Challenges of Effective Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations

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Editorial Review Board

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Mr. Boivin is particularly interested in the subject of multilateral military intervention in civil wars with a focus on Afghanistan and the surrounding region. He has published numerous articles on the subject, as well as participated in collaborative works and contributes regularly to the media. Mr. Boivin previously worked for the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, where he helped develop a course for francophone civil servants from Africa in preparation of their deployment as part of peace operations. Mr. Boivin holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Ottawa and a Master of Arts degree in History and International Relations from *l'Université de Montréal.* He is a member of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies and associate researcher with the *Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale* (GERSI).

Stephanie Blair has served in a variety of capacities for a number of peace operations. Most recently she served in Kosovo from 1999, first with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) as Deputy Director of Human Rights, and then as Head of the first Field Office for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). In 2000, she served as a Municipal Administrator for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Ms. Blair provides consultancy services for various UN agencies, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Cranfield University's Centre for Security Sector Reform. She is currently completing a doctorate degree in the War Studies Department at King's College London.

An integral member of the team that established the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ms. Blair continues to serve as a member of the faculty. She was a co-founder of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), and was Secretariat co-Director from 1995 until 1998.

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Mr. Oswald has served in the Australian Regular Army as a legal officer. He has provided legal advice and held staff appointments as a legal officer at tactical, operational and strategic levels. During his service in Australia he provided legal advice to the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Headquarters Australian Theatre, Strategic Command and Directorate of Operations and International Law. He has served in Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, East Timor and Iraq. Mr. Oswald continues to serve in the Australian Army Reserve.

Mr. Oswald has both undergraduate and post-graduate teaching responsibilities, including courses on Criminal Law, International Dispute Settlement Law (IDSL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Peace and Security Law (IPSL), Institutions in International Law (IIL), and Principles of International Law (PIL).

Contributors |

Laurie Gorman is a Master of Arts candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Her research interests include peace operations, civilian protection during conflict, as well as the global response to HIV/AIDS with a regional focus on Africa.

Prior to beginning her graduate studies, Ms. Gorman was a Legislative Assistant with the Parliament of Canada for four years. Ms. Gorman has also worked at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs in the Eastern and Southern Africa Division and is currently interning at The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. where she conducts research on ongoing peace operations in Africa.

Ms. Gorman has studied at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. and in the United Kingdom. She holds a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree in History from the University of British Columbia.

Paul LaRose-Edwards is the founder and Executive Director of CANADEM (Canada's Civilian Reserve), an Ottawa based NGO that rosters over 10,000 screened individuals, and with Canadian government funding, deploys experts into the field. An international human rights lawyer for 25 years dealing with politics of advancing rights, Mr. LaRose-Edwards has worked in mission areas and countries such as Rwanda, Kosovo, Croatia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Indonesia. Mr. LaRose-Edwards has been on staff with NGOs such as Amnesty International, as well as the Canadian government, the UN, and the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Mr. LaRose-Edwards has worked as a consultant for the OSCE, the EU and NATO.

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Stephen Cornish has spent over a decade working with humanitarian organizations including Médecins Sans Frontières and the Canadian Red Cross. He is currently The Policy and Advocacy Advisor at CARE Canada. Mr. Cornish has been involved in creating humanitarian space and in delivering humanitarian aid in Chechnya, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda, Colombia and Haiti, among others. This past year he completed two brief missions to Afghanistan and was able not only to witness the current situation, but to compare it to his previous experience of bringing humanitarian assistance under the Taliban in 1987.

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Christa Meindersma is the Deputy Director External Affairs of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, where she also heads the conflict management program. Ms. Meindersma is an international lawyer with broad experience in international affairs and diplomacy. Previously, she worked as a senior political advisor at the United Nations and the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ms. Meindersma has been involved in peace negotiations and policy advice in East Timor, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kosovo, Darfur, Nepal and New York.

Foreword

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) is pleased to present the eleventh volume of *The Pearson Papers*: "Challenges of Effective Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations."

With the mix of different actors and organizations taking part in complex peace operations, the concept of integration has become increasingly relevant, as evidenced by the lively debate among theoreticians and practitioners within the peace operations community. Integration, in its narrow sense, is often seen as difficult and even undesirable. However, if understood as part of a larger trend toward strengthening peace operations, integration can be said to reflect the importance of cooperation and coordination among all actors involved in peace operations.

Increasingly, military, police and humanitarian actors find themselves, sometimes sharing but more often, co-habiting a common space in complex peace operations. Faced with diverse perspectives, lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities, and the need to identify lessons learned, they are finding new and innovative ways to collaborate and synchronize their actions. While revised operational principles, guidelines and doctrines are carefully crafted to incorporate the multiplicity of perspectives found in intervention efforts, more is required to enhance our understanding of current approaches to today's complex operations. In this spirit, the current issue of *The Pearson Papers* thoughtfully discusses and analyzes the theme of cooperation and coordination through a selection of four major articles and one dispatch from the field.

The first article examines the effects of a shift from multinational to regional peace operations on the United Nation's ability to maintain international peace and security. While some positive outcomes are identified from this shift, ultimately, the argument remains that enhanced and concerted coordination amongst all actors involved in peace operations is critical to achieve long-term peace and security. Coordination becomes even more critical where leadership is dispersed, efforts are fragmented and there is disagreement on priority access to scarce resources and facilities. This is reflected in the remaining articles and dispatch from the field, which discuss the theme of cooperation and coordination among diverse actors in the context of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is an interesting prototype of UN-mandated but coalition-led intervention, which not only disrupts our traditional "linear" understanding of peace processes, but pushes the boundaries in terms of how we view,

understand, and work in integrated environments. Given this background, the articles examine the challenges and effectiveness of civil-military interaction in Afghanistan and the advancement of a "whole of government" approach from a coalition, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and humanitarian perspective. Lastly, the dispatch from the field provides a credible account of the nature of the challenges of cooperation and coordination on the ground.

We hope that this issue will help strengthen and clarify the theory and practice behind current approaches to peace operations, and to inspire the relentless search for greater coherence amongst all stakeholders.

We would like to acknowledge the important contributions that have been made by others in preparing this issue. In particular, we would like to thank Kathryn Robicheau, Publications Coordinator, for her incredible eye for detail and fastidious work ethic. We would also like to thank the PPC's Research Analyst, Melissa Mifflin, M.A., for her commitment, continuous assistance, and her invaluable inputs throughout the process. We are very appreciative of our Editorial Review Board, for contributing their expertise and time towards the project. In addition, we are grateful to Marta Oprisan, M.A. Candidate, for her thoroughness and dedication to assisting with the project. Our appreciation also goes to PPC's Research Analyst, Aleisha Arnusch, M.A., for her contribution and crucial support during the initial planning and coordination, in collaboration with the Planning Committee, including Ann Livingstone, Ph.D., and Sarah Meharg, Ph.D. Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to Ted Itani, Humanitarian Adviser with the PPC, for his valuable insights and assistance in editing the final proof.

Our next issue of this volume will further explore the interoperability of integration. We hope that you enjoy this issue and find that it makes a valuable contribution to your understanding of complex peace operations.

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Editor

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The Implications of Regional Peace Operations on United Nations Capacity for Peacekeeping

Laurie Gorman

Abstract

The deployment of peace operations by regional organizations is often promoted as a means of relieving the UN in the area of peace and security and of promoting cooperation among organizations with complementary goals. In practice, however, the growing preponderance of peace operations by other actors than the UN is not necessarily a value-neutral enterprise, and the legitimization of the use of force by regional agencies coincides with a growing reluctance among developed nations to place troops under UN command. This paper will evaluate the shift towards regional peace operations by assessing whether it is undermining the UN's ability to maintain international peace and security. It will examine two regional operations: Operation Artemis, deployed by the European Union into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, and the African Union Mission in Sudan. This paper will argue that while these operations provide some temporary relief during an ongoing humanitarian crisis, without improved cooperation with the UN, regional operations will have little impact on long-term peace and security.

NATO and Militaries as Trusted Partners in Civil-Military Interaction

Paul LaRose-Edwards

Abstract

NATO's future in conflict, post-conflict, and post-disaster multidimensional missions is assured if NATO continues to enhance and expand its civil-military interaction capacity. Effective NATO civil-military interaction is dependant on being trusted by civilians as a partner, for which various NATO militaries are devising new or expanded civil-military interaction mechanisms. This will be the *sine qua non* of successful NATO transformation as set out in the seminal August 2004 Strategic Vision by NATO's Strategic Commanders. This paper looks at some of the key principles of effective civil-military interaction and some courses of action for NATO and militaries in general.

At the core of militaries being a trusted civil-military partner will be a conscious and hard-won reputation by NATO militaries that they are not taking over civilian roles, nor looking to coordinate the civilians. Various NATO militaries have been overstepping into civilian territory, proving to be highly counterproductive in the effort to gain the requisite civilian trust.

NATO's future in complex multidimensional missions is inexorably linked to effective civil-military interaction at the field level. Success will come from NATO restricting itself to a military role that above all provides a stable and secure environment for its civilian partners. This self-disciplined effort by NATO is vital to its being seen as a trusted partner. There is a danger of NATO giving into the temptation of trying to control, drive, shape, or even supplant the civilians, which would destroy rather than build the requisite trust for effective civil-military interaction, and would diminish the abilities of both the military and the civilians.

Understanding the Performance of Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team

Bas Rietijens

Abstract

This article investigates the performance of civil-military cooperation. A performance assessment of civil-military cooperation is appropriate as it addresses the actual contribution of the cooperation. In practice however, it is frequently difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, the cooperation has actually contributed to the objectives of the respective participants. A performance assessment framework consisting of a set of performance criteria is developed and by means of multiple case studies, is applied to eight civil-military alliances of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan, a province in northern Afghanistan. The case study shows that despite the overall positive feelings of participants about their performance, most alliances did not contribute significantly to many of the descriptive performance criteria, such as sustainability, situational awareness and force protection. To improve the performance of civil-military cooperation, the research ends by formulating recommendations with respect to ensuring continuity of activities. These include structuring the collection and processing of information, and increasing the involvement of local populations and humanitarian organizations.

Rethinking Deeper Integration: The Case for Safeguarding Independent Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan and Beyond

Stephen Cornish

Abstract

Current best practice suggests that conflict resolution missions are most likely to succeed under an integrated or "whole of government" approach (WGA). This approach is dependent on defense, diplomatic and development actors working together seamlessly to protect the population, meet their basic needs and support the rebuilding of failing states.

This model has now been appropriated for service in the 'War on Terror' which belatedly dressed its interventions in human rights language and humanitarian clothing. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is now implementing a WGA in a counter-insurgency war, where 'State Security' needs dominate at the expense of 'Human Security' needs and humanitarian concerns (both of which are now going largely unmet).

This paper will argue that the politicization and militarization of aid under the WGA in Afghanistan has created a number of un-resolved and counterproductive humanitarian challenges which can be partially remedied by decoupling humanitarian activities from the WGA and the politico-military project underway.

Clash of Revelations:
ISAF Nations Struggle to Sell the Integrated Approach on the Home Front

Christa Meindersma

Abstract

Whether one cares to look at the ISAF operation from an Afghan or a troop-contributing national perspective, it is not the military situation that causes concern to most analysts. It is the lack of national security capacity, the fragile social fabric of a war-torn country, and the absence of local governance structures, that pose a threat to normalcy. The question is whether there is enough political commitment to put the necessary resources into diplomatic and economic efforts, in order to create real stability and tangible peace dividends for the population. Efforts must be combined into a more integrated strategy to assist Afghanistan in what is one of the most challenging state-building exercises of modern history. A genuine commitment to an inclusive political process is the key to stability in Afghanistan. Encouraging negotiations with the Taliban should be part of a comprehensive approach and an exit strategy of foreign troops.

The Implications of Regional Peace Operations on United Nations Capacity for Peacekeeping

Laurie Gorman

Introduction

The United Nations Security Council reacted to the end of the Cold War by embracing peace operations with newfound enthusiasm. Complex and robust missions were mandated with growing frequency and were deployed into more hostile environments. In the mid-1990s, the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia, coupled with the United Nations' (UN) public failure to protect civilians facing mass violence in Rwanda, led to a critical re-evaluation of the goals of peace operations and a subsequent drawdown of support among Western nations for UN-led missions. Meanwhile, the demand for peace operations, particularly in Africa, continued to grow and currently far outstrips the UN's capacity to respond. Consequently, the deployment of peace operations by regional organizations is promoted as a compelling and logical option that fosters coordination and that can help to relieve an over-burdened UN. Regional peace operations are not, therefore, "in any way intended to relieve the broader international community of its collective obligations under the Charter of the United Nations,"[1] as the Security Council retains primary responsibility for international peace and security.

The growing preponderance of peace operations led by actors other than the UN, however, is not a value-neutral enterprise. With this in mind, this paper seeks to evaluate whether the shift from UN-led to regional peace operations undermines the UN's ability to maintain international peace and security, with a particular focus on its implications in Africa. The paper begins by outlining the historical and legal context of regional operations and identifies their potential advantages and concomitant challenges. The paper then examines two particular regional operations: a "fire-fighting" mission deployed by a Western regional arrangement into the Democratic Republic

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[1]   United Nations Secretary-General, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, Report A/52/871 – S/1998/318 (13 April 1998): paragraph 45.

of Congo (DRC), Operation Artemis, and a regional operation undertaken by the African Union in Sudan, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The paper concludes that while regional operations can provide for some temporary relief during an ongoing humanitarian crisis, without improved and concerted cooperation with the UN, these types of operations will have little impact on long-term peace and security.

The Historical and Legal Context

Legally, regional arrangements are governed by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Their role is subsidiary to that of the Security Council, which retains "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" under Article 24. This hierarchy was deliberate and reflects the compromise reached at the 1945 San Francisco Conference between globalist and regionalist visions of the new world order. Regional organizations were included in the UN Charter at the insistence of Latin American countries that sought to counter-balance the hegemony of the United States and the power that it wielded within the Security Council.[2] Thus, it appears that from the outset, regional organizations were perceived as a "vehicle of containment" of the Great Powers.[3] The following sections define regional organizations and assess the extent of regionalization in Africa.

What are Regional Organizations?

Regional arrangements are first mentioned in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter, which notes that the "parties to any dispute" may "resort to regional agencies or arrangements" for the pacific settlement of disputes. In addition, Article 53(1) specifies that the Security Council may use regional arrangements for "enforcement action under its authority," though it stipulates that "no enforcement action shall be taken … without the authorization of the Security Council." At the same time, Article 54 requires that regional arrangements inform the Security Council of all activities "undertaken or in

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[2] Rosemary Durward, "Security Council Authorization for Regional Peace Operations: A Critical Analysis," *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 3 (September 2006): 358.

[3] Louise Fawcett, "Evolving Architecture of Regionalization," in *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003): 13.

contemplation … for the maintenance of international peace and security."[4] Chapter VIII, however, does not define either "region" or "regional organiza- tion." While this permits a broad range of organizations to operate under the rubric of regional arrangements, it also complicates the legal framework for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. As Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin observe, "the legal bases for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, and peacekeeping and peace enforcement by regional organizations, has not been made clear within the resolutions of either the Security Council or the organizations concerned."[5] Kennedy Graham and Tania Felicio further note that the lack of definition has created a "confusing admixture of regional and sub-regional agen- cies, with different membership, statutory mandates in peace and security, and other organizations with qualitatively different mandates."[6] Examples include, among others, military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), continental organizations including the African Union (AU), as well as sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Arriving at a working definition of regional organization matters as it affects our analysis of the operational capacity of these organizations to undertake robust peace operations, as well as our assessment of the legiti- macy and potential effectiveness of these operations. To this end, a number of scholars and practitioners have proffered definitions of regional organi- zations and regionalization, though with substantial disagreement among

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[4] See United Nations Lessons Learned Unit, *Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms* (N.Y.: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, March 1999): paragraphs 13-14.

[5] Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004): 214.

[6] As cited in Durward, "Security Council Authorization for Regional Peace Operations," 352.

them.[7] For the purposes of this paper, regional peace operations encompass the deployment of military, police, and civilian personnel by any formally-mandated organization that can plausibly operate under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, irrespective of whether it operates within or outside its geographic theatre, but excluding any *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing. In addition, as this paper seeks to evaluate the capacity and suitability of regional peace operations, it focuses on missions that operate with the consent of the host government. This deliberately excludes interventions for humanitarian purposes, even if permitted under the mandate of the organization.[8] With this definition in mind, the next section analyzes the implications of regionalization for peace and security in Africa.

Regionalization and Africa

The rationale for analyzing regionalization through the lens of its impact on Africa is outlined well at the outset of Jane Boulden's study. In quantitative terms, Africa is the source of most ongoing conflict. Even as the 2005 *Human Security Report* documents a global decline in the total number of

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[7]   Louise Fawcett proposes that regionalization encompasses "any activity at the regional level that contributes in some way to the promotion of international peace and security." This explicitly incorporates both formal organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing. In contrast, Michael Pugh adopts a more restricted view of regionalization, arguing that regionalization is (or should be) limited to formal international organizations that "occupy a security space between national and global levels." While deliberately excluding *ad hoc* coalitions, Pugh avoids having to clearly define regional organizations by reverting to Chapter VIII. Jane Boulden, for her part, focuses on the "regional" element and defines these organizations narrowly as multi-state and geographically synchronous entities. Rosemary Durward is much more expansive and defines regional organizations as those agencies that "act in the interest of a region." This definition would, therefore, permit a regional organization to act outside its respective geographical area. While Durward's motivation for such an open-ended definition is to deliberately include NATO in any discussion of regional peacekeeping initiatives, the European Union (EU) has also undertaken operations outside its geographical theatre. See Fawcett, "Evolving Architecture of Regionalization," 11; Michael Pugh, "The World Order: Politics of Regionalization," in *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003): 31; Jane Boulden, "Introduction," in *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003): 6; and Durward, "Security Council Authorization for Regional Peace Operations," 352.

[8]   Both ECOWAS and the AU have incorporated the right to intervene without the consent of the host state. While ECOWAS intervened unilaterally in Liberia, this mechanism remains untested by the AU.

armed conflicts, including a parallel decline in Africa, more people are killed either directly or indirectly from armed violence in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined.[9] As a result, the greatest proportion of peacekeepers is deployed to this continent.[10]

Boulden also contends that the nature of UN engagement in Africa, including high-profile failures in Rwanda and Somalia, has been an important contributing factor to the disengagement by developed states from UN peace operations. In her opinion, the UN's peacekeeping record on the continent has had mixed results at best and the number of failed and/or ongoing operations outweighs the number of successful peace operations in Africa.[11] Thus, it seems reasonable to say that the experience and challenges of conflict management in Africa have, to some extent, fuelled the trend towards regionalization.

Finally, Boulden views Africa as an important area of analysis because it is "the region in which the assumptions and ideas associated with cooperated efforts is most tested."[12] This is exemplified by the high number of peace operations undertaken by a variety of actors in Africa, including operations by the African Union in Burundi and Sudan, interventions by the sub-regional organization ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as extra-regional initiatives such as the European Union's operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Why Regional Operations?

The global increase in regional peace operations is primarily demand-driven. The end of the Cold War resulted in a growing willingness within the UN Security Council to authorize complex peace operations with robust mandates. This proliferation in missions, however, meant that by the mid-1990s, authorized deployment had "reached and exceeded the United Nations' capacity to undertake UN-led military and military-related field

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[9]   Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 4.

[10] Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen note that as of December 2004, 75 percent of all UN peacekeeping personnel had been deployed to Africa. Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004*, Research Report (Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2005): 21.

[11] Boulden, "Introduction," 3.

[12] Ibid., 2.

operations."[13] This situation has worsened rather than ameliorated, and by 2005 the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was once again deploying troops at nearly the same levels it had a decade earlier.[14] This time, however, the UN had minimal operational support from Western militaries.

The practical reality is that "the United Nations cannot possibly do all that is necessary in the name of peace operations in all regions and there are well-known limitations to its own competencies."[15] Thus, proponents of regionalization assert that the latter is both "necessary and desirable" because it offers a means of burden-sharing among organizations that have complementary rather than contradictory goals.[16] Indeed, the past decade has witnessed a steady increase in the number of non-UN peacekeeping missions.[17] Further, proponents contend that regional organizations have a comparative advantage over the UN in particular types of peace operations.

Advocates of regionalization typically highlight six advantages of regional organizations. First, regional agencies may have greater legitimacy among the belligerents. Second, local knowledge about the combatants and the underlying causes of the incompatibilities are thought to enhance the opportunity for diplomatic efforts. Third, geographical proximity to the dispute in question permits regional agencies to deploy troops more quickly. Fourth, local actors may be better positioned to control or limit the number of potential spoilers to a peace agreement. Fifth, because of the potential spill-over effects of a conflict, local actors have a vested interest in its resolution and may, therefore, be more willing to intervene and remain involved in a dispute. Finally, regional operations may be the only realistic option when geo-political interests, or conversely the lack of interest, among the

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[13] William J. Durch, "Are We Learning Yet? The Long Road to Applying Best Practices," in *Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*, ed. William J. Durch (Washington, D.C.: United States Instituted of Peace, 2006): 597.

[14] Durch, "Are We Learning Yet?," 598; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Statement by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Challenges Project," London, 2 March 2005, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/article 020305.htm (accessed 6 December 2007).

[15] Ian Martin, "Is the Regionalization of Peace Operations Desirable?" in *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003): 53.

[16] This point was echoed by then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his April 1998 report to the General Assembly and the Security Council. UN Secretary-General, *The Causes of Conflict in Africa*, paragraph 41.

[17] Fawcett, "Evolving Architecture of Regionalization," 19.

five permanent members of the UN Security Council means that the UN will not get involved in a conflict.[18]

It is important to note that regional peace operations are not, in and of themselves, less desirable than UN involvement in a conflict. Both Boutros Boutros-Gali[19] and Kofi Annan have highlighted the potential for greater cooperation and coordination of efforts between the UN and regional agencies. In his 13 April 1998 *Report to the General Assembly and the Security Council*, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan underscored that greater cooperation between the UN and regional agencies was "desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems."[20]

By contrast, critics of regionalization are vociferous in their opposition. Sir Marack Goulding has been particularly outspoken in this regard, contending that, "the arguments for regionalization are specious and the arguments against it strong." He maintains that the support for regionalization among Western countries is directly linked to their desire to reduce their financial burdens and to "avoid risking their soldiers' lives in other peoples' wars."[21] Goulding offers two principal arguments against regionalization. First, except for Western arrangements, regional organizations do not have the necessary resources to manage multinational military operations. Second, if regionalization occurs at the expense of effective UN operations, it can "fragment security" such that "deprived areas that are economically and strategically peripheral will experience the double deficit of perpetual economic crisis and a 'peacekeeping apartheid.'"[22] If this is the case, regionalization allows the five permanent members of the Security Council to abdicate the moral responsibility that accompanies their prestigious position in the international system. By extension, regionalization does not adequately address the inherent inequality in global geo-politics. Indeed, the response among African leaders to the Secretary-General's 1998 *Report on Africa* reflects

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[18] See, among others, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 214. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

[19] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

[20] UN Secretary-General, *The Causes of Conflict in Africa*, paragraph 41.

[21] As cited in Martin, "Is Regionalization Desirable?", 53.

[22] As cited in Pugh, "The World Order Politics of Regionalization," 38 and Martin, "Is Regionalization Desirable?", 53.

this concern.[23] Because African regional organizations do not currently have adequate capacity to mitigate the adverse impacts of conflict, these leaders cautioned that the use of regional arrangements must enhance, not undermine, the commitment to peacekeeping in Africa by the United Nations.

Ultimately, because members of regional organizations are also members of the United Nations, they have accepted the primacy of the Security Council. The burden of proof of the comparative advantage of regionalization thus rests with its proponents. Regionalization should only be endorsed if it can be demonstrated that the consequences of regionalization will enhance, rather than undermine, international peace and security.

Regionalization in Practice

The discourse surrounding regional peace operations has, to some extent, obscured the actual pattern of deployment among UN-created missions, regional agencies, and *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing. Indeed, when evaluating the impact of regionalization on the capacity of the UN, it is important that this be elucidated. To this end, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams highlight several trends that are relevant to the discussion of the impact of regionalization on the capacity of the UN to maintain international peace and security.

Initially, Bellamy and Williams note that since 1999 there has been closer cooperation between the UN and other actors during peacekeeping operations. In fact, eight of the nine operations created by the United Nations since 1999 have worked closely in the field with non-UN actors.[24] The notable exception is the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which is a traditional peacekeeping operation with a Chapter VI mandate that can only use force in self-defence.[25] While traditional peacekeeping represents an important category of peace operations, it is becoming increasingly less common due to changes in the nature of warfare from inter-state to intra-state conflict.[26] Most contemporary conflicts in Africa are intra-state in nature, and globally, intra-state violence accounts for more than 95 percent of all armed conflicts.[27] In

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[23] Jane Boulden, "United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa," in *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003): 25-26.

[24] Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," *International Security* 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 164.

[25] Ian Johnstone, ed, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007): 116.

[26] Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 97.

[27] Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2005*, 23.

response to this trend, most current UN peace operations have a Chapter VII mandate that allows for the use of force beyond self-defence.[28]

Next, Bellamy and Williams look at the pattern of deployment of peace operations and demonstrate that from 1999-2003 there was a shift towards non-UN missions. This trend "stalled" and then "reversed" in 2004 when there were three new UN missions created but only one new non-UN operation. When the size of these operations is included in the analysis, the greater weight of UN operations is even more pronounced: in 2003, UN peacekeeping operations deployed 23,390 troops while non-UN missions incorporated only 14,350 troops.[29] Thus, while the data points to a resurgence in UN operations, regional arrangements remain an important recourse when the UN is either unwilling or unable to deploy an operation. It matters, therefore, to understand the implications of regionalization for global peace and security.

In the abstract, the numbers presented above do not tell the whole story of regionalization and a later article by Bellamy and Williams looks at the pattern of troop contributions to UN operations among Western countries in more detail. One of the problems facing UN missions is that troops arrive in the field poorly-equipped and with insufficient training for the job they are assigned to do. As a result, while the difficulty of finding the required number of troops for deployment is a problem, the quality of the troops being deployed matters as much, if not more, than the quantity because the consequences of deploying ineffective troops into a context of ongoing violence can be disastrous for both the troops and the surrounding communities.

Regionalization is not necessarily a value-neutral undertaking, as troop contributions to regional operations often replace rather than complement operational support for UN-led operations. For example, the decade between 1995 and 2005 witnessed a decline in contributions to UN missions among Western countries.[30] At the same time, there was a parallel "proliferation of operations mandated and conducted by other international organizations and coalitions of the willing,"[31] making it "harder for UN peacekeeping to secure the contributions it needs."[32] Both trends have important implications for the UN's capacity to maintain international peace and security.

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[28] Durward, "Security Council Authorization for Regional Peace Operations," 353.

[29] Bellamy and Williams, *Who's Keeping the Peace?* 164-165.

[30] Bellamy and Williams define the West broadly to include the member states of NATO and the EU, as well as those countries "openly aspiring membership of these organizations, and their core allies such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand."Also, Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The West and Contemporary Peace Operations," *Journal of Peace Research* (Forthcoming): 2.

[31] Bellamy and Williams, *The West and Peace Operations*, 2.

[32] *Guéhenno*, *Statement to the Challenges Project.*

The problem of ineffective troops is ubiquitous among UN operations and was particularly evident in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In 2003, MONUC was unable to protect the civilian population from ethnic militias in the town of Bunia, in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Following this humanitarian crisis, a robust and primarily Pakistani contingent replaced the Uruguayan troops that had been stationed in the city. The difference in outcomes between these two deployments is marked. The Pakistani forces instituted innovative measures to protect civilians while also aggressively pursuing the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR).[33] Arguably, there was a substantial increase in both the actual and perceived security among the civilian population that was a direct result of the efforts made by the Pakistani contingent.

Implications of Regional Operations

In this section, the paper traces the implications of regionalization by analyzing two particular types of regional operations. The first category encompasses a "fire-fighting" operation, Operation Artemis, deployed under the European Union following the crisis in the Ituri region of the DRC. This type of operation generally operates under Western regional arrangements and is deployed to "provide in-theatre support to beleaguered UN or other missions in the field."[34] The second category comprises a peace operation carried out by a regional agency, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

Drawing on William Durch's criteria of successful peace operations, this paper will use two criteria for evaluation. First, the paper asks whether the operation accomplished the tasks it was mandated to carry out. This implies an assessment of whether the mandate is appropriate to the situation on the ground. Second, the paper asks whether the peacekeeping operation contributed to the creation of a stable and secure environment.[35] The paper argues that the temporary relief provided by the deployment of regional operations does not necessarily translate into the long-term stabilization of an ongoing crisis if the deploying agency is either unwilling to commit its resources long-term, or if it lacks the capacity to maintain an operation and fulfil its mandate.

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[33] Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect, and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006): 166-167.

[34] Bellamy and Williams, *The West and Peace Operations*, 9.

[35] William Durch, as cited in Daniel Druckman and Paul C. Stern, "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41 (1997): 154.

Firefighting Operations: Controlled Deployment

In many ways, fire-fighting missions play to the strengths of Western regional arrangements, as they require the rapid deployment of capable troops and operate under a robust mandate. These are generally short-term and limited operations. They deploy alongside an ongoing (usually UN) operation and "aim to address specific challenges … that require greater enforcement capabilities."[36] The rationale for fire-fighting operations is that by tackling an unfolding crisis that is beyond the capacity of the current mission, they create the conditions necessary for a "beleaguered" mission to fulfil its mandate. In practice, however, their impact is not straightforward. Operation Artemis, deployed to the town of Bunia in the Ituri region of the DRC in June 2003, offers important lessons for how these operations can improve the immediate security problem, but do little to ameliorate the capacity of the ongoing UN Mission to fulfil its mandate. While a detailed evaluation of this operation is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief background will provide the necessary context.

Operation Artemis, also referred to as the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), was deployed under the auspices of the EU with authorization from the UN Security Council. The purpose of Operation Artemis was, in part, to provide security while MONUC built up its own capacity. It had a Chapter VII mandate to "contribute to the stabilization of the security condition and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the [internally displaced persons] in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence."[37] IEMF troops (predominantly French with contributions from a number of other EU and non-EU countries[38]) arrived in the DRC on 6 June 2003, reached full-strength in July and handed over most tasks to MONUC by 1 September 2003. They withdrew completely from the theatre on 7 September 2003.[39]

At the outset, Operation Artemis was designed to "serve as a stop-gap, buying time to build up MONUC forces and establish security in Ituri."[40]

36 Bellamy and Williams, *The West and Peace Operations*, 9-10.
37 United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1484: The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/RES/1484 (30 May 2003): 3-4.
38 Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
39 UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1484: The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/RES/1484 (30 May 2003): paragraph 1.
40 Holt and Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 161.

When it comes to evaluating Operation Artemis, therefore, the EU and UN maintain that it was "undoubtedly a success." It achieved its mandate, which was geographically restricted to the town of Bunia, and MONUC had built up its troop strength and was able to deploy its newly-established Ituri Brigade before the time came for the IEMF to drawdown and withdraw. For these reasons, the Best Practices Unit of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations concluded that:

> The crisis in Ituri was a humanitarian emergency, which threatened the wider peace process in the [DRC]. The IEMF deployment restored security to Bunia, allowed humanitarian assistance to be provided and put an end to the immediate crisis. In the end … its success really lay in the fact that it provided an opportunity for MONUC to deploy a capable and robust brigade to take over and extend beyond Bunia.[41]

Operation Artemis, therefore, meets Durch's first criteria of achieving its mandate. Critics, however, are less charitable and argue that Artemis' mandate was overly restricted, both geographically and temporally, such that the operation did not effectively address the underlying causes of the crisis. For the purpose of this paper, two categories of analysis are important: 1) in the short-term, did the IEMF stabilize the immediate crisis? and 2) in the longer-term, did it improve MONUC's capacity to establish a stable peace in the region? On both counts, consequences are mixed.

Critics contend that Operation Artemis' mandate was "totally insufficient" to address the depth of the crisis in Ituri.[42] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), a medical non-governmental organization that conducted humanitarian relief in Ituri throughout the crisis, has consistently argued that "these forces have managed to guarantee civilian safety only in very limited spaces carved out with great effort."[43] For MSF the problem was that the IEMF was limited geographically to the town of Bunia and, therefore, did not actually neutralize the broader threat that was posed by the armed militias. Rather, it "merely pushed the problem of violent aggression against civil-

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[41] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), Operation Artemis, 16.

[42] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). As cited in Ståle Ulriksen, Catirona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, "Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?", *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 519-520.

[43] International Crisis Group (ICG). As cited in Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, "The Shape of Things to Come?" 519.

ians beyond the environs of the town."[44] For example, approximately sixteen massacres were reported in the surrounding area during the IEMF's deployment.[45] Furthermore, by identifying up-front the exit-date of the operation, spoilers simply had to wait for the EU force to withdraw before resuming the violence. Even in the short-term, therefore, Operation Artemis had a limited impact on ending the insecurity.

The second category of analysis comprises the longer-term impact of the stabilization force and the extent to which it enhanced or undermined MONUC's capacity to maintain peace and security in the DRC. Briefly, MONUC is the most complex peace operation currently operating under the auspices of the UN and has a mandate to, *inter alia*, "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."[46] Throughout the course of its deployment, however, it has been plagued by an anaemic political commitment from the Security Council, a lack of baseline capacity due to inadequate troop commitments from UN member states, an overly-ambitious mandate, and poor conceptual clarity of how this mandate should be applied in the field.[47] It is not surprising, therefore, that despite warning of the impending withdrawal of the Ugandan People's Defence Force, MONUC was ill-prepared to fill the security vacuum that this created and required robust reinforcement.

Despite the provision of outside support, however, MONUC was unable to sustain the temporary improvements provided by the IEMF deployment. This was due to a lack of coordination between the two operations, as well as unwillingness among the troop-contributing countries to place the IEMF's resources at the disposal of UN force. In short, there was a "wide disparity in the respective capabilities of MONUC and the IEMF."[48] At the time of the IEMF's withdrawal, "MONUC lacked the Special Forces, intelligence and overflight capabilities that were crucial to the IEMF's success," and the UN mission was "unable to benefit from the IEMF's assets once it had left." This reinforced the transitory nature of any benefits provided by the regional

44 Katarina Månsson, "Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 511.

45 Holt and Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 162.

46 United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1291 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/RES/1291 (2000): paragraph 8.

47 Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," in *Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*, ed. William J. Durch (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006): 301-306.

48 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), *Operation Artemis*, 14.

deployment.[49] It is telling, moreover, that none of the participants in the regional operation were willing to "re-hat" with the UN. As a result of these factors, commentators suggest that Western engagement via a regional organization instead of "more permanent deployments to the UN" resulted in "fewer lives saved than there might have been" otherwise.[50] Thus, even when a regional operation is created with the principal intention of enhancing UN capacity to maintain global peace and security, it can undermine it instead.

African Solutions to African Problems – A Moral Panacea?

In contrast to the EU's operation in the DRC, which was an emergency measure intended to bolster UN capacity, regional peace operations are more often associated with stand-alone efforts by these organizations. These are endorsed as a means of "filling the gaps" that are left when UN member states either decline to get involved in a crisis or are unable to secure the consent of the host government. As such, these operations have the potential to enhance global peace and security by deploying operations to conflicts that would otherwise receive little international attention. This section evaluates the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and argues that because the AU is currently unable to operate without substantial external assistance, it is an inadequate response to such a grave humanitarian crisis.

To begin, it is necessary to determine the extent to which success is affected by whether a peace operation is conducted by the UN or by a regional organization. In short, there is no definitive answer. Among the more than fifty operations that it has conducted to date, the UN has had "a decidedly mixed record of success."[51] Even as it is credited with facilitating a successful transition in Namibia, UN operations in Africa have experienced spectacular failures, notably in Somalia and Rwanda. At the same time, however, the effectiveness of peace operations conducted by regional organizations in Africa has yet to be demonstrated. Paul Diehl concludes that "several studies that examined the alleged advantages and disadvantages of regional peacekeeping concluded that most regional organizations have neither the resources nor the political unity to offer a peacekeeping operation superior to those conducted by the UN."[52] Diehl's negative assessment of the effectiveness of regional peacekeeping operations is tempered somewhat by the simple fact that there is limited empirical evidence on the

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49   Ibid., 14.
50   Bellamy and Williams, "The West and Peace Operations," 14.
51   Paul F. Diehl, "Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping," *Global Society* 14, no. 3 (2000): 340.
52   Ibid., 340.

success or failure of non-UN missions. As regional organizations improve their capacity to mitigate the effects of local conflicts, they may become a preferred option.

Deploying a UN operation is not always possible; the UN requires the consent of the host government, or a resolution from the Security Council authorizing the use of force against a belligerent state. While the UN no longer considers absolute consent from the host state to be a necessary pre-condition for deployment, when consent is absent or partial, peacekeeping becomes increasingly difficult.[53]

In addition, deployment of a UN operation requires that all five permanent members of the Security Council acquiesce either through a positive vote or an abstention on the relevant resolution. This can be difficult to achieve given the geo-political interests of the five permanent members. In Darfur, for example, the AU was the most expeditious means of deploying an international presence to the region, given the strategic interests of Russia and China, and their reluctance to pressure the Khartoum government over the deteriorating situation.[54] As a result, AMIS is a prime example of a regional operation "filling the gap" left by the UN.

According to Paul Williams, outside intervention is the only viable means of ending the atrocities in Darfur. Williams maintains that because the crimes of genocide and mass killing require political organization, the armed groups in Darfur will continue their campaign of violence until they have achieved their objectives, unless "they are stopped by third parties willing to use force."[55] No domestic group in Sudan is strong enough to defeat the perpetrators of the violence. The reality on the ground supports this assessment. Though estimates vary considerably, approximately 300,000 people, mostly civilians, have died as a result of the conflict[56] and more than 2 million have been displaced.[57] Many of the displaced have crossed into Chad, spreading the insecurity beyond Sudanese borders.

Despite this deteriorating humanitarian situation, the government of Sudan asserted its sovereignty in Darfur and, until July 2007, refused to consent to a UN-led mission. Unless the Security Council was willing to authorize a unilateral intervention into Darfur, it was left with two options:

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[53] Ibid., 346-347.
[54] China's interest in Sudan rests on its desire to secure access to oil resources, while Russia is a primary supplier of arms to Sudan.
[55] Paul D. Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: the African Union Mission in Sudan," *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 2 (June 2006): 168.
[56] Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing," 177.
[57] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), "Darfur – UNAMID: Background," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background .html (accessed 25 February 2008).

it could continue to pressure Khartoum to authorize a UN mission using stronger sanctions, a no-fly-zone, and an arms embargo, or it could endorse a regional operation carried out by the African Union. AMIS was thus born in April 2004. From the outset, however, this mission proved unable to protect civilians from violence. AMIS strengthened its deployment and adjusted its mandate to include civilian protection in October 2004 and then further expanded its mandate in March 2005. Despite these changes, in the year following AMIS's deployment, the UN estimates that the number of war-affected persons increased from approximately 1 million in May 2004 to 2.9 million by June 2005.[58]

According to Williams, there were three principal problems with deploying AMIS to Darfur as "an African solution to an African problem."[59]

First, an AU mission of this size was "premature" because Africa lacked the necessary resources to deploy into an area of ongoing conflict. Indeed, the growing cost of the operation became prohibitive with the AU requiring approximately $23-25 million per month to maintain its troops.[60] Next, describing AMIS as an African solution is "inaccurate" because it is only able to operate with outside support. Notably, AMIS relies on logistical and financial contributions from the UN, EU, and NATO member states. Even this financial support, however, has proven insufficient to cover operational costs, let alone reimburse troop contributors on a regular basis.[61]

Finally, Williams posits that pursuing African solutions to genocide and crimes against humanity is "misguided" because it "provides international society in general and powerful Western states in particular with a convenient excuse for not doing more to help the civilian victims of this terrible war." It is at this point that the value of regional operations becomes contested. Williams is correct to point out that AMIS was rife with problems. Specifically, he charges that "although AMIS personnel have made some significant differences in their areas of deployment, the operation has been plagued by an unclear mandate … a lack of resources … and being

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[58] Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing," 175.

[59] All references to Paul Williams' article taken from Paul Williams, "The Crisis in Darfur: Why 'African Solutions' Are Not Enough," *YES: Young Europeans for Security*, http://www.yes-dk.dk/YES/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=288&Itemid=173 (accessed 2 December 2007).

[60] Henry L. Stimson Center, "UNAMID: AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur," *Fact Sheet Series 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007): 2.

[61] Katherine N. Andrews and Victoria K. Holt, "United Nations – African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa," *Issue Brief* (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, August 2007): 3-4.

forced to operate in an environment of ongoing conflict." Furthermore, he notes that the UN Security Council undermined AMIS by the contradictory signals that it sent to the Government of Sudan. While the Security Council passed a host of Chapter VII resolutions, in private its members indicated to Khartoum that they had little intention of implementing or enforcing these measures. Although it seems counter-intuitive to argue that no operation is preferred to an inadequate one even if a modicum of protection is extended, the presence on the ground of an ineffective operation can act in a way to reduce the pressure on the Security Council to intervene in the face of egregious violence and crimes against humanity.

Nevertheless, AMIS provided some measure of protection, however inadequate, to the civilians of Darfur until the Sudanese government finally agreed, in June 2007, to the establishment of the United Nations (AU/UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).Under Security Council Resolution 1769, the operation is authorized for an initial period of 12 months with a Chapter VII mandate that includes the protection of civilians.[62] When fully deployed, UNAMID will have a troop ceiling of 19,555 military personnel, including 6,432 police and will be the largest peace operation currently operating.[63] As of 31 January 2008, however, only 9,126 uniformed personnel, including 7,476 troops, 1,510 police, and one formed police unit have arrived in Darfur.[64] UNAMID also continues to face significant obstacles in force generation as the Government of Sudan requires the operation to retain an "African character," and many of the AMIS officers who re-hatted with the hybrid mission will finish their deployment in early 2008 and need to be replaced.[65]

The mission is also struggling to find sufficient air and ground transportation. As of 31 January 2008, the most pressing requirements include three additional "military utility aviation units," as well as at least two attack helicopters. While the UN Secretary-General has reiterated the fact that these are "indispensable for the establishment of the full operational capability of UNAMID," to date, only Ethiopia has pledged attack helicopters for the operation.[66] Finally, this deployment could still be derailed by a number of

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[62] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769, *Reports of the Secretary-General on Darfur*, S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007.

[63] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), "Darfur – UNAMID: Facts and Figures," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html (accessed 25 February 2008).

[64] United Nations, *Report on the Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, S/2008/98, 14 February 2008, paragraph 11.

[65] United Nations, S/2008/98, paragraph 12.

[66] Ibid., paragraph 27.

factors including limited funding, a lack of political will, or the withdrawal of consent by the Government of Sudan.[67] The Government of Sudan has already rejected the deployment of a Nordic unit comprised of Swedish and Norwegian troops to UNAMID.[68]

Ultimately, the deployment of military, police and civilian personnel to a conflict area raises expectations of protection from the civilian population. When these troops are unable to fulfil their mandate, this can have a deleterious effect on stability. To date, neither AMIS nor UNAMID have been able to extend adequate protection to civilians in Darfur and despite the presence of UNAMID peacekeepers, the security situation in Western Darfur has continued to deteriorate.[69] UNAMID, however, is still a young operation and is not yet fully deployed. If sequential deployment proves effective, it will have implications for future collaboration between regional organizations and the UN, without relieving the UN Security Council of its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

Conclusion

The primary goal of a peace operation is to ensure a stable environment in which peace can be fostered. This can be achieved regardless of the implementing agency as long as the mission has legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population, an appropriate mandate, and the resources necessary to achieve this mandate. As noted, there are circumstances in which the UN is unable or unwilling to deploy a peacekeeping mission. In these situations, a regional operation is not simply the next best option—it may be the only option. Often, regional arrangements are also a good entry into conflict mediation.

This paper sought to demonstrate that the implications of regionalization must be carefully thought through. In practice, the increased legitimization of the use of force by regional arrangements has been accompanied by a growing reluctance among Western developed nations to place their troops under UN command. At the same time, African regional organizations are not adequately equipped or trained to deal with the sheer number of conflicts facing the continent and they depend on outside support for their operations. Thus, the deployment of an AU mission can be a means of taking the pressure off the UN while the latter works towards a long-term management option. However, this paper suggests that relying solely on regional arrange-

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[67]   Stimson Center, "UNAMID," 5.
[68]   United Nations, S/2008/98, paragraph 30.
[69]   Ibid., paragraph 9.

ments is not a viable option in the long-term. Operational as well as financial support from Western nations remains critical for effective and robust peace operations.

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NATO and Militaries as Trusted Partners in Civil-Military Interaction

Paul LaRose-Edwards

Ad Hoc Trust –
An Introduction to Civil-Military Interaction Best-Practices

All coordination of international post-disaster and peacebuilding missions is premised upon a high degree of trust amongst those looking to coordinate themselves. Most field coordination is *ad hoc* and *just-in-time*. These are neither new ideas, nor specific to military. The requirement for trust reinforced by mechanisms and attitudes to enable voluntary coordination has been hard learned and refined over decades by various civilian players.

One of the better examples on the civilian side is the evolution of the lead United Nations (UN) 'coordinator' for civilian humanitarian assistance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but without any command and control in the normal sense, and the large Cluster Approach[1] that is evolving under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee umbrella so as to involve the whole humanitarian community. Much like OCHA, the Cluster Leads, both at the global and the state level (not necessarily the same), are tasked with coordinating without controlling or preempting the role of others. Civilian agencies active in post-conflict or humanitarian situations have learned the importance of trust and voluntarily sharing amongst themselves, especially as overall command and control is not an option. The evolution of civilian agency interaction using mechanisms such as the cluster lead concept has not been smooth and remains contentious. In

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[1] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) initiated the cluster lead approach in December 2005 as a means to strengthen predictability, response capacity, coordination and accountability by strengthening partnerships in nine key sectors of humanitarian response, with a subsequent expansion to eleven cluster leads. The cluster approach formalized the lead role of particular agencies/organizations in each of these sectors and today has been applied in eight chronic humanitarian crises and six sudden-onset emergencies. A major challenge has been issues of trust and sharing amongst the multitude of partners and the challenge of being designated as the Provider of Last Resort (POLR). The challenges of the roll-out of the cluster approach are hugely informative for militaries hoping to contribute to civil-military interaction. For a recent evaluation of this evolving concept, see IASC, *IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation Report FINAL DRAFT*, 21 November 2007, http://www.humanitarianreform.org/.

truth it will remain a constant challenge as agencies and relationships vary to reflect changing contexts. Be it civil-military, civil-civil, or military-military, degrees of successful interaction will depend on observing basic principles of trust and partnership[2] to be found in any joint human endeavour. Human nature remains constant, and if they don't trust each other, coordination will remain ephemeral.

Coordination is achievable when one has command and control of all of the relevant actors, but in life one is hard pressed to find such an idyllic situation. Arguably, international post-disaster and peacebuilding missions are some of the furthest removed from such operational simplicity, as coordination in those contexts is almost totally predicated on partners voluntarily cooperating and coordinating. Furthermore, most of such voluntary coordination in the field will remain *ad hoc* and take place *just-in-time*. It goes without saying that individuals and agencies that are unable to handle operational uncertainty and ambiguity are well advised to seek alternate employment.

Ad hoc and *just-in-time* approaches reflect an attitude and approach to operations, much akin to the maneuvrist approach for military as they achieve their military tasks. This does not at all preclude extensive planning and preparation to apply those *ad hoc* and *just-in-time* approaches and procedures. In fact major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies carry out extensive planning and preparation on how they will apply *ad hoc* and *just-in-time* procedures and tools, including planning on how they may or may not work with militaries.[3] Just as militaries have evolved maneuvrist approaches to handle the uncertainty and ambiguity of armed conflict, so too is it crucially important for militaries to develop new tools to effect *ad hoc* and *just in time* civil-military interaction. As will be subsequently discussed, it will be essential that militaries have individuals like Civilian Actors Advisors (CIVADs) trained and in place to enable complex *ad hoc* and *just-in-time* civil-military interaction.

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[2] See the Global Humanitarian Platform's *Principles of Partnership*, July 2007, one of the more recent and particularly good and concise re-statements of what needs to underpin partnerships such as civil-military interaction.

[3] See InterAction, *Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*, 2007.

There always remains the elusive hope that at least there can be mandatory coordination or unity of effort amongst a particular national grouping[4] with the example of all Canadian officials in a mission area, or amongst a particular international grouping with the example of all military that are part of an international mission. However, even that is an immense challenge, and it is illuminating to quote General Zinni U.S. Marine Corps, who as the multinational force commander in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, 1991, described his command and control arrangements in the following manner:

> [R]egarding command and control relationships with other multinational contingents, [t]he Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked me…'the lines in your command chart, the command relationships, what are they? OpCon [operational control]? TaCon [tactical control]? Command?'
>
> 'Sir, we don't ask, because no one can sign up to any of that stuff.'
>
> 'Well, how do you do business?'
>
> '**Hand Shake Con**. That's it. No memoranda of agreement. No memoranda of understanding…[t]he relationships are worked out on the scene, and they aren't pretty. And you don't really want to try to capture them,…distill them, and say as you go off in the future, you're going to have this sort of command relationship…[I]t is Hand Shake Con and that's the way it works. It is consultative. It is behind-the-scene.[5]

Experienced field hands know that most relations are built upon trust, and the term *hand-shake-con* is not a bad metaphor for *ad hoc* and *just-in-*

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4   The challenges are huge and at times almost insurmountable, as witnessed by the related concepts of NATO's MNIG (Multinational Interagency Group) and PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), the U.S. S/CRS (The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), UK PCRU (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit), Canadian START (Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force), and a multitude of studies including the recent RAND and American Academy of Diplomacy Panel on *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence*, chaired by Gnehm, Hunter, & Joulwan (forthcoming 2008).

5   Quoted in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, paragraphs 2-13 on Unity of Effort.

time trust building in mission. The challenge is how to create and retain trust amongst even highly congruent groups such as all the Canadian officials in a mission area, or all of the UN mandated military in a mission area. NATO military increasingly understand the challenges of coordination of international post-disaster and peacebuilding missions, particularly across the civil-military divide.

The trick is not to rail against reality, but rather to adjust and develop mechanisms which address the 'fog of peacekeeping' and maximize civil-military interaction when there is no single boss, nor even a limited handful of bosses, but rather a plethora of quasi-independent actors. To further mix metaphors, the 'herding-of-cats' is not just a wry analogy, it is an operational truism as evidenced by the examples referred to above such as the post-2005 humanitarian cluster approach or hand-shake-con in Operational Provide Comfort. Quite consistently the most valuable civilian and military leaders in the field are those who are consummate cat-herders. NATO militaries are looking for ways to facilitate cat-herding. The civilians on their side are devising their own solutions, but looking on with interest and sometimes participating in NATO military efforts to move forward. There remains a strong concern that military designed tools will result in military command and control. The challenge for NATO military is to design tools that will build trust with civilians that the military can be trusted partners and will stay out of civilian territory. An indicative and emerging NATO practice is the use of CIVADs.

NATO CIVADs

For over two years, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has been working to evolve new mechanisms to enhance civil-military interaction. Fundamental to their progress was a desire to counter the perception by various civilian agencies that the military were always looking to take over and control.

Of course that perception had built up because in various instances the military had effectively taken over, or tried to control. In Afghanistan "…ISAF[6] takes virtually everything upon itself. This, I would suggest, is not in the interest of the mission, and certainly makes it more difficult to secure the engagement of the Non-NATO civilian actors, especially the NGOs."[7]

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[6] The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
[7] Mike Aaronson (former head of UK Save the Children), *Mission Report*, 15-22 January 2007.

On the narrower issue and ongoing debate about Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), there is an enduring perception that the military are driving and controlling much of what most of the PRTs do.

At the same time, the NATO military who desires a better working relationship with civilians, writ large, and who understand effects-based planning have led various initiatives to develop sound 'business' practices that advance rather than complicate civil-military interaction. They understand that this will not consist of NATO military taking a leadership role in civil-military interaction, but will require NATO military to build trust and enhance their attitudes and procedures on how to be a good partner to civilian agencies—not leadership *per se*, but rather shared-leadership and cooperation by example.

NATO military have been working hard to re-fashion the traditional Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept that had been developed for war-fighting but was not fitting well with peace support operations. NATO ACT work on a Transformational Concept for Enhanced CIMIC has morphed into a draft Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept that may emerge in mid-2008 as a joint Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and Supreme Allied Commander Operations (SACO/SHAPE) doctrine.

Concurrently, another evolving NATO ACT concept has been the idea of NATO identifying and hiring CIVADs.[8] On staff both at the tactical and operational levels, CIVADs would work alongside NATO military at all levels with a view to better informing military actions. These CIVADs will serve as trusted advisors to their military colleagues and it is likely that their most valuable role will be in cautioning military against trespassing on civilian functions, i.e. not taking over civilian roles.

CIVADs, hired by and working on NATO staffs, will tend to be former NGO and/or intergovernmental organizations (IGO, e.g., UN) staffers with extensive experience in NGO and/or IGO field operations. Having 'come up through the civilian ranks' of NGOs and/or IGOs, they will have insider awareness of NGOs/IGOs and have greater perceived legitimacy by their former NGO/IGO colleagues when they look to initiate or sustain civil-military interaction.

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8 For greater detail on CIVADs, see Paul LaRose-Edwards, *NATO Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction*, NATO ACT, 1 Nov 2006. The paper discusses enhancing NATO's civil-military interactions with Non-NATO Actors (NNAs) across the full spectrum of possible interactions ranging from independent action, to coordinated action, to cooperative action, and to joint action.

The CIVAD concept reflects fast evolving NATO civ-mil doctrine, and will be a key enabler as NATO military look to further operationalize their changing attitudes, procedures, and doctrines. It should be noted that there is a lot of similar concurrent activity throughout NATO and member-states military, including the *ad hoc* engagement of CIVADs by other names such as DevAds (Development Advisors) or Cultural Interpreters.[9]

It is important to note that NATO CIVADs will facilitate the tasks of military, but must not be there to enable the military to take on civilian tasks. As Aaronson puts it, the similar "DevAd role [in Afghanistan] should be helping commanders to understand better the development context in which they are operating…. In this way military activity can be supportive, rather than disruptive…. However, that is not the same as advising the Commander how to do development".[10]

In a related effort, NATO ACT is also exercising the idea of facilitating a Civil-Military Overview (CMO). Basically, it would consist of a web-based mechanism to share information between NATO and Non-NATO actors including NGOs. Such information sharing has traditionally been extremely patchy and *ad hoc* because of information security and the politics of openly sharing. However, NATO figures that some minimal sharing is possible, and is even considering the idea of totally funding such a mechanism but allowing it to be managed by NGOs. This is a risky endeavor for all potential partners not least of all NATO military, and could well fail, but it is indicative of the efforts being made by NATO in trying to find new ways of coordination and cooperation. What underpins these NATO efforts is NATO new post cold war doctrine.

NATO Doctrine Underpinning Enhanced Civil-Military Interaction

The most recent strategic basis for the NATO CIVAD concept and other similar efforts to evolve better civil-military interaction is NATO's Comprehensive Political Guidance. Set out by the NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006 at the Riga Summit, it provides the framework and political direction for NATO evolution and operations for the next 10 to 15 years.

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[9]   Cultural Interpreters is the name given to New-Canadians of relevant countries-of-origin who are hired and deployed by the Canadian Forces. Initially called just interpreters, it was immediately obvious that their insight was far greater. Most are drawn from the CANADEM roster, see http://www.canadem.ca.

[10] Aaronson, 2007.

The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) reflects the effort to recalibrate NATO to best achieve its expanding military role in the furtherance of international security writ large. The CPG clearly appreciates the truism that *there is no military solution*. The following are experts from the Riga Summit CPG:

> Peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever. ….

> … Experience has shown the increasing significance of stabilisation operations and of military support to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The role of the UN and EU, and other organisations, including as appropriate non-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and future crises will put a premium on practical close cooperation and coordination among all elements of the international response. ….

> … While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations.[11]

It is important to note that this NATO doctrine merely captures the evolution of civil-military thought and practice at the NATO tactical level where increasing numbers of individuals have brought common sense to bear regardless of historical suspicion between civilians and military.

Back to Basics –
Trust and Other Tactical Best Practices Pushed Upwards

Operational solutions to the requirement for civil-military interaction have been evolving relatively well for the past decade in a number of multinational contexts including, in particular, UN peacekeeping operations. This *ad hoc* evolution of civil-military interaction built on trust has worked best

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[11] NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidelines* (CPG), NATO Basic Texts, 29 November 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm.

at lower operational levels, the tactical level in military parlance. Invariably this is because of the immediately obvious co-dependency of civil and military 'internationals' as they attempt to achieve their respective goals and end-states. Equally, the lower the tactical level the fewer the strategic or political constraints that can be easily imposed from on high.

Tactical level civilians and military are inevitably individuals of goodwill and common sense who simply 'get on with it' and find ways to work creatively within the rules and regulations. They learn to trust each other even if their coordination may be limited to just awareness and possible de-confliction, i.e. staying out of each other's way, knowing that they are running in parallel paths to achieve common strategic goals.

The challenges remain how to push upwards the civil-military interaction lessons-learned at the lowest tactical levels. NATO has been evolving some *ad hoc* field practices and NATO ACT has been evolving some new concepts to institutionalize these *ad hoc* field practices. Some in NATO understand clearly that NATO military can be one of the 'leaders' in civil-military interaction by not being the leader. They understand that using their positions of power to preclude or supplant others will only result in those excluded finding ways to not coordinate and not cooperate. "To the greatest extent possible, commanders try to complement [civilian actors] and not override their capabilities. Building a complementary, trust based relationship is vital."[12]

Ad hoc tactical-level common-sense-interaction starts being overpowered as one starts to move up to higher operational levels where strategic and political imperatives start to impact on operations and tactics. Quite apart from the strategic politics within NATO *per se*, there are the politics inherent within member states that impact on their own national civil-military relations.

Normal competition, such as inter-party politics, inter-departmental turf battles, or government-versus-NGO-activists, continue to play out. However, efforts to overcome such natural divides also continue and there is substantial progress. Canada's START,[13] modeled on the U.S. S/CRS[14] and UK PCRU[15] is one of the more recent efforts in Canada to coordinate and cooperate. In such efforts, particularly where there is natural competition, there is always a larger onus on the 'bigger' players to share with and involve the 'smaller'

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[12] U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, paragraphs 2-30.
[13] Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force.
[14] The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
[15] Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit.

players. The obverse of that onus is the constant temptation for the bigger guys to go it alone or attempt to dictate.

In the context of field operations where the military are involved, the military are almost always a bigger player or have the ability to become one. As such, in civil-military interaction, the military are constantly tempted and occasionally give in to temptation to leap out of their lane and take charge. Quite often it is because they are not aware that civilians almost always fully populate those other lanes. Those civilians without tanks, uniforms, and weapons have less physical presence and appear either puny or invisible to those who have different perceptions about ground-truth and shaping-the-environment. The military often misjudge the civilians, but this is understandable, and NATO and others continue to develop methods to counterbalance this, e.g. CIVADs.

NATO is also developing more of an understanding of the nature of civilian operations, and an enduring awareness that *just-in-time* working interactions will remain a consistent reality in crisis response. Success is premised upon key civil-military partners having the right attitudes and sufficiently common business practices to enable *just-in-time* interactions that minimize time requirements for collaboration and maximize the attainment of common objectives.

It should also be remembered that the relative lack of sufficient funding for civilian agencies, or Non-NATO Actors (NATO-NNA), be they foreign ministries, aid agencies, UN agencies, or NGOs, forces those civilian agencies to limit themselves to staffing at the strategic level (e.g. HQ) or at the field level (e.g., embassies, missions, field projects). The civilian agencies will never be funded to the same level as militaries, and thus for resource reasons, civilian agencies invariably do not have the military equivalent of strategic commands or operational HQs. The civilian agencies do carry out the equivalent operational functions but do so either at HQ, or more commonly, in the field and *just-in-time*.

It is essentials that NATO remembers this asymmetrical reality when looking to connect with civilian organization counterparts. Below is a pictorial representation of what NATO-NNA linkages or interactions could be.[16]

Not only is trust essential for effective civil-military interaction, the requirement for *just-in-time* and *ad hoc* coordination increases the impor-

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[16]   For more nuanced pictorial representations of NNA sub-groupings with different degrees of partnerships, e.g. key IGOs, key NGOs, other IGOs, and other NGOs, see LaRose-Edwards, NATO *Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction.*

tance of a high level of trust existing prior to the need to interact in mission. Immediate field level crises and challenges for all parties, military and civilian, makes it almost impossibly for them to find the time to slowly build trust. Trust is needed right away. Unnecessary competition by militaries taking over civilian tasks and civilian funding is the biggest challenge to building and retaining that trust.

Generic NATO-NNA Civ-Mil Linkage Possibilities

Civil-Military Interactions (NATO's field-NNA awareness and interface capacity)

Competition by Military

When military unnecessarily propose or agree to undertake roles normally carried out by civilians, they inadvertently become competitors with those they want to be partners with. Many civilian agencies such as the UN or NGOs are highly dependent on mission specific operational funding by governments. For decades, many governments have encouraged the growth of civilian agencies to become their implementing partners for humanitarian and other crisis response, and those civilian agencies are ready to respond

rapidly when requested and if funded. The same issue of resource alloca-tion applies to various financial allocations within government, e.g., will scarce funds be allocated to the Canadian Forces (CF), or to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), or to Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT)?

However in the flurry of crises and the frequent desire to 'plant' visible national-flags, national politicians at times mistakenly view their military as both a military and a civilian crisis response mechanism. Invariably this is because the politicians do not understand that there is sufficient civilian capacity to respond, as well as because military responses literally have that more visible 'national' flag so as to provide instant domestic political bene-fits regardless of the effect in the mission area.

Sometimes the military themselves will initiate steps to move into the civilian 'lane' in well intentioned efforts to 'do-good' or to demonstrate their gentler side. It should be noted that expanding into civilian tasks often raises the suspicion that the military's motivation is intelligence gathering (or HUMINT[17]). However, regardless of motivation and intent, military accepting to take on what are normally civilian jobs put the military in direct competition with civilians for scarce resources.

It is hard to trust a military partner who is unnecessarily competing and taking over one's role.

Another unintended consequence is that the military will have inadver-tently caused trusted civilian partners to be absent in whole or in part because they the military have absorbed funds that otherwise would have gone to those civilian partners. This speaks to every NATO military's lessons-learned that there is no uniquely military-solution and that they need to coordinate or achieve synergies of effort with trusted civilian partners in the field if they, the military, are to achieve their end states.

The optimum solution for the military is to:

1. Know what the civilians are doing or can do (e.g., informed by CIVADs);

2. Avoid taking on the jobs of civilian agencies; and

3. Lobby on behalf of the civilian agencies for them to be provided with added funding or at least more rapid-reaction funding so that there can be concurrent military and civilian activity.

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[17] Human Intelligence.

The other related issue not explored here is that well meaning but *ad hoc* 'civilian' action by military can have unintended consequences that can reduce the impact of those 'military' actions and possibly do harm. The principle of *do no harm* and ways to mitigate the risk of doing harm has been painfully learned by civilian agencies over the past two decades, as civilian agencies have inadvertently done harm to development and humanitarian recipients through unintended consequences, where simply good intentions were not a sufficient mitigating defence. Just as militaries are schooled in the law of armed conflict so as to minimize harm in their areas of expertise so too civilian professionals have evolved procedures and approaches to minimize the chance of inadvertent harm. Militaries are not schooled in civilian tasks and how to mitigate the risk of doing harm when carrying out civilian roles.

Canadian Vignette

A concrete example of a NATO military boldly leaping into a perceived breech is Operation ARGUS, the CF Strategic Advisory Team—Afghanistan (SAT-A). This was a Canadian military initiative that began operations in Kabul in September 2005 with the mission of strengthening the Karzai government. Most of the time SAT-A has been composed of 14 military personnel and one development consultant. The strategic advisory roles of those military officers included supporting the preparation of the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), strategic planning inputs to Public Administration Reform (PAR) and support for the Training and Development Department of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission.

There is no indication that those military personnel had expertise in designing development strategies much less executing development. There is even less evidence that they were experts on public administration reform or the civil service. Perhaps most importantly, there is no indication that they were experienced in providing guidance and mentoring to developing country civil servants, a unique and critical skill set that is very different from doing things the 'Canadian' way. There is also the issue of whether Canadian military embedded in Afghan civilian ministries is sending the right message about the role of military in a democratic society, e.g., does Canada feel that military are best able to guide civil servants?

The CF riposte was that they were simply there as planning facilitators and merely assisting with the mechanics of planning. As such, they suggest that they did not need sectoral or other contextual expertise, and that they could carry out their generic facilitation by using procedural tools such as the CF Operational Planning Process (CF OPP). Such comments highlight two additional weaknesses in the logic of using Canadian military to assist Afghan bureaucrats. One, the most effective facilitators in any situation are those who know intimately the individuals being facilitated/mentored and the societal and organizational challenges that those individuals are struggling with. Two, using templates such the CF OPP makes the huge assumption that: either all societies and governments already plan the same way as Canada does; or that they do not have, nor do they need their own planning approach and should do it the Canadian military way.

Even superficial investigation provides evidence that Canada had many other available experts who combined expertise on civilian-governance with expertise on how to mentor an effect sustainable capacity building with developing country officials.[18] Regardless of the level of commitment and military professionalism of the 14 military personnel forming SAT-A, it is unlikely that they would have had the same effect as professionals from those relevant fields. Bearing in mind how expensive military deployments are-was this the best expenditure of Canadian government funds? Arguably the bang for the Canadian taxpayers' buck would have been many times larger if civilian sectoral experts had been used.

In addition, and this underscores a key aspect of successful civil-military interaction, the SAT-A military initiative has negatively impacted on the trust between CF and other Canadian government officials. "This unique project—well beyond the normal realm of military operations—was the brainchild of Canada's Chief of Defence Staff…."[19]

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[18]   CANADEM alone has over 900 such experts on its roster, a roster that was freely available to the Canadian Forces. Ten years ago, DFAIT started funding CANADEM to assist the UN and other international agencies to connect with experts, and CANADEM's roster of over 10,000 is the leading mechanism of its kind internationally. See Catriona Gourlay, *Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations* (N.Y.: DPKO, 2006): 28, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/.

[19]   Scott Taylor, *Esprit de Corps Magazine*, February 2007.

It has triggered unhappiness on the part of those who could have and should have driven this Government of Canada activity.[20] This CF initiative "…has also ruffled some feathers, not least among some senior Foreign Ministry officials in Ottawa who believe Gen. Hillier is poking the military's nose too far into the diplomat's domain."[21]

This CF incursion has retained its military link, in as much as "…SAT is closely monitored by the chief of defence staff. 'This is Hillier's brainchild and he maintains visibility on this,' says [LCol Aubin, Deputy Commander of SAT]."[22]

One senior SAT-A member also commented to the author that with regard to staffing SAT-A, that "we [the military] weren't looking for experts. We were planners and generalists. It was clear to me from day one that there is enough technical expertise in Kabul. The gap was in the coordination." The implication of that statement is clear, and many others have drawn the same observation, that military regularly feel the need to coordinate the civilians. In fact, the desire of some military to coordinate the civilians has grown over the past five years, and the U.S. debate about the creation and role of U.S. Africa Command (AFCOM) is a current example.

It has also been suggested that the CF SAT-A military initiative was due to the level of danger in Afghanistan. However, there are a large number of Canadian civilians in Afghanistan and literally thousands more willing to go.[23] One concrete example that has many parallels with the SAT-initiative is Tonita Murray the former Director General of the Royal Canadian Mounted

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[20] Curiously, the Canadian military claim that "SAT-A is an example of the "whole of government" concept at work so that Canada can maximize the value of its contribution." See Department of National Defence (DND) website, "Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan," BG-07.009, 14 August 2007. Whereas most civilians including civil servants commenting unofficially see SAT-A as an example of the failure of "whole of government," with CF having unilaterally initiated the embedding of the military officers into Afghan civilian ministries and only belatedly looking for ways to link to the rest of the Canadian government in Afghanistan.

[21] Paul Koring, "Canadians Go Undercover In Afghanistan," *Globe & Mail*, 25 October 2006.

[22] Scott Taylor, *Esprit de Corps Magazine*.

[23] CANADEM alone has been instrumental in either deploying or facilitating the deployment of over 150 civilian experts to Afghanistan from its roster, the first one having deployed in 2001. CANADEM regularly canvasses portions of its roster and consistently finds that many are open to deploying to Afghanistan (perhaps as many as 40%, which would mean almost 4,000 Canadians known to CANADEM, and thus many others not registered with CANADEM).

Police (RCMP) Canadian Police College who was deployed by CANADEM with CIDA funds to serve as a police advisor to the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. She had a number of short missions to Afghanistan in 2003-4 working on police reform, and then took up the permanent Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) post in Kabul in February 2005. She is in her third year and as such pre-dates SAT-A, and has been on-station far longer than any SAT-A member. It also should be noted that sustainable capacity building in developing countries relies heavily upon long-term personal relationships which are achieved by civilians like Tonita Murray spending years on-station as opposed to frequent military rotations.

So if there are many highly qualified Canadian civilian experts prepared to deploy to Afghanistan, it is possible that the CF:

- were seduced by their financial ability to make their initiative happen;

- were buttressed by a mistaken perception that there were no civilian experts who would deploy;

- discounted the likelihood that military officers might not be all that conversant with how civilian government ministries in developing countries can be strengthened; and

- were convinced they needed to retain the lead as they perceived that the Canadian aid agency CIDA or the foreign ministry DFAIT were unwilling or unable to take rapid action.

There were Canadian civilian experts who could have, should have, and were prepared to deploy. That these civilian experts were not on staff with DFAIT or CIDA is irrelevant, as civilian force generation by the UN, Canadian government, NGOs, etc., is predicated on tapping into the huge reserve of civilian experts—hundreds of thousands of Canadians—who move between jobs in the private sector, NGOs, UN and other inter-governmental agencies, and all levels of government.[24]

A final CF rationale for SAT-A has been that the Afghan government asked the CF directly for military officers to act as strategic advisors to civilian ministries. First of all, this reasoning ignores the principles of all-of-

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[24] There are a multitude of 'roster' mechanisms worldwide that can facilitate such civilian force generation. Some are proprietary where an agency holds its own database of experts, while increasingly there are open-source rosters which can be accessed by others, e.g. CANADEM's roster of 10,000 plus.

government and all-of-Canada[25] which underpin how the Canadian government can best decide on how to respond to any Afghan request. Furthermore, how could the Afghans possibly know who our best experts were or how to most effectively spend Canadian taxpayers' funds?

This is not to deny that NATO military in general, and the Canadian military specifically in the Afghan context, should not have input into what civilians can or should undertake. In fact, there is an onus on all partners in such common endeavours to collectively inform each other's actions. The military should comment on civilian actions, just as civilians should comment on military actions, as both are faced with operational and tactical challenges that frequently cross-impact. And since both groups are field-oriented, they will also have unique tactical knowledge of value to each other.

Certainly it would have been appropriate and laudable for the CF to lobby for a civilian SAT-A initiative by either CIDA or DFAIT. Even more so, it would have been particularly appreciated in many civilian circles if the military had lobbied for the relevant civilian actors such as CIDA or DFAIT/START to be provided with the funds to take such an initiative either themselves or to turn to their regular implementing partners, e.g., UN and NGOs, to make things happen fast.

Some CF personnel have said that CIDA and DFAIT had the funds but were not prepared to act, or simply could not move fast enough. It does seem true that CIDA and DFAIT have not moved very quickly to fill a number of civilian gaps in Afghanistan. One interpretation of this apparent CIDA/DFAIT lethargy is because they don't have the ability to move fast. In fact CIDA has shown that it can act with light speed, including in the Afghan context.[26] There are indications that perhaps early on, 2002-2005, that CIDA and DFAIT were simply not sure how to proceed in Afghanistan and with limited presence there, organizational and political cautiousness back in Canada prevailed, or was there growing civilian concern about the Canadian military driving the development agenda?

By late 2005, CIDA and DFAIT were still moving slowly on programming in Afghanistan. Rumours started to circulate that CIDA in particular

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[25] 'All-of-government' and 'all-of-Canada' are related catchphrases that encourage the potential synergies from within either all-of-government or all-of-Canada and in doing so, remind various Canadian sub-components that single departments are not islands unto themselves, and that civil servants hold merely a fraction of Canadian capacity and must figure out how to maximize all-of-Canada.

[26] For example, on 12 October 2002, CANADEM proposed the deployment of a police reform mission to Afghanistan. Just four weeks later on 12 November, CIDA responded with a $1 million grant and three weeks later, on 5 December 2002, CANADEM deployed its police-experts mission.

was feeling out-maneuvered and pushed by the CF into funding projects in Afghanistan generally and Kandahar specifically. An easy bureaucratic push-back from CIDA and DFAIT would have been to move extremely slowly in responding to demands for Canadian programming in Afghanistan other than passing on chunks of funds to UN agencies or Afghan ministries. Is this what happened?

Fast forward to early 2007, by now a new Conservative Government had been in place for a year, so arguably comfortable in its role and finally prepared to allow CIDA and DFAIT civil servants to move files forward. At this juncture in time the explanation for CIDA/DFAIT programming slowness becomes even harder to divine. In a flurry of activity, the Canadian government announced the creation of a large CIDA Afghan Task Force as well as a large DFAIT Afghan Task Force, and announced that both Task Forces in conjunction with the CF served as a best example of Canada's "whole of government" approach (WGA).

On 24 April 2007, CIDA convened a day-long gathering of some of its key NGO implementing partners with the CIDA Minister kicking off the day. She was followed by an extended session led by the CIDA President, and the remainder of the day was steered by the new CIDA Vice President heading their Afghan Task Force, notably the first time a single country had its own CIDA Vice President. The NGO community could be forgiven for assuming that the message of that day from the minister on the political side and from senior civil servants was that it was time to move fast on programming in Afghanistan. CIDA's message was that it had the funds, and it wanted its implementing partners to step up and get involved by proposing and/or bidding for projects in Afghanistan.

Almost a year on and many of those who attended the 24 April 2007 meeting continue to wonder why approval processes are so lengthy. Specific to the issue of the CF SAT-A initiative was a substantive discussion on funding a similar civilian initiative. What followed was a year long effort to get from "this-is-exactly-what-CIDA-wants", as regularly voiced by both CIDA-Afghanistan and CIDA-Ottawa, to an actual CIDA decision to move forward.

So why has CIDA taken so long? What are the implications for civil-military inter-action? Most certainly the unexplained CIDA slowness provides a certain credence to the CF's reasoning for getting into civilian tasks, specifically the SAT-A initiative. However, even assuming a worse case scenario where a SAT-A simply had to be implemented, and that only the CF would fund such an initiative, it was open to the CF to engage civilian experts to undertake civilian tasks, and there were many sources of experts from outside of government such as CANADEM's civilian reserve.

In initiating the SAT-A and by staffing it with military officers, the CF ended up getting substantially less impact and results than if available Canadian civilian experts had been deployed. It cost the Canadian taxpayers more than it should have, and provided the Afghans with less help than it could have. Perhaps more substantially, the SAT-A has confirmed in some civilian circles that the CF remains prone to trying to take over the functions of some civilians, and to coordinate most of the others. The SAT-A initiative, in a small but substantial way, damaged the existing level of trust so crucial to civil-military coordination. This particular reduction in trust is far from crucial in as much as there remains substantial goodwill towards the CF, but many will be watching to see if CF judges its initiative as a well intentioned mistake to be avoided in the future, or that it is the way of the future.

Speaking more generally to the issue of all-of-government and all-of-Canada, if Canada is going to maximize its impact internationally, it had better bring its best experts to bear—not merely assume that those with the most ready cash such as the CF are best placed to effect sustainable change in conflict or post-conflict situations.

Conclusion

The spectrum of interactions between military forces and civilian authorities, populations, organizations and agencies is broad and complex. Success in operations requires enhanced interaction amongst NATO and civilian Non-NATO Actors at all levels and across a full spectrum of possible degrees of interaction. Often civil-military interaction will be simple independent action (e.g., awareness and possibly de-confliction). A constant goal will be to move to coordinated action and this is becoming more common. A less achievable goal is cooperative action, and very infrequently can there be joint action as even some multinational military-force commanders must make do with 'Hand-Shake Con'.

Equally, and as clearly stated in NATO doctrine and most NATO militaries' doctrines, civil-military interaction implies neither military control of civil organizations or agencies, nor the reverse.[27] Certainly, this is the long standing view of the civilians. Civil-military interaction can be a critical enabler for military operations, just as civil-military interaction can be a critical enabler for civilian operations.

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[27] Not to be confused with civil-political oversight and control of militaries, *a sine qua non* of any military in a democratic society.

Common to any level of interaction is the issue of trust. The more trust, the faster the interaction will be. The more trust, the better the inter-action will be. Both sides, military and civilian, have to earn each other's trust. However the military with vastly more resources are more prone to consciously or inadvertently moving into the civilian 'lane.' By taking over the roles and frequently the funding of the civilian agencies, militaries easily lose the hard-won trust of the civilians.

Parts of NATO, as evidenced by Allied Command Transformation's multi-year effort to develop the CIVAD concept, are looking to move NATO to the leading military edge on civil-military interaction best-practice by being viewed as a trusted partner by the civilian actors. NATO is designing and refining civil-military interaction mechanisms and procedures with the intent of enabling coordination without the military leading; advancing cooperation without encroaching on civilian mandates; while concurrently leading in what are clearly military tasks but with minimal collateral damage to their civilian partners. This same civil-military transformation effort has been playing out in various NATO militaries.

Overall, military transformation is moving forward. However, there are recent examples of some NATO militaries falling into the trap of assuming that their superior funding levels equates with them having at least equal if not superior 'civilian' expertise and capacity. Backed by immensely larger funding than their civilian colleagues and that mistaken sense of 'civilian' equivalence, some militaries have blithely concluded that they can and should take over certain civilian tasks from their own aid ministries, foreign ministries, UN or other intergovernmental agencies, and non-governmental agencies.

A current NATO goal is effects-based planning and effects-based opera-tions. NATO's desired effect is civil-military interaction that helps achieve NATO goals and end-states. This will be predicated on civil-military trust that cuts both ways: NATO military trusting in the civilians; and trust by the civilians that the military are not looking to dictate nor supplant. That civil-military trust will be evidenced by a collective civilian and military percep-tion that they are all working towards the same strategic goals and that they are all partners in the broadest sense.

NATO's future in conflict, post-conflict, and post-disaster multi-dimen-sional missions is assured if NATO continues to enhance and expand its civil-military interaction transformation. The proof of this will be an enhanced perception by their civilian colleagues that NATO and NATO militaries are trusted partners.

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Understanding the Performance of Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team

Bas Rietjens

Introduction

During stabilization and reconstruction missions, overlapping tasks and scarce resources in mission areas[1] cause interdependency between international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donor organizations, and the military. Cooperation among these actors can prevent the duplication of efforts, prevent wasting scarce resources, and strengthen the combined/synergetic value of organizational contributions. For a military force, cooperation can also build consent for its presence and therefore provide a means of protection, while from a civilian perspective the military can guarantee a climate of security. Additionally, the skills, knowledge, and assets of the military can play an important role in supporting the work of local parties and of humanitarian organizations. Civil-military cooperation therefore plays an important role in stabilization and reconstruction missions.

Assessing the performance of civil-military cooperation requires addressing the actual contribution of the cooperation. In practice, however, it turns out that little attention is paid to performance measurement. Frequently, it is insufficiently clear whether and to what extent the cooperation has really contributed to the missions of the respective participants.[2] Although the

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[1] G. H. Williams, *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2005); T. R. Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of The U.S. Army War College, 2004); M. Pugh, *Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: Hegemony or Emancipation?* (Plymouth: University of Plymouth, 2001).

[2] S. J. H. Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?* PhD. Thesis (Enschede: University of Twente, 2006); A. Donini, "Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1 (2007): 158-172; A. Pijnappel, *CIMIC projectevaluaties* (Breda: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2004).

concept of effects-based operations[3] is used extensively by military forces in designing weapons systems, assessing war-fighting capabilities, and in structuring military forces, the tools, models, and even methodologies used are biased towards measuring physical effects on near-peer forces.[4] There still is no widely used framework to interpret the success or failure of civil-military cooperation,[5] nor is there a solid set of performance measurements with which to frame an understanding of the raw data.[6]

A major cause for the absence of performance assessment is the lack of clear objectives of both military and civilian actors within civil-military cooperation.[7] In some operations, the military objective is to support the civil environment, with the broad implication to improve all assisting activities. In such operations, it becomes difficult to decide when the activities should come to an end because of the different local standards.[8] It was also observed that frequently no objectives were set at all.[9] For that reason, commonly used concepts to measure performance like effectiveness and efficiency[10] do not lead to an adequate assessment of the performance since they are directly linked to these objectives.

To contribute to filling this gap, this paper aims to explain the perfor-

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[3]   Effects-based operations are defined by NATO as "a coherent and comprehensive applica-tion of the various instruments of the Allied Command and cooperation with all involved non-NATO actors, in order to create the effects." MCM-0052-2006, MC Position on an effect based approach to operations, Brussels, 6 June 2006.

[4]   J. Clancy and C. Crossett, "Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare," *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (2007): 88-100.

[5]   Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?*

[6]   Clancy, "Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare."

[7]   R. Damen and M. S. F. Olislagers, *Development of a decision framework for the Dutch military to inventory and prioritize humanitarian tasks in a complex emergency*, Master Thesis (Enschede: University of Twente, 2004); Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?*; USAID, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 2006, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf (accessed 10 January 2007).

[8]   D. Winslow, "Strange bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises." In *NL Arms: Civil-Military Cooperation: A Marriage of Reason*, ed. M. T. I. Bollen, R. V. Janssens, H. F. M. Kirkels and J. L. M. Soeters, 49-64 (Breda: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2002).

[9]   Rietjens, Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?

[10] Effectiveness is the extent to which the cooperative outcomes contributed to the achieve-ment of the objectives of each individual partner, while efficiency refers to the extent to which the same contribution to the objectives would have been possible with fewer resources.

mance of civil-military cooperation in stabilization and reconstruction missions. To do this, Section 2 presents a performance assessment framework, which is based on a literature survey and a wide range of interviews with military, personnel of humanitarian organizations, and representatives of the local population.[11] This framework is subsequently applied to civil-military cooperation between the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (NL PRT) and a broad variety of civilian actors in the Afghan province of Baghlan. After an introduction to the case study and the methodology used in the empirical review (Section 3), the performance on each of the criteria is analyzed in detail (Sections 4-7). The final section provides conclusions and recommendations.

A Framework for Performance Assessment

Bollen and Beeres state that "by no means does civil-military cooperation constitute an exception with regard to other inter-organizational alliances."[12] However, as a result of structural differences between the military and their civilian counterparts, alliances[13] are bound to be fragile. Interdependencies generate few safeguards to shield the collaborators from hidden agendas, self-interest, or from their partners' opportunistic behaviour. Inter-organizational alliances have been studied in great detail.[14]

In inter-organizational alliances, performance evaluation has been problematic. Despite a significant amount of research, researchers widely diverge on the measures of alliance performance. Some prefer subjective measures

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[11] See also Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?*

[12] M. T. I. Bollen and R. Beeres, "On the Conditions for CIMIC during Humanitarian Operations," Dutch, in NL Arms: *Civil-Military Cooperation: A Marriage of Reason*, eds. M. T. I. Bollen, R. V. Janssens, H. F. M. Kirkels and J. L. M. Soeters,19-30 (Breda: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2002).

[13] In this article, the word 'alliance' refers to the cooperative arrangement between two or more actors rather than NATO.

[14] For example: P. J. Denning,"Hastily Formed Networks," *Communication of the ACM* 49, no. 4 (2006): 15-20; J. H. Gittell and L. Weiss, "Coordinating Networks Within and Across Organizations: A Multi-level Framework," *Journal of Management Studies* 41, no. 1 (2004): 127-153; T. K. Das and B. Teng, "Partner analysis and alliance performance," *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 19, no.3 (2003): 279-308; R. Sammi, L. N. van Wassenhove and S. Bhattacharya, "An innovative Public-Private Partnership: New Approach to Development," *World development* 30, no. 6 (2002): 991-1008.

such as perceived satisfaction,[15] while others use objective measures such as profitability and sales growth,[16] or revenues and costs.[17]

According to Das and Teng, this lack of agreement reflects the underlying conceptual question: what does effective alliance performance mean?[18] They identify two distinct loci of alliance performance: the alliance itself and the partners forming the alliance. On the one hand, when alliances are viewed as separate entities, alliance performance is the success of these separate entities in terms of profitability or growth rate, for example.[19] On the other hand, because partner organizations use alliances to achieve certain strategic objectives, alliance performance should be measured in terms of the aggregated results for the partners.

Faulkner[20] makes another distinction in measuring alliance performance, namely between normative and descriptive evaluation criteria. Normative evaluation criteria, or so-called 'feel good' criteria, are related to the perceived performance of the alliance by each partner. Descriptive evaluation criteria can objectively measure the performance of the alliance, and typically deal with the extent to which objectives have been achieved.

In this research, the distinctions between alliance versus partner locus, and descriptive versus normative criteria, are used to identify the performance criteria. The partner locus identifies the performance for three partners often involved in civil-military alliances: the military, a humanitarian organization, and an actor of the host nation such as the local population. For each of the three actors, the performance assessment framework includes the perceived performance of the alliance (normative) and defines several descriptive criteria to measure the performance as objectively as possible. Figure 1 summarizes the criteria for measuring the performance of a civil-military alliance. Thereafter each of the criteria is addressed separately.

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[15] H. Mjoen and S. Tallman, "Control and performance in international joint ventures," *Organization Science* 8, no. 3 (1997): 257-274; A. Parkhe, "Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theory and Transaction Cost Examination of Interfirm Cooperation," *Academy of Management Journal* 36, no. 4 (1993): 794–829.

[16] J. Mohr and R. Spekman, "Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership Attributes, Communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques," *Strategic Management Journal* 15, no. 2 (1994): 135-152.

[17] F. J. Contractor and P. Lorange, *Cooperative Strategies in International Business, Joint Ventures and Technology Partnerships between Firms* (New York: Lexington Books, 1998).

[18] Das, "Partner analysis and alliance performance."

[19] J. M. Geringer and L. Hebert, "Measuring performance of international joint ventures," *Journal of International Business Studies* 22, no. 2 (1991): 249-263.

[20] D. Faulkner, *International Strategic Alliances: Co-operating to Compete* (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1991).

Figure 1: Performance Criteria for Civil-Military Alliances

Performance

Performance military actor
- Descriptive criteria
  - Support to the force
    - Force protection
      - Belligerent groups or key leaders are direct beneficiaries of assistance activities.
      - Total number and location of direct and indirect beneficiaries of assistance activities.
      - Visibility of the assistance activities.
    - Safe and secure environment — The outcome directly contributes to a safe and secure environment.
    - Situational awareness — Situational awareness is increased.
  - Support to the civil environment
    - Needs — Needs of the civil environment have been addressed.
    - Sustainability — The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.
    - Local capacity — Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.
- Normative criteria — The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by military actor.

Performance humanitarian organization
- Descriptive criteria
  - Needs — Needs of the humanitarian organization have been addressed.
  - Sustainability — The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.
  - Local capacity — Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.
  - Visibility — Visibility of the assistance activities.
- Normative criteria — The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by the humanitarian organization.

Performance host nation
- Descriptive criteria
  - Needs — Needs of the host nation have been addressed.
  - Sustainability — The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.
  - Local capacity — Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.
- Normative criteria — The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by the humanitarian organization.

Costs — The relative costs of assistance activities.

For a military actor, two clusters of descriptive criteria were derived from the NATO doctrine on civil-military cooperation:[21] support to the military's force and support to the civil environment.[22] With respect to 'support to the force,' three subordinate targets have been identified:

1. Force protection: Assistance activities contribute to building consent for the presence of a military force, and therefore provide a means of protection.[23] The extent to which an alliance contributes to force protection is determined by three criteria. First, a contribution is made if belligerent groups or key leaders are direct beneficiaries of the assistance activities. Second, the total number of direct and indirect beneficiaries determines the extent of force protection. Facilities like schools or hospitals serve relatively large numbers of people directly (people who are educated in schools or treated in the hospitals), and indirectly (families and friends of the direct beneficiaries), compared to the construction of a single private house. Related to their number is the location of beneficiaries. To increase force protection, it is more beneficial to provide assistance to people at strategic locations (close to the military compound, close to important roads) than to focus on people in remote areas. The third criterion is the visibility of the assistance activities. If it is clear that the military actor is involved in the assistance activities, the extent of force protection increases as the local beneficiaries directly associate the military with these activities.

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21 NATO, *AJP-9: NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*, 2003, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf (accessed 10 April 2004).

22 A third objective (liaison) is identified in the NATO CIMIC doctrine. However, this objective is regarded as a means (rather than and end) to achieve the objectives 'support to the force' and 'support to the civil environment.'

23 A. L. Hoshmand, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, International Security and Economic Policy Project Course, 2005. It should be noted that the idea of civil-military cooperation contributing to the military's force protection is deeply objectionable to many NGOs. For this perspective, see for example: V. Wheeler and A. Harmer, *Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, HPG Report 21, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2001); A. Donini, L. Minear and P. Walker, "The Future of Humanitarian Action: Mapping the Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises,". Disasters 28, no. 2 (2004): 190-204; J. Macrae, *The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action*, HPG Report 11 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002).

2. A safe and secure environment: Some assistance activities directly contribute to a safe and secure environment. These include the construction of fire stations and police stations, the disarmament of former combatants, and the de-mining of areas.

3. Situational awareness: Situational awareness can be increased through assistance activities.[24] Alliances, which include coordination and information sharing, are able to provide situational awareness to a larger extent. Partnering an organization with a large network tends to increase situational awareness.[25]

Regarding the military objective 'support to the civil environment,' three subordinate targets have been identified:

1. The extent to which the needs of the civil environment have been addressed. This includes shortcomings in the coping capacities of both the humanitarian organizations and the host nation.

2. The sustainability of the assistance activities. This is important as it deals with the extent to which the outcome of an alliance after implementation of the activities remains useful in the long-term. If facilities have been constructed and fail to function within a short period of time, initial objectives are not met and resources are wasted.

3. As a military actor intends to withdraw as soon as circumstances allow, increasing local capacity is considered important.[26] Hiring local contractors or employing local people when possible is far more beneficial than a military actor itself carrying out activities, as this decreases the involvement of, and dependency on, a military actor. To provide local people with self-supporting skills is considered key to the development process.

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[24] D. Peabody, "The Challenges of Doing Good Work: The Development of Canadian Forces CIMIC Capability and NGOs," paper presented at the CDAI Conference, Kingston, Ontario, October 2005.

[25] Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?*

[26] M .J. McNerny, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" Parameters 35, no. 4 (2006): 32-46; A .S. Natsios, "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development," Parameters 35, no. 3 (2005): 4-20; Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo.

The descriptive performance criteria for humanitarian organizations partly overlap the military criteria with regard to support to the civil environment:[27]

1. The extent to which the needs of the humanitarian organizations have been fulfilled. Through civil-military alliances, the scale (number of activities on one particular functional area) and/or scope (functional areas in which cooperation takes place) of a humanitarian organization can be increased. Examples are the use of military transport, engineering capacity, or security provided by a military actor.

2. Visibility of assistance activities is a booster of income for many humanitarian organizations and is considered very important. Visibility increases media attention, which often increases funding for an organization. In contrast to that, visibility of cooperation or association with military organizations can compromise the humanitarian imperative of humanitarian organizations.[28]

Apart from being important to the military, the following two criteria have also been identified as relevant descriptive performance criteria for humanitarian organizations: sustainability of the assistance activities and increase of local capacity. Concerning the host nation, three performance criteria have been identified: needs of the host nation, sustainability of the assistance activities, and local capacity. These performance criteria contribute to the performance of all three actor groups (military, humanitarian organizations, and host nation) involved.

In accordance with the 'altruistic self-interest principle' of Seiple,[29] civilian actors and their military counterparts look favourably upon cooperation to the extent that they expect cooperation to serve their best interest. As such, civil-military cooperation is a pragmatic strategy whenever partners consider themselves interdependent to reach their objectives. Little value is

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[27] See for example: Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo*; M. Studer, "The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict," *International Review of the Red Cross* 83, no. 842 (2001): 367-391; C. J. Currey, *A New Model for Military/Nongovernmental Relations in Post-Conflict Operations* (Carlisle: The U.S. Army War College, 2003); F. K. Abiew, "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 10, no. 1 (2003): 24-39.

[28] See for example: Studer "The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict."

[29] C. Seiple, *The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Intervention* (Carlisle Barracks: Peacekeeping Institute Centre for Strategic Leadership at The U.S. Army War College, 1996).

attached to the performance of the civil-military alliance from an alliance locus. Like individual objectives of military and civilian actors, common objectives often lack clarity, and are therefore inadequate as a basis for assessing performance.[30] A determination of the relative costs of the assistance activities measures the performance of the alliance as a whole.

The Baghlan Case

Introduction

Following the Coalition's intervention in Afghanistan, Western leaders, most notably British Prime Minister Tony Blair, promised the Afghan people that the international community would "not walk away" from its responsibilities regarding the country's rehabilitation and future stability this time.[31] Contrary to the expectations of the Afghan people and repeated requests from the transitional government's leaders, moves to expand the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul failed. As a consequence, aid agencies wanted to stay in the capital because of ISAF protection, meaning that Afghan citizens had a better chance of receiving assistance if they were in Kabul rather than away in the provinces.[32] This triggered a massive influx of internally displaced persons into the capital city, along with refugees returning from surrounding countries. Overcrowding occurred as a result, creating sanitation issues and rising prices, among other problems.

In June 2003, the President of the International Rescue Committee and the Secretary General of Care International wrote to the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, to inform him that "80 NGOs have come together to ask your attention to an urgent matter: the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul in Afghanistan under NATO's leadership."[33] Late in 2003, NATO decided to expand the ISAF area of operations and was authorised by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510. The expansion took place through the

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[30] Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?*

[31] B. J. Stapleton, *The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan. A New Direction?* (Bonn, 2003), http://bglatzer.de/arg/arp/stapleton.pdf (accessed 15 April 2005).

[32] A. L. Hoshmand, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, International Security and Economic Policy Project Course, 2005.

[33] International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), *ISAF expansion: Briefing for UNAMA* (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, 2003).

deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept launched by the U.S. in November 2002. The overall concept was to use small, joint civil-military teams to expand the legitimacy of the central government to the regions, and enhance security by supporting security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process.[34] The first official PRT was established by the U.S. in February 2003 in the Gardez Province. In subsequent months, additional teams began in other provinces and by October 2004, a total of 14 PRTs were managed by the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, conducting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Expansion of ISAF was slow, primarily due to reluctance by NATO troop- and resource-contributing nations to provide the necessary logistical capabilities and troops to enable ISAF to expand.[35] By October 2004, ISAF had five PRTs in Afghanistan: British PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Maimana, German PRTs (GE PRT) in Kunduz and Feyzabad, and a Dutch PRT in Baghlan.[36]

The different approaches of the PRTs, both within NATO and between OEF and NATO, are currently under discussion. Many contributing countries have developed their own distinct models to shape the deployment of a PRT. This case study primarily focuses on the first three rotations of the Dutch-led NATO PRT (NL PRT) in Baghlan province (September 2004 - July 2005). As part of ISAF expansion stage one,[37] its mission was "to assist and facilitate local authorities to create a safe and secure environment in order to enable the government, IOs and NGOs to carry out reconstruction activities."[38] It was therefore the perfect example to demonstrate the functioning of the Dutch integrated policy for fragile states[39] in practice.[40]

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[34] P. V. Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005): 6.

[35] Save the Children, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian – Military Relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save the Children, 2004).

[36] Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient.*

[37] Established after the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the NATO expansion plan divided Afghanistan into four zones: north, west, east, and south. In principle, ISAF was to deploy PRTs in a counter-clockwise fashion, beginning in the north (i.e., expansion stage 1).

[38] A. A. H. de Bok and Y. Stassen, *Briefing PRT tbv bezoek VKC Buza* (Pul-e-Khumri: NL PRT, 2005).

[39] Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Economics, *Notitie: wederopbouw na gewapend conflict [Policy paper: reconstruction after violent conflict]* (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

[40] A. Ten Cate, "Voor het winnen van de vrede: 1 (NL) PRT Pol-e Khomri in historisch perspectief" [Winning the peace: 1 (NL) PRT Pol-e Khomri in historical perspective], *Militaire Spectator* 175, no. 6 (2006): 256-267.

The size of NL PRT was approximately 130 persons, while its main capacity consisted of three mission teams, known as Military Observer and Liaison Teams (MOLTs) during the first months of the deployment. Each of these teams was composed of a commander (major), a deputy commander (lieutenant), four men force protection, an interpreter, and a medic. Depending on the type of mission, a team was complemented by personnel of psychological operations (Psy-ops), intelligence (Intel), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) or police liaison. The mission teams had a great variety of tasks. The first was to stay in contact with, and assist the local authorities such as governors, mullahs (religious leaders), and maliks (village elders). Second, the mission teams were to get a clear overview of the external situation in Baghlan province. This included finding out about the needs of the local population, and which actor was doing what and where. It also included the collection of intelligence and showing the presence of force in the province.

Apart from the mission team, a key player in NL PRT was the political advisor (POLAD). As a delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the POLAD was positioned next to the commander in the organic structure of NL PRT. The POLAD was responsible for political advice and the expenditures of €4.5 million allocated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In particular during the first eight months of NL PRT deployment, the POLAD also fulfilled many responsibilities regarding the coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organizations.

Methodology of the Empirical Review

Following Yin's case study approach,[41] the framework for performance assessment (see Section 2) is applied to cooperation between the NL PRT and civilian actors in the Afghan province of Baghlan. More specifically, the following eight civil-military alliances, including NL PRT, have been studied in detail:

1. Poultry production with Afghan authorities and the international NGO Dutch Committee of Afghanistan (DCA);

2. Police training courses with the highway and provincial police corps of Baghlan province;

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[41] R. K. Yin, *Case Study Research, Design and Methods*, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994).

3. The construction of micro hydro power plants with the local authorities and a local contractor;

4. Literacy training with Child Fund Afghanistan (CFA);

5. Provision of radio communication equipment to the district governors of Baghlan province;

6. Removal of explosives and ammunition with the international NGO Halo Trust;

7. Various Heart and Minds (H&M) projects (e.g., construction of river works, mosques and wells; distribution of goods) with local contractors and authorities; and

8. School, road and bridge construction with Aga Khan Foundation (AKF).

To increase the validity of the case study, both methodological and data source triangulation were employed. A general literature study was done and three interviews were held with former personnel of NL PRT (the commander of the first rotation, a POLAD, and the head of the CIMIC section). In June and July 2005, a four-week visit was made to Baghlan, for which several actions were taken to obtain detailed information. During the stay on the compound, semi-structured interviews were held with 25 persons of NL PRT, including the mission team commanders, CIMIC personnel, and the POLAD. Regarding activities on poultry production, a participatory meeting with personnel of NL PRT and local farmers was attended. The researcher took part in six research missions, where many activities were directly observed, including various H&M projects (the construction of mosques, river works, and the distribution of medical supplies), and the removal of explosives and ammunition. Over 60 meetings were held with contractors, authorities, police commanders, humanitarian organizations, small entrepreneurs, refugees, and villagers. In addition to the interviews and direct observations, documents were studied including daily and weekly CIMIC reports, project information, meeting minutes, internal memoranda, and liaison reports. Members of the CIMIC branch checked the results of the case study report and personnel of the Dutch Defence Operation Centre verified its findings.

Performance Assessment Undertaken By Alliance Partners

Although most respondents stressed the importance of performance assessments, very little attention was paid to it in many alliances. Internal meetings, like the daily debriefing meeting of NL PRT, often functioned as such. In alliances containing large financial contributions (e.g., DCA, AKF, CFA), arrangements were often made upfront to do an assessment after completing the activities.

After the completion of the three micro hydro power plants, the project was to be assessed. Based on the outcome, NL PRT would decide whether or not to proceed with the construction of 15-20 additional power plants. It was unclear how this project was to be assessed. H&M projects were completed through an on-site inspection. However, these were primarily focused on technical aspects, while many other aspects such as 'what did the activities contribute to the extent of force protection?' were overlooked. The police training courses were not formally evaluated, but several findings were included in a project proposal to extend the training courses.[42]

The following sections present the findings of the performance assessment of the civil-military alliances along the lines of the framework as presented in figure 1. Sections 4 and 5 address the descriptive criteria of the military, the humanitarian organizations, and the host nation. Section 6 subsequently addresses the similarities and differences between normative and descriptive performance criteria. Section 7 finally addresses the costs of the alliances.

Support to the Force

This section addresses the performance criteria related to the military cluster *support to the force*. These include the contributions of civil-military alliances to (1) force protection; (2) safe and secure environment; and (3) situational awareness.

Force Protection

Although most military respondents stated that force protection was the main driver of civil-military cooperation, few activities included belligerent groups or key leaders. There were a few exceptions to this, such as the

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[42] Dutch Ministry of Defence, *Nota politietraining provincie Baghlan* (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2005).

reconstruction of mosques, which were carried out to target several religious leaders perceived as potentially belligerent by NL PRT.

The lack of inclusion of belligerent groups or key leaders has three underlying reasons. First, NL PRT used several parallel databases, one each for CIMIC, Intel, and Psy-ops. These databases were not integrated, and because of their personal nature they were hardly accessible to others. Apart from the duplication of effort, this resulted in a lack of integration of information of the separate branches. CIMIC personnel were regularly unaware of the Intel or Psy-ops branch information, and unable to use it to direct their activities.

Second, the military guidelines such as the AJP-09[43] and the concept of operations were not considered useful or not exploited by NL PRT personnel at all. As a result, great differences occurred between rotations of NL PRT and between personnel within the same rotation.

Third, because humanitarian organizations and NL PRT had essentially different mandates, strategies and objectives focused on different target groups resulting in incompatibility. Humanitarian organizations did not specifically include belligerent groups or key leaders as their beneficiaries. They often selected the beneficiaries on humanitarian grounds, such as highest priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Regarding the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries—the second criterion underlying force protection, see Figure 1—the alliances greatly varied. By increasing the number of beneficiaries, the number of persons positively influenced by the activities of NL PRT increased. This in turn increased the amount of force protection. Most military respondents considered community projects like the construction of mosques, wells, or schools as very beneficial as they generally reached many people and addressed their basic needs.

Military personnel often included the location of beneficiaries in their decisions, with the aim to increase force protection. A considerable number of activities were carried out in close proximity of the NL PRT compounds. This was referred to as the 'six mile rule,' intending to positively influence the perception of those communities living within six miles of the compound. This led to great differences in the quantity and quality of assistance provided among the areas.

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[43] The Allied Joint Publication 09 (AJP-09) is the CIMIC doctrine of NATO. In this document the military guidelines concerning CIMIC are presented. It is accessible at http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf.

Concerning visibility—the third criterion underlying force protection—alliances in which NL PRT directly supported humanitarian organizations in their own needs, as well as coordination and information sharing activities, they were not able to make a large contribution. This is mainly because of the internal nature of these activities and the limited participation of the local population. Activities for the direct benefit of the local population did contribute to the visibility. Transportation activities such as the transport of medical supplies for a local hospital openly showed the involvement of NL PRT in assistance activities. Apart from these, most construction activities also contributed to visibility. The transfer of a construction project to the local communities often included ceremonies, attracting publicity and the attention of the villagers. In all these cases, pictures or videos were made and used as promotional material on television or in newspapers to increase support to NL PRT. After the transfer, signboards were often put near the constructions to point out NL PRT's contribution. One specific activity of NL PRT was the construction of a radio and television mast. NL PRT received some hours of broadcasting time each week in return, which it used to communicate with the local population.

The extent to which visibility affects the local population must be considered with caution. Jakobsen stated that local populations in Afghanistan were frequently not aware that military units had funded or contributed otherwise to the assistance activities.[44]

Safe and Secure Environment

Several of the alliances contributed directly or indirectly to a safe and secure environment. Coordination and information sharing activities related to security contributed to the operations of humanitarian organizations in Baghlan. An example of this was the set up of a committee to respond to disasters. These included national disasters such as earthquakes, but also evacuation of humanitarian organizations in case of serious decrease of the safety level.

Cooperation with Halo Trust focused on ammunition and explosives removal, which directly contributed to a safe and secure environment. These activities also contributed to the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process, as it focused on the collection of weapons and ammunitions of warlords in Baghlan province.

Training of local police trainers directly contributed to the assistance of the government of Afghanistan, with Germany as the leading nation of

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44   Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient.*

the police sector reform. The need for police training was expressed by the trainer to trainee ratio. While this was 1:5 for the Afghan National Army (ANA) it was 1:358 for the Afghan National Police (ANP).[45] The objectives of this alliance were to train policemen on the streets in basic skills and replace their metal truncheons with European Union certified ones. Through the use of a metal truncheon and excessive use of violence, current actions of the police caused many injuries to the local population and resulted in contempt and fear of the police.

A large part of the activities, however, seemed not to contribute to a safe and secure environment. Many respondents were convinced that these activities distracted NL PRT personnel from their mission and often led to mission creep. Most humanitarian organizations stressed the importance of NL PRT focusing on security-related activities, as they clearly had a comparative advantage in this field. Such a clear division of tasks and responsibilities could also contribute to preventing the blurring of their roles.

Situational Awareness

NL PRT's analysis of the civil environment took place in an unstructured manner. The different people and units of NL PRT used different assessment methods and techniques, and generally little attention was paid to the inclusion of women in the assessment capacity. In an Islamic culture, this made it very difficult, if not impossible, to get a clear overview of women's needs. As a result, NL PRT often had little insight in the civilian actors operating in their Areas of Responsibility (AoRs). These included humanitarian organizations, local authorities, and companies. The problem became more prominent as many contractors were registered as NGOs for tax reasons. Due to this lack of awareness, great effort was made time and again to search for an appropriate civilian actor to cooperate with. This led to duplication and contributed to the unfamiliarity of military personnel with larger frameworks and projects on international, national, and provincial levels.

In cases where humanitarian organizations were engaged in the cooperation effort, they often provided NL PRT with knowledge and expertise about the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance. In particular, information sharing and coordination increased the situational awareness of NL PRT. However, NL PRT was absent in most coordination structures and did not have specific liaison personnel. This resulted in the unfamiliarity

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[45] ISAF, *Ministry of Interior Affairs & Afghan National Police*, International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan.

of NL PRT with activities of humanitarian organizations in Baghlan province, and with organizations on a national level. In addition, due to a lack of continuity between the different rotations, personnel frequently had to start all over again. On some occasions, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between military and humanitarian organizations was made to provide continuity by formalizing the person-bonded contacts into formal ones.

Support the Civil Environment

This section addresses the performance criteria related to the military cluster *support to the civil environment*, which includes (1) needs of the civil environment; (2) sustainability; and (3) local capacity. As indicated in Section 2, these partly overlap the performance criteria identified by humanitarian organizations and the host nation. To facilitate the presentation, this section first addresses the needs of the humanitarian organizations and the host nation. The following two subsections address sustainability and local capacity, which have been identified for each of the three actor groups. The last subsection finally addresses the visibility concerning humanitarian organizations.

Needs of the Humanitarian Organizations

Most civil-military alliances with humanitarian organizations addressed the needs of these organizations. NL PRT had several complementary resources to address the needs of Halo Trust, DCA, and AKF among others. First, they had military transport capacity. In particular, Halo Trust was supported through the transport capacity of NL PRT in identifying and removing mines and explosives. Second, through its protection personnel, NL PRT provided indirect security to humanitarian organizations. This also involved the development of a disaster response committee to facilitate evacuation in case of emergency. In several alliances, NL PRT fulfilled the needs of humanitarian organizations through funding. Most humanitarian organizations possessed, however, far more money to carry out assistance activities than NL PRT did. Military support therefore often increased the scale and scope of humanitarian organizations only to a limited extent. A fourth complementary resource was NL PRT's technical knowledge, such as that of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)-advisor and of its CIMIC–personnel, which were trained as electrical engineers and agricultural experts, among others.

Although NL PRT put considerable effort into the execution of civil assessments, the results were often not, or only partly, used by humanitarian

organizations for several reasons. First, most humanitarian organizations were occupied with their own projects and did not need the military assessment capacity. Second, many organizations believed that military information was biased, as questioning people about their needs while carrying weapons led to biased answers. Third, NL PRT sometimes used western standards in their assessments, rather than the widely accepted Sphere standards.[46] This made the civil assessments less useful for many humanitarian organizations. Fourth, if humanitarian organizations requested information, it was often not accessible because of the lack of structure in the assessments, the classified status of many reports, and/or the use of the Dutch language for many documents. Because of this, great potential to increase the scale and scope of the assistance activities was lost.

Needs of the Host Nation

The extent to which the alliances addressed the needs of the host nation varied greatly. This had several reasons. First, local actors other than the authorities or local construction companies were rarely included. This resulted in mismatches between the local needs and the output of assistance activities, and the lack of local ownership needed to ensure sustainability. Direct involvement of local actors could positively contribute to the participation of women and other vulnerable segments of the population. Moreover, involving a mayor or other leading person in the assistance activities empowered local leadership.

A clear example of such limited local involvement is the police training. In the design phase of the police training, the police commanders of the highway and provincial police in Baghlan were rarely consulted by NL PRT. As a result, NL PRT planned to use a Dutch textual reader on police training, translated into Dari. However, soon after the contract was signed between the commander of NL PRT and the commanders of the highway and provincial police,[47] it appeared that half of the trainees were illiterate. To properly train the policemen it was necessary that the trainees were able to read and write. As this would be a lengthy process, the reader was completely adjusted and tailor-made to the level of the trainees, thereby degrading the level of the

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[46] In response to concerns about the quality and impact of humanitarian assistance, international humanitarian organizations have developed a set of minimum standards known as the Sphere standards. Sphere project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster* Response (Geneva: Oxfam Publishing, 2000).

[47] NL PRT, *Protocol* (Pul-e-Khumri: NL PRT, 2005a).

training course. Involving and consulting the local police in an early stage could have prevented this.

A second reason for the great variation in addressing local needs was the limited operationalization of NL PRT's mandate. This gave military personnel at tactical levels great space to manoeuvre and decide which activities to carry out. There is merit and appeal to this approach. Some argue that every crisis is occasion-specific and circumstance-specific, and that its unique characteristics mean that strategies and structures for civil-military cooperation need to reflect the specific circumstances.[48] However, few activities were embedded in civil or military programs. Activities therefore depended too much on the personalities involved, rather than on planning and standard operating procedures. As a consequence, the efforts were person-dependent, and many differences occurred within and between rotations. These differences included priorities, budgets, and involvement of local population. This can be illustrated by the fact that the personnel of the first NL PRT were emphatically against educational activities, while this was emphasised in the second rotation.

A final reason is the use standards. NL PRT used local standards as much as possible, which facilitated the transfer to, and the sustainable use of, the constructions by the local villagers. However, to indiscriminately apply local standards was deemed not appropriate, as Afghanistan did not have regulations ensuring a minimum level of quality.

Sustainability

Alliance outcomes varied greatly with respect to their sustainability. Alliances not requiring follow-up, such as maintenance or operations efforts, were generally sustainable. These included (1) alliances focusing on coordination and information sharing; and (2) most alliances supporting the direct needs of either a military or humanitarian organization (for example the removal of mines and explosives with Halo Trust).

Alliances requiring follow-up proved to be less sustainable. The first reason was the extent of maintenance required. After completion, tasks and responsibilities regarding future maintenance and operations were normally transferred to the community. With local contractors, no maintenance agreement or assurance was developed to ensure the quality

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48 See for example: C. Gourlay, "Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions," *Disarmament forum*, no. 3 (2000): 33-44.

of their work. If construction concerned a mosque or a well very few problems occurred after the handing over to the local representatives. If it concerned other constructions, problems occurred regularly. After the construction of the radio and television mast in Pul e Khomri (PeK), it was put into use by the local television broadcasting company. However, due to very limited maintenance, the mast seriously malfunctioned six months later.

A second reason for the low degree of sustainability was the effort required for the outcome to become, and remain, fully operational. In the case of schools, this implied paid teachers, education material, and school interiors. In the police training activities, trainees completed the courses in three weeks. After the course, a trainee would continue his normal activities and start working as an instructor for local policemen in the districts of Baghlan province.[49] However, after two months, nearly none of the trained instructors functioned this way for several reasons. First, because the upcoming elections requested so much manpower, they did not have time to start working as instructors for the local policemen. Second, most trainees originated from the two main cities in Baghlan province (PeK and Baghlan city) and were direct assistants of the police commanders. As the main goal was to train the trainers and let them train other policemen in their districts, this would not have any result in most districts of Baghlan province. Third, the police instructors had no means, such as instruction materials, available to train the local policemen.

A third reason for the limited sustainability was the extent of involvement of humanitarian organizations. Through a long-term focus, as well as experience and knowledge of development issues, involvement of humanitarian organizations contributed to the sustainability of outcomes of many alliances. Without consulting a humanitarian organization, NL PRT contracted out the construction of the river works in Karte Etefaq. Nearly two weeks after completion, floods totally destroyed the construction works, cancelling out all the efforts of NL PRT and the local contractor. Coordination with humanitarian organizations specialized on water management such as the Kunduz River Basin Program could have prevented these activities from being carried out.

A final reason for the difficulties in sustainability was the long-term dependency on outside (for example military) resources. Alliances in which

49 NL PRT, *Projectvoorstel Training basisvaardigheden Afghan National Police* (Pul-e-Khumri: NL PRT, 2005b).

a long-term involvement of NL PRT was required were often not sustainable, as the military suddenly had to withdraw or focus on other activities. The donation of goods was not sustainable as it led to a constant and durable dependency of the host nation on these outside resources. Having received goods like fuel or clothes, beneficiaries became dependent and frequently requested more support. These activities provided no permanent solution to the local needs.

Local Capacity

As NL PRT did not have the capacity to execute a large amount of assistance activities, it contracted most of them out while monitoring the progress. This should increase local capacity and stimulate the local economy. However, in the tendering process of most construction activities, two or three local contractors participated, which were known through their activities at the NL PRT compound. By involving only a few contractors in the selection process, NL PRT did not create significant competition. As a result, NL PRT often paid relatively high prices for construction activities. For example, while personnel of the CIMIC branch during the second rotation were satisfied with the arrangements of bulldozers for U.S. $50 per hour, a local interpreter of NL PRT arranged the same bulldozer within 10 minutes for only U.S. $20 per hour. In addition to increased competition, involving more contractors encourages more efficient work and spreads the benefits throughout the population.[50] At the time of investigation NL PRT was preparing a list of local construction companies and tendering was to be done according to Dutch procedures. However, at the moment, nobody knew what this exactly implied, as little knowledge of tendering processes was available within NL PRT.

As the mission of NL PRT was "to assist and facilitate local authorities to create a safe and secure environment," increasing the capacity of the administrative machinery was of great importance. Involving the Afghan authorities in the assistance activities contributed to this and empowered their leadership. This, however, proved to be difficult as one officer remarked, "various authorities I met could only talk about the lack of money and donors and never talked about their own responsibility."

Positive exceptions regarding the use of local capacity were the alliances with AKF and CFA. In cooperation with AKF, a significant amount

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50 J. Kremers, *Het aanbesteden van CIMIC projecten*, KMA-2 eindscriptie (Breda: Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 2003).

of community mobilisation took place both before starting the projects and during the implementation. Extensive discussions were held with local communities, and local community bodies elected by consensus were set up for each of these projects to be involved in planning, implementing, and taking care of future operations and maintenance of these projects. To manage these social mobilisation tasks, AKF had budgeted for two social organisers during the first year of the project, and in the second year there was one person to carry out this task.[51] Regarding the literacy classes in cooperation with CFA, the community was responsible for providing a location where the literacy classes would take place, for identifying the teachers, and for providing community support for the literacy program.[52]

Visibility Concerning Humanitarian Organizations

Many humanitarian organizations considered visibility of cooperation or association with the military a serious threat. They argued that if military personnel worked in close physical proximity, communities could no longer distinguish between military- and civilian-implemented assistance. The blurred roles could have a significant negative impact on the relationship of humanitarian organizations with the communities they served. It could also pose major security risks if civilian humanitarians were perceived as collaborating with an unwanted military force, channelling intelligence to it. Despite these strong considerations, no evidence was found for this phenomenon. Respondents argued that assaults on humanitarian employees were often not directly related to their association with military forces. Expelling humanitarian organizations from a country or region would destabilize the area and thwart the military mission.[53] However, to reduce visibility, some humanitarian organizations were very reluctant towards monitoring activities by military personnel or the joint execution of activities.

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[51] Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), *Consolidated Project Proposal to the Dutch Embassy/PRT* (Pul-e-Khormi: AKF, 2005).

[52] Child Fund Afghanistan (CFA), *Project Outline for the Support of Literacy Trainings in Baghlan Province* (Pul-e-Khormi: CFA, 2005).

[53] See also J. J. Collins, "Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 24, no. 2 (2004): 61-77.

Descriptive Versus Normative Criteria for Performance Measurement

Despite the fact that the alliances varied considerably on descriptive performance criteria, all actors were, in general, very positive in a normative way about the performance of the alliances. This is in accordance with research on business alliances, in which there often is no consistency between subjective and objective measures of performance.[54] Several underlying reasons could be derived for these differences.

Due to the hierarchical structure, the military were reluctant to express their critique. Many officers were promoted after their deployment and thought that expressing criticism could be considered a personal failure. 'Selling' the activities as a success was, therefore, more beneficial than pointing out negative aspects or missed opportunities.

As few evaluations were made and personnel often rotated, they were frequently not confronted with the outcomes of their activities. The personal bond between the partners therefore dominated the overall feeling of the alliance and influenced the perception of the performance. Most personnel had a very good time during their deployment, and afterwards they often remembered the good accomplishments rather than the negative ones. Local populations were usually satisfied with whatever assistance they got. If they expressed criticism, they feared to be left out for further assistance. Finally, respondents of humanitarian organizations were reluctant to express criticism about their activities due to their dependence on private funding sources.

Costs of the Civil-Military Alliances

In many reports,[55] critics pointed out that NGOs and locals are a much cheaper alternative to assistance activities than bringing in the military. Durch calculated that the yearly costs of a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan, when both direct and indirect expenses are included, are approximately U.S. $215,000.[56] ACBAR stated that humanitarians usually cost a tenth of this, largely because the vast majority of humanitarians are Afghans.[57] While the

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[54] Geringer, "Measuring performance of international joint ventures."

[55] See for example: A. Siegel, "Civil-Military Marriage Counselling: Can this Union Be Saved?" *Special Warfare* (December 2002): 30.

[56] W. J. Durch, *Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and Force Options* (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

[57] Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), *ACBAR Policy Brief: NGOs Concerns and Recommendations on Civil-Military Relations* (Kabul: ACBAR, 2002).

costs of expatriates can be as high as the costs of a U.S. soldier, the costs of local humanitarians are generally much lower. The yearly wages of local employees of humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan were often between U.S. $2,000 and U.S. $25,000, while local labourers earned approximately U.S. $700 to U.S. $1,500 annually.

In general, it was more cost-effective if local organizations or humanitarian organizations carried out the activities. This not only reduced total costs, but also resulted in a spin-off for the local economy through employment creation and capacity building. It also allowed military forces to focus on military objectives. This rule did not apply to all circumstances. In some alliances, NL PRT had a clear comparative advantage over humanitarian organizations or local companies. This advantage consisted of (1) the ability of NL PRT to operate in unsafe areas where other organizations either would not, or could not operate, (2) the time-period in which activities were to be completed, and (3) the lack of actors other than NL PRT that had the capacity to carry out the activities.

Furthermore, NL PRT was deployed for a two-year period in Baghlan province. Due to political commitments, it was unable to redeploy sooner even if circumstances permitted so. This sometimes resulted in overcapacity, which was used for assistance activities with low marginal costs.

The costs of most alliances involving NL PRT troops were relatively low. In the case of construction activities, local contractors were hired and local personnel employed. Information sharing and coordination were low cost activities with usually high benefits, such as avoidance of duplication of effort. In the alliances in which NL PRT supported the direct needs of humanitarian organizations, NL PRT had a clear comparative advantage (for example the transport capacity in alliance with Halo Trust).

Conclusions and Recommendations

Although many military and civilian actors stressed the importance of a performance evaluation, it was rarely done. Through the use of a performance assessment framework (see Figure 1), several conclusions are drawn. It shows that there are great differences between normative and descriptive performance of civil-military alliances. Despite the largely positive feelings by participants about the performance, most civil-military alliances cannot be considered to largely contribute to many of the descriptive performance criteria. With regard to force protection, NL PRT sometimes incorporated the number and location of the beneficiaries. Few alliances included belligerent

groups or key leaders as direct beneficiaries of their assistance activities. To support the military mission, some alliances contributed to a safe and secure environment, or an increase of situational awareness.

Support to the civil environment differed considerably among the analyzed alliances. If humanitarian organizations were involved, their direct needs were often met. Being pragmatic, many resources, varying from personnel, machines, or funds were used to fulfil the needs of humanitarian organizations. Support for the needs of the local population, whether directly through NL PRT or in cooperation with a humanitarian organization, often proved less successful. It turned out that a considerable number of activities did not address the needs of the local population, were not sustainable, and/or did not increase local capacity.

To improve the performance of civil-military alliances, three sets of recommendations are proposed. The first set of recommendations relates to the *ad-hoc* character of alliances. To address this, information gathering and processing need to be structured. The realization of agreements among all participating actors can increase clarity and transparency, and can formalize cooperation rather than it being person-bonded. This also facilitates the transfer of contacts between consecutive rotations. Pre-deployment contact and agreement between military and civilian organizations should get more attention.

The second set relates to the military institution. Military institutions should improve the knowledge and expertise of the military involved in civil-military cooperation. While in the field, continuity of activities should be ensured. In general, a sufficient overlap between personnel of the subsequent rotations can contribute to this. To increase its impact and to decrease duplication of effort, civil-military cooperation should be integrated in the overall mission. This implies fine-tuning of the activities of the CIMIC, Psyops, and Intel branches. To make maximum use of its comparative advantage, a military unit should primarily focus on security-related activities.

The third set of recommendations concerns the involvement of the local population and the humanitarian organizations. Involvement of humanitarian organizations should be done to provide expertise and knowledge on the assistance activities. Local actors should be involved in assessments, as they are often much more able than foreigners to discover the needs of the local population. If authorities bring up the needs of a community, village, or town it is important to crosscheck this with other prominent figures and direct beneficiaries. Stakeholder analyses are helpful tools to determine whether the needs indicated by local authorities are in accordance with the needs of

the local population. By consulting the beneficiaries in an early stage, they become more involved and feel more responsible in later stages.

In the implementation of activities, local capacity constitutes an important aspect of cooperation, and for that reason should be used as much as possible. This employs local people, contributes to the local economy, and involves them in the reconstruction process, enhancing ownership and continuity. As a last aspect, local standards should be used as much as possible to avoid discrepancies and promote sustainability of the endeavours.

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Rethinking Deeper Integration: The Case for Safeguarding Independent Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan and Beyond

Stephen Cornish

Introduction

From a strictly humanitarian point of view, humanitarian collaboration with the politico-military project underway in Afghanistan has not been particularly successful, nor should it have been expected to be. After all, the integrated approach to conflict resolution was designed to succeed where there was a modicum of consent and where the primary driver was the 'Human Security' needs of the population. In the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan, it is clearly 'State Centric Security' needs that predominate (firstly those of Western nations and then those of the Afghan government), and the ongoing counter-insurgency warfare and 'Hearts and Minds' campaign exposes the fragility of existing consent. In such open warfare contexts, collaboration between humanitarian and military actors is simply not possible. As Rieff emphatically points out "… to imagine that war and humanitarian action go together in wartime is fantasy." [2] The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Canada's experiences in Afghanistan, unfortunately, have proven this conflict to be no exception.

While all organizations involved in the "whole of government" approach (WGA) or 3D (defence, diplomatic and development) forcible intervention in Afghanistan have adapted in order to better coordinate the lack of clearly defined boundaries, differing interpretations on roles and responsibilities and the fact that a clear operational framework for cooperation and communication did not exist at the outset have caused and continues to cause considerable friction amongst the actors involved.

Despite these factors, one cannot deny that there have been positive successes in Afghanistan. Government-led, donor-sponsored, and often

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[1] This piece has been adapted from an article previously published by the author. See Stephen Cornish, "No room for humanitarianism in 3D Policies: Have forcible interventions and integrated approaches lost their way?" *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 10, issue 10 (Calgary: University of Alberta, Fall 2007).

[2] David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003): 329.

NGO-implemented programmes have resulted in more than 350,000 families accessing microfinance and micro-credit initiatives, and 12,000 of Afghanistan's 24,000 municipalities benefiting from the establishment of community development councils and the implementation of locally managed development initiatives.

These civilian implemented successes, however, are now at risk of being rolled back, as increasing insecurity is forcing the retreat of government social services and of NGOs from ever larger swaths of the country-side. Ordinary Afghans bear the brunt of the insecurity, which is due to the exponential escalation in conflict violence, and to an unbridled criminality that prays upon the population and humanitarians alike. This criminality, in turn, goes largely unchecked by both the fledgling state security structures (which are sometimes linked to the criminality) and the under-resourced international military contingents.

In addition to the lack of security, a number of unresolved challenges remain for humanitarians in Afghanistan (to say nothing of those to the general population), which have so far largely outweighed the benefits brought by the WGA to the conflict. They are as follows:

1. Co-opting of aid for political or security purposes;

2. Carrying out humanitarian and development activities as part of the 'War on Terror;'

3. Safeguarding humanitarian principles and ethics; and

4. Advocating civilian protection and use of force issues.

Co-opting of Aid for Security Purposes

"The incentives to dress hard military objectives in soft humanitarian clothing has been present from the start, regardless of the party in charge."[3] From the outset in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led effort paid little or no heed to the laws of war, be it to the Geneva Conventions or to International Humanitarian Law (IHL);[4] it is thus not surprising that there should be a complete lack of respect for the existing civil-military cooperation guidelines or experi-

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3 Taylor Owens and Patrick Travers, "3D Vision, Can Canada reconcile its defence, diplomacy and development objectives in Afghanistan," *The Walrus* (July/August 2007): 49.
4 Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, "Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations," HPG Report no. 21 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006).

ence worked out in earlier UN forcible military interventions and integrated missions. Aid, it seems, was to be conceived as nothing more than a weapon in 'the war against terror.'

Non-uniformed special services officers—intentionally or not—camouflaged themselves by adopting the white land-cruisers associated with aid agencies, and by addressing local leaders and elders with promises of aid and assistance. These officers were also the eyes and ears of the military, and utilised the access gained to collect information. In some areas, pamphlets were also dropped promising aid in exchange for providing information on the Taliban. "The confusion over the role of humanitarian workers that resulted from these and similar incidents severely jeopardized their security."[5]

The resulting confusion caused by this 'blurring of the lines' between humanitarian and military action was seen as a primary factor in the assassination of 5 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) aid workers. Following their deaths, a Taliban spokesperson stated that the aid organisation had become a legitimate target because it was working for American interests, causing the organization to end its operations in Afghanistan after a 24-year presence.[6]

The above-mentioned semi-clandestine operations have now largely been replaced with a more formalized form of co-opting aid for essentially military purposes called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These U.S. designed units (now adopted by the militaries comprising ISAF) began functioning as 'military-relief hybrids.' "The Canadian Forces is both a fighting force actively engaged in an anti-insurgency shooting war and a 'hearts and minds' operation that provides relief and services to the local population in a manner that is functional to its military objectives."[7]

In its classic form, the PRTs reflect the theoretical construct of the Three Block War (3BW)[8] that U.S. General Charles Krulak posited in the late

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[5] Owens and Travers, "3D Vision," 44-49.

[6] Ibid., 46.

[7] Antonio Donini, Larry Minear, Ian Smillie, Ted van Baarda and Anthony C. Welch, "Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations and Assistance Agencies," UK NGO–Military Contact Group (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, 2005): 12.

[8] "The rubric of 3BW offers the military a logical framework for the variance of their work in a way which makes sense to a combat-centric. However, 3BW was never developed as an operational strategy, but was a framework to try and understand the complexity of contemporary armed conflicts and other insurgencies." Sarah Jane Meharg, "Three Block Wars and Humanitarians—Theory, Policy and Practice" (Ottawa: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2006): 7.

1990s, in which the military would effectively be conducting combat operations on one block, separating belligerents (or peacekeeping) on another, and distributing humanitarian aid on a third, all in the same theatre and all within a few hours. The U.S. and Canadian military officials who took over from the U.S. PRT in Kandahar adopted this untested construct, in part believing that the third block of visibly placed development and reconstruction would buy consent and, by extension, force security.

In practice, however, most fighting forces were ill-equipped to conduct needs assessments, often lacked the experience and know-how to carry out quality development projects, and were generally unwilling to commit the needed resources to meeting the population's basic humanitarian needs. Furthermore, it soon became evident that in the struggle to win over the civilian population through military re-construction and 'hearts and minds' efforts, ISAF forces sometimes had unwittingly increased the risk of attack on the civilian populations they were striving to assist.

Having witnessed the problems with implementing this heavily militarized 3D construct on the ground, a number of member states like the Dutch, Germans and Norwegians began separating out development functions from their military contingents and belatedly sought to reserve a space for independent humanitarian action.

Unfortunately despite efforts to limit the militarization of aid and the resulting 'blurring of the lines' by some militaries involved in NATO's peacebuilding mission, other member states, including Canada and the ongoing U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), continue to transgress the line for tactical and strategic benefits.

Even if the increasingly pragmatic relationship between humanitarians and military contingents continues to improve as it has, the perception that aid actors are merely puppets of their intervening forces will not soon fade. Tragically, dozens more humanitarians have been killed and the humanitarian space that they had created across much of Afghanistan has shrunk considerably, further reducing assistance and development for the population.[9] In an effort to maintain their independence and in order to protect

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[9] "There has been a sharp rise in attacks against aid workers (28 NGO workers were killed from January to August 2006 compared with 31 aid workers killed during the whole of 2005) and conversely, a reduction in areas where agencies are prepared to work…This has triggered a vicious circle: the insecurity is preventing reconstruction and this in turn is fuelling the population's distrust of both the international community and the government." Holly Ritchie, "Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan at a Crossroads," *ACBAR Briefing Paper*, November 2006, http://www.reliefweb.int/library/document/2006.acbar -afg-oinov.pdf (accessed 26 July 2007): 5.

themselves from the perception of assisting the military projects in Southern Afghanistan, some agencies such as CARE and World Vision refused to consider funds to extend project activities there.

Despite the co-option of aid by the military and important losses felt by the humanitarian community, most NGOs have stayed on and attempted to carry out their assistance missions under the less than favourable conditions afforded by the WGA and the 'War on Terror'.

Carrying out Humanitarian and Development Activities in the War on Terror under the WGA

"Humanitarians would never deny that the creation of a stable peace is in everyone's best interest. However, they would also assert the need for humanitarian action to exist alongside peacebuilding efforts in order to uphold the principle of humanity and the protection of civilian life as the conflict rages."[10] Inside Afghanistan, there are largely two realities. The first is in the central North and Western regions, where humanitarian agencies and multi-mandate organizations are, despite the relative insecurity, still able to carry out humanitarian assistance, development initiatives, and peace-building ventures. The second is in the Eastern and Southern areas, where obstacles continue and aid agencies have largely had to withdraw or reduce their programming to insufficient remote-controlled efforts due to security constraints related to the ongoing War on Terror. "Reconstruction has been very slow in the South. The food aid system has failed, causing a severe famine. Much of the population of Southern Afghanistan is alienated from ISAF. Unless these circumstance change, the Canadian mission in Kandahar will become less and less acceptable to the local population. Time is not on NATO and Canada's side."[11]

Perhaps as a result of such negative descriptions, the general consensus emerging is that 3D is not working in Afghanistan and that its failings can largely be attributed to the ineffectual and uncooperative Development-D.

Ultimately NGOs receive and implement between 10 and 15% of donor aid arriving in the country. Yet they are increasingly being held responsible for all the development failures in the Afghan context. A blame game has

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[10] Erin A Weir, "Conflict or Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative," *KAIPTC Monograph* no. 4 (June 2006): 37, http://www.trainingforpeace.org (accessed September 2007).

[11] Gordon Smith et al., "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?" Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007, 14, http://www.cdfai.org (accessed August 2007).

arisen in which each actor points to the other as being responsible for the apparent failures of the WGA in Afghanistan.

Development projects funded through external support, and often directed through private contractors and/or PRTs, have been singled out as being particularly costly, wasteful, lacking in quality, and often not taking into account community needs.[12] Government-led efforts have been stalled by a nascent and corrupt bureaucracy that has been overloaded by donor funding despite its inability to manage and support such a heavy programming burden.[13]

ISAF and NATO have felt let down by all the above, as they decry the lack of visible development benefits that they believe would shore up population support following their hard won victories on the battlefields. According to Jack Granatstein, "the enemy has been strong enough that the governments' and the Canadian Forces' commitment to the 3D approach has not been able to receive a fair trial." The blame falls on the fact that the open war fighting has constrained the PRTs to spending more time protecting themselves than assisting the Afghan people, as well as on the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for being ineffectual, and on Canadian NGOs for refusing to cooperate with the military.[14]

For Granatstein, the pushing of the other non-consequential D's to the background during times of strategic necessity, or when the battles rage, is simply a logical state of affairs to be expected. For him, like many integrationists, the benefits of peace-enforcement will arrive once the battles have been won. For many NGOs and peacebuilders alike, it is precisely this type of security first logic (in which short term political interests and goals continually trump long term state-building processes) that is at the heart of the problem, and that ultimately leads to a State-building Paradox.[15]

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[12] Hamish Nixon, Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in Afghanistan- Briefing Paper Series (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007): 9.

[13] Ritchie, "Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan at a Crossroads," 6.

[14] J.L. Granatstein, *Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post 9/11 World* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007): 214-215.

[15] Nixon, *Aiding the State?*, 1.

Safeguarding Humanitarian Principles and Ethics of Independence, Neutrality and Impartiality

"Reconciling military, diplomatic and humanitarian objectives may be a more effective way of stabilizing failed and fragile states, but it also creates inevitable trade-offs and requires a high degree of collaboration."[16] The question is what trade-offs to make and how much one can agree to suspend their own morality and principles in order to arrive at the greater good. What has also been shown through the Afghan experiment is that the degree of collaboration needed sometimes remains higher than agencies can afford without becoming complicit in the militaries' agenda. The same question arises when collaborating with governments in development and peacebuilding efforts.

To remain independent, agencies must remain in charge of where and with whom they work. Yet in government or military-led peacebuilding efforts, agencies sometimes have little control over the types of projects and/or locations where they will be implemented.

What is often not understood is that many multi-mandate agencies have sacrificed a portion of their neutrality, impartiality, and independence by acting as implementing agencies for various ministries of the Afghan national government. Agencies have done this to ensure their continued role and active participation in the peacebuilding activities funded by the donors of the WGA. In fact, more than 80% of NGO activities in the country are already tied to government programs and priorities. While good donorship principles oblige that a majority of funds be directed through multilateral organisations or into direct budgetary support to the host government, this shift has further disenfranchised many beneficiaries and shut down "key services not covered under the remit of the current government programmes."[17]

The lack of funding available for independent programming, coupled with NGOs' heavy participation in implementing government programs, has now caused organizations to be viewed as government agents rather than as neutral humanitarian actors responding to community needs impartially. As a result, communities in semi-safe and unsafe areas are no longer able to afford protection to the NGOs in question, and they are forced to convert to remote control activities or to withdraw their programming activities entirely. In addition to the loss of development programs, it often becomes

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[16]   Owens and Travers, "3D Vision," 46.
[17]   Ritchie, "Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan at a Crossroads," 7.

impossible for agencies to respond to life-saving and basic humanitarian needs in such areas once the traditional community consent and protection has evaporated.

In the South, the few NGOs still able to function have clearly been unable to meet the lifesaving needs of the civilian population. Defence actors have offered to extend protection to aid agencies,[18] and have tried setting up Priority Development Zones (PDZs) in which security would be maintained by the coalition members. From the humanitarian perspective, there is little confidence in the solutions offered due to the high number of military- and police-protected development areas and PRT reconstruction convoys that have been attacked by the insurgency, and the inability of military contingents to adequately protect populations in PDZs and in most areas under their control. Furthermore, humanitarians maintain a firm belief that their security and their ability to respond impartially to needs on both sides of the conflict would be undermined by such a close cooperation. This principled, and some would say dogmatic, stance undoubtedly perplexes the military and further fixes the stereotype that humanitarians are somehow antiquated and that they selectively use neutrality as an excuse to avoid working with the military.

Yet in Southern Afghanistan, CARE's local partners have been approached and told that "Your aid is good for the local community and may continue. However if you or the programmes you implement become associated with NATO forces, then you will make yourself a target." When one is responsible, as CARE is, for the lives of more than 800 national staff members and their families, and is already helping hundreds of thousands of Afghans in twelve provinces successfully under the traditional model of community acceptance and local integration, then one must weigh very carefully the expansions of ones activities into areas where the conditions for safe and successful delivery of programming simply do not exist.

The reality is that aid agencies would make themselves targets by working in PDZs, as they would be seen to have taken sides, thus evaporating the consent based security and community acceptance model on which they rely to carry out their programming. It is thus no wonder that "Aid Agencies are very nervous about working side by side with the military. When that happens, their impartiality in the eyes of the community has been lost,"[19] and

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[18] "At the other extreme, a few agencies and donor representatives chose to embed themselves with the PRT's or to travel alongside [Canadian Forces] convoys for their protection. This approach was chastised as dangerous by most assistance agencies." Donini et al., "Mapping the Security Environment," 15.

[19] Rick Westhead, "Relief Groups reject Afghan projects," *Toronto Star*, 19 October 2006.

with it their ability to safely and effectively carry out bottom up inclusive programming for the benefit of all.

Compromising on impartiality leads to the conditionality of assistance and the discrimination of victims that has become a hallmark of the way the WGA and the Afghan government distributes and relates to development issues and assistance.

> As with many aid efforts, however, help for the displaced has been hampered by the Afghan government itself. Last March, the government declared that support for the camp dwellers should stop, so the people would be encouraged to return home. The WFP [World Food Programme] now plans to use its CIDA money to help get people out of the camps and back into their homes, with food-for-work-incentives.[20]

Using food aid as a weapon to force civilians back into unsafe areas is clearly not something that any aid agency should support, yet contravening the project risks incurring the ire of the Afghan authorities. That the WFP would be complicit in this speaks volumes as to its abrogation of humanitarian mandates in favour of short-term political priorities.

In dealings the author had with one Afghan Ministry (which will remain anonymous), he was told when looking to implement programming in the volatile Southern region that the Ministry intended to guarantee the organization's safety through the use of armed emissaries that the communities themselves would provide. In cases where it was understood that security could not be guaranteed as a result of Taliban presence, the information would be transmitted back to ISAF and the Afghan National Army so that they could 'clean up the area,' after which assumedly, CARE would be encouraged to commence its programming.

Extending the writ of the government's programming, and assisting to rout out the Taliban, thus went hand in hand for the high level Ministry official in question. That the organization could not follow through with such an unethical bargain, nor could it have accepted the armed guards, was never in question. It did, however, show the limits of deep integration, and reconfirmed the wisdom of, or reaffirmed, core humanitarian principles.

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[20] Graeme Smith, "'We have to act faster' CIDA says," Officials concede Canadian aid flows slowly in Afghanistan, Bazaar-E-Panjway, Afghanistan, *The Globe and Mail*, 21 January 2007.

Advocating Civilian Protection and Use of Force Issues

UN mandated and/or sanctioned forces, as NATO's ISAF, become party to the conflict by engaging in forcible humanitarian interventions and peace-making efforts, and as such they must respect the rules of IHL. Therefore, civilian protection must be assured and independent humanitarian assistance allowed. The means used must be in proportion to the threat presented, other-wise the United Nations and its allies will be in contravention of IHL, and as such will forfeit the legitimacy and the justification for the humanitarian interventions themselves.[21]

Following a spate of high profile and well publicized incidents in which U.S. and coalition bombardments have led to high numbers of civilian casu-alties, the United Nations released a report stating that, so far in 2007, more civilian deaths were caused by allied and Afghan forces than by the insur-gents.[22] The vast majority of recent civilian deaths in Afghanistan, however, are not related to individual soldiers' reactions on the ground in the 'Fog of War.' Civilian deaths are largely due to the coalition's increasing reli-ance on aerial bombardments[23] and long range artillery support Afghan national government, as was done in Kosovo to compensate for limited troop numbers[24] and to minimize coalition casualties. In addition to the loss of life, increased coalition activity in the South has led to an increase in Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and has caused wide scale damage to civilian houses, wells, and other infrastructure,[25] thus further aggravating the humanitarian situation on the ground.

The U.S. and NATO have now both acknowledged the problem. Although arguably they see the problem more in terms of 'losing Hearts and Minds' and

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[21] Françoise Saulnier-Bouchet, "Action Humanitaire entre droit de la guerre et Maintien de la Paix," *Les cahiers de Mars*, no. 166 (2000): 6-7, http://www.msf.fr (accessed February 2005).

[22] "A recent United Nations report said 593 Afghan civilians have been killed by violence linked to insurgents this year. But more of those deaths – 314 – were caused by ISAF or Afghan security forces than by insurgents." Kim Barker, "Afghan Civilians Caught in Crossfire," *Chicago Tribune*, 8 July 2007.

[23] "This year in Afghanistan, American aircraft have dropped 987 bombs and fired more than 146,000 cannon rounds and bullets in strafing runs, more than was expended in both categories from the beginning of the American-led invasion in 2001 through 2004, the Air Force said." David S. Cloud, "U.S. Airstrikes Climb Sharply in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, 17 November 2006.

[24] The Economist, "Western Forces in Afghanistan—Unfriendly Fire," 23 June 2007, 51.

[25] One such attack near Herat this past summer led to dozens of deaths (including civilians), created over 2000 IDPs and left 170 houses wholly or partially destroyed.

potential ramifications on their own force security than in terms of following IHL and of guaranteeing civilian protection. There is some cause for hope here in the so-called European exception. Holland, France and other continental European nations see their presence in Afghanistan more in terms of keeping the peace and nation building, and are thus said to be uncomfortable with the force posture and collateral damage being caused.

The sanctity of human life and the right to assistance and protection are fundamental constructs of the humanitarian endeavour. When these are transgressed, humanitarians have a duty to give voice to the victims and to bear witness to the suffering observed. How then, should an NGO working alongside the WGA and hand in hand with the Afghan government, respond to such breaches of IHL when these breaches are committed by its own partners and against the very people that the 'Humanitarian Imperative' would demand it assist?

For humanitarians, however, "Where there is contact with the victims of catastrophe that is instigated or made worse by the direct or structural oppression by some humans or others, the ethical mandate of bearing witness in favour of the victims arises spontaneously."[26] Ultimately, agencies therefore have a duty to remain despite the challenges and advocate or witness on the victims' behalf. Here again we can see the limits of shared vision among the actors in the WGA. The ends justifying the means may be appropriate for defence and diplomacy, but this is not the case for peacebuilding actors and for those involved in the Development-D.

Conclusion

In Afghanistan today, the list of direct and indirect victims continues to grow both through omission and direct action alike. In many areas, the population fears the insurgency, the state security apparatus (especially the Afghan National Police), and coalition forces in equal measure. An inordinate share of aid funding is instrumentalized to support politico-military objectives, which leaves some safe areas under-resourced in development spending, while in unsafe areas, humanitarian and life-saving needs go unmet or are replaced by ill-conceived military-initiated reconstruction projects that bring added risk to the intended beneficiaries.

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[26] Xabier Etxeberria, "The Ethical Framework of Humanitarian Action," in *Reflection on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions*, ed. The Humanitarian Studies Unit (London: Pluto Press, 2001): 93.

A number of the challenges that have surfaced in Afghanistan are similar to the ones already experienced in past humanitarian interventions, leading many aid actors to believe that while there may be some shared moral overlap in humanitarian interventions' desired goals, their implementation will remain fraught with discord over the appropriate means. For humanitarians, and according to the laws of 'Just War,' forcible interventions must be justly conducted, must seek to protect the civilian population, and must privilege the existence of humanitarian space where principled 'humanitarian assistance' can be delivered.

So far, however, the WGA and 3D approaches were not sufficiently ripe or mature to effectively meet these three criteria, nor to deal with the additional challenges of integrated interventions in the 'War on Terror' environment. The present experience has also perhaps elucidated certain underlying incongruities and fundamentally different agendas, which will ultimately preclude Development Ministries (not to mention humanitarians) from the type of 'seamless cooperation' currently being championed by Western governments and their defence departments.

This being said, for now, development, defence, and diplomatic actors must all strive to keep the culture of communication forged in Afghanistan flowing. While some may be disappointed that deeper integration and coherent coordination or control by one lead actor was not possible, it was in fact entirely predictable from the moment the security agenda overtook the protection agenda as the lead motive for intervention.

Granatstein suggests that the level of violence in Afghanistan means that 3D never had a chance, while others like Rieff suggest that it simply was not meant to be. What is abundantly clear is that since the 'War on Terror,' there has yet to be an effective and justified intervention that can be called 'humanitarian,' and this should give all 3D actors (defence, diplomacy and development) cause to pause and reflect.

In the future, and until such a time as the theoretical 3D construct can make room for an independent and operational Humanitarian-H, it may indeed be best to simply remove the Development-D from the equation.[27]

While Afghanistan is the central issue today, much more is at stake. The very legitimacy of humanitarian interventions could be lost if the international community is not careful to safeguard the core principle of 'humanity,' which seems to be at present almost beyond reach. Morality, in fact, does matter, especially in calculating our future power and potential influence. For

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[27] Ted Itani, "Politicization of Aid," *On Track* 12, no. 1, Conference of Defence Association (Spring 2007).

Canada, as one of the lead architects behind the Responsibility to Protect, we should be all the more concerned about the morality of forcible interventions in failed states. Otherwise, the tool that is the Responsibility to Protect with its potential to avoid conflict, alleviate suffering, and protect civilians from the abuses of their own governments, will go unused. The blame for this will be attributed to the unskilled carpenters who abused and ultimately broke it before it had a fair chance to succeed.

Recommendations Going Forward

1. In Afghanistan, Germany, Holland, and Norway have all seen the limits of deeper integration and an overly militarized approach to assistance. As a result, their development ministries are now conducting independent aid initiatives separately from their PRTs and military contingents. Canada and other ISAF partners should also separate humanitarian and development aid efforts from military and PRT activities in Afghanistan. The current trend of simply placing civilians under the command of soldiers, who use assistance as a tool in the counter-insurgency war, and who distribute assistance and reconstruction projects according to military strategic necessity, does not go far enough toward the objective or de-militarizing the delivery of aid.

2. Human security and population protection must be prioritized as central elements of the mission. The current lawlessness and chaos that prevail undermine the legitimacy of both the Afghan government and the coalition intervention, and as we have seen is now reversing some of the development gains already made. Under IHL, it is the Afghan government's, and arguably by extension the intervening forces' co-responsibility, to protect the population in areas under their control and to facilitate humanitarian aid and the delivery of basic needs.[28]

3. ISAF, OEF, and the Afghan Government should redefine both force posture and rules of engagement, and lay out a joint strategic plan

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[28] Interestingly enough, the Geneva Convention and IHL stipulations that civilians should be protected from the harms of war and that their basic needs should be met are also central tenets in classic counter-insurgency theory. The problem it seems is that nations are seldom willing to invest the force numbers, which either true civilian protection under forcible humanitarian interventions or victory in classic counter insurgency operations would require.

for obtaining their stated goals. A review of the rules of engagement and tactics used should be forthcoming in order to limit the death and destruction that continues to uproot Afghans from their homes, and that undermines both support for the politico-military project, and the long-term state building efforts underway.

4. Aid spending governed by effectiveness criteria should be targeted according to a country-wide strategy centred on poverty reduction, basic service delivery, economic development, and meeting humanitarian needs. The Afghan government and NGOs should receive only what they can manage effectively, and the over-reliance on multilateral institutions and private for profit companies should be reviewed to ensure that quality impact and expediency promised are actually delivered cost effectively on the ground.

5. Humanitarian agencies must be supported in order to respond to the human suffering that is currently going unmet, and in some cases being aggravated by the heavily militarized WGA to the conflict. This means making separate funding available for independent assistance, ending the targeting of aid workers and the impunity that follows, and putting an end to the dangerous practice of considering that NGOs can be utilized as force-multipliers in securing victory in conflict. Such steps, if taken, would enable humanitarians to adhere to the 1994 Red Cross, Red Crescent NGO Code of Conduct on aid delivery (which prohibits the instrumentalization of aid), to begin rebuilding small pockets of humanitarian space, to carry out aid projects and meet relief needs in insecure areas controlled by the insurgency, and finally to start countering the dangerous perception that NGOs are simply agents of the coalition forces and of the Afghan government.

6. Both theory and past practice suggest that successful integrated and WGA approaches to conflict resolution require a balanced approach, where defence, diplomacy, and development are utilised in right measure. If state building and peacebuilding truly are integral parts of ISAF's mandate in Afghanistan, then it must increase the funding and strengthen the profile of both diplomatic and development actors, and encourage defence to concentrate on security and protection tasks, which are its true areas of expertise. Recent steps to heighten the civilian participation and oversight of the mission are to be welcomed and increased.

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Clash of Revelations:
ISAF Nations Struggle to Sell the Integrated Approach on the Home Front

Christa Meindersma

Afghanistan, 22 October 2007

"Talk to them, they are ours." In *Morad Khan Kalay*, in Afghanistan's troubled southern *Zabul* province, a local *Pashtun* leader leaves no doubt about the role the Taliban should play in a future Afghanistan. However cruel the movement's leadership has been during its reign and despite the fact that it continues to terrorize the local population, the Taliban are and will be a part of Afghanistan's new beginning. To the ordinary Afghan, the Taliban are not that different from the old warlords and drug barons, who have become democratically elected leaders. The international military presence is slowly realizing that there can be no clear-cut military operation to fix this problem in the short run.

In fact, the tone has changed since the invasion and the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001. ISAF[1] commanders are keen to highlight that the Taliban should not be seen as a homogeneous movement, and that coalition troops are working hard to target selected key figures in order to eliminate their command structures. In other words: winning the peace by winning the war against the Taliban.

However, daily reality is somewhat less differentiated. In 2007, "thousands of Taliban" were killed by international troops, aided by the freshly trained Afghan army or police. NATO troops are tempted to portray these strikes as significant victories in the war on terror, and as a critical step towards Afghanistan's stabilization and normalization. According to General McNeil, the current commander of ISAF, there has been "significant tactical progress."[2] Some NATO member states have proposed using the numbers of Taliban killed as a critical measure of the Coalition's success.

However, for those who travel to Afghanistan, it is painstakingly clear that the Taliban are far from being put "back in the box." The security situation

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[1] International Security Assistance Force.
[2] General McNeil (Commander of ISAF), in discussion with the author, Kabul, October 2007.

in Afghanistan is deteriorating, extremism is spreading beyond the *Pashtun* tribal belt to the major towns, the narco-economy is booming, and the population is struggling to survive without seeing tangible improvements in their daily lives. Public confidence in the government and its leaders is low, particularly at the local level, owing to corruption and weak or non-existent governance. The Taliban are filling the vacuum. According to the Senlis Council, the Taliban insurgency now controls vast swaths of unchallenged territory in rural areas, border areas, some district centers, and important road arteries. Military convoys are only able to operate in the surroundings of towns and military bases, and humanitarian aid is functionally nonexistent. Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camps have sprung up in and around Kandahar since the summer of 2006, some of which are controlled by the Taliban.[3]

The majority of Taliban killed have not been leaders or Taliban operatives related to Al-Qaida, but so-called "third or fourth tier" Taliban.[4] In other words, they are local Taliban, some of which have been indoctrinated in religious schools (*madrassas*) in neighboring Pakistan. This may become a major headache for the multinational peace operation in Afghanistan, if not today, then certainly tomorrow. NATO is breeding a new style of opposition to their presence based on revenge, which is a question of honor for many *Pashtuns*.[5] Moreover, it creates a public Afghan perception of Western indiscrimination towards Afghan citizenry. These kind of civilian casualties—be they Taliban fighters or not—merely serve to nurture a feeling well-known to the local population: external powers mingling in their affairs without genuine commitment to their needs, and even less understanding of the long violent history of the central Asian country.

The Hague, 19 December 2007

A different kind of field trip takes us some eight hours west, to the Netherlands. During a lengthy parliamentary debate, a Member of Parliament cynically remarked that a few safe inkblogs were little to show for hundreds of millions of euros and Dutch soldiers' lives spent. Another pleaded with the

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[3] Senlis Council, *Recommendations to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 1 December 2007, 1.
[4] General McNeil responding to a question during a meeting in Kabul, October 2007.
[5] This is confirmed by findings of the 'Centre for Peace Studies' in Kabul that investigated why people join the Taliban. In addition to compulsion and economic gain, it appears that local 'men of fighting age' join the Taliban to take revenge against the international community. Killing Taliban in great numbers may therefore be counter-productive. http://www.caps.af.

Government to convince him that "our boys" are not dying in vain, and that what we are doing in Uruzgan is worth it.[6] The Minister of Development Cooperation tried his best to argue that reconstruction—what this is all about—is progressing well, and that hospitals and schools are being built and girls are getting educated.

Some of these statements may have been of a highly rhetoric nature. However, they reflect a broader trend in countries engaging in peace or stability operations. The domestic context is the ultimate reference point for policymakers to consider sending soldiers abroad. In many countries this has long been the case. However, the speed of information to and from the area of operations has changed the dynamics between what happens on the ground and how politics can decide on troop contributions to large-scale missions. The 21st century peace operation is a multi-media spectacle, which cannot escape the need to take thorough account of what is politically feasible given the current public perception at home.

Therefore, a field visit to the capital of a troop-contributing nation may be as enlightening as a trip to Afghanistan itself. "We have dealt a blow to the Taliban in Chora, which gives us more room to do reconstruction." Similar statements are made in national newspapers, particularly where NATO coalition partners need public (and therefore taxpayers') support. "We are here to make the Taliban irrelevant, not to kill them."[7] Officials from contributing nations tend to portray ISAF as a reconstruction mission, mainly supporting the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). As fighting continues and international (as well as national) news agencies have been covering fighting scenes where possible, the reconstruction image of ISAF has come under enormous pressure. Fierce Afghan-inspired resistance to peace-loving, school-building soldiers was unexpected.

In various ISAF nations, these kinds of revelations have led to an increasingly critical public. The Chief of the Dutch Armed Forces recently lamented that casualties and fighting make it to the news easier than successful reconstruction projects, which gives the Dutch populace the wrong impression of the character of the mission.[8] Questions have been asked as to whether ISAF can and should deal with the Taliban, and if so, how—or is the mandate strictly aimed at reconstruction? While on paper this may be clear cut, the average taxpayer is still convinced that the "boys" are out there to rebuild what no Afghan generation can remember: peace-time government institutions that

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[6]   Hans van Baalen, Liberal Party (VVD).
[7]   Colonel Hans Griensven, quoted in *New York Times*, 12 April 2007.
[8]   General Dick Berlijn, quoted in *NRC Handelsblad*, 2 January 2008.

ensure human security for the Afghan population. A combination of necessary might, with urgently needed humanitarian and diplomatic efforts over a long period of time is not the easiest to sell in a parliamentary democracy.

Whether one cares to look at the ISAF operation from an Afghan or a troop-contributing national perspective, it is not the military situation that causes concern to most analysts. Militarily, ISAF is superior to the Taliban. However, even if NATO were to gain ground on the Taliban, it is the lack of national security capacity, the fragile social fabric of a war-torn country, and the absence of local governance structures, that pose a threat to normalcy. According to the Deputy Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Asif Rahimi, the Taliban are filling a gap in the South created by a weak government rather than by a strong insurgency. Polls among the Afghan population in the tribal southern belt have revealed that absence and poor quality of government institutions (i.e. corruption) was their prime security concern; the Taliban ranked either second or third.

The question is whether there is enough political commitment to put the necessary resources into diplomatic and economic efforts, in order to create real stability and tangible peace dividends for the population. There is a lively debate about how different non-military actors can, should, and must be strengthened in order to get Afghanistan's state-building effort under way. While different in many aspects, everyone seems to agree that the Afghan government must be in the driver's seat. First, this entails putting serious effort into reaching out to the entire Afghan citizenry and making clear that you are here to stay. Second, it takes the courage and determination to open dialogue with the Taliban. A genuine commitment to an inclusive political process is the key to stability in Afghanistan. Negotiating with the Taliban is not the prerogative of the international community; it is up to the Afghan authorities to talk to the Taliban, as the intricacies of tribal relations are too complex and the stakes too high. The international community could, though, discreetly encourage the process and play a role in facilitating such a dialogue. Coalition troops have a critical role to play in strengthening the authority of the Government of Afghanistan in this process.[9] Encouraging negotiations with the Taliban should be part of a comprehensive approach and an exit strategy of foreign troops.

To achieve stability in Afghanistan—not to speak of development or democracy—military and non-military efforts must be combined into a

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[9] See also C. Meindersma, 'Four-Point plan to win the peace in Afghanistan' in *Europe's World*, forthcoming February 2008.

more integrated strategy to assist Afghanistan in what is one of the most challenging state-building exercises of modern history. According to the Special Representative of the United Nations in Afghanistan, progress at this key moment depends on the international community and the Government of Afghanistan better coordinating their efforts to defeat the insurgency, promote good governance and provide tangible improvement to the lives of Afghans.[10] This requires a radical shift in thinking and a comprehensive strategic plan for Afghanistan that includes military and non-military actors in a common quest for peace.

How far can a multinational military alliance go in terms of fostering an integrated approach? There have been various attempts, particularly by NATO and military actors, to work in a more integrated manner.[11] However, good intentions notwithstanding, this has not resulted in a more comprehensive approach. The main challenge is that civilian actors appear less thrilled about a comprehensive approach which they tend to view as a military pre-occupation rather than something that is crucial to their efforts in (post-) conflict environments. Some non-governmental organizations see military operations as an impediment to their work and refuse, for example, to work in areas of southern Afghanistan where NATO are deployed.[12] Others are apprehensive about perceived attempts by the military to make development efforts subservient to a counterinsurgency strategy.[13] They reject the notion that NATO is there to help the military "get the job done."

If NATO's ambition is to be a global security player, Afghanistan is its chance to get it right. Six years after toppling the Taliban regime, the situation in Afghanistan is at a tipping point. Either the country stabilizes or it again falls prey to Islamic extremism. Afghanistan has the potential to create more, rather than less, understanding between the various disciplines and actors involved in international stability and peace operations. However, it needs a well-maintained balance between operational realities on the ground and public perception at home. This new battlefront is set to become more

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[10] United Nations, *Report to the UN Security Council*, S/2007/152, September 2007.

[11] For example, PRTs, originally a poor-man's concept, are now heralded by some as the new model of a comprehensive approach to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

[12] See, for example, W. van de Put, "No Safety without Rehabilitation," HealthNet TPO, http://www.healthnet.org.

[13] Assertions that there is little difference between counterinsurgency and a comprehensive approach, as the former is not only "a blunt military effort that focuses solely on killing high value targets," raise concerns. in the NGO community. Amb. E. Edelman, *A Comprehensive Approach to Modern Insurgency: Afghanistan and Beyond*, 27 March 2007.

complicated to deal with as integrated mission concepts mature. The adagium of von Clausewitz that one can win the battle, but without the support of the population, one will lose the war, is as much applicable to the population of the country where the intervention takes place as to the population of the home country. The Taliban realize and exploit this fact.

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Upcoming Topics and Submission Deadlines

Volume 11, Issue 2, Fall 2008

Submission Deadline: 15 July 2008

The complexity of peace operations and of the context in which military, police, and civilians are being deployed underscores the fact that there is no—and nor should there be—a "one-size-fits-all" model of peace operations. In addition, while there should be space for some improvisation based on circumstances and context, contemporary peace operations should not rely entirely on ad hoc structures. In order to be effective, peace operations must evidence a balance between flexibility and coherence. While there seems to be a broad consensus on the need for integration, questions remain as to the what, when and how to integrate.

Volume 11, Issue 2 of *The Pearson Papers* will further explore the theme of cooperation and coordination by focusing more specifically on the interoperability of integration. How is integration of different actors conducted in practice? What factors are necessary for integration to be successful? How is success measured and evaluated?

Volume 12, Issue 1, Spring 2009

Submission Deadline: 15 December 2008

Recent history demonstrates that to achieve sustainable peace an entire spectrum of cross-cutting issues must be addressed through integrated, comprehensive responses that are multidimensional in nature. Despite this knowledge, international institutions and States still respond in silos instead of understanding the relationship and interconnections among cross cutting issues. The environment is one such issue that can no longer be neglected. Environmental degradation and competition for resources has a real impact on the success or failure of peace operations and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. Conversely, peace operations are not neutral in their effects and managing change can also have intended and unintended impacts on the environment. Consequently, it is imperative that the environment be factored into the overall response to conflict.

Volume 12 of *The Pearson Papers* aims to further the understanding of the way in which environmental issues affect the conduct of peace operations and vice-versa. Such understanding, in turn, will help in the planning of future missions and of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

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