Japan and Human Security: The Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision

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Introduction

On July 15, 2010 at 13:30 pm, Waseda University’s Okuma Auditorium was packed with people. They had come to attend the “Symposium on Human Security – its history and future: toward achievement of MDGs” organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the United Nations and the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had sent a message on video, making some general remarks on the importance of the symposium and its topic and praising Japan for its leadership in the promotion of human security.

A number of the distinguished speakers made references to a report on human security that Secretary-General Ban had submitted to the General Assembly shortly before, in March 2010. The report was the first comprehensive assessment of the UN’s pursuit of human security. I found Mr. Ban’s praise of Japanese leadership on human security slightly curious, considering how Japan appears in his report – it is hardly mentioned. In fact, Japan figures only once, in the “Recommendations”: “At the Secretariat, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS) has played an important role in addressing human security challenges. In addition to the valuable support provided by the Governments of Greece, Japan, Slovenia and Thailand, I strongly urge other Member States to contribute to the valuable work of the Trust Fund.”

On Japan, that’s all – despite the leadership in the pursuit of human security for which the secretary-general praised Japan in his video message to the symposium. Nothing done by Japan in this field is mentioned, much less in which way Japan had shown leadership. And when the country is finally mentioned at the very end of the report, it is alongside three other...
countries, and then it is not even mentioned first. To Japan, the secretary-
general’s report must have been disappointing, since Japan has made major
efforts to make an imprint on the international stage by pursuing and pro-
moting human security and has chosen to work closely with the UN in this
pursuit.
Human Security, an Alternative Security Concept

If one accepts as a starting point Arnold Wolfers’ view that security is “the absence of threat to acquired values,”3 security policies will be actions taken to reduce or limit the probability of damage to one’s acquired values. After World War II, and especially with the emergence of the Cold War, national security was seen almost by definition as equal to the absence of military threats to the state or the ability of the state to reject such threats, and military force was used by states to counter security threats. The end of the Cold War was seen as proof that world politics had changed, since the global bifurcation of the world into two hostile blocs had gone down the drain. With the partition of the world gone, gone also was the lid that had been put on regional and international conflicts.4

In the post-Cold War era, the front lines of war changed, with the proliferation of armed conflicts occurring more frequently within state borders than across them. Armed conflicts shifted from wars to intermediate and minor conflicts, with an increasing number of conflicts involving control of territory and the breakup of states, and many low-level conflicts within states involved civilian casualties and displacement on an agonizing scale. The horrific situation in which civilians in conflicts found themselves and the perpetration of crimes against human rights were appalling. Wars were not what they used to be.5 There were an increasing number of perceived threats to security that could not be countered by military measures.6 The unrelenting human costs of violent conflict became one of the reasons why the discussion of the nature of security resurfaced. With the focus shifting towards threats so far neglected in the discourse on security, the security concept itself employed in analyses and studies, national security, seemed increasingly dysfunctional.

A redefinition of security was seen to be required by the near disappearance of conventional military threats to the major powers and by an increasing awareness of the costs of the new wars, both for affected countries and for the international community. The most noted attempt at coming up with new thinking on security was seen when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presented its annual report in 1994, in which a new security concept, human security, was outlined. The new security concept did not stress values like territorial integrity and national interest but values like safety, well-being and dignity. It was multilayered, with security considered from the level of the state down to the level of the individual. In contrast with the traditional interpretation of security as national security, the security referent of human security is people and not the country. Human security is a global and inclusive concept dealing with a universal concern to which national boundaries are irrelevant, and dealing with (1) security of people, not just security of territory; (2) security of individuals, not just security of their nations; (3) security through development, not security through arms; and (4) security of all people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities and in their environment.

The traditional security concept, national security, is a top-down concept with security commensurate with national survival, dealing with protection of the state and not those living there. In contrast, human security is a bottom-up concept addressing threats to people and ways to overcome them. With people the security referent of human security, threats to security are human rights violations, political instability, poverty, economic underdevelopment, terrorism, environmental degradation, ethnic and religious violence, etc. It is only too apparent that instruments traditionally employed in national security policy – like soldiers and weapons – will not be useful or may even impinge upon security interpreted as human security.

The Foreign Policy Vision of Obuchi Keizō

After the idea of human security was launched by the UNDP in 1994, it began to be referred to in the international discourse on security and soon had established itself as a key concept on the international security agenda. Many organizations, NGOs, opinion leaders, politicians and private individuals turned into advocates of the new security idea. Japan was one of the countries that supported the new ideas. Already the year after the UNDP issued its report, in a speech in the United Nations, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi endorsed human security as an important idea for the UN. Murayama’s endorsement made Japan one of the first countries to offer its support to the human security idea. The background is to be found in the changes that the world and Japan was undergoing in the aftermath of the great changes that took place in world politics as a result of the end of the Cold War. Japan was searching for an international role commensurate with its considerable economic power and the Japanese government had began to take measures to strengthen Japan’s “international contribution,” kokusai kōken. In 1994, Murayama had been elevated to prime minister from the post of chairman of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and his support for human security can be seen as rather natural, given the fact that the human security concept is non-military in nature and fitted like a glove to his party’s high-profile pacifist stance.

While Murayama must be acknowledged as the human security pioneer in Japanese politics, it is Obuchi Keizō (prime minister 1998–2000) who is primarily linked to Japan’s human security pursuit. The first expression of his adoption of human security as a key concern was the effects and repercussions of the Asian economic crisis that unfolded after the collapse of the Thai baht in May 1997. Several of Japan’s neighbors were severely hit and Japan could not evade the negative impact of the crisis ravaging the region. Obuchi’s initial effort to further the cause of human security came when the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was signed by 122 countries in Ottawa. At this conference, Obuchi announced his commitment to work for the landmine ban. As a concrete step he announced
Japan’s “Zero Victims Program,” a plan for landmine removal and support for projects to help landmine victims.\(^{10}\)

Obuchi’s decision to work for Japan joining the international campaign against landmines became the starting point for his endeavor to promote human security. Initially, his focus was on Asian countries that were hard hit by the economic crisis ravaging the region. In a speech in Tokyo on December 2, 1998, he said: “An unavoidable fact is that Asia’s remarkable economic development in recent years also created social strains. The current economic crisis has aggravated those strains, threatening the daily lives of many people. Taking this fact fully into consideration, I believe that we must deal with these difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of ‘Human Security,’ and that we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region.” Noting that the theme of the Tokyo conference was human security, he went on: “It is my ardent wish that creative intellectual interactions emerge in this area, as they involve many urgent issues, and that wise leadership will be exercised and lead to overcoming the current crisis.” He defined human security in a way that became the prevailing one in Japan and widely quoted in the international debate on human security: “It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired. While the phrase ‘human security’ is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats.” In his speech, he outlined a strategy to cope with the problems under discussion: “Since many of the problems affecting human security cross national borders, no country can solve such problems alone; the co-ordinated action of the international community is necessary. Moreover, since these problems directly affect the lives of human beings, and since it is this area where the activities of citizens through NGOs and others...

are most effective, it is important for governments and international organizations to strengthen the linkages and cooperation with citizen’s activities to cope with such problems.”

There is a strong resemblance in the areas of concern raised by Obuchi to what the UNDP report lists as categories of human security – economic, food, environmental, personal, community, and political security. In his speech in Tokyo and another speech two weeks later in Hanoi, he clarified his view on which areas were in focus: “In our times, humankind is under various kinds of threats,” he said in Tokyo. “Environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for future generations. In addition, transnational crimes such as illicit drugs and trafficking are increasing. Problems such as the exodus of refugees, violations of human rights, infectious diseases like AIDS, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines and so on pose significant threats to all of us. Moreover, the problem of children under armed conflict ought never to be overlooked.” In Hanoi, he returned to what was awaiting: “We need urgently to implement measures for the socially vulnerable who are affected by the Asian economic crisis. [...] At the same time, even in times of economic crisis, we should not forget cooperation on medium- and long-term problems such as environmental degradation, narcotics and international organized crime which need to be addressed if we wish to protect human survival, life and dignity.” Furthermore, a vital aspect of Obuchi’s understanding of human security was that threats to human security “differ by country and region,” which indicates that threats had to be tackled differently in different countries and regions. By extension, ways and means to tackle the threat had to be selected depending on the actual threat.

In his speeches in December 1998, Obuchi outlined the strategies to be used by Japan in its pursuit of human security. In his Tokyo speech, he said

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that “we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region.” He continued: “Since many of the problems affecting human security cross national borders, no country can solve such problems alone; the co-ordinated action of the international community is necessary. Moreover, since these problems directly affect the lives of human beings, and since it is this area where the activities of citizens through NGOs and others are most effective, it is important for governments and international organizations to strengthen the linkages and cooperation with citizen’s activities to cope with such problems. [...] To support Asian countries in this economic crisis ... we have given, as one of the most important pillars of our support, assistance to the poor, the aged, the disabled, women and children, and other socially vulnerable segments of population on whom economic difficulties have the heaviest impacts.” In his speech in Hanoi two weeks later, he clarified some of the key instruments that were going to be mobilized in the pursuit of human security: “Japan will continue to address this area utilizing its official development assistance and multilateral frameworks such as APEC.”

Picking up on an idea in the 1994 UNDP report, Obuchi announced in Hanoi that the Japanese government had decided to donate ¥500 million (US$4.2 million) for establishing a human security fund within the United Nations. This was not a new idea but based on an idea that he had broached already in a speech in Singapore in May 1998.14 In Hanoi, Obuchi said that the purpose of the fund was to enable international organizations to provide support “in a flexible and timely manner to projects that are to be implemented in this region.”15 As his statement clearly shows, what he had in mind was a fund with activities in Asia but working under the aegis of the United Nations, but its scope was broadened from Asia to the global level when Japan began to pursue its international campaign in the context of the United Nations.16

14 It is likely that Obuchi based his proposal on an idea presented in the 1994 UNDP Report that a global human security fund should be established with funding based on a proportion of reductions in global military spending, a fee on globally important transactions or polluting emissions, and overseas development aid. See Bert Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security: The Founding of a New Policy, 1995–2003 (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2008), pp. 155f.
15 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia.”
With Obuchi’s speeches in December 1998, human security had been introduced onto Japan’s political agenda and became the foundation of Japan’s approach to human security.\(^\text{17}\) The chief Japanese representative to an international conference on developmental issues in New York in September 1999, Takemi Keizō, stated that “the Obuchi Government is cultivating the concept of ‘human security’ as a new element in its foreign policy.” Referring to Obuchi’s speech in Hanoi, he claimed that the prime minister had defined human security as an important priority of Japan’s foreign policy.\(^\text{18}\) It was also the key message of a speech delivered by MOFA’s Takasu Yukio at a conference on human security in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, in May 2000. Taking Obuchi’s Hanoi speech as the starting-point for his remarks, he claimed that Japan accorded high priority to human security in its foreign policy.\(^\text{19}\)

Obuchi was incapacitated by a stroke on April 1, 2000. As a politician, he was soft-spoken, with a personal approach so low key and modest that he was even derided as a “vacuum prime minister,” suggesting that he had no substance.\(^\text{20}\) But he was “a good listener,” and when his state-secretary Takemi Keizō, also a well-known international relations scholar, brought up the idea of human security, Obuchi decided on the spot to adopt it as a key idea for himself. Takemi was also seconded by a high-powered group that had been assigned the task of coming up with policy proposals when Obuchi was appointed foreign minister. According to a member of that group, Yamamoto Tadashi, Obuchi took human security “as his baby, since the con-


cept was consonant with his ideas.” In retrospect, human security turned out to be the pillar of “the Obuchi foreign policy.”

Obuchi was replaced as prime minister by Mori Yoshirō. The way in which he came to power in the confused situation after Obuchi suddenly stepped down meant Mori had to fight an uphill battle throughout his period in office. Nevertheless, once in office, Mori made it a hallmark of his policies to continue the human security policy initiated by Obuchi. While he eventually had to leave more or less in disgrace, when in office, he was guided by the Obuchi vision of human security as a key concern of Japan’s foreign policy. He continued Obuchi’s UN-centered strategy and took the initiative to establish the Commission on Human Security (CHS), also under the aegis of the UN, and increased Japan’s contributions to the TFHS to such an extent that it became the largest UN trust fund.

In January 2003, a shift in Japan’s human security policy was announced when Prime Minister Koizumi Jun‘ichirō declared in his policy speech in the Diet that “ODA will be implemented strategically in human security areas.” The shift was implemented in August with a reform of Japan’s ODA policy. It made human security a matter of ODA policy and no longer a key concern for foreign policy as Obuchi and Mori had seen it. The measures taken were intended to make Japan’s reformed ODA policy permeated with the human security idea.

Given the centrality of human security in Japan’s new ODA policy, it is instructive to look at the place it is given in the new policy. In order of appearance, the five key concepts of the revised ODA policy were: (1) Supporting self-help efforts of developing countries; (2) the perspective of “human security”; (3) assurance of fairness; (4) utilization of Japan’s experience and expertise; and (5) partnership and collaboration with the

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21 Author’s interviews with Takemi Keizō, member of the Diet, former state-secretary for foreign affairs, March 11, 2004, and Yamamoto Tadashi, President, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, March 11, 2004; quoted in Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, pp. 85f.


24 Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, p. 133.
international community. Thus, human security was listed as No. 2, placed after self-help. While it was declared to be a “pillar” of Japan’s ODA policy, it was not the pre-eminent consideration.

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Aim of the Present Report

At the time of Obuchi’s demise, his main achievement as prime minister was seen as having reinvigorated the Japanese economy, and he was remembered for the scale of his programs, which made him, as he proudly proclaimed, “the biggest borrower in the world.” While praised at the time, it is a feat that is probably seen more as a horror story than an honor story by ordinary Japanese today. In retrospect, his most important achievement must be said to have been his introduction of human security. To him, human security was both a vision as well as a practical tool. Far from being vague to the limit of meaninglessness, as some critics of the new security concept maintained, it was seen by him as a useful instrument. Human security is multifaceted and he saw that the trick was to pick measures and activities that reflected Japan’s comparative advantages. There were real problems that had to be tackled by concrete measures, and here human security was a useful compass. The repercussions and impact of Obuchi’s introduction of human security makes him a rare individual in Japanese politics: a visionary. In a previous report, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security: The Founding of a New Policy 1995–2003 (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2008, xii+315 pp.), I traced the background to and evolution of Japan’s human security policy until 2003, which can be seen as marking the end of the introductory phase of Japan’s pursuit of human security. That year the CHS released its report and Japan’s ODA policy was reformed, making human security a pillar of the new ODA policy. The present report is a sequel to that study. While the previous report deals with the introductory phase of this policy, the present report assesses the extent to which steps have been taken after 2003 to make Obuchi’s vision materialize.

The Implementation of the Obuchi Vision in Japan’s Foreign Policy

Collaboration: The National Level

Obuchi’s foreign policy was guided by a vision – to make human security a pillar of Japan’s foreign policy for the 21st century. An integral part of his strategy was the weight he placed on collaboration in national, bilateral and international contexts. This also became a key feature of the strategy of the Japanese government in its pursuit of human security. Both he and his successor Mori made overtures towards NGOs, and suggested cooperation between the government and NGOs. The prime example of such cooperation became the Japan Platform, a network organization consisting of an NGO Unit, MOFA and the Japan Business Federation, Nippon Keidanren. It was established in 2000 and receives government economic support via the ODA budget, which is complemented by private donations. The NGO Unit was established as a body working in the pursuit of human security. To use available funds, the NGO Unit had to receive approval from MOFA. The Japan Platform was an attempt by the Japanese government to further good relations with NGOs, but not all NGOs were welcome on board. Members of the NGO Unit were carefully chosen by MOFA to include only NGOs favorable to the ministry.

In my previous report, which covers the period up to 2003, it is pointed out that even while NGOs received official verbal support, their participation in Japan’s overseas aid activities was not extensive. NGOs were not seen as partners on an equal footing by government officials but as an instrument for governmental policies – at best. Relations between NGOs and the Japanese government were characterized by mutual suspicion. It was evident that MOFA officials did not fancy these organizations. Skepticism was reciprocated, however. An analysis released in 2005 claimed that not a few NGOs officials saw MOFA as pursuing aid objectives that were incompatible with the humanitarian principles of NGOs. In the eyes of many NGOs,

29 Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, pp. 186f.
30 Sakura Ozaki, The Formation of NGO Inclusion Policy in Japan’s Official Development Assistance: The Roles of NGOs, the Foreign Ministry and Business, MA Thesis, Faculty of
embedding NGOs in the NGO Unit and subordinating it to both MOFA and Keidanren, turned NGOs into subcontractors.\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, NGOs that were members of the Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), an umbrella organization of citizen-led NGOs involved in ODA, did not want to accept grants from the government because they would then lose their independence. According to a JANIC representative, NGOs involved in the activities of the Japan Platform had to “obey” those who supplied the money, the government and Keidanren.\textsuperscript{32} The important role of NGOs in the pursuit of human security that Obuchi had anticipated did not materialize, and the scale of what the NGOs were doing under the banner of human security was limited.\textsuperscript{33}

The situation has changed. Hayashi Akihito, a JANIC activist who is now employed as a JICA coordinator for NGO–JANIC Partnership Promotion, describes the breaking point as 2008 when two large-scale international meetings took place in Japan, the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD IV) in Yokohama in May and the G-8 Summit in Toyako in July. According to Hayashi, JANIC held almost weekly meetings with foreign ministry officials that year, with NGO representatives trying to be creative and proposing concrete and feasible projects and not just criticizing the government. This stance seems to have paid off, resulting in better understanding of the NGOs among officials and increased willingness on part of the government to support NGO activities. Hayashi stresses the different roles that NGOs and the government play. The NGOs have skills that the government lacks, while the government has money. Hayashi indicates that the new situation that has evolved has rectified one aspect missing in the cooperation between the government and NGOs: increased government understanding of NGOs has opened the avenue for them to also influence policymaking.\textsuperscript{34} Before, the government had not cooperated with civil society groups or NGOs in terms of policy formulation.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 178f.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 190.
\textsuperscript{34} Hayashi Akihito, Coordinator for NGO–JANIC Partnership Promotion, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and a member of the Research & Advocacy Group, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), interview by author, Tokyo, September 2, 2010.
The key partner for the government’s cooperation with NGOs continues to be the Japan Platform. The Platform has expanded, both in terms of NGO members and financial resources. The NGO Unit of the Japan Platform numbered 17 in November 2001 but had increased to 33 in 2008 and its financial resources have increased considerably. Nevertheless, even if the number of NGOs participating in this government-sponsored body is larger than before, they are still relatively few, which makes it hard to say that what Hayashi calls “Japan’s NGO World” is participating.

The irony is that while relations between NGOs and the Japanese government have improved, the interest of Japanese NGOs in working under the banner of human security is largely missing. One of Japan’s leading NGO activists, Osa Yukie, argues that human security has never been the mainstream of Japan’s NGO community. Both Osa, and JANIC’s Hayashi are of the opinion that human security is a concept that NGOs find hard to understand [wakarinikui]. According to Osa, NGOs are actually indifferent to working under the human security banner. They are of the opinion that they have been working for human security all along, only without using the word; in fact, they see it as the very raison d’être of NGOs, but see no need for the new and fancy concept. 35 She adds that if the government had created a fund for human security in Japan, many NGOs would have been interested in human security, but since there is no such fund, interest is lacking.

In the eyes of both Osa and Hayashi, it is the nature of the human security concept as it is used in Japan that results in a lack of interest, and the political scientist Ōkuma Hiroshi, a leading specialist on Japan’s ODA policy, agrees that this is the case. In the eyes of NGOs, he says, the human security concept boils down to a beautiful word for which they see no need. He describes how the concept of human security functions as an ōburoshiki, a highly comprehensive concept that contains everything – that is, contains nothing – which makes it unattractive to NGOs. 36

The aversion to human security, being such an ōburoshiki, that surfaces among NGOs is probably behind a phenomenon mentioned by Osa. The comprehensive nature of the concept of human security does not fit the way

35 Osa Yukie, Chairperson, Japan Platform, Chairperson, AAR Japan, Professor, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, interview by author, Tokyo, August 30, 2010.
36 Professor Ōkuma Hiroshi, Seijo University, interview by author, Tokyo, August 31, 2010.
NGOs are working. There is a specialization among activists in that only the particular issue that an NGO is dealing with (landmines, poverty alleviation, etc.) is picked up; if the NGO comes across something else, they don’t bother. This is a stance of which she is highly critical.37

The skepticism of NGOs towards human security as a concept and a slogan has had one important effect. In Japan, no epistemic community has formed around human security, as has been the case internationally. When I asked knowledgeable insiders and researchers whether such a community is to be found in Japan, it was a surprise to me that no one could identify such a grouping, despite activities by renowned and vocal human security protagonists like Fukushima Akiko, Takasu Yukio, Takemi Keizō, Tase Kazuo, Sachiko Pharr-Fukuda, Osa Yukie, etc. Japanese representatives may add to the international epistemic community but there is not one in the country itself. The reason seems to me to be the alienation of NGOs for which officials have been responsible and which was not conducive to eliminating the skepticism that NGOs harbored against government. The relation between NGOs and the MOFA may have improved after 2008, as Hayashi claims, but this was years after the government had abandoned human security as a key concern of foreign policy, symbolized not least by the fact that the special ambassador for human security is no longer appointed.

Collaboration: The Bilateral Level

An integral part of the campaign for human security that Obuchi Keizō initiated was efforts to initiate and promote collaboration with other countries, in the same way as reliance on like-minded countries was a primary instrument for a country like Canada.38 A lot of good will could be sensed, but collaboration in actual practice did not take off. The international campaign for human security that Obuchi initiated faced problems when the campaign also became part of a Japanese drive for leadership. The problem then was that countries like Canada and Norway and other members of the Human Security Network had the same ambition, resulting in competition that was not conducive to collaboration.

37 Osa, interview.
My interviews in 2004 with two key policymakers behind the policy pursued by Japan, Yamamoto Tadashi and Takemi Keizō, showed that even while countries like Japan and Canada were like-minded in their views of human security, certain core ideas or policies, like their views on humanitarian intervention, were too divergent in the eyes of key decision makers, with the result that collaboration did not materialize, even if official rhetoric had been strongly in favor of cooperation. In the case of Japan, behind Yamamoto’s and Takemi’s focus on conceptual differences lurked Japanese apprehension of the reaction of countries important to Japan’s campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council. The idea of human security made some developing countries anxious about the possibility that the idea might invite interference in their internal affairs. Takemi warned against mixing up human security with humanitarian intervention: “Recently, the concept of human security has been equated or associated with acts of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is a particularly individual-centered activity, allowing as it does for the international community to intervene into the sovereign affairs of a nation, from the viewpoint of supporting the rights of the individual or a group of individuals within that country. [...] However, humanitarian intervention—and I stress here humanitarian intervention, and not human security—is a deeply troubling concept for a number of developing nations, which are still embroiled in the process of nation building, the leaders of which are concerned that humanitarian intervention provides a passport for developed nations to meddle in the internal affairs of weaker developing nations. We should be careful that the true meaning of human security is not confused with the more controversial issue of humanitarian intervention.”39

Knowing this apprehension of developing countries, the Japanese government focused on the developmental and economic aspect of human security. One example of this was that Japanese representatives intentionally mentioned “poverty” in their speeches in the UN whenever they were

listing threats to human security.40 The response from members of the non-aligned movement and developing countries was favorable.41

The situation does not seem to have changed. Surveying the pre-2009 situation, Toyoshima Naoko has found that Japanese bilateral cooperation on human security with other countries has hardly been seen.42 From the start, Japan chose to engage internationally in the UN context and this approach did not change. The most important initiative taken by Japan after 2003 to promote collaboration on human security, the establishment of the Friends of Human Security in 2006, did not focus on bilateral but on multilateral cooperation.

**Collaboration: The Multilateral Level**

From the start of Japan’s pursuit of human security, the key arena has been the United Nations. Japan supports several UN bodies and programs through the TFHS. But, as will be discussed below, the TFHS has largely become a Japanese pursuit, with its activities even reported on the homepage of the Japanese foreign ministry, as if the TFHS were a Japanese governmental agency. As to the CHS, it wound up its activities in 2003 and exists now only in historical annals and Japanese foreign policy rhetoric. As for the most important body for international collaboration in the pursuit of human security, the Human Security Network (HSN), which Japan declined to join when it was established in 1999, the situation has been marginally modified in that Japan has participated as an observer in meetings after 2004.43

In 2005 Japan scored “a sort of success” [ittei no seika], as Japan’s then UN Ambassador Kitaoka Shin’ichi later wrote, when human security was mentioned in the World Summit Outcome adopted by the UN General

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40 Satō Yukio, “Nihon no kokuren gaikō to ningen no anzen hoshō: Kokuren mirenniamu samitto e no kiseki [Japan’s UN diplomacy and human security: Track record up to the UN Millennium Summit], *Kokusai mondai*, No. 530 (2004), p. 7.
41 Ibid., pp. 9–10.
42 Toyoshima Naoko, “Ningen no anzen hoshō seisaku ni miru Nihon no shisei” [Japan’s stance as seen in its human security policy], *Sōka daigaku daigakuin kiyō*, No. 31 (2009), p. 82.
Assembly.44 The §143 of the document reads: “We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.”45

Ambassador Takasu Yukio has expressed Japan’s official view of the inclusion of this paragraph into the resolution, noting that the Japanese government “highly appreciates the inclusion of paragraph 143 in the Outcome Document, and calls on other interested countries to seriously consider ways to follow up this paragraph.”46 Behind his satisfaction lurked the fact that this paragraph was inserted at the insistence of the Japanese government.47 Some countries felt misgivings over its inclusion.48 Furthermore, closely read, the statement by the General Assembly was problematic for Japan. The commitment to “discuss and define the notion of human security” pinpointed the problem that the CHS had not come up with a useful stringent definition of the human security concept. Two years after the CHS wound up its activities, the need for defining the concept of human security was pointed out again.

In the wake of the 2005 World Summit, a new initiative was taken by Japan in 2006 to further human security. The key actor on the Japanese side was Japan’s ambassador for human security, Takasu Yukio. He described the process after the World Summit in a speech at the 8th ministerial meeting of the Human Security Network, to which Japan had been invited to send an observer. According to Takasu, “Mexico...offered to organize a workshop to deepen understanding of human security among many countries as a

47 Magnus Lennartsson Nakamitsu, Minister, Embassy of Sweden, Tokyo, interview by author, November 10, 2006; quoted in Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, pp. 263f.
48 Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, p. 264.
follow up to the Outcome Document. [...] In the workshop, the proposal was made to form a framework to broaden and strengthen partnerships towards forming an international forum named ‘Friends of Human Security’. This forum is open to both HSN and non-HSN countries with strong interests in human security, and it aims at seeking partnership (not necessarily asking to become a formal member) with other countries that have not associated with any particular initiatives in the past.”

The new network could be seen as an attempt to combine the Japanese–UN and Canadian–Norwegian network initiatives by forming an informal group. Both the informal membership and the looseness of definition constitute a continuation of the Japanese way of approaching collaboration on human security. Taking participation as a measure, the new network could seem a success, since the number of countries participating increased from 23 at the first meeting, to 33 at the second and 44 at the third. However, behind lurked problems that Japan had tried to tackle by taking the initiative. Its proposal that like-minded countries should join the new network was launched in a situation where collaboration was largely missing in Japan’s mix of human security activities and bilateral and multilateral cooperation had not yielded much concrete results. While the new network was “open to both HSN and non-HSN countries with strong interests in human security,” a reasonable question seems to be: with the HSN alive and kicking, why another network? The not very convincing argument given by Takasu was that there were “many countries that are interested in some aspects of human security but do not necessarily wish to become members of the HSN.” The prime example of such a country was, of course, Japan, which had refused to become a member of the HSN when such an offer was made at the time of its formation, with the reasons for rejection said to be disagreement over concept (Yamamoto Tadashi) or policies (Takemi Keizō). Japan tried to solve the problem of its own lack of interest in collaboration – demonstrated when it did not join the HSN – by trying to paper over differences, asking also members of the HSN to join the new network.

51 Toyoshima, “Ningen no anzen hoshō ni miru Nihon no shisei,” p. 80.
52 Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, pp. 110f.
As Takasu expressed: “[...] rather than focusing on different emphasis,” the focus should be “on achieving cooperation among interested countries, [and] broaden[ing] areas of agreement and partnership.”

The approach to the Friends shows Japan’s unmistakable mark, revealed when Takasu presented what he said were his initial thoughts on the new network: “We should not rush to seek formal discussions in the UN on the definition of human security; such as holding formal consultations for negotiating over a legal definition.” His view is that it “would be sufficient to agree on a general operational definition as a base of collaborative efforts” like the one proposed by the CHS. Given the fact that the World Summit Outcome had pointed out the necessity of discussing and defining human security, this passage is surprising – to say the least.

Why this intransigence? It seems that countries pursuing policies on human security have devised them to fit policies where they have seen themselves having a comparative advantage. It was also an advantage that the concept in its vagueness could be flexibly adjusted to various contexts. As Paris indicated, “human security is powerful precisely because it lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspectives and objectives of all the members of the coalition.” The idea of human security could be customized according to the needs and interests of the actors involved in each case. With the human security concept ambiguous and multifaceted, it represented a window of opportunity for countries to contribute resources and expertise in fields where they saw themselves as pre-eminent or which were of paramount importance to them. In its pursuit of human security Japan, but also other countries, has pursued a niche policy, that is, concentrated resources in specific areas, rather than trying to cover the field. Continuing the tradition of Japan’s checkbook diplomacy, and given Japan’s diplomatic tradition, which had been hardened in the 1990s when Japan was the world’s No. 1 donor and ODA was the most importance tool of its diplomacy, it was natural for Japanese policymakers and foreign

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ministry officials to see ODA as the key instrument in the pursuit of human security.56

Japan’s Key Tools in Its Pursuit of Human Security

In an analysis of Canadian and Japanese policies for human security, Fukushima Akiko has pointed out that Japan has used the TFHS and the CHS as vehicles to promote human security, apart from its Official Development Assistance (ODA).57 This assessment seems well founded. In virtually any presentation of Japan’s pursuit of human security, the TFHS and the CHS stand out as the most important tools for implementing Japan’s policy. The CHS was a two-year commission given the task of working out the theoretical foundation of policies to be pursued and presenting proposals for actions to be pursued, while the TFHS was established as one of the trust funds within the UN system, with its program and activities an integrated part of UN actions and activities.

The establishment of the TFHS and the CHS can be accredited to two premiers. The TFHS was established within the UN at the initiative of Obuchi Keizō and inaugurated in March 1999, while the CHS was proposed by his successor Mori Yoshirō, started its work in June 2001 and delivered its report to UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan on May 1, 2003. While the CHS was devised as a planning and policymaking body, the TFHS was a body for implementing policies. The order in which the two new bodies were established might be seen as unconventional in that the body created to implement policies was established before the body that was to come up with the proposals, but it can be interpreted as a reflection of the Obuchi-inspired pragmatic way that Japan followed in its promotion of the new security idea.58

The Commission on Human Security (CHS)

A practical step towards refining and presenting proposals on how to further the new security idea was presented by Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō in his speech at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, when he proposed that an international commission on human security should be

58 See Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, p. 257.
established under the aegis of the United Nations. When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Tokyo in January 2001, he met former UNHCR Ogata Sadako and they finalized an agreement to establish the CHS. According to Annan, the issues to be addressed by this commission were closely related to the main concerns of the UN, and he promised close cooperation on behalf of the world organization. From the outset, the Japanese government supported CHS both financially and operationally, since Prime Minister Mori had taken the initiative to the commission, and Japan had begun to pursue policies defining and advocating the idea of human security as well increasingly pursuing operations based on the human security idea.59

The press release after the meeting between Annan and Ogata clarified that the goals of the CHS were: (1) to promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security and its underlying imperatives; (2) to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and (3) to propose a concrete action program to address critical and pervasive threats to human security.60 Two aspects in the ways these goals were formulated should be highlighted. First, the discussion of human security vindicated claims that the concept was hard to pin down, even “slippery”, as it was described in a famous characterization.61 In fact, the plentitude of interpretations of the human security concept was one of the key problems in the eyes of analysts and theoreticians. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the first concern of the commission would have been to come up with a definition or, at least a working definition, of the concept. This was not the case, however. The CHS was directed to come up with an operational definition and not a definition of the key concept. Maybe the directives were intentionally phrased so as to avoid getting the work of the commission stuck in a definitional quagmire.

The order of the three goals of the commission should be noted. These directives had implications for the end result. The definitional task was not mentioned first; the prime task for the CHS was to promote public understanding of, engagement with and support for human security. It shows that the CHS was expected to function as a kind of sales and PR agency

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59 Minami Hiroshi, “Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō” [Human security and Japanese foreign policy], Kokusai mondai, No. 530 (May 2004), pp. 46–47.
promoting public understanding of human security and its underlying imperatives. Given the starting-points for the work of the CHS, it should not be a surprise that its report did not come up with a clear-cut definition. Consequently, when the CHS was later criticized by some for having been “unable to come up with a definition that was easy to grasp and that could be universally shared,” it was a criticism that missed its target. If some were to be criticized for the lack of a clear-cut definition in the CHS report of the concept of human security, it is those who appointed the CHS and formulated its directive.

To guide its work, the CHS adopted at the outset a working definition of human security – “the objective of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.” As is easy to see, this is not a definition of human security per se but clarifying what the objective is. This definition makes human security a black box; we know the objective of x is but not what x is.

This evasiveness of the working definition used by the CHS made it natural for the commission to come up with a definition in its final report – human security is “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways

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65 Takemi Keizō is kind enough to describe it as the “working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human Security.” See Takemi, “Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” p. 42.
that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.”66 The problem of this definition is that it is so evasive that the author(s) had to explicate it in the next breath: “Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”67 In this key extension, the CHS stresses that the maintenance of human security should reinforce human dignity and must aim at developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to act on their own behalf. An empowerment interpretation was added to the protection aspect of human security, stressing the abilities of individuals to protect themselves from threats and conflicts and to respond to problems.68

The definitional problem that had posed problems, at least in the eyes of analysts and theoreticians, continued to be a headache. As noted by Fukushima Akiko, instead of choosing between freedom from fear and freedom from want, the CHS took the path of embracing all relevant freedoms.69 Behind this broad approach, there probably lingered an unwillingness to deviate from the approach, so far taken by ardent proponents of human security to how the work should be pursued, which had made them score successes in that human security had gradually been adopted in the international security arena. Furthermore, to limit the scope of the human security agenda would have been to go directly against the directives, since the third task of the CHS was “to promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security.”

It is likely that Ogata had a decisive impact on the adoption of the broad approach taken by the CHS. When she was asked to co-chair the commission, she contributed to broadening the scope of the commission’s work. In a roundtable talk, Ogata later revealed that she “thought that the proposed

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67 Ibid.
focus of its work, public health, was outside her field of expertise: ‘Of course
disease, poverty and unemployment are among the threats to human secu-
ritiy, but I had long been concerned with the plight of the ordinary people
who were the casualties of conflict. So I made it clear that I was willing to
be involved if the commission were expanded to include such issues’.” In
fact, her role in widening the scope of Japan’s pursuit of human security was
even more significant and had been disclosed before. When Obuchi and his
team were considering establishing what was to become the TFHS, their
focus was Asia, as was revealed by Obuchi’s speech in Hanoi in December 1998. This was in line with traditional Japanese foreign policy, with
its emphasis on neighboring Asia. They even thought of placing the fund
within the United Nations University in Tokyo but Ogata declares: “I was
not interested in an Asian focus. I saw [the pursuit] as global,” and the fund
was established under the aegis of the United Nations in New York, which
expanded its geographical scope from an Asian to a global one.

Ôkuma’s argument referred to above that human security is an ôburoshiki
concept is relevant in this context. It can be seen to be relevant for the recep-
tion of the CHS report. The strategy of the CHS – to push for something
that is in many ways an ôburoshiki – has had the opposite result than what was
intended, by alienating countries that had the potential of being key part-
ners in the human security endeavor.

Whatever the reason for the CHS choosing the primrose path, it had
implications. While it is likely that it made the work of the commission eas-
ier, it became one reason why the CHS report did not have the impact that
the Japanese government certainly intended. Having surveyed the Japanese
and Canadian experiences of furthering the cause of human security, Bosold
and Wertes noted: “Probably the most substantial impediment to success-
ful implementation of the recommendations is the vagueness and breadth
of the CHS’s definition of human security, covering almost every aspect of
the security/development nexus.” According to them, the report was mar-

71 Ogata Sadako, President, JICA, interview by author, September 15, 2010.
ginalized as a result of the ongoing war on terror and the unwillingness of key international actors to work multilaterally. The year after the report was published, Astri Suhrke characterized human security as a “stalled initiative” that might still attract attention in academic circles but had lost its attraction for policymakers.\footnote{Astri Suhrke, “A Stalled Initiative,” \textit{Security Dialogue}, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2004), p. 365. A similar criticism has been targeted at the Human Security Network. Working on numerous issues has hindered it from taking effective international action, according to, e.g., Claudia F. Fuentes and Francisco Rojas Aravena, \textit{Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Latin America and the Caribbean} (Paris: UNESCO, 2005), p. 39. A critical question is, then, effective according to what measure?}

One party that did not waver in its support of the CHS was the Japanese government. In its response to the CHS report, MOFA stated that “Japan intends to strengthen efforts with the aim of spreading the concept of human security throughout the world based on these recommendations.”\footnote{MOFA, \textit{Diplomatic Bluebook 2003} (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2003), p. 185.}

The CHS wound up its activities on May 31, 2003, and the Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) was established within the United Nations to carry forward the recommendations of the CHS.\footnote{“Advisory Board on Human Security,” United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, http://ochaonline.un.org/ABHSandOutreach/tabid/2128/Default.aspx} In Japan’s human security rhetoric, the CHS still keeps an important place, however. It was revealed not least when the symposium on human security in Tokyo, mentioned above, was organized in July 2010 by the Japanese foreign ministry, the UN and Waseda University. Ogata Sadako was the star speaker among seven international eminencies. It was quite striking to me that when she was presented as the co-chair of the CHS, it was very much as if the commission was still alive and kicking, seven years after it ceased to exist.\footnote{Likewise, in the otherwise competent survey of Japanese ODA disbursement patterns in Southeast Asia from the end of the Cold War until 2006, Dennis Trinidad wrote three years after the CHS had closed its work, that “[t]o date, the trust fund and the commission remain at the center of Japan’s multilateral response to human-security issues.” See Dennis D. Trinidad, “Japan’s ODA at the Crossroads: Disbursement Patterns of Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Southeast Asia,” \textit{Asian Perspective}, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2007), p. 97.}

The Trust Fund for Human Security

As noted above, the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS) is often described as the key Japanese tool for promoting human security or even seen as the
“materialization” of Japan’s initiative in promoting human security tools.\textsuperscript{77} Already by 2001, Japan’s generous donations had made the TFHS the largest trust fund within the United Nations.\textsuperscript{78} Japan’s total contribution amounts to 40.2 billion yen. Since the establishment of the TFHS in 1999, a total of ca. 200 projects have been approved (July 2010).\textsuperscript{79} Support goes to projects pursued by UN agencies. TFHS programs help fill the gap between humanitarian and development assistance, typically countries and regions where the insecurities of people are most critical and pervasive, such as least developed countries and countries in conflict.\textsuperscript{80} To illustrate – in 2005 projects of more than 20 UN agencies were funded by the TFHS, covering matters such as poverty alleviation, women’s empowerment, reconstruction, and drug abuse in areas like Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Sudan and Central America.\textsuperscript{81}

In my previous study on Japan’s human security policy up to 2003, three main problems with the TFHS were identified: (1) funds allocated to the TFHS were underutilized; (2) despite the fact that the TFHS is a fund within the United Nations, the way that resources were allocated to projects was awkward in that it was not the United Nations or some UN body that decided on grants and allocations but Japan and the UN; and (3) no other governments had joined Japan as financial sponsors of the TFHS, which was the unequivocal ambition of the Japanese government. The latter verged on being a curiosity but nevertheless hampered the possibility that TFHS would become what the Japanese government intended: a vehicle for Japan to have an impact on what was going on internationally related to human security.

\textsuperscript{79} Ishihara Takashi, Head, Japan Funds Unit, MOFA, interview by author, September 14, 2010.
\textsuperscript{81} Mata, “Playing the Right Game?” p. 8.
From the start it was clarified from the Japanese side that Japan had intentions to impact the usage of available funds, and the Japanese government kept the final say on how the financial resources of the TFHS were used. The decision-making process was such that Japan had a de facto veto over how allocations were made. The Japanese government did not seem willing to entrust the UN to decide how to allocate funds provided by Japan. “A noteworthy fact,” I wrote in my previous report, “is that the TFHS was, and is, seen not so much as a UN body but a Japanese institution to a large extent.” This was the view of other governments, but also a valid view in the eyes of Japan, and something likely explaining the fact that no other governments had been willing to join Japan and become a donor to the TFHS.

An audit of the TFHS has recently been issued by the Internal Audit Division of the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services. It enables an assessment of whether the problems that I identified are still found in the work of the TFHS.

It turns out that the problems have been dealt with by the auditors. As for the first problem, I quoted in my report figures presented by Fukushima Akiko, indicating a lack of efficiency in the way the TFHS used the financial resources at its disposal. I quoted her to the effect that “in February 2003 ‘the Trust Fund had provided approximately 94.33 million dollars to 74 projects. Thus, projects that have been approved by the Trust Fund account for a little over 50% of the funds available.’ Fukushima speculated that this discouraging experience was due to a lack of awareness among potential recipients of the existence of the TFHS and to the cumbersome application procedure. Second, she found that the projects financed by Japan have ‘not been visible enough to gain international attention’. Since the intention of the Japanese government was to make the TFHS a key vehicle for its ambitions to further human security, Fukushima’s assessment of its performance must be a disappointment.”

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82 Clearly seen in a statement made by Ogata Sadako, in a roundtable talk with Katsumata Makoto, Ogata Sadako, Shioya Takahide, “Ningen no anzen hoshō—Ima, Nihon ni nani ga motomerareru no ka?” [Human security—What is requested from Japan?], NIRA seisaku kenkyū, Vol. 14, No. 10 (2001), pp. 64f.
83 Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, p. 166.
In the audit report, published in January 2010, the problem of efficient use of the financial resources of the TFHS is dealt with. According to the report, the Fund spent US$223 million or 60 percent of its total income during the period 1999–2008.85 Thus, with allocation of available funds still low, the situation after 2003 has not improved. In the audit report one can also find the results of scrutiny of its efficiency in another sense in that “there has been no comprehensive evaluation of the Fund’s activities to determine its impact on the human security programme.”86

The audit report continues: “A number of trust funds and technical cooperation activities are being undertaken by the UN in similar thematic areas and the rationale behind operating a separate trust fund with similar activities remains to be determined.” This fact results in the recommendation that the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) “should initiate a comprehensive evaluation of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security to determine the impact of the human security programme and whether there is a continuing need for a separate trust fund to finance human security activities.”87 Thus, the audit report questions whether the TFHS is really needed. That the first comprehensive evaluation of the fund made by the competent organ in the United Nations results in such a recommendation must be seen as a blow to Japanese ambitions to pursue human security primarily in a UN context.

The recommendation may be linked to the assessment of the second problem identified in my report. According to the audit report, the project approval processes was in need of streamlining: “An efficient review process is essential to expedite the approval and implementation of projects to achieve their objectives in a timely manner. The UNTFHS project approval process took from 12 to 96 weeks to approve project concept notes and proposals.” The slow processing was linked to the project submission process, which had two phases: (a) “a concept note which included the essential intent of the project submitted by the requesting agency to OCHA/HSU”;

86 Ibid., p. 4.
87 Ibid., p. 5.
and (b) “a project proposal developed by the requesting agency subsequent to the approval of the concept note by the UN and the GOJ [Government of Japan].” To illustrate the cumbersome process, a figure in the audit report can be reproduced (Figure 1):

Figure 1: The TFHS Project Review Processes

Source: Office of Internal Oversight Services, Internal Audit Division, Audit report, p. 8.

As seen in Figure 1, a number of parties are involved in the project review process. Apart from the Japanese government, the process involved
OCHA/HSU, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), the Controller’s Office, and the Project Review Committee. When the Guidelines were revised in March 2008 – the fifth time since 2003 – one change undertaken was that the Japanese government no longer undertakes the review of the project proposals at the concept note stage but the fact that Japan was involved in giving clearance to projects was not eliminated.\(^{88}\) This must be said to be awkward since two other countries, Thailand and Slovenia, had joined Japan as donors to the TFHS (later Greece was added as a donor). Although the funds they allocated to the trust fund were rather modest, it meant nevertheless that Japan was no longer the sole donor, which should have been reflected in the decision making process.

This meant that the problem of the review process identified in my report had not been solved. Japan’s eagerness to keep an eye on how the funds are used by the TFHS seems to be as fresh as ever. One reason why the project review process has been so time-consuming has been that the Japanese government “was involved in the concept note and project proposal review phases at one time or another. A review of the concept notes showed that the GOJ [Government of Japan] spent an average of 12 weeks to approve and/or provide its final opinion on the submissions. However, 26 percent of the cases took between 12 weeks to 44 weeks for the completion of the GOJ process. Detailed budgets were often requested by the GOJ at the concept note stage thereby prolonging the approval process.”\(^{89}\)

The audit report recommends that the concept note review should be eliminated as a separate process and the critical steps of this process should be integrated into the project proposal phase. Nevertheless, the Japanese government was slow to act since, according to the audit report, this recommendation “remains open pending the provision by OCHA of documentation showing that OCHA and the GOJ have agreed on and instituted procedures leading to a more efficient review and approval process for projects.”\(^{90}\) What is worse, the audit report quotes the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which is of the view that the review process used “has created significant delays in the project review and approval process resulting in inefficiencies.”\(^{91}\)

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\(^{88}\) Ibid., p. 10.

\(^{89}\) Ibid., pp. 9f; emphasis added.

\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 11.

\(^{91}\) Ibid.
In my interview with Ishihara Takashi of MOFA’s Japan Funds Unit, which handles TFHS matters within the ministry, he revealed that the Japanese foreign ministry had decided to act. According to him, Japan was going to try to address the problems by proposing a revision of the Guidelines for the TFHS at the meeting of the Advisory Board on Human Security in November. If Japan’s proposal was accepted it would mean that Japan would no longer be involved in decision-making but would continue to be a member of the Advisory Board. It would be a change that could seem natural, since Japan had been joined as donor to the TFHS by three other countries, who could ask for the same privileged treatment as Japan, which would make the decision-making process even more cumbersome than before.

According to Ishihara, the reason for revision of the TFHS Guidelines was to make the TFHS multilateral. Thus, it is an attempt to address the third problem identified in my report – that no other governments had joined Japan as sponsor of the TFHS. It is likely that the new Guidelines will improve the possibility that other countries will become donors. With Japan no longer deciding how funds should be allocated, it will be easier for Japan to persuade other UN members to become donors. The situation had already changed when Thailand and Slovenia became donors. However modest their contributions, it was a step forward for the Japanese government and its ambitions to broaden the donor base of the TFHS.

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92 Ishihara, interview.
93 I asked MOFA’s Ishihara about the process by which three countries apart from Japan had become donors to the TFHS. According to him, Ambassador Takasu talked with his counterparts in New York and they accepted the idea that their countries should become donors. Ishihara, interview.
The Evolution of Japan’s Pursuit of “Human Security”

Human Security in Reports Issued by Policymaking Commissions

While the CHS and the TFHS have been the two main instruments used by Japan to further human security, there is a shift in the way in which human security policy has been approached. There is a clear shift in how human security is dealt with in reports by policy-planning and -making commissions tasked with coming up with reports on foreign policy. The first such commission after Obuchi launched human security as a key pursuit for Japan was the Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century, established by Obuchi himself. The 21st Century Commission was to map out “the desirable future direction of Japan to which the next generation of Japanese can aspire in the new century.”94 It was probably no coincidence that the famous report issued by Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi’s Study Group on Comprehensive National Security Commission (1980) was often evoked when the 21st Century Commission was brought up. The report of the Ōhira commission became famous because it launched the concept of “comprehensive security,” which made economic insecurity and non-traditional security concerns important issues in their own right in a comprehensive security agenda context.95 Twenty years later, Obuchi’s 21st Century Commission had been assigned the task of formulating the long-term goals of the Japanese nation.

After ten months of deliberations the 21st Century Commission handed over its report. It discerned a thrust within the international aid community towards “soft” aid, including systemic reform and human resource development, in contrast to the provision of physical structures, which was

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considered Japan’s forte. The Commission came up with comprehensive machinery for managing external relations designed to counter threats to security domestically, bilaterally and regionally, as well as in a global context. It devised a multilayered security framework comprised of four pillars: (1) the Japan–U.S. alliance as the core element of Japan’s preparedness against direct threats; (2) efforts through diplomacy, multilateral structures, and international institutions to build trust and reduce tensions; (3) economic security; and (4) human security designed to ensure the protection of the global environment, the eradication of poverty and hunger, and the protection of human dignity. The Commission indicated that human security would occupy an important place in Japan’s foreign policy: “In the period ahead, even greater energy should be devoted to global issues relating to human security, such as the environment, antipersonnel mines, drugs, earthquakes, refugees, population, food, medical care and AIDS, and these areas should become established as spheres of international activity by Japan.” Its proposals were intended to pave the way for the introduction of human security into foreign policy in the comprehensive way that Prime Minister Obuchi had envisaged. This was not to be, however. Not long after the Commission had presented the results of its efforts, the prime minister was incapacitated by a stroke and a member of the Commission could only tell me that the report had been quietly buried after the prime minister’s untimely death.

The next such report was released by the Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister on November 28, 2002. The Task Force was a group of heavyweights headed by Okamoto Yukio, a former MOFA bureaucrat and special advisor to the government on foreign policy, and it did not mince its words: “For Japan’s foreign policy in its development from now, Japan must formulate clear strategies as a state, which have been lacking so far. The basis of all strategy is ‘national interest’. Without a debate on

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96 Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century, The Frontier Within, pp. 164f.
97 Ibid., Ch. 6.
98 Ibid., p. 160.
99 Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, p. 236.
the national interest it is impossible to set a course for the nation.” The Task Force argued that Japanese ODA should be directly linked to Japanese national interests, with ODA classified into: (1) ODA directly related to national interest; and (2) ODA which Japan should shoulder as a member of the international community. ODA was described as a means of helping the poor but also as a political key to stabilize Japan’s international environment and to contribute to the political stability of East Asian countries, which contributed to Japan’s safety as well.

In its extensive discussion of security, the Task Force not only worked with the traditional national security concept but also other security concepts, like energy security and food security – the latter one of the categories listed by the UNDP’s 1994 report – and did not bring up or mention human security, despite it having been a high-profile idea on the political agenda of the two prime ministers immediately preceding the incumbent Koizumi. Implicitly, the saga of human security as a “pillar” of foreign policy was over in the eyes of the Task Force.

That this was the case was confirmed beyond doubt by the report released shortly afterwards by another policy-planning group, the Group on International Peace Cooperation, which had been established by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo to advise him on future Japanese cooperation for international peace and was chaired by Akashi Yasushi, a former ambassador to the UN and a leading official of the world organization. The assignment of the Group was a follow-up to Prime Minister Koizumi’s statement in May 2002 that “the government of Japan will consider how to increase our international role by providing an added pillar for the consolidation of peace and nation building.” It is notable that when the group was asked to come up with such a “pillar,” this group of eminencies did not refer to human security, to which the two prime ministers immediately preceding Koizumi, Obuchi Keizō and Mori Yoshirō, had assigned the role of “pillar” of Japanese foreign policy. To the limited extent that “human secu-

102 Ibid.
curity” figures in the report, it is in the context of the TFHS, which is brought up twice. That the human security concept was not given a place in the report was a clear indication that the days when human security was seen as a key concept of foreign policy were over.

Human Security in the Diplomatic Bluebook

Both the report of the CHS and the reform of Japan’s ODA policy were launched in 2003 and can be seen as having finalized the introductory phase of Japan’s policy for human security; now the implementation phase commenced. In an administrative move to ensure success, Ogata Sadako was appointed president of JICA on October 1, 2003. Her appointment was unusual in that it came at the age of 76, a fact testifying to the respect she commanded. The former UNHCR and co-chair of the CHS at the rudder was widely expected not only to appeal to the domestic and international audiences but also to support the implementation of the new human-security flavored ODA policies.

The new phase that Japan’s human security policy entered can be seen in the way the human security concept and ideas have been handled by the government authority responsible for implementing this policy. In order to clarify policy-making, the annual reports on foreign policy issued by the Japanese government have also been analyzed. The annual report on foreign policy, Gaikō seisho [The diplomatic bluebook], is a key official source to Japan’s foreign policy. It surveys foreign policy and has been issued by the Japanese foreign ministry since 1957. The way human security has been

104 Shushō kantei [Prime Minister’s Office], “‘Kokusai heiwa kyōryoku kondankai’ hōkokusho (an)” [The report of the Group on International Peace Cooperation (proposal)], December 18, 2002, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kokusai/dai6/6gijisidai.html. The materials used by the Group are reproduced on the homepage of the Prime Minister’s Office. Scrutinizing them, I found that the concept of human security appears only twice in the memos and surveys produced for the Group as a foundation for its deliberations, confirming that human security was no longer a concept that counted among policymakers, at least not among those who were members of the Group.


dealt with in this annual report reflects the prevailing view in the foreign ministry on human security and its place in Japan’s overall foreign policy.

As can be expected after Obuchi’s speeches in 1998, first as foreign minister and then as prime minister, the new security concept was introduced into the 1999 issue of the *Diplomatic bluebook*. In subsequent issues, a meandering can be seen in the way human security is dealt with from issue to issue, both as to the context and the length at which it is dealt with. Based on the *Diplomatic bluebook*, the human security policy pursued by the Japanese government can be divided into phases. The first phase follows Obuchi’s launch of human security as a main concern of Japan’s foreign policy. In the issues for 1999 and 2000, human security is treated in the second chapter on the international situation, in the introduction of the third subsection entitled “Towards the realization of a better global society.” The 1999 issue discusses is a range of issues that need to be addressed from the perspective of human security, focusing on the individual, and, furthermore, that governments, international organizations, and civil society need to cooperate.107

A second phase begins with the issue for 2001. Compared with the previous two editions, human security has been moved to the introductory chapter. While it is the seventh and last topic dealt with, its new location in the yearbook is a clear indication that human security has a higher priority than previously. It does not seem too farfetched to think that this is a result of Tanaka Makiko having taken over as foreign minister.108

Human security continued to be dealt with in the introductory chapter in the 2002 edition, but it had been moved to the sixth subsection of the sixth section on “Important processes of international society.” Thus, human security no longer has its own section, which indicates that it has a lower priority with the new foreign minister, Kawaguchi Yoriko. The lower priority is confirmed by the fact that human security is not a “pillar” of Japan’s foreign policy, as it had been described under Obuchi Keizō and Mori Yoshirō, but a “key perspective.”109 In the 2003 edition the lower priority assigned to human security is even clearer. Human security is moved from the introductory chapter to the third chapter on “Foreign policy areas”

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and is now found in the sixth subsection of the third section, “Processes of global matters.”

From 2004 to 2006, human security continues to be dealt with in the chapter on areas of Japan’s foreign policy. But there is a distinct difference compared with the previous editions in that no less than 18 pages are allotted to it in both the 2004 and 2005 editions, and 12 pages in the 2006 edition. This massive presentation is notable, given the fact that the 2003 ODA policy reform had made human security a matter of ODA policy and no longer a part of foreign policy. The policy change would seem to make it reasonable to discuss human security in the section on ODA, but this is not the case in the issues for 2004–2006, when human security and ODA continue to be treated separately.

A change is seen in the issue for 2007, when human security is brought up in the section on ODA, as the second sub-sub-section of the ninth subsection, “The promotion of international cooperation,” of the third chapter on “Foreign policy in different fields.” Still, it has its own section, which is also the case in the next issue for 2008, although then it appears far down the list of issue areas brought up – figuring as the 1st sub-sub-sub-sub-section of the 2nd sub-sub-sub-section of the 4th sub-sub-section of the 2nd section of the third chapter. Thus, although human security continues to be brought up, the priority allotted to it is far from that seen at the beginning of the decade, when it was a matter dealt with in its own right in the introductory chapter of the Diplomatic bluebook. The foreign minister in the Obuchi cabinet, Kōmura Masataka, had returned to the post but the zeal for human security that he had shown as the key foreign policy official under Obuchi was nowhere to be seen.

The downgrading of human security continued with the issues of the Diplomatic bluebook for 2009 and 2010. In the 2009 issue, human security has become one concern among others. It is brought up only intermittently, with no special section devoted to it, not even some sub-sub-sub-sub-section as in the previous issue. Human security figures only in references, completing its sliding down the priority ladder. Obuchi’s vision of human security as a pillar of Japan’s foreign policy for the 21st century was gone.

Since the reform of Japan’s ODA policy in 2003 made human security a matter of ODA policy, the above information about how human security has been dealt with in the annual reports on foreign policy should be
complemented with data on ODA. The publication in the field of ODA policy that is a counterpart of the *Diplomatic bluebook* is the *Seifu kaihatsu enjō (ODA) hakusho* [The ODA white paper], issued by the foreign ministry.\(^{110}\)

Going through the issues released after Obuchi elevated human security onto the political agenda shows that human security has been dealt with in a way that differs from the *Diplomatic bluebook*. An increasing focus on human security can be noted. The 1999 issue includes a section on “Human security and ODA.” There is a fairly smooth increase from 2001 (there is no issue for 2000) to 2004 in the number of pages on which human security figures, a jump upwards in the 2005 issue, an upsurge in 2007 and 2008, and a decrease in 2009.\(^{111}\)

The jump upwards for human security in the 2005 issue of the *ODA White Paper* and the upsurges in the issues for 2007 and 2008 indicate that the position of human security as an underpinning and key concept and idea of Japan’s ODA policy was solidifying. While the presence of human security dwindles in the successive issues of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, the opposite is seen in the *ODA White Paper*. The upsurge seen from 2005 is easily explained by the fact that Ogata Sadako assumed the post of president of JICA, when Japan’s ODA policy was revised, and she was given the task of implementing the new policy. As she was a leading proponent of human security both in Japan and internationally, her appointment was a natural step.

\(^{110}\) In 1999 the annual Japanese ODA report was renamed the ODA White Paper.

\(^{111}\) MOFA, *Seifu kaihatsu enjō (ODA) hakusho: Nihon no keizai kyōryoku* [The ODA White Paper: Japan’s economic cooperation] (Tokyo: MOFA, 2001–2009), Indices. The number of references to human security from 2001 to 2009 is: 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 10, 21, 40, and 27, respectively. The same pattern, although flatter, is seen for references to the TFHS.
The “Life Story” of the Idea and Concept of Human Security

The above analysis of how the pursuit of human security has fared in policymaking reports and key governmental reports clarifies that human security is an idea that has undergone a process of downgrading. What can be said to be “the life story” of human security in the Japanese context started off as a vision of Japan’s foreign policy of one politician and for some years being a lodestar of Japan’s foreign policy, only to shrink to become one concept among others in the ODA policy. The evolution of the status of this security concept and idea boils down to four phases (Table 1).

Table 1 The Life Story of “Human Security,” 1999–

| Phase 1: 1999–2000 | A pillar-to-be of Japan’s long-term foreign policy |
| Phase 2: 2001–2003 | A priority of Japan’s foreign policy |
| Phase 3: 2004–2006 | A pillar of Japan’s ODA policy |
| Phase 4: 2007– | One of five key concepts of Japan’s ODA policy |

This life story of human security is reflected in the scholarly literature. When *Sengo Nihon gaikōshi* [A history of postwar Japanese foreign policy] edited by Iokibe Makoto was issued in 1999, it was immediately recognized as an authoritative work, and quickly gained a reputation as a standard work. It has been issued in two updated editions in 2006 and 2010. In the first edition, human security is included, despite the fact that the book was issued in March 1999, only a few months after Obuchi’s two important speeches in December 1998 whereby he launched human security as a key endeavor of Japan’s foreign policy. It is reasonable to conjecture that the surprisingly quick inclusion of human security in this authoritative history of Japan’s postwar foreign policy was because of Iokibe’s position as a key advisor to Obuchi on foreign policy. In the second and third editions, human security does not figure, indicating that, after all, Obuchi’s initiative

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had been found not to have secured a place in the historical annals of Japan’s foreign policy.

Five years after the first edition of Iokibe’s book, *Ningen no anzen hoshō: Sekai kiki e no chōsen* [Human security: Meeting global challenges] (2004) edited by Satō Makoto and Andō Tsugio was released. It gives a broad presentation of human security in the Japanese context. In his introduction, Satō claims that the book will *inter alia* deal with how human security has been introduced into the foreign policy of Japan as well as Canada, two countries known as the leading proponents of human security.114 A reader will find that the chapter on Canada deals with human security as an element of its foreign policy. This is not the case with the chapter on Japan, however, which does not deal with foreign policy but Japan’s *enjō gaikō*, “aid diplomacy.”115

Still, five years later, a new full-bodied presentation of human security was issued, *Ningen no anzen hoshō: Kokka chūshinshugi o koete* [Human Security: beyond state centrism] (2009), edited by Mushakōji Kinhide, a leading scholar in Japan on the subject. In this book, Satō Makoto has contributed a chapter on “Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon gaikō seisaku” [Human security and Japan’s foreign policy]. His treatment is interesting in that the sources on which he bases his analysis are from the initial years of the millennium, with only two exceptions – one source is from 2005 and deals with the Hurricane Katrina and another is from 2006, dealing with Japan’s activities in Iraq.116 As can be understood from the titles of these two sources, what the author brings up is not central to his presentation of human security in a Japanese perspective, which might be seen as an indication that he has not found it worthwhile to use sources issued after 2004 dealing with human security as an element of Japanese foreign policy.

There is a paradoxical aspect of Japan’s pursuit of human security. In Japan’s foreign policy rhetoric, human security has continued to be portrayed as a key element of foreign policy also after it had been made a part of Japan’s ODA policy, that is, by definition, no longer a part of Japan’s foreign policy. There is a mixed view in e.g. the issues of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, in which human security continued for years to be dealt with as part of foreign policy, not ODA policy, even after 2003, the year after the ODA reform, which made it a concern for ODA policy and not foreign policy. That this description lingers on is easy to understand, however. ODA is handled by the foreign ministry. MOFA is no exception to the rule that no bureaucracy wants to be stripped of its powers or funds. In a situation where funds allocated to ODA constituted the largest budget post for the MOFA, ODA fatigue was spreading and MOFA’s reputation was occasionally tarnished because of scandals and corruption incidents, it made sense for the ministry to make good use of such an attractive concept as human security. Giving the MOFA policy a new label gave the impression that the government had come up with a new policy that differed from the previous one.\(^\text{117}\) There were spin-offs at both the institutional and the national level.

**Institutional Level**

Considering the ministry itself and its officials, there were rewards to be accrued. Human security meant increased allocation of resources for MOFA and the bigger budget meant increased status in the government bureaucracy, and vice versa. Better career opportunities were generated for officials, especially for those in the middle echelon of the ministry’s occupational ladder. In a sense, this fits Johan Galtung’s view that “while ‘Human Security’ may represent a genuine epistemological paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense, from earlier security thinking, it may also be a tactical ploy by a younger

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\(^{117}\) Kurusu Kaoru, “Ningen anzen hoshō ‘kiseki’ no keisei to gurobaru-gavānansu” [The creation of “the track record” of human security and global governance], *Kokusai seiji*, No. 143 (November 2005), p. 83.
generation of aspiring academics and bureaucrats to advance their own careers, easing out the ‘exhausted managers of exhausted paradigms’.”

After the reorganization of Japan’s ODA policy, the implementation of its human security policy was taken over by JICA, headed by the respected Ogata Sadako. In my interview of Ogata, she did not object to my conclusion that human security was no longer a matter of foreign policy per se from around 2003–04, when it had been transferred to ODA policy. In a quite a remarkable extension, this authority on Japan’s pursuit of human security added that human security has never been of central importance to MOFA. Her astounding statement throws light on the claim made by human-security insiders, whom I interviewed on the conditions of anonymity. They claimed that the foreign ministry is divided when it comes to human security. Some ministry officials are ardent supporters and proponents of human security, some say even propagandists, while others are negative. This is probably what lingered behind Ishihara Takeshi’s comment, when I asked him about his view of Vice-minister Yanai Shunji’s response in 1999, when State-Secretary Lars Danielsson of the Swedish Cabinet Office proposed collaboration between Sweden and Japan on human security and Yanai was non-committal, that is, declined the invitation. Ishihara’s laconic comment was that “all in the Gaimushō do not know human security that well.”

National Level

To keep on propagating the idea that the pursuit of human security was still part of foreign policy, even when it had been transferred to ODA policy, fitted a recent trend in Japanese foreign policymaking where it is argued that Japan should pursue its national interest and not shy away from announcing it. It was argued that the main criterion for ODA allocation is its use as a tool to promote Japan’s national interests as well as its own security

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119 Ogata, interview.
120 See my interview with Danielsson, referred to in Edström, Japan and the Challenge of Human Security, pp. 105f.
121 Ishihara, interview.
Japan’s pursuit of human security fits such a context. It is a policy area in which Japan can excel. That it is a security concept made it also reasonable for Japanese representatives to claim that the pursuit of human security made Japan engage in international security, despite its constitutional constraints, which are seen to almost inhibit Japanese participation in traditional military-based security operations. This explicit reference to national interest can be interpreted both as an expression of increasing assertiveness on the part of Japanese decision-makers and as a response to the concerns of Japanese taxpayers over the use of tax money for ODA in a situation with rising fiscal deficits and debt.

A key aspect has also been aid visibility. Human security motivated aid and grass-roots assistance made Japan very visible in the field, as an experienced Japanese diplomat has proudly reported.

As a result of the debacle that Japan’s foreign policy was perceived to have encountered in the 1991 Gulf War, the government and MOFA made endeavors to repair the damage. For them, human security was a useful, attractive slogan that came in handy for easing the prevalent negative feelings among Japanese against their own country that are a legacy of Japan’s harassment of its neighbors before and during World War II. The introduction of the human security concept, which enlarges the scope of security-related activities into social and economic dimensions, could be seen as covering up the shortfall of Japan’s policy toward collective security.

According to an ODA policy specialist, human security was useful for the Japanese government when it wanted to increase ODA and send Self-Defense personnel overseas. One of Japan’s leading international law specialists, Yokota Yōzō, argues along this line. Since Japan has restrictions in dealing with traditional security matters for constitutional reasons, he says, the pursuit of human security seemed to open the prospects for Japan to

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127 Ōkuma, interview.
play a larger role in international security. He does not hesitate to claim that the aim behind Japan’s campaign for human security was its ambition to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In the 1990s Japan used its ODA to gain international recognition of its leadership and the campaign for human security that Obuchi initiated continued this endeavor. Given the constitutional constraints and pacifist tradition that inhibit too much activism, this international campaign was a move in its effort to play a greater role on international security. A token of that would be a permanent seat on the Security Council.

In the eyes of Yokota, the use of human security as an argument for Japan to play a bigger role in international security and in the United Nations had its heyday during the discussion on UN reform that peaked 2004–05. Key players in the latter context were African countries, together representing a voting bloc of over 50 countries. They were dependent on ODA and Japan tried to come up with ways to increase ODA to African countries. For Japan, it was of no concern if the money went straight into the pockets of leaders. As long as they were happy because of the increased ODA, it served the Japanese purpose. The African countries told Japan that they did not disagree with Japan having a seat on the Security Council but insisted on Africa having a seat, too, and veto rights, a stance that Japan supported. When the campaign failed, the interest in human security of the Japanese foreign ministry decreased.

The validity of Yokota’s claim is hard to judge, however. Maybe the way human security neatly fits Japan’s ambitions on the international arena, being a country that for constitutional reasons cannot, or, at least, has great problems in, “putting boots on the grounds,” if they are military – doctors, etc. would be no problems – may seem to make it the obvious reason. The problem is that this is a reason that cannot be verified or falsified. According to Nasukawa Toshiyuki, who deals with this question in his dissertation, high-ranking MOFA officials have categorically denied that Japan’s drive for human security was to support its bid for a seat in the Security Council.

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128 Yokota Yōzō, Professor, Chūō University, Tokyo, interview by author, September 10, 2010.
130 Yokota, interview.
131 Nasukawa, “‘Ningen no anzen hoshō’ no kiseki to tenkai,” p. 94.
Yokota dismisses such denials. The Japanese government would *never* admit that the UNSC seat was the motive for the simple reason that it would undermine the whole campaign. If you put together all the evidence, he says, the puzzle will show that the motive behind Japan’s drive for human security has been its interest in a permanent seat in the UNSC. A well-known commentator, the political scientist Soeya Yoshihide, agrees with this view and finds that pursuing human security makes sense for a Japan that wants to participate in international security and has ambitions to enter the Security Council.¹³²

One aspect may indicate that Yokota and other supporters of this view are on the right track. From the “life story” of human security as laid bare above, it seems undeniable that the pertinence of the concept receded some years into the new millennium. Using Yokota’s expression, the drive for human security “lost steam” roughly at the same time as Japan’s campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council ended in failure in 2005. This might be an indication that Japan’s preference for working for promoting human security together with the United Nations was a move in its UNSC campaign. This would be a neat explanation for the fact that collaboration with NGOs domestically, and other countries internationally, did not materialize, despite a lot of rhetorical steam. A hint that the foreign ministry has abdicated from whatever ambitions it may have had of being a key actor on human security is that there are only two ministry officials working full-time on human security,¹³³ and the specially assigned human security ambassador is no longer appointed. Whatever Japan is doing in the field is largely taken care of by JICA.

Japan’s failure in its campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council affected its drive for human security on the international scene, according to Ōkuma Hiroshi. According to him, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have replaced human security as the key concept of Japan’s ODA policy. In fact, he goes as far as claiming that human security has become a sub-concept under the MDGs, which have replaced HS as the attractive concept. The situation is now one where Japan aims at contrib-

¹³² Soeya Yoshihide, *Nihon no "midoru pawā" gaikō: Sengo Nihon no sentaku to kōsō* [Japan’s “middle power” diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s choices and conceptions] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2005), p. 211.
¹³³ Ishihara, interview.
uting to development and post-conflict building but no longer under the banner of human security but the MDGs.\textsuperscript{134}

The collapsed campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council was a setback for Japan’s strategy of working with the UN and its programs and organizations in the pursuit of human security. It had implications for Japan’s international policy. One of the more weighty ones was that it was also a setback for Japanese ambitions to play a leadership role on the international stage. For constitutional and other reasons, Japan cannot carve out a leadership role based on capacity or power, but human security fitted Japan’s ambitions to exert entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership.\textsuperscript{135} According to two key administrators of the Japanese policy for human security, the pursuit of human security was seen to make it possible for Japan to make “a great contribution” intellectually and financially to international society. It constituted a rejuvenation of checkbook diplomacy and enabled the country to take the initiative to participate in rulemaking in a global context.\textsuperscript{136} The human security symposiums, workshops and meetings that Japan organized were hoped to project the image that human security was under the leadership of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{137}

To what extent has this hope materialized? Two facts brought up in the report auditing the TFHS should be a cause for concern for Japan. The auditors state that: (1) “Although much has been achieved in promoting the human security concept through funding projects, the concept has still not been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as a core area of programme activities.” This indicates that the human security concept has not gained the broad-based support in the United Nations that had been an ambition both of Japan and UN’s former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. (2) “From a review of the project documents, it was not clear whether the agencies receiving resources from the Fund had integrated the concept in their overall programme strategy or were attempting to fulfill a unique requirement arising from human security activities.”\textsuperscript{138} In other words, the auditors

\textsuperscript{134} Ōkuma, interview.
\textsuperscript{136} Tase Kazuo and Takemi Keizō, “Ningen no anzen hoshō to Nihon no yakuwari” [Human security and Japan’s role], in Tōkai daigaku heiwakenryaku kokusai kenkyūsho, ed., \textit{21 seiki no ningen no anzen hoshō} [Human security of the 21st century] (Tokyo: Tōkai daigaku shuppankai, 2005), pp. 147f.
\textsuperscript{137} Yamasaki, “A Study of Middle Power Diplomacy,” pp. 154f.
\textsuperscript{138} Office of Internal Oversight Services, Internal Audit Division, Audit report, p. 4.
had not been able to ascertain whether funds allocated to projects by the TFHS had made recipients promote human security or adopt the concept in their program strategy. Given the defused language in the audit report, this is close to a devastating criticism loaded at the working of the TFHS, indicating that Japan’s ambitions of human security missionizing have not scored.

Thus, it can be asked, as the UN auditors do, whether the reason behind Japan’s interest in creating a trust fund on human security, that is, to promote human security, has been realized. There is still a need “to determine the impact of the TFHS to promote human security” according to the audit report. It is indicated in the report that the UN’s Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) “advised the HSU to undertake an evaluation of the UNTFHS two years from that date (at the earliest),” the reason for the slow action being that “the first projects which used the new guidelines in their formulation only started in 2006/07 and have either just been completed or are expected to be completed within the next couple of years.” The dry comment from the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is that “there is no need to wait for another two years to carry out this evaluation as UNTFHS has completed its tenth year with over $223 million in expenditures.”

A reader of the report might be inclined to suspect that the slow action contemplated by the ABHS might be that such an evaluation would show that there is no need for a special body for human security such as TFHS and that its activities could be taken over by other competent organs in the UN system. However, the question is whether Japan would continue to allocate resources that have so far gone to the TFHS in a situation with continuing cuts of Japanese ODA and, furthermore, an “ODA bashing” is seen in Japan in the wake of the “ODA fatigue.”

Even worse, the front figure for the movement for human security in Japan, Ogata Sadako, is facing an “Ogata bashing” in the wake of the displeasure of laymen at the waste of taxpayers’ money revealed by the budget screening process initiated by the Hatoyama government. According to an ODA policy specialist, when criticism is tar-

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139 Ibid., p. 5.
141 The existence of the “Ogata bashing” was mentioned by a very well informed Japanese specialist on international affairs in a conversation we had in July 2010. When asked, others claim they are not aware of any such campaign. On the budget screening process
geting the governmental agency JICA with its too well paid officials, this criticism hits also the JICA president.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{142} Ōkuma, interview.


\textsuperscript{142} Ōkuma, interview.
Concluding Remarks

How has Obuchi’s vision of human security as a key underpinning of Japan’s long-term foreign policy fared? As foreign and later prime minister he spoke up for the necessity of securing human security in a way that made him become a prolific protagonist on the international stage for the human security cause. He did not limit himself to indulging in rhetoric only but took the initiative to create a practical tool for implementing his vision in a multilateral context, the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS). Obuchi’s launch of human security as an important pursuit for Japan might have been seen as modest at the time but, with his speeches in 1998 on human security, he put in place a vision of human security as a key idea for Japan’s foreign policy. His untimely death left it to others to realize his vision.

What has been the result of the undertaking to promote human security that Obuchi initiated? Referring to what MOFA states on its homepage, Michi Yamasaki has summarized the main “achievements” of Japan’s pursuit of human security as: (1) Japan provided about three hundred million dollars to establish TFHS; (2) the Japanese government supported and hosted the CHS; (3) the ODA and JICA projects are planned in accordance with the idea of human security; and (4) the Japanese government established and supported the Friends of Human Security.143 A similar inventory is presented by Toyoshima Naoko, who lists the results as: (1) the TFHS; (2) the CHS; (3) [human security] symposiums; and (4) the Friends of Human Security.144 It is notable that both Yamasaki and Toyoshima do not present actual achievements but list the allocation of money and/or the establishment of institutions.

It was a decisive moment when human security was made a concern of ODA policy and thus no longer a matter of foreign policy per se. Since Obuchi’s vision boiled down to human security as a “pillar” of foreign policy, its transformation to a matter of ODA policy meant not only that the foundation of his foreign policy vision evaporated but also the vision itself. Human security has moved from being a “pillar-to-be” of Japan’s long-term foreign

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144 Toyoshima, “Ningen no anzen hoshō seisaku ni miru Nihon no shisei,” p. 80.
policy under Obuchi and Mori, via being a “pillar” of ODA policy, to ending up as one aspect along others taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of Japan’s ODA policy.

This scaling down of the importance of human security is not unique to Japan. A similar degrading of the pursuit of human security can be noted in the case of Canada. In 1996, human security was introduced into Canadian foreign policy by the new foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. With him at the helm, Canada became a human security crusader. Human security came to more or less constitute the lock, stock, and barrel of Canadian foreign policy. In his recent analysis, George MacLean shows, however, that Axworthy’s successor John Manley downplayed human security almost immediately when he took over in 2000, and human security was replaced as the key Canadian concern by closer security relations with the United States – the Conservative government of Stephen Harper eschewed the term entirely. The shift in policy seen when Manley took over exemplifies the well-known tendency that the successor of a government or a minister might de-emphasize or reject his predecessor’s policies, and an experienced foreign policy practitioner goes even as far as claiming that new leaders “as a rule” say that they advocate new goals and new perspectives. In an empirical study of succession in democracies, as well as in socialist countries, for example, Bunce demonstrated that the election of a new leader means that the policy implemented by the government is affected and she concluded, “Who rules does indeed make a difference.”

This shift in Canadian policy away from human security occurred in 2000 and, thus, preceded “9/11,” which further pushed the Canadian government to stress the importance of relations with the United States.

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145 Bernard, Jr., “Canada and Human Security.”
149 MacLean, “Interest and Internationalism in Foreign Policy,” pp. 16f. In my interview with Osa Yukie, she told of a discussion that she had had relatively recently with
The shift in Japanese foreign policy away from human security came later than in the case of Canada. It seems reasonable to argue that it was the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that paved the way for the policy change. The shifts of Canadian and Japanese human security policies resemble each other, in that human security was eliminated as a concept used in Canada’s post-Axworthy foreign policy and scaled down in Japan’s post-Obuchi-Mori foreign policy.

There is a significant difference between Japan and Canada. Maclean’s analysis makes it clear that in Canada’s post-Axworthy foreign policy, human security was thoroughly eliminated at the rhetorical level and in many ways became anathema to Canadian governments – it was even removed from the Foreign Affairs website – but, at the same time, at the operational level it was very much still around, since Canada’s human security agenda “encapsulated much of the tradition of foreign policy.” However, while Canada’s post-Axworthy foreign policy avoided Axworthy’s pet concept, Japan continued to advance under the banner of Obuchi’s pet concept, albeit human security was now one of the underpinnings of ODA policy and no longer the lodestar and vision of foreign policy it had been to Obuchi and Mori.

That Obuchi’s foreign policy vision has evaporated does not, of course, mean that the concept and idea of human security as a key concern of Japan’s international policy has come to an end, but it is no longer a vision guiding foreign policy as it was to Obuchi and Mori. Human security no longer holds the center stage in the way they and other ardent human security protagonists planned and hoped for. Notwithstanding the frequency of claims that human security is a “pillar,” or “leitmotif,” etc. of Japan’s foreign policy, such claims do not reflect the actual state of Japanese foreign policy. It was certainly correct for a while after Obuchi put human security onto the political agenda and Mori continued this effort, but ceased to be some years ago.

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a representative of the Canadian embassy in Tokyo. Human security came up and the diplomat had revealed that until recently it was a concept that had come out of use and only recently could be used again by Canadian diplomats. Osa interview.


151 For the scaling down of Japan’s human security rhetoric that came with Koizumi, see ibid., pp. 127–35.

152 MacLean, “Interest and Internationalism in Foreign Policy,” p. 17.

153 Ibid., p. 20.
into the new millennium. The view that human security is a key concept of Japan’s foreign policy must be seen as a political relict.

That this is the case is, I think, a great mistake on part of Japan as an international actor that can be blamed on Japanese foreign policy decision-makers and officials. Its negative effects can be seen on Japan’s reputation in the world, signified in e.g. its position in the world body par excellence, the United Nations. Japan has long seen itself as a natural permanent member of the Security Council. The customary argument for such a seat has been Japan’s financial contribution. Writing as early as 1980, such a prominent Japanese official working in the world organization as Ogata Sadako saw no reason to hide the fact that it was Japan’s financial contribution that was a key inspiration for its wish to become a permanent member of the Security Council.154 But this argument led to the criticism that Japan was trying to buy a seat in the Security Council and was not willing to also contribute through policies and ideas.155 What Japan needs are ideas of how to work for peace and solve conflicts. Human security is such a concept and idea, and when it was launched by the UNDP, Japanese officials and policymakers grabbed hold of it eagerly. Pushing for this novel concept might help Japan present itself as a norm entrepreneur, filling the bottle that was so empty – Japanese ideas of how the world could and should be run. Although the origin of the human security idea and the security thinking it represents does not originate in Japan, Japanese officials liked to depict it as “Made in Japan.”156 Ikeda Josuke describes human security discourse as an “assembly line” process where foreign ideas are imported, relevant parts are put together and modified in a way that fits Japanese needs.157 In 2003, Foreign Minister

154 Ogata Sadako, Kokuren kara no shiten: “Kokusai shakai to Nihon” o kangaeru [From the UN viewpoint: Thinking about “the international system and Japan”] (Tokyo: Asahi ibuningu nyūsusha, 1980), p. 23.
Kawaguchi Yoriko emphasized that the ODA policies, which have been conducted by Japan from 1954, shared basic ideas with the human security even before the concept of “human security” appeared and received attention as a “new” concept. When Japan’s campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council failed, it also had repercussions on how Japan’s policymakers and officials viewed this new security idea. Yokota Yōzō argues forcefully that Japan scrapped its drive for human security, when the campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council failed in 2005. This may or may not be true. But the above analysis shows beyond doubt that Japan’s pursuit of human security has been scaled down and that Obuchi Keizō’s vision has evaporated.

For Japan as an international actor, this is a pity. Regardless of its constitutional inhibitions, or, rather because of its pacifist constitution, Japan is a natural member of the Security Council. After all, Japan is a country that in the preamble of its venerated constitution declares that a fundamental idea of the nation is human security, plain and simple: “We [the Japanese people] recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” It is a paradox of Japanese foreign policy that the basis for its policy for human security has not been brought back by its proponents to its roots in the constitution that this policy actually could be argued as having. Human security is a concept that was born in the 1990s but the idea is much older and belongs to the same tradition that gave birth to the Japanese constitution. The Japanese policy for human security could be argued to have its roots in this tradition and in the country’s constitution, enabling Japan to appear on the world stage with a clear and convincing message that while the concept of human security might not be “made in Japan,” its very idea is part and parcel of the credo that is postwar Japan’s.

158 Kawaguchi Yoriko, “Henka suru anzen hoshō kankyō to Nihon gaikō” [The changing national security environment and Japan’s foreign policy], Ronza, No. 94 (March 2003), p. 189.
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