Unrealistic Expectations: Current Challenges to Reintegration in Southern Sudan

By Julie Brethfeld
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and abbreviations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The DDR programme: plans and progress</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Background</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The individualized reintegration approach</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coordination with other programmes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Profile of Phase I candidates</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The DDR process</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lessons from Mangalla, Central Equatoria</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Reintegration and security</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The current security setting</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Security risks associated with reintegration</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The importance of involving communities</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Economic reintegration</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The economic context</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Considerations for economic reintegration</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lessons from other programmes</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Weaknesses of current economic reintegration planning</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Social reintegration and reconciliation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Conclusion</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the author</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms and abbreviations

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSSAC Bureau Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau
DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
GNU Government of National Unity
GoSS Government of Southern Sudan
ICRS Information, Counselling, and Referral Services
IDDRP Interim Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme
IDDRS Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
IDP Internally displaced person
IUNDDR Unit Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Unit
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
MYDDRP Multi-Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme
NCP National Congress Party
NGO Non-governmental organization
RFP Request for Proposals
RTCC Reintegration Technical Coordination Committee
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SNG Special Needs Group
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSDDRC Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPS</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAAFG</td>
<td>Women associated with armed forces and groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of Sudanese armed forces in the North, the South, and the Three Areas finally began in 2009, four years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) called for the parties to do so.¹ The intervening period was filled with protracted negotiations and planning, the establishment of national DDR institutions, and cooperation with international agencies. The delay meant the process began a mere two years before the end of the CPA’s six-year Interim Period and the referendum on Southern self-determination, planned for January 2011,² and at a time of growing insecurity, political tensions, and financial turmoil.

Despite the delay, expectations for the process are high in the South, though different parties see it as a means to different ends: of saving money spent on SPLA salaries; of improving socio-economic conditions; and of reducing insecurity. These expectations exist side by side with mounting concern about the overall feasibility of DDR and the risks involved in its implementation.

This paper takes a critical look at the first, ongoing phase of the DDR process in Southern Sudan, and specifically at the reintegration component. It briefly outlines how DDR is currently implemented as well as its progress to date. It discusses the dynamics and challenges of reintegrating ex-combatants into local communities in light of the current security environment, and considers how to minimize risks of further destabilization and insecurity due to DDR. The paper also looks at the feasibility of social and economic reintegration, considering both the socio-economic context and the specific social composition of the first group of ex-combatants to be reintegrated. In addition, it reflects on lessons learned from the reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to highlight both the challenges and the opportunities ahead for the successful and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants.

Key findings of this report include the following:

• As currently conceived and planned, and in the absence of long-term support and follow-up based on secure funding, DDR is unlikely to lead to improvements in social and economic recovery and development.
• Communities, including local authorities, are not yet sufficiently involved in DDR planning and implementation, increasing the risk of the spread of misinformation, misperceptions, and unrealistic expectations.

• The decision to adopt an individual-based reintegration programme rather than a community-based one is placing the burden of economic and social reintegration primarily on the shoulders of the communities absorbing the ex-combatants. This dynamic is not sustainable because communities are often even worse off economically than the ex-combatants.

• Given the fragile security situation in Southern Sudan, there is a risk of further destabilization if the reintegration of ex-combatants is not linked more closely to wider efforts in community security, peacebuilding, small arms control, policing, security sector reform (SSR), and other security-related areas.

• The Special Needs Groups (SNGs) chosen for the first DDR phase are challenging target groups requiring specific strategies and provisions for economic and social reintegration that are not currently in place.

• Despite the work of the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) to identify and address weaknesses in the DDR process, reintegration started before sufficient planning was in place. The SSDDRC and its partners have begun to revise procedures in light of lessons learned during the first months of DDR.

• The level of communication, coordination, and cooperation among national and international DDR stakeholders at the state, Juba, and national levels has improved but remains inadequate.

Reintegration activities had only just started when the initial draft of this paper was completed in late 2009. Although it was updated in March 2010, the report focuses largely on general challenges to reintegration rather than the specific successes or failures of the fledgling programme to date.
II. The DDR programme: plans and progress

Background

Both the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A) committed to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration\(^3\) of ex-combatants as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. The DDR provisions are found in the CPA’s protocol on security arrangements. Conceived as a national process led and owned by national and local actors and institutions—specifically the DDR Commissions and Councils—Sudan’s DDR is supported, technically and financially, by external actors (CPA, 2005, annexe I, paras. 24.2, 24.3). The key international counterpart is the Integrated United Nations DDR (IUNDDR) Unit, comprising the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), UNICEF, and the UN Population Fund. The disarmament of DDR candidates is the responsibility of the country’s two statutory armies—the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA. Demobilization is supported by UNMIS, while UNDP takes the lead in supporting reintegration, cooperating closely with other international partners and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs).\(^4\)

Funding for DDR comes from a number of sources: the Government of National Unity (GNU); the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), especially for disarmament; the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for demobilization; and other international donors for reintegration (GoSS and SSDDRC, 2008). In July 2009, the SSDDRC estimated the total budget required for the reintegration of the first group of ex-combatants in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas at USD 135 million. International donors have allocated USD 53,439,993, which will cover the costs of approximately 25,365 DDR participants. This leaves a deficit of USD 87,592,960 for the remaining candidates\(^5\) (GoSS and SSDDRC, 2009). The SSDDRC requested additional funding from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in July 2009, and USD 40 million was released for the South in the first quarter of 2010.\(^6\)

The CPA does not indicate a specific start date for DDR except in reference to SNGs. Rather, the CPA encourages parties to ‘allow voluntary demobilization,
demobilization of non-essentials (child soldiers and elderly, disabled) during the first year of Interim Period’, meaning in 2005 (CPA, 2005, annexe I, para. 19). DDR of child soldiers did in fact start before 2005 and has been ongoing since.7

Progress since 2005 has been slow. The Northern and Southern governments established the CPA-mandated DDR institutions to lead the process, including the National DDR Coordination Council, the SSDDRC, and the North Sudan DDR Commission. These institutions then modified or formed new partnerships with the relevant UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNMIS, and UNICEF, and developed programme plans and guiding strategies. But action has been delayed due to the sensitivity of processes and decisions relating to the armed forces, and because of competition between the Sudanese government and the UN over roles and responsibilities.8

The appointment of a new, proactive SSDDRC chairperson in 2008 helped drive the DDR programme forward in 2009, especially in the South. Paradoxically, the global financial crisis of 2008–10 has also contributed to the sudden progress in DDR implementation. Since Sudan’s economy relies heavily on oil revenues,9 which dropped significantly because of the crisis, many GoSS officials have been eager to cut burdensome army and government salaries. They view demobilization as one route to this goal.

Both CPA parties have agreed to demobilize and reintegrate 90,000 soldiers from each side—the SAF and the SPLA—in a phased approach through 2012 (GoSS and SSDDRC, 2009).10 Phase I involves 30,000 ex-combatants in the Three Areas, administered by the GNU, and 34,000 ex-combatants in the South, overseen by the GoSS. In the Three Areas, the process began in February 2009, starting in Southern Blue Nile and moving on to Southern Kordofan; in the South, it started in June 2009, in Central Equatoria (Stephen and Nakimangole, 2009), and later in Lakes State.11

Although both sides seem committed to completing the first phase, it is highly unrealistic to expect the full 180,00012 to be processed on time (Gebrehiwot, 2009, p. 45). Sceptics point to the limited resources and institutional capacity available to deal with such a large number of soldiers before 2012, in particular given the political upheaval that may result from the CPA-mandated referendum on Southern self-determination (Hemmer, 2009, p. 21).
The individualized reintegration approach

The SSDDRC defines reintegration as:

*a process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and are supported to develop a sustainable livelihood. It is, therefore, supposed to be both a social and economic process* (GoSS and SSDDRC, 2008, p. 10).\(^\text{13}\)

To achieve this goal, the DDR programme document developed by the GNU and UNDP—codified in the Multi-Year DDR Programme (MYDDRP)—takes an individual rather than a community-based approach to reintegration. It establishes that eligible ex-combatants and SNGs should receive ‘an immediate package of assistance in support of their effective reintegration by giving them a means to sustain a livelihood’ (MYDDRP, 2008, p. 11). Each ex-combatant is supposed to receive a package worth USD 1,750. Of this sum, USD 1,500 is to be sourced from contributions from the international community while USD 250 comes from the GNU and GoSS (GoSS and SSDDRC, 2008, p. 8).\(^\text{14}\) While the GNU has the financial resources to cover its share, the GoSS will not be able to do the same. It remains to be seen whether funding will be provided through other sources, such as the international donor community.

This individualized approach is a reversal from previous planning models. In the CPA as well as the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP), which was formally endorsed by the GoSS and the GNU in 2006, the focus of reintegration was community-based, with the aim of benefiting ex-combatants and local communities equally.\(^\text{15}\) However, subsequent concerns about diverting DDR funds to long-term programmes for recovery and reconstruction led to a change in approach. The result, agreed in June 2008, was a focus on individuals in the MYDDRP, which supplanted the IDDRP (MYDDRP, 2008, pp. 11–12).

Despite the shift of focus to individuals, there is an expectation—at least on paper—that community benefits will still accrue. But the MYDDRP’s suggestion that ex-combatants who reintegrate act as economic ‘catalysts’ for their communities\(^\text{16}\) appears overly optimistic. In fact, the SSDDRC has recognized the limitations of the individual-only approach and is now making an effort to strengthen community involvement in the programme. As part of this drive, the commission is emphasizing that there are options for extending assistance
to communities and including them in a wider recovery strategy, for which a separate programme is to be designed.

**Coordination with other programmes**

The SSDDRC recognizes that DDR cannot be dealt with in a vacuum but must be linked to and coordinated with programming in the security, humanitarian, and development sectors to achieve sustainable and integrated results.\(^{17}\) However, this position may be unrealistic given the current absence of GoSS readiness and the lack of funding for economic recovery and community security; the poor coordination among other external and national partners; the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the Southern referendum in 2011; and, last but not least, ongoing shortcomings in qualified staff within the SSDDRC itself.

In fact, the multi-sectoral coordination focus is generally limited and inadequate. Under the lead of the SSDDRC, and with the support of UNDP, reintegration activities are to be implemented through key ministries, international and national NGOs, and other agencies. In August 2009, UNDP issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) to implement economic reintegration packages in Eastern, Central, and Western Equatoria states and Lakes State (UNDP, 2009).\(^ {18}\) But while the RFP stressed the relevance of DDR as a means to restore and strengthen security,\(^ {19}\) it made no requirement that economic reintegration efforts be explicitly linked to community security programming.\(^ {20}\) This was a significant shortcoming given the complementarity of DDR and other security-related programming.

The SSDDRC has tried to make up for this by attempting to improve coordination between a range of governmental, non-governmental, internal, and external actors. It has organized a number of meetings and workshops to inform government actors (including the SPLA and the Southern police), donors, international NGOs, and local civil society actors about the DDR process and to foster cooperation between them. It also holds bi-weekly coordination meetings with relevant partners and key ministries through the Reintegration Technical Coordination Committee (RTCC). Participation so far is limited, however, partly because organizations and ministries are stretched due to other challenges. The SSDDRC is concerned that this lack of active participation will...
compromise successful DDR implementation. Opportunities for cooperation are further constrained by the fact that ministries in sectors that are key to reintegration activities have no funding allocated for these efforts.\textsuperscript{21}

Nevertheless, some progress has been made, such as on cooperation with the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Gender on training packages and economic reintegration opportunities, as well as on the reintegration of women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG). SSDDRC staff are receiving capacity building training, and the Civil Service Commission has approved the hiring of at least 88 new SSDDRC staff members.\textsuperscript{22}

**Profile of Phase I candidates**

The first phase of DDR is open primarily to qualified individuals from SNGs. This includes: (a) people with disabilities, who are considered unable to work; (b) those above the retirement age of 60; (c) female combatants; and (d) WAAFG, who made significant contributions to the war but did not fight (GoSS and SSDDRC, 2009). All WAAFG\textsuperscript{23} are supposed to go through the SNG–DDR process (see Box 1), while able-bodied female soldiers who have not yet reached retirement age will be allowed to stay in the SPLA if they wish.\textsuperscript{24} Children and youths under 18, whose membership in the armed forces is prohibited by international law, have been going through separate DDR processes led by the SSDDRC and UNICEF. Consultations with UNICEF are ongoing on the possibility of further cooperation and the use of resources to continue to demobilize under 18s.\textsuperscript{25}

In addition to the SNGs, other individuals voluntarily requesting release from the SPLA—because, for example, they have found other income options or are traumatized by their war experiences—will also be considered for DDR.\textsuperscript{26} Individuals who have self-demobilized since the CPA are eligible for the DDR process as long as they fall into one of the above categories.\textsuperscript{27} Ex-combatants who have been integrated into the police, prison, or wildlife sector are not eligible for DDR.

During the DDR planning phase in 2007–08, the SPLA collected pre-registration data throughout Southern Sudan on the sex, age, and rank of DDR candidates, the number of years spent in the military,\textsuperscript{28} where they came from, where they wanted to return, and their preferred economic reintegration options.
The pre-registration data indicated that the vast majority of DDR candidates in the first phase were men, and that more than 50 per cent had disabilities. More than 68 per cent had served in the military for at least 18 years, and an additional 14 per cent for 12–18 years. Only two per cent of candidates held high military ranks (major general, first lieutenant general, and second lieutenant general), while 44 per cent were privates. The data suggested that most ex-combatants wanted to return to their state of origin after demobilization. No information was gathered on education or skills.

More recent data from actual demobilization in Mangalla, Central Equatoria (June–August 2009), reveals strikingly different candidate profiles, however. A sample of 1,859 candidates in Mangalla included a much higher percentage of women than expected (39 per cent as compared to nine per cent from the pre-registration data); far fewer disabilities (only nine per cent compared to 50 per cent); and a much younger population with shorter army careers. These profiles were confirmed in the Rumbek caseload, where the percentage of women who went through disarmament and demobilization was above 70 per cent. Reintegration measures will have to be modified accordingly. Notably, a stronger focus on opportunities for female ex-combatants and WAAFG will be needed. This will have an impact on health facilities and services as well as economic reintegration approaches and activities; it will also necessitate gender awareness raising in host communities. The SSDDRC and UNDP have reportedly started to alter requirements in response to these findings (Deng, 2010; see Box 1).

While the pre-registration data suggested that demobilizing candidates would prefer to return to their home areas, the Mangalla caseload indicates that many would like to stay in towns such as Juba, where they hope to have better access to public services and work, or to return to states other than where their homes are located. Indeed, current DDR planning for the South will not be able to meet the stated expectations of many of the candidates. Among other long-term benefits, some ex-combatants expect to receive free schooling for their children and a pension for their army service. The GoSS is not offering army pensions because of financial constraints but has suggested it may do so in the future. This is a sensitive issue, since ex-combatants who were officially enlisted in the SAF do receive pension payments in the North.
Box 1 Demobilizing female combatants and WAAFG

Throughout the second civil war (1983–2005), female combatants and WAAFG were part of fighting forces, but their numbers were never officially recorded. Despite becoming targets of sexual violence after the split in the SPLA in 1991, many women joined the forces (often informally) to support the struggle or for their own protection. In 1986, a girls’ battalion, the Ketiba Banat, was formed, and women continued to be recruited into mixed cadres (Small Arms Survey, 2008).

Female combatants and WAAFG were specifically included in the IDDRP and the MYDDRP, based on commitments in the CPA as well as UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1590 to address the particular needs of women in DDR activities (UNSC, 2000; 2005). In practice, however, it has been difficult to identify these women, especially WAAFG. While many women in Southern Sudan feel they have contributed to the war and regard themselves as WAAFG, their status cannot be verified based on SPLA lists, which reflect the SPLA’s payroll and thus do not include these women (Deng, 2010, p. 2).

In fact, the National DDR Programme makes clear that strict criteria are needed for WAAFG ‘to stop the reasonable number of eligible beneficiaries to the DDR process that can be financially supported . . . measured against the number necessary to enhance the security environment for [the] peace process to take hold’ (GNU, 2007, para. 18). The DDR Programme specifies that each woman seeking to qualify as a WAAFG must demonstrate that she has met the following conditions:

- She has provided essential support services for the military, but is now completely discharged and disassociated from the military.
- She has resided in or around military barracks or camps.
- She is 18 years or older.
- She has moved around with the military on duty and thus lived away from her community.
- She has lived in war zones.
- She can be verified by a community leader.
- She is not a dependent or widow of a soldier (GNU, 2007, para. 18.1).

An assessment report commissioned in late 2009 revealed that the eligibility criteria were problematic. As a result, they were redefined in the standard operating procedures, which now require the SPLA to draw up official WAAFG lists. Data will be independently collected from each woman appearing on the list so that her eligibility as a WAAFG can be verified by a tripartite team composed of the SPLA, the SSDDRC, and the IUNDDR Unit.36 The SSDDRC considers a specific community-based reintegration programme for WAAFG outside the DDR process to better suit the women’s needs, but the lack of available funding might be an obstacle for such an initiative (Deng, 2010, pp. 2, 4).

It is to be expected that female ex-combatants and WAAFG will be easily accepted in some communities, while in others they may face challenges to reintegration stemming from local traditions and cultural taboos. To respond to such challenges, the SSDDRC and UNDP are cooperating with the Ministry for Gender and soliciting technical expertise from a gender adviser located at the commission.37
The DDR process

An ex-combatant’s processing through DDR begins at specifically designated demobilization sites. Once identified and officially registered by the SPLA, DDR candidates receive their demobilization ID cards and are interviewed by SSDDRC staff for basic personal information, including their preferred place of reintegration and preferred reintegration package. The resulting data represents the first fairly reliable information to be used for reintegration planning. Following intake interviews, candidates are first given a medical screening and an HIV briefing, and are then informed of the economic and social support available to them as well as their rights and obligations under the reintegration programme.

Members of the first caseload—which followed the plan and schedule originally designed for demobilization and reintegration prior to its revision—were given a referral slip for counselling services at the SSDDRC office in the state they chose for reintegration. Ten weeks later, they were expected to register for the Information, Counselling, and Referral Services (ICRS) unit within their state’s SSDDRC office. Because this procedure proved to be challenging, it was later altered (see below). Lastly, ex-combatants received their interim reinsertion support, consisting of a cash grant of SDG 860 (USD 320), non-food items, and a voucher for three months’ worth of food for a family of five; they were expected to use their own means to return to their places of origin or wherever they wished to settle.

By March 2010, all ICRS units except for those in Unity and Upper Nile states—which will be the last states to undergo DDR—had been established. Each ICRS office is to provide ex-combatants with one-on-one counselling and information on potential livelihood options, as well as psycho-social and other kinds of support. Jointly with counsellors, the ex-combatants are to identify which livelihood option and, therefore, which economic reintegration package is most appropriate for them on the basis of their individual needs, skills, interests, and local resources. People with disabilities as well as female ex-combatants and WAAFG will be considered for additional support.

In the third stage of reintegration, ex-combatants will be provided with support for developing a new livelihood. Depending on the economic package, this will comprise training, capacity building, and equipment for agriculture.
and animal husbandry (including fishery and forestry); small business development; vocational training; or adult education. These reintegration activities are to be provided by international and national partners cooperating with UNDP and the SSDDRC through the RFP process. Ex-combatants are expected to enrol in the programmes eight weeks after receiving the one-on-one counselling; but based on lessons learned from the Mangalla caseload and subsequent adjustments, this timeframe might be shortened to four to eight weeks.

By March 2010, after a delay of several months, agreements for implementing reintegration programmes had been reached with partners for eight states. The partners include international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, the International Organization for Migration, Action Africa Help, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA) project for Strengthening Basic Skills and Vocational Training. The latter was the first to provide educational training to ex-combatants in 2009. UNDP and the SSDDRC also issued a specific call for proposals for local NGOs.

The process from demobilization to ICRS to the beginning of actual reintegration activities is thus long and risks increasing frustrations among ex-combatants, as evidenced by participants’ complaints. Some claim that the cash grant is insufficient for themselves and their families, forcing them to look for income elsewhere. This may have implications for local security. Efforts are currently under way to shorten the periods between the different stages to provide more timely support, though this has already proven difficult.

Lessons from Mangalla, Central Equatoria

The DDR programme in Mangalla, Central Equatoria—and, to a certain degree, the one begun more recently in Rumbek, Lakes State—has become a test case for reintegration elsewhere. Lessons learned range from the poor quality of pre-registration data collected by the SPLA to the identification of specific logistical challenges, such as the handling of food deliveries and access to sites and markets. Feedback from Mangalla has also provided an opportunity to gauge ex-combatants’ expectations and fears about DDR, and to fine-tune processes and cooperation mechanisms between the SSDDRC, the IUNDDR
Unit, and other actors. The first caseload of 2,968 ex-combatants was disarmed and demobilized between June 2009 and the end of March 2010: the caseloads were 2,116 in Mangalla and 852 in Rumbek. The ICRS started in October 2009, and at this writing 2,201 ex-combatants had been counselled and were waiting for their reintegration packages. By the end of 2009, 62 participants had graduated from reintegration training facilitated by JICA. Overall, however, progress is slower than originally foreseen, as it has proven impossible to carry out individual counselling for 50 ex-combatants per day, as initially planned.

The process is thus already far behind schedule. Under the original DDR plan, reintegration of the first 34,000 ex-combatants in Southern Sudan was to be completed by mid-2010 (Vrey, 2009). Today, UNDP estimates that only 16,000 ex-combatants will realistically go through the process by the end of 2010, while others—depending on further progress in setting up additional demobilization sites—will start but not finish the process.

Still other problems have emerged. Due to time pressure, and the high expectations of the programme, demobilization in Central Equatoria started without proper reintegration planning in place. Since early pre-registration data was of limited predictive value, it was nearly impossible to tailor reintegration programming to specific profiles. Similarly, much of the socio-economic mapping that provided baseline data for reintegration planning had to be revised because it was insufficient or of poor quality. Exacerbating the problems, the RFP for the first reintegration caseload was not issued until the third month of the disarmament and demobilization process, leaving only a few weeks before the official start of reintegration for implementing partners to respond. In the end, ICRS and some reintegration activities started in Central Equatoria before it was decided which agencies would receive UNDP funding.

As discussed above, counselling was to take place at the state level after the ex-combatants had returned to their chosen areas of reintegration from the demobilization sites. Since the Mangalla caseload participants decided to return to areas all across Southern Sudan, UNDP rapidly established ICRS units throughout the region. Many participants still have not returned to their chosen areas, however, preferring instead to remain in Juba; as a result, they have not yet received counselling. In addition, the process of contracting implementing partners was overly lengthy, partly because of the late issuing of the RFP,
making the gap between the DD and the R for the first caseloads excessively long. In order to avoid similar difficulties for the next caseloads, participants are to receive the full counselling right at the demobilization sites.

With most of the main implementing partners now under contract and at different stages in planning or implementing reintegration, the sequence is anticipated to flow more smoothly. Partners are expected to be at the demobilization sites to ensure that participants are aware of when and where to go and whom to contact to receive further reintegration training and support; implementing partners will thus be able to make appropriate plans and schedules. Activities have been identified to bridge the gap between the DD (including counselling) and the R (including sensitization and literacy). To speed up the process in general, UNMIS may set up more sites (Deng, 2010, p. 3).

The GoSS–SSDDRC and the UN have good reason to want to proceed quickly and show positive results. But the lack of planning has meant that parts of the reintegration process for the Mangalla caseload have become an ad hoc exercise rather than a programme based on proper data analysis and planning. Nevertheless, statements by the SSDDRC and UNDP indicate that lessons learned will facilitate programming in other areas of Southern Sudan. SSDDRC is calling donors and other stakeholders to start planning for Phase II candidates soon, drawing on lessons learned and challenges encountered in Phase I (Deng, 2010).
III. Reintegration and security

The current security setting

Almost five years after the signing of the CPA, the security situation in the South remains tense (McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010; IKV Pax Christi, 2009, p. 7). The GoSS faces the monumental task of reforming its security sector, which will arguably take decades to accomplish. While it has made strides in conceptualizing a professional, civilian-directed army via the SPLA Act and other documents, implementation remains in its infancy, and the force is riven by political and ethnic fault lines. Yet the army has remained the de facto security force, as the nascent Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) remains undertrained and underdeployed. At the same time, the judiciary is barely functioning (Lokuji, Abatneh, and Wani, 2009). The GoSS and the SPLA are still far from exercising a ‘monopoly of power’ in the Weberian sense. The high number of small arms and light weapons in civilian hands remains a concern and contributes to escalating violence, casualties, and mistrust. Exacerbating matters, the nascent government is still struggling to establish itself and create a coherent, functioning governance structure that is decentralized, reaches people in the counties and *payams*—including isolated rural areas—and provides basic social services and infrastructure.

Violence and competition between political factions and individuals intensified in the run-up to elections in April 2010 (McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010; Uma, 2010); this is likely to continue through the Southern referendum in January 2011. Tensions within the SPLM as well as between the SPLM and other parties often run along ethnic and tribal lines or reflect former wartime allegiances with specific political and military groups. Competition between these groups is also frequently based on individual or group interests—both political and economic. There is a widespread perception that some inter- and intra-community or tribal tensions have been fuelled by individuals at the Juba, state, and Khartoum level. This suggests that local conflicts are being used for political gain, further destabilizing the security situation.
For example, armed conflict between the Lou Nuer and the Murle, the Lou Nuer and the Dinka, and the Lou and the Jikany Nuer has completely destabilized Jonglei State, illustrating the GoSS’s inability to maintain security at the state, county, and local levels. The attacks increasingly involved the killing of women and children, and rumours abound that commanders and members of former ‘other armed groups’—only partially integrated into the SPLA, or not integrated at all—might have been involved. Roads and settlements have become increasingly insecure with a rise in the numbers of reported robberies, attacks on cars, and killings of civilians.

In Central Equatoria, leading politicians, including GoSS President Salva Kiir, have encouraged communities to form armed self-defence groups to protect themselves against crime, cattle raids, and attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, active for some time in Southern Sudan. At the same time, high-level government officials—again, including Salva Kiir—have made repeated calls for civilian disarmament, by force if necessary (Sudan Tribune, 2009). Many in the GoSS see this as the only way to decrease the current levels of insecurity, although it also bears the risk of leading to further escalations of violence. For instance, the SPLA had to be deployed to Cueibet County in Lakes State when violence erupted during a forced disarmament campaign in 2010, echoing coercive civilian disarmament campaigns in Jonglei in 2006 that sparked armed resistance from Lou Nuer tribesmen, leading to violence in which hundreds of Lou were killed.

In the current context there are also concerns about the allegiances of many SPLA soldiers—to tribe, region, commander, or the GoSS. Commanders and rank-and-file soldiers carry with them complex personal and tribal identities that continue to influence their actions. SPLA contingents based in or sent to specific areas to prevent conflicts have on occasion stayed in their barracks, split along ethnic lines, or joined their tribesmen. Many SPLA soldiers feel undervalued by the army and have experienced long-term problems getting paid. Angry, drunk soldiers occasionally get involved in fights or harass local civilians, even shooting them.

At the beginning of 2009, war veterans blocked the roads and border crossings between Sudan and Kenya to put pressure on the GoSS to pay their salaries (Sudan Radio Service, 2009). The SSPS still does not have the capacity or re-
sources to respond to these incidents effectively, in either towns or rural areas, though training has moved forward recently.\textsuperscript{54} Thus there are major concerns regarding not only the ability of the Southern security and law enforcement agencies to establish and maintain security, but also their potential to become security risks themselves (Mc Evoy and LeBrun, 2010, pp. 30–32; Lokuji, Abatneh, and Wani, 2009).

\textbf{Security risks associated with reintegration}

One of the goals of DDR is to strengthen security in communities. But it can have the opposite effect if not handled sensitively and if it remains de-linked from wider programmes to improve community security. With their military backgrounds, ex-combatants who are dissatisfied with the reintegration process may turn to violence as a way of releasing their frustration. Angry ex-combatants are also at risk of joining armed groups or becoming involved in criminal activities in order to ‘get their share’.

During disarmament and demobilization in Mangalla, many candidates said they felt sidelined by the SPLA and the GoSS; some claimed to retain weapons and threatened to use them if they did not receive the benefits they required or expected.\textsuperscript{55} These statements suggest that the security risk posed by underpaid, demobilized ex-soldiers should not be dismissed.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, as ex-combatants become ‘ordinary’ community members, there is a risk that they will fall victim to revenge attacks for atrocities they might have committed during the war, and to inter- and intra-community violence, especially if they are considered ‘outsiders’ who are not protected by the community or are unable to defend themselves because of physical disabilities or age. Finally, communities are likely to perceive the DDR process as ‘dissolving’ or weakening the SPLA: if the reintegration of some ex-combatants fails, they will blame the SPLA or GoSS for not doing enough for their former soldiers.\textsuperscript{57} This will further undermine trust in the state and its organs.

In the academic discourse on post-conflict stabilization and recovery, there is increasing discussion about how to link DDR to other interim stabilization and security-related programmes. These include community security, SSR, policing, and civilian disarmament, along with peacebuilding activities (Muggah,
Colletta, and de Tessières, 2009, p. 20). In the IDDRP, DDR is closely tied into SSR and to community security and small arms control (through the emerging Community Security and Small Arms Control, or CSSAC, Bureau). The programme design was ambitiously inclusive, however, and led to unrealistic expectations, which may have been one cause for the delays and poor performance in its implementation (Gebrehiwot, 2009, p. 41; Saferworld, 2008).

Nevertheless, information sharing, coordination, and, where feasible, cooperation measures among lead agencies are of crucial importance. This concerns, for example, the transformation and reform of the SPLA and the police, community security and small arms control, and peacebuilding and conflict management efforts. It includes actors such as the SPLA, the SSPS, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the CSSAC Bureau, and the Southern Sudan Peace Commission. Coordination between these actors could help establish a key prerequisite for security and stability: that is, functioning law enforcement agencies that understand their new role in post-war Southern Sudan, that protect and respect the rule of law and the rights of citizens, and that are accountable for any misbehaviour or violation of laws. Their deployment to rural areas is of utmost importance for increasing security, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. As noted above, the SSDDRC is actively seeking inter-agency interaction and exchange; it has received positive responses from some actors, but this coordination and cooperation needs to be developed much further.

To ensure that reintegration takes account of local security issues and avoids furthering destabilization, it is also important to consider the security context in each particular DDR location. In Jonglei, for example, the start of DDR was postponed due to particularly high levels of insecurity throughout 2009. With the GoSS’s current civilian disarmament campaign going ahead in certain states, and with community resistance escalating into open violence, the SSDDRC will have to readjust its reintegration plans for these areas. In other states, the GoSS security strategy may end up presenting challenges to the DDR process. In Central Equatoria, for example, Salva Kiir’s controversial plan to rearm citizens for self-protection may have a negative impact on the reintegration of ex-combatants, especially in areas where the SPLA is perceived more as an enemy than a security provider.
Another point of concern is how to deal with armed (and often loosely organized) individuals or groups that are perceived as a security threat but do not fall into any category eligible for DDR. These include armed youths and former members of ‘other armed groups’, who face challenges similar to ex-combatants from the SPLA and have similar needs. Working out how to involve these individuals in programmes and activities that prevent them from posing a further security risk could provide a model for cooperation between DDR and other stabilization programmes.

The importance of involving communities

So far, local communities and administrations have played limited roles in the DDR process. Their involvement has included information dissemination, typically through radio programmes, which usually reach only urban centres. It is essential to increase and expand these efforts to rural areas, and to promote more dialogue between communities and reintegration agencies, so that the exaggerated expectations and fears related to reintegration may be corrected. Communities know the local context best and, as with the reintegration of returnees and IDPs, they will be at the forefront of reintegration, even if not formally involved. They will also bear the burden of providing resources that cannot be supplied by formal DDR actors. For example, local administrations at the payam and boma levels are responsible for addressing any potential tensions and conflicts related to reintegration, for informing communities about relevant government decisions and regulations, and for monitoring the implementation of government policies. For these reasons, it is crucial to involve communities and local administrations fully in the planning stages of DDR.

Examples of community participation in peacebuilding, community security, and early warning programmes from Sudan and other countries illustrate the variety of measures that could be used to increase community involvement in DDR. Community committees, for example, could be established to support, monitor, and, if necessary, ease the reintegration process. Public forums could provide an opportunity for ex-combatants and communities to come together and talk. Where people feel that grievances are too strong to welcome
ex-combatants back into their communities, reconciliation activities could help to overcome hostilities. Opportunities for law enforcement agencies to engage with communities in a protected space could also rebuild trust between them and enable an understanding of each others’ roles, responsibilities, and concerns. In addition, these measures could facilitate discussions on how best to maximize security for both communities and ex-combatants in the context of extremely limited resources at the local level.
IV. Economic reintegration

The economic context

As the CPA’s six-year Interim Period comes to a close, economic recovery and the rehabilitation of basic services and infrastructure in Southern Sudan have not improved to expected levels. A high percentage of donor aid and oil revenues for the South go to Juba to cover salaries and benefits for government officials, civil servants, and the SPLA (Thomas, 2009). There have been some improvements in the health and education system, but mostly in urban centres, with rural areas often losing out. The global economic crisis, volatile oil prices, and the mismanagement of funds have had a massive impact on revenues in the South. These constraints make it unlikely that recovery and development will make significant progress in the coming months or even years. In rural areas, where wealth is mainly based in farmland, cattle, and access to natural resources, communities have seen practically no ‘peace dividends’ from the CPA. Outside major cities, infrastructure is scarce and there are no effective means to address land disputes or conflicts between cattle keepers, or between cattle keepers and farmers.

So far there is little reliable information on the level of ex-combatants’ education and skills to help them find employment opportunities. Some have acquired mechanical, driving, or medical skills during their time in the army, and efforts are under way to ensure that they can build upon these valuable experiences. But the general level of education and life skills is low, along with literacy rates.62

Traditionally, most communities in Southern Sudan, and especially those in rural areas, have subsistence economies based on small-scale farming or gardening and cattle herding, supplemented by fishing, beekeeping, hunting and gathering, and forestry. Crops and livestock are sold for cash, but profits are generally modest. Trade and other business activities are picking up very slowly, and are limited to urban centres. The same applies to the provision of services. These factors will affect the planned economic reintegration programme,
which is focusing on four main categories: agriculture/livestock and animal husbandry; small business development; vocational training; and alternative education.

Of these occupations, subsistence agriculture and cattle herding rely heavily on the availability of and access to natural and human resources (Muchomba and Sharp, 2006). These include fertile farmland or grazing areas and water, access to seed or cattle, labour, agricultural and pastoralist skills, and relevant local knowledge about, for example, seasonal conditions, migration routes, and the management of plant and animal diseases. Furthermore, both successful agriculture and cattle herding are almost impossible without the support of family members who can help with planting, harvesting, and herding cattle.

**Considerations for economic reintegration**

The Ministry of Agriculture sees mechanized farming as one of the pillars of economic recovery and development, crucial to reducing poverty and accommodating the food needs of the population (Gullick, 2009, p. 26). This form of farming is rare in the South, however, and is used mostly in the Three Areas and the areas bordering Uganda. As reintegration proceeds, lessons should be learned from Northern Sudan, where mechanized farming has led to many social, political, and environmental problems. It can fuel conflicts over land and destroy livelihood opportunities for communities; it also absorbs day labourers, creating an economically exploited labour force and the growth of slum areas (Gullick, 2009, pp. 24–25; Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, and Murphy, 2007). Environmental assessments will be required to avoid damage to fragile ecosystems through extensive farming, deforestation, drainage of swamp areas, and the polluting of the water and soil by pesticides and fertilizers.

Alternative employment opportunities are limited in rural areas, mainly because of poor infrastructure: there are few roads or other means of transport, and a lack of electricity, financial institutions, and investment. In many locations paid employment is restricted to a few positions in the administration or the SPLA, and the salary earned by one individual is often the financial backbone for a large, extended family. Both soldiers and civil servants regularly suffer delays in salary payments, which further undermines the local
economy. The percentage of people involved in trading or production is also low and is concentrated in urban centres and border areas. Cattle-herding communities in particular have barely engaged in trading activities. The strength of their clan structure and family ties has created a culture in which individuals are expected to share what they own, be it money or commodities, and to support their kin. Hence, the concept of doing business, especially with people from one’s own community, is alien to many. Such cultural taboos and expectations are clearly an obstacle to DDR candidates venturing into trade and business, and the reintegration programme must seek to help them to succeed economically without encroaching upon traditional social structures and support mechanisms.

The cultural significance of possessing cattle and of owning or having access to land and fishing grounds also needs to be considered when planning for economic reintegration. Cattle and access to natural resources play important roles in the social fabric of communities as well as in their economic survival. If the existing balance of access and rights is disturbed, tensions will occur and could even escalate into open conflict.

Thus, small business activities and vocational training (such as food preparation, tailoring, carpentry, and brick-making) have to be carefully designed to take into account local traditions, the existing skills of ex-combatants, the natural resources and infrastructure of each region, the environmental impacts, the demand for products, and access to markets.

Lessons from other programmes

The process of economic reintegration of ex-combatants in Southern Sudan can benefit from lessons learned elsewhere. Livelihood projects and those seeking to assist the reintegration of returnees have generated a number of such lessons.

*Long-term programming.* Developing a livelihood is a mid- to long-term process, requiring extended mentoring, training, and equipment supplies. Building up an economic presence is a huge challenge for any individual or group, especially if the concept of business, income, or production is relatively new.
In fact, advice and supervision must be provided on a regular basis to prevent early collapse and the mismanagement of resources (Pact Sudan, 2009).

Unexpected setbacks are almost inevitable. Droughts, flooding, inaccessibility to markets because of rains, pests, and plant or animal diseases can all threaten the success of income-generating activities, regardless of the performance of the individual or group. Nevertheless, beneficiaries of livelihood projects are usually keen to start again if they are given a second chance with the necessary support—mainly in the form of coaching rather than further financial or material input (Pact Sudan, 2009). These blows can be temporary—rather than disastrous—if programming extends beyond just a few months.

**Anticipating seasonal cycles.** The reintegration of returnees has highlighted the importance of providing support at the right time of year for people building up sustainable livelihoods (Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, and Murphy, 2007, p. 50). For example, if training and equipment for agricultural activities are provided after the planting season, returnees often fail to get through their first season because they are not able to produce a first harvest. Traders who rely on access to roads or rivers to bring in their goods have had difficulties restocking in the rainy season, when roads are impassable, and in the dry season, when rivers are too shallow for boat traffic. Given the extremely limited financial reserves of most small-scale traders, such temporary challenges can have severe consequences and completely ruin businesses.

**Providing urban choices.** Data from the first DDR caseload suggests that more candidates than expected will opt to settle in towns. More reintegration strategies for urban centres will thus have to be considered. Assessments made during the reintegration of returnees suggest that although there are more employment opportunities in towns, most require intensive physical labour (Pantuliano et al., 2008, p. 15), which is inappropriate for disabled or elderly soldiers and for most female DDR candidates. At the same time, most of these jobs are short-term.

The Juba job market presents additional challenges: skilled workers from outside Sudan are often preferred to unskilled Sudanese workers (Pantuliano et al., 2008, p. 15). Returnees have also noted that the Juba job market is
disorganized, non-transparent, and unfair. For example, jobs are routinely given on the basis of ethnicity. Reintegration candidates will face similar challenges, so agencies should help to set up culturally appropriate and accessible job centres or other portals that make it easier for ex-combatants to find work (Pantuliano et al., 2008). Above all, skills training will be needed in other services for which there is a demand, such as service delivery and administration of international NGOs. One promising possibility under discussion is a cooperative effort between the Ministry of Health and the SSDDRC to train ex-combatants with medical skills to enter the health sector.65

**Anticipating special risks.** Some types of work carry specific risks. For example, resource extraction—of minerals, timber, or oil—can generate conflict, in addition to exploiting workers and ruining the local environment. On the one hand, there are examples of ex-combatants who were employed in mining operations, only to violently seize control of the mines using stockpiled weapons and old command structures. On the other hand, ex-combatants may refuse to take such labour-intensive work, seeing it as less than a reward for their services during the war.

**Sensitivity to land issues.** Access to land is another challenge for economic and social reintegration. Some ex-combatants are certain to find their land occupied or even sold, as returnees have. Women in particular will face difficulties in reclaiming their property. A press statement promising a piece of land to every ex-combatant who wants one may be premature, since the land issue in Southern Sudan is highly contentious and has yet to be properly addressed.66

Given the land shortage in urban areas, and especially Juba, claims from reintegrating soldiers can be expected to lead to conflict with community members. Without land of their own, ex-combatants may have few alternatives to living in slums. In rural areas, allocating land to DDR candidates may also add to existing tensions between farmers and migrating cattle herders. Negotiations with and between communities are therefore essential to ensuring that land is assigned to ex-combatants under conditions that take into account the claims and needs of the host communities.
Weaknesses of current economic reintegration planning

Under its current design, economic reintegration for ex-combatants is not part of a general economic recovery and development programme for the South. For this reason, the main burden for economic reintegration is likely to be borne by communities. The risk of economic failure among ex-combatants is high, and without a salary or pension many will have to rely on the support of their extended families. This is especially the case with the disabled and elderly, unless they are enrolled in specific support programmes. As with security and social reintegration, the involvement of local administrations and communities from an early stage can help to prevent mistakes, increase the support of the community, and shape economic reintegration in a locally appropriate way.

Small community-level livelihood interventions are far more promising than support for individuals or a narrow target group, as evidenced by programmes for returnees (Pantuliano et al., 2008). In community projects, ex-combatants can benefit from local knowledge and support, while communities can benefit from the ex-combatants’ skills and their project activities. Economic recovery is more sustainable if it extends to the entire community, reducing the risk of failure among ex-combatants and dissatisfaction or envy among those who do not receive support. The SSDDRC has encouraged this approach among implementing agencies. While this is a positive step, the SSDDRC can ultimately only steer and support activities under its direct coordination, rather than enforce any single approach across all partner organizations.

The current DDR programme’s focus on rural reintegration is also in need of correction for successful recovery and reintegration in the South. The overall strategy needs to include urban centres, and possibly take into consideration specific regional contexts.

Meanwhile, UNDP has responded to calls for longer-term support by increasing the duration for reintegration activities in its RFP from six to 6–12 months; it has also started to identify post-intervention support mechanisms, such as facilitating employment opportunities, supporting the formation of cooperatives, and assisting in securing land in urban areas. The DDR Commission anticipates that after the end of the formal DDR process further support for
reintegration activities will be included in broader economic recovery pro-
grammes, which are tentatively planned for the future. But the Commission
may be too optimistic. By and large, interventions in Southern Sudan are still
in a humanitarian rather than a recovery phase, and the ability of the GoSS to
invest in infrastructure and recovery programmes will be limited. Indeed, the
economic future of the entire country is uncertain after 2011.
V. Social reintegration and reconciliation

In some African countries, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, armed groups have used atrocities as tactics against communities, resulting in widespread mistrust, fear, and grievances by civilians towards security forces. In comparison, SPLA and integrated Southern forces enjoy a relatively good reputation. The documented role of Southern forces in civil war-era atrocities—often committed along ethnic lines—should not be underplayed, however. Specific incidents of mass killing and the clearing of land, directed by commanders and often supported by the National Islamic Front/NCP, are burned into the memories of many Southerners. Human rights violations still have an impact on political discourse, community conflicts, and political allegiances. In some areas, notably in the Equatorias, war-related community grievances are significant.70

The willingness of communities to accept ex-combatants will depend largely on their actions within those communities during the war. Some DDR candidates have expressed fears that they will face retaliation for crimes and atrocities they committed as soldiers,71 and thus prefer to settle in towns where there is more anonymity. Reintegration into their original communities is also complicated by the political differences between tribes and sub-tribes that developed during the war, as allegiances divided between the SPLA and other armed groups such as the those affiliated with the pro-Khartoum South Sudan Defence Forces. Some ex-combatants may have fought in groups now perceived as hostile, especially by civilians who suffered violations during the war.

For elderly or disabled ex-combatants, finding a husband or wife will also prove difficult. In Southern Sudan, marriage is an important precondition for becoming a full member of the community. Likewise, female ex-combatants and WAAFG are likely to face more challenges to reintegration if they do not have a husband or a close male relative to take care of them. They may well become socially and economically marginalized or excluded. Whether they will be discriminated against because they joined or were associated with armed groups will depend largely on the culture and traditions of specific communities;
the same applies to perceptions and acceptance of women who have children from different men.\textsuperscript{72}

The number of years ex-combatants have been away from their places of origin will also play a role in how easily they can reintegrate. Many soldiers have been based near their home communities, and it has become common in Southern Sudan, especially since 2005, for soldiers to spend most of their time at home, only occasionally returning to the barracks. In other cases, soldiers who have been deployed far away from home and have not seen their families for many years have lost ties with their relatives, extended kin, and clan. In Sudanese society, where the mutual support of extended family members is very important, this detachment will make it exceptionally difficult for ex-combatants to reintegrate into their original communities.

One of the main challenges facing returnees and IDPs has been their unfamiliarity with traditional practices in their communities. Many feel alienated and are perceived as strangers because of their newly acquired cultural attitudes (Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, and Murphy, 2007, p. 21). Ex-combatants are likely to encounter similar problems. Many have spent considerable time in the army and will have become used to military behaviour, to receiving orders from a commander, and to giving orders to subordinates. They may face difficulties readjusting to civilian behaviour, adopting the roles and responsibilities expected of them, entering into discussions and negotiations rather than taking and giving orders, and respecting traditional and government authorities (whose roles have undergone considerable changes in recent years). They may also have very little knowledge of government structures, electoral processes, human rights and the rule of law, and the CPA—although community members may also have limited knowledge in this regard.

Many ex-combatants indicate that they ‘deserve their share’—in terms of economic benefits, respect, and status. Returning to their villages without wealth or a regular income, and becoming a burden on their families rather than supporting them, will undermine their self-esteem. Post-traumatic stress, which can lead to depression, isolation, and aggression, will probably be a widespread problem and, as yet, there are no programmes in place to deal with it. The exaggerated expectations of what ex-combatants will bring home as part of their DDR package will probably further increase these tensions and misunderstandings.
In addition to the measures already discussed to facilitate ex-combatants’ reintegration into society, DDR planners should consider the specific dynamics of social reintegration carefully. Specifically, reconciliation and trauma healing are necessary both for ex-combatants undergoing the DDR process and for the civilian population, which has experienced decades of war, inter- and intra-community conflicts, atrocities, and displacement. Although the CPA emphasizes reconciliation at all levels, there has been very limited space and willingness to openly discuss grievances and accusations, or to start a process of reconciliation and transitional justice.
VI. Conclusion

Sudan is embarking on DDR in a progressively fragile security environment. North–South tensions are growing in the lead-up to the referendum on self-determination in January 2011. In the South, public dissatisfaction with the pace of economic recovery and the absence of tangible peace dividends is increasing. Ex-combatants’ high expectations of ‘compensation’ for the war effort are unlikely to be met given that the communities into which they will be integrating are no better off than the ex-combatants. It is clear, therefore, that the decision to focus on individual- rather than community-based reintegration is a major weakness in current programming. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the process will meet its ambitious goals of enabling individual ex-combatants to become catalysts for economic growth in their communities, to improve the security situation, or to contribute to the demilitarization of society.

There does not appear to be a viable plan in place to correct this error. In fact, weaknesses in coordination and cooperation among various GoSS institutions and external actors, and the limited mandate of the SSDDRC, raise serious doubts about whether reintegration will be linked to, complemented by, or followed by general mid- or long-term economic reintegration strategies and programmes. As of early 2010, DDR remained de-linked from the broader recovery framework for Southern Sudan.

Disgruntled armed actors who feel cheated by their government and who have no faith in the peace process—having seen no benefits from it—are at high risk of turning to violence, whether political, criminal, or a combination of the two. To reduce this risk, a coordinated approach is needed, involving local, national, and international actors, to ensure that DDR takes into account local and regional security outcomes. At the same time, community security planning also needs to take into account progress made and challenges facing DDR, as well as the requirements of ex-combatants.

The same applies to the interaction among agencies involved in DDR and economic recovery. Ideally, a joint strategy is needed; at the very least, it should
involve improved information exchange, coordination, and cooperation. The reintegration of returnees and IDPs provides valuable lessons on economic and social recovery that should inform the new strategy.

Community involvement is also essential for long-term sustainable reintegration. Communities should be included at all planning stages: through information and awareness raising at the outset, and consultations and decision-making in the implementation phase. Involving communities is of particular importance in Southern Sudanese society, in which nearly everybody—whether civilian or military—struggles with basic economic needs.

Reconciliation has so far been limited to conflicts between communities, as part of local peace processes. With ex-combatants returning to their communities, this need will have to be addressed more systematically at both the inter- and intra-community levels. However complex and challenging the situation in Southern Sudan appears, DDR is an important and necessary part of the peace consolidation process. It is therefore essential for government institutions, communities, ex-combatants, as well as implementing organizations, the UN, and donors, to stay engaged, take heed of the complexities, and recognize the need for lean, efficient, and effective coordination and cooperation, while also operating with a high degree of flexibility.
Endnotes

1. ‘The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international community DDR programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by the reduction, demobilization and downsizing of the forces as agreed’ (CPA, 2005, ch. VI. para. 3e).

2. The referendum is an exercise in self-determination, as part of which Southerners will vote for unity or secession (CPA, 2005, ch. I, para. 1.3).

3. This paper uses the acronym DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) for simplicity while acknowledging that the other ‘R’s—such as reconciliation and recovery—are also crucial to securing peace in Sudan.

4. UNICEF supports the reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups.

5. This projected deficit takes account of the withholding of the European Community’s contribution, which is contingent on the GNU’s signing and ratification of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.

6. Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

7. See SSDDRC and UNICEF (2009).

8. One observer has argued that the vagueness of the CPA’s DDR provisions and the low priority these were accorded in the peace negotiations have hampered implementation (Baltrop, 2008, pp. 19–26).

9. Oil revenue accounts for as much as 50 per cent of the GNU budget and more than 95 per cent of the GoSS budget (Thomas, 2009, p. 19).

10. The National DDR Strategic Plan of 2007 proposes ‘at least three phases’ but does not specify start or end dates and suggests that the number of phases may change ‘depending on the number of factors including the redeployment of forces of SAF and SPLA and the number of combatants identified during the process as per specified eligibility criteria’ (GNU, 2007, para. 15.1). In Phase II, the Multi-Year DDR Programme will officially begin to handle all eligible SAF and SPLA soldiers who were pre-registered before 9 July 2008 (GNU, 2007, para. 15.4).

11. Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

12. According to the 2008 Individual Reintegration Project Component document, the annual breakdown was estimated at 51,560 candidates for 2009; 40,000 for 2010; 46,730 for 2011; and 41,710 for 2012—totaling 180,000 (GoS and UNDP, 2008, p. 9).

13. This definition is in line with that provided by the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS): ‘the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance’ (UN IAWG on DDR, 2006, p. 19).

14. Disabled DDR candidates will potentially be eligible for additional medical support worth USD 240 per person.

15. ‘Providing both targeted reinsertion/reintegration packages for ex-combatants and support to the community has become an important feature of DDR programmes and falls within the
principles contained in the IDDRS. The IDDRP itself supports the above principles and its guidelines state that: individual combatants and target groups were to receive personalised support; reintegration support for ex-combatants should aim to create a secure environment for the entire community where the ex-combatant(s) is returning to; support be provided to communities to identify, prioritise and address their immediate security needs; and families, women, youth and other local civil society groups be involved in reintegration planning through a participatory planning process’ (UN IAWG on DDR, 2006).

According to the DDR Programme’s Individual Reintegration Project Component, ex-combatants who are reintegrating will ‘act as catalysts to the expansion of their communities’ economic opportunities and play a useful part in demilitarizing the country’s economy and culture by embracing livelihoods that are not gained by the gun’ (MYDDR, 2008, p. 11).

There is increasing discussion in academic circles about how to link DDR to other interim stabilization and security-related programmes. These include community security, SSR, policing, and civilian disarmament, along with peacebuilding activities. See Muggah, Colletta, and de Tessières (2009, p. 20).

UNDP is planning to issue further RFPs for Warrap, Western, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states (UNDP, 2009).

‘A key requirement for [the transition to peace] is restoring and strengthening security through disarmament, demobilization and, in particular, reintegration into civilian society, of ex-combatants and associates who might otherwise undermine public security and constrain progress towards development and sustainable peace’ (UNDP, 2009, p. 23).

The RFP ‘encourages’ linkages to organizations working on community security and to joint activities for ex-combatants and the community that may bring them closer together (UNDP, 2009, p. 15).

These include the Ministries of Internal Affairs; Commerce, Trade, and Supply; Education; Labour, Public Services, and Human Resource Development; Gender, Social Welfare, and Religious Affairs; Health; Housing, Land, and Public Utilities; and SPLA Affairs.

A letter by the SSDDRC chairperson from 16 February 2010 mentions the hiring of more than 100 staff members. With the current fiscal crisis, this decision for additional staff can be seen as evidence that DDR is a priority for the government. At the time of writing, staff had not yet been hired. Author correspondence with a UNDP official, 19 March 2010.

According to information provided by the SSDDRC in a workshop in Juba in January 2009, the total number of WAAFG expected to go through DDR is 2,145. For more on the situation facing WAAFG, see Small Arms Survey (2008b).

Author communication with SSDDRC staff, Juba, October 2009.

Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

Author communication with an SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2009.

RTCC minutes, Juba, 6 October 2009.

Time spent in the military refers to membership in the main SPLA or in armed groups that were later integrated into the SPLA.

Data provided by the SSDDRC in late 2008 and from an SSDDRC presentation in Juba, 21 January 2009.

At this writing, the available data sample from the disarmament and demobilization sites was limited to the period June–October 2009, covering only about 2,000 of the total 34,000 DDR candidates.
According to information provided by the SSDDRC, the SPLA is pulling out able-bodied young men from the disarmament and demobilization sites and reinserting them into the army or police forces. Information provided by the SSDDRC, from the DREAM database, Juba, October 2009.

‘Progress Report on Disarmament and Demobilization’, email release by the SSDDRC, 22 May 2010.

Author correspondence with UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

Author communication with SSDDRC staff, Juba, June–September 2009.

RTCC minutes, Juba, 16 June and 25 August 2009.

Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

The collected data is entered into the DREAM database.

The IDDRS uses the following definition for reinsertion: ‘the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year’ (UN IAWG on DDR, 2006, p. 19).

Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

For example, food provisions to be distributed by the World Food Programme have been delayed, resulting in the postponement of the start of the ICRS (RTCC minutes, Juba, 25 August 2009); an increasing food shortage in 2010 could further hinder demobilization (author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010).

The Rumbek caseload increased to 2,445 by late May 2010, according to the SSDDRC’s ‘Progress Report on Disarmament and Demobilization’, email of 22 May 2010.

The difference between counselled and demobilized counts reflects the fact that 767 ex-combatants did not return to their state of resettlement to receive their reintegration packages (author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010).

Participants were provided with training in carpentry, tailoring, and housekeeping, among other vocational skills, and have received their economic reintegration package. They are expected to receive further support to find employment or start cooperatives (author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010).

Author communication with the SSDDRC, Juba, October 2009.

RTCC minutes, Juba, 16 June 2009.

Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

Administrative districts in Sudan, from largest to smallest, include: state, county, payam, and boma.

At least 2,500 Southerners were killed in 2009 in inter- and intra-tribal fighting between the Lou Nuer and the Murle and between the Lou Nuer and the Jikany Nuer in Jonglei, many of them women and children. Attackers destroyed villages and displaced thousands of people, resulting in a humanitarian emergency. There is a strong perception among community members and international experts that dynamics have changed: taboos concerning the killing of women and children have been broken, and traditional patterns of conflict and peacebuilding
are no longer respected (author’s observations from working in Southern Sudan; author communication and briefings with NGO and UNMIS staff, January–October 2009; Mc Evoy and LeBrun, 2010).

The CPA banned all armed forces outside the SPLA and the SAF. Tribal militia, armed groups, and paramilitary forces, collectively known as ‘other armed groups’ in the CPA, were supposed to either demobilize or be absorbed into one of the two statutory armies. In the South, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) served as an umbrella for a wide range of armed groups generally allied with the SAF, many under the direction of commanders with local power bases. SSDF fighters were on the front lines of the latter stage of the civil war. The Juba Declaration of 2006 specifically forced the demobilization–integration choice on the SSDF. As a result, many SSDF commanders integrated with the SPLA and were given high-ranking positions—notably Paulino Matip, now deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA. But a number of commanders and their men still retain ties to the SAF, or are keeping their options open in the case of renewed North–South war. For background on the SSDF, see Young (2006); for more on the current state of Southern armed groups, see Mc Evoy and LeBrun (2010).

Statement by Salva Kiir at a Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau presentation, Juba, 27 August 2009; author communication with UN and NGO staff. On the LRA in Sudan, see Schomerus (2007).

There is still no legal framework governing arms possession in Southern Sudan.

Author correspondence with an NGO analyst, February 2010.

Uma (2010) indicates that 6,500 new SSPS recruits drawn from across the ten states of Southern Sudan had begun professional training by June 2010.

Author communication with SSDDRC staff, Juba, September 2009.

It may be argued that ex-combatants might receive less protection from their comrades when they are no longer members of the army.

For example, in June 2009, the Small Arms Survey Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) project, in consultation with the SSDDRC, organized a workshop entitled, ‘Southern Sudan and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Adopting an Integrated Approach to Stabilization’. The workshop was attended by representatives from the SSDDRC, the SPLA, key GoSS ministries, and institutions such as the Southern Sudan Peace Commission, the CSSAC Bureau, international research institutions, UN agencies, and NGOs. The primary objectives of the workshop were to discuss the feasibility of DDR in Southern Sudan and to explore linkages between DDR and other post-conflict stabilization measures. See HSBA (2009) for selected workshop papers and the workshop outcome document; in particular, see Gebrehiwot (2009); Muggah, Colletta, and de Tessières (2009); and Very (2009). Other factors, such as difficult access during the rainy season, also played a role in this decision.

The SSDDRC is working on a communications strategy with support from a technical expert.

Literacy training is to be considered part of the reintegration framework (author correspondence with a UNDP official, March 2010).
The decision to focus heavily on mechanized farming in Northern Sudan in the 1950s led to soil erosion and environmental destruction; it also became one of the root causes of the war. In Southern Sudan, communities have been encouraged to clear forests to make room for farmland, depriving them of valuable natural resources (Gullick, 2009). In Ethiopia, plans for extensive rose and sugar cane cultivation threaten to drain swamps that are grazing grounds for pastoralists, and to block their migration routes (observation by the author from work in Sudan, and unpublished project documents, 2007–09).

The Sudan Recovery Fund for Jonglei, which will focus mainly on road construction and the setting up of radio stations (author communication with UN staff, Juba, October 2009), is a project that could absorb unskilled workers. Whether this will happen remains to be seen, but the employment of ex-combatants can certainly be recommended.

RTCC minutes, Juba, 1 September 2009.

The presidential statement was broadcast on Miraya 101 FM, 21 February 2009.

Community reintegration projects will be implemented through other organizations, including Pact Sudan, which has earmarked funds for community-based organizations to carry out such projects to facilitate DDR.

Author communication with SSDDRC staff, Juba, September 2009.

Author correspondence with a UNDP official, Juba, March 2010.

For more information on perceptions of the SPLA, see Lokuji, Abatneh, and Wani (2009). Despite atrocities, the fact that a high percentage of Southern Sudanese fought in the war, and can therefore identify with recent ex-combatants, also plays a role. Soldiers are generally considered heroes, especially in official discourse, and there seems to be a general perception that ex-combatants will, on the whole, be welcomed back into their communities (author communication with NGO staff and community representatives, Juba, Upper Nile State, and Jonglei State, 2007–09).

The vulnerability of reintegrating soldiers was raised during an RTCC meeting: ‘What can he do to protect himself from a person from whom he probably took a goat [a] long time ago, when he was a soldier under the direct command of the commander of the army? He has surrendered his gun already; his security might be threatened. What would he do to protect himself from revenge?’ RTCC minutes, Juba, 25 August 2009.

Author communication with NGO staff, Juba, June 2009.

The CPA states: ‘The DDR programme shall take place within a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of peace and confidence building measures’ (CPA, 2005, annexe 1, para. 23.2).


*Sudan Tribune.* 2009. ‘Salva Kiir Orders to Forcefully Disarm South Sudan Civilians.’ 18 June.

——. 2010. ‘UN Says Violence Has Increased in South Sudan as April Election Nears.’ 25 March.


About the author

Julie Brethfeld is Europe–Central Asia Team Leader for the UK-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Saferword. From 2007 to 2009 she worked as Peace Technical Advisor for the NGO Pact Sudan in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. She has managed a number of community-based projects focusing on peaceful coexistence, community security, and cross-border trade in Jonglei and Upper Nile states and in the Ethiopian border area. Previously, at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, she worked on capacity building and awareness raising on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and small arms control, especially with Sudanese communities, members of the Government of Southern Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. She holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Bonn, Germany.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the staff of the Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Commission and the United Nations Development Programme for openly sharing information and views on the ongoing DDR process. I am also grateful to the participants of the June 2009 DDR workshop organized by the Small Arms Survey in Juba. Their discussions and presentations on DDR, community security, and security sector reform were invaluable. Thanks also to my colleagues and friends at Pact Sudan for their support. The feedback provided by the reviewers and by Claire Mc Evoy and others at the Small Arms Survey has been extremely helpful in shaping this paper. Special thanks go to Irina Mosel, Bernhard Harlander, and others, who have provided highly constructive support.
The Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by sustained contributions from the Governments of Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Survey is also grateful for past and current project support received from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Spain, and the United States, as well as from various United Nations agencies, programmes, and institutes.

The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also sponsors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

p +41 22 908 5777
f +41 22 732 2738
e sas@smallarmssurvey.org
w www.smallarmssurvey.org
The Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes; incentive schemes for civilian arms collection; and security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.

HSBA Working Papers are designed to provide in-depth analysis of security-related issues in Sudan and along its borders. The HSBA also generates shorter Sudan Issue Briefs, which provide snapshots of baseline information in a timely and reader-friendly format. Both series are available in English and Arabic at www.smallarmssurveysudan.org.

The HSBA receives financial support from the UK’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously, the project received direct support from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida).

For more information please contact:

Claire McEvoy, HSBA Project Manager, Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

e claire.mcevoy@smallarmssurvey.org
w http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org

HSBA Working Paper series editor: Emile LeBrun
Small Arms Survey HSBA publications

Sudan Issue Briefs

Number 1, September 2006
Persistent threats: widespread human insecurity in Lakes State, South Sudan, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Number 2, October 2006
Armed groups in Sudan: the South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration

Number 3 (2nd edition), November 2006–February 2007
Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: recent experiences and implications

Number 4, December 2006
No dialogue, no commitment: the perils of deadline diplomacy for Darfur

Number 5, January 2007
A widening war around Sudan: the proliferation of armed groups in the Central African Republic

Number 6, April 2007
The militarization of Sudan: a preliminary review of arms flows and holdings

Number 7, July 2007
Arms, oil, and Darfur: the evolution of relations between China and Sudan

Number 8, September 2007
Responses to pastoral wars: a review of violence reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya

Number 9, February 2008
Echo effects: Chadian instability and the Darfur conflict

Number 10, March 2008
Neither ‘joint’ nor ‘integrated’: the Joint Integrated Units and the future of the CPA
Number 11, May 2008
Allies and defectors: an update on armed group integration and proxy force activity

Number 12, August 2008
The drift back to war: insecurity and militarization in the Nuba Mountains

Number 13, September 2008
No standing, few prospects: how peace is failing South Sudanese female combatants and WAAFG

Number 14, May 2009
Conflicting priorities: GoSS security challenges and recent responses

Number 15, December 2009
Supply and demand: arms flows and holdings in Sudan

Number 16, April 2010
Symptoms and causes: insecurity and underdevelopment in Eastern Equatoria

Sudan Working Papers

Number 1, November 2006
The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration, by John Young

Number 2, February 2007
Violence and Victimization in South Sudan: Lakes State in the Post-CPA period, by Richard Garfield

Number 3, May 2007
The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization, by John Young

Number 4, May 2007
Border in Name Only: Arms Trafficking and Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border, by Joshua Marks

Number 5, June 2007
The White Army: An Introduction and Overview, by John Young
Number 6, July 2007
Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,
by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana

Number 7, July 2007
Emerging North–South Tensions and the Prospects for a Return to War, by John Young

Number 8, September 2007
The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview,
by Mareike Schomerus

Number 9, November 2007
Armed Groups Along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier: An Overview and Analysis,
by John Young

Number 10, December 2007
A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces, by Jago Salmon

Number 11, December 2007
Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei,
by Richard Garfield

Number 12, April 2008
The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality,
by Jérôme Tubiana

Number 13, June 2008
Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan’s Central and Eastern Equatoria,
by Mareike Schomerus

Number 14, July 2008
Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North, by Claire Mc Evoy and Ryan Murray

Number 15, September 2008
Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur’s IDP Camps,
by Clea Kahn
Number 16, January 2009
*Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign*, by Adam O’Brien

Number 17, June 2009
*Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur*, by Julie Flint

Number 18, September 2009
*Skirting the Law: Post-CPA Arms Flows to Sudan*, by Mike Lewis

Number 19, January 2010
*Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict*, by Julie Flint

Number 20, April 2010
*Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan*, by Claire Mc Evoy and Emile LeBrun
Other Small Arms Survey publications

Occasional Papers
1 Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year after the Lomé Peace Agreement, by Eric Berman, December 2000
2 Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes, by Sami Faltas, Glenn McDonald, and Camilla Waszink, July 2001
3 Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia, by Katherine Kramer (with Nonviolence International Southeast Asia), July 2001
4 Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency, by Maria Haug, Martin Langvandslien, Lora Lumpe, and Nic Marsh (with NISAT), January 2002
6 Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Republic of Georgia, by Spyros Demetriou, November 2002
7 Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons, by Edward Laurance and Rachel Stohl, December 2002
8 Small Arms in the Pacific, by Philip Alpers and Conor Twyford, March 2003
9 Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls: Small Arms in Yemen, by Derek B. Miller, May 2003
10 Beyond the Kalashnikov: Small Arms Production, Exports, and Stockpiles in the Russian Federation, by Maxim Pyadushkin, with Maria Haug and Anna Matveeva, August 2003
11 In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri Lanka, by Chris Smith, October 2003
Small Arms and Light Weapons Production in Eastern, Central, and Southeast Europe, by Yudit Kiss, October 2004, ISBN 2-8288-0057-1


Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural South Pacific Islands Communities, edited by Emile LeBrun and Robert Muggah, June 2005, ISBN 2-8288-0064-4


Special Reports

Humanitarianism under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, by Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, commissioned by the Reference Group on Small Arms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, July 2001
2 Small Arms Availability, Trade, and Impacts in the Republic of Congo, by Spyros Demetriou, Robert Muggah, and Ian Biddle, commissioned by the International Organisation for Migration and the UN Development Programme, April 2002
3 Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo, by Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin, commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, June 2003
6 La République Centrafricaine: une étude de cas sur les armes légères et les conflits, by Eric G. Berman, published with financial support from UNDP, July 2006, ISBN 2-8288-0073-3
Book Series


