The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) — among Africa's largest countries and one of the most resource-rich members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) — has been beset by civil war since 1996. To date, an estimated three million people have been killed and seven neighbouring states have been embroiled in the violence. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) convened a meeting to assess the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the Congo. The seminar discussed strategic mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of the Congolese government, SADC, civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in consolidating peace and security in the DRC. Specific topics that were analysed included: the demobilisation of combatants and security sector reform; gender and peacebuilding; justice and human rights; and election and governance issues.
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
VINEYARD HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
19-20 APRIL 2010

RAPPORTEURS
GWINYAYI DZINESA AND JOYCE LAKER
Table of Contents

Acknowledgments, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), and the Rapporteurs 5

Executive Summary 6

1. Introduction 11

2. The Role of the United Nations (UN) in the DRC 16

3. Prospects for Engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the DRC 18

4. The Roles of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and South Africa in the DRC 20

5. Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR); and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the DRC 24

6. Civil Society, Gender, and Peacebuilding in the DRC 28

7. Justice, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding in the DRC 30

8. Election and Governance Issues in the DRC 32

9. Postscript: Recent Developments in the DRC 34


Annexes

I. Agenda 38

II. List of Participants 42

III. List of Acronyms 45
Acknowledgments

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) for their generous support that made possible the holding of the policy advisory group seminar “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)” in Cape Town, from 19 to 20 April 2010. CCR would also like to thank the other funders of its Africa programme: the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research has focused on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Rapporteurs

Gwinyayi Dzinesa is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution. Cape Town; and Joyce Laker was a Senior Manager at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, and is now an independent consultant based in Uganda.
Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa hosted a policy advisory group seminar in Cape Town on 19 and 20 April 2010 on the theme “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)”.

The meeting, which was held in response to a request from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) secretariat in Botswana, assessed the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC. The seminar discussed strategic mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of the Congolese government, SADC, civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in consolidating peace and security in the DRC. It focused on seven key topics: 1) the role of the UN Mission in the DRC; 2) the prospects for engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission; 3) the roles of SADC and South Africa; 4) disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR); 5) civil society, gender, and peacebuilding; 6) justice, human rights, and peacebuilding; and 7) election and governance issues.

1. The Role of the UN’s Missions in the DRC

The 20,000-strong UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was set up in 1999, has been credited with a range of achievements that include: restoring peace to more than two-thirds of the country, following a conflict that erupted in 1996, involved seven regional armies, and cost over three million lives; helping to conduct the first election in 40 years in 2006/2007; and overseeing the return of more than one million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2009. However, MONUC’s operation as a fully integrated mission with a comprehensive mandate was not supported by commensurate human, financial, and logistical resources. Concerns about the mission’s ineffectiveness in establishing security in the eastern Congo were compounded by allegations of its involvement in plundering resources, running guns in exchange for minerals or ivory, and sexual exploitation and abuse. MONUC has also been accused of creating opportunities for powerful Western nations to advance their parochial interests in the DRC. Widespread frustration at the mission’s continued presence led President Joseph Kabila to request that MONUC’s withdrawal from the DRC start by June 2010. The UN Security Council visited the Congo in May 2010 and agreed that MONUC be converted into the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), mandated to remain in the country until December 2013.

2. Prospects for Engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the DRC

The DRC is governed by weak, parallel, militarised structures that lack any clearly defined vision of peacebuilding and how the process can be locally owned. Some fear that peacebuilding in the Congo is being used as a ‘Trojan horse’ to advance rapid neo-liberal political and economic transformation of the country in line with the interests of the World Bank. Such manipulation of the peacebuilding process can undermine the potential for achieving a just and sustainable peace in the DRC. Although the country is not officially listed on the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, the Commission has allocated $20 million from its Peacebuilding Fund to support the DRC’s stabilisation and recovery efforts. The Commission’s engagement with the DRC remains constrained by its advisory mandate, the limited funds available to it, and issues of state sovereignty that limit its capacity to intervene decisively to advance sustainable peace. Structurally, the Commission is
hampered when attempting to coordinate peacebuilding efforts, particularly by its need to try to align the often irreconcilable interests of UN agencies and member states.

3. The Roles of SADC and South Africa in the DRC

SADC's role in the DRC is constrained by its relatively limited peacekeeping experience and its lack of financial resources for peacebuilding. In addition, its power to act is largely dictated by the reactive, rather than preventive, nature of the conflict resolution mechanisms that the sub-regional body has developed. However, SADC has attempted to make a meaningful contribution to combating violence in the DRC. The organisation has recognised the need to establish institutional structures to engage in a robust approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction in the DRC. In particular, it has established a joint office with the African Union (AU) in Kinshasa. SADC's wealthiest member, South Africa, has provided significant logistical and financial support for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in the DRC, culminating in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of December 2002. South Africa also contributed 1,268 personnel to MONUC, and provided financial, human, and logistical support for the DRC's 2006 presidential and 2007 provincial elections. South Africa continues to play an integral role in Congolese post-conflict reconstruction efforts through the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC), which was first convened in Kinshasa in August 2004; and South African companies remain involved in the Congo's economy, even as China's own economic role in the DRC continues to grow, with the announcement of an $8 billion infrastructure agreement in 2007.

4. Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform in the DRC

Security, peacebuilding, and development in the DRC depend on the successful disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of armed fighters, which, in the case of foreign soldiers, may also include resettlement and repatriation. DDR plans were drawn up in 2002 for 150,000 soldiers. By the following year, the number of fighters in the DRC had risen to more than 300,000. However, Congolese bodies such as the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER) and the Structure for Military Integration have so far failed to plan and implement a comprehensive national strategy to facilitate and coordinate DDR and security sector reform. Reform of the security sector has also been undermined by the existence of parallel armed groups, and disagreements over rank and status within the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). Significant challenges to the reform process have included: uncertainty over the numbers of former combatants who are eligible for the various programmes; inadequate assembly and training camps for demobilised forces; poor logistics; inadequate vetting and training of ex-soldiers; and fundamental payroll problems, including large salary arrears and the presence of thousands of "ghost workers".

5. Civil Society, Gender, and Peacebuilding

Gender equality in the DRC is often perceived as being solely a "women's issue" and a matter of political correctness rather than a fundamental right that is necessary to the development and implementation of effective peacebuilding strategies. It is generally believed that responsibility for incorporating gender issues into peacebuilding programmes rests entirely with women. Collective efforts at achieving gender equality in peacebuilding processes are further undermined by the widely held perception that the gender aspects of projects can best be delivered by women and civil society. However, some progress has been made to engender peacebuilding and social justice concerns in the DRC. While civil society's peacebuilding efforts may have been
relatively weak so far, activists from the sector have nevertheless contributed significantly to governance, security sector reform, DDR, peacebuilding, and statebuilding. Civil society in the DRC has also played a critical role in mobilising social capital to hold the government accountable and make it more responsive to public needs. Furthermore, civil society groups have delivered services to prevent and resolve conflicts, and have promoted democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

6. Justice, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding in the DRC

Respect for fundamental human rights and justice is essential to sustaining peace and stability and enabling post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC. Since independence in 1960, various armed groups and the Congolese army have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Violence has come to be seen by some as a way of forging identity, as well as a strategic tool, and a means to securing power and control. Meanwhile, the desire for peace in the DRC can compromise the need for justice and fundamental human rights, as was demonstrated by the blanket amnesties granted by the Lusaka and Ituri peace agreements of 1999 and 2003 respectively. The DRC lacks the effective institutions to ensure that international standards of law and justice are respected. Funding constraints prevented the Congolese government from establishing a Special International Court, as recommended by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which was held between 2001 and 2003. Meanwhile, the politically-driven alternative criminal justice system offered to soldiers and civilians by the Military Courts from 2002 provides inconsistent and anachronistic remedies that fail to meet international and constitutional standards of human rights. Access to justice may have been further compromised by president Joseph Kabila's decision in February 2010 to fold the Ministry of Human Rights into the Ministry of Justice. Meanwhile, the role that the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) can play in the DRC is limited by its jurisdiction - which permits it only to investigate and try international crimes committed since 2002 – as well as by the Congolese government’s desire to protect its own fighters and pursue justice selectively.

7. Election and Governance Issues in the DRC

Promoting effective post-conflict reconstruction and overcoming the legacy of colonialism in the DRC will require just and democratic governance. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue failed to reconcile Congolese leaders and factions, to transform electoral processes, to institute “good governance”, and to restore peace and stability in the DRC. The Congo’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) lacks the capacity and funds to facilitate democratic, transparent, and competitive national elections. During the DRC’s 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, the UN provided most of the IEC’s logistical and infrastructural framework, while the European Union (EU) paid for much of the $422 million cost of the polls. Without such support and amid mounting concern over the availability of foreign financing for future polls, Congo’s IEC faces enormous challenges in effectively managing national elections. Nevertheless, the Congolese people expect that the 2011-2013 electoral cycle will be more transparent and competitive and less subject to political wrangling than previous polls. Failure by the Congolese government to hold credible elections could risk plunging the country into political uncertainty and further instability. Despite the prospect of violence at the polls, no Congolese institutions – including the IEC, the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and its National Human Rights Institution – are equipped or mandated to deal effectively with election-related violence. Meanwhile, SADC remains constrained by its advisory mandate and cannot enforce the implementation of regional guidelines for democratic electoral processes in the DRC.
Policy Recommendations

The following ten policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy seminar:

- First, the DRC government must define a national vision for peacebuilding that is articulated and owned by its 68 million people, and reflects an understanding of the root causes of the country’s conflict. The Congolese government should prioritise peacebuilding activities as part of a societal transformation that alters relationships positively between the state and its citizens, and facilitates more equitable power-sharing. The government must also establish a regular budget with adequate controls to reinforce state authority, properly manage resources, and combat widespread corruption;

- Second, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, in collaboration with the AU and SADC, should help the Congolese government build effective institutions to manage its immense natural resources. The Commission’s annual $250-million Peacebuilding Fund is inadequate to the task, and richer regional and external actors should provide more resources. The Commission should also seek to strengthen partnerships between the UN, the EU, and other external actors in order to prevent the destabilising regional and international exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources;

- Third, the UN Security Council should maintain a peacekeeping presence in the DRC that possesses a credible deterrent capability, and the capacity to oversee a secure transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in the DRC, especially in the provinces of Orientale, and North and South Kivu;

- Fourth, SADC, the AU, the UN, and the EU must establish an effective division of labour to support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC. The AU and SADC must provide political, technical, and financial assistance for peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in the DRC. They should also develop and coordinate a joint strategy that allows the Congolese to identify their priority peacebuilding issues and take ownership of the process;

- Fifth, the evolving strategic partnership between South Africa and Angola should be deployed to strengthen SADC’s peacebuilding role in the DRC. While South Africa’s bilateral engagement with the DRC should continue to be strengthened for the benefit of the region, this role should not be allowed to undermine the relevance and legitimacy of SADC’s multilateral engagement with the country;

- Sixth, the Congolese government must demonstrate the political will and commitment to plan and implement comprehensive strategies for DDR and security sector reform. These strategies should take into account local contexts and needs and include tailor-made DDR programmes to meet the special needs of groups such as women, children, and the disabled. Lessons can usefully be learned from DDR and SSR efforts in fellow SADC countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
• Seventh, peacebuilding in the DRC must address gender disparities, mainstream gender, and strategically focus on gender-oriented activities. In engendering peacebuilding, the DRC government needs to strengthen and implement coherent, coordinated, and consistent approaches that address the root causes of conflict, build a culture of peace, and realign regional and international support for peacebuilding efforts. Support from the African Union’s Gender Desk and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) should be provided to the DRC’s ministry of women’s affairs in order to combat impunity for perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence;

• Eighth, the establishment of a vibrant civil society and effective political opposition must be supported to rebuild the DRC. Congolese civil society actors should work with local communities and institutions to create and secure the policy space necessary to promote a more accountable and responsible state, as well as the rule of law. The Congolese government must strengthen partnerships with civil society actors in order to develop and implement a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction plan;

• Ninth, the DRC government must formulate a comprehensive strategy for rebuilding its national criminal justice system. Kinshasa should open strategic discussions with the International Criminal Court and the international community on managing crimes that fall outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. In this respect, the government must define and strengthen its post-conflict local alternative justice systems, which will require the drafting and implementation of more effective national laws to enhance the Congolese judicial system. Regional and international donors should also provide support to build the operational capacity of the DRC’s judicial and legal institutions. Meanwhile, transitional justice mechanisms in the Congo must address the challenges of judicial and institutional reform. These mechanisms should reinforce the voices of the poor and the marginalised, and address structural, socio-economic, and political inequalities; and

• Finally, the DRC must build an effective and professional electoral commission that can promote democratic, inclusive, and competent electoral systems. SADC, the AU, the UN, the EU, and other donors should support the Congolese government’s commitment to elections by helping to prepare the country’s political parties to accept the outcomes of polls, and by ensuring that timeous elections are held between 2011 and 2013. In addition, the DRC can learn useful lessons from electoral process “best practices” and successful examples of democracy within political parties in other SADC countries.
1. Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group seminar in Cape Town on 19 and 20 April 2010 on the theme “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).”

The meeting, which was held in response to a request from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, assessed the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC. The seminar discussed strategic mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of the Congolese government, SADC, civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in consolidating peace and security in the Central African country. The meeting focused on seven key topics: 1) the role of the UN Mission in the DRC; 2) the prospects for engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission; 3) the roles of SADC and South Africa; 4) disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR); 5) civil society, gender, and peacebuilding; 6) justice, human rights, and peacebuilding; and 7) election and governance issues. The Cape Town meeting also developed ten concrete recommendations to help the Congolese government, SADC, civil society, the UN, and the international community to address the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of SADC's 15 member states, with a population of 68 million, has been beset by civil war since 1996. To date, an estimated three million people have been killed and seven regional states (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Chad) embroiled in the violence. Tackling instability in parts of the DRC, and the impact that this could have on region-building efforts have been placed high on SADC’s agenda. The body has realised that peace and security is the sine qua non for economic integration and development in the sub-region. As part of its efforts in this area, SADC adopted a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in 2003 to promote socio-economic development in Southern Africa. It adopted a Strategic Indicative Plan for its Organ (SIPO) on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) a year later. The August 2001 SADC summit heads of state and government adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) of 1996 into SADC structures as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The DRC is one of SADC’s most resource-rich members and one of Africa’s largest countries, with nine neighbouring states (Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic [CAR], Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). Bringing peace and security to the Congo would not only contribute to sub-regional economic development, it would also create significant social, political, and other benefits for Southern and Central Africa.

1 The concept paper upon which this report is partly based was prepared by Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) researchers, Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Dawn Nagar, and Elizabeth Otitodun.
3 SADC’s 15 members are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar (which has been suspended from the bloc since March 2009), Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
4 The August 2001 SADC summit heads of state and government adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation which integrated the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) of 1996 into SADC structures as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC).
Significant international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have recently been undertaken in the DRC. South Africa led mediation efforts that resulted in the first democratic election in 40 years in 2006/2007, which was funded largely by the European Union (EU). In addition, the UN has deployed 20,000 peacekeepers to the DRC. However, the country still faces many peacebuilding challenges. The April 2010 policy advisory group seminar in Cape Town discussed how peace and security in the Congo can be more effectively consolidated by SADC, the Congolese government, civil society groups, the UN, external donors, and other international actors. The meeting represented an attempt to ensure that the 2011-2013 electoral cycle in the DRC promotes effective peacebuilding efforts. Experience on the ground in the country has shown that the establishment of appropriate and competent institutions to manage elections effectively and to promote socio-economic development can support the capacity of polls to contribute to sustainable peace.\footnote{See Centre for Conflict Resolution, *The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Southern Africa*; and Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert M. Khadiagala, and Victor Shale (eds.), *When Elephants Fight: Preventing and Resolving Election Related Conflicts in Africa* (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, 2000), p.2.}

Although SADC lacks extensive peacekeeping experience, the organisation has attempted to make a meaningful contribution to combating violence in the DRC. However, military interventions launched by SADC states into the Congo have sometimes caused controversy\footnote{See Gabriel H. Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects* (Midrand: South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006); and Agostinho Zacarias, “Redefining Security”, in Mwesiga Baregu and Chris Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Security Challenges* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp.33-51.} – a decision by SADC members Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia to send troops there in support of President Laurent Kabila’s regime in 1998 was opposed by other SADC members: South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland. Aside from military involvement, SADC states such as South Africa, Angola, and Zambia have also led peacemaking efforts, which resulted in the signing of the DRC’s Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement in December 2002. Under the administration of president Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), South Africa, as well as external actors such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium, and the EU, provided significant logistical and financial support for the
Congo’s peacebuilding process. The EU also provided peacekeepers, sending a 1,400-strong force (EUFOR) to the DRC during the 2006 elections, having deployed a 1,850-strong force – ‘Operation Artemis’ – to Ituri three years earlier. But despite the peace process, conflicts still persist in parts of the Congo, especially the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Orientale.

The Cape Town policy advisory group seminar was convened on the premise that the creation of sustainable peace and development in the DRC depends on assessing and proposing solutions to significant peacebuilding challenges such as insecurity, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of combatants; security sector reform; justice reform; fragile state institutions; human rights violations; persistent poverty; gender inequality; and the restricted role of civil society groups and other non-state actors. Representatives of SADC and its partners also sought to use the April 2010 meeting to explore the most effective ways of involving Congolese citizens in the country’s peacebuilding processes.

About 40 mostly African policymakers, scholars, and civil society activists participated in the Cape Town policy advisory group seminar. The group included Tanki Mothae, Director of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC); Takwa Zebulon Suifon, African Union (AU) Commission Expert on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding; Ross Mountain, former Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DRC; Mujahid Alam, Head of the Liaison Office of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in South Africa; and Patrick Garba, Officer at MONUC’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) unit.

Objectives

The April 2010 policy advisory group seminar’s seven key objectives were:

- First, to examine the role of the United Nations’ Missions in the DRC;
- Second, to analyse the prospects for engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the DRC;
- Third, to evaluate the key roles played by SADC and South Africa in the DRC;
- Fourth, to assess the challenges of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, as well as security sector reform in the DRC;
- Fifth, to analyse the gender dimensions of peacebuilding in the DRC, as well as the role of Congolese civil society actors;
- Sixth, to discuss the challenges of managing the implementation of human rights and the promotion of justice in the DRC, and
- Finally, to examine election management and governance issues in the DRC.
The seminar discussions aimed to assist the Congolese government and civil society, SADC, the UN, external donors, and other policymakers to obtain a better understanding of the peacebuilding challenges that the DRC confronts, and the importance of consolidating peace in the country for national development efforts. Ten key policy recommendations were drawn from the discussions for incorporation into the work of relevant stakeholders, particularly enhancing SADC’s role in promoting peace, security, and development in the DRC.

Background

The Congo’s independence from Belgium in June 1960 ushered in a period of political turmoil. A coup d’état in 1965 by Mobutu Sese Seko, supported by Belgium and the United States (US), ushered in three decades of oppression, kleptocracy, and collapse of state institutions. The era of misrule led to two Congo Wars, the first of which started in 1996, with a second being sparked in 1998.

During the First Congo War, Laurent Kabila’s rebel movement, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which was backed by Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Burundi, launched an attack against Mobutu’s despotic regime in 1997. The war ended in May 1997 with the AFDL toppling Mobutu and renaming the country, which had been called Zaire by Mobutu, the “Democratic Republic of the Congo”. However, against a backdrop of social fragmentation and swelling internal opposition to the strong influence of Rwandan military advisers in Kinshasa, Kabila adopted repressive measures and expelled the Rwandan officers. Consequently, the governments of Rwanda and Uganda supported a new rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which in August 1998, failed in its sudden military bid to overrun Kabila’s government, signalling the start of the Second Congo War. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad backed Kabila militarily to repel the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebellion for their own political, security, and economic reasons. The RCD soon split into three factions (the RCD-Original, the RCD-National, and the RCD-Populaire), which were controlled by either Uganda or Rwanda. Meanwhile, Uganda also backed Jean-Pierre Bemba’s rebel Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). The war raged on, amid a proliferation of armed groups, claiming an estimated three million lives by 2010.

In July 1999, the heads of state of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe signed a peace deal in Lusaka, Zambia, in an attempt to end the Second Congo War. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which represented an opportunity to stabilise the Congo, provided for: a ceasefire; redeployment of troops; the release of prisoners of war; withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC; a national dialogue; the disarming of all militias and armed groups; re-establishment of state authority throughout the Congo; the establishment of a new unified army; and the deployment of a United Nations
Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

The world body only gradually began to deploy a small observation force in September 1999 to monitor the Lusaka ceasefire, and the disarmament and repatriation of foreign forces. After the UN Security Council finally authorised the UN Mission in the DRC in February 2000, with deployment starting in March 2001, only 4,386 out of an initially authorised strength of 5,537 peacekeepers had been deployed by February 2003. Meanwhile, fighting continued unabated in the Congo.

In October 2001, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue began in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, before relocating to Sun City, South Africa, in February 2002. The Dialogue brought together armed factions, civil society, and unarmed civilian opposition. Ketumile Masire, the former president of Botswana, facilitated the Dialogue. In December 2002, following the intervention of South African president, Thabo Mbeki, the Congolese parties signed a Global and All-Inclusive Agreement to end the war, which outlined the framework for political transition in the DRC. The accord provided for a two-year transitional government, outlining a ‘one-plus-four’ model: president Joseph Kabila, who had succeeded his assassinated father in January 2001; as well as four vice-presidents drawn from the RCD-Goma (RCD-G), the MLC, Kabila’s former government, and a coalition of unarmed parties. The final part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was signed in April 2003 in Sun City, South Africa. Meanwhile, two other agreements – a July 2002 Pretoria Agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali mediated by South Africa, and a September 2002 Luanda Agreement between Kinshasa and Kampala negotiated by Angola – had been concluded to pave the way for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC.

The Congo’s transitional government was installed in June 2003. In line with the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of 2002, it was mandated to: reunify the DRC; adopt a new constitution; promote national reconciliation; organise national elections; disarm combatants; establish an integrated army; and re-establish state administration throughout the Congo. The transitional government succeeded in organising a referendum on a new constitution for the DRC in December 2005, and holding the country’s first national election in 40 years in 2006/2007. Twenty-eight million Congolese registered to vote and president Kabila won the October 2006 run-off presidential election with 58 percent of the vote to Jean-Pierre Bemba’s 42 percent. The inauguration of Kabila as president in December 2006, following the installation of a new National Assembly in September that year, marked the formal conclusion of the transition. However, violent conflict and insecurity have continued in parts of the country, exacerbating Congo’s enormous peacebuilding challenges.

10 Adebajo, “The United Nations”.

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC) | 15
2. The Role of the United Nations in the DRC

A UN mission was set up by the UN Security Council in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in November 1999 with a mandate initially to support implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed by the DRC and five regional states (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda) four months earlier.

MONUC’s mandate was incrementally broadened: to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel, and UN personnel and facilities countrywide; to implement the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of Congolese armed groups, and the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration of foreign armed groups; to reform the security sector comprehensively; and to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Notwithstanding MONUC being one of the most expensive peacekeeping missions in UN history – in 2009/2010 its operational costs were $1.4 billion a year, or one-sixth of the world body’s budget – the UN mission, which was supposed to operate as a fully integrated one with a comprehensive mandate, lacked adequate human, financial, and logistical support. The Security Council eventually authorised only 20,000 troops for the whole country – a territory as vast as Western Europe, and which shares borders with nine neighbours – compared with 40,000 troops committed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the much smaller European country of Kosovo after 1999. Despite persistent operational and logistical challenges, MONUC has made some progress in executing its mandate. The Mission’s achievements include: creating secure conditions for the conduct, in 2006/2007, of the country’s first free and fair national elections in 40 years; helping to conduct these elections; restoring peace to more than two-thirds of the country; and overseeing the return of more than three million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2009.

Concerns about the mission’s ineffectiveness in establishing security in the eastern Congo, in particular in the insurgency-prone provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Orientale, were compounded by allegations of the UN’s alleged involvement in plundering resources, running guns in exchange for minerals or ivory, and sexual exploitation and abuse. MONUC was also accused of creating opportunities for powerful Western nations to advance their parochial interests in the DRC. Widespread frustration at the mission’s continued presence led president Joseph Kabila to request that MONUC’s withdrawal from the DRC should start before 30 June 2010: the 50th anniversary of Congolese independence. The UN Security Council visited the Congo in May 2010 to discuss the mandate and configuration of MONUC, as well as the future for a UN presence in the country and

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3 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, pp.235-239.
agreed that MONUC should be converted into the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)\textsuperscript{16} which will be withdrawn gradually, with all the peacekeepers leaving the country by December 2013. MONUSCO’s mandate includes: protection of civilians; completion of ongoing military operations against the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and other armed groups in the provinces of North and South Kivu, and Orientale; promotion of human rights and justice; completion of DDR/DDRRR and comprehensive SSR to improve the DRC government’s capacity to protect local populations by establishing sustainable security forces that can progressively take over MONUSCO’s role as a guarantor of safety; technical and logistical support for elections; consolidation of state authority throughout the territory; and backing for the Congolese government’s efforts to fight the illegal exploitation of, and trade in, the country’s natural resources.\textsuperscript{17} The UN Security Council recognised that the primary responsibility for security, peacebuilding, and development in the country lay in the hands of the government in Kinshasa. MONUSCO, while concentrating its military forces in the country’s unstable east, was mandated to maintain a reserve force capable of redeploying rapidly elsewhere in the DRC.\textsuperscript{18} However, the challenges of protecting Congolese civilians in the volatile eastern region have been demonstrated by incidents such as the August 2010 mass rape of more than 300 women and children in the Walikale area of North Kivu, allegedly by fighters from the Mai-Mai and FDLR rebel groups, and within 15 kilometres of a MONUSCO Mobile Operational Base; and, more recently, by the alleged rape of at least 67 women by soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) over the 2011 New Year period, also in the eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{19} MONUSCO can learn from the constraints placed upon MONUC as the UN seeks to discharge its primary mandate: to provide sustained international peacebuilding support that can help to consolidate peace in the Congo.


\textsuperscript{17} United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925.

\textsuperscript{18} United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925.

3. Prospects for Engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the DRC

Although the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not officially listed on the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, the Commission has allocated $20 million from its Peacebuilding Fund to support the country’s stabilisation and recovery efforts.

The Peacebuilding Fund has committed $13.9 million from this amount to help to fund the Congolese government’s Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) of June 2009. STAREC aims to address the challenges to peace in eastern Congo and to consolidate the gains of recent peace initiatives and related military and political interventions. The plan prioritises: security and restoration of state authority, humanitarian and social assistance; and economic recovery. In support of STAREC, the UN and key partners have revised the world body’s Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (UNSSSS), which was developed in 2008. The new plan, which is now called the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (I-SSSS), aims to support national efforts to promote a secure and stable environment in key conflict-affected areas of eastern Congo. It focuses on: improving security; supporting political dialogue; strengthening the state; facilitating the return and integration of internally displaced persons and refugees; and combating sexual violence.²⁰

The DRC is governed by weak, parallel, militarised structures that lack any clearly defined vision of peacebuilding and ways in which the process can be locally owned. Some fear that peacebuilding in the Congo is being used as a “Trojan horse” to speed the advance of neo-liberal political and economic transformation of the country, in line with the interests of the World Bank. Such manipulation of the peacebuilding process could undermine the potential for achieving a just and sustainable peace in the DRC. The Peacebuilding Commission’s engagement with the country remains constrained by its advisory mandate, the limited funds available to it, and issues of state sovereignty that limit its capacity to intervene decisively to advance sustainable peace. In relation to financial limitations, the $20 million allocated by the Peacebuilding Fund prior to October 2010 represented part of a total $183 million that had been provided at that time under the framework of the I-SSSS to support peacebuilding efforts in key conflict-affected areas of the eastern Congo. However, the total sum still fell far short of the recommended budget for activities planned under the STAREC/I-SSSS frameworks, with the shortfall estimated to be $655 million.²¹

Meanwhile, the potential for the DRC to harness its vast natural resources to support an indigenous Congolese peacebuilding programme more effectively has been undermined by the continued illegal exploitation of, and trade in, these resources. The UN has made a commitment to help the DRC’s Ministry of Mines to establish a framework for legitimate mineral trade.

Experience has also shown that the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s attempts to coordinate peacebuilding efforts in the Congo have been hampered by the world body’s quest to align the often irreconcilable interests of UN agencies and member states. While a one-size-fits-all approach would not be recommended as an appropriate solution to the peacebuilding challenges faced by the DRC, the country would do well to learn from some of the Peacebuilding Commission’s operational experiences since 2006, particularly in other African countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic (CAR). The Commission could usefully work with the AU and SADC to implement practical and effective strategies under the STAREC/ISSSS frameworks to prevent a return to conflict in the DRC. It could also engage donors, agencies, programmes, and financial institutions to mobilise financial resources for the effective operationalisation of the STAREC and ISSSS road-maps for the stabilisation and reconstruction of the Congo.


4. The Roles of SADC and South Africa in the DRC

The Southern African Development Community and South Africa — the dominant economic power within the sub-region — have played key roles in the DRC.

SADC’s interventionist role

Several SADC states such as South Africa, Madagascar, and Zambia, contributed peacekeepers and logistical support to MONUC; and, before MONUC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia launched a military intervention into the DRC in 1998 in support of president Laurent Kabila’s regime against the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy rebel group. Eminent Southern African leaders, including presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, and Ketumile Masire of Botswana, were instrumental in brokering a series of peace accords for the DRC.

SADC’s role in the Congo has, however, been constrained by its limited peacekeeping experience and its lack of financial resources for peacebuilding. In addition, the sub-regional body’s power to intervene decisively and collectively in the DRC has been largely dictated by the reactive, rather than preventive, nature of the conflict resolution mechanisms that it has developed. However, SADC has attempted to make a meaningful contribution to combating violence in the DRC. The organisation has recognised the need to establish institutional structures to engage in a robust approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction in the Congo. In particular, it has established a joint peacebuilding office with the African Union in Kinshasa to help to implement DDR in the DRC in consultation with the Congolese government, the UN, and other external partners in the process.

The intervention of members of SADC in the Congo in 1998 took place against the background of a struggle for influence within the sub-regional body. At the time, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, was chaired by Zimbabwe; while South Africa chaired the main SADC. The organisation’s members were divided on how to intervene in the Congo. The split deepened a crisis that had been caused by a clash between member states over the relationship between SADC and its Organ: specifically, whether the Organ should function in subordination to, or independent of, the SADC summit. An alliance of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe chose to intervene militarily in support of president Laurent Kabila’s government, and subsequently signed a mutual defence pact with Kinshasa in April 1999. South Africa and other sub-regional states such as Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland, took a different view, preferring an approach that emphasised preventive diplomacy and a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

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25 See Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Decade; seminar report, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
The responses of SADC member states to the war in the DRC were greatly influenced by their own national interests. The SADC members justified their 1998 intervention in the Congo as a response – through the SADC Organ, which was then chaired by Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe – to a formal request by a member state to help it to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Notwithstanding such justification, the three states which participated in the intervention – Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia – each had its own strategic and economic reasons for involvement. Furthermore, South Africa’s adoption of the role of peacebroker stemmed from its own interpretation of the situation.

Angola’s interest in the stability of the DRC related to its strategy of neutralising the Jonas Savimbi-led rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in order to cut off the insurgents’ lines of communication and deny them secure rear bases in the Congo. Luanda also sought to protect its petroleum and diamond resources, especially the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. In addition, Angola was eager to build on its earlier intervention in the two Congos – in support of Laurent Kabila’s rise to the DRC presidency in 1997, and in restoring the regime of Denis Sassou-Nguesso to power in Congo-Brazzaville in the same year. Luanda thus hoped to buttress its credentials as a regional power in Central Africa.

Zimbabwean interests were driven largely by Robert Mugabe’s ambition to assert his leadership as an African statesman and principal regional power broker, against the backdrop of Nelson Mandela’s ascendancy to South Africa’s presidency in 1994. Support for the economic interests of Zimbabwe’s ruling elite, rather than larger national interests, underlay the country’s involvement in the Congo war. Furthermore, the support offered

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28 International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo, Anatomy of an Ugly War, pp.54-60
apparently as a matter of principle by Harare to protect Congolese territorial integrity and sovereignty was also perceived on the wider African and international stage as a means of providing implicit justification for the firm grip on power retained by Zimbabwe’s own ruling party – Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Zimbabwe’s leaders importantly also benefited from the Congo’s natural resources.

Namibia’s participation in the 1998 military intervention in the DRC came in response to a request from Angola and Zimbabwe to support Laurent Kabila, a long-time friend of then Namibian president, Sam Nujoma, and a close ally of both Harare and Luanda. The armies of the three SADC allies reportedly reaped economic spoils from the vast mineral wealth of the DRC. South Africa’s national interest was defined by its desire to create a stable environment in the DRC to allow its companies to trade easily and win lucrative contracts. Tshwane (Pretoria) was also keen to affirm then president Thabo Mbeki’s role as a peacebroker, and the country’s status as a regional hegemon. In addition to facilitating the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2002 and 2003, South Africa brokered the July 2002 Pretoria Agreement between Rwanda and the DRC, which set the terms for the withdrawal of Rwandese troops from the Congo. Angola played a critical role in brokering the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the DRC in September 2002, which set the terms for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the Congo.

South Africa’s peacemaking role

SADC’s wealthiest member, South Africa, accounts for over 70 percent of the sub-regional economy and has provided significant logistical and financial support for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in the Congo, culminating in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of 2002. In terms of peacemaking, Tshwane was widely regarded as the most effective African state in the DRC during the period of the transitional arrangements for government, between 2003 and 2006. South Africa contributed 1,268 personnel to MONUC, and provided financial, human, and logistical support for the DRC’s 2006 presidential and 2007 provincial elections – much of the support was provided by South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in collaboration with its Congolese counterpart. Tshwane continues to play an integral role in the Congo’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts through the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC), which was first convened in Kinshasa in August 2004. In addition, South African companies remain involved in the Congo’s economy, even as China’s own economic role in the DRC continues to grow, with the announcement of an $8 billion infrastructure agreement in 2007.

32 International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo, p.66.
35 See Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, p.28.
South Africa has played a prominent role as intermediary, facilitator, and guarantor of the DRC’s peace process. Accordingly, Tshwane adopted a leading diplomatic role during a period of limited external involvement in peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives on the continent. South Africa hosted the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City between 2002 and 2003, after the peace talks had been relocated from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, due to mainly logistical concerns and a shortage of funds. South Africa’s peacemaking role at Sun City built on earlier, albeit unsuccessful, attempts by Tshwane to mediate the two Congo wars that started in 1996 and 1998.

South Africa’s approach to peacemaking in the DRC was guided by its preference for, and promotion of, certain constitutional, judicial, and electoral structures and processes that it had used in its transition from apartheid to democracy. Key elements of the Tshwane-led peace process in the DRC that resulted in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of 2002 bore remarkable similarity to those previously employed in South Africa’s own transition: a power-sharing transitional government; the establishment of a new national army; and democratic elections. Tshwane’s intervention was also guided by its key foreign policy goal of supporting peace and security efforts in Africa in order to promote development and economic growth on the continent. At the time, South African president, Thabo Mbeki, was promoting the idea of an African Renaissance and backing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of 2001. It was clear that NEPAD’s prospects for success would be greatly boosted by bringing stability to strategic states such as the DRC with its vast territory and immense natural resources. However, Tshwane’s active participation in the Congolese peace process also gave rise to questions about South African “imperialistic” designs in the country. Critics charged that Tshwane was simply interested in securing access to the DRC’s minerals for South African corporations. In the face of such criticisms and concerned that South Africa’s reputation as a successful peacemaker could be tarnished if the Inter-Congolese Dialogue collapsed, Thabo Mbeki personally intervened in support of Botswana’s former president Ketumile Masire’s efforts to rein in the belligerents in the DRC and their foreign backers.

In general, South Africa’s attempts to “export” its peacemaking model to the DRC was criticised for failing to address the Congo’s particular circumstances and context: the weak authority of the Congolese state; the disparity between the diverse interests of domestic, sub-regional, and external actors; and the overall political economy of the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

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40 Ibid.
5. Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration; and Security Sector Reform in the DRC

Security, peacebuilding, and sustainable development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo depend on the successful disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of Congolese armed fighters into civilian life, and the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration of foreign soldiers such as the Rwandan-backed FDLR and Sudan’s LRA.

The Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement of 2002 provided for the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of an estimated 150,000 former fighters unwilling or ineligible to join the national army, and the integration of the remainder into FARDC. By 2003, the number of fighters in the DRC had risen to between 300,000 and 330,000, drawing from an eclectic mix of more than six recognised military and paramilitary groups.\textsuperscript{42} In July 2008, 130,207 combatants still had to pass through the brassage process of DDR, which remained grossly under-resourced despite the efforts of the EU, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Angola.\textsuperscript{43} A range of global, regional, and local actors have been involved in the Congo’s SSR and DDR/DDRRR. The World Bank, in partnership with various donors, UN agencies, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), implemented the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund from 2002 to 2009, which covered the DRC and six other states (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, and Uganda) in the Great Lakes region and Central Africa. However, the MDRP was undermined by the narrow remit of the World Bank’s mandate, which prohibits the organisation from engaging directly with militaries. The Bank limited itself to demobilisation and reintegration and did not venture into disarmament, which had to be planned as a separate process outside troop assembly areas, creating delays and additional costs.\textsuperscript{44} The effectiveness of the MDRP was further limited by accountability constraints. As with other such World Bank programmes, the Bank insisted on ‘national ownership’ of the plan.\textsuperscript{45} In other words, the Congolese government, army, and institutions were left with almost total responsibility for DDR.

However, Congolese bodies such as the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER) and the Structure for Military Integration have so far failed to plan and implement a comprehensive national strategy to facilitate and coordinate DDR/DDRRR and security sector reform. These processes have faced significant challenges including: the existence of parallel armed groups; uncertainty over the number of former combatants who are eligible for the various programmes; sub-standard assembly camps for demobilised soldiers; inadequate training camps for, and vetting of, ex-combatants requiring integration into the Congolese national army; the absence of a legal framework for SSR; the lack of a coherent FARDC training doctrine; disagreements over rank and status within the national army; and fundamental payroll problems, including large salary arrears and the presence of thousands of ‘ghost soldiers’.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} Apollo, ‘The EU Security Role in the Great Lakes Region’.
\textsuperscript{46} Marriage, ‘Flip-Flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier’.
MONUC was established as a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission, with a robust mandate to protect civilians. In pursuit of this goal, the UN had deployed up to 90 percent of its peacekeepers in the eastern Congo by December 2008. UN peacekeepers were deployed in support of FARDC’s aggressive disarmament of armed groups in the volatile region. A joint Congolese-Rwandan military operation also resulted in the arrest of the leader of the National Congress of the Defence of the People (CNDP), General Laurent Nkunda, in January 2009, after which the Congolese army swiftly integrated about 5,800 CNDP (of a declared total of 7,000) militia into its ranks. MONUC also continued to support security sector reform by training members and units of the FARDC integrated brigades in the areas of basic military conduct, as well as human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection, and the prevention of gender-based violence. Notwithstanding these efforts, DDR/DDRRR and SSR remained incomplete, and the eastern part of the country was still plagued by armed violence in 2010.

DDR/DDRRR and SSR have been implemented against a background of serious human rights violations, questionable political will, and ineffective control over fighters. Concerns continue to be raised that poorly coordinated DDR/DDRRR and SSR programmes in the Congo have been unable to reduce feelings of insecurity among armed groups, civilians, IDPs, refugees and former combatants in parts of the DRC, especially
in its eastern region. Some critics claim that FARDC poses a significant threat to the security of Congolese citizens, as underpaid and ill-trained forces exploit weak command structures to live off local populations, which increases the potential for physical abuse of civilians by military personnel. The government of the DRC, its bilateral partners, SADC, the UN, and the international community should ensure the completion of DDR/DDRRR and SSR processes in order to establish Congolese security forces capable of progressively taking over MONUSCO’s security role, especially in the volatile eastern Congo, and to forestall a security vacuum that could trigger renewed instability in the country.

While SSR and DDR/DDRRR in the DRC must be custom-designed to address country-specific priorities, comparisons can usefully be drawn with the experiences of the Southern African states of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The failings of the conceptual and institutional frameworks for the processes in the Congo hark back to those of the UN-managed Angolan schemes of the 1990s. In this case, inadequate mandates, a lack of resources to support proposed international frameworks, and an absence of political commitment from Angolan parties undermined DDR attempts undertaken by the UN. It is important for the Congolese government and its partners to complete the implementation of comprehensive SSR. In most other earlier Southern African cases, attention was focussed on core security actors, particularly the armed forces and the police, with the aim of strengthening their operational capacity. Limited attention was paid to strengthening justice and rule-of-law institutions such as prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary; human rights commissions; ombudsmen; customs; and customary/traditional justice systems. The construction of integrated security forces was prioritised, particularly as a tool for promoting reconciliation and nation-building through the integration of formerly warring parties into a unified national army. However – with the exception of South Africa, which developed a White Paper on Defence between 1994 and 1996 and carried out a defence review in 1998 – many Southern African states did not subsequently conduct comprehensive national security reviews in order to inform the crafting of appropriate policies in this area. A related drawback has been the granting of blanket amnesties – such as in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The problem with the use of such transitional justice mechanisms has been that they can undermine a commitment to longer-term justice and respect for human rights.

Further experiences in the SADC region have shown that political will is essential to effective DDR. Economic incentives or corruption can weaken the necessary political commitment to achieve successful disarmament. For example, in Angola, UNITA’s desire to continue controlling diamond fields outweighed its commitment to the benefits of DDR.

Effective DDR also requires coordinated support from regional and international actors. In Namibia, the Front Line States (FLS) – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia – lent constructive and important support to the country’s peace process between 1989 and 1990. Namibia’s disarmament was also significantly strengthened by the international community’s willingness to fund the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), which implemented the process.

Stakeholders in the Congo’s DDR process should continue to perceive it as an interconnected and integrated process with no gap between the two “Ds” (disarmament and demobilisation) and the “R” (reintegration). In Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa, programmatic and institutional deficiencies in DDR processes – where former soldiers were generally paid off and demobilised with little thought for their subsequent reintegration into civilian society – created a time bomb that exploded in the form of public disruption, rioting, and crime by ex-combatants. In addition, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that often results from ineffective DDR can exacerbate national and regional instability. The financial and logistical constraints that have restricted the Congo’s DDR processes have already dissuaded tens of thousands of fighters from disarming and demobilising.

The Congolese government and its partners have attempted to implement tailor-made programmes for women and child soldiers, albeit with limited success where families and wider communities were ill-prepared to receive and reintegrate former combatants. However, Kinshasa has made almost no plans for disabled ex-combatants. The Congolese government should be designed to include proper physical and psychological reintegration that helps former combatants to adjust their attitudes and expectations, and to deal with war-related mental trauma. Informal or traditional socialisation mechanisms such as ritual cleansing could also be employed to address the psycho-social problems of ex-combatants and facilitate their reintegration into local communities, as has been demonstrated in Mozambique.53

Finally, experience in Southern Africa has shown that the revitalisation of economic development in the mineral-rich Congo will be critical to the success of DDR, which can easily fail in a stagnant or imbalanced economy.

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6. Civil Society, Gender, and Peacebuilding in the DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is emblematic of how violence and conflict produce different gender impacts. Congolese women and girls suffered disproportionately during and after the country’s 1998-2003 war.

Women were quick to grasp the opportunities provided by the country’s peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction processes to engender societal structures, especially with regard to political participation, transitional justice, and security sector reform. For example, some Congolese women organised themselves into a caucus to take part in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, in which they played a key role in lobbying for an agreement between the feuding parties. Women’s networks and non-governmental organisations also actively engaged in campaigns advocating the recognition of women’s rights during and after the DRC’s constitution-making processes.

As a result of these efforts, the Congo’s 2006 constitution stipulated a 50 percent quota for women’s participation in government, and called on the government to respond effectively to sexual violence. Women’s organisations in the DRC also helped to mobilise and train women to participate in political processes, boosting the women’s vote at the 2006/2007 polls. Notwithstanding such activism and the constitutional provisions on women’s rights, the political participation of Congolese women has been limited. Only 33 out of 632 (5.2 percent) parliamentarians elected in the 2006/2007 elections were women, and only 9 out of 60 (15 percent) ministers in the post-transitional government were female. Campaigners need to identify alternative strategies to garner critical mass at the country’s forthcoming polls in 2011-2013 and place gender at the heart of the Congolese peacebuilding processes if they are to succeed in effecting a broader transformation of structures, policies, norms, and relationships – many of which are still shaped by ideas of patriarchy.

Gender equality in the DRC is often perceived as being solely a “women’s issue” and a matter of political correctness, rather than a fundamental right that is necessary for the development and implementation of effective peacebuilding strategies. It is generally believed that responsibility for incorporating gender issues into peacebuilding programmes rests entirely with women. Collective efforts at achieving gender equality in peacebuilding processes are further undermined by the widely held perception that the gender aspects of projects can best be delivered by women and civil society groups. However, some progress has been made to engage men to a greater extent in the struggle for gender equality, and to engender peacebuilding and social justice concerns in the Congo.

Despite MONUSCO’s presence, and the Congolese government’s endorsement of international conventions such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), and 1888 (2009) on women, peace, and security, the scourge of sexual and gender-based violence persists in the DRC. More than 8,000 Congolese women were raped in 2009 during fighting between warring factions, according to the United Nations

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54 See Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women; and International Alert, Women’s Political Participation in Countries Emerging from Conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, report of the Consultation Workshop, Kampala, Uganda, 28-30 August 2007.
Population Fund (UNFPA). Sexual violence is particularly widespread in the war-torn eastern region of the country, which has been grimly described as the “rape capital of the world.” Meanwhile, the lack of a fair and effective national justice system has made it difficult to win indictments for past or present crimes against women.

Religious organisations and other NGOs have, since the country’s independence in 1960, played a pivotal role in the DRC’s peace processes, including in the run-up to, and after, the historic democratic election of 2006/2007. While peacebuilding efforts by local civil society groups may have been relatively weak so far, activists from the sector have nevertheless contributed significantly to governance, security sector reform, DDR, peacebuilding, and statebuilding. Civil society groups in the Congo have also played a critical role in mobilising social capital to hold the government accountable, and to make it more responsive to public needs. Such groups continue to be integral to peacebuilding processes, have delivered services to prevent and resolve conflicts, and have promoted democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In a political climate in which the central state is weak due to internal and national conflict and poor governance practices, the international donor community has often channelled aid through civil society actors. But such actors often lack capacity and cannot be a substitute to building an effective state, which must remain a key priority.

56 Ibid.
58 See Centre for Conflict Resolution, The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Southern Africa.
7. Justice, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding in the DRC

Respect for fundamental human rights and justice is essential to sustaining peace and stability and enabling post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC.

Since independence in 1960, various armed groups and the Congolese army have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Violence has come to be seen by some as a way of forging identity; a strategic tool; and a means to securing power and control. Widespread human rights abuses were committed by all parties in the DRC conflict either directly or through local proxies. All the armed groups involved committed crimes of gender-based violence. Concerns persist about continuing serious human rights violations committed by soldiers and elements of the national security forces, including acts of arbitrary execution; rape; torture and death in detention; cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention; and looting – especially in unstable eastern provinces, and some areas in western DRC. The Congolese government, the UN, and other relevant actors must work together to end violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, to fight impunity, to bring perpetrators to justice, and to provide adequate medical, humanitarian, and other assistance to victims.

Meanwhile, the desire for peace in the Congo can compromise the need for justice and fundamental human rights, as was demonstrated by the blanket amnesties granted by the Lusaka peace agreement of 1999 and the Ituri peace deal of 2003. The DRC lacks the effective institutions to ensure that international standards of law and justice are respected. Funding constraints prevented the Congolese government from establishing a Special International Court, as recommended by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue of 2001-2003. Meanwhile, the politically-driven alternative criminal justice system offered to soldiers and civilians by the Military Courts since 2002 has provided inconsistent and anachronistic remedies that have failed to meet international and constitutional standards of human rights. Access to justice may have been further compromised by president Joseph Kabila’s decision in February 2010 to fold the Ministry of Human Rights into the Ministry of Justice, thus de-emphasising the importance and focus on human rights issues.

The role that the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) can play in the DRC is limited by its jurisdiction—which permits it only to investigate and try international crimes committed since 2002—as well as by the Congolese government’s desire to protect its own fighters and pursue justice selectively. Against this backdrop, the UN should continue to support government efforts to develop an effective and authentic working relationship with the Court.

61 Ibid.
MONUSCO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, in close consultation with Congolese authorities, have initiated a multi-year (2010-2012) joint UN justice-support programme focused on developing the DRC’s criminal justice system, including the police, the judiciary, and prisons, in conflict-affected areas. The programme also seeks to provide strategic support at the level of national government and administration in Kinshasa. A preliminary draft was produced in August 2010 outlining the five institutional pillars that the programme will aim to develop - the judiciary and police; access to justice; integrity, transparency, and judicial practice; prison administration; and anti-corruption efforts. If completed and executed, the programme could help the DRC to reinforce its justice system.

8. Election and Governance Issues in the DRC

Promoting effective post-conflict reconstruction and overcoming the legacy of colonialism in the DRC will require just and democratic governance.

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue of 2001-2003 failed to reconcile Congolese leaders and factions, to transform electoral processes, to institute ‘good governance’, and to restore peace and stability in the DRC. The Congo’s Independent Electoral Commission lacks the capacity and funds to facilitate democratic, transparent, and competitive national elections. In October 2010, the UN reported that the 2011-2013 electoral process would cost $715 million. At the time, the Congolese government had pledged $390 million towards the projected costs, after requesting UN assistance. Following a UN visit to the DRC to assess electoral needs in July/August 2010, MONUSCO submitted a budget of $40.6 million for logistical and technical back-up for the elections, supporting the funding of the poll by the Congolese government.

During the DRC’s 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, the UN provided most of the country’s electoral commission’s logistical and infrastructural framework, while the European Union paid for much of the $422 million cost of the polls. Without such support and amid mounting concern over the availability of foreign financing for future polls, Congo’s IEC faces enormous challenges in effectively managing national elections. Nevertheless, the Congolese people expect that the successive presidential, national, provincial, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections that are scheduled to be held between 2011 and 2013 will be more transparent and competitive and less subject to political wrangling than previous polls. In order to ensure the timely and credible conduct of the country’s electoral processes, Congolese must ensure that the IEC is autonomous and impartial, and conducts itself in a transparent manner to enhance the chances of securing the trust of contestants, promulgate sturdy legislation to govern the electoral process, and delimit constituency boundaries effectively. The system should also include dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with conflicts arising from electoral disagreements swiftly and authoritatively.

Failure by the Congolese government to hold credible elections could risk plunging the country into political uncertainty and further instability. Despite the prospect of violence at the polls, no Congolese institutions – including the IEC, the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and its National Human Rights Institution – are equipped or mandated to deal effectively with election-related violence. Meanwhile, SADC remains constrained by its advisory mandate and cannot enforce the implementation of the Principles and

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While democratic elections can play a critical role in the Congo’s peacebuilding process, the polls in 2011-2013 need to be complemented by the establishment and strengthening of institutions that promote socio-economic development. After more than four decades of corrupt governance, mostly under the kleptocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko between 1965 and 1997, and after its recent history of war, the DRC celebrated its 50th anniversary of independence on 30 June 2010 against a backdrop of significant administrative and institutional challenges. The problems faced include: weak state authority; predatory governance; poor regulation of resources; a flawed financial system; a culture of impunity; dilapidated infrastructure; deep-seated poverty; and a lack of state control in the country’s unstable provinces of North and South Kivu, and Orientale.

The STAREC and I-SSSS programmes need to be closely monitored to ensure that they provide significant, coordinated, and synchronised support for the implementation of structural reforms that can enable the Congolese state to project its authority nation-wide as part of a continuous peacebuilding process. In addition, the DRC’s new constitution requires Kinshasa to increase the number of provinces from 11 to 26, and complete a decentralisation of government functions before the start of the next election cycle in 2011: a formidable and daunting task amidst continuing peacebuilding challenges.

ABOVE: Dr Claude Kabemba, Director, Southern Africa Resource Watch, Johannesburg
RIGHT: From left; Ms Ahunna Eziakonwa-Onochie, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Lesotho; and Mr Mosotho Moepya, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, South African Independent Electoral Commission, Tshwane

67 Southern African Development Community secretariat, Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in the SADC Region (Gaborone: Botswana [mimeo], 2004).
68 See Matlosa, Khadiagala, and Shale (eds.), When Elephants Fight.
9. Postscript: Recent Developments in the DRC

Peace is fragile and the spectre of a return to horrific violence still looms in the DRC. The stabilisation of the country, protection of its citizens, and consolidation of state authority throughout its territory are crucial in the run-up to the election cycle starting in 2011.

Instability has continued to be a serious concern in the provinces of North and South Kivu, and Orientale. Three UN peacekeepers were killed by armed factions in North Kivu in October 2010. The human toll of the conflict in the Congo is evidenced by the huge number of people who were internally displaced there in August 2010: a total of almost two million, of whom 1.5 million were displaced in the Kivus.70

Gross human rights abuses by the various armed groups and the national army have also continued in eastern Congo. In September 2010, MONUSCO launched “Operation Shop Window”, which aimed to combat armed groups, improve the security of civilians, and support the Congolese government in its efforts to arrest perpetrators of human rights violations.71 FARDC continued “Operation Rudia II” against Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army in Orientale Province, alongside separate military operations by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).

Participants of the policy advisory group seminar “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)”, Cape Town, South Africa

The DRC’s security and that of the Great Lakes and Central and Southern African regions are intertwined. The conflict in the Congo, particularly in the eastern parts of the country, is entangled with other recent conflicts in the Great Lakes region such as Burundi and Rwanda. An April 2010 meeting of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) brought together the presidents of the parliaments of Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC to discuss peace, security, cooperation, and economic development issues. In July 2010, the DRC officially became a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that about 90 percent – or $12.3 billion – of the country’s external debt would be annulled.\footnote{International Monetary Fund, “IMF and World Bank Announce US$12.3 Billion in Debt Relief for the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, press release K3/274 1 July, 2010 (available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10274.htm).} The magnitude and complexity of the DRC conflict means that Congolese and external parties must contribute sufficient and appropriate resources to tackle the formidable obstacles to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the country.

However, despite the scale of the problems in the Congo and the improved stability that followed its 2006/2007 elections, the international community has remained frugal in its pledges and commitments to support the DRC. By September 2009, only 53 percent of resources required by the UN’s collaborative Humanitarian Action Plan for the DRC – which set a target of $946 million – had been provided.\footnote{United Nations, Twenty-Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/472, 18 September 2009, p.7.} Critics have also alleged that the UN Security Council has failed to learn fully the lessons of Rwanda, where genocide in 1994 claimed the lives of about 800,000 people. The Security Council must provide the resources required to help sustain efforts to end a 15-year war that has claimed an estimated three million lives, internally displaced 3.4 million people, involved seven foreign armies, and spanned three of Africa’s sub-regions.\footnote{See Adebajo, “The United Nations”, in Khadiagala (ed.), Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, pp.141-161.}
10. Policy Recommendations

The following ten policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy seminar:

- First, the DRC government must define a national vision for peacebuilding that is articulated and owned by its 68 million people, and reflects an understanding of the root causes of the country’s conflict. The Congolese government should prioritise peacebuilding activities as part of a societal transformation that alters relationships positively between the state and its citizens, and facilitates more equitable power-sharing. The government must also establish a regular budget with adequate controls to reinforce state authority, properly manage resources, and combat widespread corruption;

- Second, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, in collaboration with the AU and SADC, should help the Congolese government build effective institutions to manage its immense natural resources. The Commission’s annual $250-million Peacebuilding Fund is inadequate to the task, and richer regional and external actors should provide more resources. The Commission should also seek to strengthen partnerships between the UN, the EU, and other external actors in order to prevent the destabilising regional and international exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources;

- Third, the UN Security Council should maintain a peacekeeping presence in the DRC that possesses a credible deterrent capability, and the capacity to oversee a secure transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in the DRC, especially in the provinces of Orientale, and North and South Kivu;

- Fourth, SADC, the AU, the UN, and the EU must establish an effective division of labour to support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC. The AU and SADC must provide political, technical, and financial assistance for peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in the DRC. They should also develop and coordinate a joint strategy that allows the Congolese to identify their priority peacebuilding issues and take ownership of the process;

- Fifth, the evolving strategic partnership between South Africa and Angola should be deployed to strengthen SADC’s peacebuilding role in the DRC. While South Africa’s bilateral engagement with the DRC should continue to be strengthened for the benefit of the region, this role should not be allowed to undermine the relevance and legitimacy of SADC’s multilateral engagement with the country;

- Sixth, the Congolese government must demonstrate the political will and commitment to plan and implement comprehensive strategies for DDR and security sector reform. These strategies should take into account local contexts and needs and include tailor-made DDR programmes to meet the special needs of groups such as women, children, and the disabled. Lessons can usefully be learned from DDR and SSR efforts in fellow SADC countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe;
Seventh, peacebuilding in the DRC must address gender disparities, mainstream gender, and strategically focus on gender-oriented activities. In engendering peacebuilding, the DRC government needs to strengthen and implement coherent, coordinated, and consistent approaches that address the root causes of conflict, build a culture of peace, and realign regional and international support for peacebuilding efforts. Support from the African Union’s Gender Desk and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) should be provided to the DRC’s ministry of women’s affairs in order to combat impunity for perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence;

Eighth, the establishment of a vibrant civil society and effective political opposition must be supported to rebuild the DRC. Congolese civil society actors should work with local communities and institutions to create and secure the policy space necessary to promote a more accountable and responsible state, as well as the rule of law. The Congolese government must strengthen partnerships with civil society actors in order to develop and implement a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction plan;

Ninth, the DRC government must formulate a comprehensive strategy for rebuilding its national criminal justice system. Kinshasa should open strategic discussions with the International Criminal Court and the international community on managing crimes that fall outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. In this respect, the government must define and strengthen its post-conflict local alternative justice systems, which will require the drafting and implementation of more effective national laws to enhance the Congolese judicial system. Regional and international donors should also provide support to build the operational capacity of the DRC’s judicial and legal institutions. Meanwhile, transitional justice mechanisms in the Congo must address the challenges of judicial and institutional reform. These mechanisms should reinforce the voices of the poor and the marginalised, and address structural, socio-economic, and political inequalities; and

Finally, the DRC must build an effective and professional electoral commission that can promote democratic, inclusive, and competent electoral systems. SADC, the AU, the UN, the EU, and other donors should support the Congolese government’s commitment to elections by helping to prepare the country’s political parties to accept the outcomes of polls, and by ensuring that timeous elections are held between 2011 and 2013. In addition, the DRC can learn useful lessons from electoral process ‘best practices’ and successful examples of democracy within political parties in other SADC countries.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One Monday 19 April 2010

09h00-09h30 Welcome and Opening

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

Ambassador James Jonah, Former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs

09h30-11h00 Session I: The Role of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC)

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Former Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organisation

Speakers: Professor Mwesiga Baregu, St Augustine University, Tanzania
Mr Ross Mountain, Director-General, Development Assistance Research Associates, Madrid, and Former Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DRC

11h00-11h15 Coffee Break

11h15-12h45 Session II: Prospects for Engagement by the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the DRC

Chair: Ambassador Tiina Myllyntausta, Ambassador of Finland to South Africa

Speakers: Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins, Permanent Representative of Angola to the UN, New York
Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, Cambridge University, England

12h45-13h45 Lunch
13h45-15h15 Session III: The Roles of SADC and South Africa in the DRC

Chair: Dr Martin Rupiya (Rtd Lieutenant Colonel), Principal Director, International Relations, Office of the Prime Minister, Zimbabwe

Speakers: Mr Tanki Mothae, Director, SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Gaborone, Botswana
          Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, National Security Special Advisor, Office of the President of South Africa, Tshwane

15h15-15h30 Coffee Break

15h30-17h00 Session IV: Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration; and Security Sector Reform in the DRC

Chair: General Charles Shalumbu, Chief of Staff, Namibia Defence Force, Windhoek

Speakers: Mr Patrick Garba, Officer of Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration, UN Mission in the DRC, Kinshasa
          Dr Gwinyai Dzinesa, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

19h30 Dinner
Day Two  Tuesday 20 April

09h00-10h30  Session V: Civil Society, Gender, and Peacebuilding

Chair:  Mr Takwa Zebulon Suifon, Expert, Post Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding, Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa

Speakers:  Ms Anaiah Bewa, Country Director, The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Kinshasa  
Ms Joyce Laker, Independent Consultant, Uganda

10h30-10h45  Coffee Break

10h45-12h15  Session VI: Justice, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding in the DRC

Chair:  Advocate Simon Jiyane, Deputy Director-General, Court Services, South African Department of Justice, Tshwane

Speakers:  Ms Yasmin Sooka, Executive Director, Foundation for Human Rights, Johannesburg  
Dr Comfort Ero, Deputy Director, International Centre for Transitional Justice, Cape Town

12h15-13h15  Lunch
13h15-14h45  **Session VII: Election and Governance Issues in the DRC**

Chair:  Ms Ahunna Eziakonwa-Onochie, UN Resident Coordinator and UN Development Programme Resident Representative in Lesotho

Speakers:  Dr Claude Kabemba, Director, Southern Africa Resource Watch, Johannesburg  
Mr Mosotho Moepya, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, South African Independent Electoral Commission, Tshwane

14h45-15h00  Completing Evaluation Forms and Coffee Break

15h00-16h30  **Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report and Way Forward**

Chair:  Ambassador James Jonah, Former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs

Speakers:  Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town  
Ms Joyce Laker, Independent Consultant, Uganda

19h30  Dinner
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town
   South Africa

2. Mr Mujahid Alam
   UN Mission in the DRC
   Tshwane
   South Africa

3. Professor Mwesiga Baregu
   St Augustine University of Tanzania
   Dar-es-Salaam
   Tanzania

4. Mr Jonas Bergström
   Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
   Stockholm
   Sweden

5. Ms Anaiah Bewa
   The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
   Kinshasa
   Democratic Republic of the Congo

6. Professor Georgette Biebie-Songo
   University of Kinshasa
   Democratic Republic of the Congo

7. Ms Maud Blankson-Mills
   Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
   Accra
   Ghana

8. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse
   National Development Planning Commission
   of Ghana
   Accra
   Ghana

9. Dr Devon Curtis
   Cambridge University
   England

10. Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa
    Centre for Conflict Resolution
    Cape Town
    South Africa

11. Ms Shannon Ebrahim
    Political Consultant
    Tshwane
    South Africa

12. Dr Comfort Ero
    International Centre for Transitional Justice
    Cape Town
    South Africa

13. Ms Ahunna Eziakonwa-Onochie
    United Nations Development Programme
    Maseru
    Lesotho

14. Ms Nicole Fritz
    Southern Africa Litigation Centre
    Johannesburg
    South Africa
15. Mr Patrick Garba  
UN Mission in the DRC  
Kinshasa  
Democratic Republic of the Congo

16. Mr Tyrone Gunnie  
Office of the President of South Africa  
Tshwane  
South Africa

17. Advocate Simon Jiyane  
Department of Justice  
Tshwane  
South Africa

18. Ambassador James Jonah  
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies  
New York  
United States

19. Dr Claude Kabemba  
Southern Africa Resource Watch  
Johannesburg  
South Africa

20. Ms Joyce Laker  
Independent Consultant  
Uganda

21. Dr Chris Landsberg  
University of Johannesburg  
South Africa

22. Ms Marjolijn Luchtmeijer  
The Royal Netherlands Embassy  
Tshwane  
South Africa

23. Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins  
Permanent Mission of Angola to the UN  
New York  
United States

24. Mr Mosotho Moepya  
Independent Electoral Commission  
Tshwane  
South Africa

25. Mr Tanki Mothae  
Southern African Development Community  
Gaborone  
Botswana

26. Mr Ross Mountain  
Development Assistance Research Associates  
Madrid  
Spain

27. Ambassador Tiina Myllyntausa  
Embassy of Finland  
Tshwane  
South Africa

28. Ms Dawn Nagar  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town  
South Africa

29. Ambassador Welile Nhlapo  
Office of the President of South Africa  
Tshwane  
South Africa
30. Dr Funmi Olonisakin  
King's College  
University of London  
England

31. Ms Elizabeth Osiiotun  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town  
South Africa

32. Dr Martin Rupiya (Rtd Lieutenant Colonel)  
Office of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe  
Harare  
Zimbabwe

33. General Charles Shalumbu  
Namibia Defence Force  
Windhoek  
Namibia

34. Ms Yasmin Sooka  
Foundation for Human Rights  
Johannesburg  
South Africa

35. Mr Ephrem Tadesse  
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
Tshwane  
South Africa

36. Mr Suifon Zebulon Takwa  
African Union  
Addis Ababa  
Ethiopia

37. Colonel Carl Wärnberg  
Embassy of Sweden  
Tshwane  
South Africa

38. Mr Shane Everts  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town

39. Ms Fatima Maal  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town

40. Mr Mark MacGinty  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town  
South Africa

41. Ms Karin Pretorius  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town  
South Africa

42. Mr Gerard Voges  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town  
South Africa
Annex III

List of Acronyms

AFDL  Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
       Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre
AU    African Union
BERCI Bureau d’Etudes, de Recherches, et de Consulting International
BNC   Bi-National Commission
CAR   Central African Republic
CEPGL Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
       Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs
CCR   Centre for Conflict Resolution
CNDP  National Congress of the Defence of the People
       Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
CONADER National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion
       Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration
DRC   Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU    European Union
EUFOR European Union Force
FARDC Armed Forces of the DRC
       Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR  Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
       Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FLS   Front Line States
HIPC  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICC   International Criminal Court
IDP   Internally Displaced Person
IEC   Independent Electoral Commission
IMF   International Monetary Fund
I-SSSS International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy
LRA   Lord’s Resistance Army
MDRP  Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MLC   Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
       Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MONUC United Nations Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
OPDS  Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC)
OPDSC  Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC)
RCD  Congolese Rally for Democracy
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCD-G  RCD-Goma
RISDP  Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC)
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SDC  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPO  Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC)
SSR  Security Sector Reform
STAREC  Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNSSSS  United Nations Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy
UNTAG  United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
UPDF  Uganda People’s Defence Forces
US  United States
ZANU-PF  Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 28 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.

Other publications in this series
(available at www.ccr.org.za)
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in southern Africa.

This policy and research seminar held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006 developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

The policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA/A).

This sub-regional seminar held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE
The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA
PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

VOLUME 19
AFRICA’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.

VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN AFRICA
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

VOLUME 21
AFRICA’S EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE
The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 26 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA
The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of “prosecution versus amnesty” for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA
BUILDING EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, “ethnic cleansing” or crimes against humanity.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.
This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – among Africa's largest countries and one of the most resource-rich members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – has been beset by civil war since 1996. To date, an estimated three million people have been killed and seven neighbouring states have been embroiled in the violence. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) convened a meeting to assess the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the Congo. The seminar discussed strategic mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of the Congolese government, SADC, civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in consolidating peace and security in the DRC. Specific topics that were analysed included: the demobilisation of combatants and security sector reform; gender and peacebuilding; justice and human rights; and election and governance issues.