Overview for May

France has the Presidency of the Council in May.

A number of debates are planned. An open debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict is scheduled. France also proposed a debate on the Democratic Republic of Congo to reenergise Council thinking on that situation. France intends that the debate be presided by the French Minister for Cooperation, Henri de Raincourt. Debates are also planned on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia and Kosovo. An open debate may also be held on the occasion of the six-monthly briefing by the chairs of the three counterterrorism committees.

All the debates will be preceded by briefings:

- protection of civilians, likely by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic and possibly others;
- the DRC, most likely by Special Representative Roger Meece and by a representative of the World Bank;
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the High Representative, Valentin Inzko;
- Somalia, by the Special Representative Augustine Mahiga;
- Kosovo, by the Special Representative Lamberto Zannier; and
- counterterrorism, by the chairs of the three Council subsidiary bodies on the subject: Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee Chairman Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany), Counterterrorism Committee Chairman Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India) and weapons of mass destruction and terrorism Committee Chairman Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa).

Other briefings expected in May are:

- by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, on current issues of concern (in consultations);
- by the chairs of the three counterterrorism committees.

Important matters pending include:

- Resolution 1904 in December 2009 indicated that the expert groups assisting the three counterterrorism committees (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee or CTC, and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction) should be co-located and asked the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements “as soon as possible.” This request, reiterated in September 2010 (S/PRST/2010/19), is still outstanding.

- The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.

- On 11 November 2009 in resolution 1894 on protection of civilians, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on reporting for enhancing the Council’s monitoring and oversight. There has been no report back to the Council on this.

- On 28 May 2010 in resolution 1925 on the mandate of MONUSCO, the operation in the DRC, the Council requested the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council and the TCCs. The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Council and the TCCs on this issue.

- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a
**OVERVIEW**

**Haiti:**
- On Libya, by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo;
- On the report regarding international civilian capacities by chairman of the Advisory Group Jean-Marie Guéhenno, and also Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Susana Malcorra;
- On Burundi by the Special Representative Karin Landgren;
- On the Middle East (the monthly briefing by the Secretariat);
- On South Sudan from the Secretariat with recommendations on the mandate and composition of the new UN mission in South Sudan;
- On Lebanon by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Implementation of resolution 1559 Terje Roed-Larsen (in consultations);
- On the situation in Chad following the withdrawal of MINURCAT, by OCHA's head Valerie Amos (in consultations);
- On the work of the DPRK Sanctions Committee by its Chairman Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral of Portugal (in consultations); and
- On the situation in Libya, by the Secretariat (in consultations).

Consultations are also expected on Burundi, the Middle East and Sudan.

In late May, Council members will travel to Africa, including to Addis Ababa, for annual consultations with the Peace and Security Council of the AU, and to Sudan and to Nairobi for discussions on Somalia.

---

**Aide-Memoire (continued)**

May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), was never made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past were produced every two to three months. They have decreased in their frequency. The last report, released in July 2010, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.

The request in resolution 1460 on Children and Armed Conflict that all the Secretariat-General’s reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2009 protection of children elements had been incorporated into only half of the relevant country-specific reports.

The Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide has been dormant since 2008 when it held its last meeting.

The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009, submitted to it on 4 May 2009.

The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.

The position of Special Envoy for Myanmar has not been filled since Ibrahim Gambari left the post in January 2009. At the time Vijay Nambiar, the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, took on the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar in what was expected to be temporary role.

---

**Status Update since our April Forecast**

- Afghanistan: On 1 April the UN operations centre at Mazar-i-Sharif was attacked, resulting in the murder of seven UN staff members, during demonstrations against the burning of a Koran in the US. The Council held consultations on 1 April and issued a press statement (SC/10216) condemning the attack and all incitement to and acts of violence. It called on the government of Afghanistan to bring those responsible to justice and take all possible steps, with the assistance of the International Security Assistance Force, as appropriate, to protect UN personnel and premises.
- Haiti: On 6 April Colombian President René Garcia Préval and former US President and UN Special Envoy for Haiti Bill Clinton. A presidential statement was adopted at the meeting (S/PRST/2011/7) which underlined that security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing, reiterated the need for security to be accompanied by social and economic development, reaffirmed the responsibility of MINUSTAH in supporting the rule of law and good governance in Haiti, called on international donors to fulfill their pledges and stressed the importance of consistent coordination among Haiti, the UN and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.
- Middle East: On 8 April Lebanon proposed that the Council approve elements to the press on the escalation of violence in Gaza and southern Israel. The Council was not able to agree on the matter. On 21 April, B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, briefed the Council. This was followed by the Council’s regular open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.6520 and resumption 1). The stalemated peace process was the focus of discussion with many member states calling for the US to take a strong lead to revive the process. There were also calls for the Quartet to meet and endorse parameters of a peace deal (the Quartet postponed the March and April meetings).
- Kenya: On 8 April, Council members met in consultations on Kenya’s request to defer the application of the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. (On 23 March, Kenya had sent a letter
Status Update since our April Forecast (continued)

(S/2011/201) to the president of the Security Council, requesting that the Council hold an open debate on the matter.) At the 8 April the meeting, members maintained the same positions as outlined during the informal interactive dialogue with representatives of Kenya and the AU on 18 March, i.e. that the preferable venue for that issue to be determined is before the ICC itself, by way of an application under Article 19 of the Rome Statute. Following the consultations, the President of the Council stated to the press that Council members had considered the issue fully and did not agree on the proposal. He also said that no future meetings on the issue are planned.

■ Women, Peace and Security: On 12 April the Council met in consultations to hear a briefing from the head of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, on the work and priorities of UN Women, with an emphasis on the entity’s work on women, peace and security and in countries on the Council’s agenda. Bachelet provided an update on UN Women’s work on the indicators on implementation of resolution 1325—which the Council supported in its October 2010 presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/22)—as well as her recent travel. The consultations were highly interactive with Bachelet responding to multiple questions from members. On 14 April the Council received a briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström (S/PV.6515). Wallström’s briefing focused on the importance of applying the principles outlined in resolution 1960 adopted in December 2010 and reported on sexual violence in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. Wallström outlined recent incidents of sexual violence in the DRC, including along the DRC-Angola border, plus successful actions taken by the DRC to bring perpetrators to justice. Wallström also reported the progress of her office in developing systems to implement resolution 1960 and her work in Liberia and Southern Sudan.

■ Terrorism: On 13 April the members of the Council condemned the 11 April “apparent terrorist attack” that occurred in Minsk, Republic of Belarus which killed a number of people and wounded hundreds (SC/10225). On 29 April, the members of the Council issued a press statement condemning the terrorist bombing that took place in Marrakesh, Morocco the previous day which killed over a dozen people.

■ Western Sahara: On 18 April the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Christopher Ross and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Hany Abdel-Aziz (S/ PV.6516) on the situation in Western Sahara. The Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2011/249) was considered. The report had been released late, which resulted in delaying the consultations. On 27 April the Council adopted resolution 1979 extending MINURSO’s mandate for another year. The resolution also stressed the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps and encouraged the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights.

■ Yemen: On 19 April Council members were briefed by Gamal bin Omer who had recently visited Yemen as a UN envoy where he met President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Germany and Lebanon proposed a statement expressing concern at the political crisis and called on the parties to exercise restraint and enter into comprehensive dialogue. The proposed statement also expressed support for the mediation role of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Council members were unable to reach agreement and continued discussions the next day without result. It seems Russia opposed the initiative.

■ Sudan/Darfur: On 20 April the Council received a briefing from the Assistant Secretary-General of Peacekeeping, Atul Khare, on the situation in Darfur (S/ PV.6519), largely drawing upon the latest quarterly report of the Secretary-General (S/2011/244). The Secretary-General issued a separate report on the implementation of the Darfur Political Process (DPP) (S/2011/252), as requested by the Council in February. On 21 February the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/8): reiterating its deep concern over the increase in insecurity in Darfur; noting the statement by the representative of Sudan on 20 April that his government would issue 1,117 outstanding visas for UNAMID personnel; and reaffirming support to the Doha peace process and the work of Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé. The statement also recognised the potential complementary role that a DPP could play to help the people of Darfur implement the Doha outcome and specified—drawing from the Secretary-General’s report on the DPP—six aspects of the enabling environment for such a process that were yet to be in place and called upon the government of Sudan to lift the state of emergency in Darfur.

■ Small Arms: On 25 April the Council received a briefing on the Secretary-General’s latest report on small arms and light weapons (S/2011/255) in a closed meeting. The Secretary-General’s report says the Council may wish to encourage states to strengthen their tracing capacity and to enhance international cooperation regarding tracing, as well as encouraging states to voluntarily provide the UN with information on the ammunition markings used by manufacturers in their jurisdiction.

■ Syria: Council members on briefed by the crisis in Syria by the Secretary-General on 26 April. On 27 April the Council having failed to reach consensus on a press statement on the situation in Syria, held a public debate on the Middle East. The head of the political affairs department, B. Lynn Pascoe provided a detailed public briefing. Syria’s U.N. Ambassador Bashar Jaafari gave his government’s position on the situation. The draft press statement, proposed by France, Portugal, UK and Germany included calls for an end to the violence, urged restraint, stressed the importance of respect for human rights and supported the Secretary-General’s call for an independent investigation. However, Russia argued that Council action on Syria would constitute interference in a domestic matter. Lebanon was reluctant to associate itself with any statement because of its close links with Syria.
**South Sudan**

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to receive a briefing and report from the Secretary-General with recommendations on the mandate and composition of a new UN mission in South Sudan.

The Council is expected to visit Sudan, including Khartoum, Juba and Abyei, in May.

Negotiations on the new peacekeeping mission are likely to begin following the Council visit.

### Key Recent Developments

A technical assessment mission (TAM) visited southern Sudan from 16 February to 31 March. The TAM used a period of three to five years following independence as its point of reference for possible UN assistance to the new nation of South Sudan. As indicated in the April quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN is considering assistance that would be fairly decentralised, going down to the state and county levels in the areas of political support and demobilisation; governance and rule of law; conflict mitigation; security-sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. With regard to inclusion of protection of civilians, the new mandate would focus on strengthening the capacities of national institutions to fulfil their sovereign responsibility to protect civilians and ensure the security of humanitarian access.

On 20 April, Assistant Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Atul Khare indicated in a briefing to the Council that the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee would meet on 26 April to discuss the successor mission and that the Secretary-General would convey his recommendations to the Council in mid-May. Khare also briefed the Council on the work of UNMIS from January to March.

Khare also added that:
- there had been no further violence in Abyei since early March, but the situation was very tense as neither side had implemented the security agreements from January and the UN had observed a sizeable military build-up;
- there had been an increase in harassment of UN patrols in Abyei from Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities;
- the UN was concerned that further blockage of the Misseriya southern migration route would result in a flare-up of violence;
- the northern National Congress Party (NCP) and Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) had reached agreement in the latest round of negotiations on 9 to 11 April in Addis Ababa that north Sudan would bear the current external debt of Sudan in return for assistance from the south in lobbying for its relief; and
- parties had made preliminary agreements on border arrangements but differences remained on whether there should be any third-party involvement in their implementation.

Following extensive negotiations, the Council issued a presidential statement on 21 April in which it:
- urged the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to reach an agreement on outstanding issues and post-CPA arrangements and encouraged parties to engage with the UN on its future presence in Sudan;
- reiterated its deep concern over increased tension, violence and displacement in Abyei and called on both parties to implement and adhere to recent security agreements and to reach agreement quickly on Abyei’s post-CPA status;
- acknowledged the July 2009 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the borders of Abyei;
- expressed concern about recent violence in Southern Kordofan state ahead of rescheduled gubernatorial and state assembly elections;
- urged both parties to reach agreement on the future of tens of thousands of troops from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States and the future of southern rebels currently serving in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF);
- reiterated that any obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNMIS was unacceptable; and
- stated the Council will not tolerate any support to proxy militia by either party to the CPA.

On 27 April the Council extended the mandate of UNMIS until 9 July 2011. The Council indicated its intention to establish a successor mission to UNMIS and authorised UNMIS to use its assets to prepare for the establishment of such a mission, thus allowing the UN Secretariat and troop contributors to start preliminary deployment planning.

On 14 April, Abdul Aziz Adam Al-Hilu, the deputy governor of Southern Kordofan State and SPLM candidate in the state’s upcoming gubernatorial elections, accused militia loyal to Ahmed Haroun, the state’s governor and NCP candidate, of burning over 350 houses, killing 17 people and violently disrupting SPLM rallies in Al-Hilu’s home district. Haroun denounced the violence, attributing it to local disputes of a tribal nature. The elections are scheduled to be held from 2-4 May, to be followed by popular consultations on the CPA.

Violence between the SPLA and a range of armed groups continued in April. On 11 April, Peter Gadet Yak, a former SPLA general in Unity state, announced a new rebel group called the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) and issued a statement entitled the “Mayom Declaration,” seeking the overthrow of the current government of Southern Sudan due to corruption and Dinka dominance; Gadet is Nuer, the second largest ethnic group. Gadet claimed the SSLA had laid landmines throughout Mayom county in Unity state, several of which blew up four SPLA trucks, killing at least four SPLA troops on 19 April. Clashes occurred between the SSLA and the SPLA over the next four days, resulting in the evacuation of civilians and northern and foreign oil workers. There were no reported casualties.

On 13 April the UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, Lise Grande, said in a press conference that more than 800 people had died in violence in southern Sudan since January and close to 94,000 had been internally displaced. Grande cited clashes between the SPLA and at least seven armed militia, inter-communal violence including cattle theft, and sporadic attacks by the formerly Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army.

On 24 April the technical committee appointed to write an interim constitution for South Sudan released its draft, ahead of discussions by leaders of all political parties on 26 April. The southern parliament will debate the draft in May before the final endorsement by President Salva Kiir prior to 9 July. The draft interim constitution sets a four-year presidential term, starting 9 July 2011, and includes the area of Abyei defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration within the borders of the Republic of South Sudan.
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council in May will be the terms of reference for the Council visit and what political messages should be delivered to authorities in northern and southern Sudan, particularly regarding possible roles for the UN in support of implementing final aspects of the CPA, as well as capacity-building in the south. The Council visit will come at a critical time—around six weeks prior to the end of the interim period.

A further issue will be balancing the hopes of the UN secretariat for an early decision on the mandate of a new mission in South Sudan—to assist planning and deployment—with the likely need to wait before finalising the details until the CPA parties have reached agreement on key issues that the UN might have a useful role in implementing.

A related issue, in terms of planning, is whether the Council will apply the lessons learned and criteria recommended, in the most recent strategic review by the Department of Peacekeeping of requirements for a new mission—the “New Horizons” report.

Underlying Issues
It seems that strategic guidance to the planning process has been lacking. The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, which was also supposed to have met at some point during the TAM, did not provide guidance. The first meeting of the Policy Committee on this topic was 26 April.

The security situation in Southern Sudan is very fragile. There is little civilian control over the SPLA or ability to undertake meaningful investigations into allegations of rights abuses that may have occurred dealing with armed groups. The SPLA lacks a central command and control mechanism and is rather a series of regional commands carried over from the war with the north.

There are concerns in the field and by some NGOs that UN Headquarters may, for political reasons, be underestimating the fragility of the situation in seeking to present a “light” UN footprint.

Options
During the Council visit to Sudan, the Council could:
- deliver political messages to each side about outstanding issues in the post-referendum negotiations;
- hear directly from the government of Southern Sudan its preferences for the mandate and composition of a new UN mission; and
- discuss with Khartoum possible UN assistance for any residual CPA issues.

Council Dynamics
Many Council members seem concerned by a perceived lack of strategic planning within the UN system ahead of and during the TAM deployment, particularly owing to the delays in holding a meeting of the Policy Committee. Council members seem to be getting inconsistent messages from the current UNMIS leadership and the TAM team on the preferences of the government of Southern Sudan on future UN roles, likewise in bilateral discussions with Southern Sudanese representatives. Many Council members are making their own individual assessments of the needs of a future South Sudan ahead of receiving the official recommendations of the Secretary-General.

Most Council members want to press the CPA parties to reach agreement on key areas such as Abyei prior to finalising the new mandate, but members seem now to accept the possibility that some issues may take longer than the interim period to resolve.

Some Council members were concerned that the scope of the TAM was limited to UN assistance to South Sudan and did not consider any possible UN role in Abyei, South Kordofan or Blue Nile, nor along the border with northern Sudan.

The negotiations on the presidential statement and the UNMIS renewal resolution were seen by many Council members as unnecessarily exclusionary and rushed, although most members seem comfortable with the eventual outcome. (Many members were concerned by the late circulation of the text of the draft presidential statement which contained significant new language on several key issues and that the need for consultations to negotiate the text was not appreciated at the outset. Likewise the very late circulation of the draft UNMIS extension resolution to elected members ruffled many feathers.) Many seem concerned that this pattern could be inadverdently repeated in the upcoming and much more important negotiations on a new mission for South Sudan.

To give parties maximum time to reach agreement and to ensure careful consideration of a new mandate, many Council members would like negotiations on the mandate to be initiated as soon as possible. The US is the lead country in the Council on implementation of the CPA.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

Latest Secretary-General's Report
- S/2011/239 (12 April 2011)

Meeting Record
- S/PV.6517 (20 April 2011) was a meeting to consider the latest report of the Secretary-General.

Other
- S/PRST/2011/8 (21 April 2011) was a presidential statement on implementation of the CPA and the situation in Darfur.

Other Relevant Facts
UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

UNMIS: Force Commander
Maj. Gen. Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria)

UNMIS: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration
Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military and 715 police personnel
Main troop contributors: India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan and Kenya
Military strength as of 28 March 2011: 9,024 military personnel
Police Strength as of 28 March 2011: 715 police personnel
Annual Budget: $1 billion
Duration: 24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 9 July 2011

Useful Additional Sources

**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**

In May the Council will continue the higher profile attention to Somalia initiated in March under the Chinese presidency. Council members will discuss Somalia in Nairobi during the upcoming Council mission to Africa and there will also be a debate in New York on the Secretary-General’s report on Somalia (due on 1 May). The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, is expected to brief the Council. It is unclear whether there will be any new decisions.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 14 April, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that there had been a steep rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia in the first three months of this year. Ninety-seven attacks (resulting in 15 hijackings) had been recorded, compared with 35 in the same period last year. According to IMB there had also been a dramatic increase in the violence and sophistication of techniques used by Somali pirates.

In April, Mahiga continued his consultations on post-transitional arrangements for Somalia. There seemed to be a growing rift between the international community and the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In early April, the TFG, ignoring advice from the UN and the Council, decided to extend its mandate for a year beyond the end of the transitional period in August. Moreover, in a 4 April letter to the Secretary-General, Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohammed demanded that all UN agencies working in Somalia should move to Mogadishu within ninety days.

On 18 April, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed Council members on the consultative meeting. (This was part of the monthly briefing on emerging or significant issues that has recently become Council practice.) Pascoe said the TFG had agreed to participate in a follow-up meeting to be convened in Mogadishu.

Meanwhile, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expanded its control of Mogadishu to more than half the capital’s territory following the offensive that began at the end of February. This has come at a high cost, however, with more than 50 peacekeepers killed. There were also territorial gains in favour of the TFG elsewhere in Somalia.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 23 March, Zahra Mohamed Ali Samantar, the Minister of State at the Office of the Prime Minister of Somalia, addressed the Human Rights Council under its agenda item on technical assistance and capacity building. She said that her government attached great importance to the restoration of peace, observance of human rights and international humanitarian law in times of war, notwithstanding the challenges and difficulties that Somalia was facing. Following a Universal Periodic Review (UPR) workshop in Djibouti earlier this year, Somalia had decided to ratify the Conventions on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and on the Rights of the Child. Ali Samantar said that her government was committed to submitting its national human rights report in readiness for the UPR of Somalia scheduled for 5 May 2011.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is how best to support Mahiga in bringing about agreement on post-transitional arrangements. A related issue is whether the Council should be more specific about its expectations for these arrangements, in particular as regards the legitimacy and future of the TFG and the need to hold elections for the positions of president and speaker of the parliament by August this year.
A second key issue is the TFG’s apparent unwillingness to engage “in a more constructive, open and transparent manner that promotes broader political dialogue and participation in line with the Djibouti Agreement,” as the Council called for in its March presidential statement. (The Council requested the Secretary-General to assess respect for these principles in his regular reports.)

Another issue is the extent of progress in other areas outlined as priorities in the Council’s previous decisions, including in resolution 1964, such as drafting of a new constitution, adoption of a national security and stabilisation plan, development of Somali security institutions, delivery of basic services to the population, delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians. A related question is whether it is now time for UN agencies to move from Nairobi to Mogadishu.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- listening to Mahiga’s briefing, but taking no further action at least until after the visit to Nairobi;
- issuing a statement in advance of the visit signalling concern about the TFG’s failure to engage constructively with the international community, clarifying its expectations on post-transitional arrangements and reiterating some of its previous key messages;
- conveying these concerns in meetings with Somali officials during the upcoming trip to Africa; and
- moving in the Sanctions Committee to establish targeted sanctions against those involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia. (In April 2010, the UK objected to the listing of two pirate leaders proposed by the US to the Committee by putting a hold on their names. This has yet to be lifted.)

Council Dynamics
In the consultations following Pascoe’s briefing on 18 February, Council members seemed united in their unhappiness about the TFG’s refusal to participate in the meeting in Nairobi. Some pointed out that this was a direct defiance of one of the key messages of the Council’s March presidential statement. There was also a high level of frustration with the overall performance of Somali leaders, their continued infighting and failure to deliver in key areas in spite of strong support from the international community. There appeared to be a sense that the present situation cannot go on.

Most members seem to feel that Council action in May should reinforce developments in the consultations conducted by Mahiga. There are hopes for some outcome from the meeting to be convened in Mogadishu. At press time, a date had not yet been fixed for the meeting, but June seemed most likely.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1976 (11 April 2011) welcomed the report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the coast of Somalia.
- S/RES/1964 (22 December 2010) renewed the authorisation of AMISOM until 30 September 2011 and raised its troop level to 12,000.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2011/6 (10 March 2011) stressed the need for a comprehensive strategy for Somalia.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2010/675 (30 December 2010)
- Selected Meeting Record
- S/PV.6494 (10 March 2011) was an open debate on Somalia.

Other
- S/2011/230 (7 April 2011) contained a letter to the Secretary-General from the chair of the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on the follow-up to the conclusions on Somalia of the Working Group.
- S/AC.51/2011/2 (1 March 2011) were the conclusions on Somalia of the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.
- S/2011/30 (24 January 2011) was from the Secretary-General transmitting Jack Lang’s report on piracy.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania)

Visiting Mission to Africa
Council members are planning a visit in May to several locations in Africa, most likely Nairobi, Juba, Abyei, Khartoum and Addis Ababa. (Council members have travelled to Africa at least once a year for the last decade. Some of these trips were focused on just one situation from the Council’s agenda but most have included several. Since 2007, the Africa itinerary has included Addis Ababa every other year, for what has become the practice of an annual consultation with the AU’s Peace and Security Council (alternating between the two organisations’ headquarters).

At press time the Africa trip was planned for late in the month. Therefore, the usual outcome of a mission, a formal Council briefing, is not expected before June.

The Nairobi part of the trip will be focused on Somalia. The UK most likely, jointly with South Africa, will be in charge of formulating terms of reference and leading the Council delegation on this first leg. All major international actors involved with Somalia—including the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, the UN Political Office for Somalia, the UN humanitarian aid coordinator for Somalia, the headquarters of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA)—are based in Nairobi.

The US is expected to lead on the visits to the Sudan locations on the itinerary. The focus in Juba is likely to be on the preparations for South Sudan’s independence and the plans for a new UN mission there. In Abyei the delegation is expected to centre
on the ongoing violence in that region. In Khartoum members will most likely meet the leadership of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), as well as a number of Sudanese actors. (As during the previous Khartoum trip, many members of the Council will adhere to the policy of not interacting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and others who have been indicted by the International Criminal Court.)

France, as the Council president for May, will lead on the Addis Ababa segment of the trip, which will be focused largely on the institutional relationship between the two Councils. (In early May, Security Council Report will be issuing a Special Research Report, Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa: The Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, which will provide a look at the Council’s arrangements.)

the AU and present some options for analyse the relationship between the UN approaches to Africa over several years, will provide a look at the Council's Report will be issuing a Special Research Councils. (In early May, Security Council institutional relationship between the two

Key Issues

A further related issue is the potentially destabilising effects of the developments in Côte d’Ivoire on peace and security in West Africa, due to likely availability of arms

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to continue to follow the situation in Côte d’Ivoire closely. With the opening of a new chapter after forces backing internationally-recognised President Ouattara captured former President Laurent Gbagbo on 11 April, the focus is beginning to shift to the enormous peacebuilding needs in the country. The capacity and mandate of UNOCI to cope with these needs in the current phase of the peace consolidation process in Côte d’Ivoire is also expected to be discussed as Council members work on proposals for a new strategy.

The current mandate of UNOCI expires on 30 June.

A related issue is the urgent need for disarmament, demobilisation and security sector reform programmes to be developed.

A further related issue is the potentially destabilising effects of the developments in Côte d’Ivoire on peace and security in West Africa, due to likely availability of arms.
from the Ivorian theatre, the strain of the humanitarian needs of refugees on host communities in fragile states like Liberia and concerns about the potential movement of armed mercenaries allegedly recruited by the belligerents in Côte d’Ivoire along the porous borders.

A major ongoing issue for the Council is that of balancing its own role and the roles of the regional and subregional organisations in consolidating peace in the country.

Another issue is whether the Council should begin active consideration of how best to provide effective oversight for the large and complex peacebuilding needs of the country. It is unclear whether placing the country on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission is feasible, since the current challenges confronting the country (e.g. issues relating to national reconciliation and rebuilding, including the strengthening of state institutions to enable them to adequately maintain national peace and security, as well as strengthening democratisation and improving socioeconomic situations) suggest the need for enhanced peacebuilding action. A related issue is the need for more effective coordination and coherent resource mobilisation during this period.

Key Recent Developments
On 20 April, armed clashes occurred between two pro-Ouattara forces—the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and the Invisible Commandos force—in Abidjan, when the Invisible Commandos repulsed an attack on their stronghold in the suburb of Abobo.

On 22 April, Ouattara ordered all soldiers to return to their barracks, stating that law and order will be enforced by the police and gendarmes, and indicated that the Invisible Commandos should disarm or be forcibly made to comply. On 23 April General Ibrahim Coulibaly, leader of the Invisible Commandos, informed the Associated Press that he was prepared to surrender his forces’ arms but it would require some time to organise it.

On 21 April, the AU Peace and Security Council welcomed Ouattara’s assumption of “State power” and decided to lift its suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from the organisation.

On 22 April, Ouattara met with the head of Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court, Paul Yao N’Dre, in an apparent conciliatory gesture. (N’Dre had declared incumbent leader Gbagbo the winner of the disputed 28 November presidential elections, contrary to the UN’s certification of Ouattara as winner of the polls.) Ouattara subsequently indicated that he will be sworn into office during the second part of the month of May. N’Dre later told the press that he blamed all Ivorians for the situation in the country stating that “we are all responsible for what happened; the current president, the former president Gbagbo, citizens, the media that inflamed it.”

On 27 April, Coulibaly (head of the Invisible Commandos) was killed by the Republican Forces during an offensive on his headquarters situated in the northern part of Abidjan.

On 28 April the Council extended the sanctions regime and the mandate of the group of experts monitoring it for one year. (For further information please see our 20 April 2011 Update Report.)

Libya

Expected Council Action
Council members are expecting the ICC prosecutor’s briefing, requested in resolution 1970, in early May. The monthly report by the UN Secretariat requested in resolution 1973 is also expected in late May.

At press time, no new initiatives were anticipated. However, Council members will continue to monitor events on the ground and the implementation of resolutions 1970 and 1973. In addition, the next meeting of the Libya Contact Group is anticipated for early May in Rome.

Key Recent Developments
At press time, rebels held tenuous control over the key city of Misrata. However, the Benghazi authorities did not anticipate the Tripoli regime would end its seven-week siege of the port city.

On 28 April, Council members were briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe on measures taken by member states under resolution 1973 in informal consultations. (This format is different from the briefing on 24 March by the Secretary-General in an open meeting followed by informal consultations.) The situation in Libya was also one of the predominant issues in the Secretary-General’s briefing to the Council on 26 April, also in informal consultations.

On 26 April, NATO announced it was targeting Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s command and control structures in order to weaken the regime’s ability to attack civilians. NATO also said it had received reports that Libyan government troops were not reporting for duty. Media reports indicate the underlying approach is to encourage Qaddafi and his inner circle to go into exile.

Media reports also indicate that the Tripoli regime is urging the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council to hold emergency meetings on Libya.

On 20 April, Italy said it was sending military advisors to Benghazi. This followed earlier announcements on 19 April that France and the UK were also sending military advisors and the US announcement of $25 million in non-lethal aid. On 15 April, American, British and French heads of state said that a Libyan future that included Qaddafi was unthinkable. (To date France, Italy and Qatar have formally recognised the Benghazi-based Transitional National Council as the legitimate Libyan authorities and the number of countries which are de facto working with Benghazi seems to be increasing rapidly. This is significant because many countries have a policy of not making formal recognition statements.)

On 20 April, the EU and Gulf Cooperation Council expressed a common position on Libya noting Qaddafi’s loss of legitimacy, the importance of Libyan territorial integrity and expressing support for the Transitional National Council in Benghazi.

Also on 20 April, Qaddafi’s foreign minister criticised the deployment of military advisers to Benghazi and called for a ceasefire followed by elections within six months. (This seems to be a version of the AU plan which was presented to both Libyan parties on 10 April but was rejected by Benghazi because it did not include the departure of Qaddafi. However, the AU High-Level Ad
Hoc Committee met on 25 and 26 April and revisited their proposed political solution for Libya with both parties and indicated a number of possible follow-up steps in the near future.)

On 20 April, OCHA head Valerie Amos announced the establishment of a UN humanitarian presence in Tripoli following her visit there as part of a high-level UN delegation that also included the Special Envoy for Libya, Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib.

On 1 April the EU authorised “EUFOR-Libya”—a military operation to support delivery of humanitarian assistance if requested by the UN. In comments to the press on 20 April, Amos emphasised her confidence that civilian capacity could be utilised to deliver aid and that military support was an option of last resort.

On 18 April, Pascoe briefed the Council on two recent international meetings on the issue of Libya held in Doha and Cairo.

On 14 April, the UN Secretary-General convened a meeting in Cairo of the UN, the Arab League, the AU, the EU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to coordinate the international response to the crisis in Libya. He said the UN had started post-conflict contingency planning for Libya and that it was essential for the international community to remain engaged. (It seems discussion of a post-conflict role for the UN in Libya was a likely item on the agenda for an informal retreat hosted by the Secretary-General for Security Council members scheduled for 28 and 29 April.)

On 13 April the Libya Contact Group met in Doha and:
- concluded as long as the Tripoli regime continued to attack civilians the robust implementation of resolution 1973 would continue;
- called for the Tripoli regime to withdraw its forces from all captured cities and a return to barracks;
- welcomed the UN Special Envoy and the AU’s efforts for a political solution while signalling their belief that Qaddafi’s continued presence would threaten any such resolution;
- said that Qaddafi had lost legitimacy and that the Transitional National Council was the legitimate interlocutor for the Libyan people and agreed that material and financial support should be sought for Benghazi; and
- confirmed the need for a UN role in early recovery and peacebuilding in Libya.

The next meeting of the Contact Group is planned for early May in Rome. Media reports indicate that there will be follow-up to the Doha decision that material and financial support should be sought for the opposition. In particular, discussion of a financial mechanism which might allow for financial flows to Benghazi controlled areas and perhaps using frozen Libyan assets as collateral for loans to the Transitional National Council.

At a 14 April summit in Beijing, BRICS leaders said that resolution 1973 was being interpreted arbitrarily. (BRICS nations are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—all Security Council members as well.)

On 5 April ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said he would like to interview Moussa Koussa, the former Libyan foreign minister who defected to the UK on 30 March. (Koussa traveled to Qatar on 12 April to attend the Contact Group meeting where, according to media reports, he remains.) On 3 March, Ocampo said that he was investigating alleged crimes against humanity committed by Libya, including by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and his inner circle. He said the probe will look into several incidents which occurred in various towns and cities across Libya. (Resolution 1970 referred the Libya situation since 15 February to the ICC.)

On 4 April Special Envoy Khatib briefed the Council on his visit to Libya where he met with both Tripoli and opposition officials. He said that information on the humanitarian situation was limited due to lack of access but expressed concern about civilian protection issues like landmines, gender-based violence and human rights violations.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 27 April, the Commission of Inquiry, established by the Human Rights Council in February, arrived in Libya. It is expected to report back to the Human Rights Council in June.

On 20 April, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, condemned the reported use of cluster bombs and heavy weaponry and the targeting of medical facilities by the Tripoli regime in Misrata which could constitute international crimes. She also expressed concern about the regime’s treatment of journalists. In a 14 March statement, her office noted receipt of numerous reports of summary executions, rape, torture and disappearance. Her office also expressed concern over reports of weapons circulation throughout the Libyan territory and their potential availability to any actor, including children.

Key Issues

Ongoing key issues for the Council include:
- whether the Council should play a more active role in political initiatives to secure an “end-game” in Libya;
- the divergence among members regarding the interpretation of resolution 1973; and
- whether or not the arms embargo may be able to be legally interpreted as permitting supplies of arms to an alternative government.

Developments in the Libya Sanctions Committee

The Libya Sanctions Committee received proposals on additional designations by members of the Committee. Forty-five additional individuals and 37 entities were proposed for listing by the US, UK, France and Germany in early April. (Currently, there are 18 individuals designated as subject to the travel ban and 13 individuals and 5 entities designated as subject to the assets freeze.) These proposed new listings are presently on hold. The US cannot agree to any listing it is not sure it can apply domestically and is therefore working on compiling the requisite evidence on some of the individuals proposed for an assets freeze. China, India and Russia asked for more time for the listings to be studied in their capitals. India has concerns about some of the designated entities. At press time, there is no clear timeframe for when the additional individuals and entities might be approved.

The Secretariat has identified possible experts who could fill the Panel of Experts’ eight slots. The Panel could be constituted sometime in May. (It was previously hoped this Panel would be operational in April.)
The issue of appropriate Libyan representation at formal Council meetings remains in the background as a possible issue. International recognition of Benghazi as the legitimate Libyan interlocutor is growing and at least one permanent member now formally recognises the Benghazi authorities which will compel the Council to proceed carefully on procedural issues and in references to the Libyan parties. This has the potential to become an immediate issue if Benghazi representatives in New York were to request to attend the ICC Prosecutor’s briefing, as Sudan has done when the Prosecutor briefs on the situation in Darfur.

Potential issues for the Council in the future include:

- the humanitarian impact of the conflict and the sanctions and any related pressure to alleviate the impact on the population under Qaddafi’s control; and
- a UN role in post-conflict Libya.

Options

One option for the Council in May is to simply monitor the situation based on briefings with leadership on political initiatives, effectively moving to the Libya Contact Group.

A second option is to request a further briefing from UN Special Envoy Khatib who is reportedly returning to Libya on 29 April.

Regarding the ICC, the Council could discuss the Prosecutor’s briefing in informal consultations as it does in the context of Darfur.

The option to designate more individuals and entities to compel the Tripoli regime to end violence is still on the table in the Sanctions Committee.

While it still may be premature to explore options for post-conflict Libya in a Council meeting, some informal exchange, perhaps in an Arria-style meeting, might be an option to take into account views from a broad array of stakeholders.

Council Dynamics

Many Council members seem to want to remain in a less active mode vis-à-vis Libya, leaving the political work to the Contact Group and post-conflict contingency planning to the UN Secretariat. However, some Council members are uncomfortable with this and the possibility of new initiatives remains alive.

The lack of formal decisions does not necessarily translate into a less engaged Council. In April the Council discussed Libya on five separate occasions in various formats.

In the context of the wider regional political upheavals, there is some concern by a number of members about the Council’s apparent selectivity when approaching issues of civilian protection. No Council member seems to feel that another Libya-style response is appropriate or necessary. However, some Council members find the silence on other regional issues, in comparison to Libya, problematic.

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa remain concerned about whether the NATO air strikes have gone beyond the mandate of resolution 1973 and feel all political energies should be put into bringing about an immediate ceasefire.

All Council members would welcome a genuine ceasefire between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi authorities which would have a positive impact on civilians at risk and allow full humanitarian access. However, there remains a divergence of views among members on the best approach because for many members such an outcome seems illusory unless there is also a solution to the underlying political crisis.

Three permanent Council members as well as elected members Lebanon and Germany—in the context of the Contact Group—have clearly said that Qaddafi has lost his legitimacy to lead and cannot be a part of Libya’s political future.

Arab and African members of the Council, as voices of their respective regional organisations, remain concerned that Qaddafi’s anticipated exit from power not be a product of violent regime change.

Most Council members seem to feel the April meetings in Doha and Cairo were useful and helped by bringing together all the different tracks on resolving the Libya crisis. However, some are concerned that the AU track is not yet effectively integrated into a genuine international approach.

Members are aware that there may be a role for the Council in the case of post-conflict Libya. It seems the type of UN presence that might be needed in a post-Qaddafi Libya was brought up during informal consultations on 4 April, including the Secretary-General’s offer at the 29 March London Conference to lead the coordination of humanitarian assistance and planning for longer-term stabilisation support. However, as yet there were no firm positions on these issues. But there seems to be some interest among some members for an impartial UN presence to monitor any potential ceasefire and a follow-on political mission in Libya to help in coordination efforts. Separate strands of ideas include the point that any type of ceasefire monitoring presence must have full mobility in Libya versus monitoring an arbitrary line so as to reinforce Libya’s territorial integrity, but also to act as an effective brake on surreptitious continuation of violence by Qaddafi security services.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime, and established a panel of experts.
- S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, and established a sanctions committee.

Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.6509 (4 April 2011) was a briefing by Special Envoy Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib on Libya.
- S/PV.6505 (24 March 2011) was the Secretary-General’s monthly briefing on Libya.

Security Council Letter

- S/2011/246 (14 April 2011) was the statement from the 13 April meeting of the Libya Contact Group in Doha.

Other Relevant Facts

Chair of the UN Libya Sanctions Committee

Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)
UN Special Envoy
Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib (Jordan)

Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry
Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt); Asma Khader (Jordanian/Palestinian); Philippe Kirsch (Canada)

AU High Level Ad-Hoc Committee
Heads of state of Congo, Mali, Mauritania, South Africa, Uganda and the chair of the AU Commission

Libya Contact Group
Bahrain; Belgium and the Netherlands share a rotating seat; Canada; France; Germany; Greece; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Malta; Morocco; a Nordic seat shared by Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Poland; Qatar; Spain; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; UK; USA and representatives from the Arab League, EU, GCC, NATO, OIC and the UN; the AU attends as an invitee

Commander for NATO Operations under Resolution 1973
Lt. Gen. Charles Bouchard (Canada)

Protection of Civilians

Expected Council Action

In May, the Council is scheduled to hold its biannual open debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy and Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic are likely to speak.

(Security Council Report will be publishing an Update Report in early May with more detailed analysis of the Council’s recent work on protection of civilians. Our 2011 annual Crosscutting Report on Protection of Civilians will also be published soon, although unfortunately it will not be available in time for the May debate because of the recent decision to bring forward the date of the debate.)

Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s eighth report on protection of civilians came out in November 2010. It focused on the same five core protection challenges that were identified in the Secretary-General’s seventh report of May 2009:

- enhancing compliance with international law by parties to conflict;
- enhancing compliance by non-state armed groups;
- strengthening protection of civilians by UN peacekeeping and other missions;
- improving humanitarian access; and
- enhancing accountability for violations of international law.

The report reviewed progress in responding to these challenges and made a number of recommendations. It outlined three additional areas for action:

- ensuring a comprehensive approach by finding ways to address situations not formally on the Council’s agenda;
- ensuring a consistent approach by considering, among other things, ways to make further use of the informal expert group on protection of civilians through briefings on thematic protection issues and on progress made against established benchmarks; and
- ensuring an accountable approach by developing indicators for systematic monitoring and reporting on the protection of civilians.

The open debate on 22 November featured briefings by Amos, Le Roy, Pillay and Yves Daccord of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Council adopted a presidential statement endorsing an updated version of the aide-mémoire that was first adopted in March 2002 to facilitate consideration of protection issues. The statement also reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to the protection of civilians and its condemnation of all violations of applicable international law. It emphasised the need to fight impunity, the importance of humanitarian access and implementation of protection mandates in peacekeeping operations. In particular, it:

- called for the continuation of systematic monitoring and analysis of constraints on humanitarian access;
- welcomed the proposals, conclusions and recommendations on the protection of civilians included in the 2010 report of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations;
- stressed the importance of ensuring that senior peacekeeping leadership was focused on protection;
- emphasised the importance of improving pre-deployment training of peacekeeping personnel regarding protection;
- underlined the need for peacekeepers to communicate effectively with local communities to carry out protection mandates;
- reaffirmed the importance of benchmarks to measure progress in the implementation of peacekeeping mandates and the need to include protection indicators in such benchmarks; and
- reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to include more detailed and comprehensive reporting on protection issues in his reports to the Council and to develop guidance to UN missions on such reporting.

In December 2010 the Council, in resolution 1960, established a monitoring, analysis and reporting mechanism on conflict-related sexual violence in situations on the Council’s agenda. The resolution calls on parties to armed conflict to make specific, time-bound commitments to prohibit and punish sexual violence and asks the Secretary-General to monitor those commitments.

In February, at the initiative of the Brazilian presidency, Council members met in informal consultations to discuss all three protection-related items on its agenda—protection of civilians; women, peace and security and children and armed conflict—with the stated aim of ensuring that the three issues are dealt with in a coherent way and that actions undertaken by the Secretariat are mutually supportive. There was no formal Council decision, but there seemed to be an understanding that the current framework for all three protection issues functions well and should be retained.

The Council’s informal expert group on protection of civilians has met four times since the November 2010 debate. It met twice in December, first in connection with the termination of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad as of 31 December and then to discuss the renewal of the authorisation of the AU Mission for Somalia. In March, there was a briefing on Afghanistan in connection with the mandate renewal for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and also a briefing on the post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. This was the first meeting not directly linked to a mandate renewal. (The Council renewed the mandate for the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire [UNOCI] in December 2010 for another six months.)
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is continued practical implementation of resolution 1894.

A second key issue is compliance by the Secretariat with the November 2010 presidential statement, which contained several specific requests, in particular relating to peacekeeping, humanitarian access and reporting.

A third issue is how to address cases where protection concerns are real, but where the situations in question are not formally on the Council's agenda. (The Council eventually found a solution to this issue in 2009 in the Sri Lanka case, but the challenge remains.)

Another issue is how to enhance monitoring and oversight, and specifically whether the Council should provide more detailed guidance on benchmarks and indicators (as it did in the case of women, peace and security when it endorsed the indicators for implementation of resolution 1325 in an October 2010 presidential statement).

A related issue is the Council's own working methods and tools at its disposal, such as the informal expert group on protection, and whether these can be improved. This also includes the question of whether to request more frequent briefings at the Council level that specifically address protection issues in country-specific situations or schedule a follow-up to the Brazilian initiative.

Underlying Issues
How to translate thematic principles into protection of civilians on the ground remains an underlying issue for the Council. The five key challenges identified by the Secretary-General as noted above also remain key underlying issues.

Options
Some practical options for the Council include:

■ providing a much more detailed request to the Secretary-General than the Council has done so far as to the structure and kinds of information the Council would like to see on protection of civilians in his country-specific reporting, including on the issue of humanitarian access;
■ encouraging the Secretariat’s work to develop indicators for the protection of civilians; and
■ asking the informal protection expert group to monitor progress made against protection indicators and benchmarks.

Council Dynamics
The recent experiences regarding Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Yemen and Syria have put protection issues in sharp focus in Council members’ minds. (For more details on Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, please refer to our most recent briefs on these two situations.)

The divisions over resolution 1973 on Libya, which authorised member states “to take all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack,” seem to have reopened some of the more fundamental differences that still exist among Council members. There appears to be some concern that action taken in Libya in particular may lead to some push back by those countries that have only reluctantly agreed to the Council’s continuing expansion of the framework to protect civilians. But it also seems that much may depend on how the end game plays out.

The vibrations seem less acute in the context of Côte d’Ivoire (where the Council in resolution 1975 unanimously encouraged the robust use of force by UNOCI to protect civilians against the use of heavy weapons). But the case is a new element in the Council’s overall protection approach. How this element will play out in terms of Council dynamics at the thematic level may also be influenced by how successful the UN and the Council are in adjusting the UNOCI focus to an effective peacebuilding role.

The upcoming open debate may offer some initial indications as to the impact of these new developments.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on protection of civilians and chairs the informal expert group.
Guéhenno is also scheduled to brief the General Assembly.

No formal outcome is expected from the Council at this stage.

Key Recent Developments
In May 2008, under the UK presidency, the Council considered for the first time in detail how the UN system can better deploy civilian capacity to address the stabilisation needs of countries in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In a presidential statement, the Council stressed the essential role of rapidly deployable civilian expertise, particularly working in close cooperation with national authorities in helping to meet the urgent needs of countries in the two years following the end of conflict, including: re-establishing government institutions, rule of law and respect for human rights; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces; transitional justice; reconciliation; and economic revitalisation.

The Council requested a report from the Secretary-General on how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing.

The Secretary-General produced this report in June 2009. He recommended a review be undertaken to analyse how the UN and the international community can broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity-development needs of countries emerging from conflict.

In a presidential statement following a subsequent Council debate in July 2009, the Council welcomed this recommendation. The Council has since referred to the review—looking forward to its release—in three further presidential statements, most recently following its debate on post-conflict institution-building in January 2011.

In March 2010, the Secretary-General appointed an independent senior advisory group to undertake the review. The group, chaired by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, published its report in February 2011, both as a Council and as a General Assembly document. The Secretary-General subsequently formed a steering committee, led by the head of the Department of Field Support, Susana Malcorra, to provide senior-level strategic oversight, views and advice to the Secretary-General on follow-up and implementation of the review.

The focus of the review is to determine how the UN can better support and enable national capacities in a post-conflict period when communities face critical capacity shortages. The review makes recommendations within a framework it calls “OPEN”—ownership, partnership, expertise and nimbleness—seeking to:

- strengthen national ownership of peace processes, by supporting core government functions, nurturing national capacities and improving the economic impact of international interventions;
- encourage and enable the UN to look beyond its own staff and to draw on the full range of global capacities, working closely with member states and civil society through a new mechanism for civilian partnerships;
- deliver the right expertise, leveraging the success of the cluster system in the humanitarian sphere—while learning from its limitations—to provide clarity on the core capacities of the UN and stronger accountability to member states; and
- use available resources more effectively and efficiently and thus increase the UN’s ability to respond to changing circumstances in the field.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council will be how to draw upon the review’s relevant recommendations as it considers the planning and design of mandates for peace operations. However, many recommendations of the review call for structural change to UN management and funding structures that are the responsibility of the General Assembly.

Options
While this review is independent and member states are awaiting specific implementation proposals from the Secretary-General, the Council could reflect some elements of the review in its planning for a new UN mission in South Sudan—or when renewing or reconsidering existing mandates.

The Council could also establish a coordinator for this issue with a mandate to maintain regular contact with the President of the General Assembly, or any future facilitators appointed by him to consider the report in the General Assembly, so as to coordinate responses.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members seem to consider the briefing in May as the start of the process of considering the review and look forward to the formal views of the Secretary-General. Most see the review as fitting into several longer-term reform measures in the General Assembly, such as the ongoing work to reform the UN human-resources system, as well as indicating new areas of possible reform. Although the Council initiated the review, many Council members will want to encourage constructive reactions in the General Assembly.

At this early stage, few Council members seem to have analysed the implications of the review in depth. The first impression of many members is positive with many identifying strengthening civilian capacity as a priority. Many members note that the review contains principles that they support.

UN Documents

Security Council Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2011/2 (21 January 2011) was on post-conflict recovery: institution building.
- S/PRST/2010/20 (13 October 2010) was on post-conflict peacebuilding.
- S/PRST/2010/18 (23 September 2010) was on maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/PRST/2010/7 (16 April 2010) was on post-conflict peacebuilding.
- S/PRST/2009/23 (22 July 2009) was on post-conflict peacebuilding.
- S/PRST/2008/16 (20 May 2008) was on post-conflict peacebuilding.

Selected Reports of the Secretary-General
- S/2010/386 (16 July 2010) was on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
- S/2009/304 (11 June 2009) was on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, in which a review of civilian capacities was recommended.
Kosovo

**Expected Council Action**

In May the Council is expecting the UNMIK quarterly report, a briefing by Special Representative and head of mission LamBERTO ZANNIER and a debate on the situation in Kosovo.

**Key Recent Developments**

In a 19 April letter and concept note sent to the Secretary-General, Serbia requested the creation of an ad hoc mechanism, under the authority of the Security Council, to conduct a criminal investigation into allegations of trafficking of human organs in Kosovo. The allegations were initially presented in a report by Dick Marty, rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, alleging that Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi had been involved in organised crime, including drug trafficking and the illegal trafficking of human organs, during his time as a Kosovo Liberation Army leader. The letter states that all investigations into war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia have been conducted under the auspices of the Security Council and that “this basic standard of justice should be applied in the case of the harvesting of human organs as well.”

Also on 19 April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said while visiting Belgrade that Russia would back Serbia’s request to the Security Council.

In response to the request, a spokeswoman for EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton said on 21 April that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) “is fully capable and in the best position to carry out an investigation into the organ trafficking.” During his 16 February briefing to the Council, Zannier also called for an investigation of the allegations and noted that EULEX was ready to undertake the probe.

On 8 and 9 March, Kosovo and Serbia met in Brussels for the first of a series of EU-mediated bilateral talks. The talks focused on technical and practical matters concerning day-to-day life, such as property laws and telecommunications, as well as regional trade and freedom of movement for goods. The EU characterised the talks as having taken place “in a constructive and cordial atmosphere.” The delegations met for a second round of talks in Brussels on 28 March and for a third round on 15 April. The talks addressed only technical concerns and avoided Kosovo’s status. Going forward, the delegations will continue to meet in Brussels once every three weeks.

On 22 February, Kosovo’s parliament elected Behgjet Pacolli as president. Later, on 30 March, Kosovo’s top court ruled that Pacolli’s election had been unconstitutional due to irregularities in the voting process and Pacolli resigned from the post. The development threatened to send the country back to the polls until Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and its coalition partner, New Kosovo Alliance (AKR), reached an agreement with the leading opposition party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), on the appointment of Atifete Jahjaga, a former police commander, as President on 7 April ending weeks of political turmoil. Constitutional and electoral reforms were also agreed to by the parties. These agreements have mapped out an early presidential election within six months of the constitutional changes, meaning that later this year voters will directly elect their president. General elections should take place no later than 18 months after the electoral system reform.

Kosovo’s first census in 30 years was conducted from 1 to 19 April. Many ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo boycotted the census despite the fact that UN officials were sent there to register people in place of Kosovar officials. Ethnic Serbian leaders in northern Kosovo declared in early April that the census would only be acceptable to the Serbian minority community if members of the UN Mission in Kosovo conducted it. The Serbian government had also advised Kosovo Serbs to boycott the census unless it was organised by the UN, citing fears that Kosovo’s authorities could manipulate the results. The results of the census are expected to be announced in late June.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In its latest annual report on human rights in Kosovo, the US State Department expressed concerns about the number of missing persons. Citing figures compiled by the International Committee of the Red Cross, a total of 1,822 people are still missing in Kosovo, of whom 70 percent are ethnic Albanians and 30 percent are Serbs and other minorities. According to the report, institutional and societal discrimination remains endemic in Kosovo against Serbs and other minorities in employment, education, social services, language use, freedom of movement and the right of return.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether Council members want to use the opportunity in May to encourage the EU-sponsored technical talks.

Another key issue is how best to respond to the allegations presented in the Marty report, taking into account Serbia’s request for the establishment of an ad hoc investigative mechanism, supported by Russia, as well as other options.

---

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Senior Advisory Group**

- Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France), former Under Secretary-General of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Chair)
- Rubem Cesar Fernandes (Brazil), Executive Director, Viva Rio
- Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste
- Bruce Jones (US), Director of the New York University Center on International Cooperation
- Marjon Kamara (Liberia), Permanent Representative of Liberia to the UN
- Carlos Lopes (Guinea-Bissau), Executive Director of the UN Institute for Training and Research
- Catherine Pollard (Guyana), UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management
- Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany), Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone
- Mitra Vasisht (India), former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs
Options
One option would be to adopt a statement welcoming the EU-brokered talks and encouraging continued dialogue on the issues between the parties.

Another option would be to adopt a statement regarding the Council’s response to Serbia’s request concerning the Marty report.

Council Dynamics
All Council members believe that the allegations brought forth in the Marty report are serious in nature and necessitate further investigation.

The US, while stressing the seriousness of the allegations, feels that EULEX, and not the Council, is the appropriate authority to oversee investigations into the allegations.

Russia supports the Serbian request for the establishment of an ad hoc investigative mechanism by the Council and feels that EULEX currently does not have the capacity necessary to undertake an investigation and ensure adequate witness protection. Russia also supports the involvement of UNMIK.

On the issue of status, the Council remains divided between those who formally recognise Kosovo as an independent state and those who do not. France, the UK and the US recognise Kosovo, as do non-permanent members Columbia, Germany and Portugal. Many other Council members continue to remain neutral.

Useful Additional Source
Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, Dick Marty, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 12 December 2010

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Expected Council Action
In May the Council expects a report from the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko of Austria, on implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. The Council is scheduled to hold a debate with a briefing by Inzko.

Key Recent Developments
Seven months after the 3 October 2010 general elections, the stalemate over the formation of a government in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues. Currently only the government of the Republika Srpska has been settled. The formation of the central government and of the government of the Muslim-Croat Federation remains stalled.

On 17 March, two Muslim parties and a Croat party formed a coalition to govern the Muslim-Croat Federation, bypassing the two main Bosnian Croat parties. The central electoral commission ruled that the government had been formed illegally. On 28 March Inzko overruled the electoral commission’s decision, utilising his authority as high representative to facilitate “the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation” of the peace settlement. In response, nine mainstream Croat parties issued a joint statement, saying Inzko’s move reduced Croats to “lower than a national minority” and that it favours the Muslim majority.

Following these developments, leaders of the main Bosnian Croat parties on 18 April called for the establishment of a Croat entity and for amendments to the constitution that would allow for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three entities. The renewed call for a Croat entity came in a statement adopted during a meeting in Mostar, where the parties established the Croat National Assembly.

On 13 April, the parliament of Bosnia’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, began a debate on the possible abolition of the federal court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the state prosecutor’s office. Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik proposed a referendum on abolishing the federal court and office of the prosecutor, accusing them of anti-Serb bias in trying war crimes. In response, the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board (PIC SB), which meets regularly and provides the Office of the High Representative with political guidance, on 15 April issued a statement strongly supporting the state-level judicial institutions and condemning attempts to undermine them.

On 29-30 March in Sarajevo, the PIC SB expressed deep concern at the continuing problems in fulfilling its mission and embedding the rule of law. The board called for a rapid resolution of legal questions surrounding the creation of a new federation government. It also urged the quick establishment of a mechanism for developing constitutional reform proposals, stressing that the country will soon need to be in a position to adopt and enforce laws of the EU. The board also called for the completion of the outstanding objectives and conditions set by the PIC for the transition of the Office of the High Representative into an office of the EU Special Representative, known as the 5+2 agenda. (The five objectives are: the resolution of state property; resolution of defense property; completion of the Brcko final award; fiscal sustainability of the state; and entrenchment of the rule of law. The two conditions are signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and obtaining a positive assessment of the situation from the PIC.) The PIC said that, of the remaining issues, resolving the apportionment of state and defense property between the central government and ethnic entities was
particularly important. It welcomed the EU’s strengthened engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 11 November 2010, Inzko briefed the Security Council. While praising Bosnia and Herzegovina for the recent completion of general elections, he continued to urge the country to put an end to internal disagreements and divisive rhetoric. On 18 November, the Council adopted resolution 1948, reauthorising the EU force for another year.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 29 March, Thomas Hammarberg, the commissioner for human rights of the Council of Europe, reported that human rights and the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain threatened by the legacy of the country’s violent past. The commissioner warned that although some progress had been made, “the authorities at all levels...should proceed in a determined manner towards putting an end to discrimination, fostering reconciliation and building a country that reflects its multiethnic richness.” The commissioner called for national minorities to be given real opportunities for political representation.

Key Issues
A key issue is that due to the political uncertainty there has been little or no recent progress on meeting the outstanding conditions of the 5+2 agenda.

A related issue is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is still unable to form a government seven months after elections.

Constitutional reform, which is seen as necessary for the functioning of institutions and EU accession, is even more remote.

Options
One option is for the Council to simply receive Inzko’s briefing and for members to use the debate to put their national positions on record.

Another option given the deterioration of the situation since the Council last met is to seek to adopt a statement expressing concern about the challenges to the Dayton Agreement and its institutions and discouraging the continual pursuit of narrow ethnic goals by some actors.

Council Dynamics
Many Council members—in particular Russia, the US and the European nations—are interested in following developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, given that the EU is the main driver of international involvement, some Council members feel there is little role for the Council at this time.

Some Council members remain optimistic about the capacity of the parties within Bosnia and Herzegovina to work constructively together, citing that the country’s tri-member presidency (comprising a Muslim Bosniak, a Serb and a Croat representative) has cooperated productively during its time on the Security Council. But others are more worried about the trend of recent developments.

Council members have divergent views on the Office of the High Representative. Russia feels that there should be a focus on closing the office as soon as the outstanding objectives and two conditions set by the PIC SB in February 2008 are met. Other Council members, such as the US and the UK, are more supportive of keeping the Office of the High Representative open and are cautious about a premature closure. The US also stresses that constitutional changes are imperative for progress.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1869 (25 March 2009) welcomed and agreed to the designation of Valentin Inzko as high representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the PIC Steering Board.
- S/RES/1575 (22 November 2004) established EUFOR.

Latest Meeting Records
- S/PV.6421 (11 November 2010)

Selected Letters
- S/2010/510 (4 October 2010) was from the Secretary-General conveying the latest report on the activities of EUFOR from 1 December 2009 to 31 May 2010.
- S/2010/235 (17 May 2010) was from the Secretary-General transmitting the most recent report of the high representative on the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
- S/2010/113 (23 February 2010) was from the Secretary-General conveying the latest report on the activities of EUFOR from 1 September to 30 November 2009.
- S/2010/51 (28 January 2010) was from Turkey transmitting “Conclusions on developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina” from the second meeting of the political directors of the South-East European Cooperation Process.

Other
- S/1995/999 and annexes (21 November 1995) was the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes, signed in Dayton, Ohio in the US.

Useful Additional Sources
- Communiqué of the PIC Steering Board meeting on 29-30 March 2011
- Declaration of the PIC Steering Board, 27 February 2008, on the five objectives and two conditions for the closure of the Office of the High Representative

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In May, the Council will hold an open debate on the DRC. The Secretary-General is expected to attend, and the DRC will be represented at the ministerial-level. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Roger Meece is also likely to participate, as well as a representative of the World Bank. France’s minister for cooperation, Henri de Raincourt, is expected to preside. The open debate may result in a presidential statement.

The Secretary-General’s latest report on MONUSCO is due by 13 May.

The mandate of MONUSCO expires on 30 June.
Also in May, the special representative of the Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict, Margot Wallström, may brief the DRC sanctions committee, as will the group of experts on their interim report, which is due on 18 May.

Key Recent Developments
On 7 February, Meece briefed the Council. In a press statement following the briefing, Council members expressed concern over the lack of progress in security and judicial-sector reforms and the high levels of insecurity in eastern DRC. Members also condemned the recent sexual violence in North and South Kivu provinces by elements within the Congolese army. They called for the swift prosecution of all perpetrators of human rights abuses and called upon the Congolese authorities to inform the Secretary-General about measures taken.

On 21 February, a military court in South Kivu sentenced Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutware and three of his subordinate officers to twenty years imprisonment. Mutware was convicted of four counts of crimes against humanity for sending his troops to rape, beat and loot in the town of Fizi on the 2011 New Year’s Day. Five other soldiers received sentences between ten and 15 years. Additionally, the UN has been providing technical and logistical support to military-justice authorities in the trial of Gen. Jerôme Kakwau for two counts of rape. He is the highest ranking army officer to be prosecuted for such crimes in the DRC.

In a briefing on women, peace and security on 14 April, Wallström told the Council that 185 rapes of Congolese women and girls were recorded in January along the Angola-DRC border. She added that her visit to Angola in mid-March resulted in a joint communiqué by Angola and the UN, outlining a proactive approach by Angola to raise awareness of and enforce a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual violence within the ranks of the Angolan army and police.

During her briefing, Wallström also told the Council that the team of experts on the rule of law, established pursuant to resolution 1960, will visit the DRC in May to reinforce investigators and prosecutors through prosecutor-support cells in the Kivus and mentor women magistrates who have been trained to try cases of sexual violence.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that from January through March there was an increase in attacks by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in the central African region, with the majority of the attacks occurring in the DRC and causing 43 deaths. Reports indicate that the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, has returned to the DRC. In a statement on 10 March during her visit to the DRC, the head of OCHA, Valerie Amos, said that the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) must step up its operations against the LRA. Council members have expressed an interest in possibly arranging a briefing by Amos in May.

The Secretary-General’s policy committee will discuss possible UN strategies to address the issue of the LRA in one of its upcoming weekly meetings. One option may be to send an assessment team to the region to gather more information, including finding out more about a renewed AU regional initiative to engage with the LRA. Another question is the role of the UN Regional Office in Central Africa, inaugurated on 2 March in Libreville, Gabon, in addressing this regional concern.

Key Issues
A major issue is the optimal way to engage with the DRC regarding the upcoming presidential election, especially in light of the fact that the preparation for the election has fallen behind schedule and the Independent Electoral Commission is expected to announce a new schedule soon.

A second issue is the wider challenges of stabilisation, in particular institutional and economic progress.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- adopting a presidential statement or a press statement acknowledging recent achievements in the prosecution of sexual offenders but addressing the continuing challenges facing the DRC, in particular the election process and institutional reform and the underlying economic, social and wider governance challenges; or
- requesting MONUSCO, in light of the electoral process in the DRC, to monitor and report on the evolving situation more closely.

Council Dynamics
Many members welcome the open debate as an opportunity for re-establishing the issues in the DRC as a priority and to explore options for a more in depth engagement with the DRC government on achieving progress on stabilisation, with a look forward towards the renewal of MONUSCO’s mandate in June. In particular, the discussion may cover the areas previously identified as the pillars of stabilisation in the DRC: enhanced security, institutional capacity and economic development. Though Council members are in agreement that the situation in the DRC is better than it was in the recent past, some are worried about the slow progress in achieving long-term stabilisation goals.

Some Council members emphasise the importance of promoting a fair electoral process to ensure credible governance and see this as crucial if the Council’s future engagement with DRC is to produce results on the ground. A few members are worried that a recent attack on the presidential residence on 27 February—resulting in the death of six men and the arrest of several others—is evidence of the fragile security environment and think that security will remain a priority during the election. Council
Council members are generally in agreement that the DRC government’s wishes are a key factor in finding the right avenue for MONUSCO’s electoral assistance and involvement.

Council members hope that Wallström will provide the sanctions committee with concrete information for future listing of perpetrators of sexual violence. A few members hope that Wallström’s appearance, on a German initiative, will become common practice across other relevant sanctions committees in the future. The report of the group of experts is expected to be brief and focus on methodology and technical aspects, as the mostly newly appointed group has only recently visited the DRC.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1925 (28 May 2010) extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and decided that from 1 July 2010, MONUSCO should replace it until 30 June 2011.

Latest Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/17 (17 September 2010) urged the DRC government to prosecute the perpetrators of the mass rapes that occurred in eastern DRC in late July and August.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2011/20 (17 January 2011)

Meeting Record

- S/PV.6476 (7 February 2011) was the briefing by Roger Meece.

Press Statements

- SC/10167 (7 February 2011) expressed the Council’s concern with the lack of progress in reforms and the security situation in eastern DRC.
- SC/10099 (1 December 2010) announced the listing of four individuals by the sanctions committee.
- A/HRC/16/68 (9 March 2011) was the third joint report of seven UN experts on the situation in the DRC.

Security Council Report: {Date}

Expected Council Action

Council members are expecting a briefing from Special Envoy Terje Rod-Larsen on developments in the implementation of resolution 1559. This resolution, adopted in 2004, urged the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the extension of government control over all Lebanese territory.

Discussion is likely to focus on the ongoing disarmament challenge and related border security issues. At press time, it seemed unlikely that the Council would take any formal action.

Council members will also have in mind developments relating to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the possible implications of the regional political climate for Lebanon, in particular possible spill over effects from the crisis Syria.

Key Recent Developments

At press time, Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati had yet to form a cabinet. The government collapsed on 12 January when Hezbollah-aligned ministers withdrew. These ministers are part of “8 March,” a coalition of political parties, including Hezbollah, which is backed by Syria and Iran. (Saad Hariri remains as the caretaker prime minister and heads the “14 March” coalition, backed by Western and Gulf states. On 25 January, Hezbollah-backed Mikati was appointed prime minister-designate.)

Analysts note that the political upheavals playing out across the region are likely to mean a continued stalemate in the formation of a Lebanese government, in particular because key regional interlocutors are preoccupied by the situations in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. Another factor might be the hesitancy to form a government until it is known who has been indicted in the 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

On 26 April, the Lebanese caretaker prime minister called on the Lebanese UN permanent representative in New York to reject a draft press statement on the situation in Syria circulated to Security Council members on 25 April. (Lebanon is an elected member of the Security Council. Press statements are issued by consensus.)

In a 21 April, communiqué, Hezbollah criticised the UN Secretary-General’s latest 1559 report, which urged Hezbollah’s transformation from a militia into a political party. The communiqué said that Hezbollah’s weapons are a deterrent to Israel. (In December 2009, Lebanon issued a ministerial declaration, article 6 of which effectively allows Hezbollah to remain armed, citing its resistance role.)

In a 17 April letter to the UN Secretary-General, Bahrain accused Hezbollah of carrying out destabilising activities in its Kingdom.

On 20 April, authorities in northern Lebanon prohibited demonstrations either for or against the Syrian regime. On 18 April, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman called Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to stress Lebanon’s support for Syria’s security. (Earlier in the month, Syria had accused a member of the 14 March coalition of providing arms and funds to Syrian antigovernment protesters. The 14 March coalition denied the accusation.)
On 19 April, Lebanese Christian political leaders met to discuss Hezbollah arms but didn’t reach agreement. Michel Aoun and Suleiman Frangieh of the 8 March coalition said Lebanon would be a target without Hezbollah’s weapons. Samir Geagea and Amin Gemayel of the 14 March coalition reiterated the achievements of the 2005 Cedar Revolution. (The Cedar Revolution led to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, parliamentary wins in 2005 and 2009, establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the south.)

On 10 April, there were demonstrations in Beirut against Lebanon’s confessional system of governance (in Lebanon political representation is determined by sectarian or religious affiliation). Such demonstrations have been occurring since 27 February.

On 7 April, Hariri accused Iran of meddling in Lebanon’s affairs and stirring unrest elsewhere in the region. In the context of a rally to mark the 14 March coalition’s sixth anniversary, Hariri denounced Hezbollah’s arms and stressed the need to achieve justice (a reference to the assassination of his father in 2005). On 27 February the 14 March coalition said it would not join a unity government. (In his position as caretaker prime minister, Hariri appears to have strengthened his position vis-à-vis the Tribunal, Hezbollah arms and external influence in Lebanese affairs.)

On 29 March, Council members were briefed in consultations by Michael Williams, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon. In remarks to the press, Williams said the situation in Syria could have a negative effect on the formation of a Lebanese government.

On 11 March, the Tribunal’s prosecutor filed an amendment to the original sealed indictment, which is currently with the pre-trial judge for review. Confirmation of the indictments—previously expected in March—may now be ready by June but any trial activity is unlikely until much later in the year. Hezbollah has said it expects the indictments to implicate its members in the 2005 Hariri assassination. (The indictments were a key factor in the government’s collapse in January.)

Recently, the US has confirmed that it stopped providing arms to Lebanon shortly after the collapse of the government. Future arms shipments would depend on the formation of a new cabinet and its composition, policy and actions.

Key Issues
A key issue is that Hezbollah has rearmed since the end of the 2006 war with Israel. The numerous reports of the presence of weapons outside governmental control will be on Council members’ minds. These incidents highlight a lack of progress on meeting resolutions 1559’s requirements on disarmament and raise questions regarding arms smuggling.

Another issue is whether the Council might revisit resolution 1559. Some of its outstanding elements are also covered in resolution 1701. Syria maintains that it met its 1559 obligations when it withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. However, some Council members take a wider view of resolution 1559: a key dimension is sufficient progress on Lebanese/Syrian border security.

Underlying Problems
Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701. Some justify this in light of the ongoing Israeli occupation of portions of Lebanese territory, particularly the Sheb’a Farms.

Another problematic matter is in the delineation of the Lebanese/Syria border, on which progress has been at a standstill.

Options
Given the apprehension about the possible spillover effects into Lebanon from the situation in Syria, the most likely option is for the Council to maintain its wait- and-see posture, as has been the practice since June 2007, the last time the Council took action on a 1559 report.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is independent. Council members will want to respect that and monitor the impact on Lebanon’s political environment as the indictment phase approaches.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members seem to agree that there is still a need for compliance with two major outstanding 1559 issues—disarmament and borders—but recognise that the Lebanese political dialogue is likely the key to progress. The national dialogue is seen as a useful mechanism. However, it has not produced tangible results nor met since November 2010. It does have the practical effect of putting contentious issues on the back burner rather than at the centre of political confrontation.

Regarding the formation of the Lebanese government, Council members share a somewhat hybrid view. On the one hand, it seems that in consultations on 29 March, Council members registered their expectation that a Lebanese government would be formed expeditiously and would honour its international obligations, in particular Security Council resolutions. On the other hand, most Council members feel that given the region’s fast-changing political climate in general, and the situation in Syria in particular, a stalemate in Lebanon is not as much a worry as it might have been six months ago, the last time they visited outstanding tasks from resolution 1559.

Nevertheless, Council members find the heightened rhetoric between Hezbollah and Hariri over the issue of arms a worrying, even if predictable, development.

The emerging standoff between Tehran and Riyadh for regional influence and its implications for Lebanon is also capturing Council members’ attention. In that context, most Council members feel there is very little room for any productive Council decision at this juncture.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/1937</strong> (30 August 2010) renewed UNIFIL until 31 August 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/1757</strong> (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/1701</strong> (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/1680</strong> (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/1559</strong> (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Expected Council Action

The chairs of the three counterterrorism-related committees (the 1267 Committee, the CTC and the 1540 Committee) are due to brief the Council in May. The joint briefings started in 2005, when three were given. In the years since, the chairs of the three committees have jointly briefed the Council twice each year (the last briefing was in November). The briefing will likely be followed by an open debate. No Council decision is expected.

Key Recent Developments

1267 Committee
(Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions)
The first biannual report of the 1267 Committee’s ombudsperson, Judge Kimberly Prost, was submitted to the Council on 21 January. The report summarised the initial activities of the office of the ombudsperson. (Six cases have been accepted by the ombudsperson and are at various stages of the review process outlined in resolution 1904 of 2009.)

The report noted that, since the office was still in the early stages of operation, experience so far has been limited. Even so, some issues were identified for possible consideration by the Council. These included:

- the possible need to widen the ombudsperson’s mandate to address cases of individuals who have been delisted but continue to face financial and travel restrictions;
- the desirability of the committee’s providing reasons for its decision when it delists entries;
- empowering the ombudsperson to disclose the identity of designating states to the petitioner and other relevant states;
- the need for at least two additional professional staff in the ombudsperson’s office to assist with researching cases; and
- the provision of additional resources for travel and translation of documents into non-official UN languages in order that listed individuals and entities are able to communicate with the ombudsperson and the committee in a language which they understand.

The 1267 Monitoring Team submitted a report to the committee on 22 February on implementation by member states of the sanctions regime. The report centred on two matters:

- how the committee can better promote peace and stability by consulting more closely with the government of Afghanistan on delisting requests; and
- enhancing reforms introduced in resolution 1904 in light of continued challenges to state implementation of the sanctions measures.

Counter-Terrorism Committee
(CTC, or the 1373 Committee)
The CTC submitted its 2011 programme of work to the Council on 25 March. The committee plans to enhance its efforts on matching of potential donors with recipients in order to facilitate implementation of resolution 1373 and resolution 1624. (Resolution 1624 of 2005 added an additional request for states to prohibit the incitement of terrorism.) As part of promoting implementation, the committee plans to organise a special meeting during 2011, open to member states and relevant stakeholders to mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1373. The programme of work also confirmed that the committee would submit to the Council by 30 June an updated global survey on the implementation of resolution 1373, based on a report by the committee’s Executive Directorate (CTED).

The committee also organised a special meeting, hosted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France from 19 to 21 April, to discuss how to improve prevention policies dealing with radicalisation and incitement, as well as the role of law enforcement in preventing terrorism.

1540 Committee (weapons of mass destruction and terrorism)
On 20 April the Council extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee and its group of experts for ten years. The committee was requested to conduct a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and recommend any necessary adjustments to its mandate every five years.

The Council also decided that the 1540 Committee should submit an annual programme of work to the Council before the end of each May, with the next due by 31 May. In addition, the Committee was asked to address by 31 August a number of controversial issues relating to the group of experts, including expertise and broad geographical representation.

Key Issues

The key issue for the May briefing and debate is maintaining broad support for the work of all three counterterrorism committees.

Options

Possible options include using the briefing as an opportunity to publicly encourage the chairs of the counterterrorism committees, who each assumed their positions at the beginning of the year, to aim for a more free flowing interactive discussion when briefing the Council.

Council and Wider Dynamics

There is a degree of concern on the part of some members that the biannual joint briefings have become formulaic and reliant on the delivery of prepared statements. (The UK, as Council president last November, attempted to foster a more free-flowing discussion by encouraging the committees’ three outgoing chairs to offer some reflections and advice with regard to the future of the committees. This seemed to be received well by the members, although some were apparently less comfortable than others with moving discussion away from prepared statements.) There is wide agreement that the joint briefings are important in terms of transparency and in maintaining support from the wider UN membership for counterterrorism efforts. Accordingly, a meeting which
encourages exchange of information with member states and feedback is seen as important. Most accept that the goal will be lessened over time if the briefings are not re-energised in some way. Some members appear satisfied with the status quo for now and see no need yet to adjust the tone and format of the briefings.

With regard to the 1267 Committee, members are beginning to focus more on the upcoming renewal of the monitoring team and the office of the ombudsperson’s mandate in June. A number of members, particularly the European “like minded group”, remain concerned that legal challenges to the regime have continued. Resolution 1904 in December 2009, and the appointment of the ombudsperson, seem not to have resolved the underlying issues.

How to best address these continuing concerns will likely form a significant part of the renewal negotiations in the coming weeks. It seems that the “like minded” group intend to present Council members with a number of far reaching proposals, which may include:

- the committee taking de-listing decisions by majority vote without veto privileges, rather than by consensus;
- the ombudsperson being allowed to recommend delistings, which would automatically occur after 30 days if the committee does not confirm the entry;
- listed persons or entities being provided with the identity of the designating state and information regarding the grounds for their listing; and
- when the committee rejects a delisting request, providing reasons for its decision to the petitioner via the ombudsperson.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1977 (20 April 2011) renewed the mandate of the 1540 committee for 10 years. The committee was requested to conduct a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and recommend any necessary adjustments to its mandate every five years. The committee was also asked to consider by 31 August the feasibility of a coordination and leadership post for the group of experts, as well as the expertise and broad geographical representation required for the group of experts. In addition, the Council decided that the committee should submit an annual programme of work to the Council before the end of each May, with the next due by 31 May 2011.
- S/RES/1963 (20 December 2010) extended the mandate of CTED until 31 December 2013, with an updated global implementation survey of resolution 1373 to be completed by 30 June 2011.
- S/RES/1904 (17 December 2009) renewed the mandate of the 1267 Committee Monitoring Team, created an Office of the Ombudsperson for 18 months and included significant changes to the administration of the 1267 regime.
- S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004) established the 1540 Committee and its mandate.
- S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) established the CTC and its mandate.
- S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) established the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Committee and its mandate.

Latest Joint Meeting Record

- S/PV.6424 (15 November 2010)

Selected Letters

- S/2011/245 (13 April 2011) transmitted the eleventh report of the 1267 Committee’s monitoring team on implementation of the resolution.

Other Relevant Facts

Committee Chairs

- Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India): CTC
- Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa): 1540 Committee
- Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany): 1267 Committee

Burundi

Expected Council Action

In May, the Council is expecting a briefing on Burundi by the recently appointed special representative of the Secretary-General, Karin Landgren. The chair of the Burundi configuration, Swiss Permanent Representative Paul Seger, will also brief the Council.

The mandate of BNUB expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments

On 9 December 2010, Charles Petrie, the outgoing head of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BNUB), briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report. He told the Council that despite the 28 June 2010 elections and progress in the country’s transformation to stability and democracy, the overall situation in Burundi remained fragile with continued human rights concerns, such as reports of political intimidation and extra judicial killings. Following consultations between the UN and Burundi, the Secretary-General recommended that the existing mission be restructured to better reflect current developments in Burundi. Ambassador Paul Seger of Switzerland, chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), noted that with a newly legitimised government, there were good prospects for Burundi’s economic integration into the East African Community.

On 16 December 2010, the Council adopted resolution 1959 to reconfigure BNUB into the new UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), effective 1 January, BNUB will have a scaled down structure and mandate aimed at supporting democracy and institution-building efforts and establishing the foundations for sustainable development. On 31 December 2010, the Secretary-General appointed Karin Landgren as his special representative and head of BNUB. A deputy special representative has yet to be appointed.

On 5 January, the president of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, promulgated a law adopted by the National Assembly and the Senate creating the Independent National Human Rights Commission.

On 2 February, the Council held an “informal interactive dialogue” with Seger and Landgren. The Council, in its 2006 note from the president on working methods, stressed its desire to hold dialogues with new special representatives of the Secretary-General before they assume their duties, but in practice such meetings until now have been very sporadic.

On 2 March, the UN inaugurated the UN Regional Office in Central Africa (UNOCA), a new political office designed to support Central African nations, including Burundi,
in the promotion of peace and stability. UNOCA will facilitate regional coordination and information exchange on issues such as cross-border arms trafficking and organised crime.

Burundi, which is the second highest troop-contributor to the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) sustained heavy losses in an offensive by al-Shabab that started on 18 February. Reports indicate that at least 53 peacekeepers, including 43 Burundians, had been killed.

### Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

On 21 April, the Burundi configuration of the PBC adopted a document containing the outcome of the fifth and final review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. The fifth review covered the period from February 2010 to January 2011 and concluded following the visit of the chair of the Burundi configuration to the country in February. The outcome document reviews the progress achieved through the strategic framework and provides the outline for renewed engagement between Burundi and the commission.

The PBC’s future engagement with Burundi will coincide with the preparation of a new poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP II), which the government of Burundi envisions completing by this summer. The outcome document identifies peacebuilding challenges in both the political and institutional sphere and in the socioeconomic sphere in which the commission can assist Burundi.

Following the conclusion of the PRSP II, the PBC intends to organise a donor conference in Bujumbura in order to broaden the donor base and develop new partnerships for Burundi.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

On 25 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) resolved without a vote that, in view of the major changes following the 2010 elections in Burundi, the UN independent expert on human rights in that country, Fatsah Ouugergoz, should report to the HRC at its 17th session in June. In an earlier public statement, Ouugergoz had welcomed Burundi’s adoption recently of a law establishing the Independent National Human Rights Commission. He called on the Burundian authorities to appoint commissioners without delay “following an open, transparent and democratic process which will guarantee the effective participation of all concerned social entities.”

### Key Issues

A key issue is assessing the progress of the transformation of BINUB into BNUB and whether the new role for the UN in Burundi is suitable for the evolving situation in the country.

A related issue is the role that UNOCA might play in the region as it becomes more operational.

Another issue is how to encourage a political dialogue between the government and the opposition and strengthen the rule of law in the country.

### Options

Options for the Council include:

- adopting a statement that encourages the efforts of the special representative and the encourages the work of the PBC;
- including in a statement specific reference to the role that UNOCA might play in conjunction with the PBC;
- stressing the importance of political challenges of reconciliation if the peace-building process is to be successful in the long run; or
- taking no action at this time.

### Council Dynamics

Council members are expecting to hear from the special representative for the first time since her deployment in February about her efforts in downsizing and reconfiguring BINUB into BNUB, especially since the Council refrained from requesting a written report on BNUB in resolution 1959.

For many Council members, the relatively successful presidential elections of June 2010 were a key factor in agreeing to terminate BINUB in favour of a scaled-down political mission concerned with capacity-building and peacebuilding. However, a number of Council members remain interested in encouraging the ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party and the opposition National Liberation Forces (FNL) to begin a political dialogue, after the latter boycotted the elections.

In recent years, Burundi has not been an issue on which Council members have diverged greatly. Council members generally view the security situation in Burundi as stable, while aware of its fragility due to the history of ethnic conflict. Though much progress remains to be made on issues of rule of law, the abundance of small arms, extrajudicial killings, political persecution, corruption, and property disputes, Council members note the progress, albeit slow at times, that has been achieved in Burundi in recent years.

Several Council members view the new configuration of BNUB as a transition phase. Some are of the view that the key factor to any further adjustments of the mandate depends on the willingness the government of Burundi to improve the political climate.

### UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1959 (16 December 2010) reconfigured BINUB into BNUB as of 1 January.
- S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006) established BINUB.

#### Latest Security Council Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2008/10 (24 April 2008)

#### Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2010/608 (30 November 2010)

#### Other

- PBC/5/BDI/L.1 (21 April 2011) was the outcome of the fifth review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.
- S/2006/507 (19 July 2006) was a note from the president of the Council on its working methods.
Chad

Expected Council Action
In May the Council is expecting a briefing by OCHA regarding the protection of civilians in eastern Chad, especially women and children following the withdrawal of MINURCAT. The report, requested by presidential statement 2010/29, should include an overall assessment of the security situation, as well as information about the status of refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian access and security for humanitarian personnel; and responses to violations of humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

Key Recent Developments
The UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) completed its withdrawal and the handover of its programmes to the government of Chad and UN agencies on 31 December 2010. The Chadian integrated security force, the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), has since taken over protection of civilians and security responsibilities.

The first round of presidential elections in Chad is now scheduled for 8 May after having been repeatedly postponed. Initially slated for 3 April, the election was postponed by three weeks, to 25 April, by Chad’s Independent National Electoral Commission to allow it to better organise the poll. Opposition figures had petitioned the commission for several measures to be taken to ensure the integrity of the elections. After this initial postponement, three leading presidential opponents of President Idriss Deby announced on 22 March that they would boycott the elections unless certain conditions were met, leading to the further postponement to 8 May. If no clear winner emerges (with an absolute majority), a run-off will be held on 5 June.

Parliamentary elections were held on 13 February. They were the first parliamentary elections in Chad since 2002. Deby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement won 110 of 188 seats. Election observers complained of mismanagement and poor organisation of the poll, which had been rescheduled from late November 2010.

On 2 March the UN opened a new political office designed to support Central African nations in their efforts to consolidate peace, prevent conflict and tackle cross-border arms trafficking and organised crime. The UN Regional Office in Central Africa, or UNOCA, located in Libreville, Gabon, has an initial mandate of two years and will work closely with the Economic Community of Central African States, composed of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. UNOCA will give high priority to early warning and early political action as tools for conflict prevention.

On 31 March, the Libyan opposition Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) said that the government of Chad was participating in attacks on Libyan rebels and that approximately 3,600 Chadian troops were fighting for Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. ITNC spokesman Ahmed Bani claimed that Chadian forces had killed and wounded many opposition fighters since the uprising began in mid-February. Chad’s foreign minister, Moussa Faki Mahmat, denied the allegations.

At the 14 December 2010 final briefing to the Council by Special Representative and head of MINURCAT Youssouf Mahmoud, the Council received an assessment of lessons learned in the context of MINURCAT.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCHR) has expressed concerns about the need for a security mechanism to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps in Chad, to nurture respect for the rule of law following the phasing-out of MINURCAT and particularly to prevent child recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence. Almost 100,000 refugees live along Chad’s southern border with CAR. Noting the volatile political situation in CAR, and notwithstanding the political reconciliation process occurring there, OHCHR believes that voluntary repatriation to CAR is unlikely in 2011.

Key Issues
A key issue in light of the report will be whether there is need for further Council discussion on post-MINURCAT Chad.

Another issue, recalling Mahmoud’s December briefing, is how best to record the lessons learned concerning mission withdrawals and the transition to local power in the MINURCAT context for future peacekeeping operations.

Options
One option would be to simply receive the briefing in a public meeting.

Another option would be a debate to follow the briefing.

A third option would be a statement on the situation in Chad and CAR, particularly addressing protection of civilians matters.

A fourth option would be a debate on lessons learned.

Council Dynamics
There is some concern among Council members that the ongoing situation following MINURCAT’s termination may not get sufficient attention due to other, higher-profile issues being taken up by the Council in May.

There seems to be little interest in a prolonged series of further Council meetings on Chad.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council resolutions

- S/RES1861 (14 January 2009) renewed MINURCAT’s mandate until 15 March 2010 and authorised the deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR.
- S/RES1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised EUFOR.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/64 (9 February 2011) was on children and armed conflict in Chad.

Other

- S/PRST/2010/29 (20 December 2010) urged Chad to assume full responsibility for the sustainment of DIS as soon as possible and requested that the Secretary-General report on the progress made in eastern Chad on the protection of civilians by 30 April 2011.
- S/PV.6449 (14 December 2010) was a
briefing by Special Representative Youssef Mahmoud on the situation in Chad and CAR.

- S/2010/536 (15 October 2010) was a letter from Chad transmitting the updated plan for the sustainment of the DIS as requested by resolution 1923.

Iraq

Expected Council Action

A report from Iraq is expected in early May on its plans for a new mechanism that will enable the scheduled termination of the DFI to take place. At time of writing, no briefing or Council action was scheduled.

Background

Resolution 1483 in 2003 established the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to meet Iraq’s humanitarian and economic reconstruction needs following the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003. The DFI was provided with immunities to prevent creditors from seizing Iraqi oil revenue and financial assets. It holds the proceeds of petroleum export sales from Iraq as well as balances from other frozen Iraqi funds.

Resolution 1905 in 2009 extended the DFI and related immunities until 30 June 2011, the DFI to work closely with the Council every six months on compliance with making required deposits to the compensation fund, beginning by 1 January 2012.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is whether progress made by Iraq in transitioning to a post-DFI mechanism appears to be satisfactory.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- taking no action at present while continuing to monitor Iraq’s transition to a post-DFI mechanism throughout June;
- using the May benchmark as an occasion to issue a press statement (perhaps congratulating Iraq on its progress if appropriate or encouraging continued progress); or
- an informal meeting to assess progress with the other outstanding issues such as the outstanding matters between Iraq and Kuwait.

Council and Wider Dynamics

It seems most Council members continue to feel that progress made by Iraq in meeting its international obligations should be assessed regularly throughout the year. In particular, the resolutions and statement adopted by the Council in December called on Iraq to establish an action plan and timeline for a post-DFI mechanism by the end of 2010. This deadline was then further extended by the Council in resolution 1956 at a high-level meeting on Iraq held on 15 December 2010.

Resolution 1956:

- terminated, as of 30 June 2011, the DFI and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) that monitors the DFI;
- welcomed Iraq’s decision not to request any further extensions of DFI financial immunities and decided on a final extension of immunities until 30 June;
- affirmed that 5 percent of the proceeds from all export sales of petroleum would continue to be deposited into the compensation fund established by resolution 687 (1991);
- called on Iraq to work closely with the Secretary-General to finalise the transition to a post-DFI mechanism by 30 June, including putting in place external auditing arrangements;
- requested Iraq to provide the Council with a written report by 1 May on progress made on transitioning to a post-DFI mechanism, as well as written confirmation once the transfer of funds from the DFI to the successor mechanism is complete; and
- requested the Secretary-General to provide ongoing written reports to the Council every six months on compliance with making required deposits to the compensation fund, beginning by 1 January 2012.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1958 (15 December 2010) terminated the Oil-for-Food programme and established an escrow account to provide indemnification to the UN.

- S/RES/1905 (21 December 2009) extended the arrangements for the DFI and the IAMB until 31 December 2010 and called on Iraq to develop an action plan and timeline for a post-DFI mechanism in 2010.
- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) established sanctions against the previous Iraqi government, created the DFI, provided immunity to Iraqi petroleum products and envisaged the termination of the Oil-for-Food programme.
- S/RES/692 (20 May 1991) established the UN Compensation Commission and the UN Compensation Fund.

Meeting Record

- S/PV.6418 (10 November 2010) was the latest briefing on the DFI and the IAMB.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2010/563 (1 November 2010)

DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action

In May the Council is expected to receive a regular quarterly briefing from the chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee. No Council decision was expected at time of writing.

Key Recent Developments

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) held military talks at Panmunjom in the demilitarised zone from 8 to 9 February as a preliminary step toward resuming higher-level political dialogue. The talks ended with no agreement on the date or agenda of further meetings.

Regional media reported on 20 February that ROK officials believed the DPRK to be excavating tunnels in the vicinity of its
previous nuclear tests, raising the possibility that another test is being prepared.

The DPRK military on 27 February criticised the start of annual military exercises by the ROK and the US, asserting that they were an impediment to easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and that the DPRK would respond militarily to any provocation.

ROK President Lee Myung-bak said during a speech on 1 March that the ROK was prepared for dialogue with the DPRK at any time. The same day, US Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the US continues to adhere to a dual-track approach with the DPRK that pursues meaningful engagement as well as the full implementation of existing sanctions measures.

At the conclusion of a visit made by Russian nuclear negotiator Alexei Borodavkin, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 15 March that the DPRK was willing to return to six-party talks with no preconditions and discuss its uranium enrichment programme in that context. (The six parties are the DPRK, China, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the US. The DPRK withdrew from the talks in April 2009.) On 17 March, ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan said the offer to discuss the DPRK uranium enrichment programme in the six-party format was not acceptable.

On 22 March a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said the crisis in Libya demonstrated that by giving up its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, Libya had only encouraged the US to take aggressive military action against it.

The ROK military held live-ammunition ground and naval exercises from 24 to 27 March, around the one-year anniversary of the sinking of the ROK navy ship Cheonan (46 servicemen died in the incident). The exercises were intended to demonstrate military readiness and a commitment to respond forcefully to any future attacks by the DPRK.

On 25 March the Food and Agriculture Organisation, World Food Programme and the UN Children’s Fund said in a report that the DPRK was highly vulnerable to a food crisis and that the country’s public distribution system could run out of food as early as May.

The DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly met on 7 April but did not appoint Kim Jong Un, the likely successor to Kim Jong Il, to the National Defence Commission as some observers had expected. The same day, the DPRK representative to the stalled six-party talks, First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, reportedly travelled to China. The timing of the trip coincided with a visit to China by US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. Campbell was expected to meet with Wu Dawei, China’s representative to the talks.

ROK Defence Minister Kim Kwan-jin warned on 5 April that the DPRK might launch sneak attacks from across a disputed maritime boundary. Media outlets had reported that the DPRK had increased its submarine activities near the disputed area.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ROK from 16 to 17 April to meet with President Lee and Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan to discuss cooperation on regional issues. In press remarks, Clinton and Kim called for a strong response to the DPRK’s uranium enrichment programme and for dialogue on the nuclear issue between the ROK and the DPRK before resuming six-party talks.

On 18 April a US State Department spokesman said the DPRK must demonstrate its willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with the ROK but that an apology for the sinking of the ROK navy ship Cheonan is not a precondition for talks.

On 26 April former US President Jimmy Carter began a three-day trip to the DPRK with former Irish President Mary Robinson, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland. The group hoped to revive nuclear disarmament talks and identify ways to provide humanitarian aid to the country.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 24 March during a debate on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, the Human Rights Council (HRC) expressed its serious concern at the ongoing grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations there. By a vote of 30 to three, the HRC extended the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK for a period of one year. (China, Cuba and Russia opposed the extension, and 11 countries abstained.) The Council also urged the DPRK government to ensure full, rapid and unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance, delivered on the basis of need in accordance with humanitarian principles and with adequate monitoring.

Key Issues

Key issues for the Council continue to be whether the sanctions regime is proving effective and whether deference to the stalled six-party process should continue to guide the Council’s course of action.

A related issue for the sanctions committee is whether to possibly add names of individuals or entities to be subject to the sanctions regime or whether to implement other recommendations made in the last panel of experts report.

Underlying Problems

Key underlying problems are the refusal of the DPRK to abide by Council resolutions and concern that re-engaging in six-party talks may simply be a DPRK tactic for receiving aid in the near-term.

Options

Options include:

- refraining from further action while the six parties continue considering re-engagement in talks;
- discussing the possibility of designating additional entities or individuals subject to the current sanctions regime; or
- imposing additional measures against the DPRK in response to its continued non-compliance and uranium enrichment activity.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Many Committee members remain concerned by the DPRK uranium enrichment programme that came to light late last year but are mindful that finding agreement on a Council statement in response has not been possible. It is not clear how quickly, or if, this dynamic may change.

Most members continue to stress the importance of maintaining Council unity in supporting the sanctions currently in place, rather than imposing additional measures at this time. There seems to be a feeling that due to the high level of involvement by three permanent members in the six-party talks,
substantive Council action is unlikely while bilateral dialogue continues among six-party participants.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1928 (7 June 2010) extended the mandate of the panel of experts that assists the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2011.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK’s 25 May 2009 underground nuclear test, expanded the existing arms embargo and authorised inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK, as well as vessels on the high seas, and provided for the creation of a panel of experts to assist the committee.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a sanctions committee.

**Selected Presidential Statement**
- S/PRST/2010/13 (9 July 2010) condemned the attack that led to the sinking of the ROK naval ship *Cheonan* and encouraged resuming direct dialogue and negotiation as soon as possible to resolve outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula.

**Latest Sanctions Committee Annual Report**
- S/2011/84 (18 February 2011)

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)**

Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)
Notable Dates for May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Due</th>
<th>Reports for Consideration in May</th>
<th>Requesting Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>SG report on 1559 (Lebanon)</td>
<td>S/PRST/2004/36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April</td>
<td>ICC report on Libya</td>
<td>S/RES/1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG report on post MINURCAT</td>
<td>S/PRST/2010/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG report on Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early May</td>
<td>SG report on Burundi (BNUB)</td>
<td>S/RES/1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early May</td>
<td>SG report on post-DFI mechanism</td>
<td>S/RES/1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>SG report on Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>S/RES/1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina High Representative report</td>
<td>S/RES/1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>SG report on the DRC (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>S/RES/1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>SG report on Sudan</td>
<td>S/RES/1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>DRC Group of Experts</td>
<td>S/RES/1952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Important Dates

- An open debate on the DRC is expected.
- The team of experts on the rule of law, established pursuant to resolution 1960, will visit the DRC to help investigators and prosecutors of recent sexual violence incidents.
- Aliassane Ouattara will be sworn in as president Côte d'Ivoire.
- Council members will visit Addis Ababa, Nairobi and several locations in Sudan.
- The next meeting of the Contact Group on Libya is expected to convene in Rome.
- Gubernatorial elections are expected in Sudan.
- First-round presidential elections are expected in Chad.
- The Council will hold an open debate on Protection of Civilians
- Parliamentary elections are scheduled in Cyprus.
- South Sudan is set to declare independence on 9 July.
- The “transitional” period in Somalia expires in August.
- The Liberian constitutional referendum is scheduled for August.
- Elections to the Palestinian National Authority to be held before October 2011 have been announced.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- A summit-level meeting of the Arab League is expected in Baghdad in 2011 (it has been postponed twice on 15 May and 29 March).
- A referendum on the administrative status of Darfur is scheduled for 1 July.
- A referendum on the administrative status of Darfur is scheduled for 1 July.
- The “transitional” period in Somalia expires in August.
- The Liberian constitutional referendum is scheduled for August.
- Elections to the Palestinian National Authority to be held before October 2011 have been announced.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October.

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT STAFF

Colin Keating, Executive Director
Joanna Weschler, Deputy Executive Director and Director of Research
Amanda Roberts, Coordinating Editor & Research Analyst
Shamala Kandiah, Senior Research Analyst
Robert Afriyie, Research Analyst
Clare Gatehouse, Research Analyst
Troy Prince, Research Analyst
Astrid Forberg Ryan, Research Analyst
Eran Sthoeger, Research Analyst
Tim Caughley, Research Consultant
Dahlia Morched, Research Assistant
Amali Tower, Research Assistant
Robbin VanNewkirk, Publications Coordinator
Maritza Tenerelli, Administrative Assistant

Security Council Report is published with the support of the Governments of Canada, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. It is incorporated as a not for profit Organisation and operates in affiliation with the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York.