African Peace
And
Security Architecture
(APSA)

2010 Assessment Study

“With the adoption of the Constitute Act and the Vision of the African Union (AU), African leaders set the path towards Africa’s integration and sustainable development. To achieve this Vision and objectives set forth in the Act, several Organs were established and mandated to develop and implement priority strategies and programs.”

H.E. JEAN PING, Chairperson
This Report was Commissioned by the African Union’s Peace and Security Department and was Subsequently Adopted by the Third Meeting of the Chief Executives and Senior Officials of the AU, RECs and RMs on the Implementation of the MoU on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security, held from 4-10 November, 2010, Zanzibar, Tanzania
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMANI</td>
<td>African Military Exercise</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>African Union Electoral Support Mission in Comoros</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Africa Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>Bde HQ</td>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Conflict Management Division</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council of the Central Africa</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability and Development Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa standby Force</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Peace Fund</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>ESFTF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force Task Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operation Capability</td>
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<td>FOMAC</td>
<td>ECCAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
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<td>IPOs</td>
<td>Individual Police Officers</td>
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<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Centre</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>LOGBASE</td>
<td>Logistics Base</td>
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<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>Map Exercise</td>
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<td>MPMC</td>
<td>Mission Planning Management Cell</td>
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<td>MOu</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>Operational Planning Process</td>
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<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>PoW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Capability</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RMs</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Strategic Conflict Assessments</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahelo-Saharan States</td>
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<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SRO</td>
<td>Special Representatives of the Organ</td>
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<td>SSF</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Executive Summary

1. This report assesses progress made by the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms in the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It tracks and most importantly, identifies progress in the operationalization of APSA by the aforementioned institutions. Additionally, it identifies specific gaps, needs and priorities with a particular focus on the key components of the APSA i.e. the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. The build-up of the APSA at the AU and the RECs/RMs has made varying degrees of progress and achieved a certain level of operational readiness.

2. The report makes the following conclusions and findings based on the assessment criteria developed for the study. The findings are broken down into the following categories: Vertical and Horizontal Coordination; Sustainability; Subsidiarity; Coherence and Partnership.

3. On vertical coordination, the report notes that the level of coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs has registered some progress, especially as it relates to the operationalization of two key components of the APSA: the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The level of coherence in the development of these components is more advanced than the other three components (the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund). This is partly explained by the fact that the ASF and the CEWS have clearly articulated roadmaps, thereby providing more structured basis for their operationalization.

4. Beyond the ASF and CEWS, there appears to be limited coordination between the other APSA components. At the time of writing this report, there was no direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs, although this is envisaged for the future. Related to this is the feeling that APSA in its current iteration does not adequately cover all existing and emerging security challenges. The critical point here is to ensure the conceptualization of APSA is flexible so that it can be recalibrated as and when needed. At another level, there appears to be a disconnect between the AU PSC and similar organs in the RECs.

5. On horizontal coordination, the report notes that the various APSA components are developing at different paces, the level of horizontal coordination has been limited. For instance, the inter-locking system that is envisaged whereby the decisions of the PSC benefit from information and analysis from other components such as the early warning systems at the AUC.
and the RECs has been limited. At another level, the REC/RM to REC/RM interface has been equally limited. While there is a potential gap presented by overlapping memberships, there are some REC/RM to REC/RM coordinating initiatives on peace and security, which could provide useful lessons on how to enhance inter-REC/RM coordination.

6. The issue of **sustainability** featured prominently at the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, primarily on account of the fact that the operationalization of the APSA has been largely dependent on partner support. This is partly explained by the fact that recruitment of staff at the AU is constrained by the Maputo Structure which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through its regular budget. This approach inevitably raises questions of sustainability, predictability and flexibility. Although this was identified as a major gap, some RECs such as ECOWAS have put in place its own resource mobilization strategy from its Members. For example, the ECOWAS has instituted a Community Levy, a percentage of which is dedicated to the ECOWAS Peace Fund.

7. While the RECs/RMs appears to recognize and accept the principle of **subsidiarity** in their relationship with the AU, there is less clarity on its application. Some RECs/RMs are of the view that, the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency; it should rather play more of a coordination role. The unanswered question is who identifies those specific areas that the AU should be involved in implementing, and those for which it should have a coordination role?

8. There is a general feeling among the RECs/RMs and other actors that the APSA is not **coherent or comprehensive** enough in its current configuration. There are a number of security and related developments that do not fall within the remit of any of the APSA components. The need for improved governance of security forces on the continent through Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rising tide of terrorism, piracy, disaster management, post-conflict reconstruction and broader governance issues were identified as challenges that are not adequately addressed under the current APSA. Meanwhile, there is limited **coherence** between and among the APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs. This is particularly notable with the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the regions.

9. **Partnership** between the AU, RECs/RMs and external multilateral and bilateral actors has emerged as a major feature of efforts to operationalize the APSA. The operationalization process is benefiting from a wide range of partner support for the various components. While the outcome of the support has varied, it has raised questions of sustainability, predictability and ownership. Overall, there was a general feeling of the need to diversify partner support for
the APSA. Moreover, the imposition of ‘one-size-fits all’ conditionalities such as the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed is problematic because not all RECs/RMs have the same absorptive capacity and resource needs. Consequently, the capacity-building efforts in some RECs/RMs have been held back due to weak absorptive capacity or other factors in others.

10. The report makes the following recommendations, which are divided into strategic/cross cutting and APSA component or REC/RM specific.

**STRATEGIC/CROSS CUTTING ISSUES**

11. **Provide Clear and Consistent Strategic Guidance:** The AU should provide strategic guidance for the operationalization of APSA. While the AU has done so on specific components such as the ASF, through the development of the roadmap for its operationalization, it needs to do more for the other components.

12. **Improve Staffing Levels at the AU Commission and REC/RMs:** Related to the above, the staffing level at the AU Commission needs to be significantly increased. To ensure sustainability and to enhance residual capacity, the AU needs to revise the Maputo Structure which currently limits the Commission’s ability to hire staff through its regular budget.

13. **A holistic and Flexible Approach to APSA:** The AU should adopt a holistic, flexible and dynamic approach to its conceptualization of APSA. APSA should not be limited to the five components identified in the Protocol, but should be flexible to factor in emerging political and security dynamics such as governance, transitional justice and SSR.

14. **Establish Stronger Institutional Linkage with the RECs/RMs:** The AU should strengthen its relationship with the RECs and RMs. Despite the existence of the Protocol and the MoU between itself and these entities, the institutional relationship between them remains weak. To deal with this, it would be important to improve on the partnership between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs.

15. **Improve Inter-Departmental Coordination and Cooperation at the AU Commission:** The AU should improve inter-departmental cooperation between its various departments, (especially between Peace and Security and Political Affairs) at the Commission. As at the time of writing this report, there was limited collaboration between these departments. Improving inter-departmental cooperation should be a cornerstone of strengthening and
enhancing the capacity of the AU Commission. The RECs need to take similar steps to reinforce their capacities and the coherence of their programs and activities.

16. **Mainstream Gender Issues in all APSA Components**: The AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that issues of gender are mainstreamed into all the APSA components at the continental and regional levels. Although there is a commitment to do so on paper, the current staffing level of some of the APSA component is male dominated. This is a gap that should be tackled as a matter of urgency.

17. **Increase Collaboration and Partnership with Civil Society**: The AU, RECs/RMs should increase their collaboration with civil society. This is crucial as it would ensure that the operationalization of APSA is in tune with the developments on the ground. To date, several RECs such as ECOWAS have developed strong partnerships with civil society on a range of issues, most notably in the development of its early warning system.

18. **Improve Stakeholder Engagement and Outreach**: APSA is operationalised in a wider context of peace and security on the continent. It cannot achieve its goals without constructive engagement with key actors such as private sector, civil society, think-tanks, universities and other key interest groups.

**THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL**

19. **Clarify PSC Relationship with Panel**: The AU should clarify the role of the Panel of the Wise and its relationship with the PSC, vice-versa. The relationship between the two entities has so far been very limited.

20. **Enforce Criteria for Appointing PSC Members**: While it might be impractical for the Executive Council and Assembly to enforce the full range criteria for membership of the PSC, it should nonetheless engage with the RECs to ensure that their nominees meet at least the basic requirements. Appointing members that do not meet the basic criteria would in the long-run undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the PSC; two principles that should be preserved.

21. **Improve Synergy between PSC and other APSA Components**: Related to the above, the AU should ensure greater synergy between the PSC and other APSA components. To date, there is limited evidence of cooperation between the various entities, a gap that needs to be plugged urgently.
THE CEWS AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS

22. **Provide Additional Analysts for the CEWS and Early Warning**: The AU should increase the number of analyst in qualitative and quantitative terms. The number of analysts in the AU early warning is not adequate and they are overstretched. In the same breadth, special attention should be given to strengthening analytical capacities especially of those RECs that are still in the process of establishing their early warning systems.

23. **Provide joint trainings and skills development**: Develop and deliver specialised training and skills development for AUC/REC staff working on the CEWS and early warning. Joint trainings structured around the mandate of the CEWS (i.e. the PSC protocol) are an important ingredient in maintaining, developing and reinforcing CEWS operationalisation.

24. **Ensure Connectivity between AUC and RECs**: The AUC should work with the RECs to improve and ensure connectivity at all levels including transfer of information from all RECs to the AU Situation Room. An important first step in this direction would to be to improve the existing information technology infrastructure. The AUC support systems (i.e. MIS) must be provided the sufficient infrastructure and capacity to effectively support CEWS.

25. **Increase and Strengthen Collaboration with Other Actors**: The AU and the RECs should increase and where it exist their engagement with other actors such as the United Nations agencies and civil society in Africa and beyond. To date there is no actual collaboration and coordination with the UN and its specialized agencies, other international organizations, this is a gap that needs to be filled.

26. **Increase flexibility and reliability of external support**: The CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs will remain dependent on external support in the near future. To allow continuous strengthening of the early warning systems, the AUC/RECs and partners should enhance the flexibility and reliability of pledged support.

**THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE**

27. **Adopt Binding Legal Instrument with Member States**: The AU, RECs and RMs should adopt binding legal documents with member states for the employment of pledged troops. To date, none of the RECs and RMs have signed a formal MoU with their Members for the deployment of their troops.

28. **Harmonize Membership of Standby Arrangements**: If a country pledges to more than one region there must be distinct units and/or equipments. This
approach would contribute to reducing redundancies and other gaps in the system.

29. **Improve Staffing of PLANELMs at AU and RECs/RMs**: The staffing level of the PLANELMs at the AU and the RECs/RMs should be enhanced. This challenge is particularly pronounced with the police and civilian components of the standby arrangements.

30. **Strengthen Management of the ASF**: Related to the above, the AU should ensure that the proposed structure for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is adopted, an important step in enhancing the management of the ASF.

31. **Address Logistics Gap as Priority**: The AU, RECs and RMs should address the issue of logistics as a matter of priority. The establishment of continental and regional depots is important first step. In order to minimize predictability and sustainability challenges associated with partner support, the AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that they provide the bulk of the resources for their logistics depots.

32. **Provide Guidance and Leadership for Centers for Excellence**: The AU should provide more guidance and leadership for the various centers of excellence in the regions. The AU should engage the centers of excellence so as to ensure that training programs and curriculum is closely aligned to the requirements of the ASF.
THE PANEL OF THE WISE AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS

33. To enhance the role of the Panel, the report makes the following recommendations.

34. **Clarify Role of the Panel**: The role of the Panel in the AU's preventive strategy should be clarified. It is critical to establish whether the Panel will be involved in direct mediation or it would continue to play a supporting role of mediation efforts as has been the case so far.

35. **Include Panel in AU Commission's Structure**: The Panel should be included in the AU Commission's structure so as to give it greater visibility, and most importantly, to ensure that it is supported from the AU regular budget. The current reliance on partner support does not bode well for the sustainability and ownership of the Panel.

36. **Increase Staff Complement for Panel’s Secretariat**: The current staff complement of the Panel’s Secretariat should be increased to at least 5 professional staff and an administrative assistant.

37. **Increase Synergy Between Panel and Other APSA Components**: Efforts should be made to ensure that the Panel is properly linked up with other APSA components at the AU Commission and the RECs. From a practical standpoint, there should be periodic meetings (at least twice a year or as the need may be) between Panel members and their counterparts in the RECs.

38. **Develop Robust Communication Strategy**: The Panel should develop a robust communication strategy as that would give visibility to its engagements. This is particularly critical for its pronouncement on key thematic issues such as questions of election related violence and the peace and justice dilemma.

39. **Establish Dedicated Secretariats for Panel Equivalents in the RECs**: Resources should be provided to RECs to establish dedicated secretariats to support the activities of Council members. This is critical as it would ensure that Council members are properly supported and lessons from their engagements are captured and applied to future engagements.

THE PEACE FUND

40. **Establish Modalities for the use of the Fund**: The AU needs to establish modalities on what and how resources from the Peace Fund can be used for. As of the time of writing this report, there were no modalities in place on the use of the fund, this is a gap needs to be addressed.
41. **Fund Raising for the Peace Fund**: The AU should establish strong resource mobilization strategies and mechanisms for the Peace Fund. Such structures would ensure that resource mobilization is undertaken on a more structured and consistent manner.
Chapter I
The African Peace and Security Architecture: The Akosombo Spirit

Introduction and Background

42. This report assesses progress made by the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms in the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It tracks and most importantly, identifies progress in the operationalization of APSA by the aforementioned institutions. Additionally, it identifies specific gaps, needs and priorities with a particular focus on the key components of the APSA i.e. the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. The build-up of the APSA at the AU and the RECs/RMs has made varying degrees of progress and achieved a certain level of operational readiness; the details of which are discussed in subsequent sections of this report.

The Akosombo Decision
43. It was against this backdrop that the high level consultative meeting between the Chief Executives of the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) and the European Union (EU), on the EU support to the operationalisation of the APSA held in Akosombo, Ghana from 10-11 December, 2009, decided that the AU, RECs and RMs and the EU would conduct an assessment of progress achieved in the operationalisation of APSA and the challenges ahead, with a view to identifying further priorities and capacity needs. The assessment was further endorsed at the meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee on the African Peace Facility (APF) held in Addis Ababa on 3 February 2010 and at the meeting of the 4th Steering Committee (Long Term Capacity Building Programme) held in Addis Ababa on 3–4 March 2010. The Terms of References for the assessment are attached as Annex I of this report.

Purpose & Objectives

44. The purpose of the assessment is to serve as future reference for AU and the RECs/RMs to:

I. Better apprehend what capacities (and up to which quality) still need to be built;
II. Identify what measures of coherence need to be undertaken at the continental and regional levels;

III. To consolidate and further develop their capacity to engage more effectively in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and peace consolidation in the framework of the APSA.

Moreover, the assessment shall aim at:

a) Providing a clear and comprehensive overview of the current qualitative status of the establishment of the different APSA components and their interdependence as well as the quantitative and qualitative state of play of the support structures in the AUC and in the RECs/RMs.

b) Providing a clear and comprehensive picture of partners’ assistance towards the different APSA components and support structures; identifying those areas that are well supported as well as possible gaps.

c) Providing a jointly agreed basis on the steps to be taken and guidance on the way ahead for the full operationalization of APSA, leading to the Roadmap.

Methodology

45. The assessment used both primary and secondary sources of information in its data collection process. The assessment builds upon existing mappings and reports, including the outcomes of the Regional Seminars with the RECs organised by the European Commission. The primary sources included policy documents, commissioned reports and interviews, while the secondary sources involved reviewing existing literature on the subject matter. The assessment team had extensive discussions with various experts and officials both at the AU Commission and in the RECs/RMs. The team travelled to all the RECs/RMs beginning with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) followed by the North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), followed by the Eastern Africa Regional Standby Brigade (EASBRICOM), the East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), then Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The team used a set of generic and specific open ended questions for the interviews (see Annex II). The generic questions were supplemented by specific questions on the various components of APSA which were tailored to suit the specificity of the REC/RM concerned.
Background and Legal Framework

46. In pursuance of the objectives of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU entered into force on 26 December, 2003. The Protocol embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security that includes conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace building, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices and intervention and humanitarian action and disaster management. At its heart, is APSA which is intended to give the AU the necessary instruments to fulfil the tasks set out in the Constitutive Act and the Protocol establishing the PSC.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

47. The various APSA instruments described above are depicted in the diagram below:

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Figure 1: APSA architecture
48. In the preceding diagram, illustrates the interwoven relationship between the major players in the maintenance of global peace and security as the UN, AU Commission and the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms. Mention must be made of the fact that the APSA emerged out of a desire by African Leaders to establish an operational structure to execute decisions taken in accordance with the authority conferred by Article 5 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. At the heart of the architecture is the PSC which was established as the standing decision making Organ to be supported by the Commission, Panel of the Wise, CEWS, an ASF and a Special Fund. The functions of these as mandated in the Protocol underscore the importance of interdependence and synergy between the pillars. Hence in the operationalisation of APSA there is also a parallel process of setting up functioning systems in the RECs/RMs. For the system to function effectively, it requires interaction and synergy among the pillars. It comes out clearly from the given mandates that there is an expectation for a synergistic linkage between the pillars.

49. Article 12 of the Protocol provides for early warning information provided to the Chairperson through the Continental Early Warning System. This is meant to provide the PSC with an opportunity of taking the required action after due consideration of the issues. The Panel of the Wise could be deployed to support efforts of the Peace and Security Council (Article 11). In situations of grave magnitude as envisaged in Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act could trigger some form of intervention. Hence, the African Standby Force was established to deal with such an eventualities (Article 13). Therefore, the rapid deployment capacity becomes a critical milestone in the operationalisation and strengthening of the APSA. Although the Pillars could be at differing stages of development, the build up of APSA has made progress. The Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security has placed the operationalisation and strengthening of APSA as a joint priority, leading to the Akosombo decision.

**The Peace and Security Council (PSC)**

50. As stated above, the assessment of progress for each of the components is guided by a set of generic and specific questions. For example, the report attempts to address questions such as, what are the main objectives, priorities and needs in the short, medium and long-term? Are the priorities identified adequate for the requisite support? Additionally, there are questions relating to cooperation between the AU PSC and similar decision making organs in the regions on one hand and the Military Staff Committee on the other. Moreover, it addresses issues such as, what level and form of support is required to ensure that the PSC can implement its mandate. Beyond the specificity of each component there are issues concerning the relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, particularly on ways to strengthen coordination and cooperation between the AUC, PSC and RECs/RMs. For example, what measures could be adopted to improve the interaction between the AU and RECs, especially in information sharing and implementation of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Moreover, there are other cross-cutting issues that need to be addressed. Meanwhile, partners concerns about coordination and streamlining have been raised in the past and it remains to be seen how far these matters have been resolved have.

Panel of Wise
51. As provided for in the ToRs for this study, an attempt will be made to capture some of the salient outcomes of the recent mapping exercise on the Panel of the Wise, which was undertaken with the support of the government of the United Kingdom. The focus of this chapter would be primarily to assess how the cooperation and synergies between the Panel of the Wise and other structure of APSA at the continental and regional level could be supported or facilitated.

Continental Early Warning System (CEWs)
52. Building on the results of the recent mapping exercise of the CEWS, this chapter would among other things; first, it assesses the priority needs (medium and long) of regional early warning structures, with a focus on ensuring the coordination/cooperation/coherence between AU and REC/RMs. Second, it delves into the nature and extent of international partners’ support towards regional early warning system, identifying areas of emphasis as well as possible gaps against the framework for the operationalization of CEWS. Third, it tries to establish the extent to which connectivity between the early warning units in the regions and the CEWS is working, and how it could be strengthened. Finally, it assesses the analytical capacity of the CEWS and the level of support needed, and the level of reciprocal information sharing between CEWS and other APSA components such as the ASF.

The African stand by force (ASF)
53. The full operational of the ASF will undoubtedly revolve around key challenges such as the multidimensionality of the ASF, the level of coordination and cooperation between the continental and regional level, force generation, capacity related issues in terms of planning, procedures, SOPS, logistics and equipment. In light of this, the chapter attempts to determine how the full operationalization of the ASF could be enhanced in qualitative and quantitative terms.

54. The report is divided into seven chapters, the bulk of which are devoted to each of the five pillars of APSA, namely the PSC, the CEWS, Panel of the Wise, the ASF and the Peace Fund. The remaining chapters deal with issues
of coordination and coherence, the main findings and conclusions, and a set of recommendations on strategic/cross cutting and APSA component specific issues. The recommendations will be subsequently developed into a road in consultation with the AU, RECs and RM. It is hoped that the roadmap would serve as a framework and reference point for EU and other partner support.
Chapter II

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Similar Decision-Making Structures in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

Introduction and Background

55. The Peace and Security Council (PSC), the most visible component of the APSA to date, was established by the first Summit of the AU in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, as the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crisis situations in Africa. It is supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund, collectively referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Among other things, the objectives of the PSC are to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property.

56. The fifteen members of the PSC are elected on the basis of equal rights, 10 are elected for a two year period, while the remaining five are elected for a three year period on the principle of equitable representation of the five regions: North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa.

57. Unlike the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where the five Permanent Members wield the veto, none of the fifteen members of the PSC have a veto; all members are entitled to one vote each. However, the Protocol took account of the need for regional balance so as to minimize tensions and increase the potential for consensus in dealing with contentious issues such as military intervention. In addition, it factored in the power balance among its membership by emphasizing the need for members of the PSC to not only be willing to participate in resolving conflicts, but most importantly, to possess the necessary political, military, financial and diplomatic muscle to do so. However, so far, this particular principle has not been adhered to on a consistent basis as some members of the PSC lack the aforementioned requirements. For instance, some current PSC members do not have Defence Attaches in their missions to the AU, and as such, send civilian officials to attend meetings of the Military Staff Committee (MSC); a pivotal advisory organ of the PSC.

58. In a move designed to deal with some of the complications that rendered the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) redundant, the PSC’s decision-making is vested in the Permanent Representatives Council who are required to meet at least twice every month. However, given the unpredictable nature of conflicts, the PSC has on average been meeting at least five times a month since 2006. This has added an enormous burden on the members of the Council especially those with very skeletal staff at their embassies. Moreover, it has increased the workload of the PSC Secretariat, which is increasingly being requested to backstop members with limited capacity, compounding the Secretariat’s already overstretched resources. The other organs of the PSC i.e. the Council of Ministers and Heads of State and Government, are required to meet at least once a year.

59. Needless to say, the PSC is the central pillar of the APSA. Operationalized in March 2004, amidst conflicts and crisis then ravaging various parts of Africa, the PSC, in a short time span of seven years, has made notable achievements in addressing the various conflict and crisis situations. In addition, the PSC has significantly improved its methods of work with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of its work. The major improvements relate to the following:

- timeliness in convening meetings to address conflict and crisis situations;
- better organized elections for the membership of the PSC;
- increasing coordination and cooperation with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms in addressing conflict and crisis situations;
- periodic convening of retreats to brainstorm on policy issues and emerging challenges to peace and security;
- laying down the foundation for interaction with civil society organizations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- increasing cooperation with the UN Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee in addressing conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

**Regional Decision Making Structures**

60. Just as the AU, efforts are underway to develop PSC-like structures by the various RECs. For instance, since 2000, COMESA has had a Committee on Peace and Security, which meets at least annually to consider peace and security issues. All Member States are represented on the Committee at ministerial level. However, the Committee is not a decision-making structure.
It can only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers which will be subsequently forwarded to the Authority for a final decision; thus, the Authority is the supreme decision-making organ of COMESA. The Bureau serves as the standing decision-making organ that ensures a regular interface between the Authority, Committee and Secretariat on matters of peace and security. It also liaises with the AU PSC and other RECs in the region. Perhaps, given COMESA’s comparative advantage in trade-related issues, its cooperation with the PSC and other RECs in this area is still evolving. The tripartite partnership between COMESA, SADC and EAC would undoubtedly contribute to harnessing the resources and initiatives of the three RECs on issues of peace and security in particular, and more broadly.

61. Unlike other RECs, IGAD does not have an equivalent of the PSC that is distinct from its overall political organs: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the Council of Ministers, and there are no plans to constitute one in the near future. Moreover, it does not have the equivalent of the MSC, but an ad hoc panel of Chiefs of Defence Staff has been convened to provide advice on military issues such as its planned peace operation for Somalia which never materialized.

62. In Southern Africa, the troika of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is the decision making organ of the institution on issues of politics, defence and security. Consisting of three members – the outgoing, the serving and incoming members, the troika of the Organ is supported by the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), whose sub-committee on Defence is the equivalent of the MSC. The Organ is one of the oldest institutions in SADC; it dates back to the Front Line States (FLS) which was established to coordinate support for the anti-colonial struggle in the region. Unlike the PSC, decisions of the troika of the Organ are forwarded to the Summit for final approval. While consensus worked well within SADC, the true test of that consensus would only come when troika makes decisions on military intervention, a sensitive issue in the region. Institutionally, there is no formalized relationship between the troika of the Organ and the PSC, making collaboration on conflict situations such as the ongoing crisis in Madagascar problematic. There is evidence that the cooperation between SADC and the AU in finding solutions to the political crisis in that country was very rocky in the initial stages, perhaps, demonstrating lack of coordination between the two institutions.

63. West Africa, perhaps more than any other region, has one of the most robust and proactive decision-making organs, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). It has taken very intrusive and binding decisions including the deployment of peace operations to Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia in 2003, and has suspended several of its members from its Council for failing to comply with
its norms. For instance, as at the time of writing this report, Guinea and Niger remained suspended from ECOWAS due to the military takeovers in both countries. The suspensions are inline with the ECOWAS policy of zero-tolerance for unconstitutional change of government. Institutionally, the MSC is supported by the Defence and Security Council (DSC), one of the most active components of the ECOWAS peace and security architecture. Despite the pivotal role of the MSC in dealing with issues of peace and security, its cooperation with the PSC has been sporadic and ad hoc. However, when they have cooperated as was the case with the extension of President Laurent Gbagbo’s term in office in 2006, the outcome was positive in the sense that the two institutions spoke with one voice. Unfortunately, that kind of cooperation has not been replicated on a consistent basis. For instance, ECOWAS and the AU appeared uncoordinated in their response to the ongoing crisis in Niger, which was triggered by former President Mamadu Tandja’s attempt to perpetuate himself in power through a discredited referendum, which subsequently triggered the military takeover.

64. For its part, CEN-SAD is in the process of establishing a Peace Council that will consist of 10 members, which like its counterparts in other regions, will meet at three levels: Summit, Ministerial and Ambassadorial. The Peace Council is to be supported by a CEN-SAD Military Staff Committee, which would serve as an advisory organ of the Peace Council. However, at the time of the visit for this report, none of these structures were operational. The creation of these structures was pending the approval of the CEN-SAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism which was adopted in 2004 but had only been ratified by three members by July 2010.

65. Meanwhile, the PSC equivalent in ECCAS, the Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale, known under the French acronym COPAX, was established as the organ for political and military dialogue in Central Africa. Approved in February 2000, the Protocol establishing COPAX formally entered into force in January 2004. COPAX has two decision making organs, namely the Heads of States and Governments Conference and the Council of Ministers composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers in charge of Defense and Security. The Defense and Security Commission, the Political and Diplomatic Action Directorate, the early warning mechanism of Central Africa known under the French acronym MARAC and the multidimensional force of Central Africa known under the French acronym FOMAC are the technical and action organs of COPAX. Its mandate covers a wide spectrum of issues including ensuring peace, security and stability in the region. It is also responsible for authorizing the deployment of multidimensional peace operations in the region.
66. ECCAS plans to establish a Committee of ambassadors along the lines of the Panel of the Wise, to augment its preventive diplomacy. Operationally, as at the time of writing this report, there was no evidence of any partnership between COPAX and the PSC or with any other REC for that matter. This exposes a fundamental gap in the emerging continental peace and security architecture especially given the fact that Central Africa plays host to a large number of conflicts and fragile states. There is no gainsaying therefore that, peacemaking efforts in the region would be significantly boosted by a strong partnership between ECCAS, the AU and other relevant stakeholders.

**Progress, Challenges and Constraints**

67. Operationally, the PSC has been the most visible component of the emerging Peace and Security architecture. It has held nearly 250 meetings and briefing sessions on a wide range of issues, demonstrating two things. First, the growing commitment of AU member states to tackle conflicts on the continent. Second, the frequency with which it has met demonstrates the fragility of the security situation in some of its members. At another level, the PSC has convened three retreats on some key thematic and procedural issues in Dakar, Senegal in 2007, in Livingstone, Zambia in December 2008 and in Ezulwini, Swaziland in September, 2009. During these meetings, the PSC adopted its working methods, the Livingstone Formula defining its relationship with civil society organizations and how to enhance the implementation of sanctions in situations involving unconstitutional change of government.

68. In addition to the above, the PSC has authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS) and more recently Somalia (AMISOM). The deployment of peacekeepers in these theatres has exposed a major gap between the PSC’s willingness to authorize such missions and the AU’s ability to implement them. Shortage of resources -- human and material -- has emerged as a major shortfall. How the AU deals with this mandate-resource gap would determine the continued credibility of the PSC, since decisions that are not backed by resources would in the long-run erode its credibility.

69. At another level, there is a potential disconnect between the AU and the regions when it comes to electing members of the PSC, as despite the laid down criteria, election of members rests with the regions. This limits the ability of the AU to enforce its principles as the regions have adopted their own formula for nominating members to the PSC. For instance, some regions have agreed to have one of their members occupy the three year seat almost on a permanent basis, thus, creating a pseudo-Permanent member, but without any veto powers. The gap between the AU and the regions on the criteria for electing members creates a dilemma and raises profound questions. First, to
what extent is it realistic for the AU to enforce its criteria for electing members to the PSC? Second, under what circumstances should the AU reject candidates nominated by their regions? Finally, what does this gap say about the principle of subsidiarity that is meant to underpin the AU’s relations with the RECs?

70. Although an exhaustive response to these questions is beyond the remit of this study, the report nonetheless notes the following. While it is desirable to enforce the laid down criteria, it is unrealistic to enforce all of them given the huge resource disparities between AU member states. For instance, the capacities of members with enormous financial and human resources cannot be compared to some of the smaller and less well-resourced but equally important members of the AU.

71. Meanwhile, there was evidence that several member states have strengthened the staff complement in their missions to the AU following their appointment to the PSC. The cases of Ghana and Uganda are glaring examples in this respect. Prior to their membership of the PSC, both countries had no defence attaches, however, they have since deployed these officials in their embassies in Addis Ababa; a practice that should be encouraged. At the heart of the challenges of enforcing the criteria for membership of the Council is the principle of subsidiarity, which is meant to be one of the guiding principles of the relationships between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The regions, which have adopted their own formulas for electing members to the PSC in some instances, appear to be driven more by political bargaining than complying with the criteria in the Protocol; a situation that exposes gaps in the application of the subsidiarity principle.

72. However, the one principle that the PSC appears to have consistently enforced is the one that bars its members from participating in decision-making on situations where they have a direct involvement. The Protocol stipulates that PSC members that are party to a conflict or a situation that is under consideration by the PSC should recuse themselves from the discussion and decision-making process on the particular case. This principle has been largely adhered to, with some few exceptions. For instance, when Sudan was a member of the PSC it was allowed to make presentations on the crisis in Darfur, it was not allowed to participate in the decision-making process. The AU needs to clarify what constitutes a party to conflict. Given the cross-border nature of most conflicts, there has been situations where some members of the PSC who were deemed to be party to a conflict insisted on participating in PSC meetings on the basis that from their standpoint they are not directly involved in the given conflict situation. If not properly addressed, this issue would in the long run undermine the credibility of the PSC as an impartial actor in conflict situations.
73. Institutionally, the PSC is mandated to work with the Chairperson of the Commission, who will assist it in carrying out its mandate. Although the Commission has been providing the PSC with regular reports on progress and challenges on issues of peace and security on the continent, what has been missing is the link between the PSC and the Panel of the Wise, which is discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this report. As the time of writing, there was no formalized link between the two organs.
74. At another level, the role of the monthly rotating chair of the PSC vis-à-vis the substantive work of the PSC was discussed during its first retreat in Dakar in 2007. Until very recently, the role of the chair has been limited to chairing PSC sessions with minimal input either to the development of the agenda, work programme or more substantive aspects such as the drafting of reports and Communiqués. Consequently, the chair has played more of a facilitation role instead of actually driving the process by providing clear guidance and input to PSC meetings. The net result has been enormous burden on the PSC Secretariat which has had the additional responsibility of supporting PSC chairs with limited staff. In the long-run, the rather symbolic role of the chair could rob the PSC of the ownership of its programs and activities. While the AU Commission appears to have filled the gap by providing administrative and other forms of support to PSC meetings, a development that could be sustainable in the short-term, it is not sustainable in the long-term given that the Secretariat is understaffed as well.

75. At the time of writing this report, the PSC Secretariat consisted of 4 professional staff, one secretary and an administrative assistant. However, even this limited number is considered a boost from the number of staff approved through the Maputo Structure, which only provided for 2 professional staff: the Secretary to PSC, a P2 official and an administrative assistant, a figure that does not even match the more mundane responsibilities of the Secretariat such as convening PSC meetings. The skeletal staff level has been exacerbated by the growing role of the PSC in dealing with a wide range of existing and emerging security issues. Despite being overstretched, the PSC Secretariat appears to have been quite efficient in carrying out its numerous tasks. However, its continued effectiveness cannot be guaranteed with its current staff levels and ever-growing mandate.

76. Meanwhile, even if the Secretariat’s proposed increased in the number of personnel from its current 4 staff posts to 13 is approved, that still pales in comparison to the UN’s Security Council Affairs Division with a staff complement of over 60. Needless to say, the disparity between the two support organs of the PSC and the UNSC is quite stark. To put this in perspective, the Security Council Affairs Division which has ten times more staff than the PSC Secretariat is limited to a purely support function, while, the PSC Secretariat with its skeletal staff has increasingly assumed a broader role due to some of the issues discussed above. This situation is even more problematic because the PSC Secretariat does not have a legal expert
despite the fact it is dealing with a lot of issues that require legal interpretation. This is not sustainable and needs to be addressed urgently.

77. The substantive challenges are compounded by what would ordinarily be considered mundane issues. For example, convening a PSC meeting is contingent on at least two considerations. First, is the availability of a conference room, the PSC is yet to have a dedicated meeting room with all the necessary translation equipment. Second, is the availability of translators, the PSC does not have a dedicated pool of translators, and as such has to rely on those from the Commission’s Conference Services whose pool of translators is limited as well. That the Secretariat has to rely on this department is problematic because it is often overcommitted and most importantly, its working methods are not flexible. For instance, while the bulk of PSC meetings are determined by the exigencies of events, the conference services department requires prior booking of translators, an impractical situation from the standpoint of the PSC.

78. That most of the 4 professional staff of the PSC Secretariat were hired through partner support raises questions of sustainability. The reluctance of member states to approve new posts, in spite of the overwhelming evidence of the need to do so, brings to the fore questions about their level of commitment to the full operationalization of the APSA. It is obvious that competing demands for resources in the respective member states in the face of the global economic crisis, has resulted in dampened political interest especially as it relates to approving more posts for some of the APSA components and the wider AU Commission. So far, bi-lateral and multi-lateral partner support has fielded the void however, this suffers from two defects. First, partner support is often not predictable and flexible and in the interest of the recipients, and second, it is not clear how long such support can be sustained.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC)

79. Established under Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the MSC is mandated to advise the PSC on questions relating to military and security issues that are on its agenda. Consisting of senior military officers of PSC members, the chair of the MSC is held concurrently by the same country that is chairing the PSC. Since its establishment in 2004, the MSC has been engaged in providing advice on the PSC’s authorized peace operations in Burundi, Sudan (Darfur), Comoros and currently Somalia.

80. The MSC like the other APSA components, is confronted at least four inter-related challenges. First, and as stated above, at the time of writing this report, the MSC should have been chaired by Equatorial Guinea however; it could
not because it does not have a senior military officer in its embassy in Addis Ababa. In fact, three other current members of the PSC do not have a defence attaché in their embassies in Addis. This is a critical gap as it undercuts the effective functioning of the Committee. Second, and somewhat related to the above, the MSC does not meet on a regular basis due to lack of guidance on its working methods. This is problematic given that the PSC is seized with several conflict situations that require the involvement of the MSC. Third, the MSC cannot address civilian and police issues given its pure military composition. This deprives the PSC of the multi-dimensional advice that is required when it contemplates authorizing peace operations. Finally, there is lack of clarity on the institutional affiliation of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) in operational terms. In other words, it is not clear whether the affairs of the MSC, an Organ of the PSC, fall within the remit of the PSC Secretariat, the main supporting organ of the PSC or the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). From a practical standpoint and in the interest of greater coherence and synergy, the MSC should be managed by the PSC Secretariat since it is the main interface between the PSC and the Commission.

Conclusion

81. That the AU’s PSC has emerged as the most visible component of the APSA is not in doubt, however, the interface between the PSC and similar organs in the RECs has been limited to date. Moreover, the interaction between the PSC and other APSA components has not been optimal, primarily due to the fact some of the components are still being operationalized. Institutional support to the PSC, whose agenda of activities has grown exponentially, is limited. The Secretariat is overstretched in the face of growing demands on it to support both the PSC and some of its members with limited capacity in their embassies. The structures in the RECs are confronted by similar challenges, especially with respect to support structures at their headquarters.
Chapter III

The Continental Early Warning System

**Introduction and Background**

82. The Continental Early Warning System is established as one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture within Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. Article 12 specifies that the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) should consist of an observation and monitoring centre (to be known as the ‘Situation Room’). The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action.

**Progress and Challenges in the Operationalization of the CEWS**

83. Significant progress has been achieved in the operationalization of CEWS since the adoption of the Framework for the Operationalization of CEWS in December 2006. Since then the system has been able to provide reliable and up-to-date information on potential, actual and post-conflict situations. The CEWS have registered important outputs and achievements, which among others include:

- Successful development of the CEWS methodology through a consultative process with all involved stakeholders;

- Development of data collection and analysis tools and the elaboration of a software licensing agreement between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs.

- Strengthened coordination and collaboration between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs.

- Refurbishment of the Situation Room. Infrastructure upgrade and installment of the necessary equipments, including the live monitoring software (i.e. LIVEMON in the office of the AUC Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Director for Peace and Security).

- Increased expertise and analytical skills of the CEWS and the early warning systems of most RECs. This includes putting in place some Early Warning Officers, Analysts and Situation Room staff.
Information collection and monitoring tools are operational and data can be accessed through a specifically developed CEWS information portal.

84. Full operationalization of CEWS so that it effectively supports conflict prevention, mediation and preventive diplomacy is still to be realized. Moreover, uneven development and in some cases, slow development of early warning systems in RECs ultimately hinders higher level operation.

85. The 2010 APSA assessment found that automated data collection and reporting are relatively advanced at the level of CEWS. This is also the case at ECOWARN and CEWARN. In most other RECs, progress has been achieved in establishing policy frameworks, specific concepts and approaches to early warning. Data collection and reporting for early warning is yet to be effective in CEN-SAD, EAC and COMESA.

86. Continuous news monitoring, summarised in the Africa News Brief and Daily News Highlights, are circulated by the AUC to a wider network of subscribers including all RECs by email. Collection of data from stakeholders is progressing but still needs substantial efforts to be completed.

87. Conflict analysis and development of response options are at an incipient level in some regions. Together with the need for sharing information with stakeholders, analysis and response options are the biggest challenges. Only IGAD is building up an integrated response mechanism at this stage. The CEWARN response includes elements of mediation at local level. Processes and templates for Early Warning Reports that include policy options are in place at the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD Substantial efforts are needed to strengthen the way in which policy makers’ access, use and decide upon the response options developed by analysts.

88. As part of efforts to enhance the data collection and information gathering capacity of the Situation Room and Monitoring Units, the AU and RECs are in the process of developing various software modules to facilitate the collection, sharing and distribution of information within the AU (including PSOs and field offices) and with the RECs. In order to put in place the overall IT requirements of the CEWS, the following items need to be put in place.

**IT Equipment and Software**

89. To enhance the data collection and analysis capacity of the CEWS, the Conflict Management Division (CMD) in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EC have developed a new tool called the Africa Media Monitor (AMM). The AMM is an automated tool for data collection and
distribution. This software is currently hosted at the JRC and is accessible to the African Union via the internet.

Connectivity between AU the RECs

90. The PSC requires that the monitoring and observation centres of the RECs shall be directly linked to the AU Situation Room. As a follow-up to this decision an AU team carried out a site assessment mission to all RECs and submitted recommendations (technical and financial) on how to ensure and facilitate the connectivity of the early warning systems of the RECs to the Situation Room through the AU VSAT, which includes:

i. Current bandwidth enhancement (at least 4GB)
ii. Acquisition of hardware equipments

The AU Commission's management information systems (MIS) needs the necessary infrastructure and capacity to effectively support CEWS.

Human Resources at CEWS and early warning systems of the RECs

91. The Situation Room is responsible for monitoring situations of potential, actual and post-conflict situations in Africa. In order to accomplish this task currently there are 10 Situation Room Assistants working on a 24/7 shift basis. As the number of staff is not adequate to cover all regions in Africa, additional staff is required.

92. A shortage of staff can also be detected within the early warning systems of the RECs. Without substantial staff reinforcement it is questionable whether the monitoring units in certain RECs will be established.

93. Timelines and resources for recruitment at the AUC have improved over time but must be further improved. In 2006, an attempt at recruitment had to be deferred indefinitely. The present recruitment (5 analysts) was launched in August 2009, approved in December and should see analysts in place by October 2010. The other required staff spelled out in the CEWS roadmap should be contracted as soon as possible. Recruitment has generally been affected negatively by external project transitions and funding cycles. New pooled funds should give greater consistency and sustainability.

Training

94. The CEWS intends to further strengthen relations with the early warning systems of the RECs by undertaking joint trainings and staff exchange programmes in particular to enhance the analytic capacity of staff. Development and delivery of specialised and customized trainings for staff
dealing with CEWS and early warning systems in the RECs should be given priority in the coming years. Sustained skills training and capacity building for staff dealing with early warning in the AUC and RECs are required for effective operationalisation of CEWS and the early warning systems in the RECs.

*Engagement with Decision Makers*

95. Efforts to strengthen engagement with senior management and political decision makers in some of the RECs remain embryonic, a situation that should be addressed.

*Coordination and Collaboration with the AUC/RECs*:

96. Technical meetings between the CEWS and the early warning systems of RECs are taking place 3 times a year. Continued prioritisation of these quarterly technical meetings (hosted by the RECs) is required to strengthen expertise and promote coordination and collaboration.

97. An incremental, pragmatic approach is needed to gradually build functional and result-oriented partnerships with relevant international organizations. Coordination and collaboration with the UN, its agencies and other international organizations should be continued.

*Coordination and collaboration with stakeholders as mentioned in the PSC Protocol*

98. The consultation between CEWS and CSOs foreseen for September 2009 has never happened. The AU is willing to engage but has problems knowing who to engage with because of the diversity of civil society and the very different level of development in different states and regions. The very different attitude towards CSOs and think tanks across regions and within African countries cause challenges for the AUC and RECs.

99. As part of efforts to strengthen the capacity of CEWS to gather data and successfully operationalise APSA, it is imperative that the AU/RECs reach out to stakeholders as mentioned in the PSC Protocol. Such stakeholders can provide valuable information, expertise and increase awareness of CEWS and the work carried out by AUC and the RECs. Such cooperation can contribute to better use of available information and early warning by decision-makers and should be considered a strategic priority in the coming years.

*Partner Support*

100. Different kinds of support for the CEWS were drawn from a relatively small number of donors. Programmed / budget funding is provided by EU, UNDP,
GTZ and DANIDA. Flexible, ad-hoc funding is also provided by UNDP, UK GTZ and USAID.

101. In general donor support has been forthcoming with adequate timing and at sufficient levels. In particular at the level of the AUC and to a lesser extent in regional organisations. The AUC has been quite selective in establishing partnerships and in mobilizing resources. This has proven more difficult for the regional organisations. The major gaps are linked to the reliance on external support. Delays and non disbursement of pledged partner support have caused substantial problems, in particular during 2010. Moreover, most partners tend to prioritise one or two organisations rather than continent-wide CEWS support based on a pragmatic approach which match the advancement of the individual organisations.

102. Financial sustainability is a challenge at this stage of CEWS operationalisation. The large majority of the Continental and Regional Organisations advance due to availability of external partner support. Managerial and political sustainability and commitment from the AU/RECs and member states are not in question but it needs to be nurtured and possibly reinforced.

103. All in all, the collaboration between CEWS and the Early warning systems of the RECs and donor partners to build capacity for the operationalization of CEWS has been by and large successful. The critical success factors were: A relatively clear definition of goals, i.e. the specifications of the system (steered by AUC through a consultative process), Ownership and capacity within AUC to align support to its own strategies and processes, a diversity of resources (programmed and flexible funds, partnerships, expertise), donor partners were able to engage CEWS at the operational level for discussions on CEWS requirements and multi-year commitments of key donors.
Chapter IV
The African Standby Force (ASF)

Introduction and Background

104. The first Assembly of the African Union which met in Durban, South Africa from 9 to 10 July 2002 adopted the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council that included provisions on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee as well as other instruments. Article 13 of the PSC Protocol provides that ‘...on an African Standby Force shall be established. Such force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary components with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at an appropriate notice’.

105. The ASF will consist of five Regional Standby Capabilities. The PSC is charged with the responsibility for general supervision and policy guidance of the brigades of the African Standby Force. The role of the ASF is to provide Peacekeeping forces on a high level readiness capable of rapid deployment in response to a request by the UN or the AU or a given region. It is the responsibility of the REC/RMs to prepare their capabilities as mechanisms for the AU Commission to achieve the Peace and Security initiatives with respect to peace, security and stability. The ASF should thus be able to act on an AU or UN mandate to breach the gap between the eruption of violence/conflict and the deployment of UN forces. It is the responsibility of the AU to evaluate the readiness of the regional Planelms, HQ and ASF regional brigades in consultation with REC Planelms. This involves certification which is the official...
recognition that the unit or force component meets the defined standards and criteria, therefore capable of performing the mandated mission.

106. The main areas of certification are manpower, equipment, training and sustainability. Member States are responsible for preparation and achievement of prescribed standards and readiness on the basis of the ASF operational standards. There is a requirement for the brigades to develop capabilities and a force generation process.

**Policy Framework for ASF**


108. Paragraph 15 of the policy framework outlines the following scenario:

**SCENARIOS AND TIMELINES FOR DEPLOYMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment Requirement (From mandate resolution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/Regional military advice to a political mission</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN Mission</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and Preventive Deployment Missions (and Peace Building)</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU Peacekeeping Force for complex multidimensional Peace Keeping Missions including those involving low level Spoilers</td>
<td>90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.</td>
<td>14 days with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

109. The PSC is the primary authority for recommending the deployment of Peace Support Operations. Only the Summit can authorize Scenario 6 interventions. The PSC is charged with the responsibility for general supervision and policy guidance of the brigades of the ASF.

110. At the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council meeting in Sirte, Libya from 28th June to 2nd of July 2005, the Council stressed the need for the
effective operationalisation of the various segments of the African Peace and Security Architecture including the African Standby Force.

Road Map

- **Phase III** (2009) proposes an Exercise JOINT BRIGADES to validate the procedures of the ASF, including the Continental Peace and Security Architecture, including the ASF.
- **Phase I** (2003 to 2006) has successfully provided the baseline documentation Tools.

111. The ASF Roadmap required that scenarios 1 to 4 be addressed in phase 1 by June, 2006. In Phase 2 which covers the period from June, 2006 to 2010, the five regional Brigades are required to be fully operational. In this phase, the Brigades are required to fully develop capacity to address scenarios 4 to 6.

- **Phase 1** focused on individual training that was to be conducted in Member states level, PLANELM HQs level, Brigade Headquarters and LOG Base level.
- **Phase 2**, Individual Groups i.e. PLANELM, Brigade HQs, Logistic Base and units were supposed to train collectively.
- **Phase 3** culmination of collective training conducted in form of seminars, joint CPX and joint FTX (AMANI).
The overall status of readiness of the ASF is as follows:

### ASF Current Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmarks</th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>SADC</th>
<th>EASF</th>
<th>NARC</th>
<th>ECCAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Framework documents</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>In Process</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PLANELEM</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bde HQ</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pledged Units</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Log Depots</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Centres of Excellence</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bde Operational</td>
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<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Police component</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Regional Standby Arrangements

The East African Standby Force (EASF)

*Introduction and Background*

112. The name ‘EASBRIG’ was changed to ‘EASF’ Eastern Africa Standby Force, during the 6th Extraordinary Council Ministers meeting held in Nairobi Kenya, on 18 June 2010, to show existence of multi dimensionality. However, the force traces its roots back to Jinja, Uganda 16-17 February 2004 during a meeting of Eastern Africa Chief of Defense Staff. The meeting of the Chief of Defense Staff discussed the Policy Framework for the establishment of EASBRIG as one of the regional standby forces. The Policy Framework document was approved by meeting of Heads of State and Government of the region held in Kigali, Rwanda from 9-10 September 2004. Member States agreed in 2004 that EASBRIG would operate on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Accordingly, an MOU on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade was signed on 11 April 2005. The MOU entered into force on 11 May 2005 in accordance with article 14.
113. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda are the active members of EASBRIG. The absence of one Regional Economic Community (REC) covering these ten countries led the Heads of State and Government of the Region during their meeting on 28th January 2007, to authorize the creation of an Independent Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) to serve as the new Secretariat for the EASF.

**EASF Overview**

114. In the absence of a home REC, the Legal Framework of the EASF, is an MOU signed by all Members States and the EASBRICOM at the Summit level. The EASF operates with the vision to contribute to regional and continental peace and stability, through a fully operational and multidimensional joint and integrated Eastern Standby Force ready for deployment by 2015, with an initial operational capability by 2010.

115. In this regard, EASF has developed a Strategic Development Plan 2010-2015 approved during the 2nd Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Moroni, Comoros, in March 2010.

116. The Standby Force Headquarters, located in Nairobi, Kenya, is responsible for generating and preparing the Standby Brigade in liaison with the Planning Element. It is composed of military and civilian staff on secondment from Members States. The Planning Element (PLANELM), located also in Nairobi, serves as a multi-national and multi-dimensional full time planning headquarters of EASF (Military, Police and Civilian Components fully operationalized). All 10 EASF Members States are represented within the
Planelm. Coordinating with the Police and Civilian components, the PLANELM plans, trains and monitors EASF in order to ensure the readiness of the different units.

117. The PLANELM is doing multifarious capacity building activities within itself as well as within Members States of the region to ensure that all the multidimensional elements of the Force are on standby in their respective countries for AU peace support operations. In this regard, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) located opposite of the Standby Force Headquarters in Nairobi, is of a great assistance. The Force when fully established will be composed of elements contributed by all Members countries. All pledged Military, Police and Civilian personnel are being trained properly. The Logistic Base (LOGBASE) located in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia remains to be operational. There is presently no storage available and the support process is being developed. The LOGBASE is a central regional Base for sub-depots and maintaining, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure. The Brigade Headquarters located in Addis-Ababa, has only three professional staff. It is a very skeletal structure which is in line with the AU’s vision of a peace–time Brigade Headquarters.

Strengths, Challenges and Weaknesses

118. Increase in regional internal tension such as: Internal tensions and conflicts in the Member States, Piracy in Somalia; Inadequate funding to support all EASF activities; Shortfall in regional contribution to forces due to inability of Member States to commit forces to EASF; Constraints in political, diplomatic and military regional cohesion; Coordination of the various Structures of the EASF (the Bde HQs, LOGBASE and PLANELM); and Regulating partners technical and financial support in respect to EASF strategic plans and programs. The EASF Headquarters is very well structured with all Members States equally represented. The inclusion of Police and Civilian representatives in the Policy Organs meetings is another positive development. To a large extent, all the vision and missions of the EASF are consistent with those of APSA

119. First, EASF is operating with a weak Legal Framework. Currently, there is only an MOU and a Policy Framework which are not binding. Second, there is no binding arrangement between Members States for force deployment although every year the Members States renew their troops pledged. Third, there is a big lack of communication between the AU and the EASF is not adequate though this can be improved. Fourth, the communications with the RECs in the region (IGAD, EAC and COMESA) is also very poor. Sixth, efforts to operationalize the EASF is dogged by inter and intra States tensions. Finally, the Brigade HQ with only three persons is understaffed.
The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF)

Introduction and Background

120. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is a standby arrangement made up of military, police and civilian components and which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter which provides for Regional Peace and Security arrangement. Within the context of the region, it is covered by Article 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999.

Fig 1: ESF Members and Governance Structure

121. As stipulated by the said Protocol, the ESF should be composed of multidisciplinary contingents, with military, police and civilian components in their countries of origin, ready for deployment at appropriate notice.

122. The ESF vision is consequently to define, build, organize and maintain an ECOWAS standby regional capability in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to a level of self-sustenance in the areas of personnel and logistic support, in order to respond to internal or external regional crises or threats to peace and security.

123. In 2005, a team of ECOWAS P3 Development Partners (AU, EU, USA, UK, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Netherlands), the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) together with the ECOWAS Mission Planning Management Cell (MPMC) met and provided an overarching framework document for the operationalisation of the ESF. The ECOWAS Operational Framework phased the process by first of all establishing a Task Force (TF) of
2773 all ranks which has been certified in 2009 in the form of logistics exercise, and the remaining 3727 of the force to complement a brigade of 6500 all ranks to be ready by 2010. The TF is structured into two infantry battalions (Western and Eastern) and a composite logistics battalion. The Western Battalion is led by Senegal while the Eastern Battalion is led by Nigeria.

124. The ECOWAS Main Force structure is based on the operational concept that the initial ESF Task Force (ESFTF) has been rapidly deployed and that a more robust, long-term force is required. The TF is designed to mobilize quickly and deploy rapidly, and then, can be expanded and enhanced into a fully functional main force.

125. The capacity building support of the ESF is done thru three training Centers of excellence in the region, the National Defense College of Nigeria for the strategic level, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC), (in Ghana) for the operational level, the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye, (in Mali) for the tactical level. A formal Memorandum of Understanding, (MOU) has been signed in this regard between ECOWAS and these three Training Centres of Excellence in Abuja on 11th April 2007, for an indefinite period.

126. There is no formal MOU between ECOWAS and the different Members States for the Force generation. However the said MOU has been drafted already and meanwhile, there is a firm commitment of the different States leaders to provide personnel and facilities to facilitate any deployment of the Force. The Headquarters (HQ) of both the ESF and the ESFTF are collocated in Abuja. However, the Planning Element of the ESF is weak compared to the Task Force Planning Element. For now, the ESF has no civilian component in its Planning Element. But the military and police components are fully operational. The Logistic Depot of the Force, still to be built is planned to be set in Freetown. Land has been allocated in this regard by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United States of America’s Government is providing support for the establishment of the Logistics depot.
Partnership

127. The ESF through the ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF) is benefiting from different partners and donors, namely the African Development Bank (ADB), the African Peace Facility (APF), the European Union, Canada, Italy, Greece, China and Japan. However, the EPF is also planned to be resourced by 0.5% of the ECOWAS annual budget.

Strengths and Weaknesses

128. The ECOWAS has already proved in the past, its capacity to undertake positive actions in conflict prevention, peacemaking and conflict management in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire). There is a strong solidarity between the Members States, which alleviates the absence so far of a formal MOU between them and ECOWAS.

129. There is a strong commitment of ECOWAS to fund on its own budget its Peace and Security activities. The ESFTF is very well structured with the commitment of all ECOWAS Members States. There is no formal MOU between the ECOWAS and the different Members States. The civilian component is yet to be implemented. The ESF and ESFTF HQs are both collocated in Abuja, with more focus in the ESFTF, which gives a very weak ESF Planning Element. The region is lacking of a proper airlift capability. There is a need of harmonization between the different battalions of different backgrounds.

The North African Regional Capability (NARC)

Background

130. The North African Regional Capability (NARC) was created to fill a sub-regional vacuum in North Africa. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has been dormant since its establishment in 1989. Throughout the last two decades, revitalizing AMU proved to be very difficult due to political dynamics amongst member states. Thus, there was a need to create a regional mechanism to enable North African countries to contribute to the building-up process and operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF). In mid 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was drafted to establish NARC.
Fig 1: NARC and Governance structure

131. In the absence of a joint secretariat to liaise cooperation amongst NARC member states, Libya voluntarily played this coordinating role during the initial phase of starting up NARC which lasted for three years (2005-2008). Later on, the 2nd meeting of NARC Ministers of Defence held in Tripoli in December 2008 approved a recommendation to establish an executive secretariat to be located in Tripoli. Subsequently, the NARC Executive Secretariat and Planning Element were inaugurated in April, 2009. It was however, expected that staff from other member states will join the Executive Secretariat and PLANELM in September 2010. While both Egypt and Algeria had identified staff for the two elements these countries were yet to sign the hosting agreement with Libya, and in some cases the deployment of staff was constrained by domestic considerations including promotions and retirements. Meanwhile, progress in generating the civilian officers for the PLANELM lagged even further behind; this essentially meant that the NARC PLANELM was purely military as at the time of the visit for this study.

Challenges, Gaps and Constraints

132. Despite NARC’s potential given the strong economies of its members, the status of readiness of the standby brigade based on the AU’s roadmap, indicates that it is lagging in the operationalization of the standby arrangement. Though the Brigade HQ to be located in Cairo and the two logistic depots to be located in Algiers and Cairo have been identified, they were yet to be operational due to some political and bureaucratic constraints in some member states. Furthermore, it seems that creating, rostering and deploying a civilian component is somewhat problematic due to the voluntary and individualistic nature of this component and the lack of an AU strategic guidance in this regard.
133. First, is the fact that constitutional and legal regulations in some member states have delayed the ratification of the NARC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). For example, although Tunisia signed the MoU in June 2008, it has not been able to activate its membership and as such has not pledged any military, police or civilians due to the lengthy internal constitutional procedures in Tunisia to ratify the MoU. This challenge is compounded by the reluctance of some NARC members to sign the founding documents.

134. Second, the unresolved dispute over the status of Western Sahara is a complicating factor between members of the NARC, with significant impact on its operationalization. The fact that, four of the six members of NARC do not recognize the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (A.D.R) complicates how these states relate to it in the context of NARC and beyond. This was identified as a crucial challenge that continues to impact on the operationalization of NARC.

The SADC Standby Force (SSF)

135. The SADC Standby Force was launched on 17TH August 2007 in Lusaka, Zambia, with initially, a military and police component. The civilian component was subsequently established. The SADC SF mission scenarios are consistent with the AU’s scenarios and timelines for deployment. In institutional terms, the Planning Element (PLANELM) of the SADC SF has been established with the military, police and civilian components, but is experiencing shortfalls in staffing.

136. The strategic level training of the Force is conducted under the framework of the Southern Africa Defense and Security Management (SADSEM), a network of academic institutions while operational training is conducted by the Regional Peacekeeping Training Center (RPTC) located in Harare, Zimbabwe. Other capacity building and training activities are conducted through series of exercises in the region.

137. The Main Logistic Depot (MLD) will be built in Gaborone and the Government of Botswana has allocated land for the establishment of the depot.

138. SADC unlike other RECs and RMs has limited number of partners due to a policy of self-reliance on issues of peace and security. Consequently, there are few partners involved in the operationalization of the SADC SF.

139. The standby force governance structure is arranged through the organ which is an institution of SADC that reports to the summit.
Overall, there has been progress in the development of policies, plans, and capacities for establishing the SSF. Through the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (2005/2006) (ISDSC), military planners including their police and civilian counterparts met regularly to work out the strategic details on force composition, training, finance, logistics and operations. Generally there has been good cooperation between the defence forces through working groups of the ISDSC, meetings, workshops and exercises\(^2\).

**Challenges**

Like its counterparts in other regions, SSF is confronted by a range of challenges. Among these challenges include, the complex political dynamics in the region; challenge of Command, Control and Communication; the evolution of common or different battle procedures; lack of common training doctrines; interoperability of equipment and Language barriers.

Moreover, funding a stand-alone peace support operation will be a challenge in the region. In light of this, member states may have to increase their

contributions to the SADC Peace Fund. At the same time, it is obvious that SADC would require some form of external support for some of the costs involved in preparing and planning for the establishment of the SF. In operational terms, the logistical challenges of setting up the SF and deploying peace missions are immense. The challenges of operationalizing the SF are exacerbated by the shortage of capacity in the majority of member states. Among other things, this includes lack of airlift capacity, lack of engineer support and lack of storage essentials and training.\(^3\) Issues of inter-operability and compatibility of the different national armies and systems remains a big challenge. Additionally, like other Standby Forces, issues of Command and Control, Mandate, the roles of the Force Commander and the Special Representatives of the Organ (SRO) are yet to be clarified. Addressing these challenges would be influenced by the political will of the leaders to abide by their signed commitments.

143. It is highly recommended that the SSF continue to organise regular exercises of magnitude (such as 2009 GOLFINHO). Exercises are necessary to improve the knowledge and understanding of PSO issues by all personnel in SF. The training of personnel in SADC RPTC needs to be substantially increased to match these challenges. Exercises such as GOLFINHO provide a steep learning curve and substantially increase PSO capacities. Among others, it creates an atmosphere in which member states develop and improve regional cooperation in the field of PSO. In particular, it tests and strengthens the interoperability and compatibility of the mission components i.e. military, police and civilian.

**The Economic Community of Central African States (FOMAC) Standby Force (FOMAC)**

**Introduction and Background**

144. The ECCAS Standby Force, known by its French acronym FOMAC, was established in 2006 at the ECCAS Yaoundé Summit, well before the African Standby Force (ASF). It was established under the framework of ECCAS’ Peace and Security Council, known as COPAX. The COPAX is the decision making organ of the ECCAS on all issues concerning peace and security. The Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC) is the peace operations arm of the COPAX.

Fig 1: ECCAS members and governance structure

145. According to Article 23 of the Protocol establishing COPAX, FOMAC will be composed of national and multidimensional (military, police / Gendarmerie, and civilian components) contingents from the Members States with a mandate to maintain and undertake peace, security and humanitarian missions. FOMAC can be authorized to deploy by ECCAS, the African Union or the United Nations, consistent with the subsidiary principle that underpins ECCAS’ relationship with the AU and UN.

146. The absence of a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ECCAS and its Members States relating to FOMAC remains a big gap. The only binding legal framework governing the FOMAC is the document known as *Catalo 2010 of the Units*, signed February 28th 2008 in Libreville, Gabon by
Member States. Under this arrangement, Members States pledged a force of 4800 (police, military and civilians) personnel and 6 airlift carriers.

147. The Planning Element, (PLANELM) of the FOMAC was established in July 2006 in Libreville, and it consists of representatives from the various ECCAS member states. ECCAS has opted for a big multidimensional PLANELM of 36 out of which 24 are already sitting.

148. The ECCAS has opted for a non-permanent Brigade headquarters. In their view the brigade headquarter would be when a peace operation is authorized and would be led by an individual State or a group of States, in coordination with the PLANELM. ECCAS has not developed yet a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC).

Logistic issues

149. The COPAX will authorize the FOMAC in case of intervention. However, in the case of an intervention involving the AU or the UN, the authorization and support will come from these organizations. The Logistic Base (Log base) of the Force is planned to be established in Douala, Cameroun. It is however, obvious that ECCAS will require a lot of external support to have this base established.

150. In terms of training, seven Centres of excellence have been identified within the ECCAS Members States for the purpose of capacity building of the FOMAC. They are evenly distributed among the ECCAS Member states. In the same framework of capacity building, three exercises have been conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the times of writing this report, ECCAS was running its first peace operation in Central Africa Republic (CAR), known as MICOPAX. ECCAS has also been conducting maritime exercise in the Gulf of Guinea since September 2009.

151. With respect to partnerships, the EU through the APF, is FOMAC’s main partner.

Conclusion

152. There is no doubt that efforts to operationalize the ASF has registered good progress although, the degree of progress varies from region to regions. Progress in developing a multidimensional concept for the ASF is perhaps one of the most remarkable to date. The Military and Police components have been put in place in all RECs and RMs. However, there are still some crucial gaps, especially as it relates to the civilian component.
153. The absence of a binding framework between the AU, RECs/RMs is a critical gap that needs to be addressed as matter of urgency. Meanwhile, the AU should adopt an advocacy plan to raise awareness about the ASF.

154. Based on the foregoing, it is likely that the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the ASF will be achieved by the end of 2010. Moreover, it is hoped that lessons from the AMANI exercise would contribute to achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2015.
Chapter V

The Panel of the Wise and Similar Structures in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

Introduction and Background

155. Drawing on Africa’s rich tradition of bestowing peacemaking efforts on the elders because of their wisdom, the African Union established the Panel of the Wise as one of the key pillars of its peace and security architecture. In its current configuration, the Panel’s composition and mandate is outlined in Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC. Consisting of five highly respected African personalities from diverse backgrounds, the Panel’s role is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent. In addition, Article 11(4) of the Protocol states that “…at its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.” The Panel’s mandate is twofold: to support the PSC and Chairperson in their peacemaking efforts, and to act independently on issues that it deems significant to the enhancement of human security on the continent. Operationally, the Panel can act either at the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the Commission or most importantly, on its own volition.

156. Its mandate was elaborated in the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise, which was adopted in November 2007. It specifically outlined eight key points as the pivotal role of the Panel. Under the Modalities of Action, it is clearly stated that the Panel does not have a mediation role but can “assist and advise mediation teams engaged in formal negotiations.”

Similar Structures in the RECs

157. While efforts to operationalize the Panel continue to make progress, similar efforts are underway in the RECs. In fact, in some RECs such as ECOWAS, its Council of the Wise established under the 1999 Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security predates the Panel. The ECOWAS Council of the Wise has been at the forefront in preventive interventions in West Africa. Members of the Council have been deployed by the Mediation and Security Council to either backstop ongoing mediation efforts or to intervene to avert the outbreak of violence in potential crisis situations. Since its establishment, Council members have been deployed to Niger, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Guinea-Bissau to deal with varying degrees of conflicts in these countries. In a bid to strengthen
its overall preventive diplomacy, ECOWAS is in the process of establishing a permanent Mediation Facilitation Division, whose mandate will include supporting the Council of the Wise. Moreover, plans are underway to establish a Forum of Former Presidents which will complement the work of the Council of the Wise.

158. One of the major shortfalls of the Council of the Wise is the fact that its members are appointed by their governments. This is potentially problematic as it could impair their impartiality. Institutionally, there is no dedicated support for the Council in the ECOWAS Commission along the lines of the Panel’s Secretariat at the AUC. Among other things, this deprives the ECOWAS Commission of the ability to provide adequate support to Council members when they are on assignment, and most importantly, complicates efforts to capture valuable lessons and best practice from their engagements. In operational terms, there is no institutional linkage between the Council and the Panel; a gap that needs to be addressed urgently if the interventions by both entities are to be optimized.

159. For its part, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) established a structural component called CEN-SAD Permanent High Level Mediator for Peace and Security in 2000. The High-Level Mediator has since undertaken mediation efforts in Chad, Mali, Niger and the Central African Republic with varying outcomes. Institutionally, there is no support mechanism for the High-Level Mediator at the CEN-SAD Secretariat, whose overall staffing level is skeletal. To date, there is no evidence of cooperation between the High Mediator and the Panel or its equivalents in the RECs.

160. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is in the process of establishing a Committee of Elders to as part of its preventive diplomacy strategy. The Committee will have nine standing members and will be supported by a unit in the Secretariat. The Committee’s functions will include mediation, dispatching of peace envoys, and providing leadership for COMESA election observation missions. The Committee was not operational as of the time of writing this report. The first five Elders were elected by the Council of Foreign Ministers in 2009 and the remaining four were elected during the 13th COMESA Summit in 2010. There are plans to put in place a mediation support unit within COMESA’s Secretariat to support the Committee of Elders in their mediation efforts.

161. Under the draft 2010-14 Peace and Security Strategy, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has prioritized the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit. It is important to note that, IGAD has considerable experience in mediating conflicts. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan and the current Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) are two of the most notable examples of its role in mediation efforts in the region. However, currently it appears to have little institutional capacity beyond its facilitators/envoys monitoring these two peace processes.

162. The East African Community (EAC) is seeking to establish a Council of Eminent Persons to undertake mediation within and among the EAC member states. The concept is still under development and is embedded in its Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) and the two draft protocols; these instruments are still awaiting the approval by EAC partner states. However, once they are approved it would be critical to clarify the mandate of the Council of Eminent Persons, and its formal and informal links with the AU Panel of the Wise. For now though, it appears that the EAC Council will be primarily aimed at dealing with mediation instead of other areas of conflict prevention such as shuttle diplomacy. One of the most unique features of the EAC’s Council of Eminent Persons is that fact its membership is not restricted to individuals from the five partner states. Thus, the Council could include high-level personalities from other regions. This is perhaps in recognition of the pivotal role played by key South African personalities including former President Nelson Mandela in the Burundi peace process, the EAC’s newest partner state.

163. So far, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has opted not to have a standing organ that is equivalent to the Panel of the Wise or similar structures in other RECs. The troika of the Organ would mandate prominent personalities from the region to either backstop an ongoing mediation effort or to embark on other preventive endeavours. Under this model, SADC has deployed mediators and Special Envoys to Zimbabwe and more recently, Madagascar to deal with the conflicts in both countries. Just as with the other RECs, there was limited evidence of cooperation between SADC and the AU’s Panel of the Wise in their respective engagements.

164. In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is in the process of establishing the “Comite Des Ambassadeurs (Committee of Ambassadors). The Committee of Ambassadors was established in 2007 to assist the general secretariat of ECCAS in the transfer CEMAC’s peacekeeping force, FOUMC, to that of ECCAS. In 2008, the general secretariat organized a workshop which recommended the establishment of a mediation unit. ECCAS is in the process of creating a structure for preventive diplomacy and mediation. The Committee of Ambassadors would play the role of a Peace and Security Council as is the case in similar organs. These two organs should be operationalized as a matter of urgency to bolster ECCAS' preventive diplomacy in the region; a crucial issue given the number of conflict situations in the region.
Progress, Challenges and Constraints

165. The Panel has undertaken confidence-building missions to several countries including Central African Republic (CAR) and South Africa prior to its recent elections, to name but a few. Additionally, the Panel has focused on developments in West Africa, Southern Africa and the Horn region, and in this respect has pronounced itself on the situations in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Somalia and Darfur.

166. On the other hand, its thematic meetings have focused on three themes: Election Related Conflicts; Non-Impunity, Justice and National Reconciliation and Women and Children in Armed Conflicts in Africa. The Panel’s focus on these themes would undoubtedly contribute to providing clarity, and hopefully some form of consensus. The Panel’s conflict prevention role is more problematic as its role in this realm is not properly defined, at least in conceptual terms.

167. For instance, while the Panel is envisaged to be involved in conflict prevention, it is not clear at what stage of the prevention process it intervene. In other words, does prevention mean preventing conflicts from happening or managing conflicts from escalating? If prevention is understood as the former, then the Panel’s role would be somewhat of the advocacy type, and if it is the latter, the Panel might be drawn into a direct mediation contrary to the role envisaged for it in the Modalities document.

168. Meanwhile, although the establishment of the Panel is provided for in the Protocol establishing the PSC, it does not appear in the structure of the AU Commission raising budgetary, ownership and sustainable issues. As at the time of writing this report, the Panel did not receive any funding through the AU regular budget. Consequently, all its activities and those of its Secretariat have been funded through partner support; an unsustainable situation. On a separate note, the AU Commission has found it difficult to deploy members of the Panel because quite often they have other commitments. Consequently, the 2010 AU Summit in Kampala approved the establishment of a “friends of the Panel group” as a way of enhancing it. Whether this new group will help to change this situation would be largely determined by its institutional link with the AU and most importantly, the availability of resources to support its operations.

169. At another level, the fact that the appointment of members of the Panel has to go through the political organs of the AU raises questions about its potential politicization. Member states have demonstrated a great deal of interest in the appointment of members of the Panel, potentially undermining their role in
certain conflict situations. There is a general perception that political expediency has trumped other criteria in the selection of members of the Panel; potentially undermining its effectiveness.

**The Panel Secretariat**

170. Another institutional challenge has to do with the location of the Panel’s Secretariat. While the Panel’s Secretariat is currently located in the Conflict Management Division (CMD), there is no consensus on whether it should be permanently located there or should be moved to the office of the Chairperson or the PSC Secretariat. Here there are two options. The first is, to maintain it in its current location on condition that its reporting to the office of the Chairperson and the PSC is streamlined. Currently, the Panel’s Secretariat reports to the office of the Chairperson through the Director of the Peace and Security Department and the Commissioner, a cumbersome process. The second option is to move it to the office of the Chairperson. This would significantly increase its visibility within the Commission and strengthen its link with the office of the Chairperson, which has had so far a more direct working relationship with the Panel than even the PSC. Adopting the second option could potentially help to address some of the staffing challenges that the Panel’s Secretariat is confronted with as it would benefit from the resources availed to the Chairperson’s office.

171. Operationally, the Panel’s Secretariat, which has an ambitious mandate, has only two professional staff and an administrative assistant, a staffing level that is far too inadequate for its tasks. To illustrate the mandate-resource gap, the Modalities document outlines 11 core functions for the Secretariat which among others, include to “collect and analyze information on developments on the continent and the priority countries and region the Panel may choose to focus on; conduct research and contribute substantive knowledge on conflict prevention, peace-making and mediation; facilitate the Panel’s outreach efforts to civil society, research and academic institutions, and other relevant organizations; and contribute expertise and support to the Panel’s efforts to raise debate on specific issues relating to the promotion of peace and security in Africa.” Needless to say, these tasks require a combination of both substantive and administrative skill set, which cannot be provided by the current two-person staff in the Secretariat. The problem of the skeletal staff is compounded by the fact that, the two professional staff are not AU regular staff; both were hired through partner support, raising questions of sustainability. Moreover, they have other responsibilities, which limits the time that they can dedicate to the Panel’s activities.
Conclusion

172. Overall, progress in operationalizing this critical component of the APSA has registered varying degrees of progress. While the AU and ECOWAS have progressed very well in creating the institutional architecture for this component, other RECs are either at the initial stages of establishing theirs or have adopted different models such as SADC which has opted not to establish a standing body. Despite the different conceptual and practical approaches by the AU and the RECs, there is a general recognition of the need to develop this aspect of the APSA. However, cooperation and complementarity even between the AU’s Panel and ECOWAS with well established Organs remains a big challenge. How the AU and the RECs addresses this gap, would contribute to optimizing their preventive measures, and most importantly, demonstrate the extent to which the envisaged peace and security architecture is working.
Chapter VI: The Peace Fund

Introduction and background

173. The Peace Fund is established as one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture under Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. It is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The operations of the Peace Fund is to be governed by the relevant Financial Rules and Regulations of the AU.

174. The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of AU, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the AU.

175. There shall also be established, within the Peace Fund, a revolving Trust Fund. The appropriate amount of the revolving Trust Fund shall be determined by the relevant Policy Organs of the AU upon recommendation by the Peace and Security Council. When required, and following a decision by the relevant Policy Organs of the AU, the cost of the operations envisaged under the African Standby Force (Art.13.3) shall be assessed to Member States based on the scale of their contributions to the regular budget of the AU.

Progress and Challenges in the Operationalization of the Peace Fund

176. The high-levelled 2007 Audit of the African Union concluded that there is ‘cause for concern regarding the funding of peace operations in Africa. The Peace Fund remains small and precarious. On average, only 6 percent of the regular budget is allocated to the Peace Fund. This is a paltry sum viewed against the needs of peacekeeping activities of the continent. The assessed contributions to finance peacekeeping has not been done and the reimbursement within six months of States contributing contingents to peace support operations, as provided for in the Protocol, has not always been honoured.’

177. The Peace Fund is envisaged as a standing reserve on which the AU and REC/RMs can call upon in case of emergencies and unforeseen priorities.

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4 High-levelled Audit of the African Union, pp. 102. Between 2004 and 2007, an average of 1.9% of the total resources channelled through the Peace Fund came from African member states. The rest is provided by external partners.
Due to a combination of factors including the high demand for financial resources and managerial issues, the reserve had a negative balance by 2009. In a tacit acknowledgement of this state of play, the AU Summit in Tripoli (2009) decided to gradually increase the reserve to a total of 12% by 2012...The Summit stated that ‘it is critical that AU Member States meet their financial obligations, so that the organization’s dependency on external aid is reduced, and that sustainability and ownership guaranteed. It is also true that the implementation of APSA is taking place at time when demands on the (AU) organization increases exponentially. In a context where capacities are stretched to the limit, and where organizational development, training and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions and sustainability of APSA are many’. Following this decision, the AUC is preparing a ‘comprehensive report on how best to mobilize increased resources from within the continent to support peace efforts.’

178. In an effort to improve the use of the Peace Fund, the AUC has tightened management and ensured that only high-level persons can authorise expenditures. It is anticipated that tightening of result based management including professional use of yearly work plans in the Peace and Security Division will have a beneficial impact on the Peace Fund and its ability to serve as a reserve for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) including funding of ASF peace support operations. Specific guidelines and better articulation of the objectives of the Peace Fund can further improve its added value. As a legally approved financial tool, the Peace Fund could serve as a mechanism to align and harmonise the rather unpredictable and volatile external support provided by international partners. To realise that goal the AU member states, AU Commission and international partners must work together. The recently started process of AUC-partners dialogue on joint financing agreements is a step in the right direction.

APSA support systems
179. The organisational and financial capacity of the AUC and REC/RMs is closely linked to successful operationalisation of the Peace Fund and other internal and external financing arrangements.

180. In order to strengthen APSA and ensure its effective organisational, managerial and financial functioning, the following requirements need to be considered:
181. Progress is detectable in most regional organisations when it comes to accounting, auditing, internal control, procurement and organisational management. However, member states and AU/REC management need to further strengthen ongoing efforts to ensure that the support services are in line with best international standards. It is essential that the AUC/RECs can set examples and show high standards. Such continental and regional standard setting is also a must if AU/REC wants to pursue sustainable, flexible and predictable contributions from the UN and major international partners.

182. As noted by the high-levelled AU audit in 2007, none of the African organisations implementing APSA has the sufficient number and qualification of staff. This has and continues to be a serious constraint for the AUC and all RECs.5 This is recognised by African Heads of States who underlined, in 2009, the importance of 'strengthening the (AU) Commission’s capacity to better address the challenges…. Including speedy recruitment of necessary staff'. 6

Monitoring of results and progress in APSA

183. As is the case in most international organization, monitoring of decisions reached by member states and (other) regional organization remains a key challenge for integration including strengthening of APSA. Such monitoring should take place at several levels: firstly, timely and effective monitoring of implementation by AUC, RECs, RMs and member states of the PSC protocol and other policy frameworks related to the African Peace and Security Architecture (i.e. treaties, protocols etc.). Secondly, at the technical and operational level where agreed strategies, policies, concepts on APSA must be followed up by the executive agencies of the AU and REC/RMs. This transposition of continental and regional decisions is critical for APSA (and the AU/RECs in general). Without such monitoring it will be difficult for the AUC/RECs to fully operationalise APSA and to adapt a result-oriented, outward oriented organizational approach. The AU member states have committed themselves, in 2009, to ‘to speedily sign and/or ratify those (APSA-related) instruments’ and equip ‘the (AU) Commission (to) actively monitor their implementation’ and submit concrete proposals on how to improve compliance.

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5 High-Level Audit of the African Union, pp. 104-108.
6 Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace, pp.2
Chapter VII

Findings, Trends and Issues: Understanding the Dynamics of the APSA

184. This chapter discusses the findings, trends and the strategic issues relating to the operationalization of the APSA. The analysis is structured around the only existing roadmaps for the ASF and the CEWS, and the following criteria: Vertical and Horizontal Coordination; Sustainability; Subsidiarity; Coherence and Partnership. The aim here is to reflect on the key findings of the study by employing the aforementioned criteria as the framework of analysis. It is hoped that, this approach would contribute to illuminating the qualitative and quantitative status of the establishment of the various APSA components, and most crucially, their level of interdependence. In this vein, the challenges, gaps and best practices would be highlighted so as to inform continuing efforts to operationalize the APSA.

185. Understanding the level of coordination between and among the various APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs is a logical starting point in mapping progress, gaps and challenges in the operationalization of the APSA. The central question is what is the level of coordination between AU and RECs/RMs in their efforts to operationalize the APSA? To address this question, it is critical to look at coordination from two perspectives: horizontal and vertical. For the purposes of this report, vertical coordination refers to the relationship between the AU, RECs and RM, while horizontal coordination refers to the REC/RM to REC/RM interface and that between the various APSA components.

Vertical Coordination

186. The level of coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs has registered some progress, especially as it relates to the operationalization of two key components of the APSA: the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The level of coherence in the development of these components is more advanced than the other three components (the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund). This is partly explained by the fact that the ASF and the CEWS have clearly articulated roadmaps, thereby providing more structured basis for their operationalization. For instance, the AU and the RECs/RMs have worked closely together in the development of the doctrine and policy instruments for the ASF. While there are still some gaps in the development of the various standby multi-dimensional elements, coordination has proved much easier due to the existence of a roadmap. The planned Exercise AMANI Africa,
which would bring together all the RECs/RMs, would undoubtedly contribute to capturing valuable lessons for the AU PLANELM which would invariably benefit the RECs/RMs. More broadly, the rotating workshops between the AU, RECs/RMs and their partners provides an additional avenue to take stock of progress and to address wider partnership issues including funding and other forms of support. In the same breadth, the quarterly meetings between the AU and the RECs on the CEWS is proving to be an important brainstorming and lesson sharing exercise on progress and challenges in establishing the early warning systems at the continental and regional levels.

187. Institutionally, the appointment of the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU has improved the communication gap and it is hoped that when the AU deploy its Liaison Officers to the RECs/RMs, it would boost coordination. However, despite the improved communication between the AU and the RECs/RMs, their operations to date have brought to the fore some challenges that need to addressed if they are to be fully optimized. It is therefore important for the AU and RECs/RMs to clarify the level and mandate of the liaison officers. For instance, the current profile of the Liaison Officers at the AU Commission is a combination of serving military officers and civilians drawn from varied backgrounds. This has raised questions about the right profile for the Liaison Officers. This particular challenge can only be addressed after the AU, RECs and RMs have agreed on the mandate of the Liaison Officers. A related challenge is how to ensure that the Liaison Officers are involved in the substantive work of the AU and its Organs such as the PSC. There are concerns that if not properly calibrated the liaisons could be reduced to couriers, an approach that would undermine the intended objective of improving coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs in procedural and substantive terms. Moreover, it is not clear how the reporting structures for the Liaison Officers are structured.

188. Beyond the ASF and CEWS, there appears to be limited coordination between the other APSA components. At the time of writing this report, there was no direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs, although this is envisaged for the future. In light of this there is a general consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU Commission needs to play a more strategic leadership role in improving coordination in the overall operationalisation of APSA. Related to this is the feeling that APSA in its current iteration does not adequately cover all existing and emerging security challenges. For example, while the ASF is envisaged as an instrument for peace operations, the emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and improving the governance of security forces in several member states falls outside the remit of the ASF. In other words, the ASF is confronted by a conceptual challenge, which needs to be dealt with if it is to be an effective tool in managing both existing and emerging conflicts.
The critical point here is to ensure the conceptualization of APSA is flexible so that it can be recalibrated as and when needed. The flexibility advanced in this instance is twofold. First, it is important for the conceptualisation of the APSA to be flexible. Second, it is critical for the AU to be flexible to allow for a bottom-up approach as that would ensure that the APSA is aligned with the needs within the regions.

189. At another level, there appears to be a disconnect between the AU PSC and similar organs in the RECs. This is a crucial gap given that enforcing decisions of the PSC rests with its members who are also members of the RECs/RMs. Thus, without proper coordination, implementing PSC decisions will be significantly diminished, potentially undermining the credibility of the PSC. More broadly, cooperation even between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs has been largely personality dependent, a problematic approach given the strong imperative for a more structured cooperation. Among other things, this makes continuity and predictability of the cooperation between them difficult.

**Horizontal Coordination**

190. Given that the various APSA components are developing at different paces, the level of horizontal coordination has been limited. For instance, the interlocking system that is envisaged whereby the decisions of the PSC benefit from information and analysis from other components such as the early warning systems at the AUC and the RECs has been limited. Although this is partly due to the fact that APSA is still being operationalized, it is important to ensure that the level of interface is improved throughout the operationalization process. This is a gap that needs to be addressed if the envisaged interconnectedness, interdependence and complementarity of the APSA are to be optimized.

191. At another level, the REC/RM to REC/RM interface has been equally limited. This portends a big gap given the overlapping membership in some RECs/RMs and the practical and political implications of such a dynamic. From a practical standpoint, member states that belong to more than one REC are faced with resource – human and material – challenges in meeting their commitments to the various entities. Politically, such members tend to put more emphasis on RECs that are more in tandem with their national interests. While this is somewhat unavoidable, it is an issue that needs to be tackled.

192. Despite these challenges, there are some REC/RM to REC/RM coordination initiatives on peace and security, which could provide useful lessons on how to enhance inter-REC coordination. For instance, relation between COMESA,
EAC and IGAD in the area of peace and security include: a Joint Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) programme for East Africa with EAC on Small Arms and Light Weapons and with IGAD on pastoralist conflicts and cross border issues. The three RECs have jointly developed a programme entitled Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPI HSSP), on democracy, governance and human security that will be jointly implemented by EAC, COMESA and IGAD. With respect to security challenges posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia, COMESA, EAC and IGAD have jointly developed an action plan against piracy and currently working towards developing a joint programme for funding by the EU. Moreover, COMESA currently hosts the Inter-regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC), which coordinates the various RECs in Eastern Africa on European Union funding. Efforts are also underway to establish a tripartite coordination mechanism involving COMESA, EAC and SADC. The envisaged framework would help to deal with coordination issues in a region that stretches from North through East to Southern Africa. Meanwhile, ECOWAS and ECCAS have bi-lateral cooperation on specific issues such as human trafficking and piracy in the strategic Gulf of Guinea. In addition, ECOWAS has another partnership with IGAD in the area of early warning. However, despite these partnerships, coordination remains a big challenge. In addressing questions relating to vertical coordination, it is important to reflect on the issues of complementarity, existence of formal structures, questions of overlapping membership and broader political dynamics that are often at the heart of such complex arrangements.

**Sustainability**

193. The issue of sustainability featured prominently at the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, primarily on account of the fact that the operationalization of the APSA has been largely dependent on partner support. This is partly explained by the fact that recruitment of staff at the AU is constrained by the Maputo Structure which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through its regular budget. A major consequence of this has been the heavy reliance on external partner support for the key components of the APSA. For instance, most of the staff of the PSC Secretariat, the Panel of the Wise and the Liaison Officers were recruited on short-term contract through support from various partners. This approach inevitably raises questions of sustainability, predictability and flexibility. It is not clear how long partners will be willing to support these programs and even in those situations where they are providing support, some of it is not predictable. Additionally, there is consensus among the AU, RECs and RMs about uncertainties that result from the unpredictable nature of partner support.
194. Although this was identified as a major gap, some RECs such as ECOWAS have put in place its own resource mobilization strategy from its Members. For example, the ECOWAS has instituted a Community Levy, a percentage of which is dedicated to the ECOWAS Peace Fund. It is a flexible instrument that is funded from the Community Levy and partner support, and is geared to support a range of issues from military exercises to election observer missions. In practical terms, this has meant that ECOWAS accounts for approximately 80 percent of the budget to support its conflict prevention and management endeavours. ECOWAS views partner support as added value and is therefore not dependent on it for the implementation of its programs. Because of the fact that it consists of resources from its members, the ECOWAS Peace Fund can support national projects by providing support to local non-governmental organizations and community groups. Resources from the Fund have been used to fund a range of activities including anti-corruption initiatives in some of its member states. Unlike partner support, the ECOWAS Peace Fund is flexible and as such can even fund military exercises which, most partners would not support such activities due to domestic constraints. The Peace Fund is an impressive instrument that undoubtedly enhances ECOWAS’ ownership of its peace and security agenda, and should be replicated by other RECs/RMs to the extent possible.

195. The issue of sustainability gets even more pronounced when the AU or the RECs/RMs deploys a peace operation. The AU’s peacekeeping experiences in Darfur and currently Somalia, has demonstrated the risks of being heavily dependent on external support. Both missions encountered serious financial and logistics shortfalls which seriously limited their ability to implement their mandates. However, even in peace time, maintaining the proposed logistics depots for the ASF would cost a considerable amount of resources. As of the time of writing this report, neither the continental nor regional depots had been developed. While partner support would be crucial in establishing the depots, it is critical to ensure that their maintenance is not exclusively dependent on partner support. As stated above, such dependence is risky because of the lack of predictability, and the stringent constraints that comes with partner support. Moreover, the predictability challenge has been exacerbated by current economic downturn which has seriously impacted some key partner states leading to drastic cutbacks in funding support for a range of issues including peace and security. This has forced even some centers of excellence to explore the idea of setting up endowment funds to guarantee their continued functioning.
Subsidiarity

196. While the RECs/RMs appear to recognize and accept the principle of subsidiarity in their relationship with the AU, there is less clarity on its application in practical terms. For instance, some RECs/RMs are of the view that, the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency; it should rather play more of a coordination role. The unanswered question is who identifies those specific areas that the AU should be involved in implementing, and those for which it should have a coordination role? Clarifying this is critical given the implications of such a division of labour on the APSA. One of the arguments advanced in favour of this approach is the need to minimize competition between the AU and the RECs/RMs in their interventions in conflict situations. Moreover, the RECs/RMs believe that through this model, the AU would be a stronger position to provide strategic guidance to them, which is deemed to be lacking currently. While it is not practically possible for the AU to disengage from implementing its own programs, it is equally important to note that if the envisaged APSA is to function as an inter-locking system, the AU needs to provide more strategic guidance.

197. There is consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU is currently not playing that role effectively due in part to the human resource constraints at the AU Commission. Thus, strengthening the human resource capacity of the AU Commission is an important first in the application of the principle of subsidiarity. An enhanced Commission would be a stronger position to provide the strategic guidance that is needed for the full operationalization of the APSA. For instance, the AU is lagging behind some of the RECs/RMs in the operationalization of some of the APSA components. The African Standby Force is a classic example of this trend. While some of the RECs/RMs had already exercised their PLANELMs and undertaken field exercises, the AMANI exercise for the AU PLANELM was undertaken only recently. Under the circumstance, the AU PLANELM which is meant to act as the nerve centre of the ASF is essentially lagging behind the components that it is supposed to lead. This situation applies to other APSA components such as early warning where both ECOWAS and IGAD have more advanced early warning mechanisms than the AU. Needless to say, this undermines an effective application of the subsidiarity principle; an important principle that underpins the APSA.

Coherence

198. Coherence in the context of this report is used in two ways. First, is to assess the extent to which the current configuration of APSA is coherent or comprehensive, and second, to assess the level of interdependence of the
various APSA components. There is a general feeling among the RECs/RMs and other actors that the APSA is not comprehensive enough in its current configuration. There are a number of security and related developments that do not fall within the remit of any of the APSA components. The need for improved management of security forces on the continent through Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rising tide of terrorism, piracy, disaster management, post-conflict reconstruction and broader governance issues were identified as challenges that are not adequately addressed under the current APSA. While much resources have been devoted to the development of conflict management instruments such as the ASF, there is a need for a balance with conflict prevention instruments such as early warning systems and improved governance, which is perhaps the single most important prevention tool. However, even the conceptualization of the ASF is viewed as not comprehensive it is more of an instrument for peace support operation based on the six scenarios outlined in the roadmap for its operationalization. Consequently, if it is not configured it would not be a useful tool to address the aforementioned emerging security challenges. Additionally, the APSA does not fully capture the conflict triggers and the changing dynamics in all the regions. For example, some of the regions such as West Africa are moving out of an active conflict phase to a peace consolidation phase, which requires additional tools to supplement those currently in the APSA toolkit. Improving the management of security forces, dealing with the abuse of incumbency by civilian leaders and promoting post-conflict development were identified by most RECs/RMs as priority areas and as such the APSA should be recalibrated to ensure that it can address these challenges.

199. As discussed in the section on vertical coordination, there is limited coherence between and among the APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs. This is particularly notable with the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the regions. To date, there has been limited interaction between these pillars despite the fact that they are seized with the same conflict situations. Even with the more structured approach to operationalizing the ASF and the CEWS through their roadmaps, there are both conceptual and practical disconnects. There is lack of conceptual consensus on a harmonized approach to information collection for early warning, with AU and some RECs opting for an open source approach with others preferring the closed system which is close to the traditional intelligence gathering. The different approaches would undoubtedly affect the level and most importantly, the kind of information that is shared with the AU and other RECs. Practically; those with a closed system are less likely to share information freely because their activities are often anchored on the intelligence systems of their member states, which, understandably, cannot be shared with everyone. On the other hand, those with an open system will be less inhibited to share information, although the quality and timeliness of their information might not be timely.
enough for an early response. How the AU and the RECs/RMs deals with this dilemma would determine the success of the early warning systems that are crucial to bolstering the preventive aspects of the ASPA.

**Partnership**

200. Partnership between the AU, RECs/RMs and external multilateral and bilateral actors has emerged as a major feature of efforts to operationalize the APSA. The operationalization process is benefiting from a wide range of partner support for the various components. The partner support which is delivered through various multi-lateral and bi-lateral frameworks such as the Africa Peace Facility (APF) and the UN’s 10 Year Capacity-building Program. While the outcome of the support has varied, it has raised questions of sustainability and predictability (discussed in detail above) and ownership issues. For example, questions have been asked about the extent to which the high reliance on partner support undermines the principle of ownership. This is a critical issue given that some regions are keen to maintain this principle, and as such are less inclined to accept partner support even for the operationalization of the APSA components. In situations like this, the AU has an opportunity to act as a bridge between RECs/RMs that are keen on maintaining ownership of their peace and security agenda and partners as is currently the case with SADC.

201. The AU acting as a bridge would have at least two effects. First, it would ensure that all the RECs/RMs have equal access to partner support, especially ‘pool’ funds such as the APF. This would to some extent minimize the likelihood of some RECs/RMs lagging too far behind in the operationalization of APSA. It is crucial to ensure some level of parity in the development of the various components if the architecture is to function effectively. Second, such a coordinating role would undoubtedly enhance the principle of subsidiarity, one of the underlying principles of the APSA. However, it should be pointed out that this approach comes with its own challenges especially as it adds another layer of organisational, administrative and financial procedures, thereby increasing the pressure on the AU’s human resource base.

202. Overall, there was a general feeling of the need to diversify partner support for the APSA. It is currently too dependent on EU support as even the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU are supported through the APF. This is viewed in some quarters as a risky strategy as the operationalization of the APSA could be weakened if EU support is withheld or withdrawn. Moreover, the imposition of ‘one-size-fits all’ conditionalities such as the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed is problematic because not all RECs/RMs have the same
absorptive capacity and resource needs. Consequently, the capacity-building efforts in some RECs/RMs have been held back due to weak absorptive capacity or other factors in others.

Conclusion

203. On the whole, efforts to operationalize the APSA to date has brought to the fore critical challenges and gaps as discussed above, which, if properly addressed would, enhance human security on the continent. In this vein, addressing the challenges associated with coordination, subsidiarity, sustainability, coherence and partnership are important first steps.
Chapter VIII

Recommendations and Way Forward on the Operationalization of APSA

204. The report makes the following recommendations, which are divided into two categories: strategic/cross cutting and APSA component specific.

STRATEGIC/CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

205. **Provide Clear and Consistent Strategic Guidance**: The AU should provide strategic guidance for the operationalization of APSA. While the AU has provided some guidance on specific components of the APSA such as the ASF, through the development of the roadmap for its full operationalization, it needs to do more for the other components. This would not only reinforce the principle of subsidiarity but it would ensure greater harmonization and coherence of the APSA.

206. **Improve Staffing Levels at the AU Commission and REC/RMs**: Related to the above, the staffing level at the AU Commission needs to be significantly increased. To ensure sustainability and to enhance residual capacity, the AU needs to revise the Maputo Structure which currently limits the Commission’s ability to hire staff through its regular budget. While partner support has helped to fill this gap through the various capacity-building programs, it is nonetheless, not a sustainable foundation to build the APSA. Staffing of the various APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RM should be addressed as a matter of priority.

207. **A holistic and Flexible Approach to APSA**: The AU should adopt a holistic, flexible and dynamic approach to its conceptualization of APSA. Thus, APSA should not be limited to the five components identified in the Protocol but should be flexible to factor in emerging political and security dynamics. The APSA in its current configuration does not address some of the key emerging challenges that were identified by this study such as the growing need for Security Sector Reform (SSR); the rising tide of terrorism; piracy; election related violence and transitional justice issues. These are crucial issues that should be at the heart of the APSA. In a nutshell, the APSA should be driven by its original raison d’être i.e. the need to promote comprehensive security on the continent.

208. **Establish Stronger Institutional Linkage with the RECs/RMs**: The AU should strengthen its relationship with the RECs and RM. Despite the existence of the Protocol and the MoU between itself and these entities, the
institutional relationship between them remains weak. This is a critical gap given that the RECs/RMs are the pillars of the APSA. To deal with this, it would be important to improve on the partnership framework between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs. One practical step in this direction would be to ensure that the Chairperson of the AU meets with these officials in advance of AU Summits. Such meetings would allow them to review developments in the respective regions, and potentially shape the agenda and decisions of Summit meetings.

209. Improve Inter-Departmental Coordination and Cooperation at the AU Commission and RECs/RMs: The AU should improve inter-departmental cooperation between its various departments, (especially between Peace and Security and Political Affairs) at the Commission. As at the time of writing this report, there was limited collaboration between these departments. Improving inter-departmental cooperation should be a cornerstone of strengthening and enhancing the capacity of the AU Commission. The RECs need to take similar steps to reinforce their capacities and the coherence of their programs and activities.

210. Mainstream Gender Issues in all APSA Components: The AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that issues of gender are mainstreamed into all the APSA components at the continental and regional levels. Although there is a commitment to do so on paper, the current staffing level of some of the APSA component is male dominated. This is a gap that should be tackled as a matter of urgency.

211. Increase Collaboration and Partnership with Civil Society: The AU, RECs/RMs should increase their collaboration with civil society. This is crucial as it would ensure that the operationalization of APSA is in tune with the developments on the ground. To date, several RECs such as ECOWAS have developed strong partnerships with civil society on a range of issue, most notably in the development of its early warning system. Such collaborative efforts should be replicated by the AU and other RECs/RMs.

212. Improve Stakeholder Engagement and Outreach: APSA is operationalised in a wider context of peace and security on the continent. It cannot achieve its goals without constructive engagement with key actors such as private sector, civil society, think-tanks, universities and other key interest groups. Operationalisation of APSA pillars has so far been limited to a small community of AU/RECs/RM officials. This should be changed so that support is given top increase awareness through constructive outreach and information flows.
THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

213. **Clarify PSC Relationship with Panel:** The AU should clarify the role of the Panel of the Wise and its relationship with the PSC, vice-versa. The relationship between the two entities has so far been very limited. While this could be explained by the fact that most of the components of the APSA are still being operationalized, it is equally important to ensure that they are properly aligned throughout the operationalization process.

214. **Enforce Criteria for Appointing PSC Members:** While it might be impractical for the Executive Council and Assembly to enforce the full range criteria for membership of the PSC, it should nonetheless engage with the RECs to ensure that their nominees meet at least the basic requirements. For example, the capacity of members to participate fully in the activities of the PSC and adherence to good governance norms should be cardinal requirements for memberships. Appointing members that do not meet the basic criteria would in the long-run undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the PSC; two principles that should be preserved.

215. **Improve Synergy between PSC and other APSA Components:** Related to the above, the AU should ensure greater synergy between the PSC and other APSA components. There is a strong imperative for closer collaboration and coordination between the PSC and other components due to its pivotal role in the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. To date, there is limited evidence of cooperation between the various entities, a gap that needs to be plugged urgently.

*The PSC Secretariat*

216. **Additional Staff for PSC Secretariat:** Provide additional staff to deal with the Secretariat’s growing responsibilities. A first step in this direction would be to approve the 13 posts and proposed committees. It is critical to ensure that newly hired staff possesses diverse backgrounds and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of peace and conflict on the continent.

217. **Dedicated Translators:** Provide the PSC Secretariat with its own dedicated translators who can be called upon without prior notification. Having a standby pool of translators is consistent with the mandate of the PSC, especially as it has to provide adequate and timely response to emerging challenges.

*The Military Staff Committee (MSC)*

218. **Clarify Institutional Location of MSC:** The AU should clarify the institutional location of the Military Staff Committee at the Commission headquarters.
Ideally, the affairs of the MSC should be handled by the PSC Secretariat and not the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). This does not preclude the MSC to liaise with the PSOD and vice-versa.

219. **Reinforce the Capacity of the MSC and PSC Member States**: The MSC needs to be reinforced and given the required means in order for it to effectively carry out its mandate of providing advice to the PSC. A first step in this direction would be to ensure that members of the PSC have the required staff complement in their embassies, including military officers.

220. **Establish Civilian and Police Committees to Complement the MSC**: Given the multi-dimensional character of contemporary peace operations, the AU through the PSC should establish civilian and police committee to complement the work of the MSC. This would ensure that the PSC receives the multi-dimensional advice it requires when it contemplates launching peace support operations. It is therefore important to have police and civilian experts to provide advice to the PSC on those matters.

221. **Convene Regular Meetings of the MSC**: It is critical to ensure that the MSC meets on a regular basis, at least once a month. To the extent possible, meetings of the MSC should be timed to coincide with those of the PSC as that would ensure greater synergy between them. To facilitate its meetings, the MSC should have a meeting room and translators at their disposal.

**THE CEWS AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS**

222. **Ensure Connectivity between AUC and RECs**: The AU should work with the RECs to improve and ensure connectivity at all levels including transfer of information from all RECs to the AU Situation Room. While there is some level of information exchange between the AU and some RECs, more needs to be done to broaden this information as a way of increasing synergy between the continental and regional early warning systems. There is a strong imperative to improve the existing information technology infrastructure.

223. **Provide Additional Analysts for the CEWS**: The AU should increase the number of analysts, in qualitative and quantitative terms. The number of analysts in the AU early warning is not adequate and they are overstretched. In the same breadth, special attention should be given to strengthening the analytical capacities especially of those RECs that are still in the process of establishing their early warning systems. Addressing this gap would help to improve the quality of the analysis and the policy options presented to decision-makers. Finally, it is critical to enhance support to the less developed early warning systems of the RECs.
224. **Broaden the Recipient of Early Warning Reports**: The AU and RECs should institutionalize and broaden the recipients of its reports and policy options. In this vein, where that practice is not already in place, early warning reports should be shared with a range of actors including, the ASF PLANELM, the Peace Support Operations Division, the PSC Secretariat, Members of Panel of the Wise and its Secretariat, AU/REC mediators, special representatives, and ongoing peace support operations.

225. **Increase and Strengthen Collaboration with Other Actors**: The AU and the RECs should increase and where it exist their engagement with other actors such as the United Nations agencies and civil society in Africa and beyond. To date there is no actual collaboration and coordination with the UN and its specialized agencies, other international organizations, this is a gap that needs to be filled. Moreover, collaboration with civil society should be improved. ECOWAS’ partnership with civil society in this area provides a useful model for the AU and other RECs that are yet to establish such partnerships. Overall, it is important to continuously aim towards strong complementarities between RECs horizontally and value addition to CEWS vertically.

226. **Improve Documentation of Lessons Learned**: The AU and RECs should improve and strengthen the lessons learned and documentation process. To date, there has been limited effort in this direction especially at the level of some RECs. However, capturing lessons and best practices would go a long way in enhancing the efficacy of the CEWS and similar structures in the RECs.

**THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE**

227. **Adopt Binding Legal Instrument with Member States**: The AU, RECs and RMs should adopt binding legal documents with member states for the employment of pledged troops. While there is an MOU between the AU and the RECs/RMs, it deals more with Force Generation than other more substantive issues such as accountability to the Members States, compensation and reimbursement. As at the time of writing this report,, none of the RECs and RMs have signed a formal MoU with their Members for the deployment of their troops. A legal and binding document is critical to the development of the Rapid Deployment Capability. The AU, RECs/RMs and the Members States have to sort out this very important issue.

228. **Harmonize Membership of Standby Arrangements**: If a country pledges to more than one region there must be distinct units and/or equipments. This approach would contribute to reducing redundancies in the system.
229. **Improve Staffing of PLANELMs at AU and RECs/RMs:** The staffing level of the PLANELMs at the AU and the RECs/RMs should be enhanced. The current staffing levels can be improved in quantitative and qualitative terms. This challenge is particularly pronounced with the police and civilian components of the standby arrangements. For example, there is only one civilian officer in the AU PLANELM. Adopting the proposed structure for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) would help to fill some crucial staffing gaps.

230. **Address Logistics Gap as Priority:** The AU, RECs and RMs should address the issue of logistics as a matter of priority. The establishment of the continental and regional depots is crucial first steps. To date, no logistic depot has been established, exposing a critical gap in efforts to operationalize the ASF. In order to minimize predictability and sustainability challenges associated with partner support, the AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that they provide the bulk of the resources for their logistics depots. Ensuring that the AU's Peace Fund is resourced by African Members is an important priority if this is to be accomplished. The fact that ECOWAS, ECCAS and SADC ran complex field exercises that were mainly funded by their member states demonstrates the potential for the AU and RECs to fund the activities of the ASF with their own resources.

231. **Provide Guidance and Leadership for Centers for Excellence:** The AU should provide more guidance and leadership for the various centers of excellence in the regions. That all RECs and RMs have their own centers of excellence is commendable, however, in the interest of harmonization and coordination, the AU should engage with these centers so as to ensure that training programs and curriculum is closely aligned to the requirements of the ASF.

*Specific Recommendations for the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)*

232. **Improve Communication and Coordination with RECs in the Region:** Members of the EASF should work towards improving communication and coordination between the EASF and the RECs in the region. As of the time of writing this report, there was limited or no coordination between the EASF and IGAD, EAC and COMESA. Increased coordination could help to address some of the challenges associated with the fact that there is no single REC that covers the EASF Members States. Adopting an MoU between these institutions would be an important first step.

233. **Harmonize and Integrate CEWARN with EASF’s Planned Early Warning System:** Members of the EASF and IGAD should work together to ensure that CEWARN, which is one of the well established early warning systems in the
region is integrated with the EASF’s planned early warning system. This would not only minimize duplication and redundancy, it would contribute to enhancing the cohesion of the region.

Specific Recommendations for the North African Regional Capability (NARC)

234. **Ensure NARC PLANELM and other Structures are fully staffed:** NARC member states should ensure that its PLANELM, Brigade Headquarters and the Executive Secretariat are staffed to the required levels in order to achieve the goals stipulated in roadmap II. For example, the NARC PLANELM should have 15 qualified personnel from various components – military, civilian and police – and be drawn from all the member states. As at the time of the visit for this study there were only three officers managing the PLANELM. Moreover, all the officers at the time were Libyan, depriving the system of the recommended multinational character.

235. **Deploy NARC Liaison Officer to the AUC Soon:** To improve communication with the AUC, NARC should deploy its liaison officer to the AU Commission as soon as possible. This would help to deal with the communication gap between NARC and the AU Commission.

236. **Coordinate with Other RECs in the Region:** NARC member states should improve their coordination with other RECs in the region. There is currently no working relationship between NARC and other regional and sub-regional entities in North Africa, namely the League of Arab States (LAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Community of Sahel - Saharan States (CEN-SAD). Harmonization and coordination between NARC and these institutions is crucial and the AU could potentially play a coordination role.

Specific Recommendations for the ECCAS Standby Force

237. **Adopt Formal Legal and Policy Instruments:** ECCAS should establish binding policy and legal instruments for the Standby Force.

238. **Develop Civilian Component:** The civilian component of the FOMAC must be developed as well as the Logistic Depot.

239. **Improve Translation Services for ECCAS:** ECCAS should be supported to translate more documents on peace and security from English to French. The activities of ECCAS (and NARC) are often hampered by the language barrier. This is a big challenge because a disproportionate number of the existing literature on peace and security is in English.
THE PANEL OF THE WISE AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES AT THE RECs

240. To enhance the role of the Panel, the report makes the following recommendations.

241. **Clarify Role of the Panel:** The role of the Panel in the AU’s preventive strategy should be clarified. It is critical to establish whether the Panel will be involved in direct mediation or it would continue to play a supporting role of mediation efforts as has been the case so far. Clarifying this would help to define the kind and level of support that it would require. If it is to be involved in mediation, it would require more substantial staff support and should be properly aligned with the AU’s Mediation Support Unit, whose establishment is underway.

242. **Reconsider Appointment of Panel Members Based on Geographic Regions:** The appointment of members of the Panel should be revisited to ensure that it follows the eight recognized RECs instead of the current geographic configuration based on the five regions. Aligning the appointment of Panel members with the RECs would undoubtedly increase the level of coordination between the Panel and its equivalents in the RECs, a relationship that is crucial but has been lacking so far.

243. **Include Panel in AU Commission’s Structure:** The Panel should be included in the AU Commission’s structure so as to give it greater visibility, and most importantly, to ensure that it is supported from the AU regular budget. The current reliance on partner support does not bode well for the sustainability and ownership of the activities of the Panel.

244. **Increase Staff Complement for Panel’s Secretariat:** The current staff complement of the Panel’s Secretariat should be increased to at least 5 professional staff and an administrative assistant. It should however, be pointed out that, the proposed increase would only be adequate if the Panel’s role is limited to backstopping mediation efforts and other short-term preventive engagements, if it is to be engaged in direct negotiations, the required staff complement and skills set will be significantly higher.

245. **Increase Synergy between Panel and Other APSA Components:** Efforts should be made to ensure that the Panel is properly linked up with other APSA components at the AU Commission and the RECs. Ensuring that the Panel engages with other APSA structures and its equivalents the RECs on
the issues on its agenda is an important first step in improving coordination. From a practical standpoint, there should be periodic meetings (at least twice a year or as the need may be) between Panel members and their counterparts in the RECs. These can be modelled on the quarterly meetings between the CEWS and regional early warning centers, although it is not necessary for them to meet on a quarterly basis.

246. **Develop Robust Communication Strategy**: The Panel should develop a robust communication strategy as that would give visibility to its engagements. This is particularly critical for its pronouncement on key thematic issues such as questions of election related violence and the peace and justice dilemma. The position of the Panel on issues of this nature would help to complement and where necessary shed more light on the AU’s position on some of these controversial matters.

247. **Establish Dedicated Secretariats for Panel Equivalents in the RECs**: Resources should be provided to RECs to establish dedicated secretariats to support the activities of Council members. This would ensure that Council members are properly supported and lessons from their engagements are captured and applied to future engagements.

**THE PEACE FUND**

248. **Establish Modalities for the use of the Fund**: The AU needs to establish modalities on what and how resources from the Peace Fund can be used for. As of the time of writing this report, there were no modalities in place on the use of the fund, this is a gap needs to be addressed.

249. **Fund Raising for the Peace Fund**: The AU should establish strong resource mobilization strategies and mechanisms for the Peace Fund. Such structures would ensure that resource mobilization is undertaken on a more structured and consistent manner.
## ANNEX I

### Partner Support to APSA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>APSA support at continental level</th>
<th>APSA support at regional level</th>
<th>Other issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Support to ECOWAS, AU and IGAD through Canada Fund for Africa (CFA)</td>
<td>Can$ 4 m for military observers, civil observers and contributions to UNDP.</td>
<td>Can$ 4.5 m for ECOWAS for 2002-7, Support to IGAD &amp; Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
<td>Various ministries involved. Centralised decision making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Dedicated support to gender training within APSA &amp; PSOs. Decentralised decision making. Enabling flexibility and timely response</td>
<td>USD 2.6 M in 2010 for support to ASF, PoW, PSC, CEWS, Security Sector Reform &amp; liaison offices</td>
<td>IGAD, ECOWAS, EASF &amp; AU-REC relations within APSA</td>
<td>Various ministries involved. Participation in JFA. Effort on alignment, Harmonisation and Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Global support to APSA at all levels in line with JAES action plan on PS.</td>
<td>The most important EU financial arrangement is the APF. It provides funding for APSA, early response, political dialogue &amp; PSOs. Specific support is also provided through the CFSP, DCI, ENPI, IfS and CFSP/ESDP budgets.</td>
<td>APF support to all REC/RMs channelled through AU. App. € 400 M potentially available for APSA (or politically) related priorities at the regional levels (EDF10, regional envelopes).</td>
<td>Leading coordination among partners supporting APSA in Addis. Supports whole spectrum of peace and security. Centralised management of APSA support in Brussels despite recently created EU embassy to AU. Devolved management of all EDF support to regions. Division of responsibilities between various directorates.</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Contributions</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>APSA related support in AUC. App. € 3 M in 2010 for PoW, mediation, special representatives, AU liaison offices</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>App. € 90 M budget for Peace and Security Activities in Africa. Mainly implemented through military and defence cooperation in French speaking sub-Saharan countries. Gradual shift from bilateral support to Europeanisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Main focus on capacity building</td>
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Support AUC PSD consultations and coordination with African embassies to UN. Supports UN-AU desk-to-desk cooperation on peace and security.

Recruitment of ASF and PSD personnel through JFA

€ 400 M for PSOs (EDF9) incl. Amis, Amisom, Comoros and Micopax.

Total of € 600 M earmarked for APSA, PSOs & early response until 2013 (EDF10).

Technical and limited financial support to ECCAS/FOMAC.

Specific technical, financial and military support to ECCAS PSO (MICOPAX) in CAR.

Military training and financing of support to field exercises, mostly in Central & Western Africa. RECAMP/AMANI training as well as logistics and equipment.

Critically involved: Three ministries involved:

Military Cooperation and Defence Directorate part of Foreign Ministry in charge of military training throughout Africa

Military Attaché in Addis responsible for assistance to APSA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Funding provided</th>
<th>Substantial support (2010)</th>
<th>Focus on regions of</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Funding provided</td>
<td>Substantial support (2010)</td>
<td>Focus on regions of</td>
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</table>

PoW, CEWS and PCDR, Border Programme. Financing of AUC building for PSD (app. € 20 M). Support to APSTA.

Provides support to AU PSD Staff Fund (JFA)

Provides an average of app € 10 M to APSA a year at AUC and REC/RMs.

Provides technical and financial support to ASF police component.

Provided air lift for troops in AMIS

Support to AU border programme

CEWARN since 2000.

Capacity building and organisational management in IGAD, EAC, COMESA, SADC, EASF, ECOWAS.

Support in EASF focus at civilian component (training courses and CPX/FTX). Support to transport and movement for FTX

EAC supported on SALW and organisational development.

IGAD supported on CEWARN, IGAD PS strategy and mediation

Support in SADC focused RPTC (€ 12 M over 2010-1014)

Support to ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Mediation Unit, Police Cell and civilian element, training centres. KAIPTC support includes civilian training courses, workshops and studies, cooperation with CSO/NGOs and Police peacekeeping courses.

Support to ISS, Pearsons Peacekeeping Centre, IPSS (addis), Interpol, & UNDPA.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Through Italian African Peace Facility (total of €40 M for peace and security in Africa)</td>
<td>€3 M) provided to AUC PSD incl. PoW (missions &amp; staff), ASF (civilian &amp; military components, legal deployment and meetings), funding of AU Liaison Offices.</td>
<td>Particular interest to Italy, in particular the Horn of Africa. Support outside the AU target specific projects beyond the APSA pillars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Starting to increase support to APSA</td>
<td>Support to civilian aspects of APSA and PSOs incl. AMIS Contributions to UNDP pool AUC capacity building</td>
<td>Increasing but still limited coordination and harmonisation with other partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Engaged for first time in the African continent through assistance for AMIS</td>
<td>Capacity building for military officers Airlift for rotation of AMIS troops and pre-deployment training for PSO staff.</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Represents NATO politically in Addis</td>
<td>Support to UNDP pool Together with Sweden, provided earmarked contributions to Peace Fund in the past. Provided technical support to PSOs (AMIS) through construction and maintenance of police stations in IDP camps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Substantial funding pledged but volatile due to economic crisis</td>
<td>Pledged €7.3 M in 2010 for APSA support incl. PSC, SSR, ASF, CEWS (incl. CSO engagement), Post Conflict Reconstruction and Peace-Building, Prevention and combating Terrorism, SALW, support to financial management in AUC PSD and CPMR incl. liaison officers, Drug control and crime prevention</td>
<td>No regional APSA funding</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>App. € 1.5 M for AU Liaison Offices, SALW, PCRD</td>
<td>10 Year Support Capacity Building Programme</td>
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<td>AU PSD staff financed through JFA (with EU, UK, Ger, DK). App. € 2 M (2010-2012) from Sweden.</td>
<td>UNDP Funding of APSA personnel in AUC. Pledged contribution of African Year of Peace. App; US$ 1 M in 2010.</td>
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<td>Support for APSA through UNDP pool for PSD staff until 2009. Terminated due to reporting and communication problems with UNDP.</td>
<td>Past pool funding for AUC capacity building on APSA. Challenges to attract new funders for its engagement on APSA due to insufficient results.</td>
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<td>Support for PSOs.</td>
<td>Facilitation of conferences and working groups on MoU between AU/RECs.</td>
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<td>Provided earmarked funds to the Peace Fund in the past</td>
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<td>Support to IGAD, EASF and ECOWAS.</td>
<td>Support to IGAD, EASF and ECOWAS.</td>
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<td>Nordic joint support to EASF/EASBRIG</td>
<td>Nordic joint support to EASF/EASBRIG</td>
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<td>Programmatic support to ECOWAS PS strategy and activities incl. APSA</td>
<td>Programmatic support to ECOWAS PS strategy and activities incl. APSA</td>
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<td>Support to regional NGOs involved in ASPA related issues (ISS, ACCORD, FEMNET, TOSTAN, GOREE Institute, KAIPTC, WANEP, FAS, SAIIA, CCR, IJR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Support mainly through African Crisis Prevention Pool (total budget of app. £ 30 M annual budget)</td>
<td>Support to IGAD, EASF and ECOWAS.</td>
<td>Support to IGAD, EASF and ECOWAS.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Effort to enhance</td>
<td>Programmatic support to ECOWAS PS strategy and activities incl. APSA</td>
<td>Programmatic support to ECOWAS PS strategy and activities incl. APSA</td>
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<td>Support to regional NGOs involved in ASPA related issues (ISS, ACCORD, FEMNET, TOSTAN, GOREE Institute, KAIPTC, WANEP, FAS, SAIIA, CCR, IJR)</td>
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<td>Provides technical and limited financial support to ECCAS and starting up support to SADC</td>
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<td>Insufficient coordination between UNDP and UNDPKO in past led to decision to create overall UN-office incl. all relevant UN departments.</td>
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<td>Inter-ministerial coordination and funding arrangement (ACPP)</td>
<td>Inter-ministerial coordination and funding arrangement (ACPP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Support Coordination and Alignment</td>
<td>Support through ACPP</td>
<td>Lead Partner of ASF</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Major supporter of AU led PSOs</td>
<td>Assist the AUC with CEWS Situation Room and communication structures for ASF</td>
<td>Lead partner of ASF workshop with Northbrig/NARC Focus on IGAD (CEWARN, anti-terrorism) and ECOWAS.</td>
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ANNEX II

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Assessment of the progress achieved by the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the operationalization of APSA so-as to identify capacity needs and priorities

1. Background/Framework

In pursuance of the objectives of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU entered into force on 26/12/2003. The Protocol embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security that includes conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace building, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices and intervention and humanitarian action and disaster management. At its heart is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is intended to give the AU the necessary instruments at its hand to fulfill the ambitious tasks set out in the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol. The APSA instruments are the Peace and Security Council (PSC), Panel of the Wise (PoW), African Standby Force (ASF), the Peace Fund and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

The build-up of the APSA has since then made progress and achieved a certain level of operationalisation. There is need for a fresh assessment of the current qualitative status of the APSA in order to identify future priorities and align future support as effectively as possible.

Many Partners have been supporting the efforts in operationalising the APSA. The operationalization of APSA is a joint priority under the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security within the Action Plan and Joint Strategy adopted in Lisbon in 2007. With substantial partners’ funding available for APSA strengthening, coherence and synergies of support are essential.

The high-level meeting in Akosombo, Ghana (10-11 December 2009), agreed that the AU and the RECs/RMs will conduct an assessment of progress achieved in the operationalization of APSA and the challenges ahead, with a view to identifying further APSA-related priorities and capacity needs.

It was agreed that this will be achieved through a specific study, which will build upon existing mappings and reports. The priorities as identified by the AU-RECs/RMs in this exercise jointly with the EU, will be consolidated into a roadmap which will serve as a reference framework for support to APSA under relevant EU sources of funding which include the African Peace Facility (APF); Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIP), Instrument for Stability (IfS) and individual EU Member States’ funding. The Roadmap will be a major contribution to the next Africa/EU Summit and the Year of Peace and Security (2010).
2. Purpose/Objectives

The purpose of the assessment is to serve as future reference for AU and the RECs to:

i) better apprehend what capacities (and up to which quality) still need to be built

ii) identify what measures of coherence need to be undertaken at the continental and regional levels

iii) to consolidate and further develop their capacity to engage more effectively in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and peace consolidation in the framework of the APSA.

This should also allow partners to plan, manage and coordinate their efforts in the coming years.

The assessment shall aim at:

a) Providing a clear and comprehensive overview of the current qualitative status of the establishment of the different APSA components and their interdependence as well as the quantitative and qualitative state of play of the support structures in the AUC and in the RECs/RMs.

b) Providing a clear and comprehensive picture of partners’ assistance towards the different APSA components and support structures; identifying those areas that are well supported as well as possible gaps.

c) Providing a jointly agreed basis on the steps to be taken and guidance on the way ahead for the full operationalization of APSA, leading to the Roadmap.

3. Organisation and Activities

3.1. Organisation

This assessment will be a joint AU/RECs/RMs and EU effort. For that purpose, the following will be established:

a) Steering Group
b) Core Group
c) Team of Experts.

3.1.1. The Steering Group will be based in Addis Ababa and will comprise relevant focal points from AU and EU representatives as well as RECs/RMs through their liaison offices as far as is practicable. This group will meet regularly and is responsible for:

- Initiating the needs assessment study
• Providing guidance to the Core Group – and through it to the Team of Experts on the essential elements and the context of the study
• Providing background documents needed for the Study and any other assistance required
• Ensuring overall supervision and liaison with AU and EU Headquarters on strategic matters

3.1.2. The Core Group will be based in Addis Ababa and will be composed of a number of AU and EU experts. The Core Group is responsible for:

• Planning and overall coordination of the general exercise
• Collecting all background documents needed for the Study and any other assistance required
• Collecting compiling and assessing all reports of existing mapping exercises and furnishing the Team of Experts with the same
• Assessing the existing mapping exercises
• Ensuring a harmonized methodology and approach for the Team of Experts
• Providing operational guidance to the Team of Experts
• Collecting, compiling and analysing observations and presenting these to the Steering Group
• Drafting the Assessment Study for the Steering Group
• Providing backstopping support to the Team of Experts

3.1.3 The Team of Experts will consist of civilian, police and military experts and will be tasked with:

• Carrying out the Needs Assessment at the AU Headquarters and at the regional level (RECs/RMs) in line with the guidance given by the Core Group.
• Provide weekly updates on their activities and findings to the Core Group.
• Preparation of reports of the outcome of the assessment and submitting the same to the AU/EU through the Core Group and subsequently the Steering Group.

3. 2. Activities
The assessment will consist of two parts:

3.2.1. A conceptual part examining the tools, doctrines and concepts needed to make APSA operational. The first part will provide an assessment of what tools exist and how the doctrines and concepts are being put in place and shared. This part will be carried-out by the Core Group and will take place in Addis Ababa over the course of one month.

3.2.2. An analytical exercise that will look at the capacities of each element within the APSA. The second part (carried-out at the AU and RECs/RMs level) will complement the first one by filling in gaps and providing additional information. The team of
experts will approach international partners to get a clear view on their ongoing and planned APSA support activities (at AU and/or RECs/RMs level). This exercise will cover a period of 100 days.

The analysis will include the break-down of the mandates, tasks, work plans and activities of the different APSA elements. Those should be individually and qualitatively assessed (in form of a table) to allow for general conclusions.

The end result of the assessment will include a reality check comparing the APSA objectives with the existing achievements, a lessons learned analysis and a gap-analysis highlighting where additional work is required in order to achieve the full operationalisation of APSA. Finally, the assessment will also contain options for prioritization of actions and an overview of existing support being provided by international partners. This will then form the basis on which the Roadmap will be built.

The expected outcomes and timelines (indicative) for this assessment are:

a) Induction report by the Core group ready with detailed calendar and activities (work plan) latest 2 weeks after taking up of duty in Addis Ababa (indicative April 2010);

b) A draft assessment report ready by 15 July,

c) The final report ready by 15 August,

d) On the basis of the report, a draft Trilateral APSA Roadmap is expected to be prepared in an AU-EU-RECs/RMs workshop on 15 September to serve as a reference framework for programming EU support to APSA.

4. Duration of the Exercise

- The overall duration of the APSA assessment exercise will be from April to August 2010. Both, the Core Group and the Team of Experts will be available during the whole period.

5. Required expertise

5.1. Core Group

- Experience in African Peace and Security issues (APSA)
- Experience in institutional capacity assessment
- Proficiency in one of the African Union working languages. Knowledge of one or more of the other AU working languages would be an added advantage
- Excellent analytical and drafting skills

The Core Team will consist of two African and one European expert. The recruitment of the experts will be the responsibility of the African Union and European Union respectively.
5.2. Team of Experts

- Civilian, police and military expertise in a CPMR (Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution) context in Africa
- Experience in African Peace and Security issues (APSA)
- Proficiency in one of the African Union working languages. Knowledge of one or more of the other AU working languages would be an added advantage
- Good analytical and drafting skills

The Team of Experts will consist of four African and two European experts. The recruitment of the experts will be the responsibility of the African Union and European Union respectively.
ANNEX III

Core Questions for the APSA Assessment

The following questions will constitute the core of the generic questions for the assessment:

I. What would say are some of the critical political and operational challenges and constraints that are hampering efforts to operationalize your organizations peace and security architecture?

II. Related to the above, what concrete steps do you think need to be taken to address the challenges on these two levels?

III. What in your view are some of the major existing and emerging security challenges in your sub-region, and the continent as whole? To what extent can you say that the African Peace and Security Architecture is properly configured to address these challenges?

IV. To what extent are the various initiatives of the RECs/RMs consistent with the AU’s vision of a continental architecture? Related to this, to what extent is APSA moving in the direction of an inter-locking architecture or sub-regional silos? Is it necessary or even desirable to integrate or harmonize these initiatives and emerging systems?

V. What is your institution’s relationship with the African Union on the one hand and other sub-regional institutions in your region on the other? To what extent can you say that these relationships are complementary, and how can complementarity be enhanced to ensure optimal outcomes, especially in addressing complex and often interrelated conflicts? What in your view should be guiding principles for these relationships?

VI. What can you say is your institutions comparative advantage? How does this compare with other RECs/RMs in your sub-region?

VII. Who are your major partners? How can these partnerships be enhanced?

VIII. What is your organizations sustainability plan? For example, what your plans to transition from partner support to regular support from your institution’s assessed contribution?

IX. What five or six concrete steps would you identify as critical to enhancing your institutions role in dealing with the political and security challenges in your sub-region in the context of APSA?
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Amadou Diongue, Expert, Peace and Security Council Secretariat, Peace and Security Department

S.E. Dr. Ruben Maye Nsue Mangue, Ambassador of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the African Union, and Chair of the Peace and Security Council (September, 2010)

Nissa Roguiai, Expert, Peace and Security Council Secretariat, Peace and Security Department

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Abdel Kader Haireche, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Peace Support to the AU

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Colonel Mahmoud Elsaid, NARC Planning Element  
Lieutenant Colonel Rebah Tabellout, Proposed NARC Liaison Officer to the AU  
Lieutenant Colonel Abdelnasser Elshames, NARC Planning Element  
Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Kaarout, NARC Planning Element  
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