Conference report

Global conflict-future trends and challenges: towards 2030
Monday 28 February – Wednesday 2 March 2011 | WP1073
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Key points

- Deaths from conflict have been declining on a continuous trend, reducing by 90% since the 1950s. This trend should continue given economic growth, globalisation, democratisation, and better international conflict management cooperation. However, many fragile states in danger of conflict have institutional deficits with a mismatch between state capacity and the scale of complex challenges faced. These often include structural unemployment.

- Democracy is not a Western export and is widely valued. All democracies are finding that power is being diffused to an ever greater multiplicity of actors and current democratic systems do not make it easy to agree and implement long term policies.

- Power transitions create perilous moments in history. Future risks include: potential great power rivalry; proliferation of weapons and components; low-cost wars; failure of international governance to adapt to new powers; ageing populations and youth bulges; and resource competition/market volatility.

- Conflict is likely to move into new frontiers, including cyber, space and robotics, particularly as the cost of traditional war makes other options more attractive. Links between terrorist and criminal networks are also becoming more common.

Context

The institutions of global governance are increasingly out of step with the changes sweeping the world. There will be difficult transitions ahead as the process of democratisation emerges in the Middle East and beyond. Conflict prevention is not a vote winner, and it is difficult to incentivise politicians to engage in both conflict prevention and proper long term conflict resolution. The trend is to manage the crises only, however conflict rarely solves the underlying problem, especially where non-democracies view the cost of conflict differently from democracies.

There needs to be greater recognition of the limits of power (particularly Western power), and an increased emphasis on real compromise rather than mere dialogue ie. a clear distinction between assisting countries and meddling in their affairs. The goal should be a shared sense of challenges in a world where all people are equal.

Conflict prevention and resolution efforts seem to be decreasing, yet the drivers of conflict appear to be rising. Forecasting is hazardous but remains worthwhile. Trends and variables can be identified relatively easily, but there is a lack of imagination in ‘joining the dots’ to predict events and timings. Trends still do not shape policy.

There is debate as to whether China is a global power or still a developing nation. The country will achieve $8000 gross domestic product (GDP) per person per year in the 2020s (‘free/partly free’ according to the indicators of a country’s relative ‘freedom’ as defined by Freedom House, a US based NGO). However, at this point, China will also be facing an increasingly ageing population.
Improved Policy-making

Better policy making will emerge from more effective and continuous risk assessment. Accurate forecasting requires wider inputs, not just from experts and officials but also from people in the affected areas. A new United Nations (UN) Secretary General high-level panel on threats, challenges and change might be one way of fostering a shared approach.

More effective policy implementation requires reform of global and regional institutions. This includes a clear desire for increased UN legitimacy via the Security Council. In addition, changes to international financial institutions would better equip them to deal with increased globalisation, interdependence and transnational crime. Regional organisations could be more efficient, especially in security cooperation and confidence building measures, and they should play a greater role in building strong neighbourhoods. A forum for regional organisations could promote more effective interaction and mutual learning. Multilateral institutions will face increasing challenges in adapting to a multi-polar world in which the role of non-state actors will increase. Official state representatives will only be part of the solution; hidden power brokers will need to be engaged and influenced. This will all require more frequent and effective partnership working.

New policy development should be based on regional and local solutions. There needs to be a renewed focus on the inequalities in education, technology and freedom. Meaningful engagement should go beyond dialogue, and accommodate the interests of the developing world on transnational issues. The balance between promoting and preserving national interests and international norms will continue to be challenged.

There needs to be continued support for international conflict management, noting that the financial crisis and the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan will probably lead to fewer interventions, particularly by the West. Non-proliferation and export control regimes, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Arms Trade Treaty, need updating to manage the risks of widening civil nuclear capability and conventional weapons production.

Conflict – what does the future hold?

1. There has been a steady reduction in conflict deaths since the 1950s – a 90% fall, even taking account of wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa. This has been driven by a variety of trends. Perhaps most important has been the post Cold War virtual disappearance of great power proxy wars, and increased global cooperation to contain conflict (eg 300% rise in peacekeeping operations, 14-fold rise in sanctions), whose relatively low success rate is still much better than the near zero success rate during the Cold War. Global economic growth has been a rising tide lifting all ships, with 300% growth in less developed countries (LDCs), including sub-Saharan Africa, since 1991. It is predicted that LDCs will constitute 99% of global growth by 2030. Economic growth has driven improved governance, reduced corruption, and has been accompanied by a 200% rise in the number of democracies since 1991. There is increasing recognition that while repression, fear, economic marginalisation and corruption may bolster elites in the short term, they increase the risks of instability in the long term. Regimes which can change leaders peacefully, whether democratic or not, are those which are most likely to adapt and survive. Economic interdependence has driven increased regional political and security cooperation. There are good reasons to think these trends will continue.

2. However, the world is in a state of flux and there is great uncertainty as to what 2030 will hold. The global financial crisis has accelerated the ongoing shift in power towards the South and the East. This shift will continue, making the world increasingly multipolar, with wider circles of influence and the rise of new Emerging Powers. The post World War II global institutions, which underpinned European post-war recovery and the transition to a post-colonial world, will face increasing calls to adapt in response to the shift in power. The shift has helped create alternative narratives to the liberal order – models of prosperity without political freedom. In the Middle East people now
want both prosperity and freedom – but will they forego the latter if they get enough of the former?

3. Media and communications technology will continue to shift power from states to individuals and non-state actors; events in the Middle East show that people, rather than states, will increasingly be the agents of change. The fall in conflict deaths may be accompanied by rising harms resulting from transnational organised crime and terrorism, sometimes with state support, eroding the political structures and legitimacy of weaker states. Economic interdependence and societies' increasing reliance on new technologies creates new types of interconnected vulnerabilities (eg to cyber attack, market volatility). Global media can exaggerate threat perceptions – eg the rise of China, even though its military capability still lags behind the west. There is an ongoing demographic revolution – rising urbanisation and literacy, including in Africa, and falling birth rates including in the Middle East and South Asia.

4. These economic and demographic trends will increase demand for food, energy, water, and other natural resources, increasingly outpacing supply and stretching states' capacity, potentially exacerbating existing tensions, acting as a driver for states to buy insurance – military capabilities, alliances and coalitions. As the number of large scale wars fall, the risk is that fewer, smaller scale wars will have disproportionate impact on international stability. The rise of high tech, low cost military capabilities such as drones increases the temptation for the strong to use military force against the weak – 'drive-by interventions'. The risk of inter-state conflict between great powers, although reduced, has not gone away, particularly where contested borders still exist, and the impact of such conflict will be enormous.

5. There are clearly shared interests in economic growth. The challenge is to build a shared approach to security. But China and the other emerging powers have real stakes in preserving the current system as the source of their current economic growth and security. The shifts in power will make international cooperation to manage security both more important and more complex, will further reduce the appetite and opportunity for military intervention, and may also increase the risks of regional conflict. But they will also increase the opportunities and capabilities for collective action, and highlight the importance of building strong regional neighbourhoods based on shared values to manage conflict – neighbourhood matters.

6. Although there are many drivers of conflict, the three most prominent over the coming decades are likely to be changes in demographics, climate and economy. On demographics, there is a growing gap between assumptions and perceptions. However, 90% of the projected population growth between now and 2050 will be in the developing world, and there is a clear correlation between youth bulges and armed conflict. On the positive side, with sufficient good governance, youth bulges can be turned into an opportunity.

7. There is no doubt that climate change is occurring. There are already ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and whilst some regions may improve, others will decline with possible shifts from a winning to a losing position. Militaries around the world are being asked to respond more frequently to natural disasters, where civilian authorities alone cannot cope. Governments must plan now to be ready for further change; if they are too slow, then they may face internal challenges. In situations where governments already face these challenges, climate change will become a threat multiplier.

8. As the shift in wealth towards the South and the East continues, so will the shift in funding available to spend on national security. This could be increasingly influenced by large businesses, either investing or withdrawing. Economic downturns are likely to lead to unrest, so it is critical to support economic growth in developing countries, with an emphasis on the use of their natural resources.
9. Nuclear proliferation will continue to be a concern, especially as it cannot be separated from the renaissance of civil nuclear power and general acceptance that nuclear weapons can be made from any fissile materiel. Notably, nuclear proliferation has not proved to be the global problem on the scale it was once thought; it has actually been driven by regional concerns. There is also a cultural divide over how to deal with non-proliferation. The Western approach tends to look at quantitative reductions whereas many states (especially non-aligned) are more concerned about public expressions over intentions, such as US guarantees to NATO but assurances to some other countries.

10. Drivers will act at different levels: individual, state and global. They will impact on individuals and states in terms of physical needs, social/cultural issues and for moral/values/ideological reasons. At global level, the viability of some countries will lead to more failing and even failed states, and there may be changes to regional and global hegemonies. The most important factor will be legitimacy at international and state level: the ability and willingness to exercise force, counter rogue elements, make decisions, and even to have the authority and organisation of a political party, linked to the ability to influence and manage popular opinion.

11. In the future there needs to be greater clarity on values versus interests, especially in supporting non-democratic regimes or those with dubious legitimacy, and in particular balancing national interest with international values. Defence engagement can also assist: confidence building measures between militaries and the influence of values into other militaries, can make them effective agents for positive change.

12. In dealing with future uncertainty, governments should place more emphasis on anticipatory governance and embed adaptability in their scenarios and equipment planning. Collaborative foresight and improved risk management will be key. Challenges ahead include those related to freedom of access (not just maritime and air, but cyber and space), as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, violent extremism and transnational crime. However, there will also be opportunities: breakthroughs in alternative energy sources; greater access to the Arctic (resources and reduced transit times); and greater involvement with the rising powers.

Upstream Action - What Does “Good” Look Like?

13. Political appetite for preventative action is limited - it does not win elections so it can be difficult to incentivise politicians. It is generally accepted that prevention is intrinsically the right approach, but it can be difficult to understand where and when to apply effort. Are all conflicts bad? Libya’s home-grown attempts to remove Qaddafi could be thought of as a “good conflict.”

14. The rise of new powers and growth in others between now and 2030 will be significant. In addition to the BRICs, there are countries in Africa at the same stage of development as was seen in China 15 years ago. Global versus national inequalities will become ever more stark, as will competition between great powers and the transition of rising and falling powers. Global GDP is expected to double between now and 2030 (with the G7 retaining 35% of it, and the G20 65%) whilst the population will rise from 7 billion to an estimated 8.3 billion. Existing countries with annual GDP per person of $8000 or more are all ‘free or partly free’, using the Freedom House criteria. Given levels of GDP, education etc, it is suggested that there is a deficit of democracy in both North Africa and South East Asia. The historical trend is that democratisation and liberalisation is inevitable; notably China will reach $8000 GDP per person per year by 2030 (possibly 2020). The last round of democratisation in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War was brief mainly due to European Union (EU) input; the next wave is likely to be harder and longer.

15. Key success criteria for 2030 will include non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT will come to the end of its natural life unless reformed and developed. States will continue to want nuclear weapons for regional rather than global reasons, but the...
largest threat now is from non-state actors. The aim of global disarmament should remain, noting that disarmament and proliferation are linked. Further successes are needed in: crisis management and post-conflict resolution to break the cycle of conflict and replace with peace; more effective arms control (noting that as eastern powers grow, inevitably arms manufacture will also move east); and in reducing corruption. Greater chance of success in all areas will only be achieved with an improved supply of global governance, starting with a reformed UN Security Council.

16. To date, theory on transition of powers, especially great powers, has predicted great wars. But nuclear deterrence may prevent this, suggesting that nuclear disarmament before 2030 could be counter productive. The NPT is not dead, nor out of control, but equally it is not yet clear how nuclear deterrence will work in a multi-polar world. Arguably, North Korea acquired nuclear weapons because it felt threatened, yet their acquisition has not made North Korean behaviour more predictable. In fact, since North Korea gained nuclear weapons, the US rhetoric on conflict with them has stopped, perhaps justifying the North Korean decision. The US, with its overwhelming conventional forces, has the most to gain from global nuclear disarmament, despite the reduction in its military spending from the current 46% of the global total to an estimated 33% by 2030.

17. Dealing with challenges in 2030 will require a new set of international tools. Countries in difficulty will require more systematic attention and policy makers will need to look beyond immediate issues and consider greater preparation for the “known unknowns” - eg elections as potential flashpoints. States and societies also need greater resilience – in the best case scenarios, it will take 12-15 years to ‘turn around’ a conflict affected country. Resilience will be predicated on better value for money for the international community’s investment: hence smarter, more carefully applied measures of effectiveness which do not skew policy.

**Building state stability – what’s desirable by 2030 and how to get there?**

18. Deaths from conflict may be falling, but even modern conflicts with historically low death tolls have a significant impact on stability. The nexus of justice, security and prosperity/employment, with 1.5 billion people still living in poverty, and the vulnerability of trade and travel routes, are continuing drivers of instability. Security is indivisible – insecurity in the Middle East has global impact. But the most effective responses are likely to be regional: “think globally, act locally”. For example, security sector reform in Liberia improves security across the Mano river region.

19. The international community’s experience of peacebuilding illustrates that the quality and legitimacy of institutions matter – particularly justice, police and the wider security sector; and that organised crime can be a major obstacle to peace and security. All available tools, including security sector reform and justice reform, should be used to support states in addressing institutional deficits and the challenges of crime. This includes the need to tackle capacity and capability deficits, through training in operational procedures and skills. But it also needs to address accountability and legitimacy deficits, changing mindsets, helping the security sector gain the confidence of ordinary people, making them a source of security not instability, better able to manage and resolve the potential tensions between human security, regime security and national security. These efforts need to be given time to effect change.

20. There have been many lessons about what has worked with regard to building resilient states and implementing reform. Many of these are captured in the latest World Development Report:

- Build inclusive coalitions for change, including political groups, business and civil society, giving as much of the population as possible a stake, as was achieved in Chile and Indonesia;
Balance and pace political reforms, avoid hasty elections or big one-off transitions.

Rapid, tangible and visible results are crucial for building wider confidence in reform;

Balance and pace political reforms, avoid hasty elections or big one-off transitions. South Africa took three years to prepare for its 1994 elections, while Chile arguably prepared for a decade. Pace the introduction of accountability in security and justice, to minimise resistance. Argentina launched quick prosecutions of rights violators, leading to a backlash and then a slower pace of investigations;

Support local innovation, rather than copying laws and institutions wholesale. This can create problems for delivery eg in South Africa provincial governments were set up for political reasons but didn’t deliver as effectively as was hoped.

21. There have also been lessons for international action to tackle regional and global threats and to exploit opportunities for support:

Move away from attempts at early warning towards continuous risk management and reduction across high risk countries, as specific turning points are impossible to predict;

Invest in citizens, justice, jobs – transition countries find it harder to get justice and job creation assistance than support for military, education and macroeconomic;

Create a coherent plan – institutions, economy and financial processes;

Speedier decision making by international institutions to bolster their credibility. Slow decision making is often political – it is easier for donors to delay small school/NGO projects than big projects involving recipient governments;

Combine resources and knowledge of high and low income countries. Look at what has actually worked in transition countries – how long it took and the challenges faced – not just what suits the agenda of external powers.

22. There needs to be greater focus on building the right international capability and networks to support change – eg. police currently only make up 10% of UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) staff, justice practitioners only 0.1%. There also needs to be greater coordination between the different bodies responsible for tackling crime – Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), DPKO – and between donors, to ensure their efforts don’t overload the recipient. A combination of multilateral, regional, bilateral and minilateral approaches will be needed, with the aim of building good neighbourhoods.

The balance between multilateralism, ‘minilateralism’ and bilateralism

23. In conflict prevention and resolution, bilateral solutions are of limited value. Regional organisations and minilateral solutions (groupings, often informal, involving states with an interest in the issue being addressed) are considered to be more effective, often more so than multilateral ones, but they generally lack the legitimacy of multilateral organisations. Regional and minilateral solutions must not undermine multilateral ones; this is best achieved by linking them to multilaterals via a formal reporting mechanism. However, existing multilateral organisations need reform, notably the UN which is only as strong as members want it to be. Without reform, the UN will lose legitimacy; it will inevitably remain state-centric, but must engage more non-state actors.

Counter-Proliferation

24. The focus on proliferation has to be on countering, as prevention has proved impossible. Proliferation will continue to be dominated by concerns over nuclear material, but the full range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and conventional weapons, improvised explosive device (IED) components etc will also need preventative work. The future of nuclear proliferation will hinge on North Korea and particularly Iran, where successful development of nuclear weapons could trigger a regional arms race. The NPT should be retained as an international framework, but with additional protocols. Advanced conventional weapons may also create instability, with potential to alter the balance of power between nations, especially in Africa.
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The impact of non-state actors

25. The interdependence between non-state actors and states will continue, as will the crowded field of non-state actors with a key role in both conflict prevention and resolution. Changes ahead, notably in technology, will continue to redistribute power to non-state actors. This will assist violent non-state actors, including those involved in organised crime and terrorism, some of which are already able to distort political systems or even become political parties. These changes will also have positive implications: non-state actors could open up dialogue or deliver outcomes for public good, including security, requiring a more formal redistribution of responsibility and increased accountability.

Shifts in the axes of power

26. Great powers will remain central to world order. However, there are concerns that perceptions are shaping power eg. are people responding to a perception of where China might be in 2030 rather than where it actually is now? The transition of countries to become great powers (or vice versa) will be key, and the way in which these new powers choose to manage their power will drive world order. As the world becomes increasingly multi-polar, the ability to wield power and influence will potentially be more than mere hard military power, broadening into values, becoming hubs in networks, and developing the ability to manage relationships more effectively with non-state actors.

The 2030 Landscape - Enduring Strategies for Conflict Resolution

27. Conflict resolution requires a complex mix of bifocals - to see globally and locally at the same time - and binoculars - to see a bit further and be proactive rather than reactive.

28. The UN remains the most credible organisation to lead on conflict resolution, but it needs to be more proactive. Timely intervention is key - perhaps within a maximum of 30 days - but this requires early warning and a UN force at high readiness. Given that Western states are likely to be increasingly reluctant to intervene, a high readiness UN force is (and has been for some time) a ‘stuck’ issue. Similarly, the UN Peacebuilding Commission has not achieved as much as had been hoped for, and needs to be reinvigorated.

29. Whilst there are regional organisations who could take on a conflict resolution role, most currently have insufficiently effective security architecture (capability, infrastructure, structures etc) to make this possible. Existing regional organisations should be used more to help build confidence and open channels for dialogue. An example is the Nile Treaty, where signatories need to negotiate regularly and have tried and tested mechanisms for dialogue which could be widened in scope. But there is also bad practice by major players from outside the region. For example, there are currently 16 navies conducting counter piracy off the Horn of Africa, at best loosely coordinated with each other, and not coordinated with any African security architecture.

30. States will remain key players in conflict resolution. They can regulate public opinion, help to implement mechanisms to address grievances and establish safeguards, and independently oversee elections. However, states need to reform the way they give aid. Sustainable aid (give a fishing rod not a fish) is key, as is the relaxation of rules on aid money to allow it to be spent across an affected region (rather than with donor states).

31. A new strategy for the use of force is required. Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that excessive force only serves to alienate the population. A more minimalist approach to the use of force is required which would need to be linked to mediation and negotiation, as well as conveying to the opposition or rebel groups that political demands can be achieved politically. Armed forces should also restructure and retrain for modern conflict and modern conflict prevention and resolution. Capacity building and security force assistance will be required in greater numbers.
What should countries do differently?

32. There are real disagreements around the challenges and opportunities for dealing with conflict. The Middle East and North Africa crises show this – regimes have focused on stability, authority, sovereignty, freedom from external interference, and the risks of extremism. The opposition focus includes the absence of other voices and the context of Israel and the Middle-East Peace Process. The West has sometimes been part of the problem, supporting autocratic regimes. In Sri Lanka a brutal insurgency was successfully but brutally defeated. The Sri Lankan government maintains that peace is restored and the focus should be on reconstruction, while others want accountability for rights violations, and better inclusion of ex-combatants. This lack of consensus is repeated globally. States in the North tend to focus on failed/failing states, counter-terrorism, proliferation, organised crime, while the South focuses more on poverty, food security, internal conflict, and the West’s willingness to override sovereignty.

33. International justice can be a means for conflict prevention, by countering impunity and constraining bad behaviour, but its progress faces many challenges. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is increasingly portrayed as a tool of Western imperialism, with all current investigations in Africa, including Sudan and Libya referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council. Although EU Member States have been long term supporters of the ICC, they are now considering deferring the Bashir investigation because of his helpful stance on South Sudan, even though attacks in Darfur continue.

34. Identifying what states should do differently is tricky, since many past and present drivers of conflict will persist into the future. But changes could include:

- States need to redefine their goals; crude pursuit of national interests without sensitivity to others should end. Build not buy confidence – intangibles such as respect, justice, dignity. Money spent on public diplomacy will make no difference if people don’t see a real change in attitudes.
- Work harder to build a shared sense of challenges, recognising that what happens in one part of the world affects others. The 2004 UNSG high level panel on threats, challenges and change tried to reconcile differing priorities – perhaps it’s time for a new exercise like this?
- Reform needs to be quick to maintain momentum. Indonesia is a good example.
- Reform can be overturned by traditional elites or intra elite reordering eg in Kirgizstan, while in South Korea land reform eroded traditional structures; Eastern Europe’s elites were the intelligentsia. Incorporate the views of ordinary people, not just the elites; even democracies are usually elite driven.
- Get the military out of politics as soon as possible – military rarely give up power without popular pressure, yet the West likes the predictability and familiarity of often Western trained military leaders.
- Get the timing of elections right – not too early or too late. High stakes electoral systems spark violence eg Cote d’Ivoire. Elections reflect but do not transform deeper societal trends, and can trigger greater problems in the absence of effective justice institutions.
- Don’t pick winners – focus on supporting institutions not individuals. There is a tendency not to support independent institutions eg judiciary, legislature because they challenge western-friendly leadership (eg Karzai, Museveni, Kagame). Beware that the pre-occupation with preventing chaos may inadvertently prevent necessary change, incubating future chaos.
- Focus on promoting principles that countries can domesticate – eg authority from people, rule of law, free choice of leaders, freedom of association and movement, accountability and transparency – rather than imposing specific institutions.
- Outsiders are largely bystanders in the initial transition, in which internal actors play the most decisive role, although in the longer term outsiders may play a bigger role.
- Post conflict breakdown in trust between communities makes quick solutions impossible. The long term painstaking work building rule of law is important, making societies more resilient. Be wary of unrealistic expectations from donors.
and populace.

- **Fix Multilateralism.** The UN remains best placed to support conflict resolution, but it needs to be more credible and legitimate, by: expanding UNSC permanent members; reconsidering the veto (it smacks of hypocrisy to insist on national democracy yet to have autocratic features at the international level); using the UN more consistently – it is demonised when it doesn’t suit and praised it when it does.

- **Fix North/South relations.** By 2030 the international community needs to deal with poverty as well as democracy, and address globalisation’s negative as well as positive consequences – eg poverty induced deforestation, wealth induced climate change. Fair terms of trade, technology and skills development in the South will be vital; much of the South feel like victims not beneficiaries of industrialisation. Be consistent: economic deregulation was promoted in the South by the Bretton Woods institutions, but in the wake of the financial crisis, the North is now nationalising and increasing regulation.

**Regional Actions and Arrangements.**

35. A mix of global and regional approaches is required, with clear linkages between the two. A UN facilitated forum for regional organisations to share best practices, discuss issues and support each other would be beneficial. Regional organisations are key to problem solving because they are close to the troubled area, have a deep understanding of the issues involved and a stake in ensuring stability. The resolution of bilateral disputes is key to ensuring that in the years to come, regional organisations are able to resolve regional problems without being caught up in issues affecting only two countries. There is a need for new regional organisations based on the Arctic and on Afghanistan.

**UN Peace-building architecture**

36. The UN Peacebuilding Commission had done some good work, but needs significant reform to improve its performance. This should include its relationship with the Security Council and General Assembly, its input into wider UN Peacekeeping operations, its own capability and expertise, and enhanced regional footprint staffed with high quality representatives including from the region. The UN itself needs reform to restore its legitimacy. Specifically, the Security Council needs to be more representative and democratic (no vetoes).

**Follow the money- economic upside- illegal flows downside**

37. Money Flows. Money can both stabilise and destabilise. As the world economy rebalances further east, there needs to be greater burden sharing in conflict prevention and resolution. At present, the major financiers of peacekeeping operations are the western countries, but they are not the troop contributing nations. The significant sums of money involved in transnational crime are harming fragile states and their rule of law, in particular resulting from narcotics and from the criminalisation of the energy sector. To solve this requires: a greater understanding of the degree to which transnational crime has pervaded states and companies; more assistance in reinstating the rule of law; a global approach (as these are transnational issues); and a better international architecture (especially in the financial area).

**Empowering grass roots**

38. The key to supporting grass roots is to create the environment for stable change, which requires open institutions allowing the population to be involved in decision making, investing in institutions (as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has done) rather than focusing purely on elections, shaping the conditions and empowering grass roots movements. Support from the neighbourhood is very important, but western powers will need to accept that this might limit their access due to eg. ethnic or religious reasons. Enabling the creation of internal knowledge is also crucial, probably best achieved by the formation and support of think tanks. But external powers and
NGOs have to be careful about their approach to avoid draining the best talent from the country and its government.

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