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Unlocking protracted displacement
Somali case study

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Dr Anna Lindley, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (al29@soas.ac.uk)
Anita Haslie, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (aha@nupi.no)

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Refugee Studies Centre
Oxford Department of International Development
University of Oxford
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Executive summary

Two decades since the collapse of the Somali Republic, the Somali regions are still suffering from chronic political uncertainty, violence and high levels of internal and external population displacement. Protracted displacement situations which began in the 1990s have been overlaid by new crises. Most recently, in 2011, the drought has intersected with governance failures, to produce widespread livelihood loss, famine and displacement on a massive scale. By early July 2011, UNHCR estimated that a quarter of Somalia’s population was displaced, either internally or as refugees. In terms of both the numbers of people affected and their humanitarian and protection needs, the current situation is widely acknowledged to be among the worst displacement situations in the world.

This study focuses on the dynamics of displacement from south-central Somalia and explores responses to it, drawing on the accounts of policy makers and displaced people themselves. Carried out from April to June 2011, the study is based on desk research and interviews in Kenya, Somaliland and by telephone with other locations.

The current crisis is part of longer trajectories of governance failure in the Somali territories. In terms of displacement dynamics in south-central Somalia, three broad periods can be distinguished. In the early 1990s, the post-Cold War collapse of the state into factional violence was accompanied by massive displacement. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the relative localisation and stabilisation of conflict in the context of international political disengagement entailed much less fresh movement, but prompted fairly limited return, with many people becoming stuck in protracted displacement. Since 2006, the transformation of the Somali civil war in the context of the global war on terror, combined with the problems of drought, has prompted large-scale and on-going displacement.

In the recent phase there are several, intersecting causes of displacement, including flight from frontlines where armed actors clash, from specific persecution and harsh political conditions, and from livelihood loss as drought combines with political aid restrictions and people move to access food aid. Key features of the situation in 2011 include the inadequacy of former coping strategies, multiple displacements, the dramatic urban transformations orchestrated by displacement, and the involuntary immobility imposed on would-be migrants.

Displaced people are concentrated in south-central Somalia, but have also dispersed in large numbers to Puntland, Somaliland and countries in the wider region and beyond. Focusing on displacement within the Somali territories and into Kenya, official ‘durable solutions’ to displacement – return, local integration, resettlement – seem to be thin on the ground.

In relation to internally displaced people (IDPs), organised voluntary return is not feasible in the current setting. For the internally displaced, earlier small-scale informal returns have largely ceased except for the most desperate or well-protected. Meanwhile, there are intermittent forcible ‘deportations’, motivated by security concerns, from Puntland to south-central Somalia.

IDPs are integrating themselves into the social fabric in their places of refuge to varying degrees. Processes of local integration are mediated and limited by clan relations and clan
protection (or the lack of it); alternative state-building processes in different Somali territories that define the displaced as ‘outsiders’ and increasingly securitise displacement; cross-cutting sociocultural commonalities that unite Somalis wherever they are; and the role of international aid agencies in simultaneously assisting, and reinforcing the separateness of, IDPs. In this context, Somaliland and Puntland are ripe for policy approaches that deal with issues of displacement within the context of wider developmental interventions.

Longer-distance organised relocations are not currently feasible, given the delicate situation in even the more stable Somali territories. Organised micro-relocations in and around urban areas have been carried out with varying degrees of success. Very cautiously handled, relocation may offer IDPs opportunities for more secure settlement.

In relation to the situation of refugees in Kenya, the refugee regime, historically characterised by encampment and the delegation of the responsibility of dealing with refugees to UNHCR, has experienced important changes since 2006. The government has passed domestic refugee legislation and taken over the key functions of reception and registration. There has been a large influx of refugees that became particularly acute in 2011, prompting major difficulties in the Dadaab refugee camps. Finally, there has been a growing securitisation of the Somali presence in Kenya.

Faced with news of current events and the mass influx of refugees into Kenya, few refugees are willing to return in the foreseeable future. Durable stability in south-central Somalia currently seems a far-off prospect. There is, however, scope for facilitating constructive participation of refugees in Somali politics and training refugees with a view to eventual return and reintegration.

Legal integration in Kenya has been blocked by the government, which offers temporary protection in refugee camps. But some refugees have obtained IDs through informal channels; many move to urban areas despite restrictions; and there are multiple forms of de facto economic integration thanks to a vibrant Somali business community. There are various forces for and against integration, in terms of Kenyan, Somali and Somali Kenyan socio-political relations. In this context, again, embedding support to refugees within wider public services and within wider urban and rural development efforts appears to be the most fruitful and conflict-mitigating way forward.

Meanwhile, official resettlement of refugees continues, at puny levels by comparison with the rapidly growing refugee population, and shadowed by vigorous patterns of individually-instigated onward movement. Yet the prospect of potential resettlement is big in the imaginations of refugees and has a significant indirect impact in terms of fostering hope in difficult circumstances, providing opportunities to influence the behaviour of refugees, and through the backflow of remittances.

The report concludes with some reflections and recommendations regarding future policy, emphasising that while the informal strategies of displaced people outlined can be effective in securing better protection and livelihoods, internally displaced people and refugees cannot themselves resolve their crisis of citizenship and access to rights. This remains the pressing responsibility of Somali political actors and the international community.
Introduction

Two decades since the collapse of the Somali Republic, the Somali regions are still suffering from chronic political uncertainty, violence and high levels of internal and external population displacement. Since 2006, protracted displacement situations initiated in the 1990s have been overlaid by new crises associated with a dramatic transformation of the conflict in south-central Somalia and environmental factors. Most recently, the drought has intersected with governance failures, to produce famine and displacement on a massive scale. By early July 2011, UNHCR estimated that a quarter of Somalia’s population was displaced, either internally or as refugees (UNHCR 2011c). In terms of both the numbers of people affected and their humanitarian and protection needs, this is widely acknowledged to be among the worst displacement situations in the world.

This paper explores these displacement dynamics, focusing on movement within and from south-central Somalia, which represents the greatest contemporary challenge, and the policy environments in which they occur. This displacement has been caused and shaped by the decisions of key Somali and international actors over the years. In turn, it raises major policy challenges, relating both to the problems faced by people displaced, and the problem that displacement can present to host communities and other actors. Displaced Somalis have thus been met by a wide range of policy responses - from food aid to deportation.

Classic ‘durable solutions’ are thin on the ground. There are no official return programmes, nor are any likely to emerge in the near future. Local integration is unpopular with the regional governments who host the majority of refugees and the IDPs often struggle to integrate in their destinations within the Somali territories. International resettlement and internal relocation are very limited in relation to the scale of displacement.

However, displaced people are not simply passive actors, making their strategies for dealing with the problems that they face – and how these interact with official policies – of critical interest. Displaced people often deploy multiple translocal livelihood and protection strategies that cross-cut the sedentary-influenced approaches of return, integration or resettlement.

As part of the ‘Unlocking protracted crises of displacement’ project, this exploratory study was guided by the following questions:

1. What relationship exists between displacement and specific patterns of governance and conflict in the Somali territories?

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1 We would like to thank the interviewees who helped us write this report and who remain anonymous. We are particularly grateful to the staff of the following organisations which provided useful support and advice: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council Kenya and Somalia, UNHCR, Strathmore University and the British Institute in Eastern Africa. Special thanks are due to Abdiqadir Ali Abdi, Nina M. Birkeland, Samira Hassan Ahmed, Laura Hammond, Cindy Horst, Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, Hassan Noor, Laban Osoro, Sara Pavanello, and our research project collaborators.

2 Protracted displacement situations are generally defined as situations where refugees remain in exile, or people are internally displaced for long periods of time without access to durable solutions.

3 While recognising that there have also been significant and distinct displacement patterns originating in Somaliland and Puntland.
2. What are the current perceptions, interests and strategies of state institutions and other political actors in places of origin and refuge, as well as aid agencies and international state actors, in addressing displacement?

3. How do the perceptions, interests and strategies of displaced people shape situations of displacement, taking into account social, economic, political and protection/security issues?

4. To what extent could better / more strategic use of resettlement, return and local integration be pursued to address displacement, and are there innovative local, national, regional or international initiatives that offer alternative solutions?

Like the other case studies in the project, the research approach aimed to link the ‘top-down’ perspectives of the state and international agencies that underpin policy responses to Somali displacement, with the ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of displaced people. The study was carried out between April and June 2011, based on desk research as well as visits to Kenya (Nairobi and Dadaab) and Somaliland (Hargeisa), and telephone interviews elsewhere. To explore the policy environment, existing literature was reviewed and interviews were carried out with 40 policy actors – state representatives, other political actors, international organisation officials and NGO workers. To explore the perspectives of displaced people, existing research was reviewed and additional interviews were carried out with some 20 displaced people in Somaliland and Kenya.⁴

It is beyond the scope of this report to provide an exhaustive account of the situation of displaced Somalis: what we aim to do is to provide some observations regarding the interplay between displacement and shifting policy environments, in light of notions of durable solutions. The second section of this paper focuses on the causes of displacement. The third section explores both displaced people’s and official efforts to address displacement within the Somali territories. The fourth section focuses on the same questions in relation to a major regional refugee-hosting country, Kenya, and the final section makes recommendations regarding future policy approaches.

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⁴ This was not a representative sample but aimed to shed light on specific issues identified by the desk research.
1 Governance, conflict and causes of displacement

Against a background of longer-standing mobility patterns, shifting landscapes of governance and conflict across the Somali territories have produced major displacements in the last two and a half decades. This section explores three broad historical periods in terms of displacement dynamics and highlights some key features of the current situation.

Changing landscapes of governance and conflict

In the initial phase of the crisis, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Siyad Barre’s authoritarian regime confronted rebel movements on a growing number of fronts using brutal counter-insurgency tactics. The regime was ousted in 1991 and the state collapsed into factional violence. Over the course of the early 1990s, key strongmen established themselves as ‘warlords’, mobilising clanspeople to contest control of key resources: markets, ports, water points, road blocks, state property, private property in urban centres, and the fertile agricultural lands between the Juba and Shabelle rivers. Militarily strong clans invaded new areas to plunder assets and appropriate land, evicting weaker groups, in particular minority farming communities. For example, the Bantu people of the Lower and Middle Juba riverine areas had many of their lands forcibly confiscated by mainly Hawiye armed groups. While some remained on the land as share-croppers or forced labourers, many were displaced elsewhere (UNCU/OCHA 2002). Other minority groups like the Bravanese, Asharaf and Bajuni were also deprived of access to traditional livelihoods such as fishing. A proliferation of mooryaan (armed gangs of youths) resulted in more generalised urban insecurity. The combination of conflict and drought provoked a massive humanitarian crisis and large-scale internal and international displacement. Large-scale and high-profile international peacekeeping interventions between 1992 and 1995 failed to restore the state and security, with the international community largely withdrawing politically from Somalia in 1995.

This was followed by a quieter period from 1996 to 2005. To the north, Somaliland and Puntland stabilised under autonomous administrations. In south-central Somalia, pockets of relative stability emerged, particularly where majority clans or well-formed coalitions held sway. Customary law, business interests, and sharia courts provide stabilizing influences on both politics and criminality (Menkhaus 2003a). People describe the violence in this period as more predictable and negotiable through a set of standard coping strategies, including through temporary adjustments to spatial routines and temporary micro-relocations within urban areas, or to the rural hinterland (Lindley 2010b). International humanitarian aid continued to flow in to help people weather recurrent drought.

In 2005-2006, building on neighbourhood networks of sharia courts and backed by Mogadishu’s business community, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged as a major political force, winning a decisive victory against US-financed warlords in mid-2006. The ICU brought the capital under unified administration for first time in 15 years and rapidly expanded its control throughout most areas of southern Somalia. Many displaced people

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5 The major clan families of nomadic pastoralist traditions are the Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Isaq. The Digil/Mirifle clans are traditionally agriculturalists. There are also many minority groups in the south, including amongst others the Bantu, Bajuni and Bravanese.
report that the ICU had a constructive impact, commenting particularly on the opening up of movement that resulted from improved security (Lindley 2010b, Menkhaus 2007).

Map 1: Map of Somalia

The recent period since 2006 has plunged Somalia into a different kind of political crisis, accompanied by acute and massive displacement. Both Western and regional hostility to the idea of a strong Islamist state in Somalia propelled foreign military intervention. The otherwise impotent internationally-sponsored Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
received Ethiopian military backing to dislodge the ICU and install itself in Mogadishu. From early 2007, the TFG was also supported by an African Union peace-keeping mission, AMISOM, initially focused on training Somali troops and protecting government institutions. Ousted from the capital, the ICU fragmented politically but its hardline militia wing Al Shabaab mounted vigorous armed opposition against the TFG, Ethiopian and AMISOM forces. This sparked a dramatic transformation in the intensity and forms of urban violence and its human consequences: indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas, assassination of the politically exposed, abuses of civilians, forced recruitment, suicide and roadside bomb use (HRW 2007, UNICEF 2009, IDMC 2010a). These problems combined with the economic problems of hyperinflation and a spike in global food and fuel prices.

Despite the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops at the end of 2008 and the incorporation of the moderate Islamist Sharif as President, the TFG has failed to either defeat or negotiate effectively with Al Shabaab. In the first half of 2011, the TFG controlled about half of Mogadishu and pockets on the borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. The TFG and its military backers have been implicated in major human rights abuses since 2007, but it has been under increasing international pressure to protect civilians since 2009. Meanwhile, most of south-central Somalia is held by Al Shabaab; while there were initially some positive assessments by many civilians of the peace and security in these areas, this has since given way to major concerns, as systems of justice and punishment, political decrees and taxation rules were imposed that many community members found oppressive and disruptive (Menkhaus 2009). As one newly-arrived refugee succinctly put it, “[t]he stability is theirs, not the people’s, these days.” In addition, there are other armed actors, the most prominent example of which is Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), an umbrella group for traditional Sufi orders intersecting with clan connections, which holds the territory in central Somalia now known as Galmudug.

**Displacement dynamics**

These shifting political conditions help explain the broad dynamics of displacement, illustrated in Figure 1: soaring internal and external displacement in the early 1990s; then a relative stabilisation of a protracted displaced population from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s; then a new displacement crisis at the end of the 2000s. People displaced end up in a diverse range of destinations, from the new IDP city emerging in the Afgoye corridor, to informal settlements in urban areas across the Somali territories, to the refugee camps of northern Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, to the bustling Somali enclaves of regional capitals, and by overland, sea and air routes to the Arab Peninsula, Europe, southern Africa, and further afield.

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6 The TFG was formed in Kenya in 2004, with MPs selected along clan lines.
7 Which declared its allegiance to Al Qaida in 2008 under leader Ahmed Abdi Godane.
8 Meanwhile, there have been multiple reports of airstrikes against Al Shabaab within Somalia by the US.
9 IV international NGO (1), IV researcher (1). The impressions of Al Shabaab among displaced people interviewed in 2008 were much more favourable than they are currently, see Lindley (2010b).
10 IV refugee (8). Some attribute this change in part to the practice of rotating commanders out of their local areas in favour of more internationalised and radical leaders (IV researcher 1, IV international NGO 3).
11 And late 1980s from northern Somalia.
Currently there seem to be two major, intersecting causes of displacement in south-central Somalia. First, people are moving because they are directly threatened by the political violence. There are civilians moving away from the shifting frontlines where the TFG, Al Shabaab and other military actors clash, including on-going shelling of civilian areas, and fleeing specific persecution by armed actors of civilians suspected of sympathies with the opposite side (IDMC 2011). Also, some suggest that fading hopes of a resolution have prompted people who had been ‘waiting’ in areas close to their home place to move to alternative locations that they hope will be safer.

Second, the worst drought in more than 50 years has combined with adverse political conditions to generate large-scale displacement. There has been forced movement associated

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12 Sources / notes: IDP estimates from NRC and IDMC sources. As IDPs are not officially registered, these are rough estimates based on alternative data collection techniques hindered by insecurity in many areas. Figures for ‘refugees and people in refugee-like situations’ originating from Somalia were extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Database, 1 August 2011. Regional refugees here include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. 2011 figure from UNHCR (2011b).

13 There has also been displacement due to border tensions and conflict between Puntland and Somaliland, but this report focuses on displacement within and from south-central Somalia.
with violence associated with scarce pasture and water resources, especially in Galmudug.\footnote{14} But more prominently, large numbers of people have been forced to move by hunger and loss of livelihood to places where they can access food aid. Restrictions on international aid to Shabaab-held areas were imposed by both Al Shabaab, which rejects Western influence, and by Western donors, which consider Al Shabaab a terrorist organisation (Bradbury 2010).\footnote{15} While some aid continued to flow to these areas, through delicate, localised, quiet arrangements between international NGOs or their partners and political leaders and from the Somali diaspora, this was limited and woefully inadequate to address the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. By late June, an estimated one in three people in Somalia was in need of emergency humanitarian assistance, concentrated in the southern regions (FSNAU 2011). In July 2011, the UN declared that that 3.7 million people in Somalia were at risk of starvation and the situation in southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle had reached famine proportions.\footnote{18} In the same month, Al Shabaab declared that it was lifting restrictions: although the impact of this announcement is still unclear at the time of writing, there are early reports that more aid is getting in (BBC News 2011).

Interviewees highlighted several key features of the current situation. First, former coping strategies are no longer adequate: earlier systems of socio-political protection have unravelled, micro-spatial adjustments and relocations described above still leave people exposed, and the international aid on which many people relied in previous crises has been restricted. A person’s resources have always shaped their experience of violence and crisis and the strategies with which they respond, but an increasingly wide socio-economic spectrum of Somali society is affected by displacement.\footnote{17}

Second, as violence flared across south-central Somalia, many recent and long-term IDPs have found themselves displaced multiple times in search of safety.\footnote{18} This is not a particularly new phenomenon, but multiple displacement has become particularly pronounced in recent years due to the intensification of the conflict and its rapidly shifting frontlines.

A third key feature of the current situation is the rapid and dramatic transformations of urban landscapes in south-central Somalia as a result of displacement. One stark example is the progressive depopulation of Mogadishu: in 2007-2008 alone, some two-thirds of residents left, leading journalists to characterise it as a ‘ghost city’. Yet there have also been occasional surges of inward movement with people returning during lulls in the fighting, urbanisation due to long-term strains on rural livelihoods, and recent drought-related displacement.\footnote{19} Another

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\footnote{14} Personal communication, NGO worker, 29 April 2011.

\footnote{15} IV UNHCR (4), IV refugees (1 and 8) and informal discussions with refugees. The US, in particular, the world’s biggest donor to Somalia until 2009, now cannot fund assistance where there is a risk that it might benefit proscribed groups such as Al Shabaab, entailing a dramatic reduction in assistance to South-central Somalia (Pflanz 2011).

\footnote{16} The UN uses the term ‘famine’ to describe situations where more than 30 per cent of children are acutely malnourished, more than two people in every 10,000 die each day and people have no food or other basic necessities (BBC News 2011, Duval Smith 2011).

\footnote{17} IV International NGO (5a).

\footnote{18} IV International NGO (5a).

\footnote{19} Several interviewees suggested that aid agencies have been avoiding or underestimating the Mogadishu displacement issue, due to resource constraints, caution about TFG requests for further
A final key feature of the current situation is not displacement at all – it is involuntary immobility (Lubkemann 2008). This may be due to poverty, disability, flooding, a wish to stay near detained relatives, areas being locked down by fighting, or the riskiness of journeys across contested territory, exposed to political and criminal violence en route. However, the political quality of immobility is changing. In the past, one could be stopped, robbed, abused, and killed at roadblocks, but armed actors were not really trying to stop people fleeing per se. But recently Al Shabaab began forcefully turning back people trying to flee and beheading the drivers of vehicles carrying them, in an attempt to hold onto population and power. There are also instances where these efforts extended to sending envoys and text messages to new refugees to in Kenya to tell them to return.²¹

Thus, population movements over the last twenty years are rooted in complex and shifting patterns of governance and conflict, and the state-contesting phases of the conflict in the early 1990s and latter 2000s have been particularly displacement-inducing, both internally and internationally. Both Somali political actors and international actors have had a role in producing and shaping displacement dynamics. In the next section, we consider the situation of internally displaced people, and responses to internal displacement, through the lens of durable solutions.

2 Displacement within the Somali territories

The majority of displaced Somalis remain within the Somali territories rather than become refugees in other countries and while their situations vary considerably, there are some common features and issues which are outlined below. This section also explores efforts towards return, integration and relocation, which are generally led by displaced people

²⁰ The arrival of wealthy businesspeople, moving away from Mogadishu’s conflict-ridden Bakara market, following growing demand in Afgoye, and generally seeking to diversify risks and investments, has also progressively evicted many IDPs from their original settlement sites. The recent Al Shabaab take-over exacerbated existing decreases in international assistance (as a result of restrictions imposed by Al Shabaab and Western donors) and increase in rents (as landlords try to compensate for lost extortions of aid money). In such volatile contexts, where population movement is on-going, massive and still involves acute forms of displacement, it becomes hard to meaningfully discuss durable integration or reintegration. IV international NGOs (5a and 4b), NUPI interviews, IV researcher (1), IV Somali political actor (1), IV UNHCR Somalia (1).

²¹ Discussions with refugees, April and May 2011, IV refugee (8), IV UNHCR Kenya (4), IV researcher (1).
themselves rather than policy makers, although there are important ways that clan relations and state-building efforts mediate these processes.

The situation of displaced people in the Somali territories
IDPs were estimated to represent some 16 per cent of Somalia’s population in 2010 (IDMC 2011). Estimates of IDP populations, shown in Figure 2, suggest that the majority of IDPs are in south-central Somalia, with some 14 per cent in Somaliland and Puntland. While the situations of IDPs vary considerably by individual factors and context, there are several common issues.

Figure 2: Distribution of IDPs within the Somali territories, April 2011

Insecure tenure and protection threats
Many IDPs live in informal settlements in and around urban centres, sometimes squatting on government land or in abandoned buildings, but more often settling on land owned by locals. The majority of land across the Somali territories is either privately owned or customarily associated with a particular clan, and locals are generally unwilling to sell land to outsiders (in fact, it is often unclear whether the putative landlord has a genuine claim to the land, due to the uncertainty of land rights in many areas) (Menkhaus 2003b).

While some of those in Somaliland and Puntland are locals, it is thought that the majority originate from south-central Somalia.

Source: Alexander Tyler, UNHCR Somalia. Note: as IDPs are not officially registered, these are rough estimates based on alternative data collection techniques hindered by insecurity in many IDP areas.

IV international organisation (1a), IV UNHCR Somalia (1).
the land. Given their insecure tenure and lack of resources, the shelters that people build – or rent – are typically makeshift. Private landlords often charge rent, may charge fees for use of latrines and access to water, and frequently extort aid directed at the IDPs.

Most IDP settlements are informal in that there have been few attempts to register people or regularise their existence, either by NGOs or local authorities. There is some NGO provision of education, and widespread availability of Koranic schools, although access is a problem for poor families unable to forgo their children’s labour. Some suggest that displaced rural women are often more willing than men to adapt to urban life because of the relative benefits they see in terms of access to water and to schooling and healthcare for their children.

In these and other locations, IDPs experience major protection threats in addition to the vulnerability to eviction and extortion mentioned above. Particularly in south-central Somalia and Puntland, there is generalised impunity for rape and other forms of abuse of IDPs in many locations (Narbeth and Maclean 2003). Cases of highly exploitative and forced labour are routine.

**Economic strategies and food insecurity**

Economic strategies vary. Some displaced people from minority groups specialise in traditional occupations – carpentry, blacksmithing or leatherworking – and were able to use these skills at their destination. A small number receive usually small or ad hoc remittances from relatives elsewhere in Somalia or abroad. But the only livelihood option for many is (often highly irregular) unskilled casual employment (for example, as porters, construction workers, clothes washers), local charity, scarce international food aid (which is generally not dependable or close to meeting their needs) or begging. At the same time, some of those seeking refuge in Puntland and Somaliland have been swept up in the on-going transformations of the areas where they arrive – finding work in the booming trade, services and construction industries.

Despite these efforts, IDPs have consistently formed a large proportion or the majority of Somalia’s most food insecure population (FSNAU 2010, 2011). A major challenge has been the so-called ‘livelihoods gap’: the frequent return of urban communities, and particularly IDPs, to sub-subsistence economic situations following periods of plenty (LeSage and Majid 2002). In the late 1990s, concerns were voiced that a dire situation had been ‘normalised’ insofar as levels of malnutrition and maternal and infant mortality among the worst in the world were no longer being recognised as a humanitarian crisis (Bradbury 1998). In the late

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25 IV international NGO (1).
26 IV international NGO (1).
27 IV UNHCR Somalia (1), IV international organisation (1a), IV international NGOs (5a and 4b), NUPI interviews with international NGO and local NGOs, Hargeisa April/May 2011.
29 IV international NGO (1).
30 IV international NGO (5a).
2000s, aid workers have sought to frame recent displacement as an ‘emergency within an emergency’ in terms of humanitarian needs (Noor 2007).

While there are some common issues in the situation of internally displaced people in the Somali territories, it is important to note, as we do in our discussion of solutions below, that there is considerable variation in these people’s situation by origin, destination, social group and gender. For example, those who are truly ‘out of place’, lacking any connections in the areas where they ended up – generally former farmers, pastoralists without town connections, and minority groups – are particularly vulnerable.

According to the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, durable solutions have been achieved ‘when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement’ (IASC 2010: iii). The ‘durable solutions’ to internal displacement typically envisaged are return and reintegration in the place of origin, local integration where the displaced person has sought refuge, or resettlement in another part of the country. The next three sections focus on official efforts towards these durable solutions, and the strategies of displaced people in relation to these and other ends.

**Return**

Return is defined in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as return to the displaced person’s former place of habitual residence; the importance of reintegration into socio-economic life there is emphasised (IASC 2010). This was possible on a small scale for some IDPs displaced in the early 1990s: much of the decrease in estimates of internal displacement between 1992 and 1995 is thought to be due to return. However, a substantial number remained in situations of protracted displacement.

Since 2007, some people have returned to Mogadishu and other urban centres during lulls in the violence, often leaving family members behind in safer areas. Like any major urban centre, Mogadishu exerts an economic pull; even in the shadows of violence, it offers opportunities for trade and work. Moreover, occasional moments of political optimism have also encouraged return: some 70,000 people, including whole families, returned to Mogadishu in 2009 after the Ethiopian withdrawal and President Ahmed’s inauguration (UN Radio 2009). In the first half of 2011, interviews suggested that few people are returning: mainly politicians and wealthier people able to buy security and the very poor unable to secure livelihoods or safety elsewhere.³¹

While there have been no official programmes encouraging the voluntary return of the internally displaced in recent years, Puntland has an official policy of ‘deporting’ young men arriving from south-central Somalia – shaving their heads to make them easily identifiable in case they immediately try to come back to Puntland.³² International organisations prefer to refer to this as arbitrary displacement, underlining the inherent contraventions of international law and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.³³

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³¹ IV researcher (1).
³² IV international organisation (1a and b), IV UNHCR Somalia (1).
³³ IV international organisation (1a).
There have been many barriers to voluntary return: the continued generalised insecurity and political uncertainty in home areas; the reconfigurations of the ethnopolitical map of south-central Somalia, meaning that displaced people could not reclaim land and property and lacked social protection in their home area; and the fact that some former farmers and pastoralists were effectively urbanised by prolonged displacement in urban areas and refugee camps and would not have wished to return, even had circumstances permitted (Menkhaus 2003b). Recently, an additional barrier has been the possibility of being suspected of association with the enemy, particularly if returning into Shabaab-held areas, and fear of punishment. There are also the usual intervening factors – lack of economic resources required to make the journey to home areas, and fear of the danger of crossing insecure territories. Finally, any return decisions are also contingent on the degree of safety and economic possibilities at the destination, with few displaced people in Somaliland and Puntland presently contemplating return.

Even when achieved, return has been far from a durable solution for many former IDPs. Many people returning to their places of habitual residence have not been able to reclaim land and property taken by armed actors, thus compromising reintegration and meaning that they continue to rely on international assistance and local charity and face protection threats. This highlights the need to monitor carefully the situation of returnees. Much return has been unsustainable – with many returnees displaced anew as fighting engulfed their area in the most recent phase of the conflict. For the multiply displaced – people, say, who have lived in Lower Jubba, then Mogadishu, then Afgoye, then Galkayo – the location of home is now unclear. In these situations, local integration may be a better prospect.

Integration
The term integration is used in internal displacement settings to refer to ‘entry of formerly internally displaced people into the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their… new community’ (IDMC 2010b). Evaluating and promoting integration therefore requires a close understanding of the nature of that societal fabric. In fact, the English word integration is usually translated into Somali as isdaxgaal – literally, coexistence. Co-existence, toleration, acceptance, secure settlement may be more meaningful conceptualisations of durable solutions for many Somalis than more assimilation-influenced notions of integration that often underlie these policy debates. In what follows, we explore three sets of frameworks that mediate the relationships between internally displaced people and their host communities: clan relations, state-building processes, and international aid provision.

Clan relations
Somali society is highly socially segmented along clan and sub-clan lines, in some ways rigidified by the conflict. Displaced people’s social connections in the destination have critically determined how they fare in their new community. Where possible, people tended to flee to ‘traditional’ clan homelands to access protection and livelihoods support. For others,
traditions of seasonal migration to key towns, adoption into another clan (sheegata), and exogamy meant that they had family – if not paternal clan – across various urban centres, which helped to ease integration (UNDP 2011). Many of these people are no longer regarded as displaced by themselves or their communities and are not identified as such by international aid agencies either. However, there have been warnings that these social support mechanisms have become progressively saturated, in the context of the considerable burden imposed by the large-scale displacement, in host communities increasingly impoverished by poor rains and increasing food prices in late 2010-2011 (Menkhaus 2009, IDMC 2011). Since 2006, an increasingly wide social spectrum of displaced southerners have congregated in informal IDP settlements.

Meanwhile, displaced people who lack local clan connections find themselves much more vulnerable in their relations with locals, with limited recourse to customary law, which is still an important mechanism for regulating local social relations across the Somali territories. Displaced people of majority clans may receive slightly fairer treatment, because local elders may consider that one of their clanspeople may one day find themselves in a similar situation on the complainant’s home turf, or because they may be able to call on the influence of a clansperson well-established in trade or business in the host area. But minority groups have no such leverage and find themselves in the most marginalised socio-political position, associated with major economic insecurity.

State-building processes
Beyond the clan protection issue, processes of state-building and contestations of sovereignty in the three main Somali territories also mediate the relations of displaced southerners to their new communities. With south-central Somalia still in a state of violent flux, it is hard to develop any meaningful discussion about the long-term integration of the displaced. Al Shabaab holds the largest territory, but insights into the treatment of displaced people in these areas are still fragmented. Issues raised by interviewees include the fact that the rhetoric of cross-clan unity is often not matched by actions towards the displaced, particularly where there is suspicion of association with the TFG; the vulnerability of IDPs, including children, to military recruitment; and the fact that harsh political decrees are implemented in these areas that negatively impact on the rights of all civilians, including the displaced (UNICEF 2009, Abebe 2011). Many of the above concerns also apply to the treatment of displaced people in TFG-held areas. The recent signing of the Kampala Convention is viewed by some as an empty gesture in the context of the TFG’s apparent lack of capacity and will to fulfil its obligations. Indeed, the TFG has also repeatedly imposed restrictions on aid delivery, adversely affecting internally displaced people (IDMC 2011).

Somaliland has taken a distinct political trajectory, declaring independence in 1991, and is largely peaceful and stable. According to the constitution, citizens must be ‘patrials of Somaliland’, i.e. a person or descendent of a person who lived in the territory before 1960. In

39 IV international NGO (4a), IV international organisation (1a), IV UNHCR Somalia (1).
40 IV international NGO (5a), IV international organisation (1).
41 IV international NGO (5a), IV UNHCR Somalia (1).
42 IV researcher (1), IV Somali Political Actor (1), IV international NGO (4b).
43 IV international NGO (1).
practice, this is interpreted through clan affiliation. All adult citizens have been entitled to vote in several rounds of democratic elections and to register for identity documents. These processes have helped to formalise legal boundaries between Somaliland citizens and outsiders. For example, southerners cannot legally buy land in Somaliland, a major impediment to integration (although apparently not a big obstacle for the more monied Mogadishu businesspeople who have set up in Hargeisa in recent years). The large numbers of displaced southerners who have arrived since 2007 find themselves in a peculiar political limbo, considered refugees or aliens by the Somaliland government, and IDPs by international policy actors, which do not recognise Somaliland as an independent state. On one hand, for the government, hosting southern refugees is a mark of credibility and stability and resonates with a population which itself experienced massive displacement in the late 1980s at the hands of the old regime. But on the other hand, there are concerns about the infiltration of southern Somali politics, an emphasis on the importance of maintaining the separateness of Somaliland, and concerns to avert any community-level social tensions. This is compounded by security concerns following the bombings of UNDP, the Ethiopian consulate and the Presidential palace in Hargeisa by Al Shabaab in 2008. This contributed to a general securitisation of the presence of southerners in Somaliland, with reports of arbitrary detentions and attacks on displaced southerners.

Puntland’s political position is different, in that it was established as a regional state aiming to be part of a reconstituted state of Somalia, so displaced southerners are technically IDPs sharing the same citizenship rights as locals. However, due to a feeling of political vulnerability in the context of continued insecurity in south-central Somalia, and multiple incidents of explosions attributed to Al Shabaab in Galkayo and Bosasso (both important destinations for IDPs), there has been a similar securitisation of the IDP presence and attacks by locals on IDP settlements and forced evictions, prompting new rounds of displacement, as well as the ‘deportations’ mentioned above (IDMC 2010a, OCHA 2011). Some suggest that these processes of securitisation of displaced people are further boosted by the influence of Western intelligence and European-funded migration management capacity building exercises in the northern Somali territories.

However, amidst the accounts of abuse and difficulty, it is important to recognise that many impoverished Somali communities have in recent years tolerated and assisted the settlement of unusually large numbers of displaced people. Although highly segmented along clan lines, these can be quite fluid, and importantly, Somali society is also cross-cut by many religious and cultural commonalities. Beyond the non-clan family connections already mentioned, which can ease the way, there are cultural traditions relating to the treatment of ‘guests’ (galti) and Islamic precepts about the treatment of travellers and the vulnerable that inform responses to displaced people. The popular Sufi brotherhoods link people of different clans and origins. The sociocultural ideology of Somalinimo (Somali-ness) inspires decent treatment of fellow Somalis across social divides from Somaliland, to South Africa, to

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44 NUPI interviews with international and local NGOs in Hargeisa April/May 2011.
45 NUPI interviews international NGOs and displaced people Hargeisa April/May 2011.
46 NUPI interviews with international NGOs in Hargeisa.
47 IV international NGOS (2a and 4b).
48 IV Somali Political Actor (1), IV international NGO (4b).
49 IV Somali Political Actor (1), IV international NGO (2b).
Indeed Puntland’s forcible returns were roundly condemned by one interviewee as ‘un-Somali’. The political Islamist awakening in general has tended to encourage a religious nationalism over clan divisions (Mahamoud 2010, Abdi Elmi 2010).

**International aid provision**

Finally, international aid provision also provides a framework that mediates relationships between displaced people and their host communities in important ways. International aid provides an important organising principle in impoverished settings, where available (although IDPs are concentrated in areas where aid is highly limited) (UNHCR 2010b). Displaced people initially clustered in informal settlements because of land availability and for security. But over time they have also been drawn to or remained in these settlements because assistance (sometimes food, sometimes non-food items, shelter or infrastructure) is provided there – albeit typically in a small-scale, often highly irregular fashion. Moreover, the targeting of aid to IDPs vests wider interests – of landlord and NGO ‘gatekeepers’ – in the continuation of IDP identification and separate settlement as a vehicle for attracting aid resources that may be diverted, thereby feeding predatory local political economies (Narbeth and McClean 2003, NRC, UN HABITAT and UNHCR 2008). This tendency was reported in south-central Somalia and Puntland and to a lesser extent in Somaliland. Thus some aid workers express concern that long-term IDPs are to an extent the creation of aid agencies: that by providing aid in the ways that they do, in a highly impoverished context, these agencies encourage self-identification as an IDP, in a sense working against integration.

Most aid workers maintain that the newly displaced, and some long-term displaced people, do have particular needs and vulnerabilities that should be addressed separately and that displacement has particular effects on society that merit attention. However, several policy interviewees argued that many people who have lived more than a decade in urban centres with no intent of returning to their place of origin are better thought of as part of the wider spectrum of needy urban poor.

In trying to target IDPs, aid workers are anyway routinely forced by host community pressures to distribute some aid to poor locals as well (in Somaliland, displaced southerners often find themselves at the bottom of the aid ladder, with Somalilander returnees and local IDPs taking precedence) (Barnard and Grayson 2009). A typical current response to IDPs involves repeated short-term humanitarian interventions with some parallel assistance for host communities. Many aid workers suggest that a better approach would address the vulnerability of displaced people within wider spectrum interventions aimed at improving the livelihood opportunities of all urban poor in Somaliland and Puntland, which humanitarian organisations are ill-equipped to carry out. Opportunities frequently mentioned include investments in agricultural production and fisheries in the predominantly pastoralist northern territories, as a way to both combat local food security issues and provide livelihood
opportunities to the poor, including through activating the otherwise unused skills and experience of displaced southern agriculturalists.

Thus the relations between displaced people and their host communities are mediated in important ways by clan and family protection or lack of it; processes of state-building which marginalise displaced people as outsiders; sociocultural and religious commonalities that cut across these divides; and the complex role of international aid in providing a rationale for separate settlement.

Relocation

There are constant spontaneous processes of relocation of displaced people as they seek greater safety within the Somali territories, moving onwards from sites of initial displacement to Puntland, Somaliland and further afield. For example, many displaced southerners interviewed in Hargeisa in 2008 had spent periods of time within south-central Somalia before deciding to move to Somaliland. Moreover, this was not necessarily a final destination in that some plan to move on from there, if possible, to other countries (Lindley 2010b).

Officially organised long-distance relocations to more stable areas, however, do not currently seem realistic, given the delicate nature of the political accommodations reached in Somaliland and Puntland and the limited capacity of these governments to manage the processes and conflicts that could arise. But organised relocations over short distances, in and around urban centres, have been carried out in several places. While relocations of this kind demand high levels of organisation and finance in the short term, in the best case scenarios, such relocations can provide IDPs with secure tenure (or even ownership) and a basis for building more permanent shelters and longer-term livelihoods, while at the same time relieving political and social pressures in over-crowded and tension-ridden urban slums (Brookings Institute 2007).

IDP relocations in the Somali territories have had varying degrees of success. One issue that often arises is the need to avoid conflict with locals. There is a tension between providing IDPs with sufficiently improved conditions that they are willing to move, and inciting resentment by host communities. If the land allocated is too far out of town, for example, this can restrict urban livelihood opportunities. Efforts in Somaliland and Puntland often seem to prioritise ‘local’ IDPs over southerners, because of resistance to allocating land to those not from local clans.

A second, related issue is the need to ensure secure tenure. Authorities in Puntland and Somaliland and south-central Somalia own little land and lack resources to buy it for IDPs, even if they were willing to do so, so they tend to rely on local landowners donating land for public use in exchange for legalisation of their title, provision of paperwork or favours. Infrastructure development by aid agencies in relocation sites can inadvertently incentivise land-grabbing or eviction by locals. To ensure the IDPs’ tenure is secure, firm public

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56 A well-known historical example of relocation of drought-affected northerners to south-central Somalia in 1974.
57 IV international organisations 1a and b, IV international NGO 5a, NUPI interviews government and municipality officials Hargeisa April/May 2011.
58 NUPI interviews, Hargeisa April/May 2011.
commitments by a range of actors – municipality, government authorities, clan elders, religious leaders – are needed.

A third issue relates to the pressures on displaced people to relocate and aid agencies to assist. Several recent relocations in Puntland have been initiated by the Puntland government declaring that it would forcefully relocate people to new sites (in the context of on-going ‘deportations’ to south-central Somalia). Aid agencies are aware of the threat of being instrumentalised by political authorities and private landlords.

When these issues can be negotiated with reasonable success, officially organised micro-relocation of IDPs can have a very positive impact on their lives in terms of resolving insecurity of tenure and mitigating overcrowding and local hostility. However, given the complexities of the land issues that need to be negotiated for each relocation, it seems likely to remain a solution for a small minority, and is for now only sustainable in the more stable urban settings of Puntland and Somaliland.

To summarise, there are currently major barriers to the voluntary return of internally displaced people, and official efforts within the Somali territories to return people are all forcible. The situation of displaced people in host communities remains frequently highly insecure, with local integration mediated in important ways by clan protection systems, state-building processes and aid frameworks. Finally, informal relocation is on-going in the context of the current conflict and is a way for people to escape difficult situations at initial destinations; and officially arranged, carefully implemented micro-relocations may be an effective although limited policy tool to address problems associated with displacement.

3 Refugee displacement

The majority of Somali refugees remain in eastern Africa. In the early and mid-1990s, the majority sought refuge in Ethiopia during the large scale displacement from the northern territories. Since the stabilisation of Somaliland and Puntland, Kenya has been the primary regional destination for refugees. Due to Kenya’s geographical position, most of the refugees in Kenya originate in south-central Somalia, the epicentre of the current crisis. As of July 2011, there were nearly 800,000 Somali refugees registered in the region, with Kenya hosting more than half, at 423,164 (UNHCR 2011b). In exploring the situation of Somali refugees, this research therefore focused on the situation in Kenya. First we explore the refugee regime in Kenya and recent policy developments, then we focus on durable solutions – return, local integration, and resettlement – through the lens of both official policy and refugees’ informal strategies.

The situation of refugees in Kenya

The refugee regime and the situation of Somali refugees in Kenya has changed in important ways in the last five years. Figure 3 shows how the refugee population in Kenya correlates

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59 IV international NGO (1).
60 IV international organisation (1b), also IV international NGO (5a).
closely with events already outlined in south-central Somalia, with a crisis in the early 1990s followed by some stabilisation then another crisis in the late 2000s. This section provides a historical overview of the refugee situation, then explores recent shifts in terms of the roles and relationships between policy actors, intensified securitisation of the Somali presence in Kenya, and the mass influx since 2006.

**Figure 3: Somali refugee population in Kenya**

### Overview of the situation: 1990-2006

The beginning of the Somali refugee crisis in Kenya in the early 1990s heralded a major shift away from a previously government-led, open and laissez-faire approach to refugees. Kenya is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and also the OAU 1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Yet until 2006, there was no national legislation for refugees. Somalis have usually been registered as *prima facie* refugees and offered temporary protection in refugee camps.

The policy was to try to contain the refugees in the Dadaab camps (Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley) of the North Eastern Province (NEP) close to Somalia, and to a lesser extent Kakuma camp in the north west. The vast majority of refugees would only receive material assistance in these refugee camps. During the 1990s, many refugees were relocated to these camps from other locations where they had initially settled (Liboi, Thika, Mombasa, Nairobi). The decision to locate the major camps in Dadaab is significant: the NEP has a substantial indigenous Somali Kenyan population and a troubled history of marginalisation, repression and violence under both colonial and independent rule. The province benefited from little

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62 A minority of Somalis are subject to individual refugee status determination – for example, Somalis suspected of being involved in the conflict.
development intervention and there is still a considerable economic gulf between the NEP and the rest of Kenya.

At the same time, the government abdicated to UNHCR the responsibility for dealing with incoming refugees. The organisation rapidly went from dealing with a small number of urban-based refugees, to managing large camp operations, financed by substantial donor funding that flooded in to deal with the humanitarian emergency. By 1993, UNHCR declared that the emergency was over due to a stabilisation of morbidity and mortality and dramatic fall in new arrivals. The situation shifted into a phase of ‘care and maintenance’ in a more protracted refugee situation. As donor fatigue set in from the late 1990s, there were dramatic and recurring shortfalls in refugee funding, with UNHCR still struggling to maintain minimum humanitarian standards a decade after it declared that the emergency was over.

Kenya was fairly open to refugees – broadly speaking – in the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, offering asylum to large numbers of Somalis. However, the quality of asylum has often been poor, with numerous infringements of the civil, political, social and economic rights of refugees, fostered by the encampment approach (Milner 2009, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). For much of the 1990s, the Dadaab camps were rife with banditry, looting, robbery, rape and assault, reflecting wider insecurity in the NEP.

However, in the mid-1990s, a shift from a militaristic and repressive mode of government intervention in the NEP to more collaborative approaches succeeded in improving security across the Province (Menkhaus 2008). In Dadaab specifically, efforts were made to boost policing, improve access to justice with mobile and Kaadi courts, and provide projects to ease hardship in the host community and reduce conflict with the refugees (Milner 2009). These efforts bore fruit, with a 10-fold reduction in violent crime in and around Dadaab between 1998 and 2003 (Milner 2009).

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63 The events in this paragraph are described in detail in Milner (2009).
64 IV UNHCR Kenya (1).
But serious protection problems persist to this day, in terms of sexual and gender-based violence, unresolved crime, abuse of children, and discrimination and abuse of disabled people and minority groups. There are still major concerns about access to legal remedies – some cases are ignored by over-stretched and under-paid police and rampant bribery, resulting in ‘a certain culture of impunity’.65

Many refugees voted with their feet, gravitating towards urban areas in order to avoid the harsh camp conditions (heat, scarce rations, recurrent sickness among children, insecurity); to access better educational opportunities and health facilities; to find work and build a different future for oneself and one’s family; to get in contact with relatives abroad with a view to arranging resettlement; or simply because they preferred city life (Lindley 2010a). The Somali population of the capital is uncertain, but Somalis represented nearly half the 46,000 registered refugees in 2010, with many more waiting for their registration to be processed or not having tried to register (Pavanello et al. 2010).66 The Eastleigh district of Nairobi is a major hub for Somalis in Kenya and in the wider region: a place of deprivation, failing infrastructure and frequent crime, as well as vibrant informal trade and impressive entrepreneurial wealth. Many refugees also settled within the NEP in Garissa, Wajir and Mandera, in Mombasa on the coast, and there has been an increasing diversification of urban destinations within Kenya with more refugees moving out to Eldoret, Kisumu and Nakuru (Campbell et al. 2011).67

Recent shifts in government and other policy actors’ roles and relationships
Against this background, the latter half of the 2000s have seen some major developments in the Somali refugee situation in Kenya. The first major development was greater government involvement in refugee affairs. The Refugees Act (stalled by the first Somali refugee crisis in the early 1990s) was finally passed in 2006 (Government of Kenya 2006). Accompanying Refugee Regulations entered into force in 2009, and a Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) was established within the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons. As part of a three year plan to assume from UNHCR responsibility for key areas of refugee policy implementation, the DRA took over the reception and registration of refugees in March 2011. It chairs an active cross-governmental Refugee Affairs Committee, engaging officials from Foreign Affairs, Internal Security, Local Government, Public Health and the National Registration bureau – in regular discussions on refugee issues.

Key legal and policy frameworks are currently undergoing (re)development, with the outcomes still uncertain. A new Refugees Bill 2011 (along with a Citizenship and Immigration Bill) was recently drafted as part of the review of all legislation prompted by the passing of a new constitution in 2010. The Bill’s proposed modifications appear to focus on addressing security concerns (explored further below) by tightening bureaucratic control of the refugee population, requiring immediate registration and increasing penalties for non-compliance, as well as elaborating offences relating to identification document fraud and specifying their penalties.68 Meanwhile, however, a National Refugee Policy is under development in consultation with a range of government and civil society stakeholders, which reportedly may

65 IV UNHCR Kenya (4), also IV UNHCR Kenya (1), and discussions with refugees, May 2010.
66 Some estimates of the total refugee population in Nairobi are as high as 100,000.
67 The DRA indicated plans for registration in Mombasa and other key towns. IV DRA Kenya (1).
68 Draft Refugee Bill 2011, see also KBC (2011).
improve the protection of urban refugees and ease access to work permits (Lime 2011, Konzolo et al. 2011).59

Several lines of tension between policy actors exist both in the context of these significant institutional changes and in the longer term.70 First, it is no secret that the DRA is dissatisfied with levels of support from donors. Yet donors and UNHCR are reluctant ‘to be party to the creation of an externally funded public refugee bureaucracy’, with fears of unsustainability and corruption.71 A single bilateral agreement exists between Kenya and Denmark, a 3.5-year capacity-building project, with USD3.8 million from the Danish government and USD1.1 million from the Kenyan government, including the secondment of a migration management specialist (DRA-DANIDA 2009). In general, however, donor states are seen having little moral authority (given their own counter-terror policies and immigration restrictions) to pressure the Kenyan authorities on refugee issues. Their economic leverage to influence refugee issues, without a substantial additional investment of government-channelled funding, also seems limited.

Secondly, tensions have arisen between UNHCR and the DRA on the handover of responsibilities. UNHCR is concerned about protection and the establishment of reliable systems. This caution can also be interpreted – and often is by government actors – as a reluctance to relinquish control, rooted in the organisation’s own institutional self-interest.

Thirdly, UNHCR is criticised by refugees and a range of civil society actors and NGOs for emphasising ‘soft diplomacy’ in the face of ‘hard’ human rights concerns regarding border closure, refoulement, and the massive congestion of Dadaab, for fear of jeopardising relationships with government. As the organisation took on the major operational responsibilities of running large refugee camps, its ability to hold the Kenyan and donor governments to account on protection issues was widely perceived as having diminished, as it depended on these governments for access and funding for the camp operations.

Securitisation of Somali presence in Kenya
The second major recent development in the refugee situation has been a new securitisation of the Somali presence in Kenya, with concerns about Al Shabaab becoming a ‘pan-East African entity’ (Onyango-Obbo 2011) melding with older tendencies to criminalise refugees and the long-standing securitisation of the NEP. Refugee issues are a matter of high politics, with the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Affairs deeply involved (Gimode 2001, Lochery 2011). This is based on concerns about conflict spilling over the border; awareness of Al Shabaab’s quiet presence and efforts to recruit followers in Kenya; and the fear of a potential marriage of grievances of Somali Kenyans in the NEP with Al Shabaab (although in fact there is little evidence of support) (UNHCR 2011a, Bradbury and Kleinman 2010). These particular concerns are set in the context of wider public debate about Muslim minorities and extremism in Kenya, and specific incidents of social unrest in Nairobi and the World Cup bombing by Al Shabaab in neighbouring Uganda.

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59 IV UNHCR Kenya (3), IV DRA (2).
70 This paragraph draws on various interviews with the DRA, donors, UNHCR and NGOs.
71 Internal UNHCR document.
In response to these concerns, there has been border closure and remilitarisation of the NEP and police raids on urban areas to locate Shabaab followers (Mahamoud 2010, UNHCR 2011a, Lochery 2011). Overall, '[i]n response to a variety of situations, some involving specific threats which require specific police action, others involving a need for non-violent political engagement, the Kenyan police have responded with clumsy, heavy-handed and militarised action against a wide section of the Somali population’ (Lochery 2011: 2). These security concerns have also contributed to the push for more active government involvement in the reception and registration of refugees. The response, however, fails to address genuine concerns within Somali communities about the nature of Shabaab influence in Kenya (Sipius 2011). Many refugees cited two unresolved murders in Ifo camp earlier in 2011. This comment was typical:

*You can’t talk about those things in the market place. Ok maybe you can talk privately in a room… but you have to cross-check the person before you can talk. Before you open your mouth you must measure your words. They can cross the border… People fear that if you talk ill of them, they will take you to Somalia… their network is so strong.*

In the context of the mass influx of drought displaced Somalis in summer 2011, the escalation of food insecurity in drought-affected areas of Kenya, a slow donor response, and rising food prices across the region, it is likely that in coming months, food security considerations will be increasingly prominent in discussions of security and migration (Menya 2011).

**Recent mass influx and the refugee camps**

The third major recent development in the Kenyan refugee situation has been the mass influx since 2007, and particularly since the start of 2011. The border has been officially closed since 2007 due to security concerns. The subsequent closure of Liboi transit centre as a regulated entry point meant that many refugees used smugglers to cross into Kenya. There are numerous reports of police detention and even unlawful deportation of refugees on the way to Dadaab (HRW 2010). However, large numbers of refugees have succeeded in crossing the arid and sparsely populated border area into Kenya by vehicle and on foot (UNHCR Dadaab 2011).

There are effectively two populations: established, protracted refugees who fled the clan conflicts of the early 1990s, and recent refugees who fled the violence of the late 2000s. 2011 saw the arrival of large numbers of destitute agropastoralists and farming families from southern Somalia forced to move in search of food after their livelihoods collapsed in the context of drought and political disaster, arriving in very poor physical shape (UNHCR Dadaab 2011).

High numbers of arrivals since 2006, and particularly in the first half of 2011, have had severe implications in Dadaab, which is the destination for the majority of the refugees. By the end of July 2011, the camp, originally established to host 90,000 people, had a population of 386,229.

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72 IV UNHCR (3).
73 Various interviews with DRA, UNHCR, foreign states and international NGOs.
74 Discussions with refugees and agencies in Dadaab, May 2011, IV international NGOs (2b and 5d), IV researcher (1).
75 IV refugee (4).
76 IV UNHCR Kenya (4), discussions with aid workers, May 2011.
the vast majority Somalis (UNHCR Dadaab 2011). The camp is overcrowded and tens of thousands of people squat on the outskirts of the camp on land belonging to the host community. Some 30,000 await registration, and there are emergency levels of malnutrition and infant mortality (UNHCR Dadaab 2011, UNHCR 2011d). There are fears of unrest and there have been disturbances at food distributions. Since May 2011, standard reception systems have been adjusted to try to ensure that aid reached recent arrivals sooner (UNHCR Dadaab 2011).

There have been several efforts to address these problems through relocation. An organised relocation of over 13,000 Somalis from Dadaab to Kakuma took place in 2009, followed by more informal relocations to Kakuma and urban areas. Other efforts initiated by UNHCR to ‘decongest’ Dadaab, on hold for a long time, are now underway. An extension of Ifo camp was developed in 2010 to house 80,000 refugees from flood-prone areas inside the camps and new arrivals from the outskirts (UNHCR Dadaab 2011). The land was released by local authorities and USD16 million of infrastructure work was done when the government called the development to a halt. Local politics (with prominent local leaders seemingly disappointed at their cut of the business of developing the extension) and national politics (with security officials concerned that the extension, developed to modern camp standards, might act as a ‘pull factor’) coalesced to block the initiative (UNHCR Dadaab 2011). After a long period of negotiation, under added pressure as a result of the current crescendo of displacement, the Prime Minister gave permission for the Ifo extension to open in July 2011. The development of a new site, Kambioos, by Hagadera camp, is underway to house 90,000 people in tents (UNHCR Dadaab 2011, UNHCR 2011d).

However, as the government is quick to point out to the international community, the scale of new arrivals, combined with the economic and political tensions in Kenya, highlight the urgent need for international support, the inadequacy of large-scale internal relocation as a solution, and the need to focus on addressing the causes of displacement inside Somalia.

In sum, against a background of a protracted refugee situation, recent years have seen an acceleration of government involvement, heightened security concerns about the Somali presence in Kenya, and a camp crisis provoked by the new influx. In this context, the next sections of this paper discuss durable solutions, both in terms of official policies and refugees’ own strategies.

**Return**

Between 1990 and 2005, it is estimated that there were over 1 million returnees to Somalia from the region, half of whom were assisted by UNHCR. Although the majority went back to Somaliland and Puntland, still some 150,000 are thought to have returned to south-central Somalia, as the situation stabilised in some areas (UNHCR 2005). Much of this was the result of informal, individual and family decision-making processes. A notable policy initiative by UNHCR, under pressure from the Kenyan government, to stem refugee outflows and facilitate repatriation through the establishment of humanitarian operations in a ‘preventive zone’ of southern Somalia along the Kenyan border, was met with limited success because

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27 IV UNHCR Kenya (4).
28 IV UNHCR Kenya (4).
29 IV UNHCR Kenya (4).
refugees were – rightly, as it turned out – not convinced that humanitarian agencies’ presence alone would be enough to protect them (Hyndman 2000).

However, over time, informal cross-border movement – family visits, trade, medical visits – between Kenya and Somalia became more common. This did not mean that these visits were not often dangerous. Some of those interviewed recalled people who had gone back at the wrong time to the wrong place and had been killed. This suggests the importance of monitoring the situation of returnees, rather than assuming that return automatically represents a durable solution. Refugees experience similar barriers to return as IDPs. Although distant, people are aware of the risks, following the discouraging news closely through mobile phone contact with relatives, conversations with new arrivals, and radio, TV and internet news. While very small numbers of Somali refugee businesspeople, NGO workers and military recruits continue to return, visit or circulate, weighing the major inevitable risks against specific ambitions and opportunities, the vast majority of refugees have no interest in returning to any part of south-central Somalia.

Newly-arrived refugees remain very vulnerable. Not only has the border been officially closed since 2007, complicating the journey into the NEP, there have also been numerous reports of forced or pressured return in recent years (HRW 2009, 2010, UNHCR Dadaab 2011). A recent controversial incident in Mandera is illustrative. Following fighting in Beled Hawa, some 13,000 people congregated in a temporary camp but dispersed after the government intervened in March 2011. There are different accounts of what went on. Some sources say that the government proposed to register the refugees and that they dispersed because many were Somali Kenyans attracted by the assistance being provided by the Red Cross. According to human rights monitors, however, the government ordered the refugees to return to Somalia and ordered the Kenyan Red Cross to stop providing assistance, after which the population dispersed with many returning to Somalia (HRW 2011). Most aid workers consulted were under the impression that a kind of ‘soft refoulement’ took place: i.e. on the Kenyan side, the displaced people were pressured to leave (through government messages and withdrawal of assistance) and not given the opportunity to claim asylum, and on the Somali side, after Al Shabaab regained Beled Hawa, it also began to pressure refugees to go back (through text messages and by sending envoys). The general view is that many did return, while others dispersed into the urban area, went to relatives’ homes, or travelled to Dadaab. This illustrates the vulnerability of newly-arrived refugees in a highly securitised and economically marginal border area. A largely US-funded Security Partnership Programme is expected to boost policing levels and reopen a reception centre in the Kenyan border town of Liboi to screen newly-arrived refugees. It is important that this is accompanied by improved protection monitoring in the border area.

Meanwhile, there is growing political support in Kenya for the creation of a more secure buffer zone within Somalia that would prevent arrivals of refugees. Recent discussion has centred on the idea of ‘Jubbaland’, envisaged as a regional state under the TFG, encompassing Somalia’s border districts of Gedo, Lower and Middle Jubba. The Kenyan government hopes that, once stabilised, ‘Jubbaland’ would provide a buffer zone, improving border security,
stemming the flow of refugees, and allowing some repatriation. It has been militarily engaged on the Somali border and has helped to train TFG troops recruited from among the refugees (UNHCR 2011a, Bradbury and Kleinman 2010). But none of the Somali groups claiming this area are established on the ground and the earlier experiences of attempts to establish ‘preventative zones’ in southern Somalia suggest that refugees are unlikely to return voluntarily without evidence of durable stability. Yet hopes for the creation of Jubbaland seem to contribute to the government’s caution regarding the opening of the new camp in Dadaab.

Despite the repatriation-oriented stances of the government, there has been little or no investment in refugees specifically with a view to eventual return. There are scattered examples of refugee incentive workers who were recruited to work for NGOs inside Somalia, willing to take great risks for better pay. But bearing in mind the difficulties in Somalia, a cadre of Kenyan-trained refugees could provide a valuable source of recruits for a future Somali civil service and public sector. A further, related step – apparently long-discussed but slow in materialising – could be to involve refugees more in the administration and management of services in the camps, or ‘to run the camps more like cities’, as one official put it.

Beyond physical return, refugees in Kenya have over the years participated in an array of transnational activities linking them to the Somali territories: sending money home to support relatives or to look after assets left behind; fundraising for clanspeople in need and for political actors; and engaging in cross-border trade in livestock and goods (Hammond et al. 2011, Horst 2006b). Some of the most constructive forms of transnational engagements might quite easily be facilitated, for example, by the readier supply of movement passes which would allow enthusiastic young educated camp residents to observe and participate in Somali political and peace meetings in Nairobi. Encouraging open political debate in which many stakeholders are empowered to participate would seem to be particularly important in the light of evidence of fear, intimidation and self-censorship among refugees in the latest phase of the conflict. More broadly, the cross-border activities of Somali refugees in Kenya form part of much wider circuits of vigorous transnational engagement in which aid agencies and foreign powers are increasingly interested, with a view to supporting contributions deemed most constructive and using these circuits to channel international assistance and influence (Hammond et al. 2011).

Local integration
In the international refugee regime, integration describes the legal process by which a refugee becomes a full member of a new national community. More broadly, the term is used to describe the changing relationship between migrants and the host society, expressed through formal status and rights and through other forms of social, political and economic participation. In protracted refugee situations, where there is no access to fuller legal integration, recent discussions have focused on notions of localised integration; de facto /
informal / silent processes of integration; integration in the intermediate term; and secure settlement or accommodation (Banki 2004, Campbell et al. 2011, Crisp 2004, Jacobsen 2001, Chatty and Mansour 2011). This section investigates issues around legal status and place of residence, economic situation, and community relations, exploring both the spaces for societal participation opened up by official policy, and those informally created by refugees themselves.

**Legal status and documentation**

Documentation of refugee status is important for refugee protection and provides people with a formal basis for their stay in Kenya and participation in society. But there are long backlogs in processing these applications that pose particular problems to refugees outside the camps who may be stopped and asked for identification and evidence of legal status in Kenya (Campbell et al. 2011, Konzolo et al. 2011). Meanwhile, multiple forms of refugee documentation both present a source of confusion to state authorities and the police and offer opportunities for corruption and fraud (Konzolo et al. 2011). However, UNHCR and national NGOs’ efforts to sensitise the police and the judiciary regarding refugee rights and documentation, within the context of wider police reform, are thought to be bearing some fruit (Campbell et al. 2011, Pavanello et al. 2010).

The chances of obtaining citizenship are slim. There were constitutional provisions for people who have resided in Kenya for a number of years, could speak KiSwahili, and were economically self-reliant, to become citizens. But a further condition was that the person must have entered Kenya legally and this has been used as a reason to refuse refugees naturalisation. Although it is legally debatable, given that refugees have a right to seek asylum under international law, this position seems unlikely to change, given the large numbers of Somalis who would otherwise be eligible to become citizens and state and public resistance to that prospect.

Offering citizenship to a large number of Somali refugees is politically unfeasible in the current climate. But the choice is too often presented as an all-or-nothing one. Options for piecemeal or gradual approaches to integration – identifying subgroups or progressive pathways to fuller legal status contingent on the fulfilment of particular conditions – remain largely unexplored. As an internal document put it, ‘it is incumbent upon UNHCR to raise these issues with the Government, however controversial they might appear, and to develop proposals to this effect’. Meanwhile, however, some refugees have informally ‘bought’ legal status by obtaining Kenyan national ID cards from corrupt officials. This allowed them to move around the country, access formal employment and higher education and offered a greater degree of security. Others took up IDs offered by corrupt MPs who wanted their vote. This allowed the refugees

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88 UNHCR Kenya (3).
89 IV DRA Kenya (1 and 2), IV UNHCR Kenya (3), IV international NGO (2a). While obtaining citizenship through marriage is possible, legal commentators report that is it not an easy process.
90 UNHCR internal document.
91 Although long known, the extent of this is being progressively uncovered as new processes cross-check refugee fingerprints against the national ID database. The issue is complicated by the fact that some local people register in the camps to access food assistance. So it is hard to tell who is a refugee
to move more freely within Kenya, to live where they preferred, and to start businesses and access education and health services more easily. However, drawbacks have emerged for some refugees who have recently been excluded from resettlement because they hold a Kenyan ID.\(^2\)

**Urban drift**

In general, camps breed forms of separation and control that are inimical to the realisation of refugee rights and broader societal participation. A major vector of integration is the progressive urbanisation of the refugee population, described in a recent UNHCR report as ‘unstoppable’ (Campbell et al. 2011). However, is this possible, given the much-cited encampment policy?

Kenya’s legislation allows for the designation of specific places as transit centres and refugee camps, and making it a punishable offence to be outside those areas. Although such areas have in fact never been formally designated, there has been a ‘working policy’ of encampment since the early 1990s (Campbell et al. 2011). As a result of the combination of official regulations and economic and geographic obstacles, many in Dadaab have not been able to leave since they arrived in the early 1990s. Refugees are required to obtain movement passes issued by the DRA in Dadaab, which are authorised for people travelling for specific reasons: higher education, medical treatment, resettlement, specific trade or business reasons, or to escape major protection threats in the camp. But applications often take a long time to process, can be turned down apparently arbitrarily and can be subject to interference by provincial and district administration (particularly the Security Sub-Committee) (Campbell et al. 2011). In 2009, some 6,000 passes were issued to residents of Dadaab – a mere two per cent of the camp population at the time (HRW 2010).

However, many leave without a pass. Refugees on the road from Garissa to Nairobi and in the capital are routinely asked for documentation and often turned back. But there has always been considerable permeability facilitated by bribery, use of fake ID, and the sheer impracticality of complete enforcement.

Once in Nairobi, in practice, the presence of Somali refugees is tolerated by the authorities (Campbell et al. 2011). They are not at risk of compulsory relocation to the camps (Campbell et al. 2011). But they are often subject to arrest and detention (Campbell et al. 2011). Paying bribes is the most common strategy used by Somalis to escape custody – indeed it is now expected practice by both refugees and police (although, in theory, Somali refugees could call on UNHCR for assistance, they rarely do).

There are some signs of growing tacit acceptance by the authorities of the inevitability of the urban presence of refugees.\(^5\) For example, the DRA now registers refugees in its Nairobi
office and is embarking on refugee registration in other urban centres. The city health department and local councils are cooperating with UNHCR in efforts to improve the access of refugees to education and health services on the same or similar terms as locals (Campbell et al. 2011, Pavanello et al. 2010).

Access to education is a particularly important vehicle for integration. The government guarantees universal public primary schooling to all, including refugees, and many Somali children attend school in Nairobi, regardless of their parents’ status (although refugee parents may face general economic barriers relating to the cost of books and travel or specific demands for additional fees / bribes when trying to register their children) (Pavanello et al. 2010). Other parents prefer Somali-run private schools or koranic schools for religious, cultural and language reasons, or to keep a low profile (Pavanello et al. 2010). These personal and policy decisions are significant in terms of bridging or separating communities.

UNHCR, for its part, ignored the urban presence for a long time, fearing, in tacit agreement with the government, that establishing an urban refugee programme could provide a ‘pull factor’, putting pressures on already overloaded local labour markets and infrastructures and inciting resentment (Campbell et al. 2011). However, since the mid-2000s, UNHCR has taken a more proactive approach, and although still accounting for only USD3 million of its USD90 million operation in Kenya, this has been an innovative area of policy work, and anticipated many aspects of UNHCR’s global Urban Refugee Policy launched in 2009 (Campbell et al. 2011).

Economic strategies
Formal employment opportunities are few. Under the Refugee Regulations, Somali refugees should be eligible for ‘Class M’ work permits to allow them to work in formal employment, but few have managed to obtain these (Konzolo et al. 2011). An easing of access to work permits for refugees fulfilling specific criteria has been the subject of discussions in relation to the National Refugee Policy (Lime 2011). This would represent a major step forward for qualified refugees.

Camp refugees receive very basic material assistance, but most engage in other activities as well to provide for their families. For example, some camp refugees are employed by aid agencies as ‘incentive’ workers, by special agreement with the government. The monthly incentives range from KSh3,500 (about USD40) for an entry-level cleaner to KSh8,800 (about USD100) for jobs like the secondary school head teacher – well below what a Kenyan would expect for such a job. As one individual put it, ‘I don’t say I’m employed I say I’m gaining experience.’ While these jobs help refugees to earn income, develop skills and ease the hardships of life in the camps, the discriminatory terms on which they are employed simultaneously reinforce the separateness of refugees.

Another set of camp strategies relates to interactions with aid providers: as well-documented in other contexts, refugees may use various ration-card-related strategies to maximise the

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96 IV UNHCR Kenya (3).
97 IV UNHCR Kenya (3), IV DRA (2).
98 Extensively researched by Horst (2006 a,b).
99 IV refugee (1).
food aid that they receive; cultivate good relationships with particular aid providers to secure assistance or preference; and are active in representing their protection cases in particular ways so as to increase chances of resettlement (Horst 2006b). There are a range of additional social support mechanisms used by Somali refugees: sharing homes and meals, contributing collections for vulnerable people and new arrivals, paying sadaka and zakat, and engaging in community-based rotating savings and credit systems known as ayuuto (Horst 2006b). Long-term refugees have been offering particularly critical assistance by collecting food and clothes to share with new arrivals in 2011 (Joselow 2011). These strategies, building on the international assistance system and relationships with compatriots in exile, can be important for refugee welfare. However, they occur largely within the refugee ‘bubble’ and do not further interactions with wider Kenyan society.

With formal economic opportunities so limited, many camp refugees engage in informal trade in goods and services, for example, selling food aid, bringing in vegetables, clothes, consumer goods to sell, or offering telephone and money transfer services to facilitate family connections and remittances. Many small traders sell goods sent to the camps by wholesalers in Garissa and split the profit, sending back funds via the bus driver or nowadays through M-Pesa. While many of these individuals are largely stuck in the camps, these forms of economic participation contribute to integrating the camps and the aid machines that supply them into local, national, cross-border and transnational livelihood systems (Pérouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000).

Somali refugees in urban areas are generally self-reliant, only receiving material aid in exceptional circumstances. As a result, urban refugees are a self-selected group who have tended to be in a better position than camp refugees. However, recent increases in food prices and the cost of living have hit urban refugees hard. A recent survey suggested that some 20 per cent of urban refugees are employed, with Somalis concentrated largely in compatriot-run businesses and domestic work, feeding the informal enclave economy (Pavanello et al. 2010). Meanwhile, some 43 per cent of the refugees in Nairobi are estimated to be self-employed (Pavanello et al. 2010). Apart from petty trade, Somalis have invested in import and export businesses, shops and malls, real estate, hotels, the miraa (khat) trade, long-distance transport and trucking companies, livestock trade and money transfer operations. Businesses range in scale from street hawking to large multinational conglomerates. Some are officially registered; others operate within Kenya’s large informal economy.

Thus, Somalis use a wide range of economic strategies to cope with life in exile. Some of these strategies are supported and made possible by official policies, but many are informal, refugee-driven, and occur beyond state regulation. Some reinforce the separateness of refugees, others facilitate their de facto integration into Kenyan society.

The economic strategies outlined above point to the need for more macro-level discussion of the impact of the refugee presence in Kenya and how this can best be mediated. There are recurrent grievances and clashes with the host community in the Dadaab area regarding environmental issues, and the distribution of employment and contracts in the camps, which

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100 Discussions with refugees April and May 2011, IV refugees (1 and 10).

101 M-Pesa is a Kenyan mobile banking service.
has led to aid agencies implementing small projects in the local community (often doing a bit of what they do in the camps outside as well). The bigger picture, however, is that the camps provide a substantial economic stimulus in terms of food, infrastructure, employment, specific host community projects, trade, and so on. A thorough socioeconomic survey in 2010 of the local impacts of the Dadaab refugee camps suggested that while there are some negative environmental impacts in the immediate vicinity of the camps, the total economic benefits are USD14 million annually, equating to around 25 per cent of the average per capita income in the NEP (Enghoff et al. 2010). Given its size, population and permanence, Dadaab might in some respects better be thought of as a city than a camp – indeed, the population exceeds that of many Kenyan provincial cities, and puts it among the largest Somali-inhabited cities in the Horn of Africa (Pérouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000).

Meanwhile, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the impact of Somali refugees on the urban economy. But Somalis have clearly made considerable inroads into trades formerly dominated by the Asian community through their ‘high turnover, low margins’ approaches. There is anecdotal evidence of Somali businesses creating employment and paying higher wages. The almost viral success of Somali business in Kenya has also led to some resentment and overblown accusations of links to piracy and criminality, where more measured accounts suggest that the keys to success seem to lie largely in globalised clan and family networks, cooperative shareholding and Islamic financial arrangements, and the transfer of Somali business investments from Mogadishu to Nairobi in recent years (Farah 2011, Lochery 2011). An indication of the important role that Eastleigh has come to play in Nairobi’s economy is the growing interest from the tax authorities, and the recent (legally-sanctioned) refusal of many residents to pay taxes, pending much-needed local improvements (Harper 2010).  

These economic pictures should inform policy approaches to refugee issues. Rather than trying to ‘compensate’ the host community to prevent conflict, it would be better to adopt wider development approaches targeting refugee-hosting areas. For example, instead of the raft of piecemeal ‘host community projects’ in Dadaab carried out by refugee NGOs (which can simply up the stakes of interactions between host community members and the refugees), a more effective way to enhance acceptance of the refugee presence would be to adopt a comprehensive long-term area development approach, designed in ways that are sensitive to refugee-related issues. The new Kenyan Constitution, approved in a referendum in 2010, envisages greater devolution of power to county governments, which may provide a more propitious context for the promotion of localised forms of economic development and integration. UNHCR’s 12-month budgets make it hard to plan development interventions, its refugee-focused mandate and particular expertise mean that it is not suited to implement broader development programmes, but it could play a role in catalysing interest, in conjunction with DRA and other UN agencies, and would need to be involved in planning processes.

\[^{102}\text{DRA (2).}\]
\[^{103}\text{UNHCR Kenya (4).}\]
\[^{104}\text{UNHCR internal document, IV UNHCR Kenya (4). Efforts have so far been unsuccessful, including a joint UNCT mission to the refugee camps and special funding appeal for resulting project proposals.}\]
As in the NEP, in urban areas, policy approaches minimising conflict with the host community by embedding refugee support within wider programmes of support to the urban poor are likely to be most fruitful. For example, UNHCR’s urban refugee programme is planning a survey of refugee livelihoods and is making connections with OCHA, UN HABITAT and the Urban Vulnerability Forum with a view to more collaborative approaches (IRC-Kenya 2011). One of the few NGOs working in urban areas, International Rescue Committee’s urban programme seeks to work on livelihoods and legal issues with both refugees and poor Kenyans in the community (IRC-Kenya 2011).

**Socio-political relations**

Finally, beyond their legal status and economic networks, Somali refugees in Kenya are also embedded in a complex mesh of socio-political relations. First, there are several aspects to their relationship with the Kenyan public. On the positive side, Kenyans express admiration for Somalis’ strong family networks, effective business practices, trustworthiness and the fact that they tend to pay higher wages (Pavanello et al. 2010). There is also a powerful public discourse of moral duty and pan-African hospitality. As one Kenyan NGO worker put it:

> Well, I don’t know whether it exists, but I invoke it all the time as an advocate! … Saying when our neighbour’s house is on fire, it’s unafri-can-like to chase him away… You play the racial card and say ‘you know we’re black and we should help our black brothers… [our colonial masters] closed the door for us [in drawing the borders]; let’s not do it ourselves’.

Meanwhile, however, hard economic times and processes of democratisation in Kenya have tended to reinforce foreigner / national identities, as in other African countries (Milner 2009). Somalis are seen by many Kenyans as a community apart, maintaining strongly distinctive sociocultural practices and not wishing to become part of Kenyan society (Pavanello et al. 2010). There is a knee-jerk tendency to associate the refugees with regional malaise, piracy, Al Shabaab and flows of weapons into Kenya. A recent UNHCR report suggested that if there were a terrorist incident in Kenya, there could be a terrible backlash on Somalis (Campbell et al. 2011).

The Somali perspective on integration is also complex. The very protractedness of the Somali displacement in Kenya acts as a force for informal integration, as a second generation is now born in Kenya without ever having seen Somalia. There is a cohort of Somali refugees who have studied in Kenyan schools alongside nationals, speak fluent Swahili and have thrown themselves into the fast-paced ‘matatu culture’ of Nairobi youth (Bainah 2011). However, many refugees do not really see themselves as part of Kenyan society: it is impossible to answer how much this is due to local discrimination or to Somali preference (Pavanello et al. 2010). There is a fear for some of *gaalonimo* (behaving like non-Muslims) which can impede interactions. Somali nomadic practices – the tendency to seek out greener pastures, strong social networks, and dispersal of investments to reduce risks – are often thought to foster an adaptable ‘transit mentality’ (see reflections on this in Horst 2006b, Bainah 2011).

Somali Kenyans have a somewhat ambivalent position in relation to Somali refugees. The Somali Kenyan presence has offered Somali refugees opportunities for ‘segmented assimilation’ into a national minority, with its associated advantages and disadvantages. Cooperation with Somali Kenyans has been crucial for many refugees economically. However,
there is also competition, with some Somali Kenyans complaining particularly since 2006 about losing business to Mogadishu money and their sharper business practices. The treatment of Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees is closely intertwined, with refugees entering a context in which Somali Kenyans were already subject to high levels of official suspicion and control, and with Somali Kenyans’ situation further undermined by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of co-ethnics and associated ‘problems’. The political and public alarm that accompanied the rejection of the 2009 Census result for the NEP which revealed many more Somalis resident in Kenya than anticipated is illustrative. However, at the same time, some Somali Kenyans have become prominent in Kenyan politics beyond the NEP, and are seen as neutral mediators. Two of the front-running candidates in the forthcoming Nairobi-Kamukunji MP by-election (which includes Eastleigh) are Somali Kenyans, prompting refugees’ hopes for better representation and civic involvement.\footnote{106}

Resettlement

Many refugees seek to move on from Kenya to improve their livelihoods and protection situation. Some 40 per cent of urban Somali refugees interviewed in one study said that they had not experienced significant improvement in their situation and envisaged eventually moving on (Moret et al. 2006). Many people who move onwards actually do so not as resettled refugees, but as documented or undocumented migrants. Relatively few are issued with Convention Travel Documents (some 110 in the last two years).\footnote{107}

There are official family reunion, student migration and professional migration / work visa channels that some refugees are able to access. There is also smuggling, often using mukhalis (brokers) who arrange travel and necessary documents, which may lead to an asylum claim, negotiation of some other form of status or living as a clandestine immigrant (Horst 2006b, Bainah 2011). From Kenya specifically, most smuggling seems to take place via plane to the north (to Europe and the Middle East) or via overland and sea journeys to southern Africa, with South Africa a major hub, and Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe all reported as destinations.\footnote{108}

The official resettlement process rests on a two-fold rationale. First, that some refugees’ protection may be better achieved in a third country, for example in the case of minority groups vulnerable to abuse by other refugees or locals. Second, that through resettlement, other countries share the international responsibility for protecting refugees and providing durable solutions. Refugees are selected on the basis of vulnerability, with periodic efforts to focus on particular categories of people \textit{generally} deemed to be vulnerable – from women at risk, to the disabled, to members of particular discriminated social groups.\footnote{109} Currently, there is a focus on the resettlement of long-term refugees who arrived in 1991 and 1992. The anticipated ‘integratibility’ of resettlement candidates matters to most resettlement countries, who influence the characteristics of those resettled, whether as explicit policy or not.\footnote{110} Having

\footnote{106}Although refugees are excluded from voting. 
\footnote{107}Personal email communication, UNHCR Kenya, 6 July 2011. 
\footnote{108}IV DRA Kenya (2), IV refugee (1). People going on \textit{tahrib} – overland clandestine journeys north - generally travel direct from Somalia: an estimated 50,000 people were smuggled by boat to Yemen in 2008. See Crisp and Long (2010). 
\footnote{109}IV UNHCR Kenya (2). 
\footnote{110}IV UNHCR Kenya (2 and 4).
interviewed the refugee and put together a case for resettlement, UNHCR refers the case to
the national immigration boards (or in the case of the US – the primary destination for Somali
resettlements – UNHCR initially refers cases to JVA which do a pre-screening process). Once
accepted – and there are high acceptance rates among Somalis – IOM prepares the refugees
and facilitates their travel.

The account above belies the complexity of the social processes involved in resettlement.
Because of the limited opportunities for local integration or return, and because refugee
resettlement usually entails accessing secure legal status in a richer country, resettlement is
hugely popular with the refugees, and is effectively the only durable solution on offer.
Refugees often see resettlement as something that can actively be achieved – indeed must be
actively achieved – by representing their identity and insecurity skilfully, and making
opportunities to have their case heard (Hansen 2008). 111 Thus there is a cycle of distrust
between refugees and UNHCR regarding resettlement:

The UNHCR, NGOs and governments are often very suspicious about the truth of a refuge story and,
indeed, experiences are sometimes ‘adapted’ to the criteria used to judge whether someone ‘deserves’
resettlement or not. On the other hand, the refugees do not trust the UNHCR to decide on resettlement
cases fairly, as they believe that those with money can buy approval of their case. Again, these
assumptions are at least true in some cases… (Horst 2006b: 183).

This leaves both aid workers and refugees concerned that really vulnerable refugees less able
to access the humanitarian structure will get overlooked (Hansen 2008). Some advocate for a
really transparent lottery instead, but most maintain that resettlement can be a key protection
tool and should be maintained. 112

Yet the numbers of people officially resettled (from both urban areas and the camps) are
extremely small relative to the total Somali refugee population. As one UNHCR officer put it,
‘[r]esettlement has little strategic value. We resettle some 8,000 people per year, and Dadaab is
receiving some 9,000 new refugees per month. It does not create space.‘113

111 Discussions with refugees, IV UNHCR Kenya (2).
112 NUPI IV international NGO, Nairobi.
113 IV UNHCR Kenya (2). Some 8,000 people are processed each year – fewer depart each year.
The process does, however, have important other outcomes, as a form of crowd control by means of hope, behavioural incentives, and remittances.\(^{115}\) The hope of resettlement provides the possibility of an alternative future for refugees living in highly constrained circumstances, defusing frustration. Hope can easily slip into what the Somalis term *buufis*, an excessive preoccupation with resettlement, seen as damaging because people affected can give up on working for improvements towards their situation in Kenya (Horst 2006a).\(^{116}\)

Resettlement can also be used to promote behavioural change among refugees. For example, UNHCR explains to refugees that where girls are in school, resettlement countries look on this favourably, and does not resettle married minors still under the age of 18.\(^{117}\)

Remittances from resettled refugees are a major component of many refugees’ livelihoods. Estimates suggest that some 15 per cent of camp refugees and a third of urban refugees may receive regular remittances, primarily from the US, because of the high rates of resettlement there (Horst 2006b, RCK 2008).\(^{118}\) As many use the money to move to urban areas, this effectively takes some refugees off the aid list as they no longer draw on international assistance, and demonstrates that international aid agencies certainly do not have a ‘monopoly on assistance’ (Horst 2008).

### 4 Conclusions and recommendations

The famine crisis currently hitting the headlines is part of much longer trajectories of conflict, environmental pressures and governance failure in the Somali territories and the wider region. This study has tried to take account of these wider historical and geographical contexts in exploring causes of and responses to Somali displacement. This final section draws out the conclusions and policy implications of this study.

In reviewing the shifting landscapes of governance and conflict that have prompted Somali displacement over the years, the study has highlighted three key points regarding the causes and prevention of displacement:

- The least displacement-inducing phase since the civil war began in south-central Somalia was the late 1990s and early 2000s, when there was a localisation of governance and conflict, whereas macro-political battles for the state in the early 1990s and late 2000s have produced acute and massive displacement. In pursuit of state control, south-central Somali politico-military actors have imposed great suffering for the civilian population in the last five years. Foreign states’ pursuit of a narrow ‘counter-terror’ agenda and regional

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\(^{115}\) IV UNHCR Kenya (2).

\(^{116}\) IV Refuge Kenya (5).

\(^{117}\) IV UNHCR Kenya (2).

\(^{118}\) IV businessperson (1).
political projects have contributed to the current political impasse. Different political approaches will be key to stemming displacement.

- Since 2010, worsening drought has combined with governance failure and political restrictions on aid, leading to severe livelihood loss and now famine in parts of south-central Somalia. This forces people to move to where they can access emergency assistance, often across the border in Kenya and Ethiopia (defying the old maxim that most environment-related displacement is internal), seeking assistance in areas that are also under intense environmental pressure. To address the current causes of displacement, there is a general need for better analysis of environmental and economic pressures and how they combine with political and conflict-related forces in shaping Somali mobility. But meanwhile, it is important to recognise (a) that the recent phase of ‘drought displacement’ is political: the result of major governance failures in Somalia, (b) violence and persecution are still factors in prompting displacement. The implications for prevention or reversal of recent displacement are explored below.

- The current policy response focusing on food aid is late, piecemeal and inadequate, but humanitarian assistance is needed urgently both to save lives and to prevent further dislocation. Foreign donors and Somali political actors should uphold humanitarian principles and lift political restrictions that they have imposed on humanitarian aid. The extent to which recent promises by both Al Shabaab and the US government to relax restrictions are realised and the impact of these actions should be monitored closely. Localised access arrangements, careful partnership with diaspora and business actors, cash assistance (where appropriate and revitalising of local markets), and vigorous dialogue among all actors on humanitarian principles, seem likely to be crucial elements in humanitarian action over the next few years.

This paper has explored diverse sets of circumstances encountered by displaced people, across the Somali territories and the wider region, but it is clear that there are high levels of needs and a poor realisation of rights among the displaced. Thus, to ensure basic protection – even before discussing durable solutions – there is much work to be done:

- Many displaced people – and particularly the involuntarily immobile, the newly internally displaced, new refugees, and displaced people with particular vulnerabilities (like the young and elderly, the disabled, and minority groups) - are often in dire need of specific assistance to survive. For Somali and foreign political actors, and NGO and international agencies, provision of emergency assistance should continue to be a top priority.

- In light of the growing securitisation of the southern Somali presence, efforts to monitor the treatment of displaced people in Puntland, Somaliland and Kenya and the rest of the region and to lobby those governments to ensure fair treatment are critical to ensure the protection of the displaced. Somaliland and Puntland should incorporate key aspects of international policy frameworks on refugee and internal displacement into their emerging policies vis-à-vis the displaced. Both territories should stop any arbitrary detention and displacement / ‘deportation’.
In Kenya, despite some significant areas of progress over the years, there are major protection concerns, particularly around the treatment of new arrivals, registration backlogs, the safety of refugees, and access to justice. Convincing donor investments in the Department of Refugee Affairs’ independent refugee protection capacity are needed in a context in which state security concerns too often overshadow protection concerns. This might take place through the secondment of national civil society protection specialists, and the training of a team of a specialised cadre of long-contract government refugee protection officers. Alongside this, UNHCR should be supported by donors to engage in better protection monitoring, particularly in the border areas of the NEP, as well as continuing to fund legal support to refugees in urban areas, with a view to engaging in a more robust watchdog role on behalf of refugees in the future.

Moving on to longer-term strategic responses to displacement, return is often viewed by policy actors as the preferred settlement option to reach a ‘durable solution’. It is clear that it is not preferred by displaced people in the current context. Three issues emerged from the analysis:

- There is a need to build clarity among states (both in the region and beyond) that for the majority of refugees, organised mass voluntary return is not likely to become feasible in the foreseeable future, without major and durable political change in Somalia. All NGOs and international agencies concerned with displaced people and Somali issues should take a firm stand on this. Forcible returns to south-central Somalia in its current state of violence, political flux, persecution and drought – whether from Puntland, Kenya or Europe – are indefensible.

- There is a need to understand better how those newly displaced in the context of the drought view their situation and possibilities, and what would be the preconditions for sustainable voluntary return. As the situation in Somalia develops, should it prove possible to support the voluntary return of some groups to particular locations, it will be important to monitor the situation. The monitoring should be done until returnees no longer have outstanding needs caused by their displacement and in line with international standards developed for that purpose (i.e. Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs).

- Meanwhile, there are many untapped possibilities for facilitating the constructive transnational participation of refugees in Somali politics, and for training up a cohort of refugees to contribute eventually to the public sector of a stable Somalia.

The integration of internally displaced people is shaped by clan protection systems and Somali commonalities, the multiple state-building processes in the Somali territories, and the role of international aid. Three points stand out:

- External actors should remain sensitive to the considerable Somali sociocultural resources that already facilitate the coexistence of displaced people and locals in highly impoverished and conflict-affected communities.

- Overall, Somaliland and Puntland are ripe for more developmental approaches to urban poverty, embracing displaced people as part of much wider initiatives for economic
improvement. Building such approaches requires humanitarian and development actors, government authorities, civil society and international organisations to work together. For example, the new Somaliland government’s Ministry of National Planning recently began to engage in closer monitoring of NGO activities, suggesting there may be an opening for discussions with government about more collaborative approaches.

- Alongside this, all actors should seek solutions to the insecure housing and land tenure and settlement arrangements of the internally displaced, which is a major obstacle to integration. In this regard, occasional, officially-planned micro-relocations that decongest urban slums have the potential to lead to more secure settlement for small numbers of displaced people. However, careful planning and monitoring by relevant NGOs and international agencies is crucial so that such relocations do not result in a worsening of their standard of living.

With pathways to naturalisation in Kenya blocked, and the working policy of encampment since 1991, most integration of Somali refugees has been of the de facto, informal variety. While part of the displacement may be reversed if the situation eventually improves in Somalia, many refugees have spent many years or their whole lives in Kenya and are there to stay.

- It would be advisable for government actors to acknowledge this reality and formulate proactive policy responses in relation to it.

- Civil society groups, NGOs and UNHCR should encourage the government to keep integration on the agenda in policy discussions and engage in long-term thinking around possible gradual and piecemeal pathways towards fuller forms of legal integration.

- Options to explore include the granting of fuller legal membership / residency rights to long-term refugees who fulfil certain requirements, or the ease of access to work permits to facilitate regular internal labour migration and employment of refugee education and health professionals, to work in areas of Kenya where there are shortages of such workers – including the North Eastern Province.

- There is considerable scope to support broader processes of economic and social integration as part of the wider development of urban and rural areas where refugees live, by way of partnership between city authorities, devolved county governments and other development actors.

The official resettlement and informal onward migration of displaced people is a key means of securing better protection and livelihood opportunities, and because of its multiplier effects through remittances, plays an important role in the welfare of the internally displaced and refugees in Kenya. Two issues are worth emphasising:

- As the only durable solution on offer to refugees in Kenya, and in light of the clear and on-going persecution at the root of much recent displacement and protection challenges and pressures in the region of origin, foreign states should urgently expand resettlement places to help more of the people with the most serious protection concerns.
In a context where onward migration within Africa and beyond is increasingly restricted, and yet is flourishing informally, it is important that entry systems offer opportunities for displaced people to make their claims to international protection. Much current displacement occurs as a result of famine and generalised insecurity, and it is important to offer some form of protection and assistance on these grounds. But it is also important to uphold refugee rights under the 1951 Convention – members of minority groups have been particularly vulnerable to abuse due to their lack of clan protection, and many displaced Somalis have faced specific persecution, torture and threats to their lives in the context of a vicious political conflict.

Finally, throughout the analysis, we have sought to highlight the diverse ways that displaced people deal with their predicaments, including through informal return, de facto integration, and onward migration. Individuals and families also often deploy multiple, translocal/national strategies in seeking protection and livelihoods, cutting across the three classic settlement options that can lead to durable solutions – for example, when resettled refugees send remittances to relocate internally displaced people to safer areas, or to buy refugee relatives in the region national ID documents. But it is important to remember that the ability to use such informal strategies for self-betterment is highly differentiated by age, physical ability, gender, economic resources, and personal qualities – as one interviewee put it, ‘[t]here may be some de facto integration, but there are also a whole lot of people sitting in a crap situation in Dadaab.’ Internally displaced people and refugees cannot themselves resolve their crisis of citizenship and access to rights – this remains the pressing responsibility of Somali political actors and the international community.
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Hordhac

Iyada oo burburkii dawladdii dheexe ee Soomaaliya ay muddo labaatan sano ahi ka soo wareegtay, ayaa gobollada Soomaaliya weli waxaa haysata xasillooni darro siyaasadeed oo aad u xun, colad oo iyo barakac shacab tiradiisu aad u sarreyso oo gudaha iyo dibaddaba ku barkacaya. Xaaladaha barakaca dabadheerad kaasa ka soo bilowday kon iyo sgaal boqol iyo sagaashameeyadii (1990s) ayaa waxaa sii dulfuulay dhibaatooyin hor leh. Sanadkan 2011, abaarta dhawaan dhacday waxay la kulantay iyada oo aysan jirin xukuumad wax ka qabata dadka oo wixii ay ku noolaaqey ama iliihi ay dhaqaalaha ku helayeen waxayay, macalul kuwa barakac aad u ballaaran. Bilowgii Luuliyo 2011, hay’adda Qarammada Midoolbay u qaabbilsan xoostiga (UNHCR) waxay ku qiyaastay in afar meelood oo meel shacabka Soomaaliya ku nool ay barakaceen iyaga oo dalka gudahiisa ku barakacyay ama qaxooyi noqday. Marka la eego tirada dadka ee dhibaatadan waa saameysay iyada oo adeegsanaysa xogaha ama macluumaadka laga helay kuwa siyaasadaha haga iyo dadka barakacayaasha ah laftigooda.

Daraasaddani waxay xoogga saaraysaa xaaladaha intaa isbeddelaya ee barakaca kuwaas oo ka imanaya bartamaha koonfurta Soomaaliya iyo inay wax ka ogaato sida wax looga qabtay dhibaatooyinkaas iyada oo adeegsanaysa xogaha ama macluumaadka laga helay kuwa siyaasadaha haga iyo dadka barakacayaasha ah laftigooda.

Daraasaddan oo la sameeyay intii u dhaxaysay bilihii Abriil iyo Juunyo ee 2011, waxay ku salaysantahay macluumaad la ururiyay iyo wareysiyo ka dhacay dalka Keenya, Somaliland iyo taleefoonno lagu xiriiray meelo kale.


Marxaladda hadda lagu jiro, waxaa jira dhowr arrimood oo sababka barakaca kuwaas oo ay ka mid yihiin dad ka soo cararaya meelaha/goobaha kooxaha hubeysani isku hardiyaan, kuwo ka soo cararaya dilal loo geysanayo iyo xaalado siyaasadeed oo adag iyo nolol la’aanta dadka haysta abuurahaa awgood taas oo ay weheliso xannibaad siyaasadeed oo xagga deeqaha la bixiyo ah iyo socdaalka dadka si ay u gaarayn deeqaha cuntada la bixiyo. Waxyaalaha ugu waaweyn xaaladda 2011 waxaa ka mid ah qaababkii ama xeeladhiidhi horay loo adeegsan jiray oo aan ku filnayn wax ka qabashada dhibaatooyinka hadda jira, barakacyo badan, isbeddello
lama filaan ah oo ku yimid magaaloooyinka taas oo barakacu keenay iyo dadkii tahiibayaasha noqon lahaa oo laga hor-istaagay socdaalka.

Dadka barakacayaasha ahi waxay badidoodu ku suganyihiin bartamaha koonfurga Soomaaliya laakiin waxay tirooyin badani ku sii kala yaaceed Puntland, Somaliland iyo dalalka gobolka guud ahaan iyo meelo ka sii fog-fog. Marka xoogga la saaro dadka ku barakacay dhulalka Soomaalida iyo Keenya, xal rasmi ah oo waara in loo helo barakaca, sida dib u celin, degaanadda no dadku is-dhexgalaan iyo dib u dajinba waa arrimo u muuqda inay adagiyihiin in la helo.

Marka la eego dadkii gudaha ku barakacay (IDPs), in dadkii iskooldan ugu laabtaan meelii ay ka yimaadleen wax aan hadda muuqan xaaladda hadda taagan awgeed. Dadka gudaha ku barakacay marka la eego, waxaa guud ahaan joogaday dad tiradoodu koobnayd oo horay u bilaabay inay degaanaddoodii dib ugu laabtaan marka laga reebo kuwo aan iyagu rajo kale lahayn ama kuwo meelaha ay tagayaan si fiican loogu difiicaydo. Waxaase mararka qaarkood jira dib- u- celin qasab ah oo dadka laga celiyo Puntland laguna celiyo bartamaha koonfurga Soomaaliya, taas oo ay keentay ama oo dhiiri-gelisay welwelka laga qabo xagga amaanka waxa uu degganayn. Dadka barakacayaasha ahi waxay illaa iyo xad dhexgalaayaan ama ka mid noqonayaan noocayda bulshada ku dhaqan meelaha ay qaxootiga ku yihiin. Qaababka is-dhexgalka bulshada waxaa yimaad wax xukuma oo isla markaana xaddada islahaansha ama xiriirka ka dhexeeya qabillaadda iyo difaaca qabillaume laga helo ama la’anta qabiil wax difaaca. In barakacayaashu kala qaadoonaadana ama kale duwanaadaan waxaay gacan ka geysanaya ama sii xooyija habab qaran dhis ah oo ah beddalaya dawladnimada wuxuu guud kuwaas oo ka jira degaanno kale duwan oo Soomaalidu degto hababkaas oo barakacayaasha u arka ‘dad dibadda ugu yimid’ iyo barakaca looga welwel- qabo nabadgelyo xumida; dhaqanka bulshada oo Soomaalida middaamay meel kasta oo ay joogaan; iyo kaalinta hay’ada samafalka ee caalamiga ah. Markii arrintan la fiirsho, Somaliland iyo Puntland waxay u bisilyihiin inay yeeshaa habab siyaasadeed oo ay kula xaalaayaan arrimaha barakaca taas oo ka mid ah wax-qabashada guud ee horumarineed.

In si abaatul waxa loo dejiyo meelo kala fog-fog waqtiga hadda la joog ama muuqato inay suurtagal tahay marka la fiirsho xaaladda ahaan degganayn ee ka jira degaanadda Soomaalida ee yara xasilloon. Waxaa guulo heerar kale duwan leh laga gaaray dib- u dajin qorshaysan oo dadka lagu dajinayo magaaloooyinka dhaxdooda iyo agagaarkooda. Dib u dajin si taxar weyn leh looga fiirsaday ayaa laga yaabaa inay barakacayaasha siiyo fursado ay ku helaan degganaansho rasmi ah.

Marka la eego xaaladda qaxootiga Keenya, maamulka qaxootiyada oo caadiyan lagu yaqaan xeryaha qaxootiga iyo hay’adda UNHCR oo loo xilsaray inay la xaqish hawlaha qaxootiga ayaa isbeddelo badani ku dhaceen ilaa iyo 2006. Dawladdu waxay sharciyo ka soo saartay qaxootiga gudaha dalka soo galay iyada oo la wareegyey hawlaha ugu muhiimsan oo ah goobaha ugu horreeyey ee qaxootigii soo gaaray iyo diiwhangelintooda. Waxaan jirtay tiro qaxooti ah oo aad u fara badan kuwaas oo khaas ahaan tiradoodu meel ba’an gaaray 2011, taas oo dhibaatooyin adag u keentay xeryaha qaxootiga ee Dhadhaab. Ugu dambeyntii, waxaa jirtay dareen xagga nabadgelyada ah oo la xiriirka joogitaanka qaxootiga Soomaalida ee Keenya.
Wararka ku saabsan xaaladda hadda taagan oo dadku maqlayaan iyo qaxootiga faraha badan ee ku soo guulqay Keenya awgeed, in yar oo ka mid ah dadka qaxootiga ah ayaa doonaya inay dib Soomaaliya ugu laabtaa mustaqbalka dhow. Xasillooni waarta inay ka dhalato bartamaha koonfurta Soomaaliya waxay u muuqataa rajo fog. Laakiin, si kastaba ha ahaatee, waxaa jira fursado wax ku ool ah oo lagu abaabuli karo in qaxootigu ay si dhab ah uga qaybgalaan siyaasadda Soomaaliya iyo tababarro qaxootiga la siyoo iyada oo laga duulayow dib u celin tamaadda iyo qaxootiga oo mar kale bulshada dib uga mid noqda ama ula qabsada. In si sharciyaysan ay dadka barakacayaasha ahi Keenya bulshada uga mid noqdaan ama u dhaxgalaan waxaa hor-is-taagtay dawladda taas oo si ku meel-gaar ah barkacayaasha ku siisa xeryaha qaxootiga nabadgelyo iyo xannaaneyn. Laakiin dadka qaxootiga ah qaarka mid ah iyo waxay qaabab aar rasmi ahayn ku heleen waraaqo aqoonsi, kuwa kale oo badanina waxay galeen magaalooyinka waaweyn iyada oo xannibaad weyni jirto. Waxana iska sameysmay habab badan oo dhaqaale oo ka mid noqday nolosha Keenya taas oo laga mahadinayo bulshada fiirdircoon ee ganacsatada Soomaalida ah. Waxaa jira xoogag kala duwan oo taageersan ama ka soo horjeeda is-dhexgalka taas oo ka imanaaysa aragtiyaha ay qabaan dadka Keenyaatiga ah, Soomaalida iyo Soomaalida Keenya intaba. Mar labaad marka arrintan la fiirshe, in taageerada la siyoo dadka qaxootiga ah ay ka mid noqoto ama lagu nudo adeegayada guud ee bulshada iyo dadaadladda horumarineed ee magaalooyinka iyo miyiga waxay u muuqataa inay tahay midda ugu miro-dhalka fiican, waa jidka iska- hor-imaadyada yarayn kara oo la raaci karo.

Waxaa hadda socda dib-u dajinta rasmiga ah ee qaxootiga taas oo aan macno weyn lahayn marka loo fiirshe tirada dadka qaxootiga ah oo xoog u kordhaysa taas oo ay la socoto qaab weyn oo dadku qof qof ahaan ugu socdaalayaan. Isla markaa, waxay dadka qaxootiga ahi ku hamminayaan in ay dib u dajin mar uun suurtagali doonto, waxayna leedahay saameyn weyn oo aan toos ahayn marka laga eego rajo-gelinta ay keenayso iyada oo lagu jiro xaalado adag, isla markaasna la helayo fursado wax lagaga beddelayo dabeecadaha qaxootiga iyo saameynta lacaga dibadaha laga soo xawilo.

Warbixintan waxaa lagu soo gabagabeeyay in arrimahan dib looga fakaro iyo talo soo jeedin la xiriirta siyaasadaha mustaqaalka, iyada oo xoogga la saarayo in hababka aan rasmiga ahayn ee dadka barakacayaasha ah kuwaas oo halkan lagu muujiyay ay yiihiin kuwo shaqayn kara si dadku u helan badbaado iyo nolol maalmeed. Barakacayaasha kaligood may xallin karaan dhibaatooyinkooda qawmiyad ahaaneed iyo inay xuquuqdooda helaan- tani waxay ahaanaysaa waajibaadka degdegga ah oo aan laga leexleexan karin oo saaran dadka siyaasadaha Soomaaliya wada ama hor boodaya iyo beesha caalamka.