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REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATO
IN EUROPE TREATY

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MR. INDYK: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Martin Indyk, the Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. We're delighted to have you here this afternoon for the book launch of "Cooperating for Peace and Security," a copy of which is awaiting you outside, "Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy," edited by Bruce Jones, Shepard Forman and Rich Gowan. We're very happy to see this publication launched and to have the opportunity to have a discussion about it with four very distinguished and experienced guests.

For the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, the issues involving the evolution of the global order or global system and how the changes in balance of power that arise from the emergence of new powers on the global stage, China, India and Brazil are the ones we're familiar with nowadays, and the decline to use a loaded word of all the powers like Russia, the E.U. and the United States, is creating the potential for some shifts in the tectonic plates or changes in the balance of power that could have profound impacts on global security and order. That's the kind of issue that managing the Global Insecurity Project that is run by Bruce Jones was established originally with Carlos Pascual, my predecessor and now our Ambassador in Mexico, the Managing Global Insecurity Project looks at many of the facets of the changing patterns of this global order, and one important piece of that effort is to look at the evolution of international security institutions.

That's what this book is about. "Cooperating for Peace and Security" is one of the first books to look systematically at international security institutions and to ask the question whether and how they've evolved to meet key and American and global
security interests. The chapters are authored by leading experts on topics that deal with the United Nations, U.S. multilateral cooperation, NATO, European and African security institutions, conflict, mediation, counterterrorism, international justice and humanitarian cooperation. The theme running through all of these chapters is the question of how the balance of power shapes international institutions and what this means for future challenges to international order.

To discuss the work that they’ve done in this book, we are first of all going to hear from Bruce Jones. He is Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Insecurity Initiative at Brookings. He also wears two hats. He’s the Director of The Center on International Cooperation at New York University, a Senior Adviser for the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 and a consulting professor at Stanford University. He was recently appointed by the U.N. Secretary General to be a participant in the United Nations Senior Advisory Group for the review of international civilian capacities. This is the last of many positions that Bruce as held working in the U.N. Actually, I first met him when he worked for the U.N. Special Coordinator on the Middle East in the days when Gaza was a little more open than it is today. He was hanging out there. But he's served in other missions for the U.N., particularly in Kosovo in the Office of the Secretary General particularly on reform issues where he played a major role and as Deputy Research Director for the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

Following him is Jean-Marie Guehenno. We are very proud to have Jean-Marie as a Senior Fellow at Brookings. He is also the Arnold Saltzman Professor of Professional Practice in International Public Affairs at Columbia University and has just been appointed by the U.N. Secretary General as Chairman of a Senior Advisory Group for the Review of International Civilian Capacities which Bruce serves on. Previously he’s
probably known to many of you as the United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, a position that he held for 8 years from 2000 to 2008. Before joining the U.N. he served as Director of Policy Planning in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the E.U. and Chairman of the French Institute of Higher Defense Studies.

Following Jean-Marie we will have Dr. Stewart Patrick, currently a Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations where he focuses on multilateral cooperation in the management of global issues. He is the author of the chapter on United States and multilateralism in this book. Previously he was Research Fellow at the Center for Global Development where he worked on security and development issues and prior to that he served on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning staff from 2002 to 2005 where he was working on Afghanistan and other transnational issues.

Finally, Rich Gowan, who is currently the Associate Director for Managing Global Insecurity at the Center for International Cooperation at NYU. His work is focused on multilateral security arrangements and the E.U.-U.N. relationship. He is also a Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and formerly manager of the European Program at the Foreign Policy Center in London which explains his accent which is not to be confused with mine. Without further ado, Bruce, who also has a Canadian accent I suspect.

MR. JONES: Something along those lines. Martin, thank you very much and thank you for chairing today, and let me thank all of you for coming along. I took a list of the people who had RSVP'd and it's a highly unusual audience in the sense that it's a collection of people who actually care about multilateralism and international institutions
and that's an exceedingly rare things, so I'm very pleased that you're all here. You're also then by definition an audience who will disagree with where I'm going to start.

I wanted to start by characterizing, perhaps caricaturing, I would say the conventional wisdom in this country at least about international security institutions. It seems to me if you read the media and some scholarship on international security institutions in this country, you would reach three conclusions. You would reach the conclusion that international security institutions are peripheral to American security interests, you would reach the conclusion that they cannot be reformed or at the very least that reform efforts have always stalled and always failed and are stuck and haven't gotten anywhere and you would reach the conclusion that if that were going to change, the major bullet in terms of transforming multilateral arrangements and international institutions is U.S. leadership. This book suggests that all three of those viewpoints are wrong. I'll come back to that.

Let me deviate for a moment and talk about the underlying concepts of this project, the Managing Global Insecurity Project, and how we drive these conclusions. The project as Martin said has two central components. One looks at global order, the changing balance of power, the implications of that, the insecurity and instability that arises, the potential for cooperation and burden-sharing, explores the consequences for U.S. security policy and attempts to identify options for the United States and for others for how we might maintain a stable and progressive international system.

Second, we look at transnational threats. The two-part focus arises from an understanding of the underlying dynamics of globalization. It seems to me that we can talk about lots of different features but there are two that are essential. One is that economic integration is what has enabled the rise of the emerging powers, but I think post-financial crises we should stop talking about the emerging powers and talk about the
emerged powers, but it's been globalization that's been the essential driving force of their economic growth. The second key feature of globalization it seems to me is that it means that all major economies now are highly dependent on a series of globalized trade, transport, information, financial and communication networks that make us highly vulnerable to asymmetric threat that increases our vulnerability to transnational terrorism, to biological department and to fragile states which are force multipliers for transnational threats. So those two major features of globalization, there are others that undergird the two main foci of the Project on Global Order and Transnational Threats.

This book is mostly on the latter. We have a lot of work other work on the global order questions. This book is mostly on transnational threats because it's really on the transnational threats and on fragile states that international security institutions play their primary role. I would argue that by playing their role effectively and by embedding the major powers in forms of cooperation to tackle transnational threats, they also play a global ordering role. This book really focuses more on the operational side of how international security institutions play their roles on transnational threats and fragile states.

Let me then go back to the three elements of the conventional wisdom that I set out at the beginning, first being that international security institutions are largely seen as peripheral to American security interests. I think that there is by now overwhelming evidence that that's not true, that U.S. security has been and increasingly is impacted on by the performance of international security institutions in a broad range of spheres. I think we can point to the performance of NATO in Afghanistan as an obvious example. It gets much less attention, but we could point to the U.N.'s political mediation role in Iraq which is playing an important role on the issues of Kirkuk and Kurdistan or the Kurdish areas. We can point to the transformation of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's role on nonproliferation and the question of whether it gets wrong the question of proliferation cases, DPRK and Iran. Even more so, the Security Council's response to those cases so far effective on DPRK, to be seen on Iran. We can point to the creation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. This is my current favorite example. Here is an international institution where the United States hasn't even signed the CTBT treaty yet is the major financial backer and I would argue the major beneficiary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization which maintains nuclear testing verification sites all over the world, giving the United States forward intelligence on nuclear testing without the cost and complication of a forward position. So in a whole host of different ways, international security institutions reinforce American security and play I would say increasingly important roles.

Some of you here have military backgrounds. I think we can characterize the role that international security institutions play if we use a military term for a moment, manning the outer perimeter. International security institutions are never the last line of defense of a country's security, they're not even the main line of defense, but they often the first line or the outer line of defense in looking at evolving threats and far-flung threats that if left to fester can have direct implications, so I think they play important roles for U.S. security. It should therefore matter whether they perform, and they're not performing, that we can reform them. As I said, I think there is a really dominant conventional view that reform is exceedingly hard and that it has stalled and has not worked.

This is 300 pages of evidence that says that that's not the whole story, that we have seen since the end of the Cold War and since 9/11 dramatic transformations of international security institutions, fundamental transformations of what they do and how they do it, sometimes effectively, sometimes less effectively. We can
look to the transformation of NATO from a defensive alliance to an operational peacekeeping and counterterrorism entity. We can look to the development of a whole suite of nonproliferation tools at the hands of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. We can look to the dramatic transformations of U.N. peacekeeping and the U.N. humanitarian system which didn't really exist in the form that they exist today 20 years ago. We can look to the creation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. In a whole host of realms we've seen dramatic, major transformations of the world of international security institutions in the past 20 years that were in a sense on an accelerating rate in the past 10 years.

Third and last, the question of what is the U.S. in all of this. As I said, I think there is a general view in this city at least that if there is going to be a further and deeper transformation of multilateral security institutions, U.S. security policy is going to be the driving force of that and you see this now in this administration's rhetoric and strategy. I don't want to say anything that remotely discourages this administration from putting lots of energy into improving the performance and reengaging with multilateral security institutions. But I think what the historical record shows is that U.S. security policy and U.S. engagement in these questions is far from the whole story. There are some places, the nuclear issue is probably the main one, where U.S. leadership really has been the driving force of transformation of the institutions, but in most other fields, it's not been U.S. leadership that's been the key force. It's a more complicated story. Very simply, if we look across the institutions we see a common pattern that has three elements. It has U.S. support, not leadership but support, because the United States can most times in most issues block things if it doesn't like the direction of a reform. One exception is the International Criminal Court. But broadly speaking, the United States
can block and transformation in any international institution that it wants, so that you have
to have U.S. support and not necessarily leadership.

If you look at the examples, if you look across the sweep of the
examples, the leadership over the last 20 years has come from the middle powers, and
more precisely, it's come from U.S. allied middle powers, from Australia, from Canada,
from Norway, from Britain and from Sweden. It's come from the middle powers who have
the resources, the manpower and the interests to drive the evolution of the multilateral
system, but to do so in ways that are resonant with U.S. security policy or at least not too
far misaligned from U.S. security policy. I think if we project forward, I'm trying to look at
Achilles while I say this, one of the questions we want to see or we want to understand is
whether the emerging or the emerged powers will take on similar roles as the middle
powers did in the 1990s and the past decade and driving the more effective
transformation of multilateral institutions.

The third corner of the reform triangle if I can put it that way which I think
was the most surprising to us as we did our work was to discover quite how important
were senior officials of the secretariats themselves in putting forward ideas, in pushing the
intellectual boundary, in pushing the policy boundary, in keeping ideas alive, whether
it was Kofi Anan's role in the responsibility to protect, Mohamed ElBaradei's role in the
transformation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, across this set of institutions
we saw surprisingly important roles for key senior officials of the international institutions.

It's on that note that I want to end because it's a perfect segue to hand
over to the person who exemplifies this par excellence, Jean-Marie Guehenno, who as
you all know played the major role in the transformation of U.N. peacekeeping in the past
10 years.
MR. GUEHENNO: Thank you, Bruce. I'm going to play devil's advocate then. Bruce starts the book with a very interesting chapter that describes the world as a tale of two worlds. There's the world of U.S. leadership, the Bush administration, the feeling that the U.S. can be the ultimate balancer of the world, and today there is the recognition that that doesn't work. Then there is this other world, the world of multilateral institutions, a rules-based world, and I'm going to play devil's advocate not by saying that this world doesn't work, we've worked to make it work, but to say that today in 2010 we are probably less advanced than we were in 2005, that we have moved probably backwards since 2005 rather than forward and that raises some issues.

When you look at international justice when Bruce mentioned the International Criminal Court, today you have an International Criminal Court which is challenged by most African countries with a sitting head of state under prosecution by the ICC and no implementation of a decision of the chamber. That is a serious issue. I'm not saying whether it's right or wrong, but it points to one of the issues we're seeing as a fractured issue of a world that is more and more integrated by a sense of rule of law, that is not there.

When you look at peacekeeping which I hope has been quite transformed, peacekeeping today is in a very serious crisis. If you look at the two biggest missions in Africa, actually there because there are two missions in Sudan, which represent not half of peacekeeping but probably something like 40 percent of peacekeeping. Those three missions are in serious trouble. One in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the government has asked it to leave in 12 months following the fiftieth anniversary of independence, and in Sudan the mission in the south is confronting major challenges with the potential for the separation of south Sudan and how that will be managed. In Darfur there is a sense that while the mission has made a difference,
nevertheless the action is elsewhere. More fundamentally, the fact that states can challenge peacekeeping operations the way they do from Chad to Congo, it started with Ethiopia and Eritrea, it raises a big question on that major instrument of the United Nations. Some of the key issues that have been seen as key advances including the responsibility to prospect at the 2005 summit are under threat and I think we have to recognize that.

Then comes the debate for which this book provides a lot of evidence and helps in further discussion. One possible answer is should we give up on multilateral institution? Should we retreat to alliances because it's easier to deal with people who are like you than people who are not like you? Should we put NATO at the center or be even more selective? Should we go coalitions of the relevant because we see that even in NATO it's not always obvious to get all the ducks lined up and the decision-making process in NATO is painful? That is a real temptation today.

I think the book makes a good case to show that it doesn't work, and I would add my own arguments. On NATO I was struck when the Afghanistan policy was being reviewed in this country last fall. There was a ministerial meeting right in the middle of the review for whiny Europeans like me. This in a way could theoretically be the great opportunity where the Europeans come to the meeting with their own views. That would have been very bad taste on all sides. It would have been bad taste from the U.S. standpoint because it would have considerably complicated an already delicate domestic debate on what is the right policy in Afghanistan and any European position would have further complicated the work of the administration. That would have been bad taste in Europe because then the Europeans would have had to put their soldiers where their mouth was. So the compromise that everybody liked was essentially to agree on whatever would be decided in the future and that's I think quite symptomatic of
a structural problem for an alliance that does not have any more defining threat that has to deal with evolving situations where the answer is never obvious, is never self-evident, where domestic support is often fragile and international debate on those issues complicates the solution rather than bringing it closer. I think NATO in that respect will have a hard time being the alliance that can deal with far-flung crises on a regular basis.

Coalitions of the relevant or combinations of coalitions of the relevant and alliances. In a way that was the view of the British member of the panel that looked at U.N. reform. His view was essentially the U.N. is an unwieldy organization, complicated and not very efficient. The best way to go is to have likeminded countries which implement a policy and then you get the stamp of approval of the U.N. Security Council as the ultimate legitimizer. It looks neat. It's tempting. I don't think it works. I don't think it works because in the kind of complex emergencies that we now face, it's all in the art of implementation and the notion that the U.N. Security Council in its generosity would just hand over to NATO or a coalition of the relevant major issues, I don't think it will happen. Yes for issues of secondary importance, but for the major issues there will be great resistance. So coalitions of the relevant alliances cannot be the full answer. Then we are back to the other world, the world of multilateral institutions.

How can we respond to that? I'll look at concrete situation. Let's say the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today China is a major player in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has just signed a contract for more than $6 billion with the Congolese state. Let's be honest, a number of Western countries are not quite comfortable with this new competitor and there's the sense that maybe hard-won progress on criteria of governance, OECD criteria, are going to be scaled down. At the same time I would say for a country like China, and China is not alone. Many of the emerged powers to use Bruce's phase would share that view. They want a world that
continues to be an international system based on states, but they recognize at the same
time that fragile states can undermine that system of states. In a way their challenge is
the challenge of Lampudesa, what needs to be changed so that nothing changes, there's
a bit of that and that discussion needs to take place. That is, what is the degree of
engagement of the international community on a number of issues where problems do
not stop at the border, where you have to be more intrusive and that's the essence of the
Managing Global Insecurity Project where you have to be more intrusive but at the same
time you have to recognize sovereignty. There is a dilemma for which the answer will
probably not be the Western answer as we would have believed even 5 years ago, but
that doesn't mean that there is not a common ground that can be found. There is a
common interest of emerged powers as well as status quo powers that a predictable
world, a world with some rules, is a better world than a world that is unpredictable and
with no rules. That has implications for reform. That means that we cannot do away with
reform of the United Nations, as complicated and as difficult as it may be. Institutions
matter especially in a world of great imbalance because it's fine when you are rich and
powerful to have informal arrangements. You are secure so you can have a gentlemen's
agreement, and even then you would have a good contract. But nevertheless, when
there is balance you can live with a gentlemen's agreement. When there is great
imbalance you want the reassurance, the equalizer of the law of the institution and that's
why the demand for the legitimacy of institutions is not just sort of lawyers' perfectionist
view, it's a deep political demand of all those who feel that otherwise the big powers
could walk over them and so that demand is here with us to stay.

We are going to live a very interesting moment next year because when
you look at the composition of the Security Council next year, it is likely to include Japan
for sure, but it's likely to include Germany, it's likely to include Brazil, it's likely to include
essentially the G-4. It's likely to include India. It's going to be a reform council -- of
course when these members will not be permanent members, they will not have -- but
they will be sitting in the council. That's going to be an interesting test because in a way
it will open the discussion to something that is not often discussed which is substance.
That is, usually the discussion on the composition of the council is essentially a
discussion on form and on process and what needs to happen is a discussion on
substance. It's going to be a great test, whether having all the major powers, whether
having a council that actually will be very representative of this new emerged world,
whether it's going to function better or whether we're going to see more clashes. I think if
it works better then it's a very powerful argument to have reform. I would say reform will
happen if there is no frontal clash between China and the United States on the one hand,
and if there is a sense of common purpose among the G-4. If that sense is missing and if
there is the perception at the end of the day on issues of substance there is not that
much common ground, then the whole effort for reform will be seen as a complication of
lawyers that doesn't bring much progress. So I think there we have a great opportunity to
build the institutions that will be necessary to manage well that do not stop at the border.
Will that happen? It's not sure because when one looks at the impact of the crisis, look at
it in Europe, look at it in various countries, it's often more parochialism than a sense that
your interests will be in your borders so that there is more often a sense of retreat rather
than broadening the horizon which is probably natural when people are insecure. It's not
at all a done deal, but we are going to have a real live test next year. Thank you, Jean-
Marie. Stewart?

MR. PATRICK: Thank you, Martin. Having some time here as a
Research Fellow when I was working on my dissertation and having worked in the first
job that I ever had when someone actually finally employed me at the Center on
International Cooperation for 5 years where Bruce is now, it's a great pleasure to be involved in this.

For me the two critical questions or two of the questions that emerge from this book are, first, what are the preconditions for sustained U.S. investment in multilateral security cooperation? And second, what form should that cooperation take, picking up on the theme that Jean-Marie began to introduce just now.

My own contribution to this book is called The Mission Determines the Coalition: the United States and Multilateral Security Cooperation after 9/11. I want to briefly summarize the logic the way I see of the Bush administration's revolution in U.S. foreign policy with multilateral security cooperation and then turn to the Obama administration and maybe try to highlight some of the elements of discontinuity which are many, but then also at least one element of continuity.

I think it's worth noting at the outset that the United States has long been ambivalent and will probably remain always ambivalent about multilateral cooperation particularly in the security realm, and there are good reasons for that or at least understandable reasons for that. One has to do with America's massive power which gives it a lot more options and a special role in the international system. The second is American political culture and particularly American exceptionalism often seen as exceptionalism in terms of the way that it treats international regimes. The third is the constitutional separation of powers that makes the United States -- let's just say it complicates its credible commitment to multilateral institutions and organizations and particularly multilateral treaties. For those reasons you've always going to see some structural resistance to the U.S. in terms of multilateral cooperation. Partly thanks to these dynamics no American president has ever placed the fate of the United States in the hands of universal collective security or even a major multilateral alliance like NATO.
Yet from the presidency of FDR to Bill Clinton, I think it's fair to say that a recurrent feature of U.S. foreign policy was the embedding of U.S. global leadership in international institutions and a commitment to a general though hardly consistent posture of self-restraint in the use of American power.

My argument in the chapter is that that orientation ended reasonably abruptly at least during the first administration of George W. Bush. The administration obviously arrived profoundly skeptical of international institutions and alliances, particularly their ability to confront the changes of the 21st century which are dramatic and I think it's worthwhile thinking about the convictions that informed that approach. The first one was that multilateralism has to be means to an end rather than an end in and of itself. The second is that too many international institutions including the U.N. are hopelessly dysfunctional, sclerotic and obsolete. The third was this notion amongst many that expanding reach of international law was somehow constraining U.S. sovereignty or was a threat to American domestic sovereignty. The fourth was, and this is relevant particularly in talking about Afghanistan even today, a sense that asymmetries in military and technological capabilities amongst the advanced industrial democracies were really reducing the value of multilateral alliances particularly NATO in terms of actually getting things done. The fifth was a sense often argued that the threat of unilateralism was something that could actually be a jumpstart to collective action that if you threaten to go your own way, you could actually get other on board. The sixth issue which is probably the most fundamental was the argument that multilateralism comes in many forms and that it's most successful when it actually embodies a true convergence of interests and values and that's where you started to get the Bush administration talking about the importance of an a-la-carte approach and the importance of consultations of coalitions, et cetera, and it's obvious that the attacks of 9/11 greatly increased the attachment to these
instincts and redoubled U.S. insistence on freedom of action. At the same time they also removed one of the constraints on any administration which is any restraints on the part of Congress which gave the administration a blank check in the conduct of its national security policy so that the result is this revolution in U.S. national security policy which is quite controversial abroad to allies who see the United States going into "unilateralist overdrive" which is what I think Chris Patten noted, the doctrine of preemption, the downgrading of NATO and going to war in Iraq.

As a result of a lot of these actions, the administration was tarred frequently as unilateralist and there is some merit in that accusation, but what's more interesting I think for the purposes of this discussion is the fact that it was really advocating a more flexible form of multilateralism without necessarily seeing the costs that that entailed, and this is encapsulated in Rumsfeld's famous quotation, "It's the mission that determines the coalition." Beyond avoiding the pathologies of formal institutions, when you have a flexible coalition you get greater freedom of action, greater control over what the mandate of this organization is and the ability to keep it to simply likeminded countries, and the archetype for this in some ways was the Proliferation Security Initiative which the Bush administration pushed as a major counterproliferation effort that this would bring a group of countries together, a very small core group, define the mandate quite narrowly and then perhaps extend it to others and by the end of the administration, Bush officials had been talking about the PSI as a model for multilateral cooperation going forward. It's obvious in retrospect that the Bush administration's indictment of formal multilateralism was not without merit, but at the same time it grossly underestimated the costs of this for U.S. foreign policy in terms of legitimacy for American actions, opportunities for burden-sharing, not to mention the erosion of the foundations of world order.
Nor was the approach sustainable. I think one of the interesting things that comes out of the book in a number of the chapters, and certainly in Steve Stedman’s chapter, is the degree to which notwithstanding its rhetoric by the middle of the second term of the Bush administration, the United States had gone back again and again to the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Actually, Eric Rosand is here. His chapter on counterterrorism cooperation as well talked about how much the United States in practice actually kept coming back to the Counterterrorism Committee, to the IAEA or to U.N. peacekeeping, so this is a very important thing. I think the lesson that comes through in the book is that the United States can’t afford to overlook the capacity, legitimacy and legal status of formal security organizations or to imagine that these can somehow be reproduced in these sorts of flexible and also time-limited coalitions.

Very briefly since I want to give Richard time to bring us up to the present day. Now obviously we have an administration that’s quite committed to a new era of engagement as President Obama has called it and there are several aspects of that. There’s a return to multilateralism and a desire to work within the U.N. as flawed but indispensable. There’s a recognition of security interdependence to the degree that I feel like the administration or many of its officials obviously have been reading “Power and Interdependence.” Bruce is one of the coauthors. There is an emphasis on the integration of rising powers as important pillars as a part of a rules-based multi-partner world. Also interestingly, and the administration has been criticized for this, a sort of Wilsonianism of a kind. If the Bush administration practiced what I called Wilsonianism without international institutions, that is, democracy promotion and a full-throated freedom agenda but not really worrying about international institutions, the Obama administration has flipped that on its head a little bit, a little unfair to them, so there’s this return to multilateralism. The question is now can the United States lead effective multilateral
cooperation? I want to make several points that suggest obstacles to reforming multilateral security under American leadership and multilateral security institutions.

One aspect, and I think this has come through when you look at a number of international security issues, is that the world remains far more conflictual and competitive than the Obama administration would like it to be. I think that great power interests continue to collide and I think it's been harder to reach common ground with China and Russia than the Obama administration hoped. Even where interests are shared, I'm sure neither Beijing nor Moscow wants to have Iran have a nuclear weapon that they do not rank those priorities in the same way that we do.

Second is that America is in a weaker position given the erosion of its power both hard and soft as has been discussed, but is it willing to accept a more collective form of leadership, and I'm not sure that the answer to that has been made. The third point is that even America's allies do not share the same threat perceptions or willingness to sacrifice that the United States has. Afghanistan is a very good example of that. The fourth point is a large number of powers have risen with very different views on world order and it's an open question as to whether or not those countries are willing to be net suppliers as opposed to free riders on public goods that the United States and other established powers are doing. Then finally I would say that the United States which ostensibly could serve as the motor for global governance reform in international institutions remains highly ambivalent. If the Republicans make big gains in the November elections, the midterm elections, this may cause significant doubts into the already questionable prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for instance so that it's very vulnerable here.

The upshot of my remarks I think is that we are probably going to continue to see more continuity than discontinuity in U.S. approaches toward at least
some a-la-cartism given the difficulties of working through formal institutions and that's not for want of the desire to have those institutions work, I think there is just some realism here. Thank you.


MR. GOWAN: I must begin with an apology I think because I'm sure you're all very conscious that it's a lovely, sunny day outside and you're sitting in this room hearing rather gloomy, downbeat presentations. I'm afraid my presentation is not going to be a change from that because looking at this book and looking back over the project that culminated in this book, I feel rather sad and I feel rather sad for three reasons.

The first of those reasons is just how long this project came to take to fruition which was very largely my fault and I apologize to the authors and John Berger from CUP, a very fine editor, for how long that took. We started on this project about halfway through President Bush's second term, and the second reason I am sad is that when I look back to that time I suddenly think of it as a rather innocent time and I don't think I'd ever expected to think of President Bush's second term as a rather innocent time. But in retrospect it does feel like a rather innocent time because at that moment there did seem to be a clear alternative to the administration's policies and that alternative seemed to involve returning to multilateral institutions and rebuilding the transatlantic alliance which had been damaged during the Iraq war, and for someone who as my accent suggests is interested in events on both sides of the Atlantic, this seemed brilliant. It was two for the price of one, restore U.S. relations with Europe, and restore global multilateral cooperation, that these two things could happen in tandem.

The third reason I'm sad is that I fear that may no longer be true. And for reasons that Stewart was just referring to it's becoming clear that building an effective
multilateral order that includes the emerged powers like China, India and Brazil may actually involve alienating America's European allies and not rebuilding relationships with them. I think that over the first year of the Obama administration in which we have seen the president and the State Department reach out to Beijing, reach out to Delhi, we've seen a growing rise of discontent in Brussels and other European capitals because there is a real sense that this administration wants to build a multilateral order in which Europe plays a very secondary role.

It's in that context that I reread this volume and I reread it as a bit of an elegy. The prose isn't always very elegiac, but nonetheless I read it as an elegy for a time in which the European powers emerging from the Cold War contributed a huge amount to cooperation for peace and security, and that was not only through the gradual emergence of the European Union as a global security player, but through a whole range of initiatives which are described all the way through this book, be it in a huge amount of financial support for U.N. peacekeeping which Jean-Marie mentioned where European countries pay 40 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget. They pay even more of the global humanitarian budget. If you turn to page 257, the only page in this book with an illustration, something that you can turn to after you've bought it, you will find a graph that shows that while the U.S. still provides around 45 percent of all humanitarian funding in the world, European effectively provides the other half, and the chapter in this volume on humanitarian affairs emphasizes, it's been European countries that have really led the thinking on developing the humanitarian system and Britain, the European Commission and others have really been the flag bearers for the way we do humanitarian operations today.

Even if you look at the chapter in this volume on the African Union you see Europe's influence at work. The African Union is striking because it's a signal
commitment by all African nations to securing their continent, but as this volume underlines, that has been bankrolled primarily by their European counterparts to an even greater extent than the U.S. The African Commission, the core of the African Union, in Addis Ababa is deliberately structured to look like the European Commission which funds it. Whether the African Commission has the same insane number of interns that the European Union seems to collect in Brussels I don't know, but nonetheless, politically and bureaucratically the Africans have been following the European model.

In this period in which the U.S. vacillated in its approach to multilateralism, Europe played a significant role in filling the gaps that the U.S. left behind, and that's also true in terms of NATO. There's a great chapter on NATO by Mats Berdal and David Ucko in this volume. They emphasize the extent to which a lot of thinking about NATO's strategic future has come from the U.S. and that European countries remained very keen to see how the alliance can be transformed from the Cold-War-era entity into something that can respond to today's crises. Yet even before the change of administration, I think we've begun to see this European attempt to contribute to the world order come slowly apart. I think it's come apart primarily for one reason that's obvious to all of us and that's the war in Afghanistan where European countries have discovered that working through NATO primarily out of a desire to please the United States brings costs that they no longer want to bear. I think another reason that this European world order is gradually crumbling is that in the United Nations, emerging powers are increasingly unwilling to accept European superiority simply because the E.U. pays 40 percent of the budget. A great example of that is actually in an area we don't cover very much in this volume, that is, debates on human rights at the United Nations where unlike the Bush administration which effectively boycotted U.N. human rights talk, the Europeans have always remained engaged in attempting to push a human rights
agenda in New York and in Geneva. Yet despite the fact that European diplomats hold 1,200 meetings a year on internal coordination in New York and Geneva, year on year the number of countries voting with them on human rights issues, human rights issues like Sudan, like Iran, is gradually sliding. It's slid from about 75-percent support to about 45-percent support.

It's all fading away, and I was sorry that Jean-Marie took the quote from Lampudesa about what we have to change so that nothing changes. That of course is from "The Leopard" a wonderful book about the decline of an aristocratic family in the Old South of Italy. But looking at the world as perceived by Europeans today, I think the decline of another family in the Old South of America with Tara in "Gone with the Wind" and I fear that it's not a matter of what we have to change so that nothing changes, I rather fear that the rest of the world is telling us that frankly they don't give a damn.

MR. INDYK: Sorry. I've just got to put my handkerchief away. Let me start with a discussion up for a few minutes and then we'll take your questions and comments.

Is it "Gone with the Wind" in terms of the European role in multilateral institutions? Is Rich exaggerating here? And wouldn't it behoove the United States to work more closely with the E.U. in terms of the challenging of bringing the emerging powers into a consensus in support of multilateral institutions? Does anybody want to have a go at that?

MR. PATRICK: On the surface, yes, it would seem to make obvious sense. You have two pillars of a longstanding transatlantic alliance that are united by and large in their general political and economic values and have more vested in the current order than just about anyone. One of the difficulties is that in virtually all international institutions that have to be rejiggered in terms of their voting weight and

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shares and chairs, the loser would be the Europeans. This is true whether or not one is
talking about Bretton Woods institutions where the Europeans are arguably
overrepresented at least in terms of economic weight compared to some of the rising
countries, but it also has relevance when one considers the possible expansion of the
Security Council given that the United States would like to keep any such expansion quite
small, there was a natural question particularly with respect to German's candidacy as to
when there is now a common European foreign minister why there should be three
separate permanent seats for major European countries. That's just one example of
some of the problems when it comes to at least retrofitting existing international
institutions.

MR. JONES: I would be a contrarian on this. I'm less nostalgic for the
U.S.-European world order than some. Having watched it in operation in multiple parts of
the world I think it can be describe in more rosy terms than it actually played out on the
ground in a whole host of different cases. I think if you look at the way we and the
Europeans act in fragile states, in peacekeeping and a range of institutions, our policy is
poor and our performance is worse, and it's not obvious to me that the emerging powers
have worse policies than us on a range of these issues. I wouldn't do this as a U.S.-
European stitch-up and let's see what we can bring the emerging powers into. I think the
United States actually has despite declinism, despite concerns about relative balance of
power, has the ability to stand back from this a little bit confident that it will still be a major
player whatever else shapes out and have a much more open discussion with the
emerging powers and the Europeans and itself about what are the sorts of institutions
and what are the rules of the game that are going to drive things as we move forward.
I'm not so convinced that the U.S.-European stitch-up first is the way to do that. I think
we'll alienate the emerging powers more than we'll bring them in, and I think in a whole
host of areas they have constructive roles to play. We're watching some negatives, but we're not paying attention to a whole host of positives, places where the United States, China, India and Brazil cooperate on counter-piracy off the Somali coast, on peacekeeping, on response to crises, Arctic shipping, there are a whole host of places where we are starting to see cooperation and we have to keep these things in balance and see that there are going to be some tensions, but there are also places where we do have shared interests and we can cooperate.

MR. INDYK: Spoken like a true Canadian.

MR. JONES: Indeed.

MR. INDYK: So what does the Frenchman say?

MR. GUEHENNO: The Frenchman says first there are 70 million different views. The European project, you have to see it always in a long perspective and I think time and again the prophets of doom have been proven wrong on Europe so that I would be cautious on saying this is all over.

I very much agree with Bruce. I think for the Europeans, the discussion on Afghanistan is a good illustration of that. The Europeans when they look at Afghanistan they don't look at is Afghanistan an issue for us. When they look at Afghanistan, it's an issue if we disagree with the United States on Afghanistan. That's not a strategic way to look at the world. So what the Europeans need to go toward is to think by themselves what is our interest in Asia, what is our interest in Africa, all the big chunks of the world. That may eventually be coming, a government that's not yet there because there are great differences in Europe for instance on whether Africa is a strategic issue or not. A number of European countries suspect that there are just the old colonial powers who believe Africa is important and they want to drag the other
Europeans into that morass as they see it. That strategic consensus is not there in Europe and that's why there is no strategic position of Europe.

Does that mean that it will not happen? I think it will happen through crises. In the mean time you will continue to have institutions that will muddle through including on the economic front but which gradually take more strength. There is a difficult discussion for instance between the United States and Europe on financial regulation. I think that's healthy. I'm not saying that the Europeans are right or wrong, but it means that this is a substantive discussion and the more you have those discussions I think the healthier the relationship will be. I'm sounding very French there. But I think at the end of the day one has to realize that on most issues there is much more common ground between the Europeans and the U.S. than between any other part of the world so that we shouldn't be afraid of differences or views, but it's not the U.S. which is going to make the Europeans think by themselves.

MR. INDYK: I'm interested in Bruce's point about middle powers because you argued that they've played a very important role in the past in developing effective multilateral institutions. But where do they fit in this new order of things where the focus seems to be as you've all suggested in bringing the emerging powers into the game?

MR. JONES: Spoken like a true Australian. I'm going to pick up on a point that Jean-Marie made that we're worse off now than we were 5 years ago, and I think that's right in the multilateral sphere. There are two reasons. One is I would say the intellectual leadership in some key multilateral institutions is not what it once was. Enough said on that. Second and perhaps more important is I think the middle powers are lost. I don't think they understand how to maneuver and operate in a world increasingly looking like it's going to shaped by relations between the major and the rising...
powers. I don't think they know how to navigate in that space. Australia by virtue of being in the G-20 and Canada by virtue of being in the G-20 may have some room. The Brits are I think deeply conflicted about the emergence of the emerged powers or the rise of the emerged powers. The Canadians are lost. I think all of the middle powers are struggling to understand how is it they can play their roles.

Bear in mind of course it's also the case that despite what Stewart said, and it's right, that the Bush administration actually put a huge amount of energy into the U.N., they just never told anybody in Congress or the American public, but they actually did put a lot of energy into the U.N. in the second term. But the kind of general atmosphere around multilateralism was extremely negative in the Bush administration and that discouraged the middle powers.

So we've been on a declining slope in terms of the performance of the international institutions, you're on a rising trend in terms of complexity because you have the emerging powers and filling that gap is going to be very, very hard, so I think the middle powers are kind of sitting back and not knowing quite how to play their roles. I've been trying to convince the Norwegians, the Canadians and others that part of what they can do is help the major and the rising powers figure things out together because the major and the rising powers so far don't talk effectively about major issues, they don't have fora that deal with these issues, they don't have the relationships, and sometimes middle powers can pave the way, can make proposals, can generate bilateral discussions and doesn't have to be through the formal institutions. I think we're seeing in small ways some of that being undertaken and I think that role for middle powers is quite important. It's a little less sexy though than driving a major international initiative and whether they have the interest to do it will have to be seen.
MR. GUEHENNO: I think a year ago the fashion was the G-2 and I think now there is a greater awareness that actually when you put two major countries together you polarize things. I'm saying the obviously. So that introducing complexity is a better way to create flexibility in the system and that's middle powers, that's where networks that do not yet exist very strongly are important because they help create a situation where it's not two camps, where it's you can agree with that particular country on that particular issue and with that country on another issue. Then the world begins to be certainly more complex with no easy answer but more manageable.

MR. INDYK: Rich, do you want to come in on this?

MR. GOWAN: Just briefly. For a long time, middle powers was a euphemism for the further-flung bits of the British Commonwealth like Australia and Canada. What interests me now is the rise of a new generation of middle powers, countries that have reached full democracy within recent decades such as Indonesia, South Korea or Mexico. We see all those countries working very hard to contribute to the multilateral system and keep it going. South Korea gave us Ban Ki-moon. It will do better next time. There's a range of countries like that, Chile is another, that really are making a huge contribution to the system and I put more hope in those perhaps than some of the more traditional middle powers.

MR. INDYK: We should add Turkey to that mix as well. My last point and then we'll go to the audience with questions is about the rising powers because we refer to them as a group when they're very different. I wonder if we can parse this and look at them. Let's take China, India and Brazil as the three leading emerging powers. Can you break it down for us a little bit in terms of their different approaches?

MR. PATRICK: Obviously the BRIC summit is coming up in the next week or so or in the next couple of weeks, and whether it's the BRICs or the BICs, it's a
handy catch phrase, but really when you look at it more closely you begin to wonder whether or not there is much commonality amongst these countries. They have gotten together and talked about, particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis, new rules for the global economy and there has been talk about again trying to ensure that there is a greater -- in the world but also with respect to the global economy that there's a rejiggering of weighted voting for instance in global financial institutions and also some shots across the bow from all of those countries about the role of the dollar and perhaps we should have a global reserve currency pushing us from an overly U.S.- and Western-oriented global economy.

In terms of the approaches of all three of those countries, I think one thing that they have in common is that they're all struggling to figure out what their global role is and all of them are whipsawed by the fact that on the one hand they've entered the inner sanctum of global geopolitics. They're in the G-20. There are Security Council aspirants or already Security Council members. But on the other hand they are extremely ambivalent about this status because they would like to have the benefits of the status but they're also very conscious of the fact that they are developing countries with huge pockets of their population that are mired in poverty. So I think that you find a certain ambivalence about these countries in the sense that we want to take over responsibilities but we're not ready for all of them yet.

More broadly, I think the notion that these countries would form together in some sort of an enduring bloc is quite unrealistic for a number of different reasons. Take climate for instance where you saw in Copenhagen some definite fissures between the Brazilians and the Chinese on policies on the way head, there is strategic competition between China and India with respect to the Indian Ocean and territorial disputes, and you throw Russia in the mix you get two authoritarian countries and in a sense two very
vibrant democracies so that it's hard to imagine them forming a coherent, cohesive bloc going forward.

MR. JONES: Briefly I would say if we characterize Brail as a regional power with global aspirations, India as a regional power with multilateral influence and China as a regional multilateral and a global power and not yet a global power, I think the key issue and this is reinforcing what Stewart just said, that when push comes to shove, not in the rhetoric and not in the summit statements, but when push comes to shove, they each distrust each other more than they distrust the U.S. When you talk to the Indians about Chinese proposals about shifting to a reserve currency they just laugh. It's complete nonsense as far as they're concerned, this is the stuff you see in summits, and have no intention of cooperating with China on moving off of the U.S. dollar reserve. On a whole host of issues, China-India tensions are far higher than China-U.S. or India-U.S. tensions. Brazil is in a slightly different place in that. So that I very much agree with what Stewart said, I think all of those powers ultimately retain an interest in a stable global order, they retain a de facto interest in the U.S. leading that, but they're increasingly willing to challenge the content of that global order and I think the big question of the coming years is if each of them attempt to challenge to a certain limit, will they miscalculate, will we miscalculate and will we collectively put excess strain on the global order or simply fail to solve some really major challenges together and in that way fundamentally degrade the global order.

MR. INDIK: Let's go to your questions. Please wait for the microphone, identify yourself and make sure there's a question mark at the end of your sentence.

SPEAKER: I'm -- and I'm from CSIS. I don't know to whom to address the question so the question is to the panel. Considering the failures of U.N.-led peacekeeping in Africa as one of the speakers mentioned, do you think that in the new
era that peacekeeping operations should be endorsed by Chapter 7 resolutions and not to be based on the consent of the target state? In other words, do you think that U.N.-led peacekeeping should be replaced by unilateral or multilateral humanitarian interventions by ad hoc coalitions to address the challenges of the failing states if the U.N. Security Council fails to have any consensus on the action? Thank you.

MR. GUEHENNO: I think the solution that you propose would make things worse because peacekeeping operations fail when there is no solid political process. Of course, effective military forces if intelligently used can help support the political process and so sometimes military weakness is an obstacle to the success of the political process. But the notion that you just pile up troops to force a solution I think has been tried in other places and creates a whole set of other problems. The conclusion I think on failures of peacekeeping is that before you throw a peacekeeping mission at a problem you have to look at the political equation on the ground whether it's acceptable to support by foreign deployment or whether that foreign deployment will not suffice and whether you have the adequate resources and a certain convergence in political strategy. If you don't have that, Chapter 7 is not the issue. Unless you can apply overwhelming force, if you send a half-a-million troops into a country, maybe, but I don't know where the troops would come from.

MS. WERRELL: I'm Caitlin Werrell with Avoided Deforestation Partners. We often hear that climate change is going to act as a threat multiplier and some environmental models show that there will be unprecedented environmental change for all civilizations -- formation of the nation-state. I'm wondering if you see the role of climate change in institutional reform.

MR. INDYK: As a catalyst.
MR. JONES: I think that if you cast back to the 1940s and the creation of the U.N. and the Bretton Woods system, they had two basic pillars. There was an economic pillar and a security pillar and U.S. power was supposed to be the glue that kept those two things working. It didn't quite work out that way, but that was the basic model. I suspect we'll look back on the next 10 years and discover that we reengineered the multilateral system such that you still had a security pillar, you still have an economic pillar and you have an energy and climate pillar and it's the G-20 which is supposed to keep the glue working together and that won't quite work out, but there will be I think a huge amount of investment in energy and climate arrangements. How much of that are market arrangements, how much of those are rules-of-the-road arrangements, how much of that is formal institutions I think will remain to be seen.

One of the things that the MGI project does is provides some quiet backstopping to the S.G.'s shortly-to-be-announced Panel on Climate and Development Institutions. This will be a central test of the multilateral system, can we figure out a set of arrangements that help countries make what is going to be a dramatic and incredibly difficult transformation over our lifetimes toward low-carbon economies, and can they also balance the interests of the major economies with the less-developed economies and that will I think transform the global institutional landscape but it will take a long time for it to happen. I don't think that we will see a Big Bang. There is not going to be Dumbarton Oaks II for climate institutions and that we'll see a gradual agglomeration of climate and energy institutions having a huge impact on these issues over the next 10 years.

MR. PATRICK: Just briefly, I think that we're not likely to see as Bruce pointed out something as uniform like one Bretton Woods solution immediately for this with one institutional creation that's going to handle everything. I think what you have
now is what my colleague at the Council on Foreign Relations called a regime complex for climate change. You have obviously some core pillar institutions like the UNFCC and you now have something less formal, not just the G-20, but the Major Economies Forum, and those hopefully will go together in parallel and complementary tracks going forward. In addition, you’re going to have a lot of private-sector involvement and different minilateral cooperative efforts among different countries on climate technology for instance. There’s a temptation to just go with the Major Economies Forum after what looked like a big shambolic event in Copenhagen, but while that for mitigation on the adaptation front, it’s quite clear that you need to have everybody on board.

MR. INDYK: Let’s focus on what happened in Copenhagen for a moment as an example here. What does it tell us about, particularly that last session in which the communiqué was hammered out without the E.U. unfortunately or the U.N. for that matter, the way that multilateral institutions have been shaped to deal with climate change?

MR. JONES: I think it tell us very little about that. I think it tells us important things about two other things. I think it told us that the United States has not yet figured out how to do multilateral diplomacy at a high level. The United States is extremely good at geostrategy and bilateral diplomacy with major powers but it underperforms on multilateral diplomacy consistently, and Copenhagen was a dramatic example of underestimating how significant the multilateral component of what was going to go on was. That was one. Two, I think it tells us that there are deep underlying structures of shared interest on this issue. Copenhagen was as shambolic as is possible to imagine. The idea that the American president had to kind of bust down the door past a security guard to get into a meeting of the emerging powers that weren’t prepared and write the statement, it was utterly shambolic, and yet every major economy has submitted
their mitigation proposals or most of the major actors and all the major economies have submitted their proposals for verification. All the actors are going to move toward a climate deal despite the shambolic nature of the negotiation process because there is this deeply shared interest in finding some way to tackle the problem. I think these are the kinds of things where we have to see. There are some shared interests. The multilateral arrangements aren't effective, the minilateral arrangements aren't yet organized and that's the space we're going to have to negotiate hopefully substantially more effectively the next time around.

MR. INDYK: But the bottom line is there's a consensus on taking action on these kinds of things.

MR. JONES: Yes. Not on what comes first and not on at what level, but nobody can avoid the responsibility of taking action on this and so it drives some process despite the shambolic nature of the diplomacy.

MS. MOIX: Bridget Moix with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Thanks very much for all the comments and discussion.

The last comment sparked a question in my mind which is what can the U.S. do better? Secretary of State Clinton is undertaking this quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, looking at all the U.S. capacities including the capacity for things like multilateral diplomacy, there have been bills in Congress that propose improving capacities in the Foreign Service in relation to multilateral diplomacy, but from your various perspectives which are quite different, what could do the U.S. do at a high strategic level or at a very particular practical level to improve its capacity to support good, healthy and performing international institutions?

MR. PATRICK: There are a couple of ideas that I would throw out. One of them is to provide professional incentives to have that be a skill set within the U.S.
Foreign Service. It's not a cone to use the terminology within the U.S. Foreign Service, but there are different ways that one could make incentives as a condition for professional advancement for instance. I think that the IO Bureau led by a very able woman right now has not necessarily traditionally been seen as a major way station for career advancement within the Foreign Service and I think that has to change and I think that she is quite determined to make a change.

Also one of the difficulties and this is probably interagency organizationally but it has diplomatic ramifications, that the State Department has the putative lead for global engagement in most cases, but the reality is that HHS, DOE or USDA or what have you depending on what the precise issue area is where there's a multilateral negotiation actually has much of the technical expertise and sometimes these are not lashed up as well as they might be so that trying to improve the coherence of our multilateral diplomacy not just within the State Department and USAID but across different agencies and trying to plan out scenarios as well that allow us to improve our multilateral diplomacy is something that the Europeans presumably get as a matter of course since they deal with their colleagues in the E.U. all the time.

MR. INDYK: Jean-Marie, you've watched the United States operate up close and personal. Is it the way that Bruce describes where we're really not well-equipped to deal with this challenge?

MR. GUEHENNO: I think that the United States has an enormous advantage and an enormous handicap and it is the advantage that in a way the whole world comes to the United States, so it is the world and the United States in some ways. That's a huge advantage because it means that with any country there are in a way personal links, but it's a handicap because you think you are the world at the same time.

There are simple things. The more Americans see other countries I think is very
important. I think the Europeans with all their failings, the fact that most Europeans have crossed borders, have a sense that they are people even if Europe looks alike from a distance, it's very different to be in Italy or in France and I think that's important in a way culturally.

I think for Americans to promote foreign languages, these are simple things, to have a deep sense of the diversity of the world and not think that you are the diversity, you are, but it's not quite enough, that there is something that resists the enormous power of attraction of the United States and that you have to reach out for that.

MR. INDYK: Last question?

MR. O'SHEA: Kevin O'Shea from the Canadian Embassy, one of those lost colonial middle powers. A question on Iran. First of all, are you confident that we will have a Security Council resolution on Iran? Secondly, if we do not, what does that say about the strength of our international global administration institutions? Part three, will that be a game changer or an eye opener for the Obama administration's approach to multilateralism and perhaps multilateralism a la carte?

MR. INDYK: I might add to the question, the point that is I think the Bush administration succeeded in getting four U.N. Security Resolutions. Stewart, were they all unanimous in support of sanctions on Iran? What's the answer?

MR. PATRICK: I'm optimistic about the prospects that there will eventually be a resolution. I think that the Russians can be won over and that the Chinese will at the end of the day certainly not veto a resolution and probably not even abstain on a resolution on Iran. That's my suspicion. I think that if there is not a successful Council resolution that that would be an eye opener for the Obama administration. I do want to point out that structurally, obviously one of the prices for the creation of the Security Council, indeed the United Nations, was endowing every
permanent member with a veto and there are some situations in which you're obviously not going to get unanimity among the P-5 and that would as you're suggesting provide a decision point for the Obama administration as to whether or not it would decide to move forward with an ad hoc coalition that faced President Clinton in Kosovo and confronted George W. Bush over Iraq. I don't see any tremendous appetite to move in that direction in this town yet, but as the eminence of an Iran nuclear weapon grows then this calculation may change.

MR. JONES: I largely agree with that. I think that China is bargaining here and they're bargaining for currency pressure relief, they're bargaining for a number of things, and I don't think they're actually bargaining toward an actual veto. But were it not to succeed, it will create a political crisis for the administration on its policy on multilateralism. There was always this phrase in the Clinton administration that we will be multilateralist when we can and unilateralist when we must. The Bush administration was unilateralist when we can, multilateralist when we must. The Obama administration is multilateralist because we must because just ain't the option. Failure in the Security Council will kick them out of that and they'll look for some minilateral coalition but it won't succeed. The United States, Europe, the entire Western powers, don't have enough leverage on Iran. That's just the reality of the world these days. We don't have enough of the trade relationships, we don't have enough of the political relationships, we need India, we need China and we need Russia if it's going to succeed. A military option is a different question. But in terms of sanctions, the course of diplomacy or anything in that train, it won't succeed at a U.S.-European-Western coalition level. So I think we may end up there as kind of if we can't get the Council we'll shift to that kind of arrangement, but won't succeed and I think in the end it will force the realization again that you can't actually get this done without the emerging powers playing responsible roles on these
issues and we're going to have to have patience about how that works and invest in those relationships and those processes.

MR. GUEHENNO: The test is not a successful resolution; the test is a successful policy that delivers the strategic goals. I'm not at all a specialist of Iran so I don't know what the right policy is, but I would suspect that does Russia really want a nuclear Iran? Probably not. Does China think it's a good idea? Probably not. So maybe they have differences on how you get there, maybe they are wrong in their positions, maybe there are not. I don't know and I don't enter the debate. But I think if one is a genuine multilateralist speaking of change of mindset, one shouldn't focus on the procedure but on the result and take seriously arguments of countries that may have a different view on the issue, not necessarily accept them, but consider them.

MR. GOWAN: It seems to me very briefly that you can have three world orders or three ways of dealing with the world coming out of the Iran crisis. One is one where the Security Council remains central as in the mechanism for debate between established and emerging powers. One as Bruce says is something where you have what is already emerging which is the G-7 countries plus members of the Gulf Cooperation Council embargoing Iran and you sort of have a new version of the West in its allies emerge but not through a structure like NATO but through G-7 plus. And the third is a G-20 type structure where China, India, the U.S. and the European powers are prepared to talk about Iran but without the constraints of the Security Council in New York and that is sort of a genuine form of multilateralism but one in which the U.N. is seen as being too constricted, to problematic to work through. There's a fourth which is total collapse and Armageddon, but assuming we avoid number four, the world comes out of the Iran crisis in one of those three directions.

MR. INDYK: And the E.U. has a bigger role.
MR. GOWAN: Of course.

MR. INDYK: I'm afraid we're going to have to leave it there, but I want to thank the panelists very much for a fascinating discussion, and thank you the audience for participating too in this book launch. The book "Cooperating for Peace and Security" is outside if you want get a copy and these gentlemen might even sign one for you. So thank you very much.

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