Dry Peace: Syria – Israel and the Water of the Golan

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Introduction

A popular anecdote in the Middle East, coined by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, is that ‘no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace possible without Syria’ (Daoudy, 2008:215). This paper will focus mainly on the prospect of peace between Israel and Syria.

Despite some brief interludes of optimism in the early 1990s, the history of conflict and mistrust between Israel and Syria, the ongoing occupation of the Golan Heights, and periodic hostilities mean that a durable peace between them remains a distant prospect. Throughout the last two decades of official and unofficial peace talks between Israel and Syria, the position and concerns of each party to reach peace have become evident. The Syrians insist on a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, captured in 1967, down to the 4 June 1967 line, which would allow Syrian access to the Sea of Galilee/Lake Tiberias. Israeli leaders have stated their demand of keeping the Syrians off the water of the Lake and their intention to withdraw along the international border line of 1923, although it seems at least some of them do realise that the Syrian pre-condition of full withdrawal has to be fulfilled. Indeed, the stumbling block obstructing the implementation of an Israeli-Syrian peace deal is the disputed area between the 1923 international border line and the 1967 pre-war (4 June 1967) line. Although small in size, this area carries a most significant and strategic position involving water access, sovereignty and control. This has been regarded as the sticking point through the two-decade period of negotiations (Muslih, 1993:613; Renger, 1998:49).

Recently, the American administration had taken up the idea of creating a peace park in the Golan Heights as a way of resolving the Israeli-Syrian conflict particularly in the area between the 1923 and 1967 lines in the north-eastern sector of Lake Tiberias.

This paper will explore this idea, which in the past has been put forward by government officials and political analysts alike as a possible means to accommodate Syrian and Israeli concerns. In order to determine the viability of this project I shall analyse the literature regarding the utilisation of natural resources both for conflict propagation and as catalysts for lasting cooperation and conflict resolution. Then I will present a brief history of the Syrian-Israeli peace process and describe why previous peace talks have failed. Finally, I shall describe the status quo in the Golan Heights today and the discourse of environmental peace-building through the suggested proposal of a peace park along the shores of Lake Tiberias.

I will argue that while a peace park is not the panacea to the conflict existing today between Israel and Syria, within a context of comprehensive peace agreements such a project can ameliorate the concerns of both parties and provide a platform for confidence building and a way to overcome the problem of sovereignty in this particular area.
Environmental peacemaking and its prospects for the Israeli – Syrian track

With a plethora of literature accentuating the inevitability of conflict and war over environmental resources, the notion of employing the environment as a catalyst for peace has been deemed unrealistic. Water has been presented in the literature as being a reason for war and conflict (Cooley, 1984; Bulloch and Darwish, 1993; Falkenmark 1992; Gleick, 1993). Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is quoted as saying, ‘The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics’ (Wolf, 2007:214). Kofi Annan, another former UN Secretary General, said in 2001 that ‘fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future’ while also stressing that the ‘water problems of our world need not be only a cause of tension; they can also be a catalyst for cooperation... if we work together, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours’ (Ibid.). According to researchers at Oregon State University, of the 37 actual military conflicts over water since 1950, 32 took place in the Middle East; 30 of them involved Israel and its Arab neighbours. Of those, practically all were over the Jordan River and its tributaries, which supply millions of people with water for drinking, bathing, and farming (Amery, 2002:313; Wolf, 2007:260).

However, the Oregon State University research also concluded that there is a greater probability of cooperation rather than conflict over shared water (Wolf, 2007:260). A total of 1,831 water-related events that occurred between states in the years 1948-1999 were investigated, yet two-thirds resulted in cooperation and the vast majority of the remaining did not escalate to more than verbal arguments. Only the 37 incidents mentioned above reached an acute conflict level, 30 of which involved Israel and one or several of its neighbours (Wolf, et al 2003:39).

Traditional peace agreements have failed to acknowledge the role of unconventional factors in fostering a meaningful and sustainable peace. The scepticism is rooted in the idea that issues of low politics (i.e., welfare, economic growth) will have little impact and influence on issues of high politics (i.e., national security). Thus, much attention has been diverted from the cooperative essence of environmental cooperation and the lack of interest from policymakers and scholars has undermined its potential (Weinthal, 2006: 2-4). Opponents of realist doctrine argue that scarcity does not necessarily lead to conflict among states; it is often due to scarcity that states tend to cooperate. Environmental problems and degradation increase the pressure on parties to cooperate (Brock, 1991:408, Carius, 2007:70).

Environmental issues took centre stage in the 21st century as factors influencing and shaping peace, state security and economic development. The literature is filled with attempts to analyse the inherent relationship between environmental scarcity and rising levels of tension and insecurity in various regions. Moreover, research
has been done on how the interdependence of countries or regions with respect to scarce natural resources can foster cooperative management schemes which will eliminate the threats of insecurity and replace it with an atmosphere of mutual trust, sustainability and more holistic approaches to problem solving (Dabelko, 2006:6). In the post–war phase of reconciliation and peace-building, a key part of a successful peace agreement is the integration of environmental issues and natural resources within peace-building efforts (UNEP, 2009:8). Its contribution to dialogue, cooperation and confidence building between war-torn societies can render benefits for regional peace endeavours (Westing, 1998:91).

Environmental resources inherently ignore man-made boundaries and reemphasise the importance of cooperation or equal benefit sharing of these resources. While current peace processes focus primarily on issues of trade, commerce and diplomatic relations, environmental cooperation at its core is intrinsic to civil society, which is directly linked and dependent on the resources for its livelihood and wellbeing (Dabelko, 2006:2-6). There is a need for peace-building practitioners to discover unseen pathways to achieve the goals of sustainable peace. Transforming peace initiatives from an indirect form of cooperation into a more interactive and direct form is a paramount feature of environmental peace-building (Kumar, 1997:6).

Environmental peace-building has been discredited by realists as not taking into consideration the anarchic state of countries competing over natural resources; in short, the realist view is sceptical regarding the effectiveness and the possibility of success of such an endeavour. In light of this realist argument, and taking into account the instability that has characterised the Middle East for the past decade, cooperation and peace-building must be rigorously studied and implemented under a set of conditions to allow it to succeed (UNEP, 2009:22). Conca and Dabelko (2002:9) have convincingly argued that ‘environmental cooperation can be an effective general catalyst for reducing tensions, broadening cooperation, fostering demilitarisation, and promoting peace’.

Among the most promising frameworks for facilitating environmentally based reconciliation in international conflict situations are initiatives known as Parks for Peace or ‘peace parks’. A peace park is a transboundary protected area, as defined by the World Conservation Union (IUCN), where the political borders that are enclosed within the park are abolished. This includes the removal of all forms of physical boundaries, allowing free movement of people and animals within the area. Peace parks are formally dedicated to the protection and management of biological diversity, natural and associated cultural resources, and the promotion of peace and cooperation. The parks encourage regulated tourism, sustainable development and goodwill between neighboring countries.

The peace park concept is not new. The first peace park, Waterton-Lakes International Peace Park, was established in 1932 in Canada. The phenomenon spread rapidly around the world, with more than one hundred and seventy transboundary protected areas to date. With the acceptance and implementation
of such a vast number of parks worldwide, nations are learning that these arrangements benefit all parties and can be both environmentally-sustainable and safe for visitors (Ali, 2007:4-6; FOEME, 2008:102).

Water, the most contentious resource in the Middle East, has also demonstrated the highest potential for environmental peacemaking within the framework of peace parks (Conca and Dabelko, 2002:144).

The inequitable access and control of scarce resources coupled with population growth, soaring demand and political mistrust can be a recipe for tense relations between parties sharing this resource. Moreover, natural resources have always been a silent causality of conflict. Ecosystems are often altered and destroyed to achieve political and strategic goals for one party at the expense of another (UNEP, 2009:34; Weinthal, 2006:5).

Many of the political decisions within the regional diplomacy of the Middle East have been shaped around short-term political gains instead of long-term development issues that address core problems facing the nations of the region. Thus, the use of the environment as an entry point for peace-building for sustainable development can strengthen the genuine call for a peace that would go beyond paper and alter the livelihoods of people of the region, and recognise the rights and legitimacy of all actors involved. The prevailing political benefits of conventional peace agreements have been characterised in a zero–sum manner; an advantage gained by one of the parties is considered a loss for the other (Sadoff and Grey, 2005:563). Especially in contested border areas, and where issues of territorial sovereignty and land acquisition are of utmost importance, reaching an agreement that will satisfy the requirements and needs of both parties is very complex. Environmental issues such as shared water resources, however, may be so fundamental to social and economic development that the parties in conflict cannot afford to militarise them and are obliged to follow a more positive approach of sharing resources. The peace park concept is an attempt to employ such tactics (UNDP, 2006:228, UNEP, 2009:22; FOEME, 2008:93).

The precedent for peace parks in the Middle East is minimal, mostly falling within the planning stage - none have been implemented on the ground. When implemented, it is hoped that peace parks between Israel and Jordan will further actualise the commitments made in the 1994 Peace Agreement to advance cooperation in the conservation of nature and prevention of pollution. They are in the preliminary stages of being evaluated and implemented by the regional environmental organisation Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME). The aim of creating peace parks goes beyond benefiting nature and the Jordan River Valley, as it provides a secure location for people-to-people interaction, a touristic spot and a conservation area.

As a peacemaking tool, the environment offers some useful, perhaps even unique qualities that lend themselves to building peace and transforming conflict: environmental challenges ignore political boundaries, require a long-term perspective, encourage local and nongovernmental participation, and extend community-building
beyond polarising economic linkages. These properties sometimes make cross-border environmental cooperation difficult to achieve. But where cooperation does take root, it might help enhance trust, establish cooperative habits, create shared regional identities around shared resources, and establish mutually recognised rights and expectations (Conca, et al., 2005:149).
Contested Water in the Golan

The Golan Heights: Hydraulic significance
The Golan Heights lies within an area of 444 km2, from the Yarmouk River in the south, the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee in the west, Mount Hermon in the north, and Wadi al-Ruqqad in the east (Map 1). After World War I, Britain and France drew the international boundaries of the region and through the Anglo–French agreement of 1923 – which had evident water borders – partitioned Ottoman Syria. The borders between Syria and mandate Palestine were demarcated so that all of Lake Tiberias, including a 10-metre wide strip of beach along its north-eastern shore, would stay inside mandate Palestine. To the north of Lake Tiberias to Lake Hula the boundary was drawn between 50-400 metres east of the Jordan River, keeping that stream entirely within mandate Palestine (Hof, 2009:4-5). Nevertheless, the land partition still granted Syrians water usage rights. Syrian farmers were allowed to use Lake Tiberias for fishing and drinking water purposes. This applied also to the Banias and Hasbani Rivers, where Syria withdrew water for drinking. Today Israel controls two-thirds of the Golan Heights, which provides about 30 per cent of Israel’s fresh-water supply (Gurtler, et al., 2010:14; Shuval, 2000:614). The Golan Heights is inhabited by approximately 40,000 people; around 20,000 of these inhabitants are Israeli Jews while about 20,000 are Syrian (Ali and Cohen, 2010:1; Barnes-Daisey, 2009:1).

In addition to being a key source of water resources, the fertile land of the Golan has attracted farming and agriculture of multiple products. In addition, the area is ideal for generating renewable wind energy; Israeli firms are currently operating small wind farms on the Golan. In the wake of rising demand for alternative forms of energy, the potential that the Golan holds is very attractive to investors and policymakers alike (Greenfield-Gilat, 2009:5).

The Syrian-Israeli conflict
The Syrian-Israeli conflict began within the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The Syrian army in 1948 advanced west of the 1923 border and succeeded in reaching the shores of Lake Tiberias, also capturing the east bank of the Jordan north of the Lake in addition to a small section of Israeli territory west of the river (Slater, 2002:82). With the United Nations intervention in 1949, Syrian forces withdrew to their previous position while Israeli forces stayed out of the newly-evacuated areas, creating three demilitarised zones (DMZ, as seen in Map 1) to the west of the 1923 international line and west of the Jordan. The armistice agreement was far from valued and numerous violations were recorded from both sides. Growing conflict marked the period after the signing of the 1949 armistice agreement through the unilateral decision of Israel to create facts on the ground and remove Arabs living in the DMZs, replacing them with settlers. The Syrians were unhappy with the Israeli attempt to change the
status quo in these areas and this resulted in exchanges of fire. Syria and Israel also clashed over Israeli water development works in the Huleh basin, which lies in the demilitarised zone as seen in Map 2. The securitisation of water has taken centre stage in the conflict, as expressed by then Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion in 1950, who said the Jews were fighting a battle for water and that the Jewish existence in mandate Palestine was contingent on the outcome of such a battle. Through 1965–1966, Israel and Syria exchanged fire over an Arab plan to divert the Jordan River headwaters, presumably to block Israeli construction of a national water carrier, an out-of-basin diversion plan from the Sea of Galilee to areas of the coast and southern Israel (Daoudy, 2008:218; Muslih, 1993:613; Wolf, 1998:253).

Until 1967 Syria kept control over the northeast sector of the Lake and the east of the River. This ‘de facto border’ (Slater, 2002:88) came to be known as the line of 4 June 1967. In 1967 the Israeli army pushed the Syrians from the Sea of Galilee/Lake Tiberias and occupied the Golan Heights, thus improving its ‘hydrostrategic’ position (Wolf, 1996:253). With half of the Israeli water supply being dependent on water outside its international waters, the securitisation of water seemed inevitable to Israel at that time (Renger, 1998:50) and therefore it depicted its occupation as not solely for strategic reasons, but for control of the headwater of the Jordan (Wolf, 1996:19; Neff, 1994:30). In 1981, the area was annexed by Israel, a move condemned internationally and called ‘inadmissible’ by the UN Security Council. Israel’s occupation of the Golan also eliminated all Syrian access to Lake Tiberias. Israel has taken several measures to limit the remaining Arabs’ use of the Golan’s water supply.
Map 1: The Golan Heights (Hof, 2009)
Environmental Cooperation To Resolve the Syrian–Israeli Negotiations Impasse

The Syria- Israel peace process: A brief background

The Syrian-Israeli track has been characterised by its relatively simplistic problems, compared to the Palestinian track (Hof, 2009:2). While Israeli leaders have generally insisted that Syria completely normalise relations with Israel before it consents to withdraw, Syrian leaders have demanded the return of the Golan before any negotiations for peace and normalisation can begin. Evidently, full withdrawal from the Golan Heights symbolises national prestige and honour and giving up territorial sovereignty seems inconceivable to Syria (Renger, 1998:49; Miller, 2000:134). The Syrian insistence on full withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 line is also a prerequisite to the resolution of other key concerns, such as Syria’s support for Hezbollah and its policy towards Iran (Guardian, 2010; Majzoub, 1998:202).

In a regional context, pressures of domestic and regional politics have hindered the achievement of a resolution. The fluctuating Palestinian-Israeli peace process has also impacted the flow and continuity of the Syrian-Israeli peace track (Slater, 2002:79). Moreover, the Syrian-Israeli track has undergone extensive changes with the occurrence of regional and domestic events such as the death of Hafez al-Assad and the succession of his son Bashar to power, the US invasion of Iraq, and the Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 (Daoudy, 2008:230; Hof, 2009:3). A series of suspended talks have amounted to new preconditions, such as the ratification by the Israeli public by means of a national referendum any withdrawal of occupied territory which Israel claimed in 1967 from Syria (Barnes-Daisey, 2009:1; Slater, 2002:96). Taking into account the complex regional changes, it is inevitable that they further complicate the rather ‘simplistic’ Syrian-Israeli front of negotiations. The lack of compromise over the Golan Heights has suspended any progress in the Syrian-Israeli track and prolonged a complicated status quo.

The failure of the Syrian-Israeli peace process can be attributed to the leadership of both parties and the lack of willingness to attain a sustainable peace (Ross, 2005:760). Clearly, however, at the core of the negotiations lies the richness of the Golan in terms of its natural resources and strategic location, which has served to increase the nationalistic pride of both parties and impeded a resolution of the sovereignty over land and water in the disputed borderlines between the two countries. Although media sources reported the closing of a deal with Syria in 2008, with 85 per cent of the issues resolved, certain issues remain a stumbling block to an agreement and will be explored in the following section (Haaretz, 2008a).

From 1991 until the concluding rounds of negotiations at Shepherdstown in 2000, Syria and Israel’s negotiations have not proven fruitful and have failed to produce a peaceful agreement. Nevertheless, Syrian and Israeli engagement in a
series of extensive negotiations underscored the benchmark demands and concerns of each party. For Syria, the firm demand and prerequisite for peace is Israeli withdrawal to the line of 4 June 1967, while Israel refers to the international border of 1923. This has been the cornerstone of the peace process, from which arrangements over issues of water, security and normalisation with Israel were all negotiable from the Syrian point of view (Daoudy, 2008:229; Hof, 2009:6; Slater, 2002:95). Walid Muallem, Syria's foreign minister, said, ‘For peacemaking, Israel needs to be ready to recognise that Syria is entitled to every inch of the Golan’ (Guardian, 2010). Muallem also added that only full Israeli withdrawal would guarantee negotiations that could lead to diplomatic and normalised relations between the two countries. However, the Israeli position prioritised water over land, as statements in the Israeli press by Israeli politicians from the ruling Labor party, including Prime Minister Shimon Peres and his Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, argue that while the land may be negotiable, the water is not (Wolf, 1996:29).

Therefore, the resolution of water sovereignty and borders between the two countries are interlinked. The 1967 pre-war line (or status quo, as it has not been demarcated) is a line that gives Syria an increasingly strategic position on the lake (Hoff, 1997:131). The only distinction between the two lines is the inclusion or exclusion of the three small areas which made up the demilitarised zone between 1949 and 1967: Givat Banias, the hill overlooking Banias Springs; the Daughters of Jacob bridge area; and the town of El-Hamma/Hamat Gader – a total of about 60 km2 (Wolf, 1996:14). Consequently, this would grant Syria riparian rights for the lake and thus Israel’s water resources could be jeopardised. Israel would also need to consider the water needs of Syrian refugees returning to their land if a peace deal is eventually concluded, and would do so as long as they did not drain and jeopardise the water supplies of the Israeli state. Realising the weight Israel gives to its water resources, the hesitance in reaching an agreement and the missed opportunities of the peace track become clear. Additionally, full demilitarisation of the Golan Heights will be reciprocal and that it will also apply to the Israeli side of the border (Mandell, 1996:245). Ultimately, the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control would be less threatening to Israel because of advances in modern weaponry. Neff states that the security concerns still echoing within the Israeli government are only aimed at justifying the Golan’s retention (Neff, 1994:38).

The border differences under dispute are actually quite small in distance but have nevertheless proven challenging. The focus and rigidity of both parties on a mere 10 metres on the banks of Lake Tiberias have deteriorated the possibility of reaching a conclusive solution. The differences are challenging but not unbridgeable, particularly if more creative approaches to Israel's water needs can be brought into the equation (Salem, 2008:5). One of the approaches gaining momentum and being introduced as a proposal for resolving the disputed area on the shores of Lake Tiberias is the concept of a conservation area and environmental peace park.
Proposals for peace: The Golan Heights Peace Park

As seen earlier, the importance of the borderline between Israel and Syria is strikingly due to water resources. The Banias and Hasbani rivers in the north Golan, Lake Tiberias, and the El Hamma and Yarmouk rivers in the south of the Galilee are all significant water sources that feed the Jordan River and contribute to approximately a third of Israel’s water supply (Shuval, 2000:605). The vested interest of both parties in the disputed areas of the Golan has led to several proposals for special management of these contentious borders between Israel and Syria with different titles and varying provisions, from a water security zone with substantial monitoring and control by Israeli and/or international forces, to a more comprehensive proposal of joint management of these areas under an umbrella of environmental peacemaking and collaborative management and control of water resources (Hof, 2009:9-10).

Frederic Hof, a senior US diplomat and a deputy of the peace envoy George Mitchell, is best known for his expertise and extensive writings on Israeli-Syrian negotiations. This has included a US Institute of Peace study of a peace map between Israel and Syria that explored the suggestion of an ‘environmental preserve’, which will be referred to in this paper as a peace park. Patrick Seale, Hafez al-Assad’s biographer, also suggested the establishment of such a nature reserve on the northeast corner of the Kinneret/Lake Tiberias, with total Israeli sovereignty, where Syria would get formal sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the northeast coastline of the lake. In other words, ‘Syria gets the land and regulated access to the water, and Israel gets the water and regulated access to the land’ (Hof, 2009:9). Since the peace park would be implemented within the larger framework of a comprehensive agreement, issues of water sovereignty and use have been highlighted in this draft treaty prepared by the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2002: 6-14).

Under this arrangement, Syrian control would be regained over the Golan Heights territory, including its presence on Lake Tiberias, where the peace park would be created. These proposals have been discussed on an official level between the two parties. In the unofficial channel of negotiations with Swiss mediation, the Syrians even agreed to have a peace park opened for Israeli tourists in the disputed area between the 1923 international border and the 4 June 1967 lines, extending to the east of that area with variations in proposals of size, purpose, and functioning of such a preserve. Focusing on the environmental theme of the park would ameliorate the threats of water resource contamination and use beyond the provisions of the agreement, since the area would be accessible for Syrians and Israelis (Greenfield-Gilat, 2009:4; Hof, 209:10). The proposal suggests that the park would extend eastward from Lake Tiberias (as shown in Map 2) and would be almost free of permanent residents except for the resettled town of Al-Hamma and Syrian conservation and law enforcement personnel operating the park. Visitors from Israel would be free to enter the Syrian border and customs posts would be east of the preserve (ICG, 2002:6).

The practical effect of this arrangement would be that visitors from Israel would continue to have 360 degree access to Lake Tiberias, an important psychological
boost for Israelis who have enjoyed such access for the past thirty-five years and
who would probably oppose a treaty barring them from the lake’s north-eastern
shores. In return, visitors from the Syrian side would be granted recreational access
to the lake, an important psychological boost for Syrians who enjoyed access to its
waters before the creation of Israel and even during the 1949-1967 period, when
access was often limited to the military because of periodic combat. With respect
to the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias, Israel would agree to make available to Syria
sufficient amounts of water to service the requirements of the Jordan Valley Nature
Preserve. The United Nations would be asked to administer the area on the northeast
corner of the lake, which would be open to Israelis and Syrians. The Jordan Valley
Nature Preserve might also provide the parties a venue for a ‘warm’, people-to-
people peace to take root (ICG, 2002:6-10).

The treaty recommends that the entire water infrastructure already constructed
by Israel during its occupation of the Golan Heights should remain to allow Syrians
to benefit from the existing infrastructure, which would then project positively on
Israel since its water resources would not then be at risk of pollution, contamination
and depletion. It is important to highlight the issue of resettlement of Syrian citizens
in the Golan Heights and what this will mean in terms of securing water for the direct
needs of the beneficiaries. Syrians would be bound to regulate the resettlement in
order to mitigate the risks mentioned above. This also applies to the waters of the
Banias, Hasbani and Yarmouk rivers, where the extraction of water would be limited
to provide service for the resettled residents in the village of Banias, the village of Al-
Ghajar and its immediate environs, and to allow the balance to flow freely into Israel.

Other similar projects have been proposed but on a larger scale to include more
areas of the Golan where nature reserves can be profitable. In addition, investing
in environmental peace-building can encompass more than just jointly managing
disputed territories. Proponents of a peace park in the disputed area have also
proposed an extension of such projects to include other areas in the Golan (in an
Israeli-Syrian partnership) through investing in renewable energy, particularly wind
energy. Going beyond conflict resolution, advocates of environmental cooperation
highlight the advantages of engaging in a wider form of cooperation that would
generate economic benefits to both Syria and Israel. This type of cooperation would
further peace endeavours after the signing of the peace agreement by strengthening
cooperative schemes that could actualise a ‘real’ peace that would be advantageous
to both parties and would assist in the sustainability of peace. With the interest of
the international community in funding such jointly run projects that bear mutual
benefits and foster confidence-building and effective collaboration, such large-scale
projects could find the capital investment that would help them to become a reality.
This viewpoint advocates that mutual cooperation between Syria and Israel would be
profitable, at least from an economic point of view, taking into consideration the high
cost of wind energy infrastructure (Greenfield-Gilat, 2009:5-7). As will be observed
in the following chapters, proposals of such type and magnitude would need to be
analysed within the political and historical context of Israeli-Syrian relations in order
to acquire a realistic vision of environmental cooperation opportunities and the mechanism of implementation on the ground.
Map 2: The proposed Peace Park (ICG, 2002)
Limitations and Prospects of Environmental Peace-Building

It is evident through the survey of the literature and the declarations of former and current leaders and politicians that natural resources competition and assertion of control plays a very important role in the type of interaction occurring between parties seeking peaceful measures of conflict resolution in the Middle East. Creative tools have been proposed to bridge the gap between the demands and concerns over the disputed territory in the Golan Heights that physically lies between the international line of 1923 and the pre-war line of 1967, and the introduction of environmental peace-building through the implementation of peace parks has gained momentum. The suggested peace park is not a panacea for all Syrian-Israeli disputes but it is believed to offer a new and promising approach to overcome a major obstacle to concluding a peace agreement. Investigating the current political environment will allow us to analyse the viability of proposals for environmental cooperation in light of the historical and political history of the Middle East region more broadly and the case of the Golan Heights specifically.

While believed to have the potential to develop into an independent variable influencing regional politics, the establishment of peace parks is unlikely to resolve conflicts. Nevertheless, they would provide a domain of interaction rarely invested in (Tanzler, et al., 2004:15). The benefits of peace parks can be fourfold (Martin, et al., 2010:4-5):

1) Environmental protection and ecological conservation: Since the Golan Heights is fertile in terms of biodiversity and water resources, investing in the idea of nature reserves in the proposed areas on the Golan provides benefits for all. It would be of great interest to scientists and environmentalists and would overcome the political stagnancy which prevailed for decades. Since the region is vulnerable to issues such as environmental degradation, droughts and effects of climate change, investment in environmentally sustainable ventures will assist in overcoming any future degradation of natural resources. The exchange of expertise and technologies will allow development of the region’s resources within a framework of equity, shared knowledge and sustainability.

2) Economic benefits: Transboundary cooperation in both the water and conservation fields has moved, increasingly, to further economic goals. The argument is that transboundary cooperation brings about a basket of benefits, including direct and indirect economic benefits for the states involved and their communities (Sadoff and Grey, 2005:421). In addition, it is argued that the benefits accrued by states through cooperation are greater than they could
derive individually. It is expected that institutionalised transboundary cooperation may contribute to enhanced economic growth and development and, eventually, economic integration and regionalisation (Ali, 2007:201). Ecotourism, especially in an area such as the Middle East where dependence on tourism is vital for economic development, is inevitable.

3) Political development: Environmental cooperation serves as a means of overcoming political stagnancy and building cooperation and relationships between people, not only governments, unlike conventional peacemaking agreements in the Middle East. Environmental peace-building can bring about a spill-over effect (Grey and Sadoff, 2005:427) thus affecting other areas of public policy and marginalising the acceptability of force. This will transform environmental cooperation into political cooperation, thus defusing political tensions and promoting regional security, and promoting reconciliation between conflicting parties (Carius, 2007:66). Linking transboundary resource protection to other regional cooperative efforts can generate further stability.

4) Empowering civil society and enhancing effective participation: International NGOs engaging with the work of peace parks act as mediators in the planning and implementation stages and would ensure, promote and empower members of the communities impacted by the peace park to actively engage in decision-making and management of the park. Due to their multidisciplinary nature, peace parks would allow for more interaction between all strata of society and promote civic responsibility towards the environment and society. In addition, peace parks along border regions, especially between Israel and its neighbours, could provide innovative opportunities for local communities to work together to promote biodiversity, regional cooperation and economic development (Weinthal, 2006:9). Investing in people-to-people incentives such as the proposed reserve would ameliorate concerns of border communities towards the other and allow for a new type of interaction to take place.

However, any form of cooperation would not occur in a void. Taking into account the broader political context, the type of interaction and historical settings of the Syrian-Israeli relationship sheds light on the complexity of the situation on the ground.

From Hostility to collaboration: An imaginary leap?
Evidently, the type of interaction which has characterised Syrian-Israeli relations can only be described as ‘hostile’, ‘lacking trust’ and ‘negative’ (ICG, 2002:2-6). This has prevailed for the whole period since the creation of the state of Israel until today and rivalry has dominated as the norm between Israel and Syria. In addition to the current lack of political will to bring about such a project, and taking into consideration the
linkage between nature reserve proposals and water security, the following factors address the broader issues complicating the conclusion of a peaceful agreement and the policy challenges of environmental cooperation in the form of peace parks:

- **Water**: Since the peace park concept has been suggested to overcome a dispute over a land which is rich in water, the issue of securitisation of that water and the linkage with territorial sovereignty will always prevail. Gurtler, et al., (2010:19) argues that providing access to water under one country’s sovereignty to satisfy the water concerns of another (in this case, Israel) was unprecedented from the point of view of Syrian diplomats and would potentially serve as an obstruction to reaching an agreement regarding water control and sovereignty. Additionally, Israeli opposition to the accommodation of a Syrian presence and future sharing of its water resources of the Golan is expected to prevail. Shuval (2000:628) suggests that only through creating ‘water security zones’, which would include the Hasbani, El Hamma and Banias springs and feature an Israeli and/or international force with no Syrian activity, would Israel be able to return most of the Golan Heights but affirm its unilateral control and occupation over the suggested peace park area. Such a security zones do not resonate with the peace park proposal as it sets a unilateral act where the Syrian presence and involvement would not be considered. As long as the dogma of water security is reinforced in Israeli water policies and reflected on its water use and control, such proposals would not be achieved successfully.

- **Changing the status quo**: A peace deal with Syria will involve a process of withdrawal of Israeli settlements and military presence and would incur substantial monetary demands from the Israeli authorities. An Israeli newspaper estimated in 1999 that compensation for the settlers would run to over $10 billion. The influx of settlement in the Golan Heights has further complicated the issue of withdrawal from a psychological point of view. Public opinion in Israel in 2008 appeared not to favour withdrawal, suggesting that two-thirds of Israelis opposed plans to return the Golan to Syria as part of a peace agreement (Haaretz, 2008b). Issues of water control and management have also been heavily influenced by domestic and internal politics, and the relinquishment of significant territories such as the disputed area where the nature reserve would be located will be received with high levels of opposition (Miller, 2000:126).

- **The concept of peace parks** has not been extensively tested and thus its implementation and success would be put to the test, although lessons drawn from previous experiences could facilitate a more efficient and sustainable management (Martin, et al., 2010). Joint ventures between the Israelis and the Jordanians and Palestinians with respect to peace parks have not been implemented fully. Plans for development of a regional ‘Jordan River Peace Park’ have been prepared by FOEME but have not been implemented, and thus its ramifications and effectiveness could not be assessed for the Golan Heights peace park proposal. Moreover, the
contingent character of such projects to the peace process is risky. Environmental initiatives risk failure and ineffectiveness if the peace process is hindered (Zwirn, 2001:123). With a fluctuating peace process which has proven to be very unpredictable in the Middle East, the financial and political support for such projects would diminish accordingly in the case of a meltdown of ‘peace’. This would weaken the role of environmental institutions and make the project unsustainable when the peace process dwindles (Ibid.:125).

• **The gap in socioeconomic development and environmental awareness:**
  There exists a discrepancy between the needs and concerns of each party in terms of endorsing environmental cooperation as a priority. At this point in time it is not practical to expect Syria to be ready to establish not only transboundary protected areas, but also shared ones with an old foe. The priorities and level of awareness of environmental protection varies significantly between Israel and Syria. This calls for a more rigorous development and investment in environmental protection and education within Syria (and the Arab world as a whole) for projects of this level of collaboration to succeed (FOEME, 2008:95). Asymmetries in the institutional scientific infrastructure would influence all stages of a nature reserve project and constrain the nature of cooperation (Kumar, 1997:11). Similarly, Israeli environmental movements are set within ideologies which have to be examined and advanced to promote a regional mindset of environmental protection. As long as the environmental needs and concerns of each party are separated by a wide gap, initiatives of this kind will be rendered inefficient. From a local perspective, environmental peacemaking is beneficial because cooperation offers the opportunity to exchange different perspectives and generate wider interest in environmental issues, in addition to the practical benefits of pooling resources and capacities (Susskind, 1994:62).

• **Internal opposition to environmental cooperation:**
  Due to many failed peace processes, the general public has reacted to bilateral and multilateral ‘peace’ projects with feelings of distrust and even as acts of treason. Much needs to be done in order to bridge the gap between people’s perceptions and provide an alternate perspective where the actual benefits arising from collaborative projects could be observed and pursued. Since environmental (and especially water) issues have been dealt with as strategic and confidential issues, public awareness of their importance in a regional context remains minimal. Environmental cooperation can be overwhelmed when directly linked to peacemaking and can be contested by other issues central to the conflict (Dabelko, 2006:7). There is difficulty in continuing the work of environmental cooperation within a broader context of political instability and continuing friction and tension. Pre-existing local and regional conflicts undermine efforts of environmental peace-building. Solving these issues, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and collaborating on the basis of equal representation and power will enhance the probability of a successful environmental endeavour that will
gain the trust of people of all countries. Otherwise, initiatives such as peace parks will never attain their goals of regional peace and cooperation. NGOs, the pivotal mediators which can guarantee the success of the peace park model, can be hesitant to interfere and engage in border issues due to fear of political retribution, government opposition and their own marginalisation.

On the political level, the international community and Israeli politicians pressed for regional economic development as a pathway for peace. Guaranteeing that Syria would not disrupt the flow of water from the Golan to Lake Tiberias, joint Syrian-Israeli economic ventures were proposed to turn the Golan Heights into a ‘zone of prosperity’ through expanding the nature reserve into other areas in the Golan where investing in wind harvesting can be economically beneficial for Syrians and Israelis. This neoliberal viewpoint of regional economic development has been met with negative reactions from Assad, who stated that joint ventures on the Golan are a red line. The Syrian and Arab public would see such collaboration as an extension of the Israeli occupation and a new form of Israeli hegemony (Daoudy, 2008:229; Seale, 2000:76).
Conclusion – Moving forward: Empowering the role of the environment as a broker for peace

The proposal of a peace park as a potential solution to the stumbling block within the Syrian-Israeli peace process would require Israel and Syria to simultaneously take steps toward a peace deal (Ross, 2005:760) instead of taking individual steps that would create winners and losers. Environmental conservation is emerging as an attractive concept of conflict resolution to politicians and conservationists alike. Highlighting the role of environmental cooperation in a decades-long conflict might seem unrealistic and naive. However, the importance of natural resources competition is paramount in understanding and analysing present conflicts in the Middle East and methods of solving them. Peace parks offer a creative concept for bridging communities together, supporting civil society and influencing policymaking. Moreover, they provide these communities with economic and social benefits in the long term (Bitterman, et al., 2009:24). An environmental preserve under Syrian sovereignty would avoid the environmental impact which Israel fears would jeopardise its sources of water with Syria being brought to the water’s edge. It would secure the requirements of Syrian national pride, yet allow Israelis to enter with no or limited restrictions the circumference of Lake Tiberias (Greenfield-Gilat, 2009:3).

In order to move forward with the Syrian-Israeli peace process, the readiness of parties for a peaceful solution and functional cooperation is paramount. Certain regional aspects need to be present to foster trust and confidence:

- Formulate a regional cooperative water strategy for the Jordan River Basin that will ameliorate water concerns and de-securitize water. An agreement based on reasonable and equitable distribution of the water resources according to international law and standards will provide a platform for multilateral cooperation that the region requires, bringing about stability and sustainable development of the region (Renger, 1998: 54-55). Peace parks in this context will be the preliminary step in overcoming water disputes and building the foundation for a regional cooperation strategy that will encompass all riparians of the Jordan Basin. Water must be perceived as a shared resource that must be managed in real partnership with Arab countries and this approach will facilitate pragmatic solutions to the water crisis (Haaretz, 2008c). Finding solutions to overcome retaining territories would enhance creative joint management of the resource, and restrictions due to security and sovereignty would be dissolved (Wolf, 1996:28-29). Utilising the mutual dependence on shared water resources between Israel and Syria would form a basis for developing dialogue and cooperation on sustainable water management.
• Move towards formalised and institutionalised cooperation in the peace park and the Golan Heights in general to keep it from falling into the trap of ‘shallow’ cooperation. Thus, the involvement of representative governments in more formal transboundary conservation arrangements would prove to be a necessary and viable progression (Martin, et al., 2010:14). After fulfilling the separation of the concepts of territorial sovereignty from water security, the most critical step towards conflict resolution would be to engage the role of conservation agencies, which are usually isolated from the security apparatus. Scientists and environmental agencies should be empowered to influence policy matters within decision-making circles (Medzini and Wolf, 2004:193). Highlight and strengthen the role of civil society in promoting environmental peacemaking and demilitarising areas parts of the Jordan River Basin would allow access for individuals and thus facilitate an effective rehabilitation effort which will have the support and knowledge of the people. Information must be freely shared to avoid engendering distrust. Initiatives promoting good governance (top-down) must be combined with activities aimed at empowering weaker actors (bottom-up). The donor community should support programmes that empower weaker parties, especially communities, to take part in negotiations and monitor processes. The epistemic role of NGOs in providing an arena of data sharing and exchange should be allowed to provide participatory engagement of all stakeholders and actors and offer a more coherent voice to question and influence policymaking (Ali, 2007:92).

• Measure attitudes towards reserves and parks domestically and regionally as models of cooperation amongst the general public in Israel and Syria. This will engage the local communities and society in decision-making and promote any environmental scheme from within rather than solely as a Western-imposed solution. Investing in such research involves a feasibility study, where the economic viability, effectiveness and acceptability of peace parks are paramount. Simultaneously, investments must be centred on environmental education within nations, emphasising the non-military aspects of environmental threats and degradation, regional water and environmental issues, and a culture of conservation within communities. Any Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights should be accompanied by a rigorous public information campaign to promote and highlight the significance of such a withdrawal.

• Utilise the benefits of regional cooperation and international involvement. The involvement of a third party is essential for the success and continuation of a viable environmental endeavour. In the case of the Golan Heights, Turkey has expressed its interest on multiple occasions, whether through striking a deal to provide water for Israel or acting as a mediator between Syria and Israel during the peace talks in 2008. In addition, international organisations and donor agencies must play a leading role in advocating efficient and sustainable environmental initiatives and support programs that empower weaker parties, especially communities, to take
Environmental cooperation in the form of peace parks or other initiatives is a necessary endeavour but it is not sufficient to bring about peace-building in the current political context of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The prerequisites of such an endeavour would need to provide a complete political settlement coupled with equal representation and contribution of all parties (Kumar, 1997:12). Simply establishing international peace parks is unlikely to bring an end to border hostilities, and less likely to solve the Syrian-Israeli conflict. However, such initiatives may help to promote communication and cooperation as an early part of the peace process, building confidence and ultimately improving transboundary relations after reaching a peace agreement (Brock, 1991:410; Westing, 1998:91-92). Although environmental conservation must not be perceived as only a consequence, but rather a component of peace-building (Ali, 2007), in the case of the Syrian-Israeli conflict, the environment might support post-conflict peace-building measures together with the more conventional peace-building tools (Weinthal, 2006:10).

Environmental cooperation offers creative visions to resolve border disputes in the Golan and can act to counter widespread concerns that water scarcity will lead to conflict. As this means of conflict resolution illustrates, the potential for conflict can be transformed into a potential for peace if there is enough imagination and ingenuity — and the political will to embrace regionalisation. However, the current state of affairs of hostility and mistrust raises doubts about the feasibility of environmental cooperation as a means to end the impasse in the failing and almost dead peace process. This poses a serious question as to what the alternative would be to overcome this failure. In a region where resource competition is very evident and economic development is desired, avenues for both conflict and cooperation will continue to alternate until an equitable use of resources and political stability are achieved. Paths of equitable environmental cooperation are desired by people willing to work for the sustainable development of the shared environment for all in the region. Ecosystem interdependencies in the region present opportunities for mutual gain which if not harnessed could exacerbate conflict even further, and greatly complicate interstate cooperation (Conca, et al., 2005:149).
References


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ICSR is a unique partnership of King’s College London, the University of Pennsylvania, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (Israel), and the Regional Centre for Conflict Prevention Amman (Jordan). Its aim is to counter the growth of radicalisation and political violence by bringing together knowledge and leadership. For more information, see
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