OVERVIEW FOR JUNE

Gabon has the presidency of the Council in June.

A number of debates are planned. A high-level open debate on HIV/AIDS is planned early in the month. And another thematic debate, on small arms and drug trafficking, seems likely later in the month.

Another major feature in June could be a private meeting to consider a recommendation from the Security Council regarding the reappointment of the Secretary-General.

A debate is also planned on the International Tribunals.

There will be a debate on the counterterrorism machinery in the context of the renewal of the mandates for the Ombudsperson and the monitoring team assisting the Taliban/Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee established under resolution 1267.

Sudan will be a major focus during the month. The US and Russia will brief on the visit of the Council delegation to Sudan. Consultations and decisions on the future of UNMIS seem likely. There will also be briefings on Sudan from the ICC prosecutor (followed by a private meeting) and from the Sudan Sanctions Committee (in informal consultations).

On the DRC, a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a meeting in informal consultations and a meeting with troop contributors are expected, along with the adoption of a resolution on the renewal of MONUSCO. A briefing in informal consultations on the DRC Sanctions Committee is also anticipated.

Two other peacekeeping missions are scheduled for review and renewal—UNDOF (monitoring the Syria/Israel) ceasefire line and UNFICYP (monitoring the peace in Cyprus). Briefings in informal consultations and meetings with troop contributors are expected on both situations.

On Somalia, there will be a briefing by the UK on the meetings of the Security Council delegation held in Nairobi with Michel Martelly, took place on 14 May 2011. The inauguration of the new Haitian president, Michel Martelly, took place on 14 May after a lengthy and delayed electoral process. It is unclear when the Secretary-General’s comprehensive assessment will be concluded.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending include:

- Resolution 1944 (14 October 2010) called on the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the security environment following the election and transfer of power to a new Haitian government in 2011. The inauguration of the new Haitian president, Michel Martelly, took place on 14 May after a lengthy and delayed electoral process. It is unclear when the Secretary-General’s comprehensive assessment will be concluded.

- On 28 May 2010 in resolution 1925 on the mandate of MONUSCO, the operation in the DRC, the Council requested the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council and the TCCs. The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Council and the TCCs on this issue.

- The position of Special Envoy for Myanmar has not been filled since Ibrahim Gambari left the post in January 2009. Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General’s Chef de Cabinet, took on the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar in what was expected to be temporary role.

- The Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide has been dormant since 2008 when it held its last meeting.

- Resolution 1904 in December 2009 indicated that the expert groups assisting the three counterterrorism committees (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaeda and
Somali leaders and later in the month there will be a briefing on the Secretary-General’s expected report on piracy.

Libya is likely to be discussed in several briefings and consultations including the briefing by South Africa and France on the meeting in Addis Ababa between the Council delegation and the AU Peace and Security Council. Other African issues may be covered in that briefing, as well as the developing relationship between the AU PSC and the Security Council.

The AU/UN relationship will also be a feature of a briefing mid-month on the expected report from the Secretary-General on options for providing support to AU peacekeeping efforts.

Resolutions are expected to be adopted renewing the mandates of the panels of experts assisting the sanctions committees on DPRK and Iran, and the Iran Sanctions Committee chair will also brief the Council.

Consultations are expected on:
- the monthly DPA briefing;
- the monthly discussion on the Middle East (which will be preceded by the usual public briefing);
- Iraq/Kuwait; and
- Guinea Bissau (preceded by a public briefing).

Reports on Central African Republic, on Liberia (from the panel of experts) and on the temporary redeployment of UNMIL reserves to Côte d’Ivoire will be before the Council. (The authorisation for the latter expires on 30 June.) At press time it was unclear what discussions on these issues will be scheduled.

Aide-Memoire (continued)

- Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee or CTC, and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction) should be co-located and asked the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements “as soon as possible.” This request, reiterated in September 2010 (S/PRST/2010/19), is still outstanding.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), was never made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.
- On 11 November 2009 in resolution 1894 on protection of civilians, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on reporting for enhancing the Council’s monitoring and oversight. There has been no report back to the Council on this.
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past were produced every two to three months. They have decreased in their frequency. The last report, released in July 2010, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.
- The request in resolution 1460 on Children and Armed Conflict that all the Secretary-General’s reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2009 protection of children elements had been incorporated into only half of the relevant country-specific reports.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.

Status Update since our May Forecast

- **Terrorism:** On 2 May, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/9) welcoming the news that Osama bin Laden “will never again be able to perpetrate” acts of terrorism. The statement reaffirmed the importance of all previous Council resolutions on terrorism and reiterated that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality or group.
- **Lebanon:** On 6 May, Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen briefed Council members on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (S/2011/258). The discussion in consultations focused on the ongoing disarmament challenge and related border security issues, the lack of government formation in Lebanon, developments in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and possible spillover effects from the crisis in Syria.
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina:** On 9 May, High Representative Valentin Inzko briefed (S/PV.6529) the Council on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inzko said that while political parties employing zero-sum politics, state-level legislative processes were at a standstill and the country is facing the most serious and most direct challenges to the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement since it was signed 15 years ago.
- **Protection of Civilians:** On 10 May, the Council held a debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/PV.6531 and Res. 1). The situations in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria were addressed by many of the more than 40 speakers. Some welcomed the recent report of the Secretary-General’s panel of experts on accountability in Sri Lanka and called for implementation of its recommendations.
- **Kosovo:** On 12 May, head of UNMIK Lamberto Zannier briefed (S/PV.6534) the Council on the situation in Kosovo. He said that the EU-mediated talks between Kosovo and Serbia were crucial to resolving problems hampering development. He stated that he supported the call by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly for a thorough, impartial and independent investigation into allegations of inhumane treatment of people and illicit trafficking of human organs in Kosovo and said that “UNMIK remains fully available to cooperate with such an investigation”.
- **Peacebuilding:** Civilian Capacity Review: On 12 May, the former head of UN peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, briefed the Council on the independent review of UN civilian capacity for deployment in
the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/PV.6533). Guéhenno had chaired the independent senior advisory group that undertook the review (S/2011/85). The head of the UN department of field support, Susana Malcorra, and the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission, Rwandan Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana, also briefed the Council. Malcorra said she is working on recommendations for the Secretary-General to present to the General Assembly and Security Council in September or October.

- **Chad**: On 13 May, Council members were briefed by Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, on the protection of civilians in Chad (S/2011/278). She said that the 31 December 2010 withdrawal of MINURCAT so far does not appear to have adversely affected security in eastern Chad. Amos cited better bilateral relations between Chad and Sudan, the deployment of a Chad-Sudan joint border force and an increase in security personnel in displaced persons camps as contributing factors.

- **Thailand/Cambodia**: On 17 May, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, briefed Council members in consultations on the situation on the Thai/Cambodian border. This followed ten days of armed clashes in late April between the militaries of Thailand and Cambodia along their disputed border resulting in 18 deaths (including one civilian) and the displacement of tens of thousands. Pascoe updated the Council on the obstacles to the deployment of Indonesian monitors to the disputed area. The deployment had been agreed by the two countries in February, but since blocked by the Thai military.

- **DPRK**: On 17 May the chair of the Committee on DPRK sanctions briefed Council members in informal consultations.

- **Haiti**: On 17 May the members of the Council issued a press statement (SC/10256) congratulating the people of Haiti on the peaceful conduct of the electoral process and the inauguration of a new government. The statement encouraged all political actors in Haiti to resolve any remaining electoral disputes through transparent and efficient legal means in order to reflect the will of the Haitian people.

- **Yemen**: On 17 May Council members were briefed by UN envoy Jamal bin Omer during a briefing by the Department of Political Affairs on emerging issues. Bin Omar briefed on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative there. As it had previously in April, Germany proposed elements to the press expressing concern at the political crisis and support for GCC mediation. It seems Russia opposed the initiative again. On 22 May, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh again refused to sign the GCC initiative which would see him leave power within thirty days in exchange for immunity. At press time, media reports indicated gun battles in Sanaa between Saleh and his main rival Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar that have left 68 dead since Monday, 23 May.

- **Burundi**: On 17 May, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) briefed the Council (S/PV.6538). She told the Council that the situation in the country remained generally calm, and that new laws have been adopted on the functioning of political parties and also for non-parliamentary opposition parties. She also noted that the government was preparing its second poverty reduction strategy paper which will incorporate elements of the strategic framework laid out by the Peacebuilding Commission. But she also noted with concern continuing instances of extrajudicial killings, corruption and Burundi’s lack of self-sufficiency in food production caused by land erosion.

- **Middle East**: On 19 May, UN Special Coordinator Robert Serry briefed the Security Council at its regular monthly meeting followed by consultations (S/PV/6540). Serry told the Council that there was no credible initiative underway to resolve the impasse in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. His briefing also covered the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and the 15 May al-Nakba protests when Palestinian refugees tried to cross into Israel from Lebanon and Syria resulting in 14 deaths.

- **Myanmar**: On 20 May, Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General’s Chef de Cabinet, briefed the Council in a closed meeting on his visit to Myanmar from 11-13 May. He told Council members that the visit had been an opportunity for the UN to engage with the new government shortly after its installation and build on dialogue already established with other key stakeholders. He also told Council members that although small steps had been taken with regard to releasing political prisoners and reducing sentences, the measures fell short of expectations and were insufficient. Council members were also briefed on Nambiar’s meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi, opposition and ethnic nationality groups and civil society.

**Security Council Mission to Africa**: Members of the Council visited Africa from 20 to 25 May. The first leg of the mission, in Addis Ababa, was mostly spent on the annual consultation with the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), though the Council also met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. As reflected in the communiqué, the meeting with the PSC was largely focused on Libya, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. The institutional relationship between the two bodies was also discussed.

In Sudan, stops had been planned in Khartoum, Abyei and Juba. But the attack on Abyei by the Sudanese Armed Forces and the subsequent takeover of the area by the government of Sudan disrupted the plan. Abyei became the focus of most of the meetings in Sudan. A strongly worded press statement was issued on 22 May, condemning the attack. In Khartoum, on 22 May, Council members were snubbed twice by top government officials. Sudan’s foreign minister cancelled at a short notice. His deputy Amir Hasan Omar attended instead. A meeting with Vice President Osman Taha was also cancelled at a short notice. In Khartoum, members also met with UNAMID officials and with former South African President Thabo Mbeki who is engaged in a number of mediation efforts concerning Sudan.

In Juba, South Sudan, on 23-24 May, the Council met with senior officials and also visited local areas to observe the impact of UNMIS’s work.

On 24-25 May the delegation visited Nairobi to discuss Somalia and met with leaders of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions. They presented a strong, unanimous message to the Somali leadership, urging it to reconcile their differences, abstain from unilaterally extending their transitional mandates and warning that the patience of the international community and its willingness to support the TFIs were not infinite.
**South Sudan**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council needs to take decisions in June on the future UN presence in South Sudan after its independence on 9 July. It seems that the Secretary-General’s 17 May recommendations are seen as problematic by a number of Council members.

The issue is complicated by the need to address in parallel the situation in Abyei and other unresolved CPA implementation and post-CPA arrangements relating to the relationship between North and South Sudan as two sovereign states.

SCR will publish an Update Report in early June with further background and analysis following the briefing and consultations expected on 31 May.

**Key Recent Developments**
The Secretary-General has released recommendations on a new UN mission in South Sudan, referred to in his report as UNMISS. The first section of the report describes the outstanding issues in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), including the status of Abyei, disputed border areas, the redeployment and reintegration of northern and southern forces and the possible integration of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) troops into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The first section also outlines the status of negotiations on post-CPA matters such as security arrangements, citizenship, oil-sector management and external debt.

The second section of the report addresses the needs for a new UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, headquartered in Juba. The Secretary-General recommends the mission have the following main tasks under Chapter VI of the UN Charter:

- good offices and political support for peace consolidation;
- support to security sector reform and rule of law;
- conflict mitigation and physical protection of civilians;

and, under Chapter VII:

- physical protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical danger, including through the use of force as a last resort when government security services are unable to provide such security.

The report recommends:

- an integrated mission (i.e. UN funds and programmes such as the UN Development Programme and the UN Children’s Fund would be under the authority of a special representative of the Secretary-General);
- elements of the mission cover: protection of civilians, political, military, police, civil affairs, human rights, justice, corrections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, mine action, child protection, gender, public information, HIV/AIDS support, recovery and refugee return and reintegration, mission support and safety and security; and
- a mandated strength of 7,000 troops with utility helicopters and an engineering capacity and 900 individual police.

After protracted debate in the Secretariat, the report opts for a three-month rollover of the current UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from 9 July to 9 October to allow UNMIS to commence downsizing in Khartoum, while focusing on the dual role of good offices to assist the two sovereign states “to maintain calm while seeking resolutions to the residual CPA and post-referendum issues” and beginning the transformation into UNMISS. The report seems to ignore the option of two simultaneous missions but indicates the intention to deploy to South Sudan on 9 July an “advance team composed of a senior management group” to set up the core capabilities of the new mission under UNMIS’ current mandate. There have been numerous rumours that the Secretariat has no confidence that a three-month rollover will be sufficient and that the Secretary-General will have to request a further three-month extension of UNMIS.

Violence escalated in Abyei throughout May, culminating in an attack by southern forces on a northern (SAF) convoy escorted by UNMIS on 19 May. Khartoum retaliated and seized Abyei on 21 May. The SAF used heavy artillery and tanks and aircraft bombed at least four towns. The SAF used heavy artillery and tank and aircraft bombing at least four
villages in the area. Several shells hit the UNMIS base in Abyei, injuring two peacekeepers. Humanitarian agencies reported that the population of Abyei fled south of the Bahr el-Arab or Kiir river. Khartoum removed the head of the Abyei administration and dissolved the region’s administrative council. On 22 May, Khartoum issued a statement that it was “cleansing [Abyei] of illegal forces.” From 23 May Khartoum-aligned armed Missierya tribesmen burned and looted Abyei town, some say in retribution for southern forces blocking their annual migration. UNMIS condemned this action, calling upon the SAF to fulfill their responsibility for maintaining law and order in the areas they control. On 25 May Missierya tribesmen fired at UNMIS helicopters in Abyei. At press time, the head of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, Thabo Mbeki, was mediating between the parties.

A Security Council delegation visited Sudan from 21 to 24 May. The delegation met members of the Misseriya community in Khartoum and members of the Ngok Dinka community in Wau to discuss possible solutions to the status of Abyei. In light of the attack on the UNMIS convoy the Council members cancelled their planned trip to Abyei. Following the events of 21 May, Council members issued a press statement condemning the southern forces’ attack on the UNMIS convoy on 19 May, calling it a breach of agreements and a criminal act and condemned the “escalatory military operations” being undertaken by SAF in and around Abyei town, including the shelling of the UNMIS compound in Abyei. The Council delegation was scheduled to meet Sudanese Vice President Osman Ali Taha and Foreign Minister Ali Karti in Khartoum. Both cancelled their meeting with the Council members.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether to begin negotiations on the future UN role and presence in the region on the basis of the Secretary-General’s recommendation for a three-month rollover of UNMIS (in effect deferring the fundamental issues) or start negotiations on a fresh basis which addresses both the long-term needs of South Sudan internally and the medium-term needs with respect to maintaining international peace and security between the two sovereign states in light of residual CPA-related issues.

For different reasons both parties seem attracted to a fresh approach.

A further issue is to what extent the aggressive attacks on Abyei by the SAF and Khartoum’s snub of the Council delegation will affect the Council’s approach to upcoming negotiations.

Options
The Council has a range of options:
- decide on a rollover of three months (as recommended by the Secretary-General) notwithstanding the reluctance of Khartoum and Juba;
- decide to terminate UNMIS from 9 July and:
  - re-hat UNMIS personnel in South Sudan for a defined period (say October) tasked with implementing the relevant nation-building parts of the UNMIS mandate in South Sudan pending approval of a new mission with a new mandate; and
  - tasking the headquarters in Khartoum with responsibility for wind-up of mission resources in northern Sudan pending the possible establishment of a good offices capability; or
- reject a rollover and start negotiating the new mission’s mandate immediately.

The Council could also request a briefing from Mbeki on the progress of negotiations.

Council Dynamics
Council members received the Secretary-General’s report on 17 May, only two days before the delegation departed for Africa. Few Council members had a chance to reflect in detail upon the recommendations prior to the visit. Many Council members will be simultaneously analysing the recommendations in their capitals whilst their delegates (including many ambassadors) visit Sudan and provide additional assessments.

The events in Abyei and Khartoum’s snub of the Council delegation may affect the dynamics and the approach of some Council members toward the CPA parties.

UN Documents
Press Statements
- SC/10262 (23 May 2011) was on Abyei.
- SC/10248 (11 May 2011) was on Abyei.

Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2011/314 (17 May 2011) was a special report with recommendations on a successor mission to UNMIS.
On 21 May the AU Peace and Security Council met in Addis Ababa with UN Security Council members where Libya was discussed. The communiqué expressed concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation, stressed the need for an immediate and verifiable ceasefire and the need for a political solution to the conflict. The communiqué welcomed the efforts of UN envoy Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib and the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee and agreed to continue with efforts to find a solution to the crisis.

On 24 May media reports indicate there may have been systematic use of rape by Qaddafi forces during the siege of Misrata. (The UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, flagged the issue of sexual violence in her 9 May briefing to the Council as did Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict Margot Wallström on 14 April. It seems US Ambassador Susan Rice raised similar concerns during 28 April consultations on Libya.)

On 24 May a high-level delegation visited Benghazi and invited the Transitional National Council (TNC) to open an office in Washington DC. Reports indicate the US closed its embassy in Tripoli and asked representatives of Qaddafi to leave Washington DC. On 19 May US President Barack Obama in his Middle East speech characterised the TNC as credible and legitimate and said that Libya’s transition will come when Qaddafi leaves or is forced from power.

On 23 May, TNC head Mustafa Jalil met with the Turkish prime minister, president and foreign minister. Turkey reiterated its 3 May call for Qaddafi to step down and said the TNC was a legal and credible representative of the Libyan people. (Turkey has been playing a mediating role and is a member of the Contact Group and NATO. There has been no formal coordination with AU mediation efforts but Turkey has said it has presented its roadmap to the international community and is willing to contribute to any peace initiative.)

On 22 May the EU opened an office in Benghazi pledging long-term support to the TNC.

On 17 May reports indicate that Tripoli’s oil minister Shokri Ghanem was in Tunisia and may have defected from Qaddafi’s regime.

On 16 May ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo asked the Court’s pre-trial chamber to issue arrest warrants for Qaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanousi for their roles in conducting widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population, arbitrary arrest and torture, and recruitment of mercenaries. Investigations are ongoing in relation to allegations of mass rape by Qaddafi forces and attacks against sub-Saharan Africans mistaken for mercenaries in Benghazi controlled areas. (Ocampo briefed the Council on 4 May.)

On 15 May Khatib visited Tripoli where he met with several high-level officials, but not with Qaddafi as had been previously expected. (On 3 May Khatib briefed the Council and said that both Benghazi and Tripoli wanted a ceasefire but there remained fundamental differences regarding any political process which the TNC has linked to Qaddafi’s departure.)

On 10 May the Libyan situation was brought up during the open debate on protection of civilians.

On 5 May the Libya Contact Group met in Rome and:
- confirmed that Qaddafi, his family and his regime have lost legitimacy;
- reasserted the central role of UN envoy Khatib in reaching a political solution;
- endorsed a temporary financial mechanism to channel funds to Benghazi;
- agreed that the TNC is a legitimate interlocutor, and in that context;
- urged the Libya Sanctions Committee to unfreeze Libyan assets to address humanitarian needs; and
- considered the advisability of establishing humanitarian corridors and maritime corridors.

Developments in the Libya Sanctions Committee

In May, the Secretariat appointed seven members to the Panel of Experts (resolution 1973 allows for up to eight members).

In April, the Committee received proposals from France, Germany, the UK and the US on additional designations which are currently subject to various “holds” from Russia and the US. (Russia asked for time for the listings to be studied in Moscow. The US is lifting its holds on a case-by-case basis as it compiles the requisite evidence to apply the measures domestically.) China and India have lifted their previous holds. The Sanctions Committee is expected to meet in early June. However, there is no clear time frame for when the additional listings might be approved.

In June, member states are due to submit their reports to the Committee on implementation of the Libya sanctions regime (due within 120 days of resolution 1970’s 26 February adoption).

Human Rights-Related Developments

The International Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya concluded its visit on 29 April. The Commission visited Tripoli, Zawiya, Benghazi, Tobruk and Bayda meeting with Tripoli and Benghazi officials, NGOs and UN agencies and conducting interviews with victims and witnesses, medical, legal and military experts within and outside Libya. The team also visited Egyptian and Tunisian border areas. It is currently reviewing material gathered during the mission as well as submissions on matters of fact and law and will report to the Human Rights Council in June.

Key Issues

Ongoing key issues for the Council include:
- whether the Council should play a more active role in political initiatives to secure an “end-game” in Libya; and
- the divergence among members regarding the interpretation of resolution 1973.

Potential issues for the Council in the future include:
- the humanitarian impact of the conflict and the sanctions and any related pressure to alleviate the impact on the population under Qaddafi’s control;
- a UN role in any ceasefire monitoring mechanism and cooperation with the AU in that regard; and
- a UN role in post-conflict Libya.

Options

One option for the Council in June is to simply monitor the situation based on the regular Secretariat briefing.

A second option is briefings from:
- UN Special Envoy Khatib (the Secretary-General announced on 25 May Khatib would be visiting Tripoli soon);
- Special Representative Wallström on the alleged sexual violence aspects of the conflict; and
- a representative from the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on their mediation efforts.
Another option if mediation efforts seem to be gaining traction is to ask the Secretariat to brief on the progress in their post-conflict planning.

The option to designate more individuals and entities under the sanctions regime is still on the table in the Sanctions Committee.

**Council Dynamics**

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa remain concerned about the extent of NATO air strikes and feel all energies should be put into bringing about a ceasefire.

Other Council members would welcome a genuine ceasefire. However, there remains a divergence on whether a ceasefire without a credible political process would solve the problem in Libya or instead might simply create an indefinite stalemate with prolonged suffering for the people.

There is also increasing concern on both sides of this divide that the Libya conflict may become protracted especially if there is continued drift between the Contact Group and AU approach. However, efforts at integration have been problematic. It seems that the Libya portion of the 21 May communiqué in Addis Ababa was difficult to negotiate due to sensitivity about Khatib’s leadership role versus the AU High Level Committee. (The 5 May meeting of the Contact Group on Libya had previously agreed that Khatib should be the focal point for all mediation efforts whereas the AU concerns were that this approach could sideline the AU’s role.)

South Africa’s initiative for Zuma to visit Tripoli on 30 May to discuss an exit strategy with Qaddafi may help to bring the two approaches closer.

There seems to be continued wide support among Council members for contingency planning by the UN Secretariat for an impartial post-conflict UN presence, including ceasefire monitoring (provided it was mobile with access to all parts of the country versus monitoring an arbitrary line).

UN Documents

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime, and established a panel of experts.
- S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, and established a sanctions committee.

**Security Council Meeting Records**

- S/PV.6531 and resumption 1 (10 May 2011) on protection of civilians.
- S/PV.6530 (9 May 2011) was a briefing by OCHA head Valerie Amos on Libya.
- S/PV.6528 (4 May 2011) was the ICC prosecutor’s first briefing to the Council on Libya.
- S/PV.6527 (3 May 2011) was a briefing by Special Envoy Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib on Libya.
- S/PV.6515 (14 April 2011) was a briefing by Margaret Wallström, the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

**Security Council Letters**

- S/2011/319 (18 May 2011) was the terms of reference for the Security Council’s visiting mission to Africa, including a consultative meeting with the AU to discuss Libya and other issues.
- S/2011/313 (16 May 2011) and S/2011/293 (10 May 2011) was the appointment of members to the Panel of Experts of the Libya Sanctions Committee.
- S/2011/307 (16 May 2011) is the AU’s 26 April communiqué on Libya.

**Human Rights Council**


**Other Relevant Facts**

**Chair of the UN Libya Sanctions Committee**

- Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)

**Panel of Experts of the Libya Sanctions Committee**

- Yousef Fahed Ahmed Alserhan, Jordan (maritime)
- Omer Diéye Sidi, Niger (customs)
- Theodore M. Murphy, US (humanitarian and regional)
- Giovanna Perri, Italy (finance)
- Salim Raad, Lebanon (heavy weapons)
- Savannah de Tessières, France (small arms and light weapons)
- Ahmed Zerhouni, Algeria (aviation)

**UN Special Envoy**

Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib (Jordan)

**Security Council Report**

One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org

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**Sudan/Darfur**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is scheduled to receive a biannual briefing from the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on the court’s work in Sudan. The prosecutor is expected to deliver his report in a public meeting of the Council, followed by a private meeting.

The Council is also expected to discuss the Sudan sanctions regime in consultations, following receipt of the mid-term report of the panel of experts.

**Key Recent Developments**

A Council delegation visited Sudan from 21 to 24 May. In Khartoum the delegation was scheduled to meet Foreign Minister Ali Karti and Vice President Ali Osman Taha on 22 May to discuss the situation in Darfur and ongoing negotiations with Southern Sudan. Karti and Taha cancelled their meetings. The Council’s planned discussions on Darfur with the Sudanese government were overshadowed by the developing crisis in...
Abyei. The delegation did have meetings with UN representatives, the head of the AU high-level panel on Sudan, Thabo Mbeki, and internally displaced persons. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) seized Abyei town on 21 May (see separate brief on South Sudan in this month’s *Forecast*).

Prior to their visit to Sudan, Council members met the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. It seems there were differences between the two sides over the Darfur political process (DPP) and whether to endorse a launch of the DPP as soon as possible. It appears there was not enough agreement to include this idea in the final communiqué.

On 17 May the Council extended the mandate of the Sudan sanctions committee’s panel of experts until 19 February 2012 (it was due to expire on 19 October 2011). The mandate’s new period seems to reflect the delay in appointing the panel, which was authorised in October 2010 but not fully appointed until late February 2011. The Council’s early extension also recognises the reality of the situation facing the panel. Its members have had difficulties getting visas to enter Sudan, and there was a risk that it would not be able to undertake much work ahead of preparing its final report in September. Following the extension, the report is now due in January.

Moreno-Ocampo delivered his last biannual report to the Council on 9 December 2010. Several key developments have occurred since, including ongoing armed violence in Darfur against civilians and also directed against peacekeepers. The UN has confirmed that 11 civilians were killed when SAF planes bombed two villages south of Ed Da’ein in South Darfur on 16 May and ten civilians were killed in a village northeast of El Fasher in North Darfur two days later. A female peacekeeper was killed and two were injured in an attack in North Darfur on 4 April.

On 12 May the International Criminal Court (ICC) formally notified the Council about the outbreak of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir to Djibouti on 8 May to attend the inauguration of Djibouti’s president. The ICC stressed that Djibouti was obliged to execute the outstanding arrest warrants against Bashir stemming both from the Rome Statute, to which Djibouti is a state party, and Security Council resolution 1593. The court asked the Council to take any action that it might deem appropriate.

On 16 May lawyers representing the two Darfur rebel leaders facing trial at the ICC notified the court that the defendants would only be contesting whether their September 2007 attack on the AU camp in Haskanita was unlawful, questioning whether the AU mission was a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the UN Charter. Both defendants have agreed to plead guilty if the attack is ruled unlawful.

Ahmed Haroun—also indicted by the ICC—was elected governor of Southern Kordofan state in early May, despite claims from the opposition that the election was rigged.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a statement on 18 March, the Human Rights Council’s independent expert for Sudan, Mohamed Chande Othman, said that he will present his next report in September with recommendations arising from his latest fact-finding mission from which he had just returned. Othman expressed special concern about the situation in Darfur. “We must not forget Darfur, where civilians continue to bear the brunt of the fighting between the armed groups and Government forces,” he said. Othman called on the international community to assist in finding a comprehensive solution to the conflict through an inclusive peace process that addressed the conflict’s root causes, including the economic marginalisation of the region.

Key Issues

A key issue for Darfur is what effect wider issues in Sudan, such as a recent escalation of violence in Abyei and Khartoum’s stonewalling of the Council delegation, will have on the Council’s future approach to issues such as Darfur.

Another issue is the ICC request for action against Djibouti.

Options

Council members could take up the wider Darfur issues in the closed meeting which follows the prosecutor’s briefing and issue either a statement or agree to elements for a press briefing.

Council Dynamics

There are substantive differences within the Council over the ICC’s work in Sudan, particularly between those who are states parties to the Rome Statute and those who are critical of the court’s pursuit of Bashir.

South Africa had publicly indicated when coming onto the Council that it intended to seek an Article 16 deferral of the cases against Bashir.

But events in Abyei, combined with Khartoum’s stonewalling of the Council members’ visit, may mean that there is more scope for a united Council approach on Darfur in the near future.

### UN Documents

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1982 (17 May 2011) extended the mandate of the Sudan sanctions panel of experts to 19 February 2012.
- S/RES/1945 (14 October 2010) renewed the mandate of the Sudan sanctions panel of experts.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2011/252 (15 April 2011) was on implementation of the DPP.

**Security Council Meeting Record**

- S/PV.6440 (9 December 2010) was the previous regular biannual Council briefing by the ICC prosecutor.

**Other**

- S/2011/111 (8 March 2011) was a note by the president of the Council circulating the final report of the panel of experts of the Sudan Sanctions Committee dated 20 September 2010.

### HIV/AIDS

**Expected Council Action**

On 7 June President of Gabon Ali Bongo Ondimba will chair an open debate on the impact of HIV and AIDS on global security. The Council is expected to adopt a resolution.

From 8 to 10 June, the UN General Assembly will hold a high-level meeting on HIV/AIDS ten years after the General Assembly met in a special session and issued a Declaration of Commitment on the topic. Gabon has invited heads of state attending the high-level meeting to participate in the Council debate.

**Background**

The Council first discussed HIV/AIDS in the context of international peace and security.
in January 2000. This was a UN initiative under the agenda item “the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa.” The debate was chaired by then-US Vice President Al Gore as part of a month-long focus by the Council on the special challenges confronting Africa. This was the first time that the Council had identified a health issue as a security threat. Russia and China did not speak.

The UN Secretary-General, the head of the World Bank, the head of the UN Development Programme and the executive director of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) participated in the debate, plus 26 non-Council members. The consistent message from speakers was that HIV/AIDS was devastating the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

Six months later the Council adopted a resolution in July 2000 (resolution 1308), under the agenda item “the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations.” Adoption followed extensive negotiations that started shortly after the January debate.

The preamble of the resolution:

- recognised that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability; and
- stressed that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, might pose a risk to stability and security.

The operative section of the resolution:

- expressed concern at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeepers;
- encouraged all member states to develop effective long-term programmes and strategies for HIV/AIDS education, prevention, testing and treatment for their personnel, as part of their preparation for participating in peacekeeping operations, and to increase international cooperation to develop such programmes; and
- requested the Secretary-General to further develop pre-deployment and ongoing training for peacekeeping personnel on ways to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.

On 25 to 27 June 2001, the General Assembly held a special session on HIV/AIDS. The General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS with the purpose of setting common targets for reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS and alleviating its impact. According to the Secretary-General, the declaration had five priorities:

- ensuring people everywhere know how to avoid infection;
- stopping the transmission of HIV from mother to child;
- providing treatment to all infected;
- redoubling the search for a vaccine; and
- caring for all those whose lives had been devastated by AIDS, particularly orphans.

In 2005 the Security Council held another debate on HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations and issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2005/33) highlighting how resolution 1308 had been implemented in peacekeeping operations. This statement also recognised that UN peacekeeping personnel can be important contributors to the response to HIV/AIDS, particularly for vulnerable communities in post-conflict areas, and encouraged further cooperation between relevant UN entities within integrated peacekeeping operations.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council in June is defining the appropriate scope of the Council’s involvement in this issue, given that the General Assembly is also focused at a high level. A related issue is the need to identify the specific security dimensions of the problem of HIV/AIDS.

A second issue is to assess the impact in this area of peacekeeping operations and their ongoing role in addressing the issue in the conflict-affected areas in which they operate.

A further issue is whether to include wider political statements on the risks to stability from HIV/AIDS.

**Options**

The Council could:

- adopt a resolution that essentially repeats the agreed language in resolution 1308 and S/PRST/2005/33;
- include language reflecting an updated conceptual approach to HIV/AIDS that has developed over the last ten years and use more modern terminology and scientific concepts;
- broaden the focus of the resolution from just the risk to and from peacekeepers to the potential positive role of peacekeepers in helping others infected with HIV/AIDS or in prevention programmes, expanding upon language from the 2005 presidential statement;
- highlight in the resolution the relevance of HIV/AIDS to other key security challenges that the Council regularly considers, such as sexual violence in conflict; or
- identify in the resolution the specific programmes of integrated peacekeeping missions where increased attention to HIV/AIDS issues is warranted, such as in designing and implementing demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programmes; security sector reform programmes (including prisons management); gender equality and human rights monitoring arrangements; and assistance to victims of sexual violence.

**Council Dynamics**

Many Council members recall that resolution 1308 was the best outcome possible for the Council at that time, given the differences between members that existed in 2000 on the spread of HIV/AIDS. Many Council members seem to feel that a decade later the time is ripe to update resolution 1308, both in terms of its terminology and scope. Many members seem to believe that this debate and resolution could carry forward some of the concepts on the positive role of peacekeepers in remote, post-conflict communities which have been discussed in recent peacebuilding debates, such as the open debate in February on peacebuilding and development.

Many current Council members are leaders in global efforts to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa has been a strong advocate in Africa for improving developing countries’ access to treatment options. It has also been in the vanguard of developing treatment programmes in its armed services. Brazil is also recognised as a regional leader in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Latin America. There are also several major troop contributors on the Council, such as India and Nigeria, who seem likely to pay close attention to the importance of implementing and updating resolution 1308.

It should be noted that South Africa has the highest prevalence of HIV infection in the world, followed by Nigeria.
The US welcomes the fact that Gabon chose to pursue this topic in its presidency, given the leadership role the US played in 2000 and the decade since. The US and EU member states have well-developed policies regarding HIV/AIDS, particularly with respect to partnerships with developing countries, to halt the spread of HIV and alleviate the effects for those living with the disease.

Despite support for the topic itself, there may still be resistance based upon concerns about further expanding the concept of threats to international peace and security outside traditional armed conflicts.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1308 (17 July 2000) was on HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations.

Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2005/33 (18 July 2005) was a statement on the implementation of resolution 1308 in peacekeeping operations, five years after its adoption.

Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.5228 (18 July 2005) was an open briefing on implementation of resolution 1308, under the agenda item HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations.
- S/PV.4172 (17 July 2000) was the open debate on HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations and the adoption of resolution 1308.
- S/PV.4087 and S/PV.4087 resumption 1 (10 January 2000) was an open debate on the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa.

Drug Trafficking and Small Arms

Expected Council Action

A debate on drug trafficking and small arms is expected to be held at the initiative of Gabon as Council president for the month of June.

At press time a concept paper for the debate was still in development. A resolution is a possible outcome.

Background

Drug Trafficking

The Council in 2009 and 2010 put considerable focus on the thematic issue of drug trafficking and associated security risks. An open debate on drug trafficking as a threat to international security was held on 8 December 2009. The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/32) recognising that drug trafficking and related transnational organised-crime activities are a serious threat to international peace and security. The head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime briefed the Council on 24 February 2010. The Council adopted a presidential statement during the meeting (S/PRST/2010/4) that noted the increasing link between drug trafficking, the financing of terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. The statement also noted that drug trafficking and transnational crime were growing concerns that might threaten the security of countries on its agenda.

In both presidential statements, the Council stressed the importance of strengthening regional and international cooperation to counter the problem. But the links between drug trafficking and the trafficking of small arms has not until now been a prominent feature.

Small Arms

The Council was briefed on 25 April on the Secretary-General’s 2011 report on small arms. A debate devoted to the subject of small arms was held on 19 March 2010, also at the initiative of Gabon. The debate considered the impact of illicit small arms and light weapons on peace and security in the Central African region. It was well attended, with 27 member states making statements during the debate. At that time, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/6) reiterating that small arms pose a threat to peace and fuel armed conflict and that states should effectively implement existing arms embargoes.

In April 2008, South Africa presided over a debate on the Secretary-General’s 2008 biennial report on small arms.

The Secretary-General’s most recent report on small arms, delayed from 2010, was completed on 5 April. The report recommended that the Council encourage states to strengthen their tracing capacity, enhance international cooperation regarding tracing and apply, on a voluntary basis, international ammunition technical guidelines once they are finalised. It also suggested that the Council promote increased compliance by non-state armed groups with international norms relating to the use and stockpiling of weapons and ammunition in times of conflict.

But the previous Council decisions on small arms have not focused on the linkage with drug trafficking.

Key Issues

A key issue raised by the initiative from Gabon is how to bring together these two threads of the Council’s work.

A related issue is analysing the extent to which the illegal drug trade and illicit trafficking in small arms are connected.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- adopting a decision that the connections between the illicit small arms and drug trades have the effect of intensifying the threat to international peace and security which the Council has already recognised in both cases;
- requesting the Secretary-General to report on this connection in all relevant thematic and country-specific reports;
- requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a study of connections in different regions and to report to the Council by late in the year; or
- using the open debate as an opportunity to express national positions on the issue of drugs and small arms without taking action at this time.

Council and Broader Dynamics

Council members appear to be generally supportive of discussing the issue of the drug trade and small arms. Most members seem to agree in principle that the shared characteristics between the two issues (the facts that there is extensive illegal trafficking in both drugs and arms and that the use of small arms in drug related violence has become endemic in some regions) deserve discussion. Many are waiting for the completion of the concept paper to develop particular positions for the open debate in June. As has been the case over the last year, some Council members remain sensitive to the fact that the General Assembly is currently discussing an arms-trade treaty. It is unclear at present how willing members will be to take major substantive action on these two interlinked issues at this time but an analytical report from the Secretary-General would be welcomed in terms of providing a framework for substantive decisions later in the year.
The 1267 monitoring team submitted its report to the committee on 22 February. It focused on two key issues: how the committee could better promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and the issue of continuing due process concerns, which are evident in court challenges to the regime. With regard to Afghanistan, the monitoring team recommended that the committee seek ways to speed up its consideration of delisting requests proposed by Afghanistan, for example by creating a checklist of specific questions that the Afghan government would need to consider before submitting a delisting request. With regard to enhancing due process reforms to the regime, the monitoring team suggested that the committee increase transparency by publishing the ombudsperson’s observations on delisting requests (and reasons that committee members disagree with those observations, when that occurs). The report also suggested requiring the committee to reaffirm, by consensus, listings that have been considered by the ombudsperson.

On 16 May, the chairs of the 1267 Committee, the CTC (1373 Counterterrorism committee) and the 1540 committee (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism) addressed the Council in a regular biannual briefing. The chair of the 1267 Committee, Ambassador Peter Wittig of Germany, said that the Committee had built on last year’s review of its consolidated list by approving the most comprehensive set of updates to the list in its history. The committee had recently agreed to 78 list amendments and to making publicly available almost 200 additional summaries of reasons for listing. The Committee is currently reviewing the listings of 48 individuals who are reported to be deceased and aims to conclude that review by the end of May before conducting other regular reviews requested in resolution 1904.

Wittig reported that to date the ombudsperson had received ten delisting requests and had submitted her first report on a specific delisting request to the committee in February. Two further ombudsperson reports on delisting requests were completed in April. He said the Committee is considering these delisting requests. He also recalled that resolution 1904 encourages committee members to provide reasons for objecting to delisting requests. He said he had insisted that committee members do so promptly. The Committee had reached consensus on the form in which reasons for the Committee’s decision could be communicated on a case-by-case basis. The Committee will also be considering a draft checklist of necessary supporting documentation for delisting requests from the government of Afghanistan.

Following the briefing by the chairmen, all Council members and 13 member states made statements. Speaking on behalf of the informal group of like-minded countries on targeted sanctions (which currently includes Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), Costa Rica noted that the group had sent a letter to the Council in April outlining several proposals to improve and strengthen the sanctions regime including:

- that the Committee take delisting decisions by majority vote rather than by consensus;
- that the ombudsperson be allowed to recommend delistings, which would automatically become final after 30 days if the Committee did not reconfirm the listing; and
- that members provide reasons to the petitioner (via the ombudsperson) for any rejection.

Council members Germany and Colombia stated support for one or more of the proposals circulated by the group of like-minded states. The UK urged consideration of the idea of splitting the consolidated list into two distinct lists, one dealing with the Taliban and one dealing with Al-Qaeda. France also advocated taking into account how the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda has changed over time. Russia argued strongly for retaining a unified consolidated list as currently exists and for a continuation of the ombudsperson under the terms of her present mandate.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is the continuing due process concerns, which have persisted despite the modifications made to the sanctions regime in resolution 1904.

A related issue is whether any of the changes rising from the recommendations of the ombudsperson, the panel of experts

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UN Documents

Security Council Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/6 (19 March 2010) was adopted at the conclusion of the thematic debate on small arms and light weapons and the Central African region.
- S/PRST/2010/4 (24 February 2010) was adopted after a UNODC briefing.
- S/PRST/2009/32 (8 December 2009) was on threats posed by drug trafficking.

Latest Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2011/255 (5 April 2011) was on small arms.

Meeting Record

- S/PV.6288 and resumption 1 (19 March 2010) was the thematic debate on small arms and light weapons and the Central African region.

Counterterrorism: 1267 Committee

Expected Council Action

The mandates of the ombudsperson for the 1267 committee on sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida and of the monitoring team that supports the work of the committee expire on 17 June. At press time the Council had begun discussions on a renewal resolution for both.

Key Recent Developments

Resolution 1904 of 2009 created the office of the ombudsperson. It also renewed the mandate of the 1267 Committee’s monitoring team which is now set to expire. Negotiations seem to be focused on a number of recommendations made by the ombudsperson and the monitoring team in recent reports.

The 1267 Committee’s ombudsperson, Judge Kimberly Prost, submitted her first biannual report to the Council on 21 January. The report summarised the set up phase for her office and identified issues for the Council to consider. These included the need for the committee to provide reasons for its decisions on delisting persons from the targeted sanctions list. Also, she raised the practical need for the ombudsperson to be able to disclose the identity of the designating state to the petitioner and other relevant states.
and the “like minded” group can be agreed by Council members.

The possibility of splitting the consolidated list in two is another issue on the table.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• using the renewal of the monitoring team and ombudsperson as an opportunity to incorporate further improvements to the regime, as suggested by the group of like-minded countries, as well as the ombudsperson and monitoring team;
• a simple renewal of the ombudsperson and the monitoring team but deferring decisions on substantive changes to a later date (perhaps committing to complete consideration of them within say three months);
• allowing the mandate of either the monitoring team or the office of the ombudsperson to expire altogether (a less likely possibility); or
• splitting a consolidated list into two distinct lists, one dealing with the Taliban and one dealing with Al-Qaida.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There seems to be wide support in the Council for renewing both the ombudsperson and the monitoring team. However, the issue of changes to the regime is considerably more contentious. Some members (including Germany) seem supportive of some kind of time limit or sunset clause relating to listings (or at least certain categories of listings). However, it appears that significant resistance may be encountered from some permanent members, notably Russia which has spoken publicly about its reservations at the 16 May briefing. The US has not spoken publicly on this but some reservations seem likely.

There is also a difference of opinion on the desirability of dissociating Taliban listings from Al-Qaida listings with the UK (and perhaps the US) being open to this but Russia opposed.

- Meeting Record
  • S/PV.6536 (16 May 2011) was the latest briefing by the chairman of the 1267 Committee and the other two terrorism-related Council committees.

- Other
  • S/2011/245 (13 April 2011) was the letter to the Council transmitting the eleventh report of the 1267 monitoring team.
  • S/2011/29 (21 January 2011) was the letter to the Council transmitting the first report of the office of the ombudsperson.

- Other Relevant Facts
  • Chair of the 1267 Committee
    Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany)
  • 1267 Committee ombudsperson
    Judge Kimberly Prost (Canada)

Useful Additional Source
The April letter from the group of like-minded countries on targeted sanctions, which contained proposals to improve the 1267 sanctions regime, can be found at http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/22759.pdf

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In June the Council will consider whether to extend the temporary deployment of some UNMIL troops and aviation assets to Côte d’Ivoire to support UNOCI. The deployment expires on 30 June.

The mandate of UNOCI expires on 31 July.

Key Recent Developments
On 1 May, President Alassane Ouattara announced that former Ivorian Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny would head a “truth, reconciliation and dialogue” commission as part of efforts aimed at fostering national healing after the post-elections conflict. The announcement came during a visit by a global elders delegation (comprising former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu of South Africa and former Irish President Mary Robinson) to promote reconciliation.

The delegation also visited former president Laurent Gbagbo, who is being kept under house arrest in the northern town of Korhogo. On 1 May the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, indicated that he would soon request judges to open an investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the wake of the 28 November presidential run-off elections in Côte d’Ivoire.

On 5 May the Ivorian Constitutional Council declared Ouattara Côte d’Ivoire’s new president. The Council explained that its decision to reverse its December declaration awarding victory to Gbagbo (leading to the five month crisis) followed binding decisions taken by the AU, which had recognised Ouattara’s victory and demanded Gbagbo’s departure. On 6 May Ouattara was sworn into office.

On 9 May the Secretary-General wrote to the Council proposing that the publication of his next report on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), originally scheduled for submission to the Council by 31 May, be postponed to 30 June and a technical rollover of UNOCI’s mandate to 31 July be approved.

On 11 May the Secretary-General wrote to the Council recommending that the Council also authorise a further extension of the inter-mission arrangements between the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UNOCI until 31 July, subject to the renewal of UNOCI’s mandate.

On 13 May the Council extended the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July. It also extended until 30 June the temporary redeployment of military assets from UNMIL to UNOCI.

On 16 May the West African regional stock market, comprising trading companies from francophone West African countries and Guinea-Bissau (a lusophone country), resumed trading in Abidjan, the commercial capital of Côte d’Ivoire.

On 21 May the inauguration of Ouattara took place in Yamoussoukro, the administrative capital of Côte d’Ivoire.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/1904 (17 December 2009) renewed the mandate of the 1267 Committee monitoring team, created an office of the ombudsperson for 18 months and included significant changes to the administration of the 1267 regime.
• S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) established the Al-Qaida and Taliban committee and its mandate.

the allegations of serious abuses and violations of human rights following the presidential election of 28 November, in order to identify those responsible and seek to bring them to justice. The commission will present its findings to the HRC at its next session, in June.

Key Issues
The key issues for the Council remain largely unchanged, including:

- maintaining a priority focus on Côte d’Ivoire in the current context, including the role of the UN and UNOCI in assisting peace consolidation;
- ensuring that UNOCI continues to be able to support the maintenance of security in the country;
- encouraging effective disarmament, demobilisation and security-sector reform programmes as quickly as possible;
- monitoring the potentially destabilising effects of the developments in Côte d’Ivoire on peace and security in West Africa, including concerns about the potential movement of armed mercenaries allegedly recruited by the belligerents in Côte d’Ivoire along the porous borders (resolution 1981 requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed in his subsequent reports “of developments, measures taken and efforts made in the coordination of UNOCI and UNMIL to assist the Ivorian and Liberian governments “in monitoring their border and surrounding areas, including how the redeployed assets are assisting in this effort, with particular attention to any cross-border movement of combatants or transfer of arms”);
- balancing the Council’s own role and the roles of the regional and subregional organisations in consolidating peace in the country; and
- determining whether the Council should begin active consideration of how it can best provide effective input for the large and complex peacebuilding needs of the country.

Underlying Problems
The immediate challenges facing the country include: the full restoration of state authority throughout the national territory; the reunification and restructuring of the defence and security forces and making progress in the areas of human rights and the rule of law; the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; the disarming and dismantling of militias; and the delivery of urgently required humanitarian assistance and restoration of socioeconomic normality.

Options
Options include:

- organising a mission to Côte d’Ivoire well in advance of the UNOCI mandate expiry, perhaps at the level of working group on conflict prevention in Africa;
- proposing to ECOWAS that there be a joint ECOWAS/Security Council working group mission;
- not renewing the mandate of the temporary deployment of UNMIL military assets to support UNOCI;
- renewing the mandate of the temporary deployment of UNMIL troops to UNOCI, with or without modification for a further month; and
- encouraging Côte d’Ivoire and the Peacebuilding Commission in a discussion of opportunities to facilitate enhanced peace consolidation and utilising the full potential for a preventive role offered by the PBC’s existing mandate.

Council Dynamics
The US indicated, during the 13 May Council meeting that it was reluctant to anticipate any further extensions of UNMIL resources, “barring any unforeseen circumstances”, due to pressing security demands in Liberia linked to upcoming national elections, which would require UNMIL’s full capacity. France indicated that the decision regarding the future of UNMIL support for UNOCI should be essentially a technical issue and should be guided by the Secretariat.

Council members are mindful of the fact that the peacekeeping requirements of the country remain pertinent. However, many have indicated that they now see an urgent need to introduce or enhance peacebuilding components in UNOCI’s mandate. Discussion of these strategic issues will be influenced by the Secretary-General’s report, as well as the evolution of the situation on the ground.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

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<th>Selected Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1981 (13 May 2011) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July and authorised the Secretary-General to extend until 30 June the temporary redeployment of UNMIL military assets to support UNOCI.</td>
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Expected Council Action
In June, the Council will hear a briefing on the Secretary-General’s latest report on MONUSCO, the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, by the special representative of the Secretary-General, Roger Meece. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

The Council is likely to renew the mandate of MONUSCO, which expires on 30 June.
The DRC Sanctions Committee will convene to discuss the interim report of the group of experts and to hear a briefing by the special representative of the Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict, Margot Wallström, which was postponed from May.

Also in June, the DRC will be discussed in OCHA’s briefing before the protection of civilians group of experts.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Secretary-General’s final report requested in resolution 1925 was distributed on 12 May. It states that the joint assessment by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has not found a need for MONUSCO to be reconfigured. It notes the continuing violence, the limited progress made in institutional reforms, the delays in the election schedule and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In light of the above, the report concludes that MONUSCO’s mandate should be renewed for another year at its current strength.

On 18 May, the Council held a debate on the DRC, with the participation of the Secretary-General and representatives of the UN Development Programme, the World Bank and the EU. The Secretary-General recognised achievements made in the DRC. Yet 1.7 million people remain displaced, and human rights violations continue on a large scale. The Congolese minister for international and regional cooperation, Raymond Tshibanda, surveyed the progress that has been achieved in the DRC and the government’s plans for further advances. He suggested that it was time for the reconfiguration of MONUSCO with a progressive yet steady withdrawal of its military component.

At the conclusion of the debate, the Council adopted a presidential statement, applauding the cooperation of the DRC government with MONUSCO.

The statement then focused on four topics. The Council:

- underlined its concern with the persisting violence, including sexual violence, and human rights abuses against civilians, particularly in the eastern provinces and areas affected by the LRA;
- called on all parties in the DRC to ensure that the November elections are inclusive, transparent, peaceful, free and fair; it also called for MONUSCO to support these efforts, including by training the Congolese police, and for donors to provide support for police equipment;
- stressed the need for urgent progress in institution-building and reforms, in order to strengthen the rule of law and end impunity; and
- emphasised the importance of economic development and long-term stabilisation, including by reintegration of former combatants and regional cooperation.

The Council received a report from its group of experts on sanctions on 13 May. The report is mostly methodological and discusses the group’s plans to fulfil their mandate in their final report. Council members were not expecting a substantial report at this juncture, as the group has only been fully operative for a couple of months.

On 11 May, a study published by the American Journal of Public Health concluded that approximately 1.69 to 1.80 million women in the DRC had reported being raped in their lifetime, more than 400,000 of them in the 12 months preceding the study period. Wallström praised the study as “a commendable effort that helps to fill the gap in empirical research”. Some have questioned the conclusions of the study and its methodology.

On 4 May, the trial of Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, two leaders of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, commenced in Germany. The two are accused of 38 counts of war crimes and 26 counts of crimes against humanity for their alleged conduct in the DRC in 2008-2009.

During the second half of May, a joint UN Department of Political Affairs and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations assessment mission was sent to the region. In order to devise a new UN strategy on the LRA, the mission planned to visit Sudan, the DRC, the Central African Republic, and Uganda and then meet with AU officials in Addis Ababa. The mission, which was due to return on 28 May, will report to the Secretary-General’s policy committee in June on options to tackle the LRA issue.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

During the 10 May Security Council open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the head of the New York office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that the DRC was preparing to establish a special chamber to investigate and prosecute serious violations of international law, including mass killings, sexual violence and displacement. The High Commissioner foresaw, however, that the enabling legislation would need to be amended to guarantee the inclusion of a sufficient international component and to protect the independence and integrity of the process. The setting up of the special chamber is a direct response to the recent mapping report prepared for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights containing descriptions of 617 alleged violent human rights abuses occurring in the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council in June is the renewal of the MONUSCO mandate.

An underlying issue is MONUSCO’s engagement with the DRC regarding the upcoming presidential election, in order to ensure a fair, free and timely process with credible results.

Another issue continues to be the rate of progress with MONUSCO’s wider objectives, in light of the growing volatility in the country as elections approach, the discomfort by opposition groups with recent constitutional changes affecting the electoral process and the ability in such a vast country of maintaining security if grievances gain a hold.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:

- a relatively small resolution renewing MONUSCO’s mandate for another year at its current configuration;
- enhancing MONUSCO’s role in providing logistical and technical assistance to the presidential and capacity to deal with any scenario that might develop before or following the election;
- downsizing the peacekeeping mission in light of the DRC’s comments to that effect (less likely given the ambiguous nature of its position); or
- including language in the resolution on the input from the UN Regional Office in Central Africa, inaugurated on 2 March in Libreville, Gabon.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members viewed the debate on 18 May as a strategic opportunity to better understand the needs of the DRC and
assess the Council’s long-term engagement in the country. DRC’s participation at the ministerial level in the debate was perceived as demonstrating the commitment of the DRC to improve the situation in the country and to define MONUSCO’s role in the process.

The election will be a major focus in negotiations on the renewal of MONUSCO’s mandate in June. Council members as a whole seem to agree that MONUSCO’s role should be on the logistical and technical aspects. Some Council members feel that UN involvement in all electoral processes should be limited in light of the recent events in Côte d’Ivoire. They worry that substantive involvement may dent its impartiality and jeopardise MONUSCO’s ability to maintain cooperation with all parties after the election. Other members do not accept this line of argument as a matter of principle. However, it seems that most members agree that the new resolution should contain language on elections similar to that in the presidential statement, which is flexible enough to allow MONUSCO to assist the DRC in different ways. Members are also convinced of the need to provide MONUSCO with resources for election assistance.

In light of the elections in November, the continuing violence and the conclusions of the joint assessment process, Council members seem to be generally in agreement that there is little room for a drawdown of MONUSCO at this juncture. (Some Council members, as a matter of principal, believe that the will of the host state that is most pertinent, while others emphasise objective benchmarks on the ground.) It seems that the DRC is not likely to press on this issue during the current mandate renewal, instead emphasising the need to adjust MONUSCO’s mandate in the long-term, in correlation with progress made in the DRC. The convergences reached between Council members in 2010 in resolution 1925 on the objectives of MONUSCO are likely to remain substantially similar in 2011, though the Council has yet to begin negotiating a draft resolution.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1925 (28 May 2010) extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and decided that from 1 July 2010, MONUSCO should replace it until 30 June 2011.

- A/HRC/16/68 (9 March 2011) was the third joint report of seven UN experts on the situation in the DRC.

- S/2011/298 (12 May 2011) expected to provide MONUSCO with resources for election assistance.

- S/PV.6539 (18 May 2011) was the debate on stabilisation efforts in the DRC.

**Expected Council Action**

MONUSCO was established in May 1974 to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Syria. The current mandate expires on 30 June. The Council is expected to extend the mandate for six months and call upon Israel and Syria to implement resolution 338.


- S/PRST/2011/11 (18 May 2011) focused on stabilisation efforts in the DRC.

- SC/10099 (1 December 2010) announced the listing of four individuals by the sanctions committee.

- A/70/62 (9 March 2011) focused on stabilisation efforts in the DRC.

A presidential statement is also expected, as has been the practice since 1976, drawing attention to the wider issues in the region and noting that the situation in the Middle East will remain tense until a comprehensive settlement is reached. It is unclear whether the current situation in Syria might lead the Council to revisit the language or whether the consideration of UNDOF will continue to be essentially technical.

The Secretary-General’s report is due in mid-June, with consultations expected following the regular monthly meeting on the Middle East. A meeting with troop-contributing countries is also likely.

**Key Recent Developments**

The upcoming June report is expected to reflect how the deteriorating situation in Syria, as well as the border events of 15 May, has affected the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF). It seems that Israeli forces killed four civilians on the border between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights when crowds of Palestinian refugees living in Syria crossed the border in al-Nakba protests. Approximately 4,000 participated in the protest with 300 crossing the “alpha” line and 100 crossing the Israeli technical fence. Al-Nakba protests in this area are annual occurrences, however the numbers this year were unprecedented and it was the first instance of unauthorised attempts to cross the border in the 37 years since UNDOF was established. UNDOF is investigating the incident; however, it has no mandate to intervene in such a situation.

The report is also expected to raise the new development of Syrian restrictions on UNDOF’s access to carry out monitoring tasks in UNDOF’s area of limitation on the Syrian side, or past the “bravo” line. It seems these restrictions relate to the current unrest in Syria.

The escalation of the Syrian government’s suppression of public protests since mid-March—with reports, described as credible by the UN, of 850 killed and 8,000 arbitrarily detained—has led to increased pressure on Syria.

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**UNDOF (Golan Heights)**

**Mission Duration**

- 30 November 1999 to present: mandate expires on 30 June 2011

**Approved budget**

- $1.369 billion

**MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**

- **Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash (India)**
  - MONUSCO Force Commander
  - Strength as of 30 April 2011: 17,009 troops, 731 military observers, 1,255 police, 986 international civilian personnel, 2,781 local civilian staff and 616 UN volunteers
  - Approved budget (1 July 2010-30 June 2011): $1.369 billion

**Other Relevant Facts**

- Chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee
  - Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil)

- Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
  - Roger Meece (US)

- **MONUSCO Force Commander**
  - Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash (India)

- **MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**

- Strength as of 30 April 2011: 17,009 troops, 731 military observers, 1,255 police, 986 international civilian personnel, 2,781 local civilian staff and 616 UN volunteers

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**Meeting Record**

- S/PRST/2011/11 (18 May 2011) focused on stabilisation efforts in the DRC.

- SC/10099 (1 December 2010) announced the listing of four individuals by the sanctions committee.

- A/70/62 (9 March 2011) focused on stabilisation efforts in the DRC.
On 23 May the EU imposed sanctions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It had imposed similar measures on 13 members of the Syrian ruling elite on 9 May.

On 19 May, US President Barack Obama said during his Middle East speech that Assad should lead his country to democracy or step aside. On 18 May the US imposed sanctions on Assad and six members of his regime. The US took similar measures on 29 April against the Syrian regime.

On 17 May, Assad said the crisis was coming to an end and 4,000 police were undergoing training to “prevent these excesses”.

On 10 May, Rami Makhlouf, an advisor to Assad, said that without stability in Syria, there would not be stability in Israel.

On 9 May the Secretary-General reiterated his call for an end to the violence and mass arrests, for an independent inquiry into the killings and for a UN team to enter Syria to assess the humanitarian situation, as previously discussed with Assad in a 4 May phone conversation.

On 27 April the Council held a public debate on Syria, which enabled many members to put on record their concern about ongoing violence by Syrian security forces against unarmed civilian protestors. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed and Syria also participated.

On 26 April the Council failed to reach consensus on a press statement on the situation in Syria. The statement called for an end to the violence, urged restraint and stressed the importance of respect for human rights. It also supported the Secretary-General’s call for an independent investigation into the recent killings.

On 21 April, Syrian emergency laws, in place since 1963, were lifted, followed by a significant intensification of Syrian repression of demonstrations, including by military operations.

In February, John Kerry, head of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, briefed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on his talks with Assad to renew Israel-Syria peace talks. (Israeli-Syrian talks under Turkish mediation were suspended after Israeli incursions into Gaza in December 2008. Previously, the last attempt at peace talks was in 2000.)

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 29 April the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution requesting an investigative mission to Syria, with preliminary findings expected in June and a follow-up report in September. Elections to the Human Rights Council were held on 20 May in the General Assembly. Earlier in the month, there was opposition to Syria’s bid for membership. The Asia slate was uncontested and originally included Syria, India, Indonesia and the Philippines for the four vacancies. On 9 May, Kuwait announced its candidacy as another Arab candidate for the Asia slate, and on 11 May, Syria withdrew.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether the UNDOF renewal might be the trigger for a more proactive Council policy that places the Syria-Israel stalemate in the wider context of the “Arab Spring.”

A further issue is whether more comprehensive reporting from the Secretariat would be useful (bearing in mind the limitations of the UNDOF mandate and sensitivities in the region).

The earlier issue of whether to adjust the mandate from six to 12 months continues (but is unlikely to foster attention in June).

Options

One option is a simple rollover of UNDOF’s mandate for six months.

A second, more proactive option is for a stronger presidential statement reflecting the changing regional dynamics, underscoring the importance of a credible Syria-Israel peace track and requesting the Secretary-General to provide more regular and in-depth reporting.

Council Dynamics

There is consensus that UNDOF remains useful in the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. What is less clear to Council members is whether they should recalibrate their thinking about UNDOF and the Syria-Israel stalemate. Most members are aware that the language in its regular presidential statement intended to refer to the Israeli/Palestine issue—"drawing attention to the wider issues in the region and noting that the situation in the Middle East will remain tense"—now seems less well focused than it did when they last considered the Golan Heights in December 2010.

The Syrian situation has been raised variously by France, Germany, Portugal and the UK in the Council on at least seven occasions in May; during consultations following the regular monthly Middle East briefing on the 19th; in consultations during the 17 and 13 May briefings by the Department of Political Affairs; in the 10 May open debate on protection of civilians; following the OCHA briefing on Libya on the 9th; during the consultations on resolution 1559 (Lebanon) on the 6th; and following the briefing of the ICC prosecutor on Libya on the 4th.

Divisions in the Council over implementation of resolution 1973 on Libya seem to be affecting its ability to engage effectively on the Syrian situation and may make any change in the Council’s approach to UNDOF difficult. Lebanon, for its own domestic political reasons, is likely to be uneasy about any innovations on Syria in the Council or any deviation from past practices vis-à-vis the UNDOF renewal.

It is unlikely that the Council members who in the past seemed interested in a one-year mandate period will renew that push. There seems to be greater impetus to keep the Israel-Syria track under more regular review—especially in light of the events of 15 May.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/350 (31 May 1974) established UNDOF.
- S/RES/338 (22 October 1973) called for a ceasefire and comprehensive peace.
- S/RES/242 (22 November 1967) called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories.

Security Council Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/30 (22 December 2010) was the latest statement following the renewal of UNDOF.

Security Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.6524 (27 April 2011) was a briefing by Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe on the situation in Syria followed by a Council public debate, which included statements by Council members and Syria.

Key Recent Developments
In May, the Council considered the Secretary-General’s latest regular report on Somalia. In a briefing on 11 May, Mahiga focused in particular on efforts to forge an agreement among key stakeholders on post-transitional arrangements and said disagreement over whether to hold elections in July for the positions of president and speaker of parliament was a main obstacle.

Also briefing the Council, Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed highlighted improvements in the security situation and progress made in delivering basic services to the population. With regard to elections, he said the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) did not believe the current parliament had the constitutional mandate to elect a new president. Only a parliament legally elected after the end of the transitional period would have the mandate to do so.

In a presidential statement, the Council regretted the TFG’s failure to attend the consultative meeting convened by Mahiga in Nairobi on 12 and 13 April and called on it to participate constructively in the consultative process. It urged the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) to reach agreement as soon as possible on the holding of elections “without which there can be no extension” of the TFIs’ mandates.

This message was reiterated on 25 May, when Council members met with TF1 representatives, including the president, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament during a two-day visit to Nairobi as part of the Council mission to Africa. The Nairobi visit included meetings with regional leaders, UN officials and civil society as well. At a press conference, the UK ambassador Mark Lyall Grant said Council members had sent a very strong message to Somali leaders and told them that the international community’s support could not be assured if the infighting continued.

Somalia was also discussed at the annual consultative meeting between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa on 21 May, focusing in particular on transitional issues as well as the role of the AU Mission for Somalia (AMISOM). The issue of funding for AMISOM continues to be a key AU concern. It appears that the AU side reiterated its request for contingent-owned equipment to be reimbursed and also wanted a clearer commitment from the Council on the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM. However, these concerns were not reflected in the final meeting communiqué which instead stressed the importance of reliable resources for AMISOM and called on the international community “to make contributions urgently to AMISOM, without caveats.”

In April, the International Maritime Bureau reported that there had been a steep rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia in the first three months of the year. The high level of piracy activity seemed to continue in May with several new attacks being reported every week. Somali pirates are currently holding 26 ships and 518 hostages. A May report on the economics of piracy by Geopolity, an international management consultancy group, estimated the total cost of Somali piracy in 2010 at $4.9 billion to $8.3 billion and predicted that the annual cost could rise to between $13 billion to $15 billion based on current trends.

Expected Council Action
In June, Council members will have a heightened appreciation of the issues in Somalia following their meetings in Nairobi on 25 May with Somali leaders. A report from the Secretary-General is expected on the proposal to establish a specialised court system to prosecute Somali pirates. (This arose from the January 2011 report by Jack Lang, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, which recommended the establishment of an extraterritorial Somali court and specialised courts in Puntland and Somaliland.) A briefing on the report is expected.

The Council is also focused on “post-transitional arrangements” for Somalia given that the transitional period ends on 20 August. A meeting among key Somali stakeholders scheduled for 11 to 16 June in Mogadishu could lead to a Council response. It is possible that following the meeting the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Augustin Mahiga will brief Council members.
Key Issues
As piracy attacks seem to continue unabated in spite of action taken so far, a key issue for the Council in June is whether the establishment of specialised piracy courts would be the right response or whether other measures would be more effective. A related issue is whether the situation has reached some kind of tipping point. (Lang warned against this in his report, stressing the need to act with “extreme urgency.”)

The other key issue is whether Somali leaders will heed the strong warnings from the Council about the transitional process. A related issue is what role the Council should continue to play in bringing about an agreement as time is quickly running out.

Options
Main options for the Council in June include:

- continuing to defer a decision on Lang’s recommendation;
- overcoming political and financial hesitations and moving quickly to adopt a resolution for the establishment of a specialised court system to prosecute pirates;
- adopting a statement reinforcing the consistent messages on the transitional process following the consultative meeting in Mogadishu in June; or
- moving in the Sanctions Committee to apply targeted sanctions against those involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia. (In April 2010, the UK objected to the listing of two pirate leaders by putting a hold on their names. This has yet to be lifted and numerous others could also be considered.)

Council Dynamics
When the Council first considered Lang’s recommendations back in January, members were divided over his proposal to establish a specialised court system. France, Russia and a majority of elected members supported it. However, the UK and the US were less enthusiastic and argued that more information was needed on practical implementation issues. The request for another report from the Secretary-General was therefore a compromise between these two opposing positions. Whether the UK and the US will be inclined to support any further decisions at this stage is likely to depend on the findings of the report. It seems unlikely, however, that the Council would be ready to take action in June given that the report is not due until 11 June and some complex legal and financial issues will have to be considered.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia, but Russia has taken the lead on legal issues related to piracy and drafted resolution 1976 in close coordination with France.

### UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions

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<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1976 (11 April 2011)</td>
<td>welcomed the report of the Special Adviser on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the coast of Somalia and requested a report within two months on the modalities of establishing specialised courts to try suspected pirates.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1964 (22 December 2010)</td>
<td>renewed the authorisation of AMISOM until 30 September and raised its troop level to 12,000.</td>
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#### Presidential Statement

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#### Secretary-General’s Reports

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<th>Report</th>
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<td>S/2011/277 (28 April 2011)</td>
<td>was the latest regular report.</td>
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#### Meeting Record

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<th>Record</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/6532 (11 May 2011)</td>
<td>was the Special Representative’s latest briefing on Somalia.</td>
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### Additional Useful Source

*The Economics of Piracy—Pirate Ransoms & Livelihoods off the Coast of Somalia*, Geopolicy, May 2011.

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**Iran**

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to receive a briefing from the chair of the sanctions committee on Iran in June. The chair typically briefs the Council every 90 days.

The mandate of the panel of experts that assists the Iran sanctions committee expires on 9 June. The Council is expected to extend the panel’s mandate.

Key Recent Developments

A new IAEA report on Iran’s implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement and relevant Council resolutions is expected before the briefing in June. The last IAEA report, on 25 February, said that the agency was continuing to evaluate the amount of enriched nuclear material produced by Iran. (An IAEA inventory in October 2010, when taken together with Iran’s estimate of material produced through February, indicates that Iran may have produced 3,606 kilograms of low enriched uranium [LEU] and 43.6 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 per cent.)

The IAEA report is likely to conclude that Iran is not implementing a number of its obligations, including:

- implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol (under the terms of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites to address concerns about nuclear activities);
- suspension of enrichment-related activities; and
- clarification of possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

The chair of the Iran sanctions committee, Ambassador Néstor Osorio of Colombia, last briefed the Council on 22 March. He reported that the committee had received two reports from member states regarding separate possible sanctions violations involving Iran’s procuring items that could be used in enrichment-related activities or for the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. He said the number of reported sanctions violations is a matter of serious concern, but the willingness of member states to report violations is positive and should be encouraged. Osorio also said that on 4 March the committee was briefed by the coordinator of the panel of experts. The panel had begun its activities
by discussing its programme of work, investigating a reported violation of the arms embargo and conducting an assessment of member state implementation reports.

The panel of experts submitted a report to the Council in mid-May. The document, which was leaked to media outlets, reportedly says Iran has violated the sanctions regime by repeatedly engaging in multiple banned transfers of conventional arms to Syria. It appears Russia is blocking publication of the experts report at this time. (Iran was also mentioned in the context of the May report by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) panel of experts, which apparently raised the possibility that the DPRK and Iran have also been transporting items prohibited by that sanctions regime. Iran’s Foreign Ministry has denied this.)

On the question of the Iranian nuclear programme, a spokesperson for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said on 11 May that the EU had received a letter from Iran indicating openness to further discussions, but that it contained no change in position that would justify another meeting between Iran and the E3+3. (The E3+3 is comprised of China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US. A January E3+3 meeting with Iran in Istanbul was viewed as disappointing by the group.)

On 23 May the EU expanded the assets freeze it imposed against some individuals in Iran and on 24 May the US announced that it would sanction seven international firms for violating its sanctions law on Iran. US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said that economic measures against Iran should continue in order to prompt a change in its behaviour with regard to its nuclear programme.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether the mandate of the panel of experts should be renewed.

Another issue is whether Council members might want to take up the question of engagement in substantive talks on the nuclear programme and compliance with Council sanctions regimes.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- a simple technical renewal of the committee’s panel of experts for another year;
- including an expression of concern over Iran’s continuing disregard of previous Council decisions;
- requesting the committee to designate additional individuals or entities as subject to the sanctions currently in place; or
- encouraging Iran and the E3+3 to find common ground on substantive talks as a matter of urgency.

Council and Broader Dynamics
Most Council members appear to view the work of the panel of experts positively. There seems to be wide support for extending the mandate of the panel in June.

Although most Council members remain concerned about the continued development of Iran’s nuclear programme, there seems to be little appetite for opening new negotiations on the imposition of additional Council sanctions at this time. However, the recent additional economic measures imposed by the EU and the US seem to demonstrate a continuing determination.

Most members are also very concerned about Iran’s compliance with sanctions resolutions imposed by the Council. It is unclear at present exactly what reservations Russia has about the experts report. There seems to be a feeling among Council members that no significant role for the Council is politically feasible at present.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 24 March the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted by a vote of 22 to 7 (with 14 abstentions) a resolution establishing a mandate of a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. The rapporteur will report to the HRC at its 19th session in March 2012 and prepare an interim report for the General Assembly at its 66th session this October. The resolution called on the government to cooperate fully with the special rapporteur and to allow him or her to visit Iran. Earlier, in a report submitted to the HRC in accordance with General Assembly resolution 65/226, the UN Secretary-General had noted that although the government had issued a standing invitation to UN human rights mandate holders, no visit has taken place since 2005. The Secretary-General encouraged Iran to facilitate such visits as a matter of priority in order that they might conduct more comprehensive assessments and facilitate technical assistance.

UN Documents
Selected Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Iran.
- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed previous resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear activities.
- S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed commitment to a negotiated solution within the E3+3 dual-track framework, and called upon Iran to comply with previous Council resolutions.
- S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) reiterated existing measures against Iran and imposed additional ones.
- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran’s arms exports and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of certain items related to nuclear activities and weapon-delivery systems, imposed an asset freeze on certain persons and entities and established a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

Selected Meeting Record
- S/PV.6502 (22 March 2011) was the most recent briefing by the chair of the 1737 Committee.

Latest IAEA Report
- GOV/2011/7 (25 February 2011)

Other Relevant Facts
Sanctions Committee Chairman
Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

Useful Additional Source
Charles D. Ferguson, “Steps Toward a Deal on Enhanced Safeguards for Iran’s Nuclear Program”, Arms Control Today, March 2011
China and US President Barack Obama.

Key Recent Developments

Former US President Jimmy Carter, former Irish President Mary Robinson, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 26 to 28 April. The group hoped to confirm the willingness of the DPRK to engage directly with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and to identify ways to provide humanitarian food aid to the country. At the conclusion of their trip on 28 April they received a written message from DPRK leader Kim Jong II calling for a resumption of six-party talks and saying he supported inter-Korean dialogue, including a summit meeting with ROK President Lee Myung-bak. Carter emphasised to ROK officials the same day the dire need for food aid that he had witnessed in the north.

The panel of experts that assists the DPRK sanctions committee submitted the final report under its current mandate to the Council in mid-May. It seems that China has some difficulties with the report. (A version leaked to media outlets suggests that items prohibited by the sanctions regime have been transferred between the DPRK and Iran on aircraft that transit through a third country (possibly China)). Formal publication of the report seems unlikely for the time being. (It took six months to get agreement to publicly release the panel’s 2010 report because of China’s reluctance.)

On 9 May, ROK President Lee offered to meet with Kim Jong II at a nuclear security summit scheduled to be held in Seoul in 2012 if the DPRK took responsibility for the sinking of an ROK navy ship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island, both in 2010. DPRK state media carried a government response that the offer was “ridiculous.”

Senior US and Chinese officials met in Washington from 9 to 10 May. At the conclusion of talks, the US State Department issued a statement that participants had reiterated their common position on the DPRK made in a joint statement in January after talks between President Hu Jintao of China and US President Barack Obama. (The statement said constructive dialogue between the two Koreas and an improvement in their bilateral relations were essential to progress.)

The US special representative for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, travelled to the ROK from 16 to 18 May for talks with the South’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, Wi Sung-lac, and other officials. In remarks after the discussions, Bosworth said communication and coordination between the ROK and the US were extremely good and that they had almost reached a common view on the possibility of providing food assistance to the DPRK.

On 17 May the chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee delivered a regular 90-day briefing to the Council in informal consultations. It seems that many Council members urged that the panel of experts’ report be published as soon as possible. However, China apparently said that it required more time to analyse its contents.

On 18 May China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, Hu Zhengyue, denied China was a transit point for banned DPRK missile components.

On 20 May, Kim Jong II was reported to have begun an unannounced trip to China, apparently for talks related to the DPRK’s economic development.

US special envoy for human rights in the DPRK, Robert King, travelled to the DPRK on 24 May for talks related to humanitarian issues.

Human Rights-Related Developments

During its March session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) received the report of its special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. The special rapporteur, Marzuki Darusman, strongly urged all parties to reconvene the six-party talks to create an environment for progress on human rights by addressing regional peace and stability. Darusman also stressed the need for the international community to provide continued humanitarian support, including food and medicine, subject to “no access, no aid.” At the same time, he called on the DPRK to address continued food scarcity by improving the public distribution system and channeling or reallocating financial resources. The rapporteur expressed concern that the government had so far not shown any commitment to implement the recommendations and conclusions of the HRC’s universal periodic review of the DPRK.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council at present is whether to renew the mandate of the panel of experts that assists the sanctions committee.

A related issue is whether the current sanctions regime is proving effective.

Underlying Problems

A key underlying problem is the continuing refusal of the DPRK to abide by Council resolutions and a lack of progress towards substantive talks on the DPRK nuclear programme.

Options

Options include:

- a simple technical resolution to renew the mandate of the experts;
- more sustained efforts to secure agreement on release of the recent report; or
- waiting while the parties continue considering a re-engagement in talks and to allow more time for Council members to digest the latest panel of experts’ report.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Most Council members appear to be fully supportive of extending the mandate of the committee’s panel of experts. The panel has come to be viewed as essential to the committee’s work and therefore to the effective monitoring of the sanctions regime.

Some members are concerned that the recent contention over the contents of the panel’s final report (as well as the question of how soon it may be published) may develop into a more general disagreement on the role and function of the panel. Nevertheless, many Council members believe that extending the panel of experts for another year should be fairly straightforward, especially if the renewal resolution retains the current mandate and makeup of the panel.

Many committee members remain concerned by the DPRK’s efforts to circumvent sanctions measures, as well as its uranium enrichment programme that came to light in 2010. However, they also seem to realise that the sensitivities of the permanent members engaged in the six-party talks process limit the scope for the Council to be more active.
Security Council Report

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1928 (7 June 2010) extended the mandate of the panel of experts that assists the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2011.
- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery are threats to international peace and security.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK’s 25 May 2009 underground nuclear test, expanded the existing arms embargo and authorised inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK, as well as vessels on the high seas, and provided for the creation of a panel of experts to assist the committee.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned the DPRK’s launch of ballistic missiles.

Latest Sanctions Committee

Annual Report

- S/2011/84 (18 February 2011)

Selected Letter

- S/2010/571 (5 November 2010) was a note transmitting the final report of the panel’s first year of work.

Other Relevant Facts

Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

- Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)

Iraq

Expected Council Action

The activities of the high-level coordinator, who advises the Security Council on the Iraq and Kuwait missing-persons issue, are currently authorised through 30 June. It is expected that the Council will receive a report on the issue and a briefing from the high-level coordinator in June. The Council will likely decide whether to extend the coordinator’s activities before the end of the month.

In addition, the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) terminates as of 30 June 2011. At time of writing, it was unclear whether the Council would take any action to acknowledge Iraq’s transition to a post-DFI mechanism.

Key Recent Developments

On 8 April the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) wrote to the Council to report on a session of its governing council held from 5 to 7 April. (The UNCC was created in 1991 to process claims and pay compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.) At the session, a number of governing council members highlighted the ongoing importance of the compensation fund and the need to retain current or similar arrangements to ensure that payments of 5 percent of oil revenue continue to be deposited into the fund after the expiration of the DFI and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) at the end of June.

On 28 April the UNCC made $880 million available to the Kuwaiti government for distribution to nine successful claimants. The payment brings the overall amount of compensation made available to date by the UNCC globally to $32.2 billion. However, an outstanding balance of approximately $20 billion remains owed to Kuwait.

On 29 April, Iraq submitted to the Council its most recent report regarding arrangements for the transition to a DFI-successor. The report said Iraq had completed arrangements to ensure an effective transition to a post-DFI mechanism. A new account will be opened at the US Federal Reserve Bank and all financial assets currently held in the Development Fund for Iraq will be transferred to it. The account held in Iraq to receive revenues from the export of oil will continue to operate after 30 June and 5 percent of revenues will continue to be transferred to the UN Compensation Fund. (Iraq will continue to use the same mechanism as under the DFI for deduction of the 5 percent compensation percentage in order to ensure transparency.) In addition, proposals have been received from the big four accounting firms to audit successor accounts through 2011. An external auditor will be selected after the IAMB provides its opinion on the matter.

At press time it was unclear whether there had been any developments of note relating to Kuwaiti missing persons and property.

Key Issues

A key issue before the Council is whether an extension of the high-level coordinator’s activities would help resolve the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and property.

A related issue is whether progress on the missing-persons issue might help in resolving other Iraq/Kuwait issues, such as compensation and the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. (In extending the high-level coordinator’s mandate in December 2010, the Council expressed willingness to consider the continuation of his activities in the context of their review of the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on the Chapter VII resolutions Iraq is subject to.)

Options

Options for the Council include:

- extending the activities of the high-level coordinator for an additional six months or longer;
- allowing the high-level coordinator’s mandate to expire; and
- adopting a statement acknowledging Iraq’s successful transition to a post-DFI mechanism and reiterating the need to resolve outstanding issues between Iraq and Kuwait before the removal of any further Chapter VII measures imposed during the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Council and Wider Dynamics

With regard to missing persons and property, it seems that most Council members are waiting to hear from the high-level coordinator before taking a position on extending his activities. However, in the past the Council has favoured the continuation of the coordinator’s role in order to support any momentum being built to resolve the issue.

There continues to be a feeling that progress on Iraq/Kuwait issues, including borders and compensation as well as missing persons, is key in order to lift remaining Chapter VII measures and allow Iraq to fully regain its international standing. Most Council members appear keen to continue monitoring progress on these issues throughout the year.

Members appear to be satisfied that Iraq has taken the expected actions necessary to establish a DFI-successor mechanism. It is possible that Council members will agree on a press statement marking the termination of the DFI. However, some point out...
that since resolution 1956 explicitly laid out the timetable and manner for accomplishing this, an additional statement at this time is unnecessary.

The US is the lead country on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq/Kuwait issues.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1958 (15 December 2010) terminated the Oil-for-Food programme and established an escrow account to provide indemnification to the UN.
- S/RES/1957 (15 December 2010) terminated the WMD-related Chapter VII measures and urged Iraq to ratify the Additional Protocol as soon as possible.
- S/RES/1905 (21 December 2009) extended the arrangements for the DFI and the IAMB until 31 December 2010 and called on Iraq to develop an action plan and timeline for a post-DFI mechanism in 2010.
- S/RES/1859 (22 December 2008) requested the Secretary-General to report on all Council resolutions concerning Iraq since 1990; a letter from Iraq requesting the lifting of Sad-dam-era resolutions is included as an annex to the resolution.
- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) established sanctions against the previous Iraqi government, created the DFI, provided immunity to Iraqi petroleum products and envisaged the termination of the Oil-for-Food programme.
- S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999) appointed a High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property.
- S/RES/692 (20 May 1991) established the UN Compensation Commission and the UN Compensation Fund.

**Selected Press Statement**

- SC/10130 (17 December 2010) noted the Council agreed to extend the financing of the mandate of the high-level coordinator for six months.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2011/290 (29 April 2011) was Iraq’s most recent report regarding arrangements for the transition to a DFI-successor.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Secretary-General’s High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property**

Gennady Tarasov (Russia)

**Cyprus**

**Expected Council Action**

In the second half of 2012, the special representative and head of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Lisa Buttenheim, will brief the Council in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report due by early June. The Council is expected to renew the mandate of UNFICYP for another half-year.

At press time, it is unclear if the Secretary-General’s report on the good offices mission in Cyprus will be produced prior to the Council meeting in June or be delayed until after his next meeting with the two leaders scheduled for 7 July.

The mandate of the UNFICYP expires on 15 June.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 15 March, Special Adviser on Cyprus Alexander Downer briefed Council members in consultations on the status of the negotiations in Cyprus. In the briefing, Downer said that talks between the two sides have intensified, yet little substantive progress has been made on the difficult issues of property, territory, security and guarantees. He said that upcoming elections in Cyprus and Turkey might stall progress in the negotiations in the near future.

Since March, the leaders and special representatives of both parties have continued to meet on a regular basis. In a statement to the press on 5 May, Buttenheim said that significant progress was achieved on the issue of international treaties. Convergences have reportedly also been reached on the issues of EU matters and internal security. On the other hand, little progress seems to have been achieved on the core issues of property, territory and shared governance.

On 22 May, the Greek Cypriots held parliamentary elections. The main opposition party, the right-wing Democratic Rally, topped the polls with 34.27 percent of the votes against the ruling left-wing Progressive party of the Working People, which came in second with 32.67 percent. Both parties increased their share of the vote, compared with the corresponding percentage in the 2006 parliamentary elections. The government coalition partner, the Democratic Party, won 15.77 percent of the votes. The biggest surprise was the number of abstentions, reaching 113,282, an unprecedented 21.32 percent. The parliamentary election will not affect the continuation of President Dimitris Christofias’ term of office, which continues until 2013.

The Secretary-General will host a meeting of the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities on 7 July in Geneva.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In her annual report on human rights in Cyprus, presented at the March session of the Human Rights Council, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, noted several positive developments in the reporting period, including the opening of a new crossing linking the villages of Limnitis/AMAGELM in the north and Kato Pyrgos in the south. The opening of this crossing would, she hoped, serve as an important confidence-building measure. Pillay observed, however, that the division of the island continued to constitute an obstacle to the full enjoyment of human rights there. She hoped that the current efforts by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to negotiate and achieve a comprehensive settlement for Cyprus would help improve the human rights situation there.

**Key Issues**

The main issue for the Council in June is the renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate and how, if at all, the status of the talks should impact the reconfiguration of and an eventual exit strategy for, the mission.

Beyond the renewal of the mandate, the key issue for the Council is how to engage the two sides to achieve speedier and more substantive progress in the reunification talks and in implementing confidence-building measures.
Options
Options for the Council include:
- renewing the mandate of UNFICYP at its current configuration;
- including new language encouraging the parties to reach a settlement, emphasising that the process cannot be indefinite, especially in light of key events (elections, Cyprus EU presidency) that may hinder the negotiation process in the next couple of years;
- encouraging the UN good-offices mission to intensify its support for the talks between the opposing sides in an attempt to bolster their momentum; or
- including language in the resolution focusing more on possible confidence-building measures.

Council Dynamics
The dynamics of the Council regarding Cyprus continue to be affected by the relationship of various members with the Cypriot parties. Russia, and to some extent France, lean towards the Greek Cypriots, and the UK is more sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot side.

Negotiations around the language included in resolutions on UNFICYP have been used in the past to assert pressure on the parties. However, at the moment many Council members feel that this will be of little practical effect, especially since it comes prior to the meeting of the leaders with the Secretary-General in July.

Some members are optimistic that the Secretary-General will be able to use the opportunity of the meeting in Geneva to stimulate the parties to achieve progress. This, accompanied by bilateral pressure, may create a renewed momentum in the talks. Some have hopes for a possible international conference before the end of the year. Several Council members emphasise that, in light of the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004, both sides bear the responsibility to prepare their communities for the inevitable compromises of an agreed solution and to reach a settlement, emphasizing that not enough has been done to address the security-related violence in February and an anti-government attack in the northeastern city of Birao in November 2010, in which six people were killed.

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan rebel group, continues to perpetrate attacks in CAR. On 13 March the LRA attacked a village in the central mining area of Nzako, killing at least six people, including four CAR soldiers, and abducting between 30 and 50 others. On 18 January the LRA attacked two villages, Agoumar and Madabazouma, in southern CAR, abducting 12 civilians, mostly women.

In the latest report on the good offices mission, the Secretary-General reported that it was agreed that international treaties, security and guarantees could be discussed at the conference, but that maps and figures related to territory would be discussed at the last phase of the negotiation process.

The Turkish Cypriots think that such a conference should be attended by the two communities plus Turkey, Greece and the UK (the latter three being the guarantor parties) and convened at the earliest possible opportunity to deal with outstanding issues. The Greek Cypriots would like the conference to be attended in addition by the P5 and the EU and for the Republic of Cyprus to be symbolically represented as such, a position the Turkish Cypriots oppose.

The Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), a CAR rebel group, announced a ceasefire on 28 April to enable the opening of negotiations with the government of CAR. CPJP draws most of its support from northeastern and southern CAR and has been behind several anti-government attacks, including election-related violence in February and an attack in the northeastern city of Birao in November 2010, in which six people were killed and several soldiers were captured.

On 23 January, Francois Bozize was re-elected as president of CAR after receiving 66 percent of the vote. The results were widely contested, and the outcome was deferred to July.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1953 (14 December 2010) renewed UNFICYP’s mandate until 15 June, urged the leaders of the two sides to “intensify the momentum in the negotiations” and develop “a practical plan for overcoming the major remaining points of disagreement.”

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2010/605 (26 November 2010) was on UNFICYP.
- S/2011/112 (4 March 2011) was on the good-offices mission in Cyprus.

Other
- S/PV.6445 (14 December 2010) was the meeting record of the Council’s adoption of resolution 1953 with Turkey’s explanation of vote.
- S/2010/570 (2 November 2010) was a letter from Turkey responding to Christofias’ statement in the General Assembly on 24 September.

Other Relevant Facts
UNFICYP: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Lisa M. Buttenheim (USA)
UNFICYP: Force Commander
Maj. Gen. Chao Liu (China)
UNFICYP: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration
Strength (as of 31 December 2010): 922 military personnel, 68 police, 37 international civilian personnel and 113 local civilian staff
Troop contributors: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Hungary, Paraguay, Peru, Serbia, Slovakia and the UK
Annual Budget: $58 million
Duration: 4 March 1964 to present; mandate expires 15 June

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
The Council is expecting to receive the semi-annual report on BINUCA in June. At press it was unclear whether they would consider the Secretary-General’s report on CAR in June. It seemed possible that it might be deferred to July.

BINUCA’s mandate expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
The security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) remains fragile. Banditry, extreme poverty and lack of capacity by defense and security forces and the judiciary continue to impede peace consolidation.

On 31 December 2010 the UN Mission in CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) completed its withdrawal and the handover of its programmes to the governments of Chad and CAR and UN agencies. This has left a security vacuum in northeastern CAR, which has yet to be filled with any sufficient security arrangement.

The LRA attacked a village in the central mining area of Nzako, killing at least six people, including four CAR soldiers, and abducting between 30 and 50 others. On 18 January the LRA attacked two villages, Agoumar and Madabazouma, in southern CAR, abducting 12 civilians, mostly women.
immediately rejected by three of the five candidates, who called the balloting a “masquerade.” Following calls for redressing electoral irregularities, three electoral commission officials were arrested on 11 February as part of a fraud investigation. Also on 11 February, amid election-related tensions, CAR soldiers clashed with CPJP rebels in eastern CAR, killing seven rebels.

On 19 May, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of Margaret Vogt of Nigeria as his special representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), replacing the outgoing special representative, Sahle-Work Zewde.

On 2 March the UN opened a new political office designed to support Central African nations in their efforts to consolidate peace, prevent conflict and tackle cross-border arms trafficking and organised crime. The UN Regional Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) located in Libreville, Gabon, has an initial mandate of two years and will work closely with the Economic Community of Central African States, composed of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. UNOCA will give high priority to early warning and early political action as tools for conflict prevention.

On 8 December 2010, Zewde briefed the Council, as did the chair of the CAR configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Belgian Ambassador Jan Grauls. Grauls said that the integrated strategic framework developed by BINUCA had incorporated the priorities identified by the PBC, which would help further strengthen the cohesion between the PBC, BINUCA and the government. On 14 December, the Council extended the mandate of BINUCA for another 12 months.

### Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) will host a donor’s roundtable on 16-17 June in Brussels. The event, which the PBC is coordinating in collaboration with the government of CAR, the World Bank, the UN Development Programme and the African Development Bank, seeks to involve traditional and non-traditional donors, including foundations and the private sector, to mobilise resources in support of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSP describes macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs needed to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. The PRSP is built on four pillars: security, peace and conflict prevention; good governance and the rule of law; economic revitalisation; and human development.

#### Human Rights-Related Developments

In his latest report under resolution 1612 submitted to the Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on 13 April, the Secretary-General expressed his continuing grave concern over the use of children in armed conflict in CAR. While noting that he was encouraged by the government’s efforts to develop accountability for violence against children, the Secretary-General urged CAR to ensure that grave human rights violations against children, especially child recruitment, sexual violence and abductions, were rigorously addressed and prosecuted. He called on the government to issue clear orders, including at the local level, prohibiting the recruitment and use of children by local self-defence militias.

#### Key Issues

A key issue is the security situation in north-eastern CAR, which remains precarious following MINURCAT’s withdrawal.

A second issue is the threat to stability posed by the LRA and determining how this can best be addressed within the Council’s wider approach to tackling the LRA threat in the subregion.

A third issue is the need for security sector reform and good governance, including establishing rule of law capacity in terms of moving forward with the peacebuilding process.

#### Options

One option for the Council is to simply receive the briefing.

A second option would be to make a determined effort in the CAR case to build on the thematic conclusion reached by the Council in its debate in February on Security and Development and the need to address root causes. Further integrating its efforts with the PBC Country Specific Configuration would be a related option.

Another option would be to lift the profile of the security situation in the country by issuing a statement.

### Council Dynamics

There continues to be general consensus among Council members on the need to support the peacebuilding process in CAR. But Council members tend to take a wait-and-see perspective on how to address the situation. The Secretary-General’s report and Vogt’s briefing may influence the Council’s next steps.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/29 (20 December 2010) was on the situation in Chad and CAR.
- S/PRST/2010/26 (14 December 2010) extended the mandate of BINUCA for another 12 months.
- S/PRST/2009/35 (21 December 2009) welcomed the establishment of BINUCA, called for all political stakeholders to “ensure free, fair, transparent and credible preparation and conduct of the 2010 elections” and asked that the elections take place within the timeframe set by the constitution.

#### Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2011/241 (13 April 2011) was the report on children and armed conflict in CAR.

#### PBC-Related Document

- PBC/4/CAF/5 (11 November 2010) contained the recommendations and conclusions on the first biannual review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in CAR.

### Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.6438 (8 December 2010) was the briefing by then-Special Representative Sahle-Work Zewde and chair of the CAR configuration of the PBC, Belgian ambassador Jan Grauls.

### Letters

- S/2011/292 (10 May 2011) was from the Council President on the appointment of Margaret Vogt of Nigeria as special representative for BINUCA.
- S/2011/291 (6 May 2011) was addressed to the Council President from...
Security Council Report

Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
In June the Council is expected to consider a report on Guinea-Bissau. The head of the UN office, Joseph Mutaboba, will likely brief the Council. The mandate of UNIOGBIS expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
Mutaboba last briefed the Council on 25 February on developments in Guinea-Bissau. He noted that while there had been progress in the political and security spheres, the situation in the country remained tenuous and complex.

He highlighted four key issues:
- the need to enhance the stability of state institutions and to jump-start implementation of the security sector reform programme for the defence sector;
- the national dialogue and conference process;
- impunity, drug trafficking and organised crime; and
- the complex relationship between the international community and the authorities of Guinea-Bissau.

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior of Guinea-Bissau, who also participated in the meeting, briefed the Council on the evolution of the situation in his country, including the political, socioeconomic and international challenges confronting it.

The Council issued a press statement:
- welcoming the release of those previously detained in connection with the army mutiny of 1 April 2010;
- expressing continued concern at the insecurity and growth in transnational organised crime, including illicit drug trafficking, and reiterating the need to tackle the problem of illicit drug trafficking in the countries of origin, transit and final destination;
- emphasising the need for Guinea-Bissau to intensify efforts in creating an enabling environment for enhanced civilian control and reform of the security sector, fighting impunity and tackling illicit drug trafficking; and
- reiterating the Council’s request to the UN Secretary-General to engage with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) with a view to undertaking a joint assessment of the requirements to support the rapid implementation of the ECOWAS-CPLP road map.

In March the government of Guinea-Bissau and ECOWAS leaders endorsed the ECOWAS-CPLP road map for security sector reform.

The UN Department of Political Affairs and ECOWAS undertook an assessment from 11 to 16 April of requirements to support the rapid implementation of the ECOWAS-CPLP road map.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council will be how to respond to the findings of the DPA/ECOWAS assessment mission and whether to adopt the mandate of the UN Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) or supplement the mandate with new guidance.

Another key issue is better integrating the Council’s work with that of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the challenges for both bodies in finding the time, capacity and creative working methods to this end.

Another issue is the impact of emerging threats to national stability and regional peace and security posed by drug trafficking, as well as organised crime, which have become problematic in parts of West Africa.

Useful Additional Source


SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
MONTHLY FORECAST

JUNE 2011

(Please see SCR’s Special Research Report, Emerging Security Threats in West Africa of May 2011.)

Underlying Problems
Perennially weak state institutions have greatly undermined governance in Guinea-Bissau and resulted in military insubordination to civilian leadership and intensified development gaps resulting in critical socioeconomic challenges. Illicit drug trafficking and cross-border organised crime now threaten effective peace consolidation in the country.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- issuing a statement to signal its continued concern that the peace consolidation process must remain on track;
- adopting a wait-and-see stance until the December UNIOGBIS mandate renewal and closely following developments on the ground;
- deciding to revisit the regional implications of the emerging threats and scheduling a Council debate on this later in 2011; or
- deciding to establish a Panel of Experts to assist the Council on emerging threats in West Africa and mandating the panel to report to the Council in good time before the scheduled debate.

Council Dynamics
Council members generally appear to welcome the initial progress being made regarding the situation in Guinea-Bissau, including the endorsement of the roadmap, but remain wary in light of the previous pattern of significant political and security setbacks.

The UK, US, France and Germany seem to prefer pushing for early concrete action by the government to address the challenges in the country, especially those relating to the rule of law and justice. Others, such as Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa, advocate a more cautious and sustained prompting of the government, arguing that practical constraints facing the national authorities have to be taken into consideration.
A common point of convergence for Council members is the need to convey the sense that they are closely monitoring developments on the ground, which might suggest that a Council statement based on the upcoming Secretary-General’s report will be possible.

Nigeria is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2010 15 (22 July 2010) expressed concern at the prevailing security situation in Guinea-Bissau and stressed the need for genuine security-sector reform in the country.

Letters
- S/2008/208 (25 March 2008) was from the chair of the PBC to the president of the Council providing advice on peacebuilding priorities for Guinea-Bissau.
- S/2008/87 (28 December 2007) was from the chair of the PBC informing the president of the Council about the placement of Guinea-Bissau on the PBC’s agenda.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

Latest Press Statement
- SC/10184 (25 February 2011)

Latest Meeting Record
- S/PV.6489 (25 February 2011)

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS
Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)

Duration
1 January 2010 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2011.

International Criminal Tribunals

Expected Council Action
In June the presidents and prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are expected to brief the Council.

The Council is expected to adopt a resolution for each tribunal responding to various technical requests submitted by the tribunals’ presidents relating to the extension of judges’ mandates.

The working group will also hear a briefing from the presidents and prosecutors and continue to discuss practical arrangements for the residual mechanism.

Key Recent Developments
On 22 December 2010, the Council adopted resolution 1966, establishing the international residual mechanism for criminal tribunals, with two branches. (The mechanism is meant to carry out the essential remaining functions of the tribunals, including the trial of fugitives, after their closure.) The branch for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will commence functioning on 1 July 2012 and the branch for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on 1 July 2013. Annexed to the resolution are the statute of the residual mechanism and arrangements for the transition period before the closure of the tribunals. The Council requested the tribunals to conclude their work by 31 December 2014.

The presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR last briefed the Council on 6 December 2010. In his report of 12 May, ICTY President Patrick Robinson reiterated his concerns about staff attrition and its negative impact on the work of the tribunal. ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz stressed in his report that Serbia must re-evaluate its failed strategy for apprehending the two remaining fugitives and demonstrate more determination.

On 26 May, Serbian President, Boris Tadić, announced that former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić, has been arrested by the Serbian Security Intelligence Agency. Tadić confirmed that extradition to the ICTY is under way. Mladić, chief of the Bosnian Serb military, faces charges over the massacre of at least 7,500 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995.

The ICTR report of 12 May highlighted that ten fugitives remain at large, while Kenya has yet to provide credible information on Félicien Kabuga’s alleged departure from Kenya and the investigation and sequestration of his assets in the country. On 5 May, President Dennis Byron wrote to the Secretary-General, requesting that the Council remove the requirements in the ICTR statute that the president be a trial judge and that the president be resident at the seat of the court, in order for it to be possible for the president to be redeployed to the appeals chamber sitting in The Hague. Alternatively, Byron suggested the Council authorise that an ad-litem judge be elected vice president and become president later on, after the departure of the president.

On 25 May, ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow announced that Bernard Munyagishari was arrested in the DRC by the Congolese Army, with the participation of the ICTR tracking unit, and will be transferred to the Tribunal. Munyagishari is a former Hutu militia leader charged with counts of genocide and crimes against humanity for allegedly recruiting, training and leading militiamen in acts of mass killings and rapes against the Tutsi population.

Key Issues
The immediate issue for the Council are the various requests from the tribunals’ presidents relating to the extension of judges’ mandates and in particular to amend the ICTR statute in order to fill the position of ICTR president.

Another issue is the continuing work of the working group on tribunals on practical arrangements for the residual mechanism.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- adopting technical resolutions for each tribunal responding to the various requests submitted by the presidents;
- laying out solutions or options the Secretariat should employ to address the staffing issues; or
- urging all states to cooperate with the tribunals on issues of evidence and appearance of witnesses.

Council Dynamics
With the adoption of resolution 1966 and its annexed statute setting up the residual mechanism for the tribunals, the most substantive differences between Council members have subsided. The working group is meeting in June to consider the technical requests made by the presidents of the tribunals. It will also continue to discuss outstanding arrangements for the mechanism, such as sentencing arrangements for condemned individuals and the rules of procedure and evidence of the residual mechanism. These and other issues will become more pertinent as the mechanism’s operational date draw nearer.
In addition, the working group continues to monitor the progress of negotiations between the tribunals and the UN Office of Legal Affairs on practical arrangements for the residual mechanism.

Council members seem comfortable with a resolution extending judges’ terms as needed. There is also support for amending the ICTR statute or approve the appointment of an ad-litem judge as vice-president, in accordance with President Byron’s letter. The decision is likely to depend on President Byron’s exact request in his briefing before the Council.

The briefing by the ICTY prosecutor will be much anticipated in light of the apprehension of Mladić by Serbia after the conclusion of his report. As mentioned above, the report criticised Serbian cooperation with the ICTY and its efforts to apprehend Mladić. The issue is of particular interest to the European members of the Council and other EU states, as the prosecutor’s comments on Serbian and Croatian cooperation with the Tribunal may impact Croatia’s accession to the EU, now in its final stages, as well as Serbia’s progress towards EU membership.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1966 (22 December 2010) established the residual mechanism.

Selected Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2009/258 (21 May 2009) was on administrative and budgetary implications of possible locations for ICTY and ICTR archives and the seat of the residual mechanism or mechanisms.

Selected Letter

- S/2010/513 (13 October 2010) was from the Secretary-General transmitting a request from the president of the ICTR for the Council to authorise two judges to complete their cases after their terms of office expire, extend the authorisation for the tribunal to temporarily exceed the maximum number of ad-litem judges allowed by its statute and amend the statute to allow ad-litem judges to fill the positions of president and presiding judge.

Other Relevant Documents

- S/2011/317 (12 May 2011) and S/2011/316 (12 May 2011) were the latest reports from the ICTR and ICTY, respectively, on implementation of their completion strategies.
- S/PV.6434 (6 December 2010) was the latest Council briefing by the presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR.
- A/64/PV.16 (8 October 2009) was the presentation in the General Assembly of the tribunals’ annual reports.

Other Relevant Facts

**ICTY**

- Former Croatian Serb politician Goran Hadžić still at large
- Former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić awaiting extradition to the Tribunal
- Three accused awaiting re-trial, 14 on trial and 11 at the appeal stage

**ICTR**

- Nine accused at large, of which three are considered high-ranking, including Félicien Kabuga, a Rwandan businessman accused of helping to finance and organise the 1994 genocide
- Bernard Munyagishari awaiting extradition to the Tribunal
- One accused awaiting trial, 20 on trial and nine at the appeal stage
Notable Dates for June

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Mandate Expiry in June 2011

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<td>30 June</td>
<td>Temporary redeployment and additional deployment to UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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June 2011 Other Important Dates

- Council members will brief on visiting mission to Africa.
- Next meeting of parties to Western Sahara dispute.
- President of Gabon Ali Bongo Ondimba will chair a Council debate on the impact of HIV and AIDS on global security.
- The Council will have its regular monthly briefing on the Middle East followed by consultations.
- The Council is expected to hold an open debate on drug trafficking and small arms and drug trafficking.
- A referendum on the administrative status of Darfur may be held on 1 July.
- The Secretary-General will host a meeting of the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, in Geneva on 7 July.
- South Sudan independence will occur on 9 July.
- The “transitional” period in Somalia expires in August.
- The Liberian constitutional referendum is scheduled for August.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October.
- A summit-level meeting of the Arab League is expected in March 2012 (it was postponed twice on 15 May and 29 March)

Briefings expected in June:
- Special Representative Roger Meece on the DRC
- Presidents and Prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR)
- Under-Secretary-Generals Alain Le Roy (Peacekeeping) and Susana Malcorra (Field Support) on support for AU Peacekeeping
- Office of Legal Affairs on Somalia Piracy
- Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy on Sudan
- Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe on Libya
- Under-Secretary-General Pascoe, on DPA issues
- High-Level Coordinator Gennady P. Tarasov on the Iraq and the Kuwait missing persons/property issue
- Special Representative and head UNIFICYP Lisa Buttenheim on Cyprus
- ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on Sudan
- Head of the UN office Joseph Mutaboba on Guinea-Bissau
- Special Representative and head of BINUCA Margaret Vogt on CAR
- Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict Margot Wallström, to the DRC Sanctions Committee
- Chair of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran and the 1591 Sanctions Committee on Sudan, Ambassador Nestor Osorio of Colombia

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