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THE PEACEMAKING EFFECTIVENESS
OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

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In the mid-1990s the journal *International Security* hosted a famous debate on the impact of international institutions on peace and stability. The debate, which frames the current article on regional organisations, commenced with the neo-realist assertion by John Mearsheimer that institutions can do little if anything to enhance stability in an anarchical international system that generates fear, uncertainty and relentless competition for power and security among states (Mearsheimer 1994/95). According to Mearsheimer, institutions are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, they have no independent effect on state behaviour and they are therefore not an important cause of peace.

Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin (1995) responded by arguing that liberal institutionalism shares the utilitarian and rationalist underpinnings of realism, but posit that states set up institutions in order to advance their interests and facilitate collectively beneficial cooperation. In relation to security, institutions can provide states with information, reducing the uncertainty and risks associated with anarchy. Alexander Wendt (1995) challenged neo-realist thinking from a constructivist perspective, which holds that world politics is socially constructed. The fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and shape the identities and interests of states as well as their behaviour. These social structures are defined by shared knowledge and understanding among groups of states, and vary between relationships of mistrust and conflict and relationships of trust and cooperation. Interdependence, collective identity formation and the institutions of sovereignty and the democratic peace have greatly reduced the dangers of anarchy. Mearsheimer (1995) closed the debate by insisting that his critics had failed to present solid evidence of the peace-causing effects of institutions.

Since the mid-1990s a notable international development has been the growth in the number and assertiveness of regional organisations active in the realm of peace and security (Pugh and Sidhu 2003; Peck 2001). These organisations have created security regimes of various kinds and have undertaken preventive diplomacy, mediation, peace operations, post-war peacebuilding, arms control and disarmament. On several occasions they have facilitated the termination of violent conflict. For example, in 2008 the African Union (AU) brokered a peace agreement in the midst of civil violence in Kenya; in 2005 the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated an end to the decades-long civil war in Sudan; and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) brokered the Algiers Agreement of 2000, ending the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The European Union (EU) and its forerunners were instrumental in creating a security community in which war is inconceivable (Buzan and Waever 2003: ch.11), while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, September 13-15, 2010. I am grateful to James Putzel, Ben Shepherd, Herbert Wulf and the conference participants for their helpful comments.

2 Mearsheimer (1994/95: 8) defined an institution as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should co-operate and compete with each other, prescribing acceptable forms of state behaviour and proscribing unacceptable kinds of behaviour. International organisations, including regional organisations, are formal and structured forms of institutions.
(ASEAN) has forged a culture of pacific management of inter-state disputes (Sridharan 2008). In light of these developments, it is no longer tenable empirically to claim that international institutions serve only the interests of great powers and are not a cause of peace.

Regional organisations are considered significant not only by the member states that devote resources to them but also by the United Nations and the donor governments that fund these bodies in the South (Klingebiel et al. 2008). Article 52 of the UN Charter encourages pacific settlement of local disputes by regional arrangements or agencies. The end of the Cold War gave fresh impetus to this aspiration. Over the past two decades the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General have championed the peacemaking role of regional organisations (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN General Assembly 1994; UN 2001, 2006, 2008; UN Security Council 2005). The UN’s enthusiastic endorsement of these organisations rests largely on the promise that they can help to create a pacific regional environment because they serve as forums for conflict resolution, build trust through the frequency of interaction among states, encourage and facilitate a collective approach to cross-border security issues and encourage their members to adhere to international and regional norms on governance and conflict prevention.

Between 2005 and 2010 the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) co-ordinated a research project on the peacemaking role and impact of regional organisations within their respective geographical domains. There were two primary questions: whether these organisations contributed to the prevention and resolution of violent conflict between and within their member states; and what factors account for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness in this regard. The project did not examine the role of regional organisations in responding to extra-regional threats or in mounting peace operations beyond their own territory.

The following organisations were studied: the AU (Møller 2009b; Marshall 2009; Nathan 2010a); ASEAN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Sridharan 2008; Nathan 2010b); the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Pinfari 2009); the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Møller 2008b); the EU (Møller 2008a); IGAD (Healy 2009); the Organisation of American States (OAS) (Hertz 2008); the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Matveeva and Giustozzi 2008); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Nathan 2006a; Alden 2010). In addition, three papers had a multi-organisational focus (Haacke and Williams 2009; Møller, 2009a; Wulf and Debie 2009); two explored regional conflict formations rather than regional organisations (Matveeva 2007; Giroux et al. 2009); and one focused on security communities (Nathan 2006b).

The project’s main empirical finding is that the contribution of regional bodies to conflict prevention and resolution varies greatly from one case to another. In contrast to both the unremitting pessimism of neo-realist scholars and the uncritically positive view of the UN and donor governments, the spectrum covers organisations that have been highly successful, those that have been largely or completely ineffectual, some that have been successful in relation to certain types of conflict but not others, and some that have achieved success in certain periods but not others. Any theory of the role and impact of regional bodies in relation to peace and stability must endeavour to explain this variation.

Our main theoretical conclusions are as follows. A regional organisation’s peacemaking focus, orientation and effectiveness are shaped by historical, geographic, political and economic circumstances. The relevant factors include the process of state formation, the
strength of states, their domestic politics and foreign policies, the level of development, the
regional distribution of power and resources, the role of external powers and the nature of
domestic and external conflicts and security threats. The salience and consequences of these
factors differ from one case to another, with the result that the organisations’ dynamics,
capabilities and institutional culture vary markedly. This is immediately apparent if one
compares, say, ASEAN, the Arab League, the EU, IGAD and the SCO.

Notwithstanding the variations, the dominant general factor is that regional organisations are
forums of states. This is their primary characteristic since every one of their key features –
mandate, norms, decision-making modalities, goals, strategies, programmes, structure,
capacity and culture – derive from their members. Other than as decided by member states, a
regional organisation can have no mandate on peace and security, it can take no action to deal
with a specific conflict and its leaders and officials can have no authority to engage in
peacemaking. A comparative enquiry into the peacemaking effectiveness of regional
organisations must thus focus principally on the character, policies and interests of these
states and on the relationships between them.

Our overall conclusion is that an organisation’s peacemaking effectiveness depends largely on
whether its members want the organisation to be effective and on whether they have the
political trust and cohesion that are needed to make it effective in the realm of peace and
security. More specifically, we distinguish between the internal and external logic of regional
peacemaking as separate requirements for sustained effectiveness. The external logic, which
is captured by liberal institutionalist theory, refers to the interests and objective conditions
that make communal peacemaking a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states.
The internal logic, which is captured by constructivist theory, refers to the normative
congruence among these states that enables them to engage in close political co-operation in
order to prevent and end conflict. In the absence of common values, member states are unable
to resolve or transcend their major disputes, build trust and cohesion, develop regional
policies and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the external logic
provides the motivation for the peacemaking mandate, the internal logic is the glue that
allows member states to reach agreement on the mandate and to implement it. The internal
and external logic are necessary conditions for sustained effectiveness but whether they are
sufficient conditions is an open question.

The paper is organised as follows. The first section clarifies what is meant by ‘effectiveness’
and discusses the difficulties in determining the impact of regional organisations on peace and
stability. The following section illustrates the variations in the peacemaking effectiveness of
these bodies by considering a geographic spread of cases: namely ASEAN, the EU, IGAD,
SAARC and SADC. A third section explores state interests and the external logic, while the
fourth examines common values and the internal logic. The final section presents the
conclusions.

Assessing the peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations

In many studies that deal with the impact of international organisations, there is no discussion
on what the author means by ‘effective’ (or ‘successful’ or ‘significant’), on the criteria for
determining effectiveness and on the difficulties in making such judgements. These
considerations are implicitly viewed as unproblematic, leading to incomplete and imprecise
arguments. Mearsheimer (1995: 85), for example, is scornful of the claim by Keohane and
Martin (1995) that international organisations ‘matter’, dismissing this claim as hopelessly
vague. In order to achieve clarity where ‘effectiveness’ is a component of the dependent variable, it is necessary to specify what is meant by this term. It is also helpful to acknowledge the epistemological problems when trying to gauge effectiveness.

For Mearsheimer (1994/95) the central issue was whether international institutions can contribute to peace and stability by getting states to eschew balance-of-power logic and thereby avoid war. In two respects the CSRC project had a broader focus. First, it examined the role of regional organisations not only in preventing violence but also in ending hostilities. Even if an organisation fails to avert violent conflict, its success in ending such conflict must surely count as contributing to peace and stability. Second, the project was concerned as much with large scale intra-state conflict as with inter-state conflict. This approach is consistent with the UN Security Council’s expectations of regional organisations, especially where national conflict has a destabilising regional impact and severe humanitarian and human rights implications.

Some authors claim that a regional organisation is successful by virtue of having established a regime comprising treaties, protocols and mechanisms for security co-operation and peacemaking (Franke 2009; Ngoma 2004). This criterion for success is too formalistic and limited, however, because it ignores the efficacy of the protocols and mechanisms. The CSRC project sought to assess the peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations in terms of their actual contribution to the prevention and resolution of violent conflict.

There are several difficulties in making such assessments. The first problem is that conflict, peace and stability are complex phenomena that have multiple causes, many of which interact with each other at national, regional and international levels. It is consequently hard to ascertain the relative weight of different causal factors and the particular impact of a regional organisation. For example, a mediation process led by a regional body might be accompanied by UN peace initiatives, financial and other support from international partners, military action by member states and coercive measures taken by foreign powers. The IGAD mediation that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan is an example of this constellation of actors and dynamics (Healy 2009).

The difficulty of identifying the particular impact of a regional organisation is even greater with respect to claims that these bodies can contribute to the long-term prevention of violence. Bjørn Møller (2008b) illustrates this difficulty with reference to the evolution of the EU region from being the world’s bloodiest continent to becoming a zone of peace. This transition might have been due to a learning process following two world wars on the continent, a high level of interdependence, a stable balance of power underpinned militarily by the US, institutionalisation through the EU and its predecessors, or a combination of these factors. Møller (2008b: 1) observes that ‘even though mono-causality makes for neat and parsimonious hypotheses and theories, in real life developments are often the result of many causes’.

In the course of this paper, reference will be made to two theories regarding the long-term prevention of violence in a region. Neo-functionalist theories of integration, pioneered by Ernst Haas (1958; 1961) on the basis of the European experience after the end of World War II, suggest that increasing economic co-operation and functional interdependence within a region can have a pacifying effect, reducing the risk of hostilities between countries. The theory of security communities, developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues (1957) on the basis of an extensive historical survey, explores the attainment of a high level of integration,
common identity, loyalty, trust and sense of community such that the members of the community enjoy the assurance of dependable expectations of peaceful change, confident that their disputes will be settled by means other than fighting (Adler and Barnett 1998).

The second problem in assessing the peacemaking impact of a regional organisation is that we cannot know what the security situation would have been like had the organisation not existed. In some instances it might seem clear that the organisation has made absolutely no difference to the severity of regional conflict (e.g. SAARC in South Asia) but in other cases it is conceivable that regional conflict would have been more intense or more pervasive in the absence of the regional body (e.g. SADC in Southern Africa). Similarly, a specific peace initiative might be deeply flawed and fail to achieve stability but it is possible that the level of instability would have been higher without that initiative. An example of this phenomenon is the AU peace mission in Darfur in 2004-7 (Williams 2006).

The third difficulty relates to organisational objectives. An organisation is formed to attain certain objectives and any evaluation of its effectiveness must consider the extent to which it has achieved them. A regional body whose protocols proclaim that it will promote respect for human rights will thus be adjudged ineffectual if it ignores gross abuses in a member state. Yet the real objectives of a regional body might be different from its stated objectives, with the result that an organisation that blocks international criticism of human rights abuses in a member state could be considered effective in terms of its unstated objective of regime protection. The real but unstated objectives of an organisation are seldom clear cut and have to be inferred from its behaviour.

Finally, critical assessments of the peacemaking efforts of regional organisations should be tempered by an appreciation of the intractability of severe intra- and inter-state conflict. Protracted high intensity conflicts, such as those between Ethiopia and Eritrea and those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur and Myanmar, defy quick and easy resolution by regional bodies, the UN and powerful states alike.

Cognisant of these various difficulties, we focused on the following indicators in relation to our primary research questions: the scope, duration, severity and prevalence of violent conflict between and within the member states of a regional organisation; the organisation’s strategies and activities (or lack thereof) aimed at preventing and resolving violent conflict; and the outcome of the organisation’s peacemaking endeavours. In some instances an outcome is clear cut but in other cases it requires a judgement to be made.

The varied peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations

While the UN’s motivation for the engagement of regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution might seem compelling, the picture that emerges from case studies of these organisations is decidedly mixed. Indeed, the most striking aspect of this picture is the variation in effectiveness. The organisations range from being highly successful (the EU) to being completely ineffectual (SAARC) or largely ineffectual (SADC and IGAD). Within this spectrum there are organisations that have been effective in certain respects but not others (ASEAN) and institutions whose effectiveness has changed in different historical periods (the CSCE/OSCE). This section illustrates these differences by presenting summary overviews of the peacemaking impact of the EU, SAARC, SADC, ASEAN and IGAD.
In the relatively short period of fifty years following the end of World War II, Europe evolved from a region that had been rent by war for centuries to one in which war is inconceivable. It has attained the exalted status of a security community. The EU and its predecessor organisations were the institutional vehicles for the process of integration and the building of a common identity, loyalty, trust and sense of community, which are among the defining features of a security community (Wæver 1998).

From its inception the integration process was conceived as a peace project. The first building block, the European Coal and Steel Community, sought to pool coal and steel production as a means to eliminating the age-old enmity between Germany and France and making another war between these countries ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ (1950 Schuman Declaration, quoted in Møller 2008a: 2). Thereafter the EU continued to promote and consolidate peace among its members through interdependence and integration rather than, as with many other regional bodies, through security co-operation, mediation and preventive diplomacy. The EU is also distinct among regional bodies in that integration and a sense of community and common identity have reached the point where member states have been willing to transfer sovereign decision making on certain issues to supranational authorities. As a result of the EU’s prosperity and domestic and regional stability, a third distinguishing feature is the fact that the geographic focus of the organisation’s peace operations and programmes lies beyond the borders of its member states.

Since the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community, the EU has incrementally expanded the territorial boundaries of its zone of peace. Through successive waves of enlargement it has grown from six members in 1951 to twenty-seven members in 2010. It has also induced positive change in neighbouring states wishing to join the organisation, which have modified their behaviour in order to meet the human rights and other criteria for admission (Møller 2008a).

South Asia is a volatile conflict formation with a bipolar regional structure that revolves around the rivalry between Pakistan and India (Buzan and Waever 2003: 101-127). Since independence in 1947 these countries have been locked in the grip of enmity based on political, ethno-religious and territorial tensions. There have been three wars and several major crises in which the risk of war loomed large (Buzan and Waever 2003: 102). Each country accuses the other of provoking or fuelling domestic instability and cross-border violence. The competing claims on Kashmir have generated an arms race and the maintenance of highly militarised border areas. In 1998 the dangers attendant on the arms race rose dramatically when both countries conducted nuclear weapons tests. At a lower intensity there is tension between Bangladesh and Pakistan, and India has acrimonious relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

At the domestic level the region has been riven by violent ethnic and religious conflict and terrorism, which cross borders easily because of the weakness of states and the presence of the same ethnic and religious communities in adjacent countries. Most of the South Asian

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3 A list of the 27 EU member states can be viewed at http://europa.eu.
4 The members of SAARC are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and, since 2007, Afghanistan.
states have experienced acute instability and periodic bouts of violence. The extreme cases include: war-torn Afghanistan; Sri Lanka, where over 60,000 people died in the war against the Tamil Tigers; and Nepal, whose civil war lasted a decade from 1996.

Since its inception in 1985 SAARC has done nothing to resolve or even ameliorate these conflicts. The annual summit meetings of heads of state have not only failed to address the various conflicts but have been rendered almost inoperable by them. By 2008 only fourteen summit meetings had been held in the preceding twenty-two years, the other meetings having been postponed or cancelled due to tension between states (Sridharan 2008: 8-9).

Although the preamble to the SAARC Charter expresses a desire to promote peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through methods that include peaceful settlement of disputes, the section on the objectives of the Association pointedly omits any reference to dispute settlement. The most significant aspect of the Charter is Article X(2), which states that ‘bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations [of the organisation]’ (SAARC 1985). This provision was included at the insistence of India, which feared that its neighbours would unite against it in a regional forum for conflict resolution.

SADC

In 1980 the newly independent countries of Southern Africa formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) with the aims of stimulating development co-operation, mobilising international aid and reducing the economic dependence of member states on apartheid South Africa. In 1992, as the apartheid era drew to a close, SADCC was replaced by SADC, which is mandated to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions. Four years later SADC created the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, a common security regime charged with ensuring peace and stability through political, military and security co-operation and the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflict. In 2003 the heads of state and government approved a Mutual Defence Pact, which provides for defence co-operation and a collective response to an armed attack against a member state.

Following SADC's establishment the region remained wracked by a high level of violent conflict. The most prominent of these conflicts were the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC, which began in 1998 and continues to flare up periodically; intense state repression in Zimbabwe from 2000; and riots and a coup in Madagascar in 2009. Unlike SAARC, however, relations between the SADC states are not characterised by the threat and use of force.

Despite the existence of the Organ, SADC has a woeful record of peacemaking. In most of the crises that beset the region it refrained from diplomatic engagement and critical comment. It played no meaningful role in relation to the Angolan civil war and was deeply divided over the DRC rebellion. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded to the rebellion by deploying troops in support of the Congo government while South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania pursued a diplomatic solution. The divergent strategies generated acute animosity within SADC and crippled the Organ (Nathan 2006a). The Lusaka Accord of 1999, brokered

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5 The members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADC suspended Madagascar’s membership in 2009.
by Zambia on behalf of SADC, achieved a partial ceasefire and provided the framework for inter-Congolese negotiations, but it also shifted the locus of peacemaking from SADC to the UN and the OAU/AU. As chairperson of the AU, President Mbeki of South Africa played a vital mediating role, facilitating the 2002 agreement that paved the way for the DRC’s first democratic elections four years later.

SADC fared poorly in relation to the Zimbabwe crisis. For several years after the onset of the reign of terror in that country, the Southern African heads of state expressed solidarity with Harare and ignored the human rights abuses and abrogation of the rule of law. It was only in 2007 that SADC appointed Mbeki to mediate in Zimbabwe. The talks that he facilitated between the government and opposition parties resulted in the formation of a government of national unity in 2009, but it remains sorely disunited. In the case of Madagascar, mediation efforts by the UN, the AU and SADC have been unsuccessful.

**ASEAN**

ASEAN is credited with the major achievement of preventing a war between member states. Following the *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1963-66, the organisation’s formation in 1967 institutionalised a reconciliation process and ‘facilitated the transformation of a sub-region of turmoil into a more stable and predictable area in which the role of force has been minimised’ (Muthiah Alagappa, quoted in Sridharan 2008: 3). ASEAN has not resolved all the disputes between its members, but it has provided them with an institutional framework in which to address, or ignore, these disputes peacefully (Sridharan 2008; Leifer 1989; Acharya 1998). It has also enabled member states to negotiate collectively and reach an agreement with China on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea (Sridharan 2008: 6).

The pacification of inter-state relations is attributed to a set of norms and principles referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’, which includes dialogue, consensual decision-making, non-interference in domestic affairs and peaceful settlement of disputes (Acharya 1998). Although ASEAN has concluded a number of treaties relating to peace and security, one of its distinguishing features has been its preference for dealing with conflict through informal dialogue and ‘agreeing to disagree’ rather than through formal rule-based instruments. Unlike the AU and several of the sub-regional bodies in Africa, it has avoided the creation of a regional peacekeeping force.

While the ‘ASEAN way’ has helped to prevent bilateral disputes from escalating into war, the non-interference norm has also prevented the Association from addressing gross human rights abuses and violent conflict within member states. ASEAN was paralysed when separatist insurgencies and anarchy gripped Indonesia in 1998, it was ineffectual in relation to the East Timor crisis of 1999 and it has been criticised severely for its soft approach to the military regime in Myanmar (Sridharan 2008). In the 1970s and 1980s the threat of communist insurgency consolidated ASEAN solidarity and security co-operation; but in the 1990s the challenge posed by popular resistance to authoritarianism reinforced regime solidarity and security at the expense of human security (Acharya 1998).

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6 The members of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
In 1986 the countries in the Horn of Africa formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). A decade later the body was transformed into IGAD with a mandate to promote peace and stability and create mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. Accordingly, the IGAD Secretariat established a peace and security division and a conflict early warning and response mechanism. In 2003 the IGAD heads of state tasked the Secretariat to develop a comprehensive peace and security strategy. The resultant strategy document had not been approved at the time of writing.

The IGAD region has experienced extensive conflict, including war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000, leaving 100,000 soldiers dead; war in southern Sudan between 1983 and 2005, with a death toll of nearly two-million civilians; violence and ethnic cleansing in Darfur from 2003; fighting and state failure in Somalia; atrocities committed by the Lords Resistance Army in northern Uganda; and civil conflict in Kenya in 2007-8. There are also many inter-community conflicts, both within and between member states.

A pervasive conflict dynamic has been the use of force by IGAD states against each other, sometimes directly but more often by supporting rebels in neighbouring countries (Cliffe 1999; Healy 2009). Examples from the past decade include Ugandan, Eritrean and Ethiopian support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM); Sudan’s support for the Lords Resistance Army; Eritrean support for Darfur rebels and armed opposition groups in Ethiopia and Somalia; and Ethiopian and Sudanese support for Eritrean dissidents.

IGAD has generally failed to address, let alone resolve, the violent conflicts between and within member states. There have been two major exceptions to this trend. An intermittent mediation process led by Kenya on behalf of the regional body culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that brought an end to the war in south Sudan. In 2002 IGAD mandated a group of member states led by Kenya to undertake peace and reconciliation efforts for Somalia, leading to the creation of the Transitional Federal Government and a national parliament in 2004. However, these structures have been unable to establish their authority in Somalia.

The IGAD experience highlights the fact that the ‘worst case scenario’ is not the failure by a regional organisation to address conflict but rather a situation where the organisation’s peacemaking efforts provoke or exacerbate conflict. The IGAD peace process for southern Sudan was a proximate cause of the 2003 Darfur rebellion because the negotiations and emerging agreements between Khartoum and the SPLM excluded Darfur and were perceived by Darfuri communities to entrench their long-standing marginalisation (Nathan 2008: 9). By way of further example, the Darfur Peace Agreement brokered by the AU in 2006 sparked violent protests in western Sudan, heightened the fragmentation of the rebel movements and bedevilled subsequent endeavours to facilitate peace talks (ICG 2006). It has also been argued that the military force deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian civil war in 1990 prolonged the war and generated wider regional instability (Howe 1996/97; Sesay 1995).

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7 The members of IGAD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 2007 Eritrea suspended its membership of the organisation.
State interests and the external logic

As noted in the introduction, Mearsheimer argues that international institutions cannot enhance stability and contribute to peace in an international system defined by anarchy. One of the empirically and logically unsatisfactory aspects of this position is that many states in many parts of the world put a great deal of effort into building and sustaining international organisations whose goals include peace and stability. Mearsheimer (1994/95: 47-49) tackles this issue only with respect to US participation in multilateral institutions, which he maintains is driven by American idealism and core beliefs that run counter to realism’s pessimistic outlook. Whether or not this is true, it is clearly inadequate as a general explanation since it does not account for the motivation of other countries.

Liberal institutionalist theory, on the other hand, offers a logical and plausible explanation for the formation and use by states of regional arrangements for peace and stability. As rational actors, these states must believe that institutionalised co-operation and co-ordination will serve their interests by helping them to achieve one or more goals or solve one or more problems. If they did not hold this belief at the outset, or if the initial belief proved to be unfounded over time, they would not expend resources on communal arrangements.

The same reasoning applies to the question of effectiveness. Since a regional organisation will only attain its objectives if it has the support and co-operation of its members, it can only be effective if these states share the conviction that the organisation meets, or at least has the potential to meet, their respective interests. The satisfaction of the external logic of communal arrangements for peacemaking is thus a necessary condition for effectiveness: member states must be convinced that the arrangements are beneficial in terms of their interests and the relevant circumstances.

As discussed in this section, the CSRC project’s main empirical finding regarding the external logic is that the key details vary markedly among the cases under consideration. The circumstances and interests that drive regional efforts in the realm of peace and security differ from one organisation to another and from one state to another, they change over time and they are a major reason for the differences in institutional focus, effectiveness and constraints. In some instances states are averse to regional forums per se, or to regional forums for conflict management and resolution in particular, because they view these forums as threatening their interests.

Keohane and Martin (1995: 42) contend that international institutions have the following benefits: they ‘provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for co-ordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity’. These benefits might well apply to peace and security as much as to other spheres but they are not specific to peace and security. The particular contribution of institutions to security, according to Keohane and Martin (1995: 43-44), is the provision of information that helps to mitigate the uncertainty, risks and consequential insecurity emanating from an anarchic international system.

From the UN’s perspective, regional arrangements for peace and security serve the interests of states in three ways: they contribute to preventing, containing and resolving violent conflict, which is immensely costly and destructive not only for the states embroiled in conflict but also for their neighbours; they democ ratise international affairs by giving states responsibility and authority for the maintenance of security in their geographical domains;
and they provide a platform for state co-operation and co-ordination on cross-border security problems such as trafficking in contraband or arms (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN 2001).

Many of the regional organisations in Africa were motivated to construct peace and security regimes because of the severe obstacle that violent conflict poses to economic growth and integration. For example, the founding mandate of ECOWAS focused on economic integration but it soon became apparent that this was unattainable in a context of large-scale violence. The organisation therefore created, and has applied vigorously, a set of mechanisms for conflict resolution (Adebajo 2002). Similarly, the rationale for the AU’s peace and security architecture is the reverse of the neo-functionalist theories that anticipate political co-operation and pacific relations emerging from functional co-operation and economic integration. The AU is convinced that achieving political stability through peacemaking, security instruments and good governance is a necessary pre-condition for integration, trade, investment and development. The same reasoning is evident in SADC’s founding documents:

‘War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security’ (SADC 1992a: 9-10)

In addition to facilitating security co-ordination and co-operation, regional organisations can undertake peacemaking interventions that are more legitimate and less threatening than those of a single state because they represent collective interests or a balance of national interests rather than a narrow set of parochial and partisan interests. This potential advantage has not materialised in all regions, but it is evident throughout Africa, where numerous mediation efforts have taken place under the auspices of a regional organisation (which often mandates one of its member states to host or conduct the mediation). The legitimacy of a regionally endorsed peace initiative is particularly important to the UN and the donor governments that support the initiative and its non-threatening and balanced character is particularly important to the belligerent parties.

By way of illustration, the mediation that culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan began in 1993 when Khartoum approached IGADD for assistance in ending the war. IGADD responded by setting up a peace committee headed by President Moi of Kenya. While Kenya led the process from start to finish, the IGADD/IGAD institutional framework provided several significant benefits: it allowed the process to survive major shifts in state alliances and antagonisms; it ensured continuity when the regional political constellation was not conducive to a settlement; it enabled Western powers and donors to render support through the IGAD Partners Forum; it brought together all the neighbouring states that were directly and indirectly involved in the war; and it held at bay the would-be mediators from outside the region, namely Egypt, Libya and Yemen (Healy 2009; Woodward 2004).

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8 This is one of the main themes of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), which is the socio-economic programme of the AU. See www.nepad.org.
In some cases a regional organisation acquires a peace and security remit when long standing tensions among member states dissipate, prompting expectations of a new era of co-operation. IGAD’s adoption of a peace and security mandate in 1996, for example, occurred during a rare (and short-lived) period marked by an absence of inter-state conflict. When that period ended, most dramatically in the form of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, member states lost interest in setting up collective peacemaking mechanisms (Healy 2009: 4-5). The decision to replace SADCC with SADC in 1992 and to give the new body a peace and security mandate was similarly motivated by the ending of regional enmity as South Africa abandoned minority rule and its policy of regional destabilisation.

In other cases, the emergence of a regional body was driven by a desire to contain a potential or actual security threat. As noted earlier, the European Coal and Steel Community aimed to eliminate the historical threat posed by Germany, one of its own members. The CSCE’s extended conferences during the Cold War, on the other hand, were intended to facilitate détente between two rival military alliances and lower the risk of outright warfare. In addition to having a common interest in détente, the West sought to use the CSCE to promote human rights in the East, while the Soviet Union was more interested in the prospect of economic co-operation with the West (Møller 2008b).

ASEAN’s formative phase was also shaped by a common threat. Set up in 1967, the Association was galvanised by the communist victory in Indochina in 1975 and Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia two years later (Sridharan 2008: 4-5). Faced with the prospect of communist insurgencies in their own countries, the founding members of ASEAN engaged in close co-operation against cross-border movement by guerrillas, mitigating tension around territorial disputes and promoting solidarity (Acharya 1998: 203-204). Although ASEAN long denied that it was a security arrangement, it represented an attempt by the non-communist states to ‘stabilise their part of the region by providing an organisation for promoting a code of behaviour for the peaceful resolution of disputes’ (Diane Mauzy, quoted in Sridharan 2008: 11). The ASEAN countries have continued to believe that their interests are better served by this means than by warfare.

By contrast, SAARC has refrained from creating formal or informal mechanisms for security and conflict resolution. This is mainly due to New Delhi’s concern from the outset that SAARC might be used by the other member states to counter-balance and constrain India’s power. This concern led to the SAARC Charter’s exclusion of deliberations on ‘bilateral and contentious issues’. India remains convinced that more harm than good would come from amending the Charter (Sridharan 2008: 12). As the Indian Foreign Secretary put it in 2005, ‘it should be clear to any observer that India would not like to see a SAARC in which some of its members perceive it as a vehicle primarily to counterbalance India or to seek to limit its room for manoeuvre’ (Saran 2005: 2).

Along the lines of the AU’s rationale for concentrating on peacemaking, Pakistan has proposed that SAARC should be involved in mediation and other peace initiatives in order to address the inter-state disputes that impede regional development and economic co-operation (Indian Express, July 29, 1998; Kyodo News International, January 5, 2004). India’s contrary stance resembles the neo-functionalist theories of integration, insisting that regionalism should be driven by economic co-operation and the avoidance of contentious politics, leading to the gradual easing of tensions and thereby paving the way for deeper integration (Saran 2005). Bangladesh shares India’s resistance to amending the Charter, while Sri Lanka’s position is closer to that of Pakistan (Sridharan 2008: 12-13).
In Central Asia the EU, the UN Development Programme and other external actors have pushed for the formation of regional structures in order to facilitate development, mitigate conflictual relations between states and address disputes and cross-border problems. The pressure has been resisted by the five states in the region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states have pursued policies of separation rather than integration, dealing with security concerns such as drug trafficking, terrorism and cross-border ethnic tensions through closed borders, isolationism and bilateral security agreements with Russia and the US. Whereas the donors view the security and other benefits of regional co-operation as self-evident, the states themselves place a higher premium on consolidating their regimes, statehood and sovereignty, which they fear might be weakened by a regional body. Only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the poorest and most geographically disadvantaged countries, have a strong interest in the opportunities afforded by a regional organisation. Kazakhstan – the most stable and prosperous country – is more interested in integration with Europe than with its poor and unstable neighbours (Matveeva 2007; Allison 2004).

The state interests discussed in this section are not exhaustive. A more extensive account would cover the size and strength of countries, distinguishing between the interests of small states and large ones in a regional body; the location of states, particularly in relation to external security threats; the security presence of foreign powers, which might be reassuring or threatening; and the relevance of trade and other regional interests represented by the ruling parties of member states. For present purposes the key point is that state interests are a major factor in determining the presence or absence of regional peacemaking arrangements, the ambit of these arrangements and their effectiveness.

Common values and the internal logic

The CSRC project found that values were as significant as interests in determining whether states were willing to utilise regional forums for peacemaking and in determining the extent to which such forums were effective. Where states have been unwilling to set up or use these forums, this has invariably been due in part to acute mistrust arising from antagonistic political relationships and values among member states. Examples of this dynamic include the conflicts between the Islamic regime in Khartoum and the neighbouring states that have supported rebel groups in Sudan; the conflict between Islamic Pakistan, which has experienced long periods of military rule, and democratic, secular and predominantly Hindu India; and Uzbekistan’s tensions with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan around jihadi Islamists and ethnic minorities. Conversely, as discussed below, common values have been integral to the peacemaking success of ASEAN and the EU.

We conclude that the satisfaction of the external logic of regional peacemaking is not a sufficient condition for sustained effectiveness. The organisation’s internal logic must also be met: there must be enough congruence in the core values of member states to enable them to engage in close political co-operation on conflict prevention and resolution. Common values are essential because international institutions comprise a set of principles, norms, procedures and rules that are intended to constrain state decision making and behaviour. States do not lightly accept such infringements on their sovereignty, they are especially reluctant to do so in the domain of high politics and it is not something they will do in the absence of trust.

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9 In 2005 the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation, which was little more than a declaratory body, was merged into the Eurasian Economic Community.
Common values mitigate the suspicions and tensions evoked by anarchy, provide the basis for trust and cohesion, facilitate the forging of a common approach to peacemaking, minimise the compromises that states have to make in order to achieve consensus and reduce the risk that some states will deviate from the common policies.

In this section I examine the importance of common values in relation to three organisations that operate in different regional environments with different levels of effectiveness as peacemaking institutions: SADC, whose members abide by the norm of refraining from the use and threat of force against each other, but lack common values on domestic policy and on regional security and peacemaking; the EU, which has satisfied the internal logic; and ASEAN, which lacks normative congruence on domestic policy, but has institutionalised a set of pacific principles on inter-state relations. I focus on these organisations because each of them has identified a set of core values and it is therefore possible to ascertain how the organisations themselves have construed the matter. After discussing these cases I consider the inter-subjective and contingent nature of the internal logic and the question of which values are most relevant to peacemaking effectiveness.

**SADC**

For twenty years prior to the formation of SADC, the liberation movements and independent countries of Southern Africa were united in their struggles against colonialism and minority rule. As this era drew to a close in the early 1990s, the region’s leaders declared that ‘a new Southern Africa concerned with peace and development must find … [an] abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region’ (SADC 1992a: 5). The enduring basis for co-operation would lie in ‘the establishment of common political, social and other values, such as democracy, respect for human rights [and] respect for the rule of law’ (SADC 1993: 24). The SADC Treaty of 1992 provides that the organisation’s objectives include the ‘evolution of common political values, systems and institutions’ and that its principles are sovereign equality of states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC 1992b).

In subsequent years the logic of common values as the basis for regional co-operation on peace and security was proven correct. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which is designed to address major intra- and inter-state conflict, has been largely ineffectual because of the absence of shared values. With respect to domestic politics there is no consensus among member states on the basic tenets of governance. Swaziland and Zimbabwe are not democratic and there are many *de jure* democracies whose governments are intolerant of dissent, barely accountable to parliament and insufficiently respectful of human rights. The SADC Parliamentary Forum has observed that politicians in the region ‘talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in power’ (South African Press Association, October 15, 2000). In this context it is not surprising that SADC has failed to deal effectively with internal conflict and repression in Zimbabwe and other member states. As one commentator asked rhetorically in the midst of growing local and international frustration over SADC’s desultory stance on Zimbabwe, how could anyone expect a regional body comprising despots to take the lead in disciplining Mugabe? (Sunday Times, South Africa, January 20, 2002).

With respect to foreign policy, SADC was embroiled for more than a decade in a stormy debate over the most appropriate approach to regional security and peacemaking. One group
of states, led by South Africa and supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, favoured a common security regime that emphasised diplomatic co-operation and peaceful forms of conflict resolution. The rival camp, led by Zimbabwe and backed by Angola and Namibia, emphasised military responses to conflict and preferred a mutual defence pact along the lines of the NATO Treaty. The debate became so acrimonious that it immobilised the Organ and damaged relations between fraternal countries (Nathan 2006a). The strategic import of the division was revealed starkly in 1998 when war erupted in the DRC, a SADC member state. The pacific group promoted negotiations and a ceasefire, while Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe entered the war as belligerents in support of the DRC government. As the two groups worked at cross-purposes and exchanged insults, the rift became so great that it gave rise to the notion of ‘two SADCs’ (Williams 2000: 97).

The great divide in SADC stemmed from divergent values and philosophies rather than from competing interests. There is no evidence that the pacific and militarist camps were based on interests that were common to their respective members and different from those of their rivals. SADC countries vary substantially in terms of resource, geographic, demographic, economic and security factors, giving rise to varying interests, but the variations are much greater within the camps than between them. Instead, the Organ disputes were normative, based on the political and strategic cultures of states and their ruling parties. The states agreed that a mechanism for peacemaking and security co-operation would serve their national and collective interests but disagreed profoundly on the orientation and methods of that mechanism (Nathan 2006a).

Despite their differences on the use of force as an instrument of peacemaking, the SADC states have maintained peaceful relations with each other. Adherence to this norm is a product of the liberation struggles and SADC’s forerunners, the Frontline States and SADCC, which forged a high level of political affinity and unity in the region. In the post-apartheid era the legacy of this experience has been the assertion of solidarity and an anti-imperialist front when a member state is under international pressure. In 2003, in the midst of intense repression in Zimbabwe, the SADC heads of state reiterated their rejection of sanctions against the government in Harare and ‘re-affirmed the indivisibility of SADC and solidarity with Zimbabwe’ (SADC 2003: para.24).

The principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism are a weak rather than a strong exception to the lack of common values. They bolster regime security at the expense not only of human security but also of regional security, and they impede the resolution of conflict. They mask rather than transcend the substantive political differences between member states and have therefore not provided an adequate normative platform for a common security regime. Invoked when foreign powers put pressure on a SADC state, the principles have had no utility when SADC states are at loggerheads with each other.

The EU

In both Southern Africa and Western Europe the initial impetus for regional co-operation was the need to enhance security in the face of a common threat – a historically aggressive Germany in the case of Europe after World War II and an aggressive South Africa in the case of SADCC in the early 1980s. The presence of an external threat is not an enduring substitute for common values, however. Instead, it has to be replaced by shared values if the organisation is to maintain political cohesion after the demise of the common enemy. Whereas SADC recognised this challenge but has struggled to meet it, the EU and its
predecessors were successful, forging so strong a common identity as to create a security community.

The core values that bind member states are spelt out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union of 1992: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’. Precisely because these assertions are true and not merely rhetorical, the EU states have enjoyed sufficient affinity and trust to achieve a high level of integration, develop communal policy on many issues and establish bodies with supranational authority. In addition to its customs, economic and monetary unions, the EU has produced a plethora of laws, rules and standards in various sectors that are binding on states and justiciable before the European Court of Justice. A serious or persistent breach of the principles annunciated in Article 6(1) can lead to the suspension of a member state’s voting rights.

Highlighting the significance of the internal logic, the EU distinguishes between the negotiability of its policies and the non-negotiability of its values:

‘All our decisions are debated and negotiated within the framework of our shared values and common policies. So, the policies and actions we develop are negotiated and mediated by the democratic process. It is the common values, which underlie them, that are not negotiable. … Our common policies are, of course, negotiable because they do not constitute universal values.’ (Cremona 2001)

The EU’s admission criteria imply that shared values are the foundation rather than the outcome of close political co-operation in a regional organisation. Article 49 of the Treaty provides that admission is only open to European countries that respect the principles set out in Article 6(1). Central and East European states would consequently not gain membership on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept democratic norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these norms (EU commissioner, quoted in Cremona 2001). Prospective candidate countries have therefore modified their behaviour in order to comply with the requisite standards. As Møller puts it (2008a), one of the EU’s major contributions to European security lies not so much in doing something as in being something: namely an immensely attractive market and community of nations, which induces democratisation among non-member states wishing to join it.

The EU is convinced that its core values of democracy provide a basis both for pacific relations between states, along the lines of the democratic peace theory that holds that democratic countries do not go to war with each other (Russett 1993), and also for the security of people since democratic governance constrains the power of the state and protects individuals and minorities. Consequently, the EU seeks to spread these values in Africa and other regions through aid conditionality; its policies on its relations with its southern and eastern neighbours emphasise shared democratic values, interdependence and integration as the basis for collective stability, security and well-being; and the development and consolidation of democratic norms feature prominently in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (Møller 2008a: 7-11).

The EU has struggled to reach consensus on communal security, defence and foreign policies. In the mid-1990s Philip Gordon (1997/98) explained the difficulty by suggesting that member states did not have sufficiently similar interests, they believed that the costs of lost
sovereignty outweighed the potential gains and they had too great a diversity of historical relationships, foreign policy traditions, strategic cultures, values and attitudes towards the use of force. Fifteen years later, the foreign policies of EU member states remain, in several respects, uncoordinated and divergent, and Europe was deeply divided over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, in an incremental fashion many of the key differences and disputes have been ironed out or put aside, and the European Security and Defence Policy now encompasses an independent military capability and a number of peace missions outside the EU region (Møller 2008a: 11-15; Forsberg et al. 2007).

**ASEAN**

As indicated earlier, ASEAN has enabled the pacific management of inter-state disputes in Southeast Asia and thereby contributed to preventing hostilities, an achievement ascribed to the ‘ASEAN way’. This regional political culture is the normative glue that has bound the organisation since the demise of the common enemy of communist insurgencies and the Association’s expansion beyond its founding non-communist members to include the Indochinese states. In addition to its procedural elements such as consensual decision making and ‘agreeing to disagree’, the ‘ASEAN way’ comprises a set of principles on international relations. These principles include non-interference in domestic affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, avoidance of the threat or use of force and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. While most of these norms can be found in international conventions and thus have a universal character, Amitav Acharya (2004) shows that they have a distinctly Asian nuance in their adoption and application by ASEAN. In 2003 the Association declared its intention of building on this approach with the goal of becoming a security community by 2020 (ASEAN 2003).

With respect to intra-state conflicts and crises, by contrast, ASEAN has been loathe to play a peacemaking role. It has been criticised for its failure to address, in particular, the Indonesian upheaval in 1998, the Indonesian security crackdown in East Timor after the referendum in favour of independence in 1999, the authoritarianism and repression of the military regime in Myanmar, and the 2006 coup and subsequent violence in Thailand (Sridharan 2008). The resulting damage to ASEAN’s credibility and the persistent problem of domestic instability have provoked a contentious debate around softening the non-interference doctrine in favour of ‘enhanced interaction’ or ‘flexible engagement’ when internal problems have negative external implications (Acharya 2004: 260-264). These ideas have not gained traction, however. In 2004 Indonesia proposed that ASEAN should establish a regional peacekeeping force for deployment in domestic conflicts, but the proposal was rejected immediately by Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand and was promptly shelved (Asian Political News, June 21, 2004).

There are several reasons for ASEAN’s reluctance to tackle intra-state conflicts and crises, some of them related to state interests. The dilution of the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs could undermine if not destroy the tenuous trust, unity and peace that they engender between member states. The principles have particular salience in Southeast Asia, moreover, because of state concerns about the historical and contemporary engagement of external powers in the region (Kuhonta 2006).

Equally important, the ASEAN states do not have common values on domestic governance. Rizal Sukma paints the regional portrait as follows: Malaysia and Singapore are models of soft-authoritarianism; Thailand and to a lesser extent the Philippines are still struggling to
consolidate democracy; Brunei is a sultanate; Myanmar is ruled by a military junta; Vietnam and Laos are Leninist states; Cambodia is effectively under one-man rule; and Indonesia alone can be regarded as a stable democracy (Sukma 2009). Given this diversity, ASEAN is unable to undertake effective peacemaking interventions at the domestic level because it does not have the requisite political cohesion and consensus on the desired outcomes.

**The contingent and inter-subjective nature of the internal logic**

The cases discussed in this paper demonstrate the significance of the internal logic of peacemaking by regional organisations: the political co-operation, trust and cohesion that are essential for collective decision making and action and thus for sustained effectiveness require congruence in the core values of member states. In summary, the normative congruence among the Central Asian states is so low that they have not set up a viable regional body; it is so low among the South Asian countries that SAARC has been inoperable as a conflict-resolution forum; aside from a brief interlude, this is true also of IGAD; ASEAN has forged a consensus on pacific management of inter-state disputes, but the diverse political systems of member states, combined with the normative consensus on non-interference in domestic affairs, have precluded peacemaking in intra-state conflicts; the SADC countries have sufficient affinity to maintain pacific relations, but have struggled to play an effective peacemaking role because they lack common values in terms of domestic governance and policy on peacemaking; and the EU has attained so high a degree of normative congruence that it has become a security community.

On the strength of these cases, it is not possible to conclude that there is a particular set of values, democratic or other, that constitutes the right set of values or the best set of values for ensuring peacemaking cohesion and effectiveness. What seems clear, instead, is that the values that are most relevant to regional peacemaking and to the nature of the relationships between member states derive from the domestic and foreign policies of these states and from the process of state formation and other historical circumstances. The internal logic is thus a contingent condition. It is also an inter-subjective dynamic in that it reflects a shared understanding of relationships among a group of neighbouring and proximate countries.

These conclusions correspond to Deutsch’s constructivist findings about the relevance of values in relation to security communities. In the 1950s Deutsch and his colleagues conducted an extensive inquiry into the means by which war had been eliminated in certain geographic areas and historical periods through the formation of these communities. The researchers studied amalgamated security communities where independent provinces or countries had become a unitary state (e.g. the US, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland), as well as pluralistic security communities comprising states that had retained their sovereignty (e.g. Norway and Sweden, the US and Canada, and France and Belgium) (Deutsch et al. 1957: 29-30). They found that ‘compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making’ was one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of these communities but they could not identify a set of values that was common to all the successful cases (Deutsch et al. 1957: 46-49, 66, 123-129). The critical values differed from one instance to another and depended on historical factors and the domestic politics of the participating units. In some processes of integration leading to a security community, states had tacitly depoliticised some of their incompatible values (Deutsch et al. 1957: 46).

These findings regarding security communities also apply to peacemaking by regional organisations: the values that enable close political co-operation are a matter of choice by
states in a given set of circumstances; states decide whether their normative commonalities
and differences lie at the centre or the penumbra of their concerns; and they determine
whether the threshold for congruence has been met. In short, the internal logic of
peacemaking by regional organisations requires sufficient compatibility of values that
member states deem cardinal.

Conclusion
The CSRC project on the role and impact of regional organisations in relation to conflict
prevention and resolution found that there are substantial differences not only in the focus,
aims and institutional culture of these organisations, but also in their peacemaking
effectiveness. There has been nothing like the success or progress over time hoped for by the
UN, but neither has there been the irrelevance predicted by neo-realist theory.

A rich mixture of historical, geographic, political, security and cultural factors at domestic,
regional and international levels account for the diversity among the organisations, and for the
mandate, orientation and effectiveness of each of them. Notwithstanding the regional
specificities, our overarching finding is that there are two necessary conditions for
peacemaking effectiveness: member states must believe that the organisation’s peacemaking
mandate and mechanisms serve their respective interests; and there must be sufficient
normative congruence among these states to enable close political co-operation, cohesion and
trust.

The diversity confirms the constructivist claims that state relationships are shaped not only by
anarchy and material structures; but also by social structures based on shared knowledge and
understandings, and that groups of states can experience conflictual or co-operative
relationships as a result of these intersubjective dynamics (Wendt 1992). In some parts of the
world states have been able to institutionalise patterns of co-operation and pacific dispute
resolution through regional bodies. Neo-realist theory cannot account for this. It offers an
explanation for the mistrust and use of force among states in the SAARC and IGAD regions,
but it does not allow for the forging of long-standing pacific relationships between states in
the ASEAN, EU and SADC regions and for the efforts of the AU, ECOWAS and SADC to
build elaborate peacemaking regimes.

Space constraints have precluded a discussion on the disposition of regional hegemons in
relation to communal peacemaking arrangements. But here, too, the picture is decidedly
mixed, reinforcing the constructivist assertion that state are not fated to behave in a
predictable manner on the basis of their power and material capabilities: Ethiopia, India and
Uzbekistan have a militarist and anti-regionalist posture (Healy 2009; Nathan 2010b;
Matveeva 2007); Nigeria is militarist and regionalist (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003); and
Indonesia, Germany and South Africa are anti-militarist and regionalist (Sridharan 2008;
Katzenstein 1997; Nathan 2010b).

Although the internal logic of common values and the external logic of state interests have
been treated as separate requirements for peacemaking effectiveness, it is worth noting in
closing that values, ideas and interests are inter-connected phenomena. As Wendt (1995: 74)
put it:

‘to ask “when do ideas, as opposed to power and interest, matter?” is to ask the
wrong question. Ideas always matter, since power and interest do not have effects
apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such.’
States do of course seek to defend and promote their interest; but they identify and define these interests, and they determine the most appropriate strategies for pursuing their interests, through the lens of values and ideas that are rooted in domestic history and politics and influenced by international developments, including interactions with other states (Campbell 2002; Weldes 1996; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Nathan forthcoming 2011).
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The Crisis States Research Centre aims to examine and provide an understanding of processes of war, state collapse and reconstruction in fragile states and to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in these processes. Through rigorous comparative analysis of a carefully selected set of states and of cities, and sustained analysis of global and regional axes of conflict, we aim to understand why some fragile states collapse while others do not, and the ways in which war affects future possibilities of state building. The lessons learned from past experiences of state reconstruction will be distilled to inform current policy thinking and planning.

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