during the quartering of combatants prior to discharge. The 100,000 ex-combatants in Category 2 will be referred to health screening and services through the ADRP Regional Support Centers. Given the state of the health system in Afghanistan, international agencies, including NGOs, will need to be mobilized and funded to deliver health services. ISAF facilities and medical personnel may be able to play an important role particularly in TB screening and other medical diagnostics and treatments. Programs that may help address psychosocial needs among ex-combatants will be supported to increase their capacity. Psychosocial reintegration assistance will support former combatants to rejoin community life and deal with their psychological and social experiences.

Assistance to special groups

Attending to the special needs of vulnerable cases (e.g. ex-combatants with disabilities, underage soldiers, HIV/AIDS patients, traumatized ex combatants). The Child Soldier component will offer opportunities for young people to develop their capacities to participate in re-building their communities. To ensure long-term sustainable livelihood for themselves and their families, young people will participate in targeted education, vocational training, and the development of sustainable enterprise. Youth participation is designed to prevent re-recruitment by fighting forces by addressing the psychological and social factors. To foster social reintegration, young people will be organized into local clubs that will support participatory group

income generation and participation in community services under the guidance of a committee of elders. Additionally socio economic support will be provided to receiving families/communities.

Diagram 2: Timeframes and Schedule for Start-up of Activities

Expected Timeframes	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3	Month 4	Month 5
Staff Selection & Training	→				
Establishment of Database	→				
Undertake Survey		→			
Registration			→		
Profiling		→			
Establish RSUs			→		
Start Reintegration Programming				→	

IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES AND NEXT STEPS

- Establishment of institutional arrangements and co-ordination mechanisms
Administrative and logistical requirements for establishment of NCDR and RCOs
- Information and media campaign - delineation of tasks, building of partnerships, and implementation arrangements
- Carrying out of a targeted labour market assessment with the purpose of establishing a labour market information system that could provide information on new employment opportunities for skilled and unskilled labour
- Detailed assessments of a number of key elements of the programme are needed such as:
 - Disarmament and issues of weapons' control
 - For the new security forces, screening mechanism, terms of services etc.
 - Potential service providers, capacities and needs
 - The social dimensions of the dynamics between receiving communities and returning ex-combatants
- Registration and information gathering on beneficiaries
- Implementation of programme

PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

The overall size of the project is estimated to be US\$ 77,910,000 million, for which donor funding will be sought. Table 1 provides an overview of the provisional cost estimates for the ADRP. The costing is based on the number of police and soldiers to be demobilized (74,400 Category 1 and 100,000 Category 2 beneficiaries) and on unit cost. The unit costs are derived on the basis of international experience and take into account local economic conditions.

Table 1: Estimated Demobilization and Reintegration Programme Costs


ARP Component	Total Millions US\$	Percent
1) Demobilization, including discharge centers, survey and registration, database, etc.	4,250,000	5.4
2) Transitional assistance (separation, in-kind, transport)	7,000,000	8.9
3) Information and awareness raising	800,000	1.0
4) Economic Stimulation Fund (ARP-IRRS/RSU)	14,000,000	17.9
5) Reintegration (Sector Programme Support) e.g. demining, capacity-building of service providers	30,000,000	38.6
6) Special Target Groups	11,000,000	14.1
7) Institutional Strengthening	1,750,000	2.2
8) ARP Coordination Office, and Regional Support Units (capital cost)	1,400,000	1.8
9) ARP Co-ordination Office, and Regional Support Units (recurrent/5 yrs)	4,000,000	5.1
10) Sub-Total	74,200,000	-
11) Contingencies 5%	3,710,000	5.0
Total	77,910,000	100.0

Budget for the establishment and operations of the NCDR and the ADRP.

Line item	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
1	2,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	200,000	50,000	4,250,000
2	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,000,000	7,000,000
3	350,000	350,000	50,000	50,000	-	800,000
4	3,000,000	5,000,000	3,000,000	2,000,000	1,000,000	14,000,000
5	3,000,000	7,000,000	10,000,000	8,000,000	2,000,000	30,000,000
6	3,000,000	5,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	11,000,000
7	300,000	450,000	350,000	350,000	300,000	1,750,000
8	1,000,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	1,400,000
9	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	700,000	300,000	4,000,000
10	15,150,000	21,400,000	18,000,000	13,900,000	5,750,000	74,200,000
11	757,500	1,070,000	900,000	695,000	287,500	3,710,000
Tot	15,907,500	22,470,000	18,900,000	14,595,000	6,037,500	77,910,000

Costs in the above matrix assume that starts up activities are based on the remainder of the calendar year and on a declining scale over subsequent years.

ANNEX 1: ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM: ADRP



ANNEX 2: TORS - NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (NCDR) AND CO-ORDINATION OFFICE

An inclusive technical level National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration will be established for the duration of the programme with the membership of key government ministries and organizations to guide the co-ordinate and direct the ADRP. NCDR will consist of higher-level representatives from key ministries, and will be advised by an overall Advisory Committee consisting of relevant ministers and representatives of key donor and partner agencies. The responsibilities of the NCDR are:

Policy, Planning and Co-ordination

- to review and endorse the policy of the Afghanistan Interim Administration/Transitional Administration on demobilization and reintegration;
- to develop policy strategies and coordinate all activities for the implementation of the AIA/Interim Government programme for assistance to ex-combatants;
- to ensure coherence between all relevant ministries and government organizations in the planning and implementation of programme activities;
- to ensure coherence with other reconstruction and development activities directed towards affected communities and vulnerable groups; and,
- to ensure transparency and accountability of ADRP activities and institutions.

Guiding Operations

- to take all necessary steps to promote the transition of ex-combatants into productive civilian life;
- take such steps that may be necessary to minimize frustration on the part of ex-combatants in any phase of the programmes;
- to supervise and monitor any special assistance to ex-combatants which is under the authority of NCDR;
- to identify and address any problems related to ADRP expeditiously and effectively so that planned projects are properly administered;
- to guide and supervise all parties involved in the implementation process of the programme; and,
- to carry out other activities that may be conducive or incidental to the attainment of the objectives of ADRP.

Management Oversight

- to supervise and monitor the work and performance of the ADRP Coordination Office;
- ensure that all support and arrangements provided under the programme are administered properly, including timely information sharing between departments and other stakeholder.
- to supervise and monitor the work and performance of the ADRP Regional Support Units.

Functions of the ADRP Co-ordination Office

The Co-ordination Office assists NCDR in the planning, co-ordination and monitoring of the Afghanistan Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. The Co-ordination Office is headed by a Commissioner nominated by NCDR, and is staffed by Afghans. To help build capacity of the office and ensure an early operational ability, the different functions will be supported through a partnership arrangement with international organizations participating in the programme. Like NCDR, the Co-ordination Office will be phased out upon the completion of the programme.

The functions of the ADRP Co-ordination Office include:

- develop the operational policies and guidelines for ADRP;
- develop functional implementation arrangements;
- co-ordinate the inputs and activities of implementing partners;
- appraise and plan activities proposed by implementing partners and ensure that they contribute to the programme objectives;
- compile and analyze centrally all data on ex-combatants;
- provide information on the programme to the public;
- develop and maintain an appropriate management information system (database);
- monitor and evaluate ADRP programme activities in accordance with agreed performance criteria;
- form working groups with government and international partner organizations on selected target groups and topics;
- provide financial management and administrative support to ADRP;
- ensure logistical, administrative and operational critical to programme success;
- liaise with other, parallel, programme co-ordination units to ensure compatibility of programme plans and activities; and,
- provide secretariat functions to the NCDR.

During the preparations of the ADRP plan, staff specifically employed to conduct the technical and socio-economic studies will assist the Commissioner. They may continue in the implementation phase of the ADRP. Other staffing and technical assistance arrangements will be developed within two main units covering programmes and finance/administration, respectively.

Functions of the Regional Support Units

Eight Regional Support Units (RSU) will be set up across the country to assist the implementation of the programme. The units will be technically supported by international organizations as required. The main functions of the units include:

- provide information, counseling and referral to facilitate access for ex-combatants to training and employment opportunities available in their region;
- provide the transitional livelihood support to eligible ex-combatants; and,
- monitor and review the implementation and effects of the assistance;
- appraise and approve sub-projects up to a set cost level;
- identify needs and further required interventions;
- provide financial management of regional activities;
- oversee/supervise specific programs.

ANNEX 3: PROJECTS WITH POTENTIAL FOR INTENSIVE LABOUR USE

Sector	Agency	Project Title	Project Cost \$	Potential Labour Intensity (est) (high/medium/low)	Fundraising / Donor	When will implementation/di sbursement begin?	Which provinces/regions
Infrastructure	UNDP	Immediate Results for Initiatives for Employment Generation	10,000,000	high	Ongoing	Pending funding	National
Infrastructure	UNCHS / UNDP	Public Roads-Job Creation Facility	8,700,000	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	Hirat, Nangarhar, J.Abad, Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh,M.Sharif
Infrastructure	UNDP	Recovery and Employment Afghanistan Programme (REAP)	12,000,000	High	Partially funded (3,000,000)	April 2001	Kabul, Nangahar, balkh, Hirat, Kandahar, Bamyan
Employment	UNDCP	Alternative livelihood Strategies to Poppy Cultivation	4,399,000	high	Ongoing	Pending funding	Nanarhar, Badakhshan, Himland,Kandahar , Uruzgan
Employment	UNDP	Establishing Internet Presence in Afghanistan	14,380,000	low	Ongoing	Pending Funding	National
Employment	ILO	Skills development for Afghan job-seekers	3,200,000	high	Ongoing	Pending funding	National

Agriculture	FAO	Irrigation, Training, Rehabilitation of Community Based Irrigation Schemes...	7,006,500	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	Kabul, Nangahar, Balkh, Hirat, Kandahar
Water and Sanitation	WHO	Rehabilitation of Water Supply System	8,690,074	High	Partially funded (1,568,669)	January 2002	J.Abad, Charikar, Kunduz, Mehterlam, Sheberghan
Water and Sanitation	UNCHS / UNDP	Transition Projects in Water and Sanitation	9,000,000	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	Kabul, Parwan, Balkh, Hirat, Farah, Kandahar, Bamyan
Water and Sanitation	UNICEF	Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation and Hygiene Education	13,300,000	High	Partially Funded (3,700,000)	October 2001	Logar, Laghman, Badakhshan, Balkh, Jawzjan, Hirat, Farah, Kandahar, Bamyan

World Bank Assistance with Potential for Intensive Labour							
Infrastr ucture	WB	Roads Water / Sanitation Power	50 million (approx.)	High	Under preparation	June 2002	National
Comm unity- driven Develo pment (CDD)	WB	Grass-root initiatives to rebuild local communitie s	20 million (approx.)	Medium	Under preparation	June 2002	National
Educat ion	WB	Support to the rehabilitatio n of the education sector	20-25 million (approx.)	Low	Under preparation	June 2002	National

Projects with Potential for Intensive Labour

Sector	Agency	Project Title	Project Cost \$	Potential Labour Intensity (est) (high/medium/low)	Fundraising / Donor	When will implementation/di sbursement begin?	Which provinces/regions
UNDP Projects with Potential for Intensive Labour							
Infrastructure	UNDP	Immediate Results Initiatives for Employment Generation	10,000,000	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	National
Infrastructure	UNCHS / UNDP	Public Roads-Job Creation Facility	8,700,000	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	Herat, Nangarhar, J.Abad, Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh,M.Sharif
Infrastructure	UNDP	Recovery and Employment Afghanistan Programme (REAP)	12,000,000	High	Partially funded (3,000,000)	April 2001	Kabul, Nangahar, balkh, Herat, Kandahar, Bamyan
Employment	UNDCP	Alternative livelihood Strategies to Poppy Cultivation	4,399,000	high	Ongoing	Pending funding	Nanarhar, Badakhshan, Himland,Kandahar , Uruzgan
Employment	UNDP	Establishing Internet Presence in Afghanistan	14,380,000	low	Ongoing	Pending Funding	National
Employment	ILO	Skills development for Afghan job-seekers	3,200,000	high	Ongoing	Pending funding	National

Agriculture	FAO	Irrigation, Training, Rehabilitation of Community Based Irrigation Schemes...	7,006,500	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	Kabul, Nangahar, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar
Water and Sanitation	WHO	Rehabilitation of Water Supply System	8,690,074	High	Partially funded (1,568,669)	January 2002	J.Abad, Charikar, Kunduz, Mehterlam, Sheberghan
Water and Sanitation	UNCHS / UNDP	Transition Projects in Water and Sanitation	9,000,000	High	Ongoing	Pending funding	Kabul, Parwan, Balkh, Herat, Farah, Kandahar, Bamyan
Water and Sanitation	UNICEF	Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation and Hygiene Education	13,300,000	High	Partially Funded (3,700,000)	October 2001	Logar, Laghman, Badakhshan, Balkh, Jawzjan, Herat, Farah, Kandahar, Bamyan
WB Projects with Potential for Intensive Labour							
Infrastructure	WB	Roads Water / Sanitation Power	50 million (approx.)	High	Under preparation	June 2002	National
Community-driven Development (CDD)	WB	Grass-root initiatives to rebuild local communities	20 million (approx.)	Medium	Under preparation	June 2002	National
Education	WB	Support to the rehabilitation of the education sector	20-25 million (approx.)	Low	Under preparation	June 2002	National

