Overview For October

Nigeria will have the Council presidency in October. A number of open debates and other initiatives are planned.

Nigeria decided to organise a debate on security sector reform, an issue last discussed by the Council as a distinct theme in 2008. The debate will likely be chaired either by its president or foreign minister and the Secretary-General is expected to brief the Council.

The quarterly open debate on the Middle East is expected in October and so is the annual open debate on women and peace and security and the implementation of resolution 1325, with the head of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, likely to brief.

The Council expects to adopt in October its annual report to the General Assembly. It will also have its annual private meeting with the President of the International Court of Justice.

Briefings are also expected:
- on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, to be followed by a debate;
- on post-conflict peacebuilding by Assistant Secretary-General Judy Cheng-Hopkins;
- on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by Under-Secretary-General Herve Ladsous, to be followed by consultations;
- on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

Important Dates Over the Horizon...

Expected Council Action

In October, the Council is likely to review the force levels of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to ascertain whether conditions in South Sudan could permit a reduction of the mandated level of military personnel from up to 7,000 to 6,000. If the Council does decide to decrease the force level, it will need to adopt a resolution.

The Council will also likely receive a briefing and hold consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in order to review the mandate, potentially adding a border-monitoring support role to the mission by adopting a resolution.

Given the fluidity of the situation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, it is possible that the Council may meet in October to discuss the violence in these two regions of Sudan.

The mandate of UNMISS expires on 8 July 2012, while the mandate of UNISFA expires on 27 December 2011.

Key Recent Developments

South Sudan President Salva Kiir announced the appointment of his new 29-member cabinet on 26 August. It is more ethnically and regionally diverse than the caretaker government it replaces, with Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bhar el Ghazal represented in key posts. Women also make up nearly 30 percent of the posts. On 31 August, the National Assembly of South Sudan approved the appointments.

Between June and August, several attempts by the Council to negotiate a statement on the violence in South Kordofan were unsuccessful. It seems that Council members could not reconcile differences over how to describe the reported human rights abuses in the region. There also appear to have been differences regarding the level of responsibility for the violence that should be apportioned to Khartoum on the one hand and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) on the other.

Fighting broke out in Blue Nile State in Sudan between the Sudanese for Armed Forces and the SPLM-N on 1 September. The next day, Khartoum declared a state of emergency in Blue Nile, dismissed the governor (Malik Agar, a member of the SPLM-N) and appointed a military governor.

On 4 September, Ambassador Dafa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman forwarded two letters to the president of the Security Council from Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Ahmed Kari. In one of the letters, Kari stated that the government of Sudan had created a committee to “assess the legal situation in the state (Blue Nile) and to receive complaints and conduct the necessary investigations regarding the violations committed by the (Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army) forces there.” Meanwhile, the SPLM-N issued a statement accusing Sudan of “naked aggression and attacks on civilians.”
Overview For October (continued)

- by Joint Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari, to be followed by consultations;
- on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), to be followed by consultations;
- in consultations, by the head of the Department of Political Affairs, Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe, on issues of concern as part of the monthly “horizon scanning” process;
- on two Somalia-related reports: on the protection of Somali natural resources and waters and on piracy off the coast of Somalia by Pascoe, to be followed by consultations;
- in consultations, on Western Sahara by Personal Envoy Christopher Ross; and
- in consultations, on Lebanon by Special Envoy Terje Red-Larsen, on the implementation of resolution 1559. Consultations are also expected to review the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime.

Formal Council meetings are expected to adopt resolutions:
- on the adjustment of Côte d’Ivoire sanctions;
- on the authorisation for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF);
- on the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) mandate renewal; and
- possibly on Libya, addressing NATO’s role.

An election to fill five rotating seats on the Security Council is scheduled to be held by the General Assembly on 21 October.

Status Update since our September Forecast

- Iran: On 7 September, the chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), briefed the Council (S/PV.6607) that the Committee had received additional information from a member state on a previously reported incident of an alleged export of arms, in violation of resolution 1747 (2007). The Committee also received a joint communication from four member states reporting a violation of resolution 1929 (2010) which bans any activity related to ballistic missiles. Following the briefing, all Council members expressed support for the work of the Committee. France, Gabon, Germany, Portugal, the UK and the US called for the most recent report of the Committee’s panel of experts to be published as soon as possible. China and Russia stressed that the work of the panel should be objective and impartial.
- Terrorism: On 9 September, the members of the Council marked the tenth anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, recalling that nearly 3,000 people from over 90 countries were killed. Council members reiterated their condemnation of the attacks and noted that in the aftermath states had joined together in a spirit of cooperation to combat terrorism and that such cooperation should be further strengthened. They stressed that terrorism can only be defeated by a comprehensive approach involving states, international and regional organizations and civil society to address the threat and conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. On 7 September, Council members condemned the terrorist attack that killed numerous people that day in Delhi, India (SC/10377). On 21 September the members of the Council condemned the terrorist attack that killed multiple people the day before in Kabul, Afghanistan, including the Chairman of the Afghanistan High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani (SC/10391). Council members reiterated their commitment to support the government of Afghanistan and the peace and reconciliation process.
- Sierra Leone: On 14 September, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPISIL) for a period of 12 months (S/RES/2005). On 12 September, Council members were briefed by Michael von der Schulenburg, the Executive Representative for the Secretary General, on political and other developments in Sierra Leone (S/PV.6609). This was followed by Council discussions, in which Council members were briefed by Joseph B. Dauda, the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone.
- Tribunals: On 14 September, the Council decided in resolution 2006 to reappoint Hassan Bubacar Jallow as prosecutor of the ICTR for a new term with effect from 15 September 2011 until 31 December 2014 and in resolution 2007 to reappoint Serge Brammertz as prosecutor of the ICTY for a new term with effect from 1 January 2012 until 31 December 2014 (S/PV.6612 and S/PV.6613). These decisions followed separate letters from the Secretary-General to the Council on their reappointment (S/2011/561 for Jallow and S/2011/566 for Brammertz) in which he had requested that both be reappointed for a new four-year term in accordance with the Tribunals’ statutes.
- Liberia: On 16 September, the Council passed a resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for 12 months (S/RES/2008). This followed unexpectedly prolonged Council discussions. On 13 September, the Council was briefed by Special Representative Ellen Margrethe Løj on the latest developments in Liberia. This was followed by Council consultations discussing a draft resolution, circulated the previous week, renewing UNMIL’s mandate. The draft was put in blue on 14 September to be adopted on 15 September, but a few Council members broke silence that evening. The resolution was only adopted the following day, 16 September. In the course of the discussions, the Secretary-General submitted a letter to Council President on 15 September (and circulated among Council members) on the inter-mission cooperation with the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (S/2011/577) (15 September 2011). The letter discussed the use of three military helicopters and the transfer of 150 military and 100 police personnel from UNOCI to UNMIL from 1 October to 30 November 2011.
- Preventive Diplomacy: On 22 September, the Council held a high-level meeting (S/PV.6821) on preventive diplomacy in which it considered the Secretary-General’s report “Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results” (S/2011/552). Lebanon circulated a concept paper “Strengthening and Consolidating Preventive Diplomacy” (S/2011/570) in advance of the meeting, which included the participation of six Heads of State and other high-level officials. The Secretary-General briefed the Council as well. The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/18) at the meeting in which it, inter-alia, reaffirmed the responsibilities of states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; reaffirmed that UN conflict prevention activities should “support and complement, as appropriate, the conflict prevention roles of national governments”; expressed its intention to strengthen its partnerships with regional UN offices; emphasised the role of civil society in preventive diplomacy; and reiterated the need to strengthen cooperation with regional and subregional organisations with respect to conflict prevention.
- Yemen: On 24 September, the Council
On 8 September, Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations; Philippe Lazzarini, deputy director of the coordination and response division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); and Hilde Johnson, the head of UNMISS, briefed the Council on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan in consultations.

Mulet said that the first phase of the withdrawal of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), constituting the majority of mission personnel, had been completed. He added that deployment of UNISFA was well underway, with more than 1,700 peacekeepers already on the ground. He also noted that Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to withdraw their troops from Abyei between 11 and 30 September.

Lazzarini discussed the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. He said that the fighting in both regions had significantly curtailed humanitarian access. While difficult to verify, he estimated that the fighting in Blue Nile had displaced approximately 50,000 people, with many crossing the border into Ethiopia.

Johnson said that the deployment of UNMISS was progressing, with over 4,600 troops expected by the end of September. Johnson also commended President Kiir on the appointment of a new cabinet that represents ethnic, regional and gender diversity. She described the government’s priorities moving forward, including education, health care, rule of law, infrastructure development, and the transformation of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army via a political process. Regarding the security situation in South Sudan, Johnson expressed concern about the violence in August between the Murle and Lou Nuer communities, caused by cattle-rustling in Jonglei state. She noted that the scope of the violence, which led to the deaths of approximately 600 people and 1,000 wounded on 18 August, was unusual.

On 12 September, Sudan’s parliament adopted a resolution supporting the extension of a state of emergency in Blue Nile state and endorsing the military operation there. During a visit to Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile, on 17 September, first Vice President Ali Osman Taha, reiterated Khartoum’s commitment to maintain control of Blue Nile, reportedly stating that Sudan would “cut off every hand that wants to extract it”.

On 21 September, Human Rights Watch reported that Sudanese security forces incarcerated over 100 suspected SPLM-N party members when fighting broke out in Blue Nile on 2 September, with many being released after they were forced to denounce their political affiliation.

On 18 September, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan held the first meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), which seeks to promote political and security cooperation between the countries, especially with respect to their shared border. (The two parties had agreed to a border-monitoring support mechanism on 30 July.) At the meeting, they agreed to establish ten crossing points within a demilitarised zone along their 2,000-kilometer shared border.

On 22 September, several dozen Sudanese soldiers and SPLM-N rebels died in fighting in the Rashad district of South Kordofan. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the fighting, which appears to have been initiated by the rebels.

The Satellite Sentinel Project reported on 23 September that satellite images demonstrated that 3,000 Sudanese troops were making their way toward the city of Kurmuk in Blue Nile, supported by tanks, helicopter gun-ships and artillery.

On 27 September, UNHCR reported that since 3 September approximately 25,000 refugees had arrived in Ethiopia, fleeing the violence in Blue Nile. UNHCR anticipated that the number of refugees would increase as fighting continues in the Blue Nile.

At press time, the UNISFA report, which was due out on 27 September, had yet to be released.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In her statement on 12 September 2011 at the opening of 18th Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC), UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay addressed both Sudan and South Sudan related issues. Regarding South Sudan, she said that with the assistance of the international community it had an opportunity to build a democratic and prosperous state based on the rule of law, good governance and human rights. She urged the new nation to ratify core international human rights treaties and create a normative framework necessary to protect human rights. She expressed deep concern about ongoing inter-communal violence and the risks faced by human rights defenders, and denounced the arrest and beating by police of her representative in the country.

Addressing Sudan, she expressed concern at the stand-off between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLM-N in South Kordofan, and violence that had spread to neighbouring Blue Nile. Pillay mentioned that she had published a report describing a wide range of violations of international criminal law and international humanitarian law in South Kordofan in June. She strongly recommended the establishment of an International Commission of
Inquiry into these incidents. She urged the government to pay heed to this recommendation and allow the deployment of human rights observers to monitor the situation on the ground.

On 19 September 2011, Mohamed Chande Othman, the UN expert on the human rights situation in Sudan, drew the HRC’s attention to the enormous challenges faced by South Sudan, including the urgent need to accelerate its transition from a military movement to a responsible and accountable government. Violence and systematic abuses of human rights that continued to occur in an environment of impunity also remained a great concern and needed to be addressed by the new government. Othman concluded that the human rights situation in both Sudan and South Sudan remained precarious and warranted the undivided attention of the HRC.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how it can most effectively monitor and address the continuing violence in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, while maintaining security in the contested border region of Abyei.

Another key issue is what role the Council can play in generating the necessary trust and goodwill between the parties to resolve the remaining Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) issues—including border demarcation, oil sharing, citizenship and the status of Abyei.

A further important issue is how the Council can support South Sudan in maintaining security and developing effective state institutions. A related issue is how the Council can address the recent escalation of violence resulting from cattle-rustling in South Sudan. The raids in August in Jonglei and Unity states related to cattle-rustling were also reported in Unity state in September.

Another important issue is how the Council can strengthen its overall approach to the region by exploring potential synergies among the three UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan.

Options
One option is to bring together key UN and regional actors—for example, Haile Menkerios, the special envoy of the Secretary-General on Sudan and South Sudan; Hilde Johnson, the special representative of the Secretary-General and head of mission of UNMISS; Ibrahim Gambari, the Joint AU-UN special representative for Darfur; and Thabo Mbeki, chair of the High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan—for a high-level meeting to discuss how the Council can foster a more strategic approach to the challenges facing Sudan and South Sudan. The Council held a similar high-level meeting in June 2010 to discuss the implementation of the CPA and the Darfur peace negotiations, which included the participation of Gambari, Mbeki, Menkerios and Djibril Bassolé, who was then the AU-UN joint chief mediator on Darfur.

With respect to the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the Council could:
- hold an Arria-formula meeting that includes the participation of NGOs with quality information about events unfolding on the ground;
- adopt a statement expressing concern about the violence and human rights violations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and calling on the parties to cease the violence; or
- adopt two separate statements, one that focuses on Khartoum’s role in the fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and another that focuses on the SPLM-N’s role in the conflict. (This would allow the Council to focus separately on each side’s responsibility for the violence.)

With respect to UNMISS and the situation in South Sudan, the Council could:
- maintain the authorised force level of the mission at 7,000 military personnel;
- reduce the mandated force level to 6,000 military personnel, if the Secretariat indicates that this would be sufficient;
- defer a determination on the number of mandated military personnel until the next review of the force level, expected in January, when there is likely to be further progress in the deployment of UNMISS; and
- adopt a statement that condemns the recent violence in Jonglei and Unity states related to cattle-rustling.

With respect to UNISFA, the Council could:
- keep the mandate of the mission unchanged; or
- adopt a resolution that would include a border-monitoring support role for the mission.

Council Dynamics
All Council members remain concerned about the ongoing fighting and the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. However, there is a broad range of opinion over the appropriate approach to the violence and the level of accountability of the parties in the conflict. On one side of the spectrum, some members believe that the Council should take a strong stance against Khartoum, condemning in particular aerial bombardments and human rights violations. On the other side of the spectrum are members who hold the perspective that, as a sovereign government, Khartoum needs to defend its territory, that there is a lack of clarity regarding events on the ground and that, in addition to Khartoum, the SPLM-N shares considerable responsibility for the fighting.

Regarding UNMISS, some members appear particularly interested in ensuring that the mission is as cost-effective as possible. This seems to arise from the fact that there are now three missions in Sudan and South Sudan, mandating over 38,000 military and police personnel.

With respect to UNISFA, there appears to be widespread support within the Council for according a border-monitoring support role to the mission. Some members have noted that coalescence on this issue might provide a springboard for the Council to address other intractable challenges in Sudan where there are currently differences of perspective on the Council.

Some members of the Council have expressed the view that there is a need to approach the complex issues in Sudan and South Sudan in a more holistic and strategic manner that fosters greater complementarities between the three UN peace operations in the countries.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1997 (11 July 2011) liquidated UNMIS.
- S/RES/1996 (8 July 2011) established UNMISS.
- S/RES/1990 (27 June 2011) established UNISFA.

Letters
- S/2011/558 (4 September 2011) contained two letters from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sudan accusing the SPLM-N of violence in Blue Nile state.
- S/2011/524 (18 August 2011) was from Sudan on the establishment of an inquiry committee in Southern Kordofan.
- S/2011/522 (18 August 2011) was from Sudan refuting the report on human rights violations in Southern Kordofan.
- S/2011/511 (10 August 2011) and S/2011/510 (5 August 2011) were between the President of the Council.
The Implementation Follow-Up Committee for the DDPD met for the first time on 11 September. Representatives from Sudan, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), the AU, the EO, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the UN and numerous governments (including all five permanent members of the Council) participated. They exchanged ideas on how to support the implementation of the DDPD, which focuses on seven areas: human rights; power-sharing; wealth-sharing; justice and reconciliation; compensation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); ceasefire and security arrangements; and internal dialogue and consultation. Ibrahim Gambari, joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, noted that the agreement of the LJM and the government of Sudan to abide by the DDPD was evidence that sustainable peace could be achieved in Darfur.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir appointed al-Haj Adam Youssef as second Vice President on 13 September, making him the third-ranking official in the Sudanese government and the first Darfuri to hold such a high position. However, spokespersons for the SLM-AW and JEM rebel groups criticised the appointment as a meaningless gesture, citing Youssef’s Arab heritage and indicating that he would not represent the interests of Darfur’s non-Arabs.

In Khartoum on 14 September, Gambari called on the SLM-MM, SLM-AW and JEM to join the peace process in Darfur. He also said that UNAMID had “significantly stabilised the situation in Darfur”. Gambari further estimated that armed attacks in the region had decreased by up to 70 percent during the past three years. He noted that, as a consequence, more IDPs had been able to return home. Hussein Abu Sharati Niyala, a spokesperson for IDPs in Darfur, challenged Gambari’s assertions.

On 21 September, al-Bashir appointed Tijani el-Sissi as head of the Darfur Regional Authority, which is responsible for implementing the DDPD. A former Darfur governor, el-Sissi is a member of the LJM, the rebel group that has signed the DDPD with Khartoum.

Violent incidents continued to occur in Darfur. On 2 September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied militias reportedly attacked the ethnic Fur town of Tabra, killing 58 people and wounding 86. On 8 September, 13 Sudanese police were killed and at least 30 wounded in clashes with an armed group in the Jebel Marra region. Sudanese officials said the violence occurred while police were attempting to rescue three hostages—two Sudanese and one Italian aid worker—from an armed group. The SLM-AW reportedly said it was the armed group that had clashed with the police. However, it refuted Khartoum’s claim that it was holding hostages.

On 11 September, JEM announced that its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, had returned to Darfur from Libya, where he had been in exile since May 2010. Some JEM fighters had reportedly fought for Qaddafi during the recent conflict in Libya. It appears that the fall of the Qaddafi regime, which had rebuffed several requests by the Sudanese government to expel Ibrahim, prompted his return to Darfur.

The Sudan Sanctions Committee met on 29 September. During the meeting, it seems that concerns were raised about the continued fighting in Darfur, and the flow of arms in the region. It also appears that there have been tensions between the Secretariat and the Committee’s panel of experts which may affect the panel’s work.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether or not a Darfur-based political process can be successful in the midst of ongoing fighting and government repression, with civil society groups, IDPs, tribal leaders and other stakeholders fearful of violations of their political and civil rights. Several major rebel groups—JEM, SLA-AW and SLA-MM—have not signed the DDPD, and the Sudanese government has not lifted the emergency laws in Darfur.

Another key issue is what impact the ties between rebel groups in Darfur and the SPLM-N—and Khartoum’s response to those ties—will have on the level of violence in Sudan. (The SPLM-N is currently engaged in conflict with Sudan in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.)
An ongoing issue is how Khartoum’s lukewarm acceptance of UNAMID impacts on the mission’s effectiveness. In its last resolution renewing its mandate, the Council deplored delays in issuing visas to UNAMID staff, demanded removal of restrictions on the use of UNAMID aircraft and expressed deep concern over the detention of national UNAMID staff. Sudan expressed displeasure with the mandate renewal, saying that it altered the initial mandate and interfered in domestic matters.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- taking no action in October but using the Secretary-General’s report as a platform for starting discussions on next steps;
- reiterating calls on Khartoum to lift the emergency laws in Darfur;
- reiterating calls for rebel groups that have not signed the DDP to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict; and
- expressing concern in the statement at the ties between certain Darfur rebel groups and the SPLM-N.

**Council Dynamics**

There are contrasting perspectives among Council members on the viability of the Darfur-based political process under current circumstances. The US and the UK have expressed reservations about the immediate feasibility of such a process, given ongoing repression and human rights violations on the part of the Sudanese government. Other Council members, notably African members and Russia, have been more supportive of it, believing that better options currently do not exist.

African members Nigeria and South Africa have been particularly concerned that the call for an enabling environment as a pre-condition for the political process in Darfur contravenes the wishes of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). (During the joint consultative meeting between the Council and the PSC on 21 May in Addis Ababa, the two Councils appear to have differed over whether to launch the DPP as soon as possible, which resulted in the issue of the timing of the DPP not being included in the final communiqué. The communiqué called for the government of Sudan and the armed movements to “contribute to the necessary enabling environment” and spelled out a number of human rights related requirements. On 19 July, the PSC also issued a communiqué in which it indicated that the DPP should be a priority upon the successful completion of the Doha negotiations.) South Africa and Nigeria have expressed the view that the AU position has been given short shrift and that the spirit of partnership that should be an important element in the AU-UN relationship in Darfur has in this case been violated.

While several Council members have indicated the importance of UNAMID’s role in protecting civilians, the US and the UK in particular have emphasised this aspect of the mission’s mandate.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur in the Council, while Colombia chairs the Sanctions Committee.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1982 (17 May 2011) extended the mandate of the Sudan sanctions panel of experts until 19 February 2012.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

**Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2011/422 (8 July 2011) was the latest quarterly report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID.
- S/2011/252 (15 April 2011) was on implementation of the DPP.

**Meeting Record**

- S/PV.6597 (29 July 2011) was the Council’s discussion of the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNAMID.
- S/PV.6548 (8 June 2011) was the latest briefing by the ICC prosecutor.

**Other**

- S/2011/466 (27 July 2011) contained the communiqué of the AU PSC on UNAMID’s mandate renewal.
- SC/10291 (23 June 2011) was the Council press statement on the Doha peace process.
- Communiqué (21 May 2011) adopted at the consultative meeting between the members of the Security Council and the AU PSC.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur**

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

**UNAMID: Force Commander**

Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

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**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**

In October, the Council is expecting two reports from the Secretary-General:
- a report on the protection of Somali natural resources and waters and on alleged illegal fishing and dumping off the coast of Somalia, as requested by the Council in resolution 1976; and
- a report on the general situation with regard to piracy off the coast of Somalia and implementation of the anti-piracy provisions of resolution 1950, which expire in November.

A briefing by Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe followed by consultations is expected.

Additionally, at press time it seemed possible that the Council would consider a draft resolution proposed by Russia on strengthening prosecution of suspected pirates. It seems the resolution would, among other things, demand that Somalia adopt counter-piracy laws and strongly urge all other states to criminalise piracy under their domestic laws. The Council would also express its intention to continue consideration of the possible establishment of specialised anti-piracy courts in Somalia or elsewhere in the region with international participation and support (as initially proposed by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, Jack Lang).

**Key Recent Developments**

A major step forward in the political process was taken on 6 September in Mogadishu with the adoption by all major Somali stakeholders of a road map for ending the
transition before August 2012. The road map identifies four priority areas for action: security; constitution; political outreach and reconciliation; and good governance. It also establishes key tasks, including adoption of a new constitution, holding of parliamentary and presidential elections and clear timelines for implementation, while assigning responsibility and identifying available resources and ways to measure compliance.

On 14 September, the Council was briefed on these developments and on the Secretary-General’s latest report by Special Representative Augustine Mahiga. Mahiga referred to the adoption of the road map as a “milestone in the peace process”, but also warned about the challenges ahead, noting that “the international community must redouble its engagement and strike that most delicate of balances” between induce-ment and compelling compliance.

Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, also spoke. Abdiweli stressed that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was doing its best to extend authority to areas vacated by the Islamist rebel group Al Shabaab, but that government forces were overextended and international support was urgently needed. In particular, he called for an increase in the authorised troop strength of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 12,000 to 20,000.

On 30 September, the Council adopted resolution 2010 renewing the AMISOM authorisation until 31 October 2012. The resolution:

- encourages the UN to work with the AU to develop a dedicated AMISOM guard force of appropriate size to provide security for international personnel and welcomes plans to develop an AMISOM police component; and
- calls for an expansion of the logistical support package for AMISOM from UN assessed contributions “to take into account the shortcomings identified over the past few months.” This would include self-sustenance of troops and reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment (raising AMISOM to UN mission standards). The PSC also called on the Council to support the deployment of formed police units and the creation of a guard force of 850 troops to protect civilian personnel, “it being clearly understood that this force should come in addition to the 12,000” already authorised by the Council.

These requests were reiterated by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, at the 23 September mini-summit on Somalia.

According to the latest piracy report from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Somali pirates were responsible for 60 percent of global piracy attacks during the first half of 2011. While the number of attacks increased to 163 from 100 during the same period in 2010, the number of successful attacks decreased from 27 to 21. International anti-piracy efforts therefore seem to have had some impact. As of 27 September, however, 15 vessels and 277 hostages were still being held by Somali pirates according to IMB. A recent incident, in which Somali pirates were reported to be responsible for the kidnapping of a British national from a tourist resort in Kenya near the Somali border (and the killing of her husband) could indicate a further expansion of their reach.

The adoption of the AMISOM resolution had initially been scheduled for 16 September but was postponed following a request from the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). In a 13 September communiqué on Somalia, the PSC asked the Security Council to delay adoption until after a planned 23 September mini-summit on Somalia to be held on the margins of the General Assembly in order “to consider further inputs and updates on the situation … including by thoroughly engaging with the AU and giving due consideration to the requests and other elements contained in the present communiqué … as well as by taking into account the conclusions of the planned mini-summit on Somalia.”

More specifically, the PSC requested that the Council authorise an expanded support package for AMISOM from UN assessed contributions “to take into account the shortcomings identified over the past few months.” This would include self-sustenance of troops and reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment (raising AMISOM to UN mission standards). The PSC also called on the Council to support the deployment of formed police units and the creation of a guard force of 850 troops to protect civilian personnel, “it being clearly understood that this force should come in addition to the 12,000” already authorised by the Council.

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According to the latest piracy report from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Somali pirates were responsible for 60 percent of global piracy attacks during the first half of 2011. While the number of attacks increased to 163 from 100 during the same period in 2010, the number of successful attacks decreased from 27 to 21. International anti-piracy efforts therefore seem to have had some impact. As of 27 September, however, 15 vessels and 277 hostages were still being held by Somali pirates according to IMB. A recent incident, in which Somali pirates were reported to be responsible for the kidnapping of a British national from a tourist resort in Kenya near the Somali border (and the killing of her husband) could indicate a further expansion of their reach.

The humanitarian situation remains acute. On 21 September, 20 aid agencies working in Somalia issued a joint statement focusing attention on humanitarian access. They warned that the situation could get worse and called for a “dramatic change in approach” involving enhanced diplomatic efforts to ensure unhindered access and increased funding. At a 24 September mini-summit on the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa held on the margins of the General Assembly, new pledges amounting to $218 million were made, but $500 million is still needed to meet the overall humanitarian appeal for the region of $2.48 billion.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Shamsul Bari, the UN expert on Somalia who has visited the country twice this year, reported to the Human Rights Council on 15 September. Bari commended Somalia for its commitment to promote and protect human rights even in the midst of war. He recommended that the government strengthen human rights policy by adopting an action plan, improving the administration of justice and providing human rights and international humanitarian law training for the security sector, including the judiciary, police and armed forces. Bari believed that an important confidence-building initiative of the government should be the establishment of a national human rights commission and that efforts should be made to consult with Puntland and Somaliland authorities to draw on their experience.

Key Issues

The timely implementation of the road map will remain a key issue for the Council until the end of the transition. A connected issue is the Council’s role relating to monitoring and compliance and whether the frequency of the current reporting cycle (every four months) will keep it sufficiently informed. (The road map has a tight timeline and there are several important tasks scheduled for completion already in October.)

A continuing key issue is the need to accelerate expansion of the UN presence in Mogadishu to facilitate international...
support for the implementation of the road map.

Another key issue is the future of AMISOM and whether the additional support authorised by resolution xxx will help speed up deployment of the remaining troops. (Djibouti announced this month that it would deploy 850 peacekeepers to AMISOM in October while Uganda said it would send an additional 2,000 troops, but without specifying a timeline.) There are continuing concerns that warlords may gain control over areas vacated by Al Shabaab in the absence of a sufficient number of adequately equipped TFG and AMISOM forces.

With regard to piracy, a key issue in October is whether further action should be taken at this stage or whether the Council should first consider the Secretary-General’s upcoming reports and wait until November, when the current anti-piracy measures expire. Another question is the added value of Council action as it relates to the road map’s benchmark on “effective maritime security and counter-piracy policy and strategy”, which addresses some key concerns, such as enactment of Somali anti-piracy legislation (due by 18 May 2012).

Key issues also include the humanitarian crisis and in particular obstructions to humanitarian access imposed by Al Shabaab. Additionally, there were reports of TFG forces preventing aid agencies from delivering food to areas controlled by Al Shabaab, citing security concerns.

A final key issue is whether to consider any of the recommendations of the Monitoring Group for the Somalia/Eritrea sanctions regime that have not yet been implemented, such as designating additional individuals for targeted sanctions, including pirate leaders.

Options
Main options for the Council include:

- adopting a resolution on ways to strengthen prosecution of suspected pirates as proposed by Russia;
- listening to the briefings scheduled for October, but taking no further action at this stage;
- requesting monthly briefings on progress in implementing the road map;
- requesting a further briefing on the humanitarian situation in Somalia in the Council’s informal expert group on protection of civilians (the group last considered Somalia on 1 September in preparation of the AMISOM re-authorisation); and
- issuing a statement to signal to the TFIs that the Council is closely monitoring implementation of the road map and also to express renewed concern about the humanitarian situation.

Council Dynamics
While recent progress on both the political and security front have created a sense that Somalia is finally moving in the right direction, Council members also seem wary of the many challenges ahead and whether the TFIs will be up to the task. At the same time, most Council members recognise that strong international support, including through an enhanced UN presence in Mogadishu, will be critical for the road map to succeed. The humanitarian situation also continues to be a major cause for concern.

With regard to AMISOM, it seems resolution 2010 did not fully resolve the long standing tensions over how to ensure adequate resources for the mission as it only partially responds to the concerns expressed by the AU. It appears that substantive divisions on AMISOM among Council members were also exacerbated by differences over procedure related to the more general issue of relations with the AU, which have sometimes been strained. South Africa had initially urged that negotiations on the AMISOM resolution not start until after the meeting of the PSC on 13 September in order to allow Council members to first consider any requests emanating from this meeting. (Negotiations started on 12 September.) It was only following a formal request from the PSC that adoption of the resolution was postponed. It appears that this delay allowed for further bilateral consultations between the UK and African Council members resulting in revisions that to some extent satisfied their concerns.

On the issue of piracy, Russia circulated a draft resolution to all Council members in September focusing on prosecution of pirates, but at press time negotiations had not yet begun. Council positions were therefore still unclear. It appears that a key objective of the draft would be to keep the issue of specialised anti-piracy courts on the Council’s agenda.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council, while India chairs the Sanctions Committee and Russia has taken the lead on legal issues related to piracy.

Libya

Expected Council Action
The Council’s attention is expected to continue to be focused on Libya in October as the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) deploys. The Council also expects a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe.

If the National Transitional Council (NTC) should gain full control of Libyan territory
the Council may want to revisit the no-fly zone authorised under resolution 2009.

**Key Recent Developments**

At press time, intense fighting was being reported between the NTC and forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in Sirte and Bani Walid. Qaddafi’s whereabouts remained unknown and the NTC had yet to establish an interim government.

On 30 August, the Secretary-General briefed the Council saying that the UN’s potential role in post-conflict Libya had been discussed with the NTC. The Council then met in consultations with the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Post-Conflict Planning, Ian Martin (who was appointed as Special Representative and head of UNSMIL on 16 September).

In a 7 September letter to the Council, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of an integrated support mission to be set up for an initial period of three months. This mission’s mandate was envisaged to include:
- restoring security and order and promoting the rule of law;
- promoting reconciliation and embarking upon constitution-making and electoral processes;
- strengthening emerging accountable institutions and restoring public services;
- protecting human rights and supporting transitional justice;
- initiating economic recovery; and
- coordinating multilateral and bilateral support.

On 9 September, Council members met in consultations and were briefed by Martin—who had just returned from a five-day visit to Libya meeting senior NTC representatives, including Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil—on the nature of support being sought by the NTC.

A 14 September letter from the NTC to the Council formally requested the assistance of the UN and laid out its priorities for assistance. The NTC also requested that regular commercial flights be allowed to resume whilst maintaining the no-fly zone applicable to military aircraft to protect civilians.

On 16 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2009, in which it:
- provided the mandate for UNSMIL for a three-month period;
- created exemptions to the UN arms embargo;
- modified the asset freeze, particularly in the oil and banking sectors; and
- eased restrictions on commercial aircraft while keeping in place the no-fly zone and protection-of-civilians provision (as per resolution 1973).

On 22 September, Martin said that UNSMIL was already supporting the NTC in the areas of elections, public security and transitional justice.

On 26 September, Pascoe briefed the Council and highlighted four key concerns: reconciliation; arms control; transitional justice; and the welfare of migrants. He said that all senior UNSMIL staff was now in Libya. Pascoe also updated the Council on the humanitarian country team that was working with the Libyan authorities to enhance support in conflict areas by providing food, water and medical kits while assessing further needs. This UN inter-agency team had arrived in Tripoli on 1 September.

A number of other notable events regarding Libya took place in New York on the margins of and in the General Assembly.

On 16 September, the Assembly approved by a significant margin the credentials of the delegation representing the NTC. The NTC has been recognised as the legitimate governing authority by over 80 countries, including by China on 12 September. The Arab League, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have admitted the NTC as the Libyan representative.

On 20 September a high-level meeting on Libya convened in New York. The NTC, UN member states and representatives of regional and international organisations participated in the meeting. Participants reaffirmed that the UN and the Council should lead the international community’s efforts in supporting the Libyan-led transition. It was also agreed that, in the future, “Friends of Libya” meetings should be co-chaired by the Libyan interim government and either the Secretary-General or Martin, periodically in Tripoli. Martin attended this high-level meeting after three days of discussions in Tripoli.

The Secretary-General held talks with NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on 21 September to discuss the nature of cooperation within the framework of their engagement in Libya. NATO’s mandate was also extended by 90 days.

On 24 September, the Executive Chairman of the NTC, Mahmoud Jibril, addressed the General Assembly. Jibril acknowledged that the NTC was not yet in full control of the Libyan territory. He urged the Council to lift its asset freeze of Libyan funds as soon as possible.

On 26 September, Jibril addressed the Council in a briefing saying that due to the ongoing fighting, NATO’s role in the protection of civilians continued to be valid. He requested the Council to adopt a resolution that would unfreeze Libyan assets for Libya’s use. The Council then met in private consultations.

Other key events concerning Libya included the “Friends of Libya” conference, jointly hosted by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron on 1 September. The conference, held in Paris, was attended by the US, China and Russia as well as 60 other nations and international bodies. (South Africa did not attend as it had in the recent past).

On 8 September, the ICC prosecutor requested that INTERPOL issue a red notice to arrest Qaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, and the head of Libya’s intelligence services, Abdullah Al-Sanousi, for alleged crimes against humanity. (An INTERPOL red notice seeks the provisional arrest of a wanted person with a view to extradition or surrender to an international court.)

Human Rights Related Developments

On 29 September, the United Nations Human Rights Council asked the General Assembly to lift the suspension placed upon Libya. (Its decision to suspend Libya in March 2011 marked the first time when one of its members was suspended.)

Developments in the Libya Sanctions Committee

On 26 September, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal), Chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, briefed the Council on the changes to the sanctions regime under resolution 2009.

Resolution 2009 has introduced a new working method to this Sanctions Committee with the use of a “negative decision”. In effect, a single Council member cannot affect the unfreezing of assets or the approval of exemptions to...
the arms embargo. This means all Council members must collectively object to the lifting of a given measure for it to be rejected. (Whereas, other sanctions committees work by consensus, i.e. all 15 members have to agree.)

The Committee will continue to meet in October and will likely be considering the NTC’s call to unfreeze Libyan assets. It appears that the NTC has been tasked with meeting certain technical criteria that would prevent misappropriation of funds.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is its role in ensuring the territorial integrity of Libya and preventing any large-scale civil war.

If the NTC manages to gain full control of Libya, the Council will likely need to determine the scope of NATO’s role in protecting civilians.

Its role in minimising the impact of the conflict and its aftermath on the civilian population and the delivery of humanitarian assistance are two closely related issues for the Council.

Another issue is the need for the continued coordination of efforts of various stakeholders and other international bodies in a post-Qaddafi Libya.

Options
The Council’s options include:
- receiving regular briefings on UNSMIL and closely monitoring the situation in Libya;
- amending the current resolutions or adopting new resolutions as and when the situation dictates, i.e. including the modification of no-fly zone; and
- revisiting the sanctions imposed on Libya.

Although not envisaged at present, based on the lessons learnt from the now extinct 661 Committee, there seems to be ample room for improving the transparency and accountability requirements for the use of unfrozen funds under resolution 2009.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members felt that it was important to adopt the resolution authorising UNSMIL as quickly as possible. However, disagreement remains over the scope of NATO’s involvement. African members, in particular, remain concerned that the Council is not calling for a cessation of hostilities more explicitly (as underscored in South Africa’s address to the General Assembly). Other Council members feel that there remains a significant threat to the civilian population as the NTC has yet to gain full control of the Libyan territory; therefore, NATO’s role in this regard continues to be crucial.

When negotiating the draft of resolution 2009 some members felt that the inclusion of priorities for the new mission should include precise and explicit language referring women, peace and security, including women’s participation in any post-conflict political process; protection of civilians; and specifically, children. However, other members indicated a preference to incorporate these elements when discussing a more long-term UN presence after the anticipated expiry of UNSMIL in three months’ time.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/2009 (16 September 2011) authorised the deployment of UNSMIL and partially lifted sanctions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a panel of experts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions and established a sanctions committee.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Security Council Meeting Records</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.6622 (26 September 2011) was the latest briefing on Libya.</td>
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<td>S/PV.6620 (16 September 2011) was the Council meeting where resolution 2009 was adopted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.6606 (30 August 2011) briefing held on the situation in Libya.</td>
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<th>Security Council Letters</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/2011/588 (19 September 2011) and S/2011/587 (19 September 2011) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council noting the appointment of Ian Martin as the head of UNSMIL.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2011/578 (15 September 2011) was from the Secretary-General to the Council President forwarding the NTC’s request for the UN’s assistance in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2011/542 (7 September 2011) was the Secretary-General’s letter to the Council President proposing the establishment of UNSMIL.</td>
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Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In October the Council is expected to review the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime after the group of experts that supports the sanctions committee reports on their implementation. Resolution 1980, unanimously adopted on 28 April, renewed an arms embargo, a ban on the diamond trade that was helping fuel the conflict and sanctions on travel by selected individuals deemed to be threats to “peace and national reconciliation” in the country. The measures are to remain in effect until 30 April 2012.

Issues that are likely to be discussed as part of the review include: the continuing violence in the western parts of the country; issues relating to national reconciliation, including the setting-up of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission; accountability for the crimes committed during the post-electoral violence early this year; and the forthcoming National Assembly elections in December.

The mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) expires on 31 July 2012.

Key Recent Developments
President Alassane Ouattara, who was inaugurated on 21 May, appears to have significantly consolidated his government and adhered to his inaugural message of reconciliation “through dialogue, solidarity
and justice”. He has promised to combat impunity by allowing the national justice system and international judicial mechanisms a free hand to investigate and prosecute violators on all sides of the recent violence.

Former President Laurent Gbagbo, detained in April, was charged on 18 August with “economic crimes” that included his alleged looting of half a billion dollars from the state treasury. Ouattara’s government insists that this prosecution is separate from other charges that may be brought against Gbagbo, either by the national judiciary or the International Criminal Court (ICC).

On 3 May, Ouattara wrote the ICC Prosecutor to ask for investigations into serious crimes committed in the country since 28 November 2010, when the post-electoral crisis started. The Secretary-General’s report of 24 June 2011 estimated that as many as 3,000 people were killed during the violence, characterising it as “serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.” (Though Côte d’Ivoire is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, it accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in 2003, ironically when Gbagbo was in office.)

Also in May, shortly after his inauguration Ouattara, announced the setting up of a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a key transitional justice mechanism. Charles Konan Banny, a former prime minister, chairs the commission, which has commissioners from diverse ethnic, religious and regional groups. The commission was inaugurated by Ouattara on 28 September.

Human rights and other observers, however, have raised questions about Ouattara’s commitment to end impunity after he promoted two military commanders who were allegedly involved in past atrocities on 3 August. One of them, Martin Kouakou Fofie, was also placed on the UN sanctions list in 2006.

Ouattara has also announced plans to review the country’s controversial citizenship laws, which are believed to be a key cause of the electoral violence, when a new National Assembly is in place. But progress towards the legislative elections appears fraught. On 21 September, Gbagbo’s Ivoirian Popular Front party announced it was pulling out of the electoral commission on the grounds that it was stacked with Ouattara loyalists. It seems likely that this will lead to more controversy.

Violent incidents have continued to affect the country. In mid-September, mercenaries allegedly from Liberia killed 23 people in the western part of the country.

UNOCI has recently deployed more troops in the region and intensified its surveillance by helicopters, which after 30 September will be based in Liberia. Under resolution 1992, UNOCI has an inter-mission arrangement with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to share assets. Resolution 2008, which renewed UNMIL’s mandate on 16 September, emphasised the need for the two missions to “regularly coordinate their strategies and operations in areas near the Liberian-Côte d’Ivoire border... to prevent armed groups from exploiting the seam of political boundaries.”

Human Rights-Related Developments

Addressing the Human Rights Council on 13 September, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Kyung-wha Kang raised concerns about responses to peaceful protests that she said were too often met with brutal repression and other inhumane treatment. She recalled the High Commissioner’s denunciation of these kinds of human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, amongst others. Kang stressed that when peaceful protests occur, states have the responsibility to respond in a manner that is respectful of human rights. She stated that resorting to lethal or excessive force against peaceful protestors that is unlawful or incompatible with the tenets of a democratic society not only violates fundamental rights but exacerbates tensions and breeds a culture of violence.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how the sanctions and related Council actions contribute to the consolidation of peace and security and, in particular, ensure that the continuing violence in the western region is curbed and help ensure successful legislative elections in December.

A related issue is the successful implementation of the transitional justice mechanisms that are being set in place, including the ICC investigations, the prosecution for economic crimes, and the work of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Options

The Council could:

- leave the sanctions regime in place and adopt a resolution deciding to review all the sanctions after six months; or
- make the following changes to the sanctions regime: decide that diamond sanctions are treated separately, to be reviewed only after Côte d’Ivoire complies with the requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and becomes a participant; or lift all the sanctions except the travel ban on select individuals to assist the ICC’s investigations.

Council Dynamics

There seems to be broad consensus that the Council’s attention should now be focused on assisting the country through the process of reconciliation and accountability for past crimes, as well as instituting measures to entrench the rule of law and ensure a peaceful electoral process.

France is the lead country in the Council on Côte d’Ivoire.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/2008 (16 September 2011) extended the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2012 and called on UNOCI and UNMIL to coordinate strategies and operations in the Liberian-Côte d’Ivoire border regions.
• S/RES/2000 (27 July 2011) renewed the mandate of UNOCI at its current force levels (including the earlier ad-hoc increases) until 31 July 2012.
• S/RES/1992 (29 June 2011) extended the temporary redeployment of helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI until 30 September.
• S/RES/1980 (28 April 2011) extended the sanctions regime and the mandate of the group of experts monitoring it for one year.
• S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) authorised the redeployment of aviation assets from UNMIL to UNOCI.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

• S/2011/387 (24 June 2011)

Letters

• S/2011/577 (15 September 2011) was from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council on the inter-mission (UNOCI and UNMIL) use of three helicopters and the transfer of 150 military and 100 police personnel from UNOCI to UNMIL from 1 October to 30 November 2011.
• S/2011/468 (26 July 2011) and S/2011/469 (28 July 2011) was an
exchange of letters containing the Secretary General’s intention to appoint Albert Gerard Koenders as Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire and head of UNOCI.

- S/2011/419 (7 July 2011) appointed four individuals to the group of experts for the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions committee.

**Expected Council Action**

In October, the Council is expecting to be briefed in consultations by the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross. The Council is also likely to discuss the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) mandate. At press time, Ross was expected to undertake a visit to the region to meet all parties concerned before the consultations.

MINURSO’s mandate expires on 30 April 2012.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 19 April, the Council was last briefed by Ross on the negotiating process. It also considered the Secretary-General’s most recent report on MINURSO and was briefed by his Special Representative for Western Sahara, Hany Abdel-Aziz.

On 27 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1979, extending MINURSO’s mandate until 30 April 2012. The resolution stressed the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. It also encouraged the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights.

The resolution also welcomed the establishment of the National Council for Human Rights (CNDH) in Morocco on 3 March and its proposed component regarding Western Sahara and the commitment of Morocco to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council.

The resolution also asked the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on progress in the negotiations.

Parties to the Western Sahara conflict—Morocco and the Sahrawi national liberation movement, the Polisario Front—met for the seventh round of informal talks between 5 and 7 June in Greentree, New York. Algeria and Mauritania sent delegations to attend the opening and closing sessions and the discussion on confidence-building measures. After the meeting, Ross issued a communiqué stating that “the discussions took place in an atmosphere of serious engagement, frankness, and mutual respect”. Furthermore, the communiqué reiterated that the same issues and commitments were discussed in previous talks in Malta on 8 and 9 March.

The eighth round of talks took place in Greentree between 19 and 21 July. As before, Algeria and Mauritania attended the opening and closing sessions, as well as the discussions on confidence-building measures. Following the meeting, Ross stated that “the parties continued to deepen their discussions on the two proposals, including the issue of the electoral corps, mechanisms for self-determination, and the forms of guarantees”. The statement added that, “each party continued to reject the proposal of the other as the sole basis for future negotiations, while reiterating their willingness to work together to reach a political solution in conformity with the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations Security Council”.

The meeting also took note of the report by the UN Mine Action Service based on its latest technical mission and preliminarily discussed the theme of natural resources within a UN-proposed framework. Moreover, on confidence-building measures, all parties involved reiterated their support for the appropriate implementation of the 2004 plan of action.


**Human Rights-Related Issues**

In a statement issued in Rabat on 16 September, the UN human rights expert on cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, urged Morocco to further promote cultural rights and diversity in the country. Shaheed had just completed a 12-day tour of Morocco and had also visited Dakhla in Western Sahara. Noting a degree of suppression of cultural references in proposed performances at festivals promoting the heritage of Western Sahara, Shaheed asserted that “measures that limit the cultural rights of the population of Western Sahara should be immediately revoked.”

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council to consider is the nature of its own role to ease the four-year deadlock in the negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front. This deadlock has been caused mainly by the refusal of both parties to accept the proposal of the other as the sole basis of negotiation.

**Options**

One option for the Council is to simply receive the briefing and take no action.

Another option, to highlight its concern with the lack of movement on the negotiations, would be to adopt a presidential or press statement supporting all or some of the three approaches recommended by the Secretary-General’s report:

- emphasise the inclusion of a wide cross-section of the population of Western Sahara in the discussion of issues related to final status and the exercise of self-determination;
- highlight the need to obtain the approval of the population for any agreement; and
- encourage both parties to focus on common ground to resume formal discussions instead of devoting energy to points of contention.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council members remain divided on the best way to resolve the conflict in Western Sahara. Countries such as South Africa acknowledge that MINURSO has been successful in preserving the ceasefire since its inception. However, they also feel that the objective of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara has yet to be met.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Albert Gerard Koenders (Netherlands)

**UNOCI Force Commander**

Maj. Gen. Jean Marie Bourry (France)

**Chair of the Sanctions Committee**

Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil)

**UNOCI: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration**

*Authorised Strength:* 11,142 total uniformed personnel, including 9,600 troops, 192 military observers, 1,350 police

*Strength (as of 31 July 2011):* 8,974 troops, 193 military observers, 1,276 police personnel

*Main troop contributors:* Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco and Malawi

*Annual Budget:* $486.7 million

*Duration:* 4 April 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2012
The duration of this mission, 20 years and running, has been a considerable concern to several members. At the time of MINURSO’s mandate renewal, a concern was voiced that there were no African members within the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, which is comprised of France, Russia, the US, the UK and Spain. The UK has been supportive of Ross’ efforts, but is acknowledging that no progress has been made and that the current impasse is not sustainable long-term.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1979 (27 April 2011) renewed MINURSO’s mandate until 30 April 2012.
- S/RES/1871 (30 April 2009) renewed MINURSO’s mandate and welcomed the parties’ agreement to hold small, informal talks.
- S/RES/690 (29 April 1991) established MINURSO.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2011/249 (1 April 2011)

Other

- S/2011/460 (26 July 2011) was the President of the Council’s letter to the Secretary-General acknowledging the receipt of his earlier letter to the Council.
- S/2011/459 (22 July 2011) was the Secretary-General’s letter to the President of the Council informing the Council of his intention to appoint Maj. Gen. Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh) as force commander of MINURSO.
- SC/10234 (27 April 2011) was a press release reporting the extension of MINURSO’s mandate.
- S/PV.6516 (18 April 2011) was the official communiqué of the closed meeting between the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries to MINURSO.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt)

Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy

Christopher Ross (United States)

MINURSO Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh)

Size and Composition of MINURSO as of 31 July 2011

Authorised: 231 troops; 6 police officers
Current: 228 total uniformed personnel

(i.e. 27 troops; 4 police officers; 197 military observers; 98 international civilian personnel; 162 local civilian staff; 18 United Nations Volunteers

Military Contributors: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and Yemen.

Police Contributors: Egypt, El Salvador and Jordan.

Cost

1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012: $63.22 million (A/C.5/65/19)

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Expected Council Action

In October the Council is expected to hold a debate on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, a vast coastal stretch from Ghana in West Africa down to Gabon in Central Africa. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime is likely to brief.

At press time it appeared that the Council would issue a presidential statement.

Key Recent Developments

On 23 August, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, briefed the Council on the growing phenomenon of piracy in West Africa. As part of the monthly DPA “horizon scanning” briefing, Pascoe highlighted the issue as an overlooked but significant emerging threat to security. On 30 August, a Council press statement addressed the problem.

This growing trend had also been included—though tangentially—among the key threats to the fragile stability of West Africa highlighted in a Council briefing by Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA), on 7 July 2009.

The Gulf of Guinea is home to Africa’s leading oil producers—Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Ghana—and has long been associated with various forms of illicit trafficking. Piracy is relatively new and, until recently, infrequent and under-reported. That changed suddenly in 2009 after the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) listed the coastal area as one of its seven top hotspots in the world. Since January 2011, there appears to have been about two dozen piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result of these attacks, in August Lloyd’s Market Association, a leading group of insurers, placed the coastal waters off Benin and part of Nigeria in the same high-risk category as Somalia.

Nigeria, from where most of the pirates are believed to have originated, previously bore the brunt of the attacks, mainly on its oil exports. Pirate attacks on Nigeria’s oil facilities since 2006 have reportedly cut its oil exports from 2.2 million barrels a day to 1.6 million barrels and have spiked annual oil sector security costs to a reported $3.5 billion. Nigeria is by far Africa’s biggest oil producer. The US, which consumes 40 percent of Nigeria’s oil, has been providing training and other support to the Nigerian navy to ward off the pirates.

It appears that, as a result of more effective measures in Nigerian waters, the pirates have switched to other targets, mainly shipping in the far less protected waters of Benin. Attacks by pirates have also involved assaults on banks in coastal cities, and in one extraordinary case, the presidential palace in Malabo, the coastal capital of Equatorial Guinea.

The pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea are believed to be more violent than their counterparts in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. There is little scope for holding hostages and engaging in prolonged negotiations. Hostages are generally released within 72 hours, but are usually maltreated and sometimes physically abused. Some observers believe that the frequency of the attacks against shipping from a fragile economy like Benin risks causing serious destabilisation and even collapse if unchecked.

In September, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) President Victor Gbeho called for concerted regional action against piracy, including permanent joint naval patrols. The phenomenon of piracy, he said, could have serious economic and political consequences for West Africa without immediate and firm action to curb it.
As part of its military cooperation programme, called Africa Partnership Station, the US has sent a warship to help train personnel in Ghana, Togo and Benin in combating pirates. France has also sent a frigate to help with surveillance and interception of pirates.

In the General Assembly meetings in September, West African leaders called for “urgent action” to curb the growing menace of piracy in the Gulf. The Prime Minister of Togo, Gilbert Fossoun-Houngbo, said that the coasts “cannot be allowed to be taken hostage by pirates.” Isatou Njie-Saidy, Vice President of Gambia, said that the international community “must...agree on a framework for cooperation” involving “greater United Nations engagement with regional and subregional leaders and organizations in stamping out (the) menace.”

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how it can assist in coordinating national, regional and international actors for effective monitoring of the Gulf’s coastal waters and what support it can offer to the two regional bodies, the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States.

A related issue is ensuring improved information exchange and coordination of efforts among regional countries, regional bodies and other key international players in the anti-piracy efforts in the region.

Also, since most of the pirate attacks are concentrated on the coast of West Africa, another related issue is the role of UNOWA in monitoring the attacks or in providing support to regional governments and ECOWAS.

Options
One option for the Council would be to hold a debate with an eye to exchanging experiences and views on the subject.

Another option for the Council could be to adopt a presidential statement highlighting its concern about the issue. The Council could also:

- ask the Secretary-General to send an assessment mission to examine the phenomenon and submit a report suggesting possible ways to address it;
- call on governments in the region to set up focal points to coordinate their respective efforts in countering the problem; and
- commit to taking further steps following the assessment mission and its recommendations.

Council Dynamics
The Council appears to be unanimous on the issue. Nigeria, an elected member of the Council, is the spearhead for the Council debate and is likely to push for urgent action on the issue. The US, a key consumer of oil from the Gulf of Guinea coast, appears to have shown robust interest, as have France, Britain and China and elected member Gabon.

UN Documents
Security Council Press Statement

- SC/10372 (30 August 2011) was on piracy and maritime armed robbery in Gulf of Guinea.

Security Sector Reform
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to hold a debate in October on security sector reform (SSR), a theme that was last discussed following a briefing by the Secretary-General on 12 May 2008. Nigeria will chair the debate, with either its president or foreign minister likely to preside, and is likely to circulate a concept paper early in October.

The Secretary-General is expected to brief the Council before the debate. A presidential statement will likely be issued at the debate’s conclusion.

Background
Since 1989 in newly independent Namibia, UN agencies have been involved in the development of security structures in post-conflict situations. In recent years, this process has become known as SSR.

The Council held its first and to date only thematic debate on SSR at the initiative of Slovakia in February 2007. It sought to balance concerns by emphasising the “sovereign right and the primary responsibility of the country concerned” to determine the national approach and priorities, while underlining the importance of international input.

As a follow-up, South Africa and Slovakia held a workshop on African perspectives on SSR in November 2007.

In response to the Council’s request for clarity on UN approaches to SSR, the Secretary-General published a report on 23 January 2008, setting out ten guiding principles. These began with the goal of SSR: to develop effective and accountable security institutions in a state, underpinned by respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Key Recent Developments
On 12 May 2008, when it last addressed SSR, the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General on his report. In addressing the Council, the Secretary-General—following discussions with member states—underscored that the UN should engage in SSR at the request of national governments or in response to Council mandates and General Assembly resolutions. Council members centred on the apparent need for a coordinated, coherent approach on one hand and acknowledgement that reform must be tailored to—and “owned” by—the individual country, on the other.

In a presidential statement adopted following informal consultations, the Council reiterated that the approach and priorities to SSR were the primary responsibility of the country concerned.

On 14 May 2010, Nigeria, South Africa and the Netherlands held a High-Level Forum on African perspectives on SSR in New York. The discussions focused on national ownership, coordination of assistance and the regional dimensions of SSR.

The forum’s final report concluded that for the SSR process to be viable, the reforming state had a responsibility to implement the parameters for reform. It noted that in the long term, external donors could not bear the responsibility for coordinating SSR; it had to be borne by the state concerned.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how SSR can best be used as a peacebuilding and conflict prevention tool.

A related issue is how the Council can best use this tool in mandates it designs for post-conflict situations.

A further issue for the Council is striking a balance between assisting states in building the security sector and promoting national ownership of security structures.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The issue has not been discussed by the Council in a thematic debate since 2008. In addition to Nigeria, Council President in October, South Africa has over the years shown strong commitment to SSR and is supportive of the Council’s closer focus on the matter. There are likely to be some political sensitivities though, with the UN membership at large. In 2007, during the open debate, the Non-Aligned Movement
said that the Council, with its limited membership, was not the "appropriate framework to plan, or even to direct, activities...aimed at carrying out reforms in the security sector." Moreover, that it was national governments, not the international community, which should prescribe the road ahead in post-conflict situations.

Key Recent Developments
At press time, the Council was expecting the next report on the implementation of resolution 1559 in mid-October. A key development since the last report in April was the 13 June announcement of the formation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s cabinet in which 18 of the 30 seats went to two Hezbollah parliamentarians and Hezbollah-aligned members of parliament. Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s 14 March coalition did not join the new government. Hezbollah-aligned ministers received key portfolios including defense, foreign affairs, justice and telecommunications. (The previous Hariri-led government fell on 12 January when 11 Hezbollah-aligned ministers withdrew over the issue of the Tribunal.)

On 30 August, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2012 by unanimously adopting resolution 2004. The resolution also condemned “in the strongest terms all terrorist attacks against UNIFIL” and urged “all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel.”

On 27 September, Mikati, while chairing a Council meeting, expressed Lebanon’s support for the Tribunal. Such support was also acknowledged on 21 September by Lebanese President Michel Suleiman during his address to the General Assembly. On 11 September, Mikati indicated that Lebanon would pay its share of funds to the Tribunal noting that Lebanon would not be selective about implementing its international obligations. (The Tribunal is funded by Lebanon [49 percent] and voluntary contributions [51 percent]. At press time Lebanon had not yet paid its 2011 contribution.)

Regarding the Tribunal, after 18 September the process to determine whether to proceed to trial in absentia can begin. (The Tribunal waited 30 days from 19 August when it unsealed the full indictment against the four men accused in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.) Trial activity is not anticipated before mid-2012.

On 9 August, the Lebanese prosecutor general reported to the Tribunal that Lebanese authorities had failed to detain any of the accused men.

On 25 May, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah called on Syrians to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. (Analysts note that Hezbollah receives much of its international support from Syria and Iran.)

Key Issues
Hezbollah’s rearmament since the end of the 2006 war with Israel remains an issue. Council members are likely to be concerned about the presence of weapons outside the reach of the Lebanese government as it raises questions about arms smuggling.

An ongoing issue has been whether the Council might revive its attention to resolution 1559 as some of its outstanding elements are also covered in resolution 1701. Syria has, thus far, maintained that it met its 1559 obligations when it withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. However, most Council members take a wider view of the resolution, a key dimension of which is progress on Lebanese/Syrian border security and delineation which remains at a standstill.

Underlying Problems
Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701. However, this has been justified by some as a reaction to the ongoing Israeli occupation of portions of Lebanese territory, particularly the Sheb’a Farms and Kaf Shuba hills.

Options
Given the apprehension about the possible spillover effects into Lebanon from the situation in Syria, the most likely option is for the Council to maintain its wait-and-see posture, as has been the practice since June 2007, the last time the Council took action on a 1559 report by issuing a presidential statement.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is independent. Council members will want to respect that while monitoring its impact on Lebanon’s political environment as the trial phase approaches.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members seem to agree that there is still a need for compliance with two major outstanding 1559 issues—disarmament and borders—but maintaining stability in Lebanon may be the only achievable goal in the medium term.
Most Council members agree that the situation requires sustained Council attention. However, progress on arms smuggling, disarmament and border delineation is only likely in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track. Both of these seem unlikely to yield progress in the foreseeable future, especially in the context of the ongoing crisis in Syria.

Regarding the Tribunal, Council members have a positive view of the fact that the indictment phase did not have a destabilising effect in Lebanon. Members will continue to monitor developments as the trial phase approaches. Council members have generally underscored the importance of the Tribunal’s independence and foresee no Council role in its activities this year. (The Tribunal’s mandate expires in March 2012.)

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

### UN Documents

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.

**Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2007/17 (11 June 2007) expressed concern at illegal movements of arms and supported the Lebanese army’s efforts to restore stability in Lebanon.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2011/406 (1 July 2011) was on resolution 1701.
- S/2011/258 (19 April 2011) was on resolution 1559.

### Israel/Palestine

**Expected Council Action**

In October the Security Council is due to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East after a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe. The focus of discussion will likely be whether there has been tangible progress to break the stalemate in the Israel/Palestine peace process against the backdrop of the Palestinian bid for UN membership.

**Key Recent Developments**

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas formally submitted the membership application to the Secretary-General on Friday, 23 September. It was transmitted to Council members the same day. Council members met on this issue for the first time on Monday, 26 September in informal consultations. On 28 September the Security Council, in a closed formal meeting, decided to refer Palestine’s application for admission to the UN to its standing Committee on the Admission of New Members. At press time, the Committee was expected to meet on 30 September to begin its consideration of the application.

On 23 September, the Middle East Quartet (the EU, Russia, the UN and US) issued a statement noting Palestine’s application, setting out a timeframe for Israelis and Palestinians to resume direct negotiations and reach an agreement by the end of 2012 and reiterating both parties’ obligations under the Roadmap. However, it seems the Quartet was unable to reach agreement on parameters for negotiations beyond reaffirming support for US President Barack Obama’s vision for peace as laid out in his 19 May speech.

On 27 September the Council was briefed by Pascoe, who highlighted recent developments, in particular, Palestine’s bid for UN membership and diplomatic activity by the Middle East Quartet.

On 2 September, the Secretary-General received and made public the report of the Panel of Inquiry into the 31 May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident. It is not expected that the Secretary-General will transmit the report formally to the Security Council.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 13 September, five independent human rights Special Rapporteurs appointed by the Human Rights Council issued a statement criticising a conclusion of the report of the Panel of Inquiry on the flotilla incident of 31 May 2010 that Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip was legal. The experts believed that the report had failed to see that the naval blockade was “an integral part of Israel’s closure policy towards Gaza, which has a disproportionate impact on the human rights of civilians”, subjecting Palestinians to “collective punishment, in flagrant contravention of international human rights and humanitarian law”.

**Key Issues**

The key issue is how the Council treats the application by Palestine for admission to the UN. (For more detail, see our 23 September Update Report on Palestine’s Application for Admission to the UN.)

A related issue is the application’s possible impact on the peace process and the signals subsequent Council action might send to the region given the current political upheavals.

A remaining issue is whether the Council can play any role in addressing the Israel/Palestine conflict, including the establishment of parameters for direct negotiations.

**Underlying Problem**

Continued Israeli settlement activity remains the key blockage to the resumption of direct negotiations.

**Options**

The main option for the Council in October, vis-à-vis Palestine’s UN membership application, seems to be continued consideration at the Committee level.
Options also seem similarly limited for any Council role in the peace process in order to give the Quartet initiative time to yield results on the political track.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

On the application, it seems that some Council members, at the Committee level, may suggest that before making any substantive decision time should be given to the most recent Quartet initiative, which set out a specific time frame for the resumption of negotiations. (If there is disagreement in the Committee on whether or not to recommend Palestine for UN membership, it is possible that its application could remain in the Committee.)

It is widely thought among Council members that the US would veto any Palestinian application for full UN membership. President Obama’s 21 September address to the General Assembly underscored that position. However, the US may not be the only Council member that might find the application premature.

Palestine is currently recognised by 129 states, nine of which are Security Council members (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Gabon, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia and South Africa). Among the nine that have recognised Palestine, there are those who consider positive consideration of the membership application as complementary to the peace process. However, it is unclear if bilateral recognition would automatically translate into a positive vote on this issue in the Council.

On the peace process, the US seems to be continuing to argue that the Council is not the appropriate body for establishing parameters regarding the Israel/Palestine issue. Few, if any, Council members would disagree that the fundamentals of any agreement must be reached through direct talks. However, most consider that this does not necessarily rule out a Council role in the peace process.

The Palestinians have said that they do not view their bid for UN membership as contradictory to either the peace process or the parallel track of going to the General Assembly to seek non-member state observer status (which can be granted by a simple majority of the General Assembly).

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**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1850 (16 December 2008) supported the Annapolis peace process and its commitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations.

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**Security Council Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2010/9 (1 June 2010) called for an impartial and transparent investigation into the Gaza flotilla incident and stressed that the situation in Gaza was not sustainable.

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**Security Council Meeting Record**

- S/PV.6623 (27 September 2011) was the most recent briefing on the Middle East.

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**Security Council Letter**

- S/2011/592 (23 September 2011) contained Palestine’s application for admission to the UN.

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**Afghanistan**

**Expected Council Action**

In October the Council will consider extending the authorisation for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ahead of its expiry on 13 October. Informal discussions on a resolution renewing ISAF’s mandate, followed by a formal meeting to adopt the resolution, are expected.

Given that the Council will have discussed Afghanistan at the end of September, a wider discussion is not expected.

**Key Recent Developments**

In his latest report on Afghanistan, released on 21 September 2011 the Secretary-General highlighted the volatile political and security situation and the increasing number of civilian casualties. He also pointed out that this creates a challenging environment to operate in and to deliver on mandates. He emphasised the need for a comprehensive approach to transition and in this context, the importance of development, governance and rule-of-law.

The security situation continued to deteriorate with more complex urban attacks and high-profile assassinations in August and September. On 13 September, ISAF troops were called in following an attack by insurgents on the US embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul. At least 7 people were killed and 19 wounded.

On 20 September, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, chairman of the High Peace Council, was killed at his home in Kabul while meeting with the Taliban. He had been leading the reconciliation efforts for the government. In condemning the terrorist attack, Council members reiterated their support for the Afghan government and its efforts to advance the peace and reconciliation process.

Foreign minister Zalmay Rassoul addressed the General Assembly on 22 September on behalf of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who had returned to Kabul following the assassination of Rabbani. Rassoul said all “parallel structures” created by the international community, including security, governance and development arrangements, would have to be dismantled to make way for indigenous institutions. While welcoming the review of the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) mandate, he said that it would need to be adjusted to the “requirements of Afghan sovereignty”.

A New Silk Road ministerial meeting was held on 22 September in New York, co-chaired by the foreign ministers of Germany, Afghanistan and the US. Afghanistan’s immediate and proximate neighbours, as well as international donors, attended. The New Silk Road project hopes to establish a network of trade corridors linking the countries of Central and South Asia.

In early September, the top two executives of Kabul Bank resigned amidst allegations of corruption, triggering a run on the bank as depositors tried to withdraw their cash. By 8 September, this led to clashes with the police.

In early September, ISAF announced that it was ahead of schedule in training 350,000 Afghan security personnel by November 2012. The next areas to be transferred to Afghan control are expected to be identified in early October.

NATO suspended the transfer of detainees to some Afghan jails following reports that prisoners were being tortured. A UN report on human rights violations within prisons run by the Afghan police is expected to be published soon.

From June through August, UNAMA documented 971 civilian dead and 1,411 injured, an increase of five percent in civilian casualties compared to the same period in 2010. August also saw the highest number of US casualties in a month since 2001. Sixty-six US troops died, 30 of them in a helicopter attack.
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A future issue for UNAMA is what role it can play in building civilian capacity, particularly in the areas of governance and development.

Also a future issue is the transformation of the provincial reconstruction teams and what sort of role UNAMA can play in this process.

Finally, also an issue is what the upcoming Istanbul and Bonn conferences (in November and December) can achieve and how the outcome of the two conferences might affect UNAMA. There appears to be increasing pressure for a significant outcome from Bonn, but it is unclear if political developments in the next few months will allow for real progress in the peace process.

Options
Options available to the Council include:
- simply renewing the ISAF authorisation with little change except an update addressing key events;
- including stronger language on the deteriorating security situation and civilian casualties;
- having an initial discussion on any preliminary observations from the Secretariat on the review of UNAMA’s mandated activities and UN support in Afghanistan as requested in resolution 1974 and due at the end of 2011; and
- engaging in a wider discussion of the deteriorating security situation.

Council Dynamics
At press time Council members were focused on the September UNAMA debate and the ministerial week at the General Assembly and had not given much consideration to ISAF’s reauthorisation. However, there appears to be a general sense that no major issues are likely to emerge. There also seems to be a sense that there would be consensus on not making any real changes to ISAF’s mandate.

Most members expect the resolution to be simply updated to reflect relevant events since October 2010. In previous years various members have pushed for stronger language on civilian casualties and counter-narcotics, but most members seem to feel that the current language is satisfactory.

Germany is the lead country on Afghanistan until the end of 2012.

Key Issues
A continuing issue is the complex security environment and the resilient and adaptable insurgency, particularly as troops from a number of countries prepare to withdraw.

A closely related issue is what an insecure environment means for UNAMA and its security needs as well as its ability to carry out its mandate.

Another ongoing issue is the high number of civilian casualties and the impact on the Afghan people’s trust in ISAF and the Afghan government.

An emerging issue relates to governance, particularly in the light of the Kabul Bank crisis, and its impact on economic development and future investments.

Also an issue for the Council is how Rabbani’s death will affect the peace process and if there is a need for a greater UN involvement in the reconciliation dialogue. UNAMA’s Salaam Support group has been providing assistance to the High Peace Council and promoting confidence-building measures.

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nature of the security threats facing the country;
- recognised that with the winding down of large-scale humanitarian operations and the completion of national elections, many of the challenges that had justified the post-earthquake surge in MINUSTAH’s troop and police strength have decreased significantly;
- stated that a partial drawdown of the mission’s military and police capabilities would be unlikely to undermine the progress made so far with regard to security;
- acknowledged the vital contribution made by MINUSTAH in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, noting that recovery and reconstruction efforts are ongoing and will continue to require mission assistance, especially in the form of military engineering assets; and
- anticipated that MINUSTAH will refocus its efforts on support for the political process, good governance, consolidation of state authority and assistance in building the capacity of government institutions.

The report also stressed that Haitian authorities must take increasing responsibility for the country’s stability, including by establishing a greater governmental presence throughout the country in the areas of policing, the judiciary and public administration. More progress is needed with regard to education, as well as the provision of basic services and housing to individuals displaced by the 2010 earthquake. In addition, sustained engagement by the international community and increased investment in development are crucial to ensuring that any potential downsizing of the mission does not create a vacuum.

The report recommended that:
- the Council extend the mandate of MINUSTAH until 15 October 2012;
- the mission’s authorised military strength be reduced by 1,600 personnel (this would be accomplished by withdrawing two infantry battalions from the lowest-risk areas of the country and reconfiguring other military units);
- the mission’s authorised police unit officers be reduced by 1,150; and
- the recommended troop and police reductions coincide with current troop and police rotation schedules and be completed by June 2012, accompanied by an adjustment of existing deployments to ensure adequate regional coverage in the country.

During the subsequent debate, Council members expressed support for a 12-month extension of MINUSTAH’s mandate as well as the Secretary-General’s recommendation for a reduction in troop and police levels. However, most also emphasised that any drawdown must be implemented gradually and carefully so as not to negatively impact the security situation in the country. The UK expressed concern that maintaining a large number of peacekeeping troops could be counterproductive and cause the mission to be viewed unfavourably by the population noting that troops are not necessarily the most appropriate means of delivering development aid.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council will be whether to accept the recommendations included in the Secretary-General’s report, in particular with regard to the size and composition of MINUSTAH. A related issue is how to ensure that the security situation is not negatively affected if the overall force level of the mission begins to be drawn down.

**Underlying Problems**

Underlying problems in Haiti include a history of political instability and systemic poverty, as well as significant continuing challenges posed by the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- renewing the mandate of MINUSTAH at a reduced level, as recommended by the Secretary General;
- renewing the mandate of MINUSTAH without reducing the size of the mission at this time;
- reducing the size or mandate of MINUSTAH in a more substantive way; and
- including with any mandate renewal a provision for reassessing the security environment in Haiti and the composition of the mission at some point in the coming year in order to provide a basis for discussions of a future or further drawdown of MINUSTAH.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council members agree on the need to renew MINUSTAH’s mandate, most likely for a further 12 months. There also seems to be broad, if cautious, support for implementing the troop and police reductions that were recommended by the Secretary-General in his latest report. A number of members voiced some concern that the mission not be reduced precipitously. However, it appears that the suggested reductions are acceptable to most members in light of the Secretary-General’s assessment that they would be unlikely to undermine security gains that have been achieved. While the UK expressed disappointment during the September debate that a greater reduction in the mission’s size had not been recommended, it is unclear if other members will be persuaded of the need for this at the present time.

Although agreement seems to be coalescing around the Secretary-General’s recommendation with regard to the size of MINUSTAH, there is not yet consensus on whether, and when, the Council should ask for a follow-up assessment of the security situation in Haiti. Such an assessment could form the basis for future discussions regarding possible further reductions in the size of the mission.

The Group of Friends continues to play an influential role in discussions regarding Haiti (Council members Brazil, Colombia, France and the US remain actively involved in the group). As has been the usual practice in past years, the group is expected to produce a draft renewal resolution as a basis for Council discussion. Council members anticipate beginning their negotiation of the text early in October.
UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1944 (14 October 2010) renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH and called for a comprehensive assessment of the security environment in 2011 following the elections.
- S/RES/1927 (4 June 2010) authorised the deployment of 680 additional officers for the police component of MINUSTAH as a temporary surge, with a particular focus on building the capacity of the Haitian National Police, and encouraged the mission, within available means, to provide temporary logistical and technical support to the government of Haiti that will be phased out as Haiti’s national capacity grows.
- S/RES/1908 (19 January 2010) bolstered the troop and police personnel for MINUSTAH by 1,500 additional police and 2,000 additional military personnel.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2011/540 (25 August 2011)

Presidential Statement
- S/PRACT/2011/7 (6 April 2011) was adopted at an open debate chaired by Colombia’s president.

Letter
- A/C.5/65/19 (22 July 2011) was a note submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly providing a summary of approved resources for peacekeeping operations, including MINUSTAH.

Meeting Record
- S/PV.6618 (16 September 2011) was the most recent debate on Haiti.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH
- Mariano Fernández (Chile)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- Kevin Kennedy (US)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator
- Nigel Fisher (Canada)

UN Special Envoy for Haiti
- Bill Clinton (US)

Force Commander
- Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira (Brazil)

Police Commissioner
- Marc Tardif (Canada)

Size and Composition of Mission
Authorised strength as of 4 June 2010: military component of up to 8,940 military personnel and police component of up to 4,391 officers.

Current strength as of 31 July 2011: 12,252 total uniformed personnel, including 8,728 troops and 3,524 police.
(As of 30 June, the uniformed personnel are supported by 564 international civilian personnel, 1,338 local civilian staff and 221 UN volunteers.)

Contributors of military personnel:
- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Japan, Jordan, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, the US and Uruguay.

Contributors of police personnel:
- Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, the US, Uruguay and Yemen.

Cost
- Approved budget (1 July 2011 – 30 June 2012): $793 million

Useful Additional Source
Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No. 26, International Crisis Group, 8 September 2011

Peacebuilding

Expected Council Action
The Council is likely to have a briefing in October on post-conflict peacebuilding in line with the Council’s 13 October 2010 presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to brief it by 13 October 2011 on progress made in implementing his agenda for action, including progress towards increasing the participation of women in peacebuilding. The presidential statement also asked for the Secretary-General to submit a report on this issue no later than 13 October 2012.

At press time it was unclear what format would be used for the briefing. No formal outcome is expected from the Council at this stage.

Key Recent Developments
On 23 March the Council discussed the fourth annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). In presenting the 2010 report, the outgoing PBC chair, Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany), said that momentum had to be maintained and higher level political commitment from both member states and the UN was needed. Incoming chair Eugene-Richard Gasana (Rwanda) noted that the PBC could assist the Council by providing an early peacebuilding perspective, developing key partnerships and providing advice about countries on the PBC agenda.

The Council last discussed the issue on 21 January, issuing a presidential statement stressing that institution-building was a critical component of peacebuilding and emphasising the importance of national ownership. The Council also indicated its willingness to make greater use of the advisory role of the PBC and stressed the importance of well-defined partnerships. It also committed to considering the inclusion of early peacebuilding tasks related to institution-building in mission mandates.

In 2011, it appears to have become a practice for the chairs of country-specific configurations to brief the Council during mandate renewals or formal meetings on the PBC countries (Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone).

The country-specific configuration chairs have also used the informal interactive dialogue format to brief the Council. In December 2010, chair of the Liberia configuration, Ambassador Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), briefed on his first official visit to Liberia. In February this format was used to facilitate discussions between Council members, the chair of the Burundi configuration, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), and the incoming head of the UN mission in Burundi, Karin Landgren.

Key Issues
A key issue is sustaining the Council’s interest in post-conflict peacebuilding. Council members have not had an opportunity to discuss this issue since March, when the issue was last covered in the Council debate on the fourth report of the PBC held under China’s presidency. The two previous Council presidents had also addressed it, Bosnia and Herzegovina in January and Brazil in February.

This is in stark contrast to 2010 when there were several debates on post-conflict peacebuilding as well as significant
reports, including women’s participation in peacebuilding and the review of the peacebuilding architecture.

Also an issue is exploring new working methods to find ways of drawing on the PBC’s expertise.

Council Dynamics

Neither the Council nor the Secretariat appears to be particularly focused on this issue. At press time there was little awareness that post-conflict peacebuilding was likely to be on the October programme of work.

Currently Council members are not showing much appetite for thematic discussions on peacebuilding. This may be due to having had several debates on the peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding continuum as well as a number of debates on post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as a number of debates on post-conflict peacebuilding.

At the start of the year there was some expectation that the two PBC configuration chairs on the Council (Germany and Brazil), and countries such as India and South Africa with a keen interest in peacebuilding, might want to focus on the issue. However, the crisis situations in the Middle East and Africa this year appear to have diverted members’ attention.

Some situations now on the Council’s agenda, like Libya, may provide an opportunity to put into practice some of the concepts that have been discussed in recent years, including the need to initiate peacebuilding activities in the early stages of peacekeeping mission planning.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1947 (29 October 2010) requested all relevant UN actors to take forward the recommendations of the PBC five-year review within their relevant mandates with the aim of further improving the effectiveness of the PBC.

Security Council Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2011/4 (11 February 2011) was on the interdependence between security and development, wherein the Council reiterated its support for the work of the PBC and its readiness to make greater use of the PBC’s advisory role.
- S/PRST/2011/2 (21 January 2011) was on institution-building in post-conflict recovery.

Security Council Documents Related to the PBC

- S/2010/466 (7 September 2010) was the Secretary-General’s report on women’s participation in peacebuilding.
- S/2010/393 (21 July 2010) was the report of the co-facilitators of the “review of the UN peacebuilding architecture.”
- S/2010/386 (16 July 2010) was the progress report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

PBC Annual Report

- S/2011/41 (28 January 2011) was a report on PBC’s fourth session.

Women, Peace and Security

Expected Council Action

In October the Council is due to hold its annual open debate on women, peace and security, with a focus on women’s participation in conflict resolution. Head of UN Women Michelle Bachelet is expected to brief, along with representatives from the department of political affairs and the department of peacekeeping operations.

Nigeria is expected to circulate a concept note ahead of the debate.

The Council also expects the Secretary-General’s annual report on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). As requested by the Council in its 26 October 2010 presidential statement, the report is likely to contain a strategic framework to guide the UN in the implementation of resolution 1325 in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict and in other relevant situations. The framework should include targets and indicators as well as recommendations for policy and institutional reforms in the UN.

The Council is expected to adopt either a presidential statement or resolution following the debate.

Key Recent Developments

The Council held two meetings on women, peace and security in April. On 12 April, the Council met in consultations to hear a briefing from the head of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, on the work and priorities of the entity, with an emphasis on women, peace and security and in countries on the Council’s agenda. Bachelet provided an update on UN Women’s work on the indicators for implementation of resolution 1325, as requested by the Council in its 26 October 2010 presidential statement, and on her recent travel.

On 14 April, the Council received a briefing from the Secretary-General’s special representative for sexual violence in conflict, Margot Wallström. The briefing focused on the importance of applying the principles outlined in resolution 1960 (adopted on 16 December 2010) and reported on sexual violence in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. Wallström also reported on work done by her office’s Team of Experts on the Rule of Law to support local authorities in implementing resolution 1960 in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan.

Allegations of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire have emerged recently. Allegations that peacekeepers in the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) had been involved in the sexual exploitation and abuse of young local girls arose in August. On 30 August, 16 peacekeepers found to be involved were repatriated to Benin and barred from serving with UNOCI. In Haiti, following the alleged sexual assault of a young Haitian man by Uruguayan members of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a Uruguayan delegation arrived in the country on 9 September to investigate the allegations. On 14 September, the Secretary-General sent a senior team to Haiti to enforce the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on personnel misconduct. Both teams met with leaders of MINUSTAH as well as Haitian authorities.

On 19 September, UN Women hosted a high-level gathering of female political leaders, titled “Women’s Political Participation—Making Gender Equality in Politics a Reality”, as part of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly. Event participants issued a joint statement that called for increasing women’s political participation and decision-making across the world, stressing that women’s participation is fundamental to democracy and essential to achieving sustainable development and
peace in all contexts, including in times of peace, conflict, post-conflict and political transitions. It also encouraged states to take proactive measures to address the factors preventing women from participating in politics—such as violence, poverty, lack of access to quality education and health care, the double burden of paid and unpaid work—and to actively promote women’s political participation, including through affirmative measures, as appropriate.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is continuing to work to ensure that the norms of the women, peace and security agenda are integrated into all of the Council’s work.

A related issue is how to integrate the information contained in the Secretary-General’s upcoming report, as well as the recommendations therein, to inform and guide consistent implementation of resolution 1325 and to monitor progress on all issues pertaining to women, peace and security, including women’s participation.

Options
One option for the Council would be to adopt a focused resolution or presidential statement on the issue of women’s participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution that requests tangible measures be taken by relevant member states, regional bodies and UN entities to ensure that women and women’s interests are included in relevant decision-making processes.

Another option for the Council would be to adopt a more general resolution or presidential statement reiterating the Council’s support for the 1325 agenda, including on the issue of women’s participation.

Council Dynamics
Council members are supportive of the women, peace and security framework and most are ready to push for better implementation of resolution 1325.

Council members also appear to believe that the issue of women’s participation in conflict resolution is an important aspect of the women, peace and security agenda that has received less attention than other aspects, such as sexual violence. Most members support a focus on women’s participation in conflict resolution and mediation, and in principle an outcome document on this theme should be uncontroversial.

Some Council members view a concise and actionable resolution that provides a focused approach to the issue of women’s participation as the preferred outcome of the debate. Other members feel that a presidential statement would be a sufficient outcome and that a resolution on participation is not necessarily warranted.

While Council members welcome the information obtained by the indicators in the Secretary-General’s upcoming report, some have reservations about their operation and may wish to review the mechanism. The UK is the lead country on women, peace and security in the Council.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009) established mechanisms for the UN to address sexual violence in conflict.
- S/RES/1882 (4 August 2009) expanded the criteria for the Secretary-General’s “list of shame” in his reports on children and armed conflict to include rape and other sexual violence against children.
- S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008) confirmed the Council’s readiness to address more systematically the use of sexual violence in conflicts on its agenda.
- S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) recognised that conflict has a disproportionate impact on women and promoted women’s participation in peace and security processes.

Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/22 (26 October 2010) supported taking forward the set of indicators presented by the Secretary-General in S/2010/498.
- S/PRST/2010/8 (27 April 2010) requested the Secretary-General to develop further the set of indicators to track implementation of resolution 1325 and submit a revised set to the Council in October 2010.
- S/PRST/2007/40 (24 October 2007) requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council in October 2010 on the UN system’s implementation of resolution 1325 in 2008 and 2009.

Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/2010/498 (28 September 2010) contains an assessment of the implementation of resolution 1325 over the last ten years and a set of revised indicators to track implementation of 1325 at the global level.
- S/2010/466 (7 September 2010) contains a seven-point action plan to address women’s participation in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

Useful Additional Source

International Court of Justice

Expected Council Action
In October, the president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Hisashi Owada (Japan), is expected to brief the Council in a private meeting. This briefing, which has been held annually since the practice was first established in 2000, normally coincides with a presentation of the annual report of the Court to the General Assembly.

Judge Owada is likely to brief on the overall activities of the ICJ and discuss the relationship between the Council and the Court. No Council decision is expected.

At press time, the ICJ annual report covering the period from August 2010 through July 2011 had yet to be released.

In November, the Council and the General Assembly will elect five judges to the Court.

Background on the ICJ
The ICJ, one of the UN’s six principal organs, is located in The Hague. All UN member states are parties to the ICJ Statute, which is an annex to the UN Charter. The Court is composed of 15 judges selected for terms of nine years in separate but simultaneous elections by the General Assembly and the Council. (Two such elections were held in 2010 to fill vacancies on the Court.)

The ICJ is the only international court of a universal character with general jurisdiction in terms of subject matter. Only states have standing to appear before it. To date, 66 states have submitted a declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court (acceptance of jurisdiction in advance). States may also accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction through special agreement on an ad-hoc basis. In addition, some 300 bilateral and multilateral treaties provide for the Court’s jurisdiction in resolving disputes arising out of the treaties’ application.

The ICJ and the Council have an important nexus established by the Charter. In the event that a state fails to abide by a Court decision, the other party may have recourse to the Council. Under the Charter, the Council may then make recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to the ICJ’s decision.

The ICJ also exercises advisory jurisdiction through a procedure allowing intergovernmental organisations to request advisory opinions. The Council or the General Assembly, and some specialised agencies, may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal issue.

The Council has requested an advisory opinion on one occasion, on 29 July 1970, regarding the legal consequences of South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia. On 21 June 1971, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion, concluding that South Africa was obligated to recognise the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and that UN member states were expected to hold elections for five members of the Security Council. The new members will take up their seats on 1 January 2012 and will serve on the Security Council until 31 December 2013.

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Expected Action
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