Shaping the War in Afghanistan: The Situation in the Spring of 2010

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
With the Assistance of Nicholas B. Greenough

March 12, 2010
Where We Stand and How We Got There

IED Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

| Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IED Incidents</th>
<th>Sep-07</th>
<th>Sep-08</th>
<th>Sep-09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IED's Turned in</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found/Cleared</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective IED Attacks</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Attacks</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF KIA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFWIA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005-2009

Security Incidents 01 Jan 05 – 15 Sep 05

Security Incidents 01 Jan 09 – 15 Sep 09

Security Incidents 01 Jan 07 – 15 Sep 07

Events Density

- No events
- Low
- Medium
- Significant
- High

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data.
The Insurgency Reaches a Crisis: 2005-2009

- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive

- Insurgent strength is enabled by GIROA weakness

- International support for development has not met population’s expectations

- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency

- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters

In COIN, catch up ball does not work

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Where the Fighting Is: 2009

Afghanistan Security Incidents
January – October 2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.
71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.
Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: 2009

- **RED:** Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace
  - 95 Total
- **Orange:** Insurgents have demonstrated capability
  - 97 Total
- **Yellow:** Insurgents have limited capability
  - 162 Total
- **White:** Not able to assess
  - 45 Total

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.
Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009

We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban

Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment

Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level

AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):

- Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
- Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
- 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)
“Time is Running Out....”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.

Kinetic Events by Geography

01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05

01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07

01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09

Kinetic Events by Week and Type

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 12 NOV):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.

- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.

- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
The insurgency is confident “…Winning a War of Political Attrition by Reducing International Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Likely</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operations:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reduced international support for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA</td>
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<td>- Reduced support for ANSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Dangerous</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced security in population centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Significant loss of international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Open popular frustration with GIRoA</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Popular enmity toward ANSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

…looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Can the New Strategy Work?

“Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”
Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer

- **Shape**: Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

- **Clear**: Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

- **Hold**: Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

- **Build**: Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

- **Transfer**: Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.
Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

• **Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.**

• **Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.**

• **Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).**

• **Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.**

• **Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.**

• **Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.**
In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

• Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.

• Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.
ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

Allied Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: July 23, 2009

- Stand Aside: 28%
- Engaged: 15%
- Peripheral: 57%
In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations.
Clear

In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.

ISAF will focus on 80 of 364 districts in 2010. Has not identified the districts, but are key population centers.
Population Density of Afghanistan

Source: globalsecurity.org
Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan
Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar
Hold

In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

*Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.*

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
ANA and ANP Casualties: 2007-2009

**ANA**

Total Wounded in Action: 1,980
Total Killed in Action: 651

**ANP**

Total Wounded in Action: 2,885
Total Killed in Action: 1,764

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Note: Numbers are as of 6/22/2009.
Source: CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.

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Source: CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.
Assigned ANSF 2005-2014

Nov 08 155K

Afghan National Police  Afghan National Army
ANA Unit CM Levels June 2006-December 2008
With Progress Goals for 2009-2014

ANA Unit CM Ratings
Period-To-Period Comparison

Capability Milestone (CM)

CM1: capable of operating independently
CM2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
CM3: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions

Notes: May not include fire support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.
CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%.
SIGAR is conducting an ongoing audit to evaluate the reliability of ANSF assessments, including the CM rating system.

ANP Unit CM Ratings
Period-to-Period Comparison

Capability Milestone (CM)

CM1: capable of operating independently
- As of Dec 31, 2009: 12
- As of Sept 13, 2009: 11

CM2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
- As of Dec 31, 2009: 29
- As of Sept 13, 2009: 37

CM3: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
- As of Dec 31, 2009: 35
- As of Sept 13, 2009: 34

CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions
- As of Dec 31, 2009: 13
- As of Sept 13, 2009: 21

Notes: One unit completed the District Development Program in December and thus is no longer rated.
CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >95%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%.
SIGAR is conducting an ongoing audit to evaluate the reliability of ANSF assessments, including the CM rating system.
Transfer

No clear definition as yet, but “transfer” is to begin by mid 2011.

- Afghan government will remain dependent on US and outside financial aid indefinitely into the future -- probably through 2021 and beyond.
- US military advisors talk about doubling (and largely funding) the ANA and ANP, but Presidential approval is uncertain and force expansion is to be assessed annually.
- US military advisors call for real partnership with Afghan forces, but it is unclear if this can be implemented before 2011, must less fully prepare for transfer before 2014.
- No clear plan for increasing Afghan governance capacity or economic support and development.

Success requires the US to address all six centers of gravity in the war. The US must have truly integrated civil military efforts. And, there is Pakistan...
Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

• Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Restructure the UN, allied, NGO, and the international community efforts to actively address these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.
Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

1) Securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and

2) Training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.