Early Warning Issues for July

The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of July is Benin, represented by H.E. Dr Ferdinand Montcho, Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the AU. In the absence of a country’s representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month. Member States currently represented on the AU Peace and Security Council include Benin, Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Somalia

Despite the military gains that the TFG and its allied forces have achieved over the course of the past few months, the TFG has shown very little indication of being encouraged to achieve political cohesion. In a disappointing turn of events, the military success was not capitalized upon to elaborate and pursue an effective political strategy. Instead, as the TFG/AMISOM and allied forces gained territories from Al Shabaab, the various power factions within the TFG became embroiled in fierce squabbles. Although the appointment of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed as the new Prime Minister brought some cause for optimism, the stability of the TFG has once again come under serious strain since the beginning of the year. With the end of the transitional period fast approaching, disagreement has erupted between the Transitional Federal Parliament and the executive institutions of the TFG over the end of the current term of office of the TFG.

Livingstone Formula

‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/PR/ (CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.
North African Update

Events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya continue to hold Africa and the world spellbound. Although Tunisia and Egypt seem to have the makings of orderly transition, there are still many unknowns for participants and observers alike. In the case of Libya, an intransigent dictator is facing mounting pressure to relinquish power, but still retains sufficient authority to be able to destroy the lives of many of his country’s citizens, and to severely cripple the economic structure of the country itself. There are concerns among African leaders and African institutions like the African Union, that NATO has gone beyond its brief to provide a no-fly zone and is now exacerbating the political, economic and social problems confronting the quest by the majority of Libyans for a new order.

Swaziland

The recent protests, intentionally modelled on the North African uprisings, were the result of many years of relentless campaigning for the restoration of multi-party democracy and were led by banned opposition parties. The political objectives of the 12 April demonstrations were two-fold: firstly as an anti-austerity refutation spearheaded by public sector unions and secondly as a denunciation of the governance regime of King Mswati III.

The political formations in the pro-democracy group have been demanding the immediate dissolution of the government, suspension of the legislature and the appointment of an interim government that will establish the modalities for a new democratic dispensation, including the drafting of a new Constitution. They also demand the unbanning of all political parties and organizations; the release of all political prisoners and the annulment of all court cases against political leaders and activists; the unconditional return of Swazi exiles to Swaziland; the convening of a national Conference (for a Democratic Swaziland) mediated by South Africa; and appeal to regional and international partners to put pressure on the Swazi government to allow political space for reform.

Lord’s Resistance Army

Despite its Ugandan origins in the mid ‘eighties the LRA is today a more serious security threat to the DRC, CAR and southern Sudan. On 21 June, the Ugandan Minister of State for Foreign and International Affairs, Oryem Henry Okello, said that the LRA, which once brutalised and terrorised northern Uganda, was no longer a threat to the people or security of Uganda. The State Minister said that sources from the Ugandan intelligence had revealed that the number of active LRA rebels had been reduced to less than 100, excluding abducted and enslaved conscripts. However, the fugitive group of killers, looters and rapists, despite having lost their cause and relevance long ago, would still sow havoc and misery in a desperate attempt to survive. Therefore, the LRA continues to raid remote locations to gather food, money, or captives in order to help sustain its existence.

COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Somalia

Previous Communiqués of the PSC

In a press statement, PSC/PR/BR.2(CCLXXIII), adopted at its 273rd meeting held on 21 April 2011, the PSC expressed its concern over continued and serious differences between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) over the end of the transitional period and post-transition arrangements. The PSC urged them to harmonize their views on these issues and further urged the TFG to take advantage of the gains made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to map out a clear political strategy.

The offensive that the TFG forces launched in collaboration with AMISOM in February 2011 enabled the TFG to achieve some military gains and control more than 60 per cent of Mogadishu. There has also been some important progress in terms of engaging local Somalis through improving the delivery of essential services. Under the new Prime Minister, the TFG also initiated encouraging steps for dealing with corruption. However, the TFG has not capitalized on the military gains to identify and implement a coherent political strategy for an inclusive process. More disturbingly, the stability of the TFG has also come under serious strain. Serious disagreement erupted in the course of the past few months between the President of the TFG and the Speaker of Parliament over the end of the transitional period. Although the two resolved their disagreements on 9 June 2011 by signing an accord in Kampala, the terms of the accord that called for the resignation of the Prime Minister triggered violent protests in Mogadishu. Although the disagreement over extension of the terms of the TFG has diminished somewhat, following the announcement of Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi that he would resign in the interest of peace, the stability of the TFG is far from guaranteed.

Despite the territorial gains achieved by the TFG, the security situation remains volatile. The fighting that erupted following the latest TFG offensive resulted in the deaths, injuries and displacements of large numbers of people in Mogadishu. TFG military gains have also forced al Shabaab to resort to suicide bombings.
and high profile targeted killings.

Key internal dynamics and recent developments

The offensive that the TFG considered for over a year finally materialized early in 2011. Against the background of the divisions within Al-Shabaab that have substantially weakened the terrorist armed opposition group, the TFG launched a military offensive on 19 February 2010 with the support of AMISOM forces. In Mogadishu, where much of the TFG-AMISOM offensive took place, Al-Shabaab lost ground to TFG forces. On 23 February, TFG forces controlled and destroyed an extensive trench system over a mile long that had been used by Al-Shabaab fighters to bring reinforcements and supplies to the Mogadishu front lines. AMISOM forces also captured several buildings in northwest Mogadishu that were being used as Al-Shabaab's tactical headquarters, including the former Ministry of Defense, the Milk Factory, and the Military Officers' Club. In the following months, Al-Shabaab suffered further losses of territory in Mogadishu and it was subsequently reported that TFG and AMISOM forces had brought more than 60 per cent of Mogadishu under their control.

In Mogadishu, an area of strategic importance was the Bakara market, which was under Al-Shabaab control and served as a base for launching shells against the TFG and AMISOM forces. What made the attempt to seize the Bakara market difficult was its importance as a business district and its dense population. The fighting that started in mid-February led to the closure of businesses in the market. The closure not only pushed up food prices, but also unduly affected the livelihood of many people who depend on the market. While the fighting continued on through the month of June, it was reported that AMISOM troops had captured major areas in and around Bakara Market.

In other parts of Somalia, TFG and allied forces, including Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, also launched an offensive against Al-Shabaab forces. The fighting by these forces mainly focused on Southern Central Somalia, including areas such as the Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions, Hiran and the Galmudug region. Al-Shabaab retreated from Gedo and Lower Juba, and remained under pressure in other areas. In April, government forces reportedly cleared seven towns along the Somalia-Kenya border.

The military losses it suffered prompted Al-Shabaab to increase suicide bombings and high profile targeted killings. In February, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonated outside a TFG training facility, resulting in several casualties. A suicide bomber with a large explosive was killed at a police camp in the Hamar Jabab district on 21 February, killed eleven people. At the end of April, a roadside bomb killed 15 people in the Gede region. On 10 June, the Ministry of Information spokesman, Abdifatah Abdirnur, reported that Abdi-Shakeer Hassan, who was also minister for National Security, had been killed by a suicide bomb.

Al-Shabaab has been further weakened by defections. During the first week of April, the TFG announced that 15 Al-Shabaab militants had defected. Further defections were also reported in the following month. In order to encourage more defections, and acting in accordance with Somalia's war economy, the TFG announced that it would buy weapons from Al-Shabaab fighters who agreed to surrender. The terrorist group also forced tribal leaders to pledge allegiance to them and join the fighting, while it continued the practice of forced conscription in some of the areas under its control.

Clearly, Al-Shabaab has lost its initial momentum. Its losses to TFG forces are likely to reinforce the resultant decline of the group. While this is good news, it does not at all suggest that Al-Shabaab is about to disappear or that the threat it represents should no longer be taken seriously.

Although TFG and AMISOM forces have achieved significant military victories over Al-Shabaab and retaken territories previously under Al-Shabaab's control, these gains have come at a heavy cost. There are no reliable figures, but both sides have suffered significant casualties. The losses by Al-Shabaab include one of its high profile commanders, the American Abu Mansour al-Amraki, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, believed to be Al-Qaeda's top operative in East Africa. He was one of the world's most wanted terrorists.

Sadly, civilians paid the highest price in the fighting. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in May alone some 1,590 people were admitted to the three main hospitals in Mogadishu. This is almost as many as the total number of injuries reported during the previous three months. Almost half of them were children. The percentage of children affected increased from 3.5 per cent in April to 46 per cent in May. This surge in the number of civilian casualties is attributed to the increased fighting in the densely populated Bakara Market area. According to UN sources, the total number of reported civilian casualties in the five months since the beginning of the year is 3,346.

In the first three months of 2011, nearly 50,000 new Somali refugees were registered in neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. This amounts to more than a hundred percent increase from the number of refugees (23,000) registered during the same period in 2010. This period also witnessed a sharp increase in the number of displaced people. While more than 12,000 Somalis were displaced in April, nearly half of them in Mogadishu, a further 12,500 were displaced in May, again more than half of them in the capital.

Despite the military gains that the TFG and its allied forces have achieved over the course of the past few months, the TFG has shown very little indication of being able to achieve political cohesion. In a disappointing turn of events, the military success was not capitalized upon to elaborate and pursue an effective political strategy. Instead, as the TFG/AMISOM and allied forces gained territories from Al-Shabaab, the various power factions within the TFG became embroiled in fierce squabbles. Although the appointment of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed as the new Prime Minister brought some cause for optimism, the stability of the TFG has once again come under serious strain since the beginning of the year. With the end of the transitional period fast approaching, disagreement has erupted between the Transitional Federal Parliament and the executive institutions of the TFG over the end of the current term of office of the TFG.

The President and his cabinet advanced the view that the term of President Shari’s government should be extended for a period of one year from August 2011. This would enable the TFG to consolidate the security gains achieved over the course of the past few months and finalize other transitional tasks, most importantly the constitution making process. The...
TDFP, particularly its speaker, together with the European Union and the UN, insisted that elections should be held for the position of the TFG President, the Speaker of Parliament and the Deputy Speaker.

Early in February, the Somali Parliament decided to extend the term of office of the Parliament for three years from August 2011 to August 2014. This decision, which attracted huge criticism from Somali and international actors, was based on the constitutional requirement under the Transitional Federal Charter that any extension of the term of the TFG Parliament had to be made before 20 February for the extension to be legal. At the UN-facilitated meeting held in Nairobi, an understanding was reached to extend the TFP mandate for two years rather than the three that the parliament had decreed early in February. Subsequently, the Parliament also adopted a decision reducing the extension of its term of office from three years to two years.

In its February decision, the Parliament also decided that elections would be held to elect the President, the Speaker and his deputies before 20 August. Over the course of the following months, the Parliament stood by this decision. The parliamentary constitutional committee also maintained that these elections should be held.

These actions resulted in an impasse between the Parliament on the one hand and the President and his Cabinet, which sought postponement of the elections by one year. On 10 May 2011, the Minister of Interior of the TFG banned 35 MPs from travelling to Nairobi, who had been elected to the newly formed Electoral Commission of Parliament. The impasse persisted until the second week of June when Uganda’s President intervened to mediate a settlement. President Sharif and the Speaker of Parliament signed the Kampala Accord in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, on 9 June 2011. In terms of the Accord, elections of the President, the Speaker of Parliament and his deputies were deferred for 12 months and would take place before 20 August 2012. The Accord further stipulated that the Prime Minister would resign from his post within 30 days of the signing of the Accord.

Notwithstanding the breakthrough about the extension of the elections by one year, the deal has proved to be shaky. This is mainly because it came at great personal cost to the Prime Minister, who became a sacrificial lamb. The Prime Minister’s downfall came only a few months after he had been appointed. This was also the Prime Minister who was credited with the security gains of the TFG and for his initiative in addressing corruption and enhancing service delivery. Seen from this perspective, it was no surprise that the stipulation in the Kampala Accord that the Prime Minister had to resign triggered violent protests in Mogadishu, thereby forcing the government to ban demonstrations. Although the earlier announcement by the Prime Minister that he would not resign unless compelled by parliament, presented another blow to the Kampala Accord, the Prime Minister subsequently announced on 19 June that he would resign in the interest of the Somali people. Clearly, his decision brought the quest for an extension of the terms of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) to an end. However, it does not represent the end of the differences in the TFIs. The continuing struggle for leadership among key role players and disagreements over the choice of strategies and policies will persist as manifestations of the dysfunctional organization and division of power in the TFG.

Another development worthy of note is the worsening of relations between the TFG and the semi-autonomous Puntland. On 16 January, the Puntland administration announced that it had severed relations with the TFG, which it accused of failing to undertake proper consultations and to allocate for Puntland administration the development funds it had received.

Finally and crucially, there are many transitional issues that are still outstanding. Urgent actions need to be taken to ameliorate the worsening humanitarian situation in the country and the TFG needs to contribute effectively to such efforts. Security conditions need to be consolidated and as such, more focus should be applied to transforming the security sector. Particular attention should also be given to creating conditions and supporting regional and local government/administration efforts. Reconciliation processes need to be enhanced, based on a comprehensive political strategy that facilitates intra-Somali dialogue, driven by Somalis and inclusive of all sectors of society. Alongside these prerequisites, there is also the need to finalize the constitution making process.

Geo-political dynamics

AU and RECs dynamics

On 30 January 2010, the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government held its 17th Extra-Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa. After considering developments in Somalia and the expected end of the transitional period in August 2011, the Assembly decided that in order to avoid a political vacuum, the duration of the term of the Transitional Federal Parliament would be extended. The Assembly left the decision about the duration of the extension of the TFP’s term and the extension of the current term of other TFG institutions to the Somali stakeholders. The Assembly of the AU endorsed the IGAD Communiqué on the extension of the term of the TFG at its 16th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, from 30 January to 31 January.

On 15 October 2010, the PSC endorsed AMISOM’s revised Concept of O perations (C O N O Ps) for a new force-strength of 20,000 for AMISOM, and called for the UNSC to accordingly increase the force strength of AMISOM. As part of the effort for the extension of the force, the AU endorsed AMISOM, a technical level meeting was held on 7 and 8 March 2011 in which the mission’s technical and enabler requirements for the additional troops were considered. Uganda agreed to provide some maritime capability, an air component and some combat engineering elements. In addition, Burundi and Uganda each pledged an additional 2,000 troops. A meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) held on 17 March further discussed the requirements of AMISOM, including the much talked about increase of the allowance of AMISOM troops and compensation for death and disability.

On 23 February, AMISOM, IGAD and UNP OS signed a joint regional strategy agreement. This instrument sought to serve as a basis for coordinating efforts of the three bodies and enhancing cooperation among them.

Early in March 2011, Burundi deployed 1000 troops as the first batch of the required additional AMISOM troops. This contribution increased the force strength of AMISOM to about 9000 troops. AMISOM’s presence in Mogadishu has been further strengthened by the relocation...
of AMISOM civilian staff and police troops to Mogadishu in May 2011.

In April 2011, AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, submitted his periodic report on Somalia to the PSC. In the report, Chairperson Ping updated the PSC on various political and security as well as humanitarian developments in Somalia. With respect to problems in the TFG, the report underlined that the continuing disagreements between the TFG and the TFP had the effect of impeding the implementation of the transitional mandate and called for the speedy resolution of the differences within the TFG. Regarding AMISOM, the report highlighted that 'the major challenge now is to provide predictable and sustainable funding for the Mission to cater for adequate equipment and enablers for the additional 4,000 troops, increased allowances for the troops (at the UN rate of US$ 1,028 per soldier), and funds for military related expenditure'.

**UN Dynamics**

In response to the request of the PSC for increasing the force level of AMISOM to 20,000, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1964. In the resolution, the UNSC decided to increase the force level of AMISOM by 50 per cent bringing the number to 12,000. In April, the Secretary General submitted his latest regular report on Somalia.

In March 2011, the UNSC held an open debate on the situation in Somalia. A presidential statement that was subsequently adopted urged the Transitional Federal Institutions to broaden and consolidate the reconciliation process and intensify efforts to complete outstanding transitional tasks, including the constitutional process. It also highlighted the need for increasing support for AMISOM.

On 12 and 13 April 2011, the UN sponsored a high level consultative meeting that attempted to bring together all Somali stakeholders. The President and the Cabinet rejected the meeting and declined to participate. In a presidential statement issued in May, the UNSC regretted the TFG’s failure to attend the consultative meeting. The UNSC also urged the TFG to reach agreement about the end of the transition and the post-transition arrangements. The UNSC also discussed Somalia during its annual consultative meeting with the PSC, held on 21 May 2011. At the meeting of the members of the Council with the representatives of the Transitional Federal Institutions, the UNSC expressed “grave concern” about the impact of discord between Parliament and other Transitional Federal Institutions over the political process, and urged all sides to reach timely agreement on holding elections.

**Wider International Community Dynamics**

The International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia held its 19th meeting on 2 and 3 June 2011 in the Ugandan Capital, Kampala. The ICG discussed the prevailing political and security situation in Somalia and considered ways of achieving cohesion between the various TFG centres of power, as well as consolidating the security gains registered during the course of the past few months.

Regarding the serious differences between the various TFIs, the ICG expressed its grave concern over the continuing protracted political crisis within the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and noted that changes had to occur throughout the entire spectrum of the TFIs. Although several participants expressed the need for the election of new leadership before the end of the transition in August, it was agreed that Somalis needed to reach agreement on the transition, albeit with the understanding that any extension should not exceed a period of 12 months. The ICG also reaffirmed its support for the Djibouti Agreement and peace process as the basis for the resolution of the conflict in Somalia.

With respect to the security situation, the ICG expressed its support for AMISOM. It also urged the international community to enhance its support for AMISOM. The ICG further stated the need for continuing with the reorganization of the military, police and justice institutions.

**Scenario Building**

Given the above developments, the following possibilities could arise:

**Scenario 1:**

Despite the resignation of the Prime Minister, the division and infighting within the TFG will persist. As a result, the TFG will have very little time and energy for implementing various transitional tasks.

**Scenario 2:**

The TFG will continue to face armed resistance. In the absence of strong political leadership and progress in consolidating key security institutions, the TFG may encounter difficulties in expanding its military campaign and maintaining the territorial gains it has achieved.

**Early Response Options**

The following could be the early response options that the PSC might consider:

**Option 1:**

The PSC could issue a communiqué calling on the President and Speaker of Parliament to maintain their collaboration and speedily agree on the appointment of a new Prime Minister in order to maintain the momentum created during the term of the outgoing Prime Minister.

**Option 2:**

The PSC could also reiterate its call for the international community to provide predictable, timely and reliable funding to AMISOM, including increasing the allowance of AMISOM personnel to the level of UN personnel.

**Option 3:**

The Peace and Security Council could call on the Transitional Federal Government to prioritize the implementation of all remaining transitional tasks including the development of a comprehensive political strategy and constitution making process on the basis of an all-inclusive consultation process.
On 21 May 2011, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held their annual consultative meeting at the Headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This was the fifth such meeting that the two bodies have held since 2007. This is their longest meeting to date and lasted for about 7 hours from 10:00 am to 5:00 pm. Last year the meeting took only three hours.

As agreed during the 4th consultative meeting held in New York in August 2010, there was an agenda agreed between the two bodies when they met on 21 May 2011. The agenda items included consideration of crisis situations (Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Sudan), strengthening the working methods and cooperation between the two bodies and consideration and adoption of a draft joint statement.

This 5th consultative meeting came against the background of increased divergence between the PSC and the UNSC in their approach to some conflict situations in Africa. These most notably relate to Libya and Somalia. On the subject of Libya, there was serious concern that the PSC’s proposal was being sidelined. In their consideration of conflict situations of common interest, the two bodies therefore spent close to two hours on the situation in Libya. The members of the PSC expressed their concern over the approach taken in dealing with the crisis in Libya and in particular their conflicting interpretation of the language of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. For the AU, some of the military actions being taken by NATO raised serious concerns about legality. Most importantly, the PSC members did not respond well to the 5 May 2011 decision by the International Contact Group on Libya that the UN Special Envoy should be the focal point for all mediation efforts. This decision was seen by the PSC as an attempt to further sideline the role of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee that had been mandated to lead on political efforts for resolving the crisis in Libya.

In the joint communiqué issued at the end of their meeting, the two bodies stressed the need for a political solution to the Libyan crisis and welcomed the efforts of both the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General and the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya in the context of the AU Road Map. The difference between the two bodies clearly highlights the need for, and importance of, substantive consultation when dealing with crisis situations in Africa.

The discussion on Côte d’Ivoire was much shorter. Both PSC and UNSC members welcomed the end of the post-election crisis in that country and the inauguration of President Ouattara. In their joint communiqué, the two bodies expressed readiness to support the efforts for rebuilding state institutions and completing the unfinished aspects of the peace process, such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In indicating the fundamental importance of reconciliation and addressing impunity in Côte d’Ivoire, the members of the two bodies expressed their full support for the Ivorian authorities’ efforts aimed at promoting justice and reconciliation, including the planned establishment of a Truth, Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission, and the President’s commitment to investigate alleged human rights violations reported during the post-election crisis.

On Sudan, the members of the PSC and the UNSC discussed the referendum and its aftermath, the imminent independence of South Sudan and the escalating violence in Darfur and Abyei. While they welcomed the successful and peaceful completion of the referendum process, the members of the two bodies also indicated the need for resolving outstanding issues. Although the Sudan Armed Forces assumed full control of Abyei at the time when the PSC and UNSC members were having their consultations, the military takeover did not come to their attention and hence did not feature in their deliberations. Yet, against the background of escalating tension in the area in previous weeks and months, the two bodies emphasized the importance of the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on Abyei. On Darfur, sources present during the discussions indicated that the two bodies differed in their approach to the Darfur Peace Process (DPP). Some members of the UNSC were of the view that conditions on the ground were not conducive to the full implementation of the DPP and that conditions needed to improve substantially as a prerequisite for support of the DPP.

In their joint communiqué, the members of the two bodies urged the parties to the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 to reach an understanding on outstanding CPA issues under the auspices of the AU High Level Implementation Panel. The UNSC and the AU PSC also expressed concern over the violence and insecurity in Darfur, and the importance of reaching an inclusive and comprehensive solution in that region. Most notably, they called on the Government of Sudan and the armed movements to contribute to creating the necessary enabling environment for the Darfur Political Process, including civil and political rights, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of movement of participants and of UNAMID, freedom from harassment, arrest or intimidation, or interference from either side.

On Somalia, apart from the prevailing security situation, an important issue considered by the members of the two bodies was the funding of AMISOM. Members of the PSC reiterated their view that AMISOM should be financed from the assessed contributions of the UN. Like the reservations that UNSC members expressed about the recommendations of the Prodi Report for financing AU led missions through assessed contributions, they opposed the funding of AMISOM through assessed contributions since the UN has no command authority.
On 27 June 2011, the International
conference concerning the situation in Libya and
June 2011, to discuss developments
in Pretoria, South Africa, on 26
The Ad Hoc Committee also met
solution to the crisis.

In their joint communiqué, the AU
PSC and UNSC commended the
progress made by AMISOM and the TFG in consolidating security in Mogadishu and stressed the importance of predictable and timely resources for AMISOM. They also called on the international community to “make contributions urgently to AMISOM, without caveats”.

The AU Peace and Security Commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra, said after the meeting that some African states were frustrated that the UN had failed to impose the no-fly zone and naval blockade for Somalia that was requested last year, but had moved within days to take action in Libya. He said that ten months had elapsed without a significant decision and “the official reaction is that those requests are still being considered”. The AU has also been pushing the UN to “re-hat” AMISOM as a UN peacekeeping force.

The discussion on strengthening working methods and cooperation received much shorter time than the time allocated for the conflict situations. As important as they may be, the meeting’s procedures, unlike previous years, did not obstruct or dampen the deliberations of the two bodies. Of ways of enhancing their cooperation, the meeting encouraged the joint UN/ AU Task Force on Peace and Security to focus on strategic
and country-specific issues of interest to both organizations. A more in-depth consideration of the relations between the two bodies is anticipated when the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations submit their respective reports on their respective strategic visions of the partnership between the AU and the UN.

As in the past year, the two bodies again agreed on the need to implement their previous agreement to further consider undertaking collaborative field missions, on a case-by-case basis and as appropriate, in respect of selected peacekeeping operations, in order to enhance synergy in monitoring their assessments of results and their response strategies.

O n 27 June 2011, the International Criminal Court issued the long anticipated arrest warrant for Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanussi, accusing them of crimes against humanity. However, the Libyan authorities had previously said they did not recognise the court and were not concerned by threats to arrest Libyan leaders. A government spokesman, Moussa Ibrahim, claimed the court was overly preoccupied with pursuing African leaders and said it had “no legitimacy whatsoever”. Some African countries have publicly opposed the issuance of such arrest warrants. However, some observers have also pointed out that a number of African states, some African leaders and even African political parties were handsomely funded by the Libyan dictator. Uganda called the move to arrest Libya’s leaders premature on the grounds that the issuance of warrants tended to preempt the option for dialogue as proposed by the African Union.

In his address to the meeting of the Contact Group in Rome, Italy on 25 May 2011, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, called for an international partnership in the resolution of the Libyan crisis and appealed for international recognition
of the activities of the African Union (AU) High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya.

The AU’s Panel of The Wise, which held its 10th meeting in Addis Ababa on 12 May 2011, expressed deep concern at the situation in Libya, and called for an immediate and complete ceasefire and an end to all attacks against civilians.

However, some diplomatic sources have announced that some African officials at the AU summit in Equatorial Guinea agree that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi should leave power for a democratic transition to take place. U.K. Minister for the United Nations and Africa, Henry Bellingham, said that most AU foreign ministers meeting in Malabo had been telling him privately that they felt Gaddafi should go, thereby defying the issue still considered a taboo at the AU.

On 18 June, 2011 a meeting on Libya attended by Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States; UN Secretary General Mr. Ban Ki-Moon (via video conference); Jean Ping, Chairperson of the AU; Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Abdel Elah Al Khatib, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General for Libya; and Ambassador Habib Kaabachi, Director of the General for Libya; and Ambassador Elah Al Khatib, the Special Envoy of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

On 29 June, 2011, France admitted that it had been air-dropping weapons for civilians in the rebel-held eastern sector of Libya, claiming that civilians couldn’t defend themselves and that they needed help to overrun Muammar Gaddafi’s stronghold in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Reports also disclosed that up to 40 tonnes of weapons, including “light armoured cars”, had been delivered to rebels in western Libya by France. According to Le Figaro the French arms shipments were dropped from planes in the Djebel Nafusa region, where Berber tribes had risen to join the revolt against Gaddafi’s rule and seized several provincial towns. The news was not welcomed by the African Union.

In a statement on 29 June, the AU Commissioner stated that France’s decision to air-drop weapons to Libyan rebels was dangerous and put the whole region at risk. He said that such actions risked creating problems similar to those in war-torn Somalia. Subsequent reports noted that the rebels were advancing to the west in the direction of Tripoli and had made some gains in the last weeks of June, 2011.

The US also continued supporting the mission amidst strong pressure on Obama from war skeptics on Capitol Hill as senators from both parties rejected the administration’s contention that it didn’t need Congress’s permission to continue the military campaign in Libya. President Barack Obama insisted that US participation in NATO military strikes on Libya remained limited and legal, accusing congressional critics of making a “fuss” for political reasons. Germany which recently recognized the rebels also announced that it was ready to provide to provide military ordnance to the NATO mission in Libya, despite its UN Security Council abstention against the mission.

In a joint statement, on 28 June, 2011, the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria and Croatia announced that their respective countries had joined the list of countries who had granted diplomatic recognition to Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) as the only legitimate representative of the Libyan people. As of 30 June, 2011 more than 21 countries had publicly recognized the NTC as legitimately representing the Libyan people. Other countries have implicitly recognized the Council as a political force, for example by visiting its leaders in their Benghazi stronghold, or hosting them for talks, but have stopped short of formal diplomatic recognition. Countries like China, which opposed the NATO attacks, have also eased their stance. Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, described the NTC diplomatic chief, Mahmoud Jibril, as an “important dialogue partner” during Jibril’s trip to Beijing in June. The Turkish Foreign Ministry also declared that while it regarded the NTC as “a legal and credible representative,” of the Libyan people, it did not consider it as the sole representative.

Egypt

On 29 June 2011, Egyptian police clashed with hundreds of anti-government protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, leaving more than a thousand people injured. In the most serious demonstrations since Mubarek’s forced resignation in February, riot police fired tear gas canisters to try to disperse the protesters who were calling for the prosecution of former Egyptian officials, especially the security officials accused of killing protestors, and for the speedy implementation of reforms. Nine people were arrested. On 23 June, Egypt’s former Trade Minister, Rachid Mohamed Rachid, was sentenced to five years in prison in absentia for embezzling public funds and, earlier this month, former Egyptian Finance Minister, Yussf Boutros Ghali, was sentenced to 30 years in prison in absentia, also on corruption charges. Former President Mubarak, who is in custody at a military hospital, is due to go on trial on 3 August alongside his sons, Alaa and Gamal.

On 13 May 2011 The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, met with the Prime Minister of Egypt, Dr. Essam Sharif, in Addis Ababa. The AU Chairperson applauded the improving relations between Egypt and the rest of the African continent and expressed confidence that the political transition process in Egypt was on track. He expressed the hope that it would successfully culminate in Egypt’s genuine democratization. Prime Minister Sharif acknowledged that the Egyptian People were largely dependent on Africa.

The Panel of the Wise of the African Union (AU) held its 10th meeting on 12 May 2011, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The meeting was Chaired by Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and, among other issues, discussed the popular uprisings in North Africa. The Panel emphasized that these developments provided a unique opportunity to deepen the democratization processes.
on the continent and ensure that the commitments made by Member States in numerous AU instruments would be upheld and fully implemented. Referring to recommendations made by two of its members on 6 and 7 April 2011, the Panel appealed to all stakeholders in Egypt to realise popular aspirations for genuine democracy through observation of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The Panel, which undertook a mission to Egypt from 3 to 6 June 2011, met with the Egyptian Prime Minister, Essam Sharaf, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the newly elected Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Dr. Nabil El Araby, as well as other officials and a wide range of civil society representatives. The Panel expressed its satisfaction with what it called the exemplary efforts being deployed by the current Interim Government of Egypt, including the Supreme Council of the Military Forces, for the transition to a new dispensation, a "New Egypt", and a new constitutional order, in accordance with the democratic and developmental aspirations of the Egyptian people.

As evidence of the continuing evolution of the Egyptian political landscape, and in a step that reflects the Islamist group’s growing political importance, the United States announced on 30 June, 2011 that it had decided to resume formal contact with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the movement is facing various challenges in post-revolutionary Egypt, where a new political openness is taking its toll. At the end of June 2011, several members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, including a prominent senior figure, broke away to form a new political party, thereby exposing further cracks in the organization that is expected to be a formidable contender for political power in Egypt’s forthcoming elections.

**Tunisia**

On 28 June, Tunisian police arrested 26 Islamic fundamentalist activists, demanding the release of seven fellow activists, whom they got into a confrontation outside the justice ministry with a group of lawyers. Islamic fundamentalists have become a stronger force in Tunisia since the fall of President Ben Ali, as authorities legitimised the previously banned Ennahda (Renaissance) party in March 2011, allowing it to operate in Tunisia. Ennahda was legalised after three decades as a banned opposition group. It is a moderate Islamist party, comparable to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In a move further manifesting the cracks in the transitional process, and between Tunisia’s emerging political forces, Ennahda said it was withdrawing from participation in a commission intended to prepare the country for its first democratic elections and draft up political reforms. Ennahda accused the commission of ignoring the true aims of Tunisians.

On 20 June, a Tunis court sentenced ousted president, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, each to 35 years in prison for misappropriating public funds, after only six hours of deliberation. The judge also fined Ben Ali 50 million dinars (25 million euros) and his wife 41 million dinars for their transgressions. Through his Paris-based lawyer, Ben Ali stated that the court had ‘delivered a sentence that (was) judicially insane, but politically opportune’ and called the sentencing a ‘parody of justice’ and ‘political liquidation’. Rached Ghannouchi, head of the Islamist Ennahda party, ridiculed the first trial and stated that Ben Ali deserved to get the death sentence. Of 93 charges against him and his inner circle, 35 were referred to a military court. Many Tunisians and several human rights groups have said more should have been done to secure Ben Ali’s extradition from Saudi Arabia, ahead of his trial. On 29 June, a court in Tunis announced that Ben Ali would be facing new charges concerning weapons and drugs.

Tunisia was one of the issues discussed at the Panel of the Wise meeting on 12 May, 2011, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Panel also visited Tunisia at the beginning of June, 2011 and met with high officials in the Tunisian government.

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**Swaziland**

**Previous PSC and AU Communiqués and Recommendations**

Despite the widespread reports of violence in Swaziland on 12 April 2011 and subsequent reports of political repression, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) responsible for promoting peace and security in the region, is yet to consider the political and security situation in that country. The South African government, which assumes the chair of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in August 2011, however, released a statement on 14 April, expressing concern over the political developments in the country and urged the Swazi government to begin a political dialogue with all stakeholders, to seek a speedy and peaceful negotiated solution to the current situation. No other troika or SADC member, notably Mozambique, an immediate neighbor of Swaziland, has released an official statement in that regard. Cognizant of the principle of subsidiarity, the matter has not been elevated to the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, nor has there been any statement as yet from the United Nations, even from its Mbabane-based Resident Coordinator’s office.

**Crisis Escalation potential**

**Recent events**

On 12 April 2011, a planned three-day pro-democracy demonstration in Sub-Saharan Africa’s last absolute monarchy, Swaziland, was met with a severe police crackdown in the towns of Manzini and Mbabane. The were scheduled to coincide with the date in 1973 when the previous monarch, King Sobhuza II, through Proclamation No 7 of 12 April 1973, unilaterally declared a state of emergency. The Proclamation banned political parties, dissolved Parliament, and declared Sobhuza II to be the supreme ruler of the Kingdom with control over the three branches of government that were
then preemptively suppressed by government paramilitary units.

A constitution promulgated in 2005 still gives the King absolute power over all branches of government. In fact, the 1973 political status quo has largely been maintained during the 25 years of the rule of King Mswati III, albeit with less diplomacy (associated with King Sobhuza) and more coercion. The Suppression of Terrorism Act, promulgated in 2008, effectively outlaws multi-partyism and gives the King wide ranging powers to deal with political dissent and the media. The Swazi state has, indeed, become more militarised, with the government increasing its armed capabilities, especially the Royal Swaziland Police and the National Defence force, in recent months.

Currently, the country is experiencing a budget deficit crisis attributed to deficit spending, over expenditure in the public service, and financial mismanagement, among other financial ills, with reports that it has few months of spending power left. The economic crisis is bringing the political and social dynamics of Swaziland’s politics to a head, with financial scandals involving the country’s Prime Minister, Barnabas Dlamini, cabinet ministers and excessive increases in the monarchy’s budget, signed into law under the Royal Emoluments and Civil List Act of 1998. There are also partisan business networks such as Tibiyo Taka Ngwane that serve as additional income streams for the monarchy. Juxtaposed against the country’s widespread poverty, the current crisis is seen as the direct result of inefficiency and mismanagement by the country’s centralized political system.

The recent protests, intentionally modelled on the North African uprisings, were the result of many years of relentless campaigning for the restoration of multi-party democracy and were led by banned opposition parties. In fact, they were similar to those held in Swaziland in the 1990s, then motivated by the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the spread of multi-party democracy at the end of the Cold War. The political objectives of the 12 April demonstrations were twofold: firstly as an anti-austerity refutation spearheaded by public sector unions and secondly as a denunciation of the governance regime of King Mswati III. The latter is known as the Tinkhundla system where voters elect delegates to an electoral college, which then elects members of the House of Assembly and Senate from among themselves by secret ballot. Under this system the King has authority to appoint the country’s Prime Minister, members of the cabinet, and the judiciary. In sum, Tinkhundla elections lack meaningful competition since there is no political pluralism and the King can overturn the election of members at his discretion.

The political formations in the pro-democracy group have been demanding the immediate dissolution of the government, suspension of the legislature and the appointment of an interim government that will establish the modalities for a new democratic organisation, including the drafting of a new Constitution. They also demand the unbanning of all political parties and organizations; the release of all political prisoners and the annulment of all court cases against political leaders and activists; the unconditional return of Swazi exiles to Swaziland; the convening of a national Conference (for a Democratic Swaziland) mediated by South Africa; and appeal to regional and international partners to put pressure on the Swazi government to allow political space for reform.

In what is likely to be a year of protest action, the Trade Unions Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA), along with banned opposition parties like the People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEM), and the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) have resolved to take to the streets once every month for the duration of the year. The planned three-day demonstrations slated for 22 June, described as follow-up demonstrations to the events of 18 March and 12 April, are also expected to sustain the momentum for democratic reform in the country. The relentless pursuit for change is clear, as witnessed by efforts to employ diverse pressure tactics. A case in point is the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT) demonstration of 1 June that petitioned the South African and American embassies in Manzini to freeze the assets of King Mswati and key members of the country’s ruling elite; put pressure on the Swazi government to initiate democratic and economic reforms and respect and uphold human rights in the interim; and to withdraw diplomatic recognition of the Swazi government ‘until the system is changed.’ These demonstrations continuously re-cast the demand for democratic reforms in Swaziland on the international radar.

There have been many failed attempts at popular uprisings in Swaziland in the past decade, with the government’s heavy-handed approach being very conspicuous. These actions have created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainties around freedom of association, assembly and expression; freedoms that are effectively curtailed under the selective application of the blanket legislation that governs civil society operations in Swaziland. Tuesday, 12 April was clearly not an exception and the aftermath has seen arrests, police repression, some arrests and some later released without any formal charges. Two prominent youth leaders, charged with possession of explosives, remain in police custody and reports of arbitrary police raids, extra-judicial killings, presumably under orders of the King who serves as their commander-in-chief, are on the increase. The detention of protestors, in particular the President of the Swaziland National Union of Students, Maxwell Dlamini, has been utilized as an international campaign tool for highlighting the markings of an autocratic state. The pro-democracy movement’s main base of solidarity, the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (CÔ SATU), which also staged a parallel protest at the Swaziland-South Africa border post, has recently committed itself to ‘bringing the pro-democracy campaign to a climax [in 2011]’. To this end, CÔ SATU has threatened to lead a border blockade between Swaziland and South Africa in coming months; mobilise its international allies around the call for a comprehensive boycott of Swazi goods; and put the ‘Swazi matter’ on relevant global multilateral agendas, to enforce action. Today the possibility of a nation-wide revolt, sparked by the Swaziland government’s failure to pay civil servants’ salaries, remains high.

Despite talk about the need to convene a progressive dialogue with the pro-democracy groups, Prime Minister Barnabas Dlamini, who...
has steadfastly resisted domestic and international pressure over democratic reforms, has been downplaying the need for such an initiative. The monarchy has since occupied itself with keeping the masses depoliticised and ungoverned through a combination of measures including surveillance, media control and intimidation. A tacit pro-monarchy campaign, equating dissent with being anti-Swazi, is underway and the aftermath of the 12 April protests has seen an increase in the appeals for respect for royal tradition and nationalism. These efforts have somewhat succeeded in keeping much of the rural population disconnected from politics. However, the shelf life of such initiatives cannot be guaranteed, as frustrations with a perceived closed, corrupt and unresponsive political system remain incessant. What remains a serious challenge is the lack of a common vision for the future of the country, and a clear ‘meeting of the minds’ where common reformist objectives can provide a platform for dialogue between dissident voices and the ruling elite. In light, monarchists should not fear the transition to democracy, but rather use the negotiation platform to ensure the construction of an appropriate democratic system that could be mutually beneficial.

**Key issues and internal dynamics**

The Swazi government has slammed criticism, by the international community on its handling of popular dissent, as political interference and has rejected any form of external intervention. This position simply mirrors a strong history of state repression and autocratic rule, juxtaposed with population pressures, high income inequality and stark economic decline, all of which are contributing to Swaziland’s increasing conflict vulnerability. Uncertainties are mounting on how the government is to reduce its high wage bill in coming months and whether it will implement the proposed 30 per cent cut to conform to the benchmarks outlined in its Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap (FAR) loan arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Alternative sources of revenue, including external revenue, are not forthcoming, with reports that an African Development Bank loan worth R1-billion, anticipated for July, may now only arrive in December.

Despite the protests and growing labour militancy, broad-based popular mobilisation has been difficult to achieve, in part because of surveillance and political repression, but also because of the failure of the democracy movement to bridge the disparate interests of Swaziland’s urban and rural poor. This is significant in light of the monarchy’s use of tradition rhetoric to perpetuate itself and also to fix the notion that any ideological innovation against the monarchy would be a violation of Swazi law and custom.

It is important to note that the monarchy has always had deep-seated misgivings about political pluralism, which it believes will undermine its traditional authority. The electoral regime that has governed Tinkhundla elections (1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008) is designed in such a way that traditional authority is superior to all forms of modern governance. The political system is described as a modified traditional system with a bicameral Parliament, consisting of the House of Assembly, Senate and Judiciary, as well as a set of key traditional institutions, notably the Council of Ministers and traditional advisers, Liqoqo. However, the separation of powers is an illusion, as real and absolute power lies with the King and his Council of Ministers. There are also fragmentations in the country’s political establishment and feelings of alienation from the Tinkhundla parliamentary system, within the establishment itself. A case in point is the sacking of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mathendele Dlamini, and the King’s private secretary, Samuel Mcombe, for allegedly entertaining the revival of the Inbokodvo National Movement, a strong political party that existed prior to independence in 1968.

**Geo-political dynamics**

Despite being a signatory to a number of international and regional conventions on good governance, democracy, elections, rule of law and human rights, including being an active member of SADC and the African Union, Swaziland’s domestication of these norms and subsequent compliance have always been hampered by the duality of the government system and the insistence of the political structure on maintaining its unique character. In fact, it is apparent that the Swazi constitution does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and that the country’s election processes do not conform to the SADC Protocol on elections.

Swaziland has not featured on the agenda of the SADC summit recently, since the SADC Summit only discusses matters tabled by its Chairperson upon the request of the Chairperson of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS). However, the Executive Secretary is empowered to flag specific countries experiencing peace and security challenges, that if not addressed would affect the rest of the region. There are reports that the Organ, with the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, Tomas Salamao, is considering the deployment of a fact-finding mission to the country, which would provide an official basis for any action from the multilateral body. The 14 April statement released by South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, in which it expressed its concern about the political situation in Swaziland, is a welcome change from the regional diplomacy stalemate. South Africa and Mozambique need to reinforce their regional responsibilities as members of the SADC Troika. Stepping up efforts to mediate in Swaziland and giving impetus to a change in rhetoric and tact by the monarchy is what is required for the impasse to be resolved.

Due to relatively strong historical, cultural and bilateral relations, a South African led mediation committee that would be able to initiate such a dialogue with the monarchy and assist in crafting strategies that can balance democracy and monarchism may be welcomed without excessive suspicion or negative reaction by the ruling elites. In the interim, what is required to avert a possible crisis is an effective regional early warning mechanism that could provide a basis for policymaking and also allow for an early intervention to counteract negative developments. For South Africa and Mozambique, this should be a matter of national security as a conflict on their doorstep should certainly pose a spill-over risk to their own countries. Given its advocacy of democracy norms, such a conflict...
could put the Zuma administration in a particularly bad light, but would also raise tensions with the ANC-government’s tripartite partner, COSATU and the ANC Youth League that has labelled SA government relations with the Swazi regime ‘illegitimate’ and vowed to “campaign for social and political justice in Swaziland” at its recently concluded National Congress.

Way forward and likely scenarios

The size and extent of the actual power and influence of the pro-democracy movement in Swaziland, following the 12 April 2011 demonstrations, remain to be seen. Unlike the discontent stoked by high unemployment in North Africa, due mainly to the frustrations of rising populations of highly educated, but unemployed, young people, around 70 per cent of the Swazi population live in rural areas. They are dependent mainly on subsistence farming on land that is communal land held by the King ‘in trust for the nation’ and administered by local chiefs. However, about 47 per cent of the population is under the age of 15 and in the next decade or so, young people without work will cause the total number of unemployed to rise considerably. Urban migration is on the increase and the fruitless search for employment will see many job-seekers ending up in urban slums with poor access to services and little hope for a brighter future. However, according to some observers, it is unlikely that a revolution will take place in the country, in the short to medium term. This assessment is based on the argument that the concept of democratic reform is not widespread and neither well understood nor embraced by the majority of the population. However, what is certain is that the factors that have contributed to the outpouring of anti-monarchy support will continue to linger and fester. In light of this analysis, three possible scenarios can be envisaged.

Scenario Building

Scenario 1:
The best-case scenario, albeit an unlikely one in the short term, is that the monarchy tacitly yields to domestic and international pressure in recognition of the potential risk of destabilisation and the unsustainability of the current model of governance. In this scenario, SADC speedily institutes an investigation into the political developments in the country, compiles a report and tables the matter before the Summit. This paves the way for significant reforms, including the unbanning of political parties, the release of political detainees and initiatives to develop broad and permanent consensus on the future governance model of the country.

Scenario 2:
The second scenario, which is highly likely, is that the socio-political status quo is maintained, but reports of repression begin to increase. In this scenario the shadow seemingly looming over the monarchy diminishes, as protestors fail to mobilise other sections of the population, mainly the middle class and the rural masses. A variation of this scenario is that the Swazi government decides to ignore international pressure and consolidates its repression to discourage further protests.

Scenario 3:
In the third scenario, the government decides to buy time, with the King appearing to heed calls for change and re-committing himself to resolving the adverse political and economic situation. However, none of these actions is likely to lead to substantial transformation. They could lead to political consultative initiatives similar to the Review Commissions of 1992, 1996 and 2005 (all chaired by monarchy-linked personnel), where once again loyalist appointees would be in control. Compromised by a conflict of interests and obvious political bias, these actions could result in minor and cosmetic changes, but would in reality only serve to further consolidate the power of the present regime.

Early Response Options

Option 1:
The OPDS Chairperson should constitute a joint investigation mission to Swaziland, while in the meantime encouraging the relevant political actors to engage in political dialogue that provides the framework for a new political consensus in Swaziland.

Option 2:
In the interim, attempts should be made to address the pressing socio-economic problems that are fuelling social discontent. SADC and development partners could identify priority issues that form the basis for humanitarian support, capacity building, and civil society engagement with peace and security issues, at the regional level.

Option 3:
As democratic norms spread in southern Africa, it will be challenging for the leaders of the region to remain indifferent to the situation in Swaziland. Therefore, a concerted and integrated regional drive would be needed to convince the monarchy that democracy and the preservation of local traditions are not mutually exclusive.
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

Previous AU/PSC Communiqués and Recommendations:

The spread and rise in the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has over the course of recent years evolved into a regional security threat in the eastern and central Africa region, has been a serious security concern for the AU. Recently, the second meeting of Ministers of Defense and Security of countries affected by the atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was held at the African Union in Addis Ababa from 6 to 8 of June 2011. Chaired by the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, the meeting was attended by the Ugandan Minister of Defense, Crispus Kiyonga; the Deputy Minister of the Central African Republic (CAR) in charge of National Defense, Veterans, War Victims and the Restructuring of the Army, Jean Francis Bozizé; the Minister of National Defense and Veterans of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Charles Mwando Nsima; and the Minister of Interior of the Government of Southern Sudan, Lt General Gier Chuang Aluong. Chad and Sudan also sent their representatives to the meeting.

In a Press Release dated 8 June 2011, the AU announced that the ministers had agreed to the establishment of a Regional Task Force (RTF) to facilitate the creation of a Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) by the countries affected by the activities of the LRA. The Joint Coordination Mechanism which is an ad hoc structure composed of the Defense Ministers of the countries concerned, will coordinate the efforts of the AU in responding to the threat posed by the LRA. The agreement recommends the establishment of an African Union peacekeeping mission, comprising of voluntary troop contributions from the affected countries, with the purpose of ending the atrocities being committed by the LRA. The AU will also mobilize financial resources, logistics and any other forms of support needed for the benefit of other components of the RTF. The results of the meeting will be submitted to the Heads of State and Government for adoption, at the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government to be held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea during June-July 2011. The affected countries have further agreed that the fight against LRA should be authorized by the AU and done in collaboration with the UN and the wider international community.

At its meeting held on 22 December 2008, the PSC issued a ministerial communiqué, PSC/MIN/Comm. 2(CLXIII), on the situation in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Council concluded that the joint operation being waged by the DRC, Uganda and the government of Sudan in the Garamba Park region against the LRA, should inspire other actions against the negative forces in the region. The LRA was also featured in the report by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, entitled ‘Enhancing Africa’s Resolve and Effectiveness in Ending Conflict and Sustaining Peace’ SP/ASSEMBLY/ PS/RPT(I), presented at the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments held in Sirte, Libya back in July 2009. Mr Ping highlighted the ‘threat to peace and security in the Great Lakes region’ posed by the LRA and briefed the Assembly on the continental effort to limit the LRA’s atrocities in northern Uganda and in the neighboring states of the surrounding region. On 25 August 2009, the PSC issued a communiqué that, among other issues, discussed the impact of the LRA’s action on events in Southern Sudan, PSC/PR/Comm. (CCI). The Council also called on the international community to exert pressure on the LRA to stop committing atrocities against civilians.

Crisis Escalation Potential:

Africa’s most brutal militia, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), has continued to carry out a campaign of mass abductions, killings, torture and rape in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan. There have been continuing reports of attacks by members of the LRA, emanating from a range of locations in the affected region, and more than a hundred new attacks have occurred since the beginning of 2011. In early June 2011 the LRA launched a five day attack on villages in the region of Dungu, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), killing at least six people. The group also plundered goods and properties from these villages. Dozens of villages were attacked, looted and burned.

On 7 June, 2011 the LRA killed a doctor who was delivering polio vaccines in an ambush in the Central African Republic. His driver was also killed. The rebels later set fire to their vehicle and all the vaccines they were carrying. Horrified by this cruel and senseless action, the CAR council of doctors, pharmacists and dentists demonstrated in the capital, Bangui, demanding protection from the activities of the LRA.

Further manifesting its reach in the region, the LRA carried out another raid in the Equatoria region of Southern Sudan, in June 2011. Local people and officials reported that members of the LRA raided Kidii village in Gangura Payam, Yambio county, on Friday, 17 June, abducting two children, a 12 year old girl and a 14 year old boy. The children were rescued by the Arrow Boys, named after the bows and arrows they had used before the state provided them with guns, a local militia that had been established to counter the attacks of the LRA. The Arrow Boys said they had killed two of the LRA abductors. The Minister of Information and Communications in the government of Western Equatoria State condemned the LRA attack and called for continued support for the SPLA and the Arrow Boys to help bring peace and stability to the state and appealed for financial support from the government in order to further build the capacity of the Arrow Boys.

The biggest attack in recent LRA history took place in December 2009, where the LRA raided local communities in the Makabola region of the DRC during a four day rampage that resulted in the deaths of some 300 people and the abduction of 250 others, including 80 children.

Since September 2008, the LRA has killed nearly 2,400 civilians and abducted some 3,400 others, many of them children. More than 400,000 people have been displaced due to LRA activities across this remote...
Central African region, with limited or no access to humanitarian assistance. The LRA continues to present a grave threat to the security of civilians in the region amid the ongoing peace and political processes in these countries. Through the years, LRA bandits have demonstrated their ability to mount operations across borders, which has implications for the crisis escalation potential in the region’s complex conflict dynamic.

**Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:**

On 17 June, Joyce Apio, the coordinator of the Uganda Coalition for the International Criminal Court, announced that the trial of war crime suspect Col. Thomas Kwoyelo, over atrocities committed during the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in northern Uganda, had been postponed until July. Kwoyelo, who is accused of kidnap with intent to murder, is set to appear before the War Crime Division of the High Court in Gulu, Uganda, on 11 July 2011. Kwoyelo was captured on 3 February, 2009 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Despite its Ugandan origins in the mid-eighties the LRA is today a more serious security threat to the DRC, CAR and southern Sudan. On 21 June, the Ugandan Minister of State for Foreign and International Affairs, Oryem Henry Okecho, said that the LRA, which once brutalised and terrorised northern Uganda, was now a threat to the borders or security of Uganda. The State Minister said that sources from the Ugandan intelligence had revealed that the number of active LRA rebels had been reduced to less than 100, excluding abducted and enslaved conscripts. However, the fugitive group of killers, looters and rapists, despite having lost their cause and existence.

The LRA emerged shortly after the ascendancy to power of Ugandan Yoweri Museveni, who succeeded Milton Obote in 1986. The remnants of Obote’s defeated forces fled to their home areas in the north and, fearful of revenge from the new government, formed a pseudo-spiritual movement which later evolved in 1988, under the leadership of Joseph Kony, to form the LRA, supposedly guided by the ten commandments of the Christian Bible.

Joseph Kony was born in 1961 in the village of Odok, among the Acholi people of northern Uganda. He inherited power through his aunt, because she was the tribe’s mystic who started the Holy Spirit Movement that inspired the Acholi people to try to retake the capital city, Kampala. The LRA has now been waging a brutal rebellion for more than two decades in northern Uganda. Kony claims to be on a mission to cleanse the Acholi ethnic group, which is largely resident in the northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum in northern Uganda. He employs biblical references to explain that it is necessary to target and abduct the Acholi because of their reluctance to support his cause. In this way the Acholi became the first victims of the LRA’s terrorism. More than half a million people in Uganda’s Gulu and Kitgum districts have been displaced by the conflict and are living in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

The LRA has abducted large numbers of civilians for training as guerrillas. Most victims are children and young adults. The LRA has also abducted young girls as sex slaves. Other children, mainly girls, are reported to have been sold, traded, or given as gifts by the LRA to arms dealers in Sudan. While some later managed to escape or were rescued, the whereabouts of many children remain unknown. Amnesty International has reported that without child abductions, the LRA would have few serving combatants.

An extensive military operation named Operation North, launched in 1991 by the Ugandan government, failed to eradicate the LRA due to significant support from the Sudanese government. Consequently, the LRA was able to establish safe bases across the border in southern Sudan. Although it is not clear how such brutality accords with the Ten Commandments, civilians suspected of supporting the Ugandan government or forming self-defence forces had their ears, lips and noses hacked off.

In 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony, his deputy, Vincent Otti, and three other rebel commanders. Following the long and fruitless efforts to achieve peace in the region, including the Juba Peace Processes LRA attacks continued unabated. Consequently, the governments of the DRC and Sudan, led by the Ugandan armed forces and strengthened through intelligence and logistical support from the United States, undertook a military campaign against the LRA in the north eastern Congo. The campaign, known as Operation Lightning Thunder, took place in December 2005. The operation, which aimed to neutralise the LRA, ended on 15 March, 2009. Although the operation succeeded in weakening the LRA, the fact that the borders of the countries involved remained porous, and that the territories affected by the LRA remained without effective protection by the respective national armies, allowed the rebel group to continue terrorizing its victims.

Specifically, the LRA has exploited the inability of the Congo, South Sudan and the CAR to control their border areas, and has benefited from these weaknesses and the ineffective coordination between the security institutions of these countries. The UN missions in the Congo and South Sudan have also not received specific mandates to address the LRA threat. Consequently, civilians have been left with no choice but to seek alternative ways to defend themselves. Faced with repeated LRA attacks, local authorities in the CAR and southern Sudan urged the local population to set up self-defense groups to protect their villages. The adoption of a self-defense approach could however trigger an even wider conflagration which could also generate additional spin-off militia groups which might ultimately make the entire region ungovernable. For example, in southern Sudan, where the DDR process is facing serious challenges, the proliferation of rebel groups and the arming of civilians by the government could backfire.

For a long time, countries of the region have been downplaying the LRA threat. Most notably the denial by the Congolese government of the...
LRA threat has sparked criticism and local demonstrations by people in the Uele district who feel abandoned by their government and fear the LRA. There have also been reports that the Congolese government and military authorities have intimidated and censored civil society members to limit their criticism of the government, pressuring them to seek official approval before making any public statements, and threatening that there would be consequences if they continue to speak out about ongoing LRA attacks.

The LRA uses tactics based on the use of small and highly mobile militia formations, which attack unprotected villages to abduct new recruits as well as stock up on supplies, including food and clothing. The LRA seems to have received some support from Sudan and this has had an impact on relations between Uganda and Sudan, and the two governments have traded accusations about supporting one another rebel movements. In April 1995 they even severed diplomatic relations over this issue. There are now allegations that Joseph Kony is operational in the southern Darfur region of Sudan. However, these reports are yet to be substantiated. There are also reports, still to be verified, that the LRA is actively seeking alliances with other militia groups such as the Liberation Army for the Restoration of Conscience (LARC) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD).

Without a doubt, the LRA poses the most significant security threat for civilians in the region. The LRA has regionalised its sphere of activity and now has to be combated through an integrated regional and continental approach. The inability of the national security forces of the countries in which the LRA is operational, to coordinate their response to the rebels, allows them to continue conducting their operations across the relatively porous borders.

Geo-Political Dynamics:

Pan-African and REC's Dynamics:

The recent AU-led effort to coordinate the strategies of the countries affected by the atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Uganda and Sudan, in a significant advance in addressing this serious regional security challenge. The meeting agreed to the establishment of an African Union peacekeeping mission with the aim of ending LRA atrocities. The African Union will be working to mobilize voluntary contributions to fund the envisaged JCM, including the establishment of force headquarters and a Joint Operations Centre (JOC). The AU will also mobilize financial resources, logistics and any other forms of support needed for the benefit of other essential components of the RTF. The affected countries will contribute troops for the operation.

The AU has actively sought to promote efforts to resolve the ongoing conflict between the Ugandan government and the LRA, as evidenced by its support for the Juba peace process. The AU also participated in the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) that emerged from the Juba process. AU observers had been deployed in Southern Sudan to monitor the implementation of hostilities of August 2006. However, in July 2009 due to the impasse in the peace process; the AU withdrew its military observers from Southern Sudan. The LRA’s current sphere of activity includes at least four countries with membership in more than one regional bloc, which means that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) should also be involved in finding solutions to the crisis.

UN Dynamics:

In December 2009, the UN issued a report alleging that the LRA was responsible for committing human rights atrocities, including summary executions, abductions, rape and systematic pillaging, in the Haut Mboumou region of the CAR. On 28 May 2010, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1925, revising MONUC’s mandate from a peace-keeping operation to a ‘stabilisation mission’, which has been renamed the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). However, the government of the DRC has since requested the UN to withdraw its armed presence from the country by August 2011, which raises concerns about regional stability. In response to attacks by the LRA, the United Nations Security Council also calling on UN missions in the region to coordinate strategies for, and information about, the protection of civilians. The UN missions in the region include MONUSCO, UNMIS (in the Sudan), MINURCAT (in the Central African Republic and Chad), UNAMID (the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) and BONUCA (United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic).

On 9 June 2011, the head of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Roger Meece, told the UN Security Council that the only strategy that would significantly reduce or eliminate the LRA as an ongoing threat in the region would be one that focuses on LRA leaders, three of whom are under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Mr Meece further informed the Council that the strategy required a broad effort that went beyond the scope and mandate of the UN’s Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). He also noted that MONUSCO’s military operations were being negatively affected by a shortage of helicopters.

The UN peacekeeping force in the Congo, MONUSCO, has just over 17,000 peacekeepers deployed throughout the country, but fewer than 1,000 are deployed in LRA-affected areas in northern Congo, and none are based in the Bas Uele district where Kony and other senior LRA leaders have recently been active. Due to inadequate resources, MONUSCO has given priority to the protection of civilians in the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo.

MONUSCO faces a serious shortage of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers, intelligence analysts, interpreters, helicopters, and adequate fire power. Consequently, there have been accusations that the UN Security Council has paid insufficient attention to the LRA and its activities.

According to Human Rights Watch the LRA has successfully carried out attacks in extremely close proximity to a MONUSCO base on at least five occasions in the past 12 months. In one such attack, on 28 August, 2010, the LRA attacked less than 500 meters from MONUSCO’s Company Operating Base (COB), which housed...
200 peacekeepers. The attack took place in the Duru Haut Uele district and resulted in the abduction of eight civilians by five LRA combatants. No special patrols were sent to the site of the attack, nor were any clear actions taken by the peacekeepers to pursue the assailants. That night, the LRA brutally stabbed and killed three of the young men they had abducted.

**Wider International Community Dynamics**

Bilateral and multilateral strategic partners of the African Union were in attendance at the opening of the second meeting of Ministers of Defense and Security of countries affected by the atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The European Union, as well as bilateral partners, such as the United States of America, reiterated their support, in principle, for this important initiative of strengthening regional cooperation for the ultimate elimination of the LRA.

The most significant international effort to eliminate the LAR was the signing of a new piece of legislation by US President Barack Obama on 24 May 2010, entitled ‘the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009’ (S.1067/HR 2478). The Act which was unanimously adopted by the US Senate on 11 March 2010 authorised up to $40 million for humanitarian relief, reconstruction, reconciliation, transitional justice and economic recovery for northern Uganda. This law focused on articulating a new strategy to end one of Africa’s longest running insurgencies. President Obama pledged to continue to support efforts to protect civilians and to end what he described as a ‘terrible chapter in central African history’. The US also provided intelligence, logistics, equipment and political support for the Ugandan-led Operation Lightning Thunder in 2008.

Subsequently, on 24 May, 2011, the first anniversary of the law, a coalition of nearly 40 human rights groups accused the Obama administration of doing little to end the humanitarian crisis created by the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Central African Republic and called on the US to step up efforts to fight against the LRA that has intensified its attacks in Central Africa, especially in Congo’s volatile northeast. The groups, which included the New York-based Human Rights Watch, requested that a special envoy should be appointed for the African Great Lakes region.

When the new commander of the US Africa Command (Africom), General Carter F. Ham, visited Uganda in early May 2011, he expressed frustration at not being able to catch Joseph Kony and end the LRA menace in the region. Gen. Ham emphasised the importance of arresting Joseph Kony.

**Civil Society Dynamics**

On 9 June, 2011 a group of 47 human rights bodies urged the UN Security Council to better equip its peacekeepers to protect civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The group said that the UN mission, in its current form, was insufficiently prepared to respond to many challenges posed by ongoing violence from various quarters, including in the eastern Kivu provinces. Members of civil society further urged the UN Security Council to ensure that the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) had adequate and appropriate resources to protect civilians from attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

**Scenario Planning:**

Given the regional crisis caused by recurrent attacks by the LRA on civilians the following are potential scenarios:

**Scenario 1:**

The continued LRA insurgency could lead to even more deaths and displacement, creating a more pronounced security and humanitarian crisis in the region. This could negatively affect the ongoing peace and political process in the countries concerned. For example, South Sudan, which will shortly become an independent state, in view of its relatively weak security institutions and state structure might struggle to protect its citizens from LRA atrocities.

**Scenario 2:**

The realization of the AU-led regionally coordinated peacekeeping mission, with necessary external support, could restrict the LRA’s sphere of activity and help capture or kill LRA leaders and fighters, thereby putting an end to two decades of LRA atrocities.

**Scenario 3:**

The revitalisation of the Juba peace process could lay the foundations for a political solution to the LRA crisis, which seeks to address the root causes of conflict in the region, notably the security, stability and economic development of northern Uganda.

**Scenario 4:**

The possible merger of the LRA with other regional armed militias in South Sudan, Darfur, Rwanda or the DRC could effectively multiply the magnitude of the existing security threat.

**Scenario 5:**

Enhancing the mandate and capacity of MONUSCO could help protect civilians in the DRC and facilitate humanitarian assistance in the area.

**Early Response Options:**

Given the above scenarios the following options could be considered by the PSC to improve the security and stability in the region:

**Option 1:**

The PSC could work to implement the decisions by the Ministers of Defense and Security of countries affected by the atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) after adoption by the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government.

**Option 2:**

The PSC could coordinate its interventions in tandem with the UNSC to develop a joint response...
strategy, which would be based on a close partnership with UN missions in the war affected countries and would address the defensive gaps in eastern CAR as well as much of northern Congo, including Bas Uele district.

**Documentation:**

**Relevant AU Documents:**
- Press Release on the 2nd Regional Ministerial Meeting on the LRA (6-8 June 2011) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- Assembly/AU/6(XIII) (1-3 July 2009) Report of the Peace and Security Council of

**UN Documents:**

**SPOTLIGHT: AU-USA RELATIONS**

The recent visit to Ethiopia by the Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and her address, on 13 June, at the African Union Commission headquarters in Addis Ababa, focused on AU-US cooperation on peace and security among other issues.

Despite the fact that there are numerous regional and international security issues mutually shared by the two parties, America's engagement with the African Union has been very much limited and unilateral compared to the relations between the AU and the EU. Nonetheless, there is enormous potential for a close and effective partnership. The address by Secretary Clinton, which is the first AU address by a US Secretary of State, stated that the US has a genuine interest in partnering with the AU on various peace and security matters, including piracy, trafficking and terrorism. Her speech also illustrated the division between the AU and the US on Africa's major security issues, like Libya.

In 1995, the US Defense Department released a memorandum which boldly stated that 'America's security interests in Africa are very limited' and that 'ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa'. Nevertheless, the past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the strategic importance of Africa, particularly due to the need to access oil and other natural resources, increased incidents of terrorism and climate change challenges. These developments have compelled the US to revise its strategic involvement in Africa. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 altered US strategic foreign policy interests, which led to that country's increased security, military and intelligence involvement in Africa. Consequently, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region are in particular viewed by the US as potential safe havens for Al-Qaeda and other religious extremist groups.

Such developments have resulted in the creation of institutions like the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), which was launched in 2007. Many African observers have criticized the move as 'a militarisation of American diplomacy in Africa' and a number of pivotal AU member states, including key regional actors like Nigeria and South Africa, have openly stated their skepticism about the Command's mission. However, AFRICOM has repeatedly stated that its only objective is to work to promote the peace and security of the continent and stipulates that it wants to build the capacity of African national security institutions. One of the areas that the Command focuses on is security sector governance. However, the US does not yet have significant institutional engagement with the AU as an institution. In his February 2010 visit to the AU, the former Commander of the United States (US) Africa Command, General William Ward, announced that AFRICOM was willing to assist the AU in its peace and security efforts within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

In August 2006, the United States became the first non-African country to establish a separate diplomatic mission to the African Union. The intention was to partner with the AU in strengthening democratic institutions and promoting peace and stability in Africa. The United States assisted the African Standby Force (ASF) in its effort to become fully operational and also contributed resources and expertise to the on-going development of a sound maritime...
strategy and to improving the medical planning capability of the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). In 2009, the US also delivered communication equipment and provided training to support the AU’s goal of developing a continental communication architecture that includes regional standby brigades and on-going peace support operations.

Training is a significant component of U.S. support to the AU’s peace and security initiatives, including the areas of strategic communications, conflict monitoring and analysis, and military planning. Additionally, since 2007 the United States has reportedly provided support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) valued at 258 million USD, making the U.S. the largest individual financial contributor to AU peacekeeping operations in that country. Between 2006 and 2008, the United States also sent close to a billion USD to the UN/AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.

However, none of the total U.S. aid to Africa in 2008, an estimated 5.2 billion USD, nothing was specifically allocated to the African Union. The US has directed the funds toward peacekeeping missions and AU-supported programs on a case-by-case basis in preference to direct institutional engagement with the AU. In her 2005 address, Jennifer Cooke, co-director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported to the US Senate that American support to the AU was ad hoc, crisis-driven, vulnerable to depletion by other budget lines, and uneven from year-to-year. In August 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also acknowledged these gaps and pledged additional assistance. Some observers are of the view that the US has never been able to construct a coherent effective policy on what to do about Africa. Critics have also repeatedly complained that the US has continued to supply money to individual countries that benefit its interests, rather than giving more substantial funding to the AU.

Secretary Clinton’s address to the African Union covered three points, namely democracy, economic growth and peace and security. She emphasized America’s commitment to democratic principles, including free and fair elections, just transitions of power, and sound governance. Mrs Clinton pointed out that, in order to support these goals, USAID has been working with the AU’s Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit to improve election processes across Africa. USAID also assists the AU to promote the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, and has strongly emphasized the important work of regional institutions in solving security challenges and delivering concrete results that produce positive changes in people’s lives. She said that to solve the problems confronting Africa and the world, the world needs the African Union and Africa’s sub-regional institutions to lead the way.

In reference to the many peace and security issues on the African continent, Secretary Clinton focused on the situations in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC and efforts to end the brutal campaign of the Lord’s Resistance Army, as well as transnational crimes like piracy and trafficking. She also devoted much attention to recent developments in North Africa and called on the AU to step up pressure on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to relinquish power and to isolate his embattled regime. She urged African countries to suspend the operations of the Gadafi regime by closing Libya’s Embassies where necessary, and expelling pro-Gaddafi diplomats. There was an element of disagreement in the AU meeting hall as many member states still disapprove of the NATO led attacks on Tripoli. The disagreement about the manner of implementing the “no fly” zone over Libya manifests the serious disagreements between the AU and the US on some outstanding major issues. However, Mrs Clinton’s points on other areas and future partnerships were generally well received by the AU Commissioner and Chairman of the Permanent Representatives’ Council (PRC).

The ongoing growing partnership between the AU and the US will undoubtedly have a positive effect in addressing various global and regional security challenges affecting Africa. However, such engagements should be based on close consultation and mutual respect, facilitated through diplomatic channels between the U.S. government and the AU and focus on assisting the AU to build its capacity and ultimately take the lead in addressing Africa’s many challenges.
## Important Forthcoming Dates

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### Election Dates

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