Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and Darfur remains tense

At the end of 2010 at least 4.5 million people were internally displaced in Darfur, the Greater Khartoum area, South Kordofan and the ten states of Southern Sudan. It is thought that in December 2010 there were between 4.5 and 5.2 million IDPs, in the western region of Darfur (where estimates ranged between 1.9 million and 2.7 million), in and around Khartoum, in the state of South Kordofan and in Southern Sudan. In addition, there were unknown numbers of IDPs in the other northern and eastern states.

In Darfur, large-scale attacks on civilians have become less common but insecurity prevails in most areas. Over 100,000 of almost 270,000 people newly displaced in Darfur in 2010 were displaced in eastern Jebel Marra, where sporadic fighting between government and rebel forces has continued since February 2010. Meanwhile, Darfur witnessed the continued failure of peace talks, further fracturing of anti-government forces, greater restrictions on humanitarian access, and violence in IDP camps such as Kalma camp.

IDP camps in Darfur are becoming permanent urban settlements, with populations dependent on assistance. An inter-agency rapid assessment in October 2010 found that displaced communities had critical needs in health care, nutrition, water and sanitation, and child protection.

In Southern Sudan over 220,000 people are estimated to have been newly displaced in 2010, a considerable decrease from the 390,000 reported in 2009. Good rains have led to a reduction in cattle raiding and disputes over access to water and grazing; however violent incidents between southern communities have increased. In the build-up to the January self-determination referendum in Southern Sudan, there are fears that incidents along the border and in undemarcated areas could lead to significant further displacements in early 2011.

The Greater Khartoum area continues to host some 1.7 million IDPs from areas in or bordering the south. In August 2010, the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan
(GoSS) announced a new initiative to facilitate the rapid return to the south of up to 1.5 million southern Sudanese currently living in the north and in Egypt. From October to early December 2010 over 50,000 people were believed to have returned as a result, and further returns were expected. As a result of international concerns about the feasibility and voluntariness of return and the lack of funds to receive returnees, the GoSS has taken a longer-term perspective, no longer linking mass return of IDPs to the referendum.

The returns have been either supported by administrations of states such as Unity State, or have been spontaneous. Those IDPs who have returned in recent months often find receiving communities and local authorities unprepared and lacking resources to support their initial re-establishment and reintegration. Many have arrived with limited resources after long journeys and have struggled on arrival in war-ravaged regions in which some 80 per cent of people have been displaced at least once over the previous 15 years. Nonetheless, while living in Khartoum they have acquired skills that they hope to use in the south.

The Government in Khartoum launched a new strategy for Darfur in 2010. Focused solely on return, it does not recognise the right of IDPs to choose where they want to settle. The National IDP Policy adopted by GoNU in 2009 remains largely unimplemented. The focus on return in the new strategy for Darfur and the return plan of the GoSS indicate that both the national and southern governments lack commitment to giving IDPs a genuine choice between different settlement options through which to pursue a durable solution to their displacement.

In July 2010, the protection cluster was established in Southern Sudan and stakeholders have demonstrated commitment to address displacement issues.
General map of Sudan

Source: UN Cartographic Section
More maps are available at www.internal-displacement.org
Background and causes of displacement

The multiple episodes of displacement in many areas of Sudan are essentially due to the same cause: deep-rooted tensions between the centre and peripheral regions, a highly inequitable division of power and wealth and a government unwilling to acknowledge Sudan’s ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. Estimates of the numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) have been, and remain, inexact. It is thought that in December 2010 there were between 4.5 and 5.2 million IDPs, in the western region of Darfur (where estimates ranged between 1.9 million and 2.7 million), in and around Khartoum, in the state of South Kordofan and in Southern Sudan. In addition, there are unknown numbers of IDPs in the other northern and eastern states.

Figures are unreliable for several reasons. There is restricted access to areas where many IDPs live, particularly in eastern Sudan, Abyei and parts of Darfur. The current monitoring system for newly displaced IDPs in Southern Sudan does not provide an accurate figure of IDPs in the region. IDP figures are also questionable because they are cumulative within in each year and reportedly cover only the newly displaced. There is however no mechanisms to track how many of the substantial 2009 displacements may have been double-counted within 2010 numbers or excluded from those numbers but still in displacement. IDPs may not want to be counted, especially in Darfur or Khartoum. There is contestation around the definition of an IDP: some argue that people displaced to Greater Khartoum have been resident there for so long that they can no longer be considered IDPs.

In Southern Sudan, a first phase of armed conflict between the Khartoum government and southern separatists broke out prior to Sudan’s independence in 1956 and ended in 1972. The civil war resumed in 1983 after the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) took up arms in protest against imposition of shari’a law.

The second phase of the civil war was brought to an end by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. It set out detailed transitional arrangements concerning the sharing of power and wealth and the status of the “Three Areas” claimed by both the north and the south: Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The CPA provided for nationwide democratic elections, which took place albeit with considerable reservations from international observers in April 2010, and a Southern Sudanese referendum on self-determination scheduled for January 2011. The CPA led to an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) based in Juba which is dominated by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the SPLA’s political wing.

The CPA established an interim Government of National Unity in Khartoum (GoNU) but real power in Khartoum remains in the hands of the National Congress Party (NCP) of the Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir. It is widely anticipated that the Southern Sudanese will opt for secession. A number of key issues remain unresolved between the Khartoum and the GoSS. Tensions over the border demarcation, citizenship of residents, and control of oil fields, water and pasture all provide potential for renewed conflict and further displacement (ICG, 23 November 2010; Concordis International, September 2010; NRC, 14 December 2010).

The Darfur conflict began in early 2003 as two loosely-allied rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), took up arms against the government in Khartoum. After protracted negotiations, and under pressure from the international community, the government in Khartoum and a faction of the SLM/A under the rebel leader Minni Minnawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. However, the DPA
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failed to bring peace and stability, instead triggering new waves of violence and displacement as rebel groups splintered into many factions (Women’s Commission, December 2008).

Following heavy fighting between JEM and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the government in Khartoum and JEM signed the Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building in January 2009, in which both declared a commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict (IRIN, 28 January 2009; UNSG, 17 April 2009). However, JEM suspended its participation in March 2009 following the International Criminal Court’s issue of an arrest warrant for President el-Bashir and the subsequent government decision to expel 13 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and dissolve three national NGOs (Sudan Tribune, 24 April 2009).

In February 2010, fighting broke out in Jebel Marra in the state of West Darfur between the SAF and a faction of the SLM/A, displacing thousands (Reuters, 25 February 2010; BBC, 25 February 2010). In December 2010, a peace agreement was signed between the government in Khartoum and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a coalition of ten Darfuri rebel factions created in February 2010. IDPs opposed to the agreement have argued that it does not provide the basis for a just peace, and they have demanded that the two main rebel groups, JEM and SLA, work together to present a coordinated platform before resuming peace talks with the government in Khartoum in Qatar. (Sudan Tribune, 10 December 2010). In mid-December 2010, fighting between SAF and the SLA faction headed by Minni Minnawi in Khor Abeche, South Darfur, displaced some 12,000 people (UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 17 December 2010).

The Three Areas

Abyei, Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains (the Three Areas) have a population of around four million. The CPA stipulated that the future of the region was to be decided by January 2011, with inhabitants of oil-rich Abyei to vote on whether to join the north or south and inhabitants of the other areas to be consulted on greater autonomy within the GoNU. However, there has been little progress. In July 2009, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled that key oilfields in Abyei should be in north Sudan but most of the land in the south, including Abyei town, substantial fertile areas and one significant oilfield. However, the judgement has not been implemented. Talks between the NCP and the SPLM have failed to demarcate the borders, establish a referendum commission or agree voter eligibility procedures (Sudan Tribune, 7 November 2010; ICG, 23 November 2010; Rift Valley Institute, October 2010; Eric Reeves, 26 November 2010). The Abyei referendum and the popular consultations are unlikely to take place in January 2011.

A further destabilising factor is tension between the Misseriya, an Arab tribe who mostly wish to remain with the north, and Dinka Ngok who constitute the majority of Abyei’s permanent population and who mostly supported the south during the civil war. The Misseriya fear if the south secedes and the north-south border becomes an international boundary they will lose grazing rights and their livelihoods. There have been rumours that the Misseriya are planning large-scale settlements in the north of Abyei in order to change the demographic balance in advance of any referendum (OCHA, October 2010; SRS, 8 October 2010).

Amid these multiple tensions, 3,000 IDPs returned to Abyei. It is not clear how many of 50,000 people who had been displaced from Abyei in 2008 following fighting between the SPLA and the SAF were still displaced in Southern Sudan (OCHA, October 2010; OCHA, 6 November 2010). Insecurity and the limited presence of NGOs have hindered the delivery of assistance to IDPs and
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There are high rates of malnutrition: after a November 2010 visit to Abyei the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator reported that “a food security assessment conducted in October 2009 revealed that 30 per cent of the Dinka Ngok population and 23 per cent of the Misseriya population are severely food insecure. 52,000 people receive food assistance in the greater Abyei area” (OCHA, 6 November 2010). Abyei is ill-prepared to receive the 36,000 IDPs who registered with the local authorities and indicated willingness to return to Abyei. The local authorities have called on the international community to assist with providing health care, education and other basic services (Sudan Tribune, 7 November 2010 and 22 November 2010).

**Eastern Sudan**

In 1995, long-running grievances over perceived exclusion and marginalisation turned to violent conflict between the army and an insurgent coalition known as the Eastern Front (Reuters, 12 April 2010; Pantuliano, September 2005). In October 2006, the two parties signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) but its implementation has been extremely slow and the east remains “profoundly underdeveloped” (HPG, 26 March 2009, p.3). Restrictions on access make it impossible to verify IDP figures. At the end of 2008 it was reported there were up to 420,000 IDPs in the region from the eastern states and elsewhere in Sudan, of whom 68,000, mostly from the Three Areas and Southern Sudan, were in the city of Kassala (OCHA, October 2010).

Eastern Sudan has some of the worst development indicators in Sudan (UNDP, 2010). Humanitarian assistance is limited and just over 50 per cent of camp-based IDPs were reported to be receiving food rations in September 2010. Kassala and Red Sea states have the highest malnutrition rates in the north, with acute malnutrition rates above the 15 per cent emergency threshold in some areas (OCHA, October 2010). Humanitarian access to the region improved in 2010, particularly for UN agencies, but the government in Khartoum continues to impose severe restrictions on access to Red Sea state (OCHA, October 2010). Relatively few INGOs operate in the region and humanitarian donors have not responded to the identified needs to the same extent as in Darfur and Southern Sudan.

**Southern Sudan**

The total number of IDPs in Southern Sudan in 2010 is difficult to determine due to ongoing population movements. Thousands of IDPs have been returning from the north, particularly since October. More than 220,000 people were newly displaced in the first ten months of 2010. States where the most people have been displaced are Jonglei and Lakes, due to inter-tribal fighting, and Western Equatoria, due to attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The UN reported 217 violent incidents and 991 deaths from January to the end of October, half of them in Jonglei with many also recorded in counties in Warrap and Lakes (see maps on the Sudan country page of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).

Inter-tribal violence generally decreased in 2010 primarily because good rains reduced disputes over water and grazing and led to a reduction in the number of cattle raids. However, in the build-up to the referendum the rate of small-scale incidents has increased. Between July and September 25,000 people were newly displaced across Southern Sudan (OCHA, October 2010). Western Equatoria and also Western Bahr el Ghazal continued to face LRA attacks, between July and September alone leading to 4,000 people being displaced.

Since November several air raids by the Khartoum forces have been reported along the South Darfur
and Northern Bahr el Ghazal border and several incidents along the border of Upper Nile and Sennar states, although the Khartoum government has denied most of these attacks (VOA, 24 November 2010; Sudan Tribune, 14 November 2010; Sudan Tribune, 2 November 2010)

Further displacement was caused by floods in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states in September and October. The floods have affected areas that are home to some 290,000 people, leaving 75,000 in need of immediate assistance and displacing over 50,000 people (OCHA, October 2010; Sudan Tribune, 13 October 2010).

Of the approximately four million IDPs displaced by the civil war, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has estimated that between the 2005 CPA signing and the end of 2009 over two million IDPs returned to Southern Sudan, Abyei and Southern Kordofan. However, ten per cent of these movements led to secondary displacement (IOM, December 2009, p.8; UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.95). In August 2010, the GoSS announced a new initiative aimed at facilitating the rapid return to the south of up to 1.5 million southern Sudanese currently living in the north and Egypt (BBC, 24 August 2010). Since then the plans of the GoSS have been revised following concerns expressed by the international community and slow funding (BBC, 12 November 2010). The GoSS now anticipates a longer period for return and distances this plan from the referendum. Its new programme, the Accelerated Returns and Reintegration Initiative (ARERI), foresees the return of about half a million people before the referendum (UNHCR, November 2010).

Since October 2010, 50,000 IDPs have returned. Some humanitarian actors have highlighted that in Khartoum no systematic and comprehensive information is available to IDPs about organised and spontaneous returns. It appears that the majority of the returnees who have so far returned to the south did not have formal or long-term employment while in the North. This might indicate that the southerners who have decided to remain in the North might be those with more stable jobs. Returnees travelling through Southern Kordofan have been reportedly faced with the Misseriya blocking their movement in a dispute apparently linked to compensation for cattle and en route “taxing” (IDMC interviews with humanitarian organisations, December 2010). There are reportedly a significant number of unaccompanied children, women and child-headed families among the returnees (IDMC interviews, December 2010; NRC, 14 December 2010).

Those who have lived in Khartoum for years and have acquired skills are reportedly not planning to return to their villages but settle in Juba and other urban settlements in Southern Sudan. Returnees are sometimes unable to return to places of origin as state and GoSS authorities are unprepared and lack capacity to receive them (NRC, 14 December 2010; OCHA, Returns, 30 November 2010). IDPs are in need of food, shelter, and livelihood opportunities, many arriving in the region with minimal material resources. Assistance by the international community is normally provided only at a final destination in order to avoid clustering of people in transitional sites, protracted displacement situations and aid dependency. This leaves those who cannot return to the home village without any assistance. The achievement of durable solutions by returnees will be difficult in a war ravaged region still plagued by insecurity and limited access to water, health care, education and livelihood opportunities.

In addition to IDPs arriving from the north, substantial numbers of people have been in protracted displacement for years, sometimes decades, within Southern Sudan. The GoSS has not done enough to offer them a genuine choice between the three settlement options of sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (return); sustainable
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local integration in areas where IDPs take refuge (local integration) or sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere). On the contrary, it has been adamant that all Southern Sudanese IDPs and refugees should return to their home villages.

For many IDPs in protracted situations the long-term nature of their displacement means that return to their original homes is neither possible nor desirable. After years or sometimes decades, places of displacement have become home, people have grown accustomed to urban lifestyles, established new community affiliations, developed new livelihoods, often changed their diets and grown dependent on education and medical services. Many experience culture shock on arrival in Southern Sudan, particularly those who may have lived their entire lives in urban environments in northern Sudan and been educated in Arabic. Such is the preference for relocation to urban areas that researchers from the UK’s Overseas Development Institute found that only about ten per cent of returnees who have settled in Juba are originally from the Southern Sudanese capital (ODI, September 2008).

For some, neither return to their villages of origin nor local integration in their places of displacement are feasible. The barriers they face include lack of access to land, services or opportunities to re-establish their livelihoods. For this group, the only durable solution is resettlement elsewhere, often in South Sudan’s rapidly expanding towns.

Khartoum

Estimates of the total number of IDPs (from the south, Darfur and the east) in the Greater Khartoum area vary widely. The census published in May 2009 and disputed by GoSS stated there were only just over half a million Southern Sudanese in and around the Sudanese capital (UNHCR, December 2009; Sudan Tribune, 24 May 2009; Chatham House, January 2010, p.19; GoS, 9 April 2010, p.1). In 2008, a Tufts University-IDMC survey found that Khartoum hosts between 1.3 and 1.7 million IDPs (in camps and out-side the camps and resettlement areas), most of them from the south (Tufts-IDMC, August 2008).

According to a government if Khartoum study, about 624,000 IDPs were living in Khartoum at the end of 2009, including those who had returned to the south but since returned to Khartoum after failing to re-establish themselves in their places of origin (GoS, 9 April 2010; UN and partners, 19 November 2008; Tufts-IDMC, August 2008). In addition, an estimated 1.5 million IDPs had integrated in Khartoum over the previous 20 years, with 59 per cent (925,000) of them originating from the south and the Three Areas (GoS, 9 April 2010).

Most IDPs in Khartoum – between one and 1.3 million people – live outside officially designated camps and resettlement areas; some 300,000 to 400,000 IDPs live in camps where they have been allocated plots, and some squat on privately-owned land (Tufts-IDMC, August 2008, GoS, 9 April 2010). Although Khartoum has seen strong economic growth in recent years, driven by the country’s greatly increased income from oil, growth has been uneven and IDP locations generally offer poor living conditions and few sustainable livelihood opportunities or basic services (GoS, 9 April 2010; Landinfo, 3 November 2008, pp.12-13).

During the registration of Khartoum-based voters for the January 2011 referendum, several observers noted that southern IDPs were intimidated by both the NCP and the SPLM to make them either register for the referendum or the opposite (IDMC interviews, December 2010; Africa News, 22 November 2010). Just over 105,000 southerners have registered in the north (BBC, 8 December 2010, SSRC, 9 December 2010). Several observers have stressed that if a pro-independence referendum vote triggers violence against southerners in Khartoum that the government in Khartoum
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has an obligation to provide protection and that it certainly has capacity to prevent violence if it has the political will to do so (IDMC interviews, December 2010).

Darfur

The number of IDPs in Darfur is estimated at between 1.9 million and 2.7 million (UN and partners, 30 November 2010; UN and partners, 14 July 2010; Office of the UN Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, 2009). Following clashes between various rebel groups and government armed forces, almost 270,000 people were newly displaced in the first nine months of 2010 (OCHA, 2 November 2010).

2010 has witnessed violent clashes between rebel factions and government troops and conflict between anti-government forces, often triggered by inter-tribal rivalries (BBC, 25 October 2010; Sudan Tribune, 7 October 2010). Ongoing peace negotiations brokered by Qatar and the failure or Darfuri representatives to adopt a common position have provoked tensions between internally displaced communities. From late July to September 2010 there was conflict among the 44,000 residents in the Hamediya camp in West Darfur and also among the 82,000 IDPs in the Kalma camp in South Darfur (OCHA, September 2010; Sudan Tribune, 3 November 2010; SRS, 26 October 2010). After the outbreak of violence in Kalma camp the government in Khartoum moved forward with its plan to close the camp (Miraya FM, 19 October 2010). The main reason for closure was reported to be insecurity, with the governor of South Darfur describing the camp as “the most uncooperative IDP camp in the state” and “a den of criminals fleeing from justice” (IRIN, 14 October 2010).

Observers have warned that the closure of the camp and resettlement of IDPs might include “some degree of forced movement that is tied to the forfeiture of land rights” (Enough, 24 August 2010). UN officials have emphasised that all resettlements should adhere to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which stress the right of IDPs to “be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk” (IRIN, 19 October 2010). In August 2010, Khartoum also imposed a two-week blockade of the camp, endangering the residents’ health and nutritional status (VOA, 16 August 2010).

Khartoum has also severely restricted humanitarian access to eastern Jebel Marra, where sporadic fighting between government forces and the SLA has been ongoing since February 2010. Up to 100,000 people were displaced at the peak of fighting (OCHA, September 2010). In September, WHO and UNICEF were granted access to the region to deliver emergency relief. An inter-agency rapid assessment in October 2010 found critical needs in health care, nutrition, water and sanitation, child protection and food security (OCHA, September 2010; IWPR, 19 November 2010; IRIN, 5 October 2010, IRIN, 19 October 2010).

The protracted and large-scale nature of displacement has meant that many IDP camps have developed into become urban environments, dramatically accelerating the process of urbanisation across Darfur. Many IDPs would prefer to locally integrate in these camp locations in the hope that they become recognised urban neighbourhoods (de Waal, 31 March 2009; Tufts-IDMC, August 2008, p.18). Some pragmatic local authorities are recognising that camps are becoming permanent urban areas and in the case of Nyala are including IDP communities in city-wide planning processes (UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, September 2010).
National response

In January 2009, the government in Khartoum adopted a national IDP policy intended to have effect in all areas including the southern regions, setting out IDPs’ rights and the required responses to their needs during different phases of displacement. The policy recognises the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of IDPs. It strives to enhance social life and sustainable development within internally displaced and host communities, and promotes voluntary return or settlement to other places of IDPs’ choice.

The policy applies to all levels of government; it delineates institutional roles and responsibilities in the planning of IDP interventions (Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009; Brookings, 2010). It charges the Humanitarian Aid Commission (on behalf of the GoNU) and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) (representing the GoSS) with the coordination of state agencies and other national and international bodies, and the provision of technical support. According to Southern Sudan’s interim constitution, the functions of the SSRRC include “the repatriation, relief, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons and the facilitation of reconstruction in conflict-affected areas.” So far, neither side has demonstrated commitment to implement the policy. Because it was promulgated in the name of the GoNU it is unclear to what extent the GoSS intends to support the policy. The SSRRC’s role has been limited to returns and relief coordination. Although present in all ten southern states it lacks capacity and is under-funded.

In September 2010, the government in Khartoum released a new strategy document (entitled Darfur: Towards a New Strategy for Achieving Comprehensive Peace, Security and Development) outlining efforts to support the peace process, enhance security and promote development (GoS, September 2010). The strategy focuses solely on return of IDPs to their original homes without giving space for them to decide between settlement options. Given that IDPs have spent prolonged periods of displacement in urban areas, it is likely many would choose to stay in the place of displacement and integrate (UNHCR, November 2010). Practical steps to implement this strategy are yet to be developed. Khartoum plans to develop a sub-strategy that will deal specifically with the issues related to internal displacement, including the voluntariness of returns, the return to original homes and the issue of compensation (Tag Elkhazin, 2 October 2010). Human rights observers have raised concerns over the strategy, emphasising that return as planned would be neither voluntary nor safe (Eric Reeves, 8 October 2010).

Sudan has ratified the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, including protocols on protection and assistance and the property rights of returnees. However, its implementation has remained stalled. Sudan has also not signed the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (also known as the Kampala Convention), which was adopted by the AU in October 2009.

International response

Humanitarian operations in Sudan continue to be the largest in the world with estimated needs at the beginning of November 2010 totalling $1.84 billion (UN and partners, 14 July 2010; OCHA, October 2010). The World Food Programme (WFP) is providing assistance to 11 million Sudanese, by far the agency’s largest operation worldwide.
At the end of November the inter-agency Work Plan for Sudan 2010 was only 64 per cent funded. Across sectors, the donor response is uneven. Mine action is only nine per cent funded and protection 28 per cent, while food security and livelihoods is 76 per cent funded (OCHA Financial Tracking Service, December 2010).

In October 2010, the UN Human Rights Council renewed the mandate, first created in 2004, of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan. This was a crucial decision as no other mechanism provides a comprehensive overview of the human rights situation in Sudan (OHCHR, 7 October 2010; AI, 1 October 2010).

The UN's Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) in Khartoum has two deputys for Humanitarian Affairs, in Khartoum and in Juba. Sudan is the only country in the world with two international peacekeeping missions: the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

**Southern Sudan**

UNMIS, established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2005, is primarily charged with implementation of the CPA and is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It has a mandate (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) authorising the use of force to protect civilians. UNAMID, a joint AU/UN peacekeeping mission established by the UNSC in 2007, reports both to the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council.

In April 2010 the cluster approach was formally introduced in seven emergency sectors in Southern Sudan. Each cluster is co-led by a UN agency and an NGO. Until the protection cluster was established in July 2010, protection of civilians was a responsibility of UNMIS. Since then, the coordination structure for protection has been reorganised. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have co-led the cluster. The separation of physical security provided by UNMIS and humanitarian protection provided by the humanitarian actors is now clearer due to the establishment of the protection cluster (UN and partners, 14 July 2010; OCHA, September 2010; NRC, 14 December 2010). The International Council of Voluntary Agencies has commended the protection cluster as “pro-active, dedicated and cooperative …one of the stronger examples of a well-functioning and well-led field-based” protection cluster (ICVA, 8 November 2010).

UNMIS has been criticised for failing to fulfill its mandate to protect civilians on the ground (NGO coalition, 2010, p.15; UN, November 2009, pp.329-330). UNMIS’s protection of civilians (PoC) mandate has been further compromised by dissolution of its Protection Unit and delegation of PoC responsibilities to UNMIS state coordinators who do not necessarily have requisite experience (NRC, December 2010; IDMC interviews with humanitarian actors, September 2010). The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that there has been no head of UNMIS Human Rights for Southern Sudan since August 2010 (IDMC interviews, November 2010). A number of other important protection posts remain unfilled.

The mandate of UNMIS is set to expire in July 2011, the termination date of the CPA process. Its future remains unclear and will be subject to discussions between the Khartoum, GoSS and the UNSC (Sudan Tribune, 18 October 2010).

**Darfur**

UNAMID replaced the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in January 2008, and has currently been authorised until 31 July 2011 to support the implementation of the DPA between government in Khartoum and the faction of the SLM/A loyal to Minni Minnawi. UNAMID's effectiveness has been undermined by the failure of the international community to support the operation with sufficient equipment and troops.
The operational environment in Darfur remained difficult throughout 2010. The government in Khartoum has restricted the movement of peacekeepers and 27 aid workers and peacekeepers have been kidnapped since March 2009: in November 2010, four were still being held captive (OCHA, 9 November 2010). Recent expulsions of individual aid workers have contributed to a climate of operational uncertainty and perhaps made operational agencies more risk averse (IRIN, 5 October 2010).

Under the “New Strategy for Darfur” the government in Khartoum expects UNAMID to play a decisive role in shifting focus from relief to development (GoS, September 2010; Eric Reeves, 8 October 2010). The new strategy also speaks of the central role of UNAMID in IDP return and reconstruction. Some observers have warned that this is outside its mandate and that UNAMID engagement in development work “dangerously confuses the rules of peacekeepers and humanitarians” (Eric Reeves, 8 October 2010).

Note: This is a summary of IDMC’s internal displacement profile on Sudan. The full profile is available online here.
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About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people.

In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

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