


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UNPOL: UN police as peacekeepers

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There have been momentous shifts underway in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UN Police Division, long back the ‘poor cousin’ of the military side of the house, has been elevated to a new status. In the new institutional environment, the Division is now embedded within a rule of law and security institutions pillar, with its own Assistant Secretary-General, and which is increasingly recognised as being central to the successful conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. This paper looks at the rise of the Police division within the UN family, and assesses some of the challenges currently facing the UN’s unprecedented push to use police to a much greater and deeper extent in very challenging contemporary peace operations.

Keywords: UNPOL; UN police division; peace keeping; peacebuilding; international policing

Policing within the peacekeeping and peacebuilding context

The concept of peacekeeping was introduced by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold to isolate Cold War conflicts; to ‘maintain quiet’ to try to allow political solutions to develop as well as they might (UN Department of Public Information 1990). Key peacekeeping principles were one that insisted UN peacekeeping operations to be: UN missions (formed by the UN with a UN appointed general in the field under the authority of the UN Secretary-General); deployed with the consent of all parties after political settlement reached; strictly impartial; that personnel were to be provided on voluntary basis; and that military and other units operated under strict rules of engagement that emphasised minimum use of force (Goulding 1993). In such scenarios there was, theoretically, a peace to keep. However, the events of the early and mid-1990s saw the UN being drawn into second generation peacekeeping, peacebuilding and even towards the possibility of peace enforcement.¹ Though the UN has shied away from peace enforcement post-Somalia, and although the term ‘second generation peacekeeping’ has slipped out of common usage, there has since emerged what has been termed a ‘peacebuilding consensus’ (Richmond 2004). Here a normative shift has seen the UN being drawn into complicated and comprehensive post-conflict efforts to rebuild state institutions, to go beyond the peacekeeping principles mentioned above. This has had major ramifications for UN police personnel. ‘Peacebuilding’ has been defined in many ways but what is important here is that it often requires an ability to build

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organisations, to construct or change institutional structures and organisational cultures, not just to patrol or monitor, and these tasks are generally undertaken in very difficult post-conflict scenarios. This paradigmatic shift has been recognised by the UN Police Division and a number of resultant changes have been put into place, but the Division remains under-resourced for the tasks that it is mandated to do and it will soon face new strategic shifts within the UN family that will continue to demand further adaptation. This paper looks at the rise of the Police division within the UN family, and assesses some of the challenges currently facing the UN's unprecedented push to use police to a much greater and deeper extent in very challenging contemporary peace operations.

Recent changes in New York: the UN police division

A Civilian Police Unit was first established at the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in May 1993 and was tasked with planning and coordinating all matters relating to policing activities in UN peacekeeping operations (Hansen 2002, p. 21). Throughout this decade policing tasks deepened and broadened, with the traditional support, monitoring, advising, reporting and training (SMART) model that predominated during the Cold War years and that reflects traditional peacekeeping principles as outlined above starting to be challenged by the operational needs of peacebuilding missions. These missions increasingly saw UN police personnel drawn into executive policing functions and towards reform, restructuring and rebuilding roles.

In a statement made in 1997, the President of the Security Council (UN Press Release 1997) recognised the importance of police personnel to the broader UN mandate by stating that:

(T)he civilian police perform indispensable functions in monitoring and training national police forces and can play a major role, through assistance to local police forces, in restoring civil order, supporting the rule of law and fostering civil reconciliation, (moreover the UNSC) sees an increasingly important role for civilian police.

Following recommendations from the Brahimi Report (United Nations Secretariat 2000) which looked to reassess the UN's involvement in peacekeeping writ large, the Civilian Police Unit was upgraded to a Civilian Police Division. Here too, as Hansen points out (2002, p. 22) it was significant that at this time the Division's head was promoted to the same level as the UN Military Adviser to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping. The Report (United Nations Secretariat 2000, p. 7) also called for a significant increase in staffing for the Division – from nine to 23 officers. However, the recommendation for creating the post of Assistant Secretary-General to manage both uniformed divisions was at that point in time denied by the UN's funding committees (Lewis *et al.* 2002, p. 8).

More recently, the military adviser was promoted to the level of Assistant Secretary-General, whilst a new Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions was created in mid-2007. The aim was to enfold the Police Division alongside Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section, DDR Section and Mine Action Service. This created linkages with Security Sector Reform (SSR), and entitles the Office as a whole to its own Assistant Secretary-General.² In late 2007, the UN

Police Division was comprised of around 33 staff at any one time and has three core parts – the Office of the Police Adviser, the Strategic Policy and Development Section (SPDS), and the Mission Management and Support Section (MMSS).³ The Police Adviser currently has three support staff and will receive an additional Deputy Police Adviser once the selection process for that post is finalised in early 2008. The SPDS has eight allocated positions and the MMSS 19. The position of Police Adviser is also one that is a two-year post with a possible one-year extension, with the Adviser being chosen from country nominations. This division of labour will have to adapt in order to conform to the new Integrated Operational Team (IOT) concept (as explored further below). In order to help augment these staff that are permanently based at the UN and following approval that came through in 2006, the UN has also developed a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) that consists of 27 personnel to be ‘always ready to go’ to start up new operations or to assist existing ones with expert services. It is set to include 25 personnel with backgrounds in areas such as police reform, transnational crime and transitional justice as well as two administrators. It completed its first two week induction training programme on 8–19 October 2007 and began to deploy its first mission in Chad in December 2007. The SPC will be based in New York for a year before relocating to Brindisi. In addition to such in-house reshuffling, the UN Police Division has also been making concerted efforts in other fields. It has created a Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) to assess a cross section of rule of law factors in a mission area. Although there has been some uncertainty as to how this relates to the collection of what may ostensibly be seen as intelligence-gathering, ROLIX is intended only to focus on the status and workings of rule of law institutions, and that it is a joint project with other UN offices – hopefully helping to overcome some of the duplication and miscommunication that has occurred in past operations. Similarly, the Division is seeking to establish a database of prospective leaders including Police Commissioners and Senior Police Advisers. The database is intended to provide a rolling list of key police personnel across police contributing countries (PCCs) to help speed up the process of recruitment and deployment. The Police Division has also enlisted the help of an International Policing Advisory Council (IPAC) to provide strategic advice and a ‘specialised and dedicated high-level forum for critical discussion and policy-level input on international policing matters’ made up of prominent policy-makers, experts and specialists in the field (Kroeker 2007).

At the same time, a concerted effort has also been made to systematise the information side of the Division’s undertakings. In addition to the monthly statistics on police numbers from contributing countries, additional publications have been produced. The *Portfolio of Police and Law Enforcement Projects* that was produced in 2007 is a comprehensive document that charts all 73 existing law enforcement projects then underway in nine missions.⁴ Among other things, it outlines the objectives, estimated costs (and breakdowns thereof) for one year, activities, expected outcomes and benchmarks. It also provides contact details for mission managers as well as useful annexes that summarise budgetary issues (UN Police Division 2007). The provision of this information is at least in part expected to encourage further donations from PCCs either through the UN system or bilaterally, to reassure those donors as to how missions are being tracked, but also to provide information to help cooperation and coordination with other agencies (by helping to avoid duplication, etc). The Division has also published two editions of a *UN Police Magazine* (in

December 2006 and June 2007), although at the end of 2007 there are no dedicated personnel nor a secure pool of funding for this project to continue. Finally, the Division is using the DPKO intranet to organise relevant documents, and is carrying out an oral history project with Princeton University, to capture the experiences of Police Commissioners and others in the field, to bolster institutional memory and to provide a useful resource for training and information purposes.

Beyond these internal developments, there has also been some effort at strengthening relationships within DPKO and the broader UN family as a whole. The IOTs mentioned above are an important initiative because they bring together police, military, political and logistical/support components in mission based teams – hence the creation of ‘Team Darfur’ – which are co-located and whose role is to provide advice, coordination of response and essentially be a multi-tasking New York based contact point for missions in the field. Longer term development planning at the strategic level and recruitment will remain core tasks within the Division, although operational and tactical parts of missions may increasingly be shared with and across other actors. In addition to the information and experience sharing that this will engender, it may also help to standardise some aspects of the tasks that military and police undertake. Although military and police personnel have very different training, ethos and understandings about vital issues such as the use of force, for reasons of operational functionality, ‘training and doctrine within a coalition need not be uniform for true integration, but it must be compatible’ (Bullock cited in Hillen 2000, p. 60). The move to IOTs could well see, for example, the emergence of a common understanding as to how the military joint command structure of ‘J1-J9’ corresponds with similar roles within policing institutions. IOTs therefore present a number of opportunities for a more coordinated, systematic response to crises but may also mean that personnel who are technically counted as working for the Division may not be able to multi-task or work on other projects, thereby further stretching already limited resources.

In addition to the IOT concept which is based around specific mission requirements, initiatives involving others have also been ongoing. For example, as Mobekk (2005, pp. 8, 9) notes, the importance of a holistic rule of law approach to operations had originally been recognised by the creation of a Judicial Officer post and a similar position for a Correctional Officer within the SPC of the Police Division. Although this has changed with the shift to an overall rule of law ‘pillar’ within DPKO which has seen the criminal law and judicial advisory section moved out to separate sections, according to Acting Chief of the MMSS (G. Beekman, personal communication, Nov 2007), good communication and cooperation continues between the Police Division and the other Sections within the Office. Furthermore, there are ongoing efforts to strengthen relationships with member states’ permanent missions. Most countries at the UN do not have a permanent police adviser, and as Smith *et al.* (2007, p. 6) have pointed out, the Police Division has therefore had to work with military advisers who may not understand the requirements of policing. At the end of 2007, only Argentina, Australia, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, Spain and Sweden (soon Canada too) had police advisers based at their permanent missions, whilst at least 85 countries had military advisers (and usually deputy advisers) based in New York. This is, in part, connected to the UN’s overall focus on strength in diversity, and it is clear that there is a diverse range of personnel offered up for such missions.

The principles and practice of UNPOL in peace operations

In order to try to create some common minimum operating standards and principles across this diverse range of recruits, the UN Police Division is moving to formulate new doctrines and guidelines for all UN Police (UNPOL) personnel. This section outlines such recent and ongoing developments before investigating the issue of current composition, and rounding off by mentioning a number of pressing, operationally focused issues.

Principles and guidelines: developing common standards

In terms of the development of guiding principles, long-term strategic planning and doctrinal development, the UN has long had a very general code of conduct for law enforcement officials which calls on them to undertake their duty imposed upon them by law, to serve the community, to uphold human rights, and to abide by the minimum use of force ethos amongst other things. Similarly, the more detailed (United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch 1994) *United Nations criminal justice standards for peace-keeping police* handbook was released in 1994 with the help of Civilian Police (CIVPOL) members who had served in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in the hopes that it would prove useful in those future UN operations ‘acting as a catalyst for change in law enforcement and police behaviour, as well as a guide for effective and fair criminal justice administration’ (p. 3). The handbook covers the role of police as it relates to fulfilling duties imposed by law, serving the community, protecting persons against illegal acts, and respecting and protecting human rights. It also outlines the procedures for lawful arrest, the use of force and firearms, trials, the handling of victims, refugees, detainees and prisoners, and the need for law enforcement officers to resist corruption, the use of torture, illegal executions and genocide.

However, there are still a number of gaps in terms of the development of an overarching comprehensive doctrine and a more robust standardisation of policing efforts. In an effort to fill such gaps, the UN Police Division has also recently brought about Doctrine Development Groups. These groups have been established to undertake work on the development of doctrine and policy in areas such as policy relating to formed police units (FPUs) and police Pre-Deployment Training. These doctrines were, at the end of 2007, still being finalised but present the first real chance for all of those personnel involved in policing roles to be ‘on the same page’ in terms of a much more comprehensive and systematic set of common rules and guidelines.

For example, with regard to Pre-Deployment Training, it is clear that a lack of common standards has significantly hampered UN efforts. In the later part of the 1990s and into the new century the UNDPKO brought into being the *Selection standards and training guidelines for United Nations civilian police* (UNDPKO 1997), and the *United Nations police officers course* (UNDPKO 2000) which looked to outline more stringently the requirements for personnel operating in UN policing missions. Moving on from the more basic requirements for recruitment to UNPROFOR as outlined by Perito (2004, p. 94) and which included minimum five years police experience, ability to drive 4WD vehicles, and oral and written fluency in English, the UN has developed more specific guidelines for the standards,

skills and training of recruits. In addition to these minimum requirements, UNPOL personnel will also ideally have knowledge of:

- their member state's laws and penal system;
- their member state's national constitution and legal authorities;
- the national/international code of conduct for law enforcement officials;
- basic crime scene skills;
- the use of communication equipment and radio procedure;
- the use, proficiency, care and control of personal issue firearms;
- basic policing skills; foot patrols, vehicle patrols, domestic intervention, traffic control, accident site reporting, map-reading, reporting writing and interviewing techniques;
- basic negotiation and conflict resolution skills;
- problem solving strategies; and
- basic first aid and stress management techniques (Asia Pacific Regional Initiative 2003, pp. 160–161).

Clearly not all recruits reach this level of competence. However, what is most notable with regard to this issue of training is that, as noted in discussion with Policy Coordination Officer (R. Landgren, personal communication, Nov 2007) *for the first time* the Division, in cooperation with the DPKO Integrated Training Service (ITS), is currently drafting both a Darfur tailored pre-deployment curriculum as well as a standard pre-deployment curriculum that may hopefully become *de rigueur* for UNPOL personnel. In addition to more systematic approaches to initial recruitment of personnel, the Police Division is also seeking to introduce a Performance Appraisal System that is linked to promotions and extensions and to launch an FPU evaluation and training system (Kroeker 2007) (With regards to this latter ambition, as Dziedzic and Stark (2006) note, there have been some advances already, such as the UNDPKO teamed with the Centre for Excellence in Stability Police Units to conduct command development seminar for FPU commanders and their police commissioners with the first seminar being held in mid-March 2006). Although such measures are vital for ensuring the quality of UNPOL personnel in the field it also, admittedly, narrows the potential candidates for selection – presenting the UN with something of a catch-22 situation as it aims to deploy good quality police in enough numbers to actually be able to make traction in peacekeeping missions.

Such attempts to standardise minimum policing principles at a global level present an unprecedented opportunity to disseminate norms that see police as being responsive to the people they serve. Although it may be difficult to embed these norms deeply in those personnel from very different social and cultural contexts and who are rotated fairly frequently, there is a chance here to *both* gain some common understanding *and* to help seed and further embed those basic standards and practices outlined in previous documents – such as the upholding of human rights – at a global level.

Composition issues

All of the documents outlined above are part of a concerted effort to overcome past operational problems. Many of these problems have occurred because of the wide variations in the quality of police personnel that are offered up for service on UN

missions. Consequently, additional efforts at increasing the size of the pool of potential police for deployment as well as other quality control efforts have been undertaken in tandem with these more general guiding statements of principle sketched above. After all, the UN Police Division is first and foremost tasked with the recruitment of police officers for deployment to UN missions, and the quality of those police needs to be such as to enable the UN to achieve the objectives of the mission at hand. Policing numbers grew from 35 in 1988 to 1500 during the Namibia mission, and as Bayley (2001, p. 4) notes, by February 2000 the UN had deployed 9000 CIVPOL around the world. Moreover, as Kroeker (2007) outlines, numbers of UN Police officers deployed on operations increased from 7300 in August 2006 to 8800 in January 2007 to 9600 in August 2007, and projections suggest that the number of UN Police deployed in international operations will likely grow to 16,000 in 2008 (other projections suggest this may be a conservative estimate).

In terms of finding enough qualified personnel the Brahimi Report (United Nations Secretariat 2000, Recommendation 10) explicitly called on UN member states to 'establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice'. This document was the result of a very comprehensive review of United Nations Peace Operations which, amongst other things, sought to augment and invigorate member state commitment to international policing to address the key issue of recruiting and retaining good police personnel. By the time of the Report, the UN was finding it very difficult to sustain adequate numbers of qualified policing personnel in the field. For example, in February 2000 member states had provided only 5122 police officers to fill the nearly 9000 posts that had been authorised by the Security Council (Crossette 2000). The increasing demand for such a policing capability helped bring about a realisation that ensuring greater commitment to international policing by member states was a necessary part of successful peace operations. In October 2004, the UN Police Division established a Police Generation Service in the hopes of bringing this recommendation to life. There was a call for member states to have rolling rosters of experts to share the recruiting burden and to pool police in support of this stand-by concept. However, this concept was hampered by a rather patchy response across PCCs and never really gained the momentum needed. More recently, as noted by Smith *et al.* (2007, pp. 5, 6) this concept has been replaced by other initiatives such as *Operation 100* which hopes to increase the number of PCCs (which stood at 88 in mid-2007). At the end of 2007 the number of PCCs was 92, and, according to the second edition of the *UN Police Magazine* (UN News Service 2007b, p. 11), in terms of numbers of personnel provided, the top ten PCCs in respective order were: Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Senegal, Nigeria, India, Portugal, USA and Turkey.

In addition to trying to increase the number of donor countries, the UN Police Division has moved towards using FPU's. Formed or Stability Police Units are valuable in providing an interim force between military and community police responses in peace support operations because, as Dziedzic and Stark (2006) note, they are:

(R)obust, armed police units that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the flexibility to use either less-than-lethal or lethal force, as circumstances dictate.

Initially deployed in Kosovo (although the *carabinieri* were earlier used in a similar role by NATO in Bosnia), in 2005 the UN was fielding 27 FPU. By early 2007, there were 35 FPU deployed in UN operations with projections for up to 19 units to be used in the coming mission to Darfur (Sudan) in 2008. Unlike the provision of individual officers to the UN (who do not qualify for reimbursement but receive a mission subsistence allowance (MSA) between \$2400 and \$4500 per month) governments providing these FPU do get reimbursement (albeit less, at around \$1400 per month) which makes recruitment of FPU an easier task (Smith *et al.* 2007, p. 3).⁵ Whilst in mission, the UN must provide clothing, equipment, communication and transport; however, such personnel must find and fund their own accommodation and provide for their own security, even if unarmed. Moreover, in testing FPU for selection, only the FPU commander is required to meet all of the above criteria, as the FPU is expected to operate as a unit and therefore, is tested as a unit only with regards to more practical tests such as crowd control responses. This may help to address some of the critical recruitment problems the Police Division faces. While this could potentially allow for unsuitable candidates to gain UNPOL status, such FPU may help to promote another key concern: the issue of gender balance.

The UN's first all-female FPU was deployed in 2007 from India to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to join the 82 other individual female officers already serving in that mission. This highlights ongoing attempts by the UN to address the need to increase the ratio of female police staff involved in missions (UN News Service 2007a, pp. 4, 5). The UN has done more than this, by hosting workshops to create strategies to improve upon the number of female officers that made up just 6% of the force, by working on a document to mainstream gender, and simply by highlighting that this is a central issue for UNPOL (Kroeker 2007). This is particularly significant, given the post-conflict situations that UNPOL often find themselves working in-situations where female officers may perform better with regards to dealing with issues such as war rape or other human rights violations against women and children.

Lastly, another sensitive topic that is also beginning to be tackled is the question of when a uniformed police officer is required to undertake certain tasks versus when non-police officers may carry out certain jobs. The 'civilianisation' of policing and military establishments has proceeded apace since the end of the Cold War. This occurs against a background of budgeting and recruiting pressures, and the ongoing reassessment of just what skill sets those institutions require to successfully conduct their core business. However, this has become even more pressing in recent years for the Police Division as its mandated tasks have broadened and deepened, requiring different skill sets for different facets of the policing part of operations within a peacekeeping mission.

The practice of international policing

As noted above, the UN has moved beyond the SMART model. Not only has what qualifies as 'monitoring' changed significantly (as noted by Hansen in 2002), but the key tasks for personnel increasingly revolve around the 'Three R's' – *reform, restructuring* and *rebuilding*. Police may be deployed as *peacekeepers* in the

traditional SMART context or even *enforcers* if they have an executive policing role, but there is also a growing demand for UNPOL to act as *peace builders*.

There is an urgent need for particular skills in this new environment, skills in business administration, human resources and management amongst other things. The Division is not just having to source good street cops but also trying to find senior management and strategic advisers. This has necessitated the development of a new approach to recruitment and has highlighted the need to match staff to tasks. Such changes in institutional culture and capacity (here I mean changes *both* within the Division *and* in terms of the missions the Division is becoming involved in) may well bring about an increased civilianisation of some roles. Although this is a sensitive issue in terms of trying to establish when there is a need for uniformed personnel as opposed to when a well-informed civilian with specialist skills may well be the right choice, it is nonetheless crucial to match needs with appropriate skill sets to enhance chances of success in the rather daunting tasks the UN takes on. Andrew Carpenter (personal communication, Nov 2007), Chief of the Police Division's SPDS strongly asserts that international policing is 'different from the day job' since it projects a body of men and women beyond their normative legal framework not only into a different cultural, political, social and economic environment, but one that has been racked by conflict. Moreover, this work of reforming, rebuilding and restructuring police institutions requires skill sets that are in desperately short supply or non-existent within regular domestic policing. Personnel must be matched to these tasks at hand and this could see an increasing presence of non-uniformed personnel in certain jobs or in certain phases of a mission. This revision of just who can undertake 'policing' tasks and why is an ongoing one, as is the relationship of the Division to the Mission in-field.

Two positions are particularly key for how UNPOL operates on the ground, these being the civilian role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSB), and the top policing position on the ground – the Police Commissioner. The SRSB is the head of mission, and the Police Commissioner (who exercises control over UNPOL personnel and coordinates activities with other actors on the ground) reports to him or her through the Principal Deputy SRSB, not back to the Police Division in New York. Once the mission is in place, then, the Police Commissioner can operate quite autonomously from the Division. In the past this has sometimes meant that the Division has acted more as 'mailman' than adviser to those in the field, although it appears that this is starting to change as the Division moves into longer term strategic planning and standard setting.

Lastly, in terms of the 'nuts and bolts' of policing in UN missions, there have been some changes forthcoming in terms of the use of FPU and minor changes with regards to logistical support. As noted above, there has been a major increase in the use of FPU for a variety of reasons. These FPU are increasingly used as a 'presence' in missions, patrolling the streets – albeit with the need to clearly display 'police' insignia and the requirement to report to the Police Commissioner rather than any military figure. With regard to the second issue of logistics, the UN system (despite the establishment of the base at Brindisi) has been criticised for being too slow and cumbersome. Indeed at times Brindisi has added to the problem. This is because if equipment is needed for a mission and is available locally for quick delivery, it cannot be brought in if the same equipment is held in Brindisi, which slows UN missions even further. The UN Security Council has to approve a mission

before the UNDPKO can start procurement, and there has not been success thus far with stockpiling mission kits (Perito 2004, p. 96).

The above demonstrates that major changes have taken place and are ongoing for both the Police Division at UNHQ in New York and for UNPOL personnel deployed in mission. Further changes are set to follow.

The future of police as peacekeepers?

Police have moved from limited roles in UN missions to deeper and broader involvement that may bestow executive powers or that may require the complete rebuilding of a country's police service. Yet the Police Division and UNPOL personnel must work within the broader UN framework and will therefore again have to adapt to any further changes that may be introduced under the new reviews into SSR and into the broader concept of peacekeeping and peacekeeping doctrine that are currently underway.

Prompted by the increased demands being placed upon the UN to support national authorities in SSR, a UN system-wide SSR Task Force was recently established by the Secretary-General to lead in the development of a holistic, coherent and coordinated UN approach to SSR. The Task Force is co-chaired by the United Nations Development Programme and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations. The most immediate priority of the SSR Task Force is the preparation of a comprehensive Secretary-General's report on SSR, as requested by the General Assembly in May 2007. This report will propose a framework for future UN engagement in SSR, which is expected to assist UN actors in this important area. For example, UN training on SSR, to civilians as well as police and military personnel, may assist in ensuring better governance of security sector actors, whilst enabling UN staff to better support national counterparts. This process will therefore impact upon both the Police Division and UN 'policing' more generally, although these effects are obviously yet to be played out.

An even broader review is underway to define the doctrinal foundation of UN peacekeeping writ large. This review process, called the 'Capstone Doctrine' is assessing the overarching status of UN peacekeeping – that is, its purpose and key principles. This is a major task that has not been undertaken since the mid-1990s. At the end of 2005 the assessment process had moved through a number of iterations. Retired Major General Robert Gordon was brought in to draft an initial document. The draft was reworked in light of initial feedback at the UN, and then sent out for consideration within six regional workshops held in Stockholm, the USA, Singapore, Ottawa, Jordan and at the Conference of American Armies from late 2006 to mid-2007. Think tanks, field workers, NGOs, bureaucrats and practitioners have been brought into comment on draft documents, and an initial summary of some of the key ideas were drafted by Ahmed *et al.* (2007) and published in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* in 2007. The final draft is now under consideration by member states. Here, as outlined on the UN Website (2007), the major concern is to clearly demarcate what the UN can do through peacekeeping and what it cannot. There is some concern to try to push the envelope with regards to issues such as whether or not defence of a mandate qualifies as 'self-defence', and the potential to shift from terminology of the non-use of force to that which refers to 'restraint in the use of force'. There is also concern to recognise the limits of peacekeeping. Thus the

notion of consent has been stressed, the idea of peace enforcement by and large ignored, and the idea of peacebuilding entertained but again mainly sidelined whilst the core business of peacekeeping is reinscribed. If and when the Capstone Doctrine is released there will be further work to be done on ascertaining where peacebuilding fits for the UN family given the very recent creation of the Peacebuilding Commission.

These broader developments will undoubtedly impact upon the work of police as peacekeepers *and* peacebuilders no matter what the eventual outcome, but such effects are as yet to be discovered. In projecting possible scenarios, there could well be a number of different mechanisms and divisions of labour that, emerge to deal with these core demands of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It could mean, for example, that UNPOL police officers managed by the Police Division return to focus on peacekeeping whilst the Peacebuilding Commission deals with the broader management, human resources and institution building side of police efforts in UN missions. Of course, any such scenario would have to be well thought through as to its strengths and weaknesses. And whatever the result, there will need to be strong communication ongoing between all UN agencies, as well as the ongoing pursuit of a healthy relationship between uniformed officer and non-uniformed civilian advisors.

Conclusion: UNPOL as peacekeepers

Numbers of police deployed under UN mandates have increased exponentially. The practice of international policing has broadened and deepened. There have been concomitant changes at the UN Police Division in terms of UNPOL personnel being tasked with peacebuilding not just peacekeeping, but complementary expansion in terms of the growth of institutional support for this role change has not been forthcoming and the organisational culture of the Division has struggled to keep pace with these changes.

The Police Division in New York is clearly under-resourced for the missions it finds itself tasked with. There is a clear mismatch between needs and expectations of UN policing and the resources that have been made available to undertake such missions. There are 33 staff members to manage a predicted 16,000 plus personnel in the field in 2008. Although the SPC and the IOTs will improve capacity somewhat, however, in spite of an increase in status with the creation of the rule of law and security institutions pillar within DPKO, the Division is stretched both by operational requirements and by the demands of longer term strategic issues. These include the pressing need to develop doctrine to keep up with changes in just what such personnel are tasked with in mission.

UNPOL used to operate principally as peacekeepers. The SMART model that emphasised monitoring and some more limited training programmes dominated until the 1990s but this has increasingly been replaced both by executive policing missions and by the three R's: reform, restructuring and rebuilding tasks. These entail two different skill sets: the first demands strong beat policing skills by uniformed, preferably unarmed police officers (although the mission may well need FPU support to function effectively); the second requires senior management, human resources or business administration experience. This demands a concomitant shift in planning and practice, as contemporary international policing can potentially move a peacekeeping beyond a mere 'security pause' into capacity-building and state-building. Police are

increasingly being used as peacebuilders rather than being restricted to narrower peacekeeping roles. However, in order to do this the UN needs quality recruits with various skill sets that are well-resourced and deployed in enough numbers with a robust mandate based on consent, clear lines of accountability and ongoing review to maintain legitimacy. Thus far, this has not been an easy task and will continue to be beset with problems until member states give higher priority to international policing missions.

Most important here at the end of the day is the fact that *all* UN missions require competent personnel who are all cognisant of the key principles, standards and operating procedures that should bind all police together when carrying out international policing tasks whether that involves peacekeeping or peacebuilding. As noted here, with the training and doctrine development that has begun at UN headquarters, there is now a chance to create, disseminate and consolidate minimum standards of international policing norms worldwide. This in particular is an opportunity that must not be lost.

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Notes

1. For a useful discussion of how UN operations can be seen to fall into four main camps, namely: observation missions; traditional peacekeeping; second generation peacekeeping and enforcement actions, see Hillen J., 2000. *Blue helmets; The strategy of UN military operations*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 18–31.
2. This raises the profile of the Office as a whole, improving its status relative to the other agencies within UN DPKO; the Office of Operations, Office of Military Affairs, and the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division.
3. Five of these positions are professional five-year posts ('P' posts) or 'galaxy' positions (positions that are open to competition). Upon completion of the five years, personnel who have occupied that position cannot reapply for their own post although they can go elsewhere in the Division or within the UN system. The other posts are either temporary contract staff or national secondments that were one-year rolling contracts for up to three years and which now may be moving to a two-year contract with possible one-year extension. There is no strict geographical allocation for such positions, but police contributing countries (PCC) are naturally interested in having a presence within the Division, although countries are usually represented by a maximum of two or three personnel.
4. These missions were underway in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Sudan (UNMIS), Liberia (UNMIL), Cote d'Ivoire (OUNCI), Burundi (ONUB), Georgia (UNOMIG), Kosovo (UNMIK), Timor Leste (UNMIT) and Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL).
5. They are easier to manage due to costs and represent a lesser demand on administration and management. After all, as Perito argues, usually when civilian police (not FPUs) are deployed in mission, although they may arrive as national contingents, they are often assigned as individuals to missions (2004: 86).

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