PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

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ABSTRACT

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

The African Great Lakes Region (GLR) has witnessed some of the most intense violence and protracted conflict of the last half-century. There has been spiralling and sometimes over-lapping conflict in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (hereinafter Zone 1 conflict states). Yet their neighbours—Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia (hereinafter Zone 2 peaceful states)—have remained generally peaceful. This article asks what makes the difference in conflict outcomes between these neighbouring states? It has one goal: to identify a set of structural and historical factors (if any), that differentiate the zone 1 from the zone 2 states and which can explain the incidence of conflicts across time and countries. We set out to document and estimate the impact of a common set of structural factors that underpin the outbreak of wars in this region over the past fifty years, while controlling for time and country specific effects.
**BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION**

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*Patrick Paul Walsh* is a professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at UCD. He received a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. During 1992-2007 he worked in Trinity College Dublin and left as an Associate Professor, College Fellow and Dean of Social and Human Sciences. He was a Visiting Professor at K.U. Leuven during 1997-1999 and a Research Scholar in the Department of Economics, Harvard University during the academic year 2002-2003. His professional activities include being Editor of the Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland and runs a related IRCHSS funded "Our Polestar is Truth" project based in the Long Room Hub in TCD. He is on the Standing Committee for Social Science in the European Science Foundation. He coordinates UCDs HEA-Irish Aid Programme of Strategic Cooperation 2007–2011. This Programme runs a flagship "Sandwich or Swedish Model" UCD Ph.D. in Global Human Development, among other things. He also chairs a TCD-UCD Masters in Development Practice that is part of a Global Network based at the Earth Institute at Columbia University and funded by the MacArthur Foundation. He is on the management committee of the UCD Geary Institute. Amongst other publications he has published in the Economic Journal, Journal of Industrial Economics, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Comparative Economics, and the Economics of Transition.
INTRODUCTION

The African Great Lakes Region (GLR) has witnessed some of the most intense violence and protracted conflict of the last half-century. While many of the events were intra-state, the conflict literature is beginning to connect them as part of a conflict matrix in the GLR. There has been spiralling and sometimes over-lapping conflict in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (hereinafter Zone 1 conflict states). Yet their neighbours—Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia (hereinafter Zone 2 peaceful states)—have remained generally peaceful. This article asks what makes the difference in conflict outcomes between these neighbouring states? How did one group of poor states avoid conflict while their neighbours suffered it? How, with flows of refugees from neighbouring wars and close proximity, did zone 1 states remain peaceful while their neighbours in zone 2 were engulfed in conflict? What explains the radical difference between otherwise comparable countries?

This article has one goal: to identify a set of structural and historical factors (if any), that differentiate the zone 1 from the zone 2 states and which can explain the incidence of conflicts across time and countries. We do not attempt to look at the specific events that triggered wars, or the different intensities and course of war in the different countries, or the specific mechanisms that reproduced or deterred conflict in each country. Rather we set out to document and estimate the impact of a common set of structural factors that underpin the outbreak of wars in this region over the past fifty years, while controlling for time and country specific effects.

In the first section of the article, we outline the trends of violent conflict in the GLR which are to be modelled in a simple linear probability model below. In the second section, we briefly review the literature and propose plausible hypotheses. In the third section, we outline the methodology and data used to estimate the probability of war and its relationship to a set of structural factors, controlling for time and country specific effects. In the subsequent sections we review in detail the results for each hypothesis. In concluding, we overview the core results of the paper and outline the research questions it raises for the future.

TRENDS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT IN THE GLR

From 1960 to 2010, 86 conflict-episodes were recorded in the GLR: 35 in Uganda; 19 in Burundi; 19 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 11 in Rwanda. Only two conflict-episodes happen in our peaceful Zone 2, both in Kenya. In figure 1 we sum the conflicts in each decade by zones of conflict. We can observe that the number of conflicts increased as we moved through the decades in the conflict zone (1), with the 1990s and 2000s accounting for three-quarters of all episodes.
Even though we do not model the intensity of the wars, we document in figure 2 the average number of battle-related deaths per year for each decade. The numbers of deaths increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, and remained very high in the 2000s. In these decades, over 100,000 people per year lost their lives in the conflict zone.
This increase in numbers of conflicts and continuation of intensity is atypical, since globally the numbers of conflicts have decreased since the early 1990s and the likelihood of settlement has increased.\textsuperscript{3} Moreover in the GLR, as figure 3 shows, serious outbreaks of war have become increasingly clustered, with sequential outbreaks in the zone 1 countries.

In what follows, we attempt to model the probability of conflict as a function of a set of structural factors that induce a higher probability of war, controlling for time and country specific effects. Our focus is specifically upon structural factors - both those which are historically given and those that vary over time. We do not model path dependency (lagged dependent variables) in our modelling of conflict, for example the view that the history of war explains the current war. Nor do we model diffusion and contagion effects (when one state goes to war it pulls in others or encourages them to copy). We rather attempt to identify a set of structural features which increase states’ vulnerability to conflict. Some of these factors may themselves be produced by past conflict; some may make states vulnerable than others to contagion and diffusion effects. But this is not part of the specific explanation offered here. Nor do we attempt to explain the varying intensity of conflict within each state, or the processes and paths of conflict resolution.

THE LITERATURE: GENERATING PLAUSIBLE HYPOTHESES

There is a developed literature on each of the states in the GLR, which we use primarily as background material in developing hypotheses and interpreting results.\textsuperscript{4} In each of the states, the social bases of “ethnicity”, the numbers, divisions
and resources of the different groups, and their access to the state differs. For example, to take only the conflict-ridden states, in Rwanda and Burundi, a common cultural and linguistic base was overlain by a dyadic social structure imposed during the period of Belgian colonisation, with very strong horizontal inequality (whereby colonially defined Tutsi elite was opposed to Hutu majority): the dominant political group differed in each state, although in each with genocidal results.\(^5\) The history of Uganda, in contrast, is a permanent imprint of the Buganda Kingdom—it is one of few places in Africa that had developed a strong “nation state” before the onset of colonialism—coinciding with religious rivalries, and a territorial division of labour between North and South.\(^6\) The intense violence of the early decades took place during the brutal military dictatorship of Idi Amin. Meanwhile the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast territory with an area of 2,345,410 square kilometres and a population of 68 million divided into 250 ethnic groups (including a large Rwandan population) of varied religious background although majority Christians.\(^7\) It has a long history of intense and brutal violence dating from the days of slave trade in the 16th Century and encompassing intense violence and population displacement in the colonial period.\(^8\) The vast resources are held responsible for attracting imperial forces in the country that have in turn played on ethnic divisions. This practice continued in the post-colonial period, as did the repertoires of violence. Meanwhile studies of Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia show different interrelations of ethnicity, inequality and the state. Tanzania, for example, has over 120 disparate groups and yet it has been the most peaceful of the zone 2 countries with fewer outbreaks even of relatively minor violence. It also took some of the boldest measures to ensure that ethnicity did not impact on state functioning: compulsory national service, promotion of Kiswahili as a national language, rural resettlement into Ujamaa (communal) villages, nationalization (including of land), adoption of socialism and self-reliance principles, etc. Kenya, by contrast, inherited better developed infrastructure at independence and is still a regional hegemonic power. It also inherited one dominant ethnic group from British colonial practices, the Kikuyu, and although relative peace has been maintained, the Kikuyu factor has remained a key component of governance.\(^9\)

Given the different histories and conditions of each country, are there common factors which explain the patterns of conflict? One hypothesis - which we treat as the null hypothesis to be accepted only if none of the other hypotheses are confirmed - is that no such factors exist:

**H1**: the causes of conflict are sui generis within each state.

Our substantive hypotheses, however, suppose that there are underlying structural and/or historical commonalities that explain the difference between country outcomes in the conflict-ridden (zone 1) and peaceful (zone 2) states in the GLR.

There is an extensive quantitative literature on the factors associated with violent conflict. However the data sets cover a very diverse set of countries and conflicts.\(^{10}\) By comparing only a small range of states similar in terms of economic development, state capacity, their “newness” (all post-WWII) states, and their mutual proximity, yet very different in terms of conflict outcomes, we are able to
look more closely at the underlying structural factors, historical and otherwise, that make some states significantly more vulnerable to violence than others. The different outcomes in zone 2, otherwise broadly similar in socio-economic profile, provide us with an excellent control group of countries. Taking this set of cases allows us to set aside some factors which are correlated with conflict in the large-n literature, but which are common to all the states in the GLR.

Poverty is highly correlated with violent conflict: the World Development Report of 2011 points out that “Slow-developing low-income economies largely dependent on natural resources are 10 times more likely than others to experience civil war.” All the GLR countries are poor, the peaceful zone 2 states as much as the conflict-ridden zone 1 states, as figures 4 and 5 below show. To construct these graphs, we used a measure of income poverty—GDP Per Capita Per Day in 1990 US$ and corrected for purchasing power (Converted at Geary Khamis PPPs). The data is constructed from the Total Economy Database at the University of Groningen. This represents the average outcome and does not tap into internal income inequalities. On these figures, zone 1 countries are no poorer than zone 2 countries. All countries show the common cyclical character of economic development in Africa where commodity price movements dominate standards of living, and where living standards often come perilously close to the accepted extreme “poverty” measure of less than 1 US dollar per day. If we compare the average outcome per person per day with their ex-colonial masters, we see the average person in Belgium and Britain living on 20 US dollars a day in 1960 which gradually increases, without much volatility, to 65 US dollars a day by 2010.

Figure 4: Daily PPP Dollars per person (1990 US$)- Zone 1
Conflict is associated with weak rather than strong states. In our comparison both the strongest state in the region (Uganda) and the weakest (DRC) have seen some of the most intense violence. It is associated with refugee movement, but of the three largest receivers of refugees from conflict zones—Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia—a only one has itself experienced successive conflicts. Conflict has sometimes been argued to be associated with the absence of democracy, but as we discuss below, the birth of democracy was a factor that triggered conflict in our zone 1 states. Indeed for most of time (88%) for most of the decades under analysis, both zone 1 conflict and zone 2 peaceful states were governed by some form of dictatorship.

Are there underlying factors that explain the different conflict outcomes in the two zones? We take six hypotheses from the existing literature that we judge to have initial plausibility for this region. For each of these hypotheses, we take a proxy measure which allows us to test them quantitatively over a fifty year period, comparing outcomes in zone 1 and zone 2 countries. The hypotheses, derived from the comparative literature and discussed elsewhere in this volume, are as follows

H2: Violent conflict is caused by a cluster of factors, not just one.

H3: Structural-historical factors are important in setting in motion a path of conflict (proxy: colonial power-holder, Britain or Belgium).

H4: Political exclusion is a cause of conflict (proxy: democracy vs civilian vs military dictatorships).
H5: Economic opportunities, not least the future prospects of individual and group advance, make violent conflict less likely\(^\text{18}\) (proxy: openness to trade, overseas development aid).

H6: Civil society restrains from violent conflict\(^\text{19}\) (proxy: demographic characteristics, proportion of population under 14 years; life expectancy).

H7: Ethnic division makes violent conflict more likely\(^\text{20}\) (proxy: linguistic and religious fractionalisation).

We are aware that the proxy measures are far from adequate to the theoretical intuitions behind the hypotheses, and we do not claim that they are the only possible proxy measures. However they do capture key aspects of historical, cultural, economic, social and political processes.\(^\text{21}\) The qualitative discussions which follow allow us to show their relevance and the mechanisms by which they produce conflict.

**METHODOLOGY**

Our data set, primary sources and summary statistics are documented in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data 1960-2010</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict =1 if there is a least 25 battle-related deaths per year Conflict = 0, otherwise.</td>
<td>World Bank Development Indicators: Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Battle-Related Deaths</td>
<td>408 Zone 1 204 Zone 2 204</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: Hadenius &amp; Teorell 2005 I—Region and Colonial Data</td>
<td>408 Zone 1 204 Zone 2 204</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Origin =1 if Belgian. Colonial Origin =0 , if British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>World Bank Development Indicators: Alesina et al, 2003. “Fractionalization”. Journal of Economic Growth, 8 (June): 155-194</td>
<td>408 Zone 1 204 Zone 2 204</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, as written in equation (1), we estimate the probability of a Conflict = 1 event as a linear function of a set of structural indicators and controls for time and country specific (random) effects. Our measure of conflict is specific to country j in time period t. We have 8 countries over 51 years. As outlined in table 1 we have controls for history that do not vary over-time. In addition we have controls for Economic International Integration, Social Structure and Political Regimes that do vary across country and time.

\[ E(\text{Conflict}_j|X_j) = e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{History}_j + \beta_2 \text{EconSocPol}_j + \beta_3 \text{Time}_j + \omega_j + \eta_j} \]

We estimate a basic model without country specific (random) effects in our error structure and then we estimate a probit regression with random effects. The results of these estimations are documented in Table 2 together with the marginal effects of these structural factors. Rather than empirically describe the results we discuss each factor separately, referring back to the statistical significant of each variable and marginal effect.
### Table 2: Probit Regression with and without Country Specific Random Effects 1960-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of a Conflict Episode</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Marginal Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian Colonial Origin</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Default British)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
<td>(6.5)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.7)</td>
<td>(5.2)</td>
<td>(5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic International Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Dependency</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
<td>(5.3)</td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictatorship</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Default Institutionalized Democracy)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Specific Random Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistics in brackets. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variable in question.

### HISTORICAL FACTORS

**Colonial Origin**

In the introduction to this volume, Ruane and Todd suggest that the history of colonialism may set in place particular configurations of conflict which take on path-dependent properties that are particularly hard to break, even long after the colonial period is over. Is this the case in the GLR? The range of cases allows us to test the effects of British versus Belgium colonial presence. The results in Table 2 show that a history of Belgian colonization is highly correlated with the presence of conflict: a former Belgian colony has a 33% higher chance of war in any year of the 51 years, than does a former British colony.

Why this is so requires further exploration since the British colonial presence was by no means always benign. Even in our case studies, Uganda (an ex British colony) is among the high-violence zone 1 cases. We suggest that it is a function of the mode of colonial administration, and in particular the forms of indirect rule. The Belgian practice was to use and augment previous distinctions to define a local ruling elite - going as far as giving identity cards to distinguish Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi and Rwanda, and displacing whole populations in the Southern DRC to maximize the economic exploitation of the region. The British also followed the practice of indirect rule—in Ireland, in Uganda—although without the legal inflexibility of Belgian imperial rule. However, in the other GLR countries, indirect
rule was highly moderated for a variety of contingent reasons. In Tanzania, the British presence was relatively short lived, taking control of Tanganyika as a UN trusteeship having defeated the former colonial power—Germany—in WWI, and there was no obvious ethnic group to favour for indirect rule. In Rhodesia, white settlers were concentrated in the Southern part of the colony, and—having failed to include the Northern area (to become Zambia) with Malawi in a federation—the British focused their attention on the South. Only in Kenya, in our zone 2 countries, did indirect rule definitively favour the one ethnic group (the Kikuyu) and this remains a feature of tension even in contemporary Kenya. In short, our results tap into a particular mode of imperial territorial management—via indirect rule which privileges one indigenous population over another, thus cementing cultural as well as economic division and making boundaries exclusive. Theoretically, there is good reason to believe that this mode of governance is likely to be conflict-generating into the future. Our empirical evidence shows that it is.

**Cultural Fractionalization**

The GLR states have very different internal cultural divisions and cleavages. The relative extent of linguistic and of religious fractionalization in 1961 (the historical start-point of analysis) is shown in figure 6 below. Table 2 shows that one unit increase in linguistic fractionalization, within the scale of 0 to 1, will increase the chance of conflict by 1 per cent. Religious fractionalization has the opposite effect, with marginal changes reducing the chance of conflict by 2 per cent. Highly religiously fractionalized states are less likely to experience violent conflict, while states with more even religious divisions are more likely to engage in conflict.

Figure 6: Ethno Linguistic and Religious Fractionalization, 1961
Several points are worth noting here. First, while language is typically used as a proxy for ethnicity, religion is much more evident as a divisive feature in this region. Secondly, as Coakley has pointed out, fractionalization per se is a bad measure of potential for conflict: other things equal, a highly fractionalized society is less likely to have persistent conflict than a dyadic one. Linguistic fractionalization may well prevent communication and make more difficult the mechanisms of conflict-avoidance, both at local and wider levels. But it is the massive religious divisions—between 50% and 60% in most of the conflict states—which provide a legitimation for antagonism. Indeed in this set of cases, it is the clustering of religious fragmentation at the 50-60% level in zone 1 that is most clearly correlated with conflict outbreaks.

A closer comparison of the two zones, however, bears out the conclusions of the wider literature that ethnic diversity does not of itself determine violent conflict. Linguistic fragmentation was as evident in Tanzania as in DRC and Uganda in 1961, and in Tanzania the religions (in particular Christianity and Islam) were dyadic. However in Tanzania linguistic fractionalization was overcome by strong educational and cultural policies (promotion of Kiswahili as the language of the state), and the potential effects of religio-ethnic division overcome by prudent constitutional politics and political practices.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The GLR states differ markedly in their openness to trade and their receipt of international development assistance, with zone 2 countries much more likely to score more highly on these measures in the last two decades. This is documented in figure 7 below.

Figure 7: Trade Openness and Overseas Development Aid Index
Of course the fact of intense violence and military dictatorships in zone 1 regions may itself deter trade and aid or even change the composition of such aid; this is likely to be only short-term effect(s). Over the 50 year period, we see dips and unevenness in the conflict zone, and—particularly from the 1980s, a steady rise in openness and aid in the peaceful zone. Although the effects at the margins are small (see table 2 above), since the substantive amounts of trade and aid are high, the effects on conflict are far from insignificant. Whether they are due—on the one hand—to the openness to wider norms and standards, or to the possibilities of future change held open by international linkages, or to both, is not evident on this data and would require closer qualitative study. However it shows that increased international economic interactions are associated with a reduced probability of conflict in this region, and indeed helped the peaceful zones to remain peaceful during the 1990s and 2000s.

**SOCIAL STRUCTURE**

Violent conflict has many effects, among them a demographic hollowing out of the male population and often—given sexual violence rife in GLR conflicts—an additional source of HIV and Aids, decimating the entire sexually-active cohorts. A socio-demographic factor which clearly differentiates zone 1 and zone 2 states is the percentage of the population under 14 years: clearly higher in zone 1 countries as is shown in table 2 above and in figure 8 below, and particularly so in the crucial decades of 1990s and 2000s. Equally life expectancy is significantly higher in zone 2 states.  

Figure 8: Social factors
In the wider literature, there has been some discussion of the relationship between the share of youth in the population and the risk of violent conflict: in particular, the “youth bulge” between 15-24 has been the focus of attention, since it is this cohort which is most likely to join militant groups. Most recently, Fearon has not found strong evidence to support this linkage. Our findings show a definite correlation between the still younger age group (under 14) and outbreaks of violent conflict. This is highly likely to be in part a result of violence. However it also has a feedback effect, and not simply in the availability of youth recruits for rebel armies. We know that cross-communal civil society organizations are strong predictors of peace rather than conflict, and that even intra-communal civil society organizations favour inter-communal peace. Strong organizational networks and authority structures at the grass roots level prevent small scale violence escalating into larger scale, and provides a stabilizing force against those “ethnic entrepreneurs” or warlords who might benefit from violence. And these civil society organizations are always adult organizations, their existence undermined by the effects of war. It is thus highly plausible that as these constraints on violence are eroded, violent conflict escalates.

In Zone 2 countries, in contrast, the society, to varying degrees, was sewn together through common threads. Kenya for instance is known for its Harambee tradition. Harambee was a government initiative to get the whole society involved in solving immediate problems surrounding them in a self help basis. Communities would pull together meager resources for a common good. This is also observed in Tanzania where civil society supplements the state in a range of ways.

POLITICAL FACTORS

An extensive literature on the “democratic peace” suggests that democracies are less likely than other regimes to experience violent conflict. African history, however, suggests that the process of democratization may be a difficult and dangerous one, liable to produce violent conflict. Indeed “benign dictators” may be much more likely to build national unity and preclude ethnic violence than simple democracies. As outlined in Table 1 we use an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) of Institutionalized Democracy to construct a Dictatorship = 1 if the score of Institutionalized Democracy < 3. Dictatorship = 0, otherwise. For most of the data most of these countries have some form of dictatorship. Overall, we find that democracy increases the likelihood of conflict by 10 per cent when compared to a dictatorship over this period.

Indeed the raw probabilities mapped in Figure 9 show that the single type of regime most likely to give rise to conflict is a presidential democracy (admit within fewer periods), while periods during traditional royal dictatorships and military dictatorships are less likely to be correlated with violent outbreak.
While democracy makes conflict more likely in our data set, it is also the case that democracy has been more prevalent in the peaceful zone 2 countries than in the conflict-ridden zone 1 countries, as shown in Table 3. The preponderance of democracies, 18 per cent of the periods, in zone 2 has to be seen in the context of democratization in the 1990s which was significantly more successful and more peaceful in these states, following and usually guided by civilian dictatorships, than it was in zone 1, following typically military dictatorships for most of the time periods.

Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Regime</th>
<th>Zone 1</th>
<th>Zone 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Democracy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Dictatorship</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Dictatorship</td>
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The distinction between civilian and military dictators taps into the well-documented qualitative distinction in forms of leadership in the early post-colonial years in the GLR. Where there was strong leadership, relatively strong institutions emerged to navigate through the uncertain global politics of the 1960s and challenges of state building. The early rise of military dictatorship in the countries of zone 1 especially the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda had lasting impact on peace. The main distinction between DRC, Burundi and Rwanda in this respect is that the DRC had a more stable military dictatorship that dominated the scene for three decades, while Burundi and Rwanda had a succession of them. In contrast, the civilian-dictator leaders of the zone 2 countries had a much clearer vision of national unity: Zambia
(humanism), Tanzania (socialism) and Kenya (African socialism). Indeed Uganda too began with a strong “Common Mans Charter”, although this was soon overthrown by the long military dictatorship of Idi Amin. The success of civilian dictators in nation-building in the early decades in the zone 2 countries gave a context more conducive to peaceful democratization than in the zone 1 countries. Indeed in Tanzania, the process of democratization was carefully managed to limit the politicization of ethnic divisions.

CONCLUSION

Our conclusion is that there are significant underlying causes of the conflict-proneness of zone 1 states and the relative peacefulness of zone 2 states. Zone 1 states began the period of independence with serious vulnerabilities: particular forms of colonialism interlocked with ethnic divisions to produce conflict potential. However this was far from determining. It was the addition of other factors - military dictatorships, an isolation from the wider economy, and, particularly as violence developed, a hollowing out of the adult population and a destruction of civil society, that produced high conflict risk. While our data gives support to H3-H7, no single factor is decisive in producing conflict. It is the clustering of factors in zone 1 states, as predicted in H2 that radically increases the risk of conflict. Equally, a clustering of “positive” indicators radically lessens the risk of conflict. Zone 2 states began with a more favourable historical conjuncture, but it was subsequent choices and events, openness to international trade and aid, civilian dictatorships with strong integrative ideologies, that permitted the building of cultural, political and civil society barriers—as if an immune system—against conflict.

The result was that the states in each of the two zones had very different capacities to respond to conflict-generating challenges. This is seen most clearly in two phenomena of the 1990s. The first is the process of democratization, which tends to produce new tensions and highlight older grievances. In the zone 1 countries it triggered conflicts. Yet it was managed peacefully in the zone 2 countries. The second is the “diffusion” effect of conflict as flows of refugees and armed groups from one conflict-state helped destabilize another. In zone 1 countries, this posed an almost insuperable problem, pushing even those which had temporary peace back to war. In zone 2 states in contrast, the refugee flows were perceived as dangers but ones that could be successfully managed, for example by Zambia and Tanzania, who hosted very large numbers of refugees.

Our analysis in this paper is not complete, even in explaining the difference between zone 1 and zone 2 countries. However the factors that we have identified as important in this explanation tap into broader processes generally recognized in the literature to be conflict generating: the historical factors are proxies for indirect rule that crystallizes horizontal inequalities; the regime variables tap into the importance of leadership in avoiding conflict, and of military power and human rights abuses in generating it; the economic variables tap into general values of openness and perceived opportunities; the social factors into the importance of civil society, or its absence, in explaining the difference between peaceful and violent states. While more work needs to be done to identify the mechanisms which
reproduce or insulate from conflict, we have argued that there is good evidence—both quantitative and qualitative—for hypotheses H2-H7 in this case.

The article also holds out policy-relevant morals: not least, that when states themselves lose any immune response to conflict risk, it behooves their neighbours and the wider international community to help rebuild that capacity. Their neighbours are already doing so by concerted efforts to build a regional organization able to limit refugee and arms flows. The international community can help not just by conflict mediation but by continuing, indeed intensifying aid and trade.

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1 For example, Idean Salehyan and K. S. Gleditsch, “Refugees and the spread of civil war”, International Organization 60/2 (Spring 2006) pp.335-366.

2 Here we define Conflict = 1 if there is a least 25 battle-related deaths per year. Otherwise Conflict = 0, indicating no conflict. This data is taken from the Uppsala data set of battle-related deaths, that is deaths in battle-related conflicts between warring parties. This data set does not count violence occurring in post-election riots or in intergroup contests.


7 US Department of State, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2010).


9 The Kikuyu who making up 22% of the population also dominate the government and business. See also Dagne, Ted, “Kenya: Current Conditions and the Challenges Ahead”


12 Fearon and Laitin (note 3).

13 Salayhen and Gleditsch (note 1).

14 See the discussion in Gurr (note 3) pp. 151-194.


16 See the Introduction to this volume.


21 In a different context, Amartya Sen has argued that discussions of rights must take account of each of these sets of processes.

22 Baregu, Mwesiga (note 8).

For example, it enhances the group status distinctions and horizontal inequalities and legitimating ideologies which Donald Horowitz (note 20), pp. 141-228, argues are at the root of ethnic conflict.


26 Coakley (note 10).

27 For example, one finds a delicate balance being maintained at the presidency with alterations of Christian-Muslim-Christian-Muslim in the last fifty years since independence. See also Heilman, Bruce and Kaiser, Paul J., “Religion, Identity and Politics in Tanzania”, Third World Quarterly 23/23 (2002) pp. 691-709.


32 See the discussion in Gurr (note 3) pp. 151-194.
