Measures of Effectiveness: Peace Operations and Beyond
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Peace Operations and Beyond
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**Editorial Review Board**

**Stephanie Blair** has served in a variety of capacities for a number of peace operations. Most recently she served in Kosovo from 1999, first with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) as Deputy Director of Human Rights and then as Head of the first Field Office for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). In 2000, she served as a Municipal Administrator for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It is in these contexts that she understands the requirement for the measurement of effectiveness, but also the challenges that this poses in a conflict environment.

Ms. Blair provides consultancy services for various UN agencies, including Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Cranfield University’s Centre for Security Sector Reform. She is currently completing a doctorate degree in the War Studies Department at King’s College in London.

An integral member of the team which established the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ms. Blair continues to serve as a member of the faculty. She was the co-founder of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) and Secretariat co-Director from 1995 until 1998.

**Dr. Trevor Findlay** is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University. He has a BA Honours degree in political science from the University of Melbourne and a Masters degree and PhD in international relations from the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra.

Dr. Findlay served for thirteen years in the Australian diplomatic service, including as a member of the Australian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This was followed by several academic appointments at the ANU’s Peace Research Centre, including acting director. He then spent four years at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden, where he established its program on peacekeeping and regional security. From 1998 to 2005, Dr. Findlay was Executive Director of the London-based, non-governmental organization, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).
He is the author of a number of books on peacekeeping, including *Cambodia: The legacy and lessons of UNTAC* (1995) and *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (2002), both published by Oxford University Press for SIPRI.

**Bruce “Ossie” Oswald** is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Melbourne. He is also an Associate Director of the Asia Pacific Centre of Military Law (APCML) and Program Director of Peace Operations.

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Ossie has served in the Australian Regular Army as a legal officer. He has provided legal advice and held staff appointments as a legal officer at tactical, operational and strategic levels. During his service in Australia he provided legal advice to the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Headquarters Australian Theatre, Strategic Command and Directorate of Operations and International Law. He has served in Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, East Timor and Iraq. Ossie continues to serve in the Australian Army Reserve.

Ossie has both undergraduate and post-graduate teaching responsibilities, including courses on Criminal Law, International Dispute Settlement Law (IDSL), International Humanitarian Law, and International Peace and Security Law (IPSL). When teaching IDSL and IPSL he examines, amongst other things, the role and effectiveness of peace operations as a means of ‘dispute settlement.’
**Contributors**

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**Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg** is a specialist in post-conflict reconstruction. Her published warfare strategy, *identicide* (1997), informs much of her work on the intentional destruction of culturally symbolic places during contemporary armed conflicts. Dr. Meharg has a Bachelor’s degree in Landscape Architecture (Guelph), a Master’s of War Studies (RMC), and PhD in Geography (Queen’s). Dr. Meharg is currently researching measures of effectiveness and the unintended consequences of social-cultural reconstruction and stabilization in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Dr. Meharg is Senior Research Associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and holds the position of Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, where she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in peacekeeping and reconstruction.

The author would like to thank the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre for its support in publishing this paper. In addition, the Canadian Forces, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade contributed to the author’s thinking on measures of effectiveness through their continued interest to improve their activities in the field of reconstruction and development.

**Joseph Schumacher** works as a research and evaluation analyst for the Ministry of Social Development in New Zealand. Previously he has worked in the international development field, as a consultant on transparency issues in the extractive industries and as an editor at the Peace and Conflict Monitor. He is currently studying towards his PhD on emerging trends in resource governance in international law.
Dr. Kobi Michael is a scholar and a lecturer who concentrates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its strategic and security aspects, including civil-military relations and third party involvement. He is currently a visiting scholar and lecturer in political science at Northwestern University, a researcher at the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University and a fellow at Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. He was one of the founders of the Israeli-Palestinian security coordination apparatus, which was established in line with the Oslo Agreement. He completed his PhD at the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Dr. Michael wrote a book about civil-military relations in Israel (*Military Fights Peace*, forthcoming) and edited two books about peacekeeping operations in the Israeli-Palestinian arena following the international experience. In addition, he has published more than 20 articles and monographs about civil-military relations, peacekeeping operations, security cooperation and future political arrangements in Jerusalem.

David Kellen is a scholar who concentrates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dealing with international involvement as well as track two and non-governmental initiatives. He is currently an assistant researcher at the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University and completing his MA at the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
It is with enthusiasm and pride that the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) presents the first issue of the re-designed Pearson Papers.

Since the emergence of the PPC in 1994, we have been engaged in innovative research in the area of peacekeeping and peace operations. The Pearson Papers provide a forum where researchers and practitioners can openly engage with the complexities of evolving peace operations. The journal is peer-reviewed and represents an opportunity for professionals and practitioners to meet and provide an interdisciplinary dialogue on the complexities experienced in peace operations within the global peace and security realm.

The topics covered in each issue of the Pearson Papers are chosen through a nexus of internal discussion, while keeping a finger on the pulse of the dialogue taking place within the international peace operations community. Each volume is thematically-oriented, with space for field contributions, research articles, and topical reviews examining emerging trends.

In consideration of the current dialogue surrounding peace operations, the Pearson Papers Planning Committee identified measures of effectiveness as a salient issue evidenced by theoreticians and practitioners within the peace operations community. Although some systems of measurement exist, they may not adequately capture the effects of peace operations activities. What is clear is that more thought and discussion needs to be committed to this subject.

In this spirit, the current issue of the Pearson Papers has been focused on the theme: “Measures of Effectiveness: Peace Operations and Beyond.” Within this issue, you will find diverse approaches to measurement and even differing conceptualizations of what peace operations today consist of, including those that go ‘beyond’ the traditional notion of peacekeeping. It is hoped that this issue provides a valuable compendium on the topic and acts as a stimulant for further discussion and debate beyond the bounds of this publication.

We would like to acknowledge the important contributions that have been made by others in preparing this issue. In particular we would like to thank Kathryn Robicheau, Publications Coordinator, Interior Layout, for her eye for detail and tremendous effort. We are very appreciative of our Editorial Review Board, for contributing their expertise and time towards the project. In addition, we are grateful to Barbara MacLaren, MA
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Our next issue of this volume is on Integrated Missions, which exemplifies the interdisciplinarity that is at the heart of this broader discussion. As the Planning Committee will be meeting to frame the next volume, your input regarding upcoming topics is welcomed. In the meantime, we hope that you enjoy this issue and find that it makes a valuable contribution to your library of knowledge on peace operations.

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Our Seven Wars in Afghanistan: Progress under the SWORD Model

N. N. French

Abstract

Continued reports of corruption, increasing violence, struggles with development, and slow progress with poppy eradication seem to indicate that the situation in Afghanistan is on the decline. This paper will argue that the chances for success in the troubled nation are actually improving – although several adjustments must be made to how the problem is being solved. The ongoing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will be assessed with respect to the SWORD model’s seven strategic dimensions or ‘wars within the war.’ These strategic dimensions are: (1) the legitimacy war; (2) the shooting war; (3) the war to isolate the insurgents from internal support; (4) the war to isolate the insurgents from external support; (5) the war to stay the course and maintain commitment; (6) the intelligence and information war; and (7) the war for unity of effort.

A trend-based approach is used whereby the progress or regress with respect to each ‘war’ is assessed using trends that relate to the key elements of that particular war. These trends will be derived from indicators of the situation in Afghanistan as well as the increasing or decreasing adherence of the involved elements of the international community to the dimensions of the SWORD model. Most of the trends are positive, indicating that the wars are being won and overall chances of success in Afghanistan are thus increasing. A few others are negative, indicating regression. The paper will suggest how positive trends can be further improved and how negative trends can be reversed so that the seven wars can be won, focusing on those which can be most easily influenced by the Afghan government and the international community.
Measuring the Effectiveness of Reconstruction and Stabilization Activities

Sarah Meharg

Abstract

The international community has become seized with measuring the effectiveness of emerging ‘reconstruction and stabilization’ activities in war-affected environments. This is partially motivated by a need to calculate the costs of these very expensive ventures, but also because activities have not been as effective as intended. While, on one hand, the international community is interested in measuring the effectiveness of its work in places like Afghanistan, on the other, it may be reticent to discover if reconstruction and stabilization activities are ineffectual, or worse, that they have negative effects on recipient populations recovering from armed conflicts. The measures of effectiveness systems that are available, especially military combat metrics, are limited in relation to quantifying cultural and social indicators and require a recasting in order to capture the longer-term impacts upon cultural narratives within recipient populations recovering from such conflicts.

This paper argues that there is a need to include social and cultural narratives, as well as numbers and scores, in emerging measurement systems to better understand the effectiveness of reconstruction and stabilization activities in war-affected environments. Further, it is incumbent upon interventionists to revisit recipient populations and identify measures of effectiveness from their perspectives.
What to Measure in Peace Operations

Joseph Schumacher

Abstract

This essay presents background to the field of evaluating peace support operations. It recommends a mix of macro and impact evaluation approaches, combined with Social Capital Theory and the results accountability model of Mark Friedman, which stresses contribution over attribution.

The main innovation of this essay is to posit that evaluating the complex interrelationship between a peace support operation, violence, human security, perceptions, group dynamics and politics is to accept that war is a culture in itself. If we accept this, then we need to develop indicators to measure the latent nature of society’s transformation from a culture of war to a society that deals with its problems and fissures through non-violent means. To this end, the essay’s evaluation model attempts to outline a methodology that can incorporate multiple contributing factors. One approach that dodges the need for strict application of causality is to apply a change-agent model.
Israeli-Palestinian Bi-level Conflict Zone and Its Implications for International Intervention: What Went Wrong and What Can be Done?

Kobi Michael and David Kellen

Abstract

Over the course of the Second Intifada, the international community launched several unsuccessful initiatives to secure a ceasefire and return Israelis and Palestinians to September 2000 conditions. This article seeks to understand why those missions failed to meet their objectives.

A number of factors common to most of the recent interventions underscore the need for rethinking approaches to intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, whose unique characteristics as a bi-level conflict zone defy the traditional distinctions between interstate and intrastate conflict. Analysis of the international experience in the Israeli-Palestinian arena as well as in Iraq demonstrates the need for new conceptual approaches that focus on stabilization and reconstruction instead of peace and reconciliation.

This article further claims that the deployment of an international force with strong state-building capabilities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone is necessary for the establishment of a Palestinian state entity. Such international involvement might also reduce, to a substantial degree, the dimension of political asymmetry in the conflict zone and provide the necessary conditions for the commencement of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Our Seven Wars in Afghanistan: Progress under the SWORD Model

N. N. French

“We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years now. If we don’t change approaches we will be fighting there for another 20 or 30 years.”

-Mikhail Gorbachev

Introduction

The international community has taken on a task of great difficulty and incredible importance in Afghanistan. Its successful accomplishment is vital for the Afghan people and important to the international community as a whole. At the core of this task is a counterinsurgency war against a determined foe as part of a larger effort against global Islamist subversion. Numerous different sources offer their perspective as to our progress with respect to this task or give predictions as to the possible outcome and many are among them are negative. Among these sources are the media, various military reports, international organizations, academia, and many others. Some reports have looked at increases in violent incidents and made predictions, some focus on corruption while others have assessed the situation from a military perspective alone. Comparisons with counterinsurgencies from the past have been made as well. The media often employ “simplistic metrics” that give the impression that “the country is on the brink of failure.”

The narrow approaches of others tend to be insufficient given the scope of the problem. Approaches that are wider in scope are seldom focused on the key elements.

The eventual outcome, be it lasting stability or overall failure, will depend on the successful mastery of a complicated combination of numerous different factors acting at several levels. Some of these factors will inevitably be more important; others will be near inconsequential. Concentrating

3 Ibid, 31.
on the specific combination of factors that will lead to success is critical but extremely difficult. This focus is best accomplished using the model developed in the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate of the US Southern Command (herein referred to as the SWORD model) by Max G. Manwaring. This paper will use the most recent refinement of this model, published in John Fishel and Max Manwaring’s 2006 *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*.

The Sword Model

The effectiveness of the SWORD model originates from the empirical approach used to develop and validate it. In the late 1980s, Max G. Manwaring, current General Douglas McArthur Chair of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, studied 43 post-Second World War insurgencies to distill from them the correlates of success. The end result was a set of seven ‘dimensions’ that could be used to predict the outcome of a counterinsurgency effort. To later test the model, Manwaring partnered with John Fishel and identified 72 variables likely to affect the outcome of an insurgency. He then developed a questionnaire where the importance of each of these variables to the eventual outcome of the insurgency could be rated on a four-point ordinal scale. The questionnaire was given to a number of experts who were directly involved in the conflict or had intensely studied its history. The experts also rated the insurgency as a win or a loss. This data was then statistically combined and used to test the SWORD model against five other models. The SWORD model rated highest, outscoring the closest competitor by 20%.

Such an approach is rare but vital when attempting to study such a vast collective experience. Most works on counterinsurgency are often based on a single conflict. Other works look at several different counterinsurgencies and the author judges which elements are the most important, often selecting common factors based on their individual merit, rather than their value as part of an integrated whole. Doctrine attempts to overcome this by combining the lessons of great swaths of military experience and the works of numerous authors, thus inheriting the faults mentioned above. Military leaders or decision-makers can choose to focus on certain elements of doctrine

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more than others, distorting doctrine while locked in the “vise of previous [and often limited] experience.”

Manwaring did not theorize any of the dimensions of the model. He and John Fishel have indicated that the model is “original only in the way that the dimensions were combined and in how they were derived and tested.” Those that may be inclined to see the model as too abstract and academic in nature, perhaps proclaiming themselves as more ‘reality-oriented,’ are thus forced to accept that the only academic element was the actual method of refining the collective decades of field experience that form its source data.

At the same time, Manwaring was mindful of the fact that “every conflict is situation-specific” but also contended that no situation is entirely unique. For the development of the model he therefore focused on the “analytical commonalities” of counterinsurgencies. In addition, the common elements are often those that are large-scale and most important; the elements that are uncommon between situations are typically small-scale and near-inconsequential.

The SWORD model (or Manwaring Paradigm) has been tested time and time again. Early analysis validated the model, showing it capable of correctly predicting the outcome of a counterinsurgency nine times out of ten, with the tenth usually being some obvious anomaly. More than two decades of use have further polished and tested the model. In the words of the model’s creators: “Although the model has been refined over the years, we have not been able to refute it. And we have certainly tried.”

In short, evidence demonstrates that a challenged government must adhere to the dimensions of the SWORD model if it wishes to defeat a given insurgency. The converse is also true; failure to do so will result in the eventual failure of the challenged government.

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7 Ibid, 251.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 283.
12 Fishel and Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, 251.
Approach

This paper will seek to assess the current international involvement in Afghanistan with respect to the seven wars or seven dimensions of the SWORD model.\(^{14}\) Particular mistakes, achievements, or snapshots of the overall situation at any particular point, be they past or present, will not be the primary input for the assessment. As the conflict is ongoing, the analysis will instead take a trend-based approach, whereby the progress or regress with respect to each dimension will be assessed using trends that relate to the key elements of that particular dimension. Stated otherwise, each dimension will be considered with a view to determining whether or not the chances of success in the counterinsurgency are increasing or decreasing with respect to that particular dimension. The trends will be derived from both indicators of the situation in Afghanistan as well as the increasing or decreasing adherence of the involved elements of the international community to the strategic dimensions of the SWORD model.

This process will expose areas that need to be improved so that we may better adhere to the model and thus increase chances for success. Of these areas for improvement, suggestions will be made with an emphasis on those within the influence of the Afghan government and the international community, rather than on those more difficult to control.

To prevent the oversimplification that would result with the use of solely \textit{al Qaeda} or \textit{Taliban}, I will borrow the term “anti-government forces” (AGF) from Colonel Thomas Hammes’ \textit{The Sling and the Stone} 2004 to describe the mélange of actors that we are countering in Afghanistan.\(^ {15}\) The term will be used to describe the full spectrum of \textit{al Qaeda}, \textit{Taliban}, warlords and their militias, smugglers, drug dealers, and others seeking personal gain,

\(^{14}\) As suggested in Fishel and Manwaring’s \textit{Uncomfortable Wars Revisited} (p. 253), it must also be noted that there is another perspective: that of the relative adherence to the model by the different adversaries in conflict. For example, the Afghan government may well have problems with unity of effort, but challenges with unity of effort among the insurgents may be more severe. This should also be considered by the reader, but such an analysis is the topic of another paper. To see the wider global insurgency from the \textit{al Qaeda} perspective, readers should consult Kimbra L. Fishel’s “Challenging the Hegemon: \textit{Al Qaeda}’s Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare onto the Global Arena,” in \textit{Networks, Terrorism, and Global Insurgency}, ed. Robert J. Bunker (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2004), 115-128.

and personnel working covertly for foreign powers. Afghan citizens that have turned to violence out of frustration, revenge, or anger and actors that American General Robert Durbin labels “anti-change forces,” which is to say any other actor wishing to preserve the status quo, are also included.\(^\text{16}\)

Furthermore, the term ‘international security forces’ will refer to troops of both the NATO (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The term, ‘Afghan security forces,’ is used to describe the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and other elements, like the Afghan Border Guards.

Our Seven Wars

The most recent refinement of the SWORD model redefines Manwaring and Fishel’s seven vital strategic dimensions or ‘wars within the war.’\(^\text{17}\) With respect to the current situation in Afghanistan, they are:

1. the legitimacy war to defend the Afghan government’s ability and moral right to govern;
2. the shooting war between the allied Afghan and international security forces and the AGF;
3. the war to isolate the AGF internally from their national and local sources of support;
4. the war to isolate the AGF externally from their sources of global and regional support;
5. the war to stay the course, referring to the resolve of the involved elements of the international community to sustain support for Afghanistan in the long-term;
6. the intelligence and information war to win the support of the population and defeat the AGF forces and their operational and leadership structures; and


\(^{17}\) The terms ‘war’ and ‘dimension’ will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
7. the war for unity of effort among the multiple entities of the international community in Afghanistan and the Afghan government itself.\textsuperscript{18}

Analysis

This segment will assess the seven ‘wars’ or strategic dimensions of the current counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Each will be analyzed separately, but it should be understood that the dimensions act as an integrated whole. Some of the more evident connections between dimensions will be mentioned, but the holistic nature of the dimensions runs much deeper than can be easily pointed out. It is important to keep in mind that the analytical process that generated the SWORD model exposed a system of seven dimensions, rather than seven stand-alone dimensions. Lastly, the analysis was completed in Fall of 2006 and does not consider developments that may have occurred since.

The Legitimacy War

The legitimacy war will be won when the Afghan government has a high degree of domestic support, the ability to govern its people, is not perceived by Afghans as corrupt, and political violence is rare, indicating that issues are instead being resolved through the democratic process.\textsuperscript{19} Analysis of the SWORD model has firmly established the statistical primacy of this dimension.\textsuperscript{20} The war that the Afghan government is fighting to preserve and increase its legitimacy is thus the most important of all seven. This is derived from the simple reality that the principal target of the AGF is not the Afghan and international security forces, but the Afghan government’s legitimacy, which is best described as a combination of its moral right and its ability to govern.\textsuperscript{21} Trends observed indicate progress with respect to this dimension.

When assessing the degree of domestic support for the government, the importance of Karzai’s election in October of 2004 (with a voter turnout of

\begin{itemize}
  \item Fishel and Manwaring, \textit{Uncomfortable Wars Revisited}, 21.
  \item Phil Battaglia, “The Manwaring Paradigm and the Iraqi Insurgency,” in \textit{Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement} 12, no. 2 (2004): 44.
  \item Manwaring and Fishel, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 281, 285.
  \item Courtney E. Prisk, “The Umbrella of Legitimacy,” in \textit{Uncomfortable Wars Revisited}, 69.
\end{itemize}
80%) cannot be understated.\textsuperscript{22} Karzai won with 55% of the vote, far ahead of his nearest competitor, establishing a legitimacy that the transitional government, or any government before it, did not have. Candidates agreed that these elections were free and fair, despite some minor discrepancies of process.\textsuperscript{23} Elections held for the National Assembly and provincial council were conducted in September 2005 and continued driving this momentum. Recalling the early stages after the fall of the \textit{Taliban} when Afghanistan had virtually no central government whatsoever, these are crucial steps forward and more will certainly follow.

The legitimacy of the international community’s involvement must also be considered as it affects the legitimacy of the Afghan government by association. The international community does not face the same challenges in Afghanistan that the Coalition has encountered in Iraq, where legitimacy has been referred to as the “Achilles heel of the intervening power.”\textsuperscript{24} Externally, much of this is related to the US failing to obtain a UN Security Council resolution for the operation (although the UN is involved with reconstruction in Iraq). In Afghanistan, both OEF and NATO began operations under UN mandates; the two were established under Resolutions 1368 and 1386 respectively. Other resolutions followed and the Security Council continues to be actively involved with efforts in Afghanistan. Broad participation on the part of the international community, particularly with respect to the NATO mission,\textsuperscript{25} also serves to increase the legitimacy of the international involvement in Afghanistan. One major detriment exists that counters all this: OEF’s prisoner treatment policies. To win the legitimacy war, international security forces must retain the moral high ground in all aspects of this conflict, regardless of what atrocities the enemy commits.\textsuperscript{26} Small steps have been taken to improve this, including a limited opening of Guantanamo to outside observers, the commencement of trials, and the recent disclosure of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Maloney, “Afghanistan Four Years On,” 21.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Phil Battaglia, “The Manwaring Paradigm and the Iraqi Insurgency,” \textit{Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement} 12, no. 2 (2004): 44.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Melvin R. Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84, no. 6 (2005): 14-20.
\end{itemize}
prisoners’ names, but much more must be done to bring the policies in line with international norms for treatment of the accused.

The Afghan government has experienced difficulty in developing its ability to govern. Afghanistan has never been centrally-controlled to any great extent and the structures of this governance have therefore not previously existed to any significant degree. Its vast tribal network, harsh terrain, and limited infrastructure quickly explain why.

At present, Kabul has a growing presence in most of the provinces, but has experienced some difficulty in the southeastern provinces of the Pashto Belt. Major progress has been made in some provinces with the ‘lateral promotion’ of several warlords into the legitimate government, essentially removing their power so that the government can begin to take control instead.\textsuperscript{27} The fighters formerly controlled by these warlords are being retrained and then transitioned into civilian occupations or into the Afghan security forces.\textsuperscript{28} Security forces are increasing in numbers which is having a major effect on Kabul’s ability to govern. This area is closely related to the ‘shooting war’ and much improvement in it will come as the Afghan security forces and other parts of the Afghan government begin to operate on their own. A reduction in the number of internationals in the country will reduce possible perceptions of occupation and replace it with the perception that the government is beginning to handle its own problems. Continual improvements to infrastructure are also increasing the influence of central authority. Again, we must recall that the government essentially started from nothing and that any control outside Kabul was virtually nonexistent at the outset. Given this scenario, the situation today, although far from perfect, is a considerable improvement and the established positive trend is holding its momentum.

Corruption is currently one of the major impediments to the Afghan government’s legitimacy and is a challenge that any government will face, regardless of the presence or absence of an insurgent force.\textsuperscript{29} It is intensified in this case by the nation’s uncertain future and extreme poverty. As these

\textsuperscript{27} Maloney, “Afghanistan Four Years On,” 26-27.
\textsuperscript{29} Transparency International listed Afghanistan as having a corruption perception index of 2.5 last year (where 10 is highly clean and 0 is highly corrupt). They did not publish results for 2003 and 2004. Once released, results for 2006 will hopefully indicate a positive trend. See: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2005.
two conditions improve as a result of progress in other areas, corruption should decline accordingly. The work of international advisors and their Afghan counterparts to increase public transparency and accountability will have the same effect. Overall, these elements of the legitimacy dimension indicate a positive trend.

Endemic violence is also a major problem in Afghanistan and the trend in this element indicates regression. Data in the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base indicates a very clear increase in politically motivated violence. Beginning in 2001 and extrapolating to include 2006 in the analysis, a steady annual rise is observed in both the number of incidents and the number of violence-related deaths and injuries.\(^{30}\) The increase in the number of violent deaths is most dramatic. If the current trend continues, the number of people killed in 2006 will be almost double that of 2005.\(^{31}\) However, it is important to note that this violence is not widespread; roughly half of all incidents in 2006 have occurred in a group of five of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces, all of them in the southeast of the country.\(^{32}\) Despite the steady but relatively localized rise in violence, the other trends are positive and indicate that the overall legitimacy war is being won in Afghanistan.

The Shooting War

This dimension of the counterinsurgency deals primarily with the international and Afghan security forces. The model indicates several key guidelines for both. Considering international security forces, the data indicate that the use of relatively small numbers of foreign troops in primarily a support and training role will win this war. If a large force is deemed necessary, it should only be used at the outset.\(^{33}\) The SWORD model requires that indigenous security forces be well trained and highly-disciplined, willing to take casualties, and capable of effective small-unit tactics if they are to contribute positively to overall chances of success in the shooting war.\(^{34}\) Trends in this dimension indicate progress in this war, with some exceptions.

\(^{30}\) The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (www.tkb.org) is an on-line database of information on politically motivated violence that incorporates data from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Databases, the Terrorism Incident Database, and DFI International’s research on terrorist organizations.


\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Fishel and Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, 22.

\(^{34}\) Manwaring and Fishel, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 284.
With respect to international security forces, the first trend violates the SWORD model and is that of a steady increase in the numbers of foreign troops in Afghanistan. OEF began in 2001 with less than a thousand SOF soldiers supporting and training indigenous forces, and quickly grew to roughly twenty-two thousand in 2003 after expansion of the US-led OEF and the addition of NATO’s ISAF. NATO continues to increase its troop commitment at present and although some of this expansion includes US troops that were recently transferred to NATO command, the overall number of foreign troops in theatre is currently more than forty thousand. This goes against the recommendations of NATO’s own research branch, which after analyzing the Soviet experience indicated that a large foreign military presence may hinder the pursuit of political solutions in Afghanistan as the population has been historically sensitive to outside influence. In addition to an overall troop increase, commanders have started concentrating forces in the more troubled areas. The SWORD model indicates the chances for failure of a counterinsurgency effort increase as the military actions of intervening powers become more intense and voluminous. The trend is thus negative in this regard and indicates regression, both overall and in certain problem areas. Experience has shown that intervening powers often commit forces in response to a deteriorating situation, with the situation getting worse as a result. Although reasons for the steady increase in foreign troop presence may exist, among them the need to provide security to allow for reconstruction efforts, the model speaks clearly, with experience indicating that the international security forces must reduce their troop strength – even if critics propose otherwise. This would limit the resources of commanders and would require “subtlety and thought [to] be used instead of brute force.”

The best solution to the above problem begins with a capable Afghan

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36 Maloney, “Afghanistan Four Years On,” 23.


security force, which is developing slowly but surely. The Afghan National Army (ANA) currently has a total of thirty thousand troops and is growing at a rate of one thousand per month with expectations for the final target of seventy thousand to be attained by 2009.\textsuperscript{42} The ANA, despite some difficulties, including vulnerabilities to insurgent penetration and problems with junior leaders, is faring relatively well as an indigenous force when compared to those of other countries dealing with Islamist insurgency.\textsuperscript{43} International security forces have credited them with impressive bravery and resolve.\textsuperscript{44} Such attributes represent considerable progress considering that the forces have been built from almost nothing. Although training is cited as weak,\textsuperscript{45} the expansion of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is also on track, with the force now numbering thirty-seven thousand.\textsuperscript{46} Overall trends in respect to the Afghan security forces include steady increases in the number of trained personnel, the reduction of corruption through wage increases,\textsuperscript{47} a rapidly increasing experience base and continual learning through close relations with professional international security forces. Billions of dollars of new equipment are currently arriving and will be phased in over the next year to year and a half.\textsuperscript{48} With respect to the SWORD model, these trends indicate progress and are likely to maintain their momentum.

The Afghan security forces must now take the place of international security forces. This will surely be a very gradual shift, but the transition is underway. Afghan troops are beginning to take a leading role in major operations. The summer of 2006’s Operation Mountain Thrust, the largest operation in country in the last three years, was led by 2,000 Afghans from the ANA and ANP assisted by 2,500 foreign troops.\textsuperscript{49} This is one example of many that demonstrates Afghan security forces are building the capabilities they need to allow a reduction in the foreign troop count. It also indicates a

\textsuperscript{42} Durbin, “Major General Robert Durbin (USA),” 1996.
\textsuperscript{43} Daniel Byman, Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 16.
\textsuperscript{44} Rosie DiMano, “Raw recruits brave death daily to rebuild a land,” Toronto Star, sec. A12, April 8, 2006.
\textsuperscript{45} The Economist, “A geographical expression in search of a state – Afghanistan,” July 6, 2006.
\textsuperscript{46} Durbin, “Major General Robert Durbin (USA),” 1996.
\textsuperscript{48} Durbin, “Major General Robert Durbin (USA),” 1996.
transition of international security forces from a fighting role to more of a support and training role. However, foreign troops are still heavily involved in actions against the AGF and are still highly visible to the Afghan public. More emphasis is thus required if this element is to contribute significantly to overall progress.

On the whole, the shooting war is being won – but by a slim margin. The steady rise in foreign troop numbers combined with their concentration in problem areas goes against the counsel of the SWORD model. Fortunately, this can be reversed if the number of foreign troops involved in Afghanistan is steadily reduced as the Afghan security forces grow.

The War to Isolate the AGF Internally

To win this war, the international community and the Afghan government must isolate the AGF from their national and local sources of support (ideally early on in the conflict) and deny them sanctuary within Afghanistan’s borders. The trends in this dimension indicate overall progress in this war.

The main source of AGF supply and sanctuary is the population of Afghanistan itself and is thus most critical. This element of the war to isolate insurgents internally is closely linked to the information and intelligence wars. If the support of the population can be won in the information war, the AGF will have difficulty gaining sanctuary and support from the population. If the intelligence war is won, security forces will gain information from the population that will allow them to locate insurgents wherever they may hide and find their supply caches, again denying them both sanctuary and sources of supply. At present, the Afghan population is shifting closer and closer to the government side.

The only major exception is the southern Pashto Belt. In the Pashto Belt there has been a recent decline in government control primarily as result of poppy eradication efforts in the area. Poppy fields for the cultivation of illegal opium production have either been destroyed or are threatened with this fate. As a result, the local population has either lost or is at risk of losing what they believe to be their only viable livelihood given the current situation in the troubled country. This has resulted in a resistance to government control followed by an increased acceptance of the AGF who in turn serve to protect crops from government destruction.\(^{50}\) This then guarantees support and sanctuary to AGF in these areas.

The Pashto Belt is most problematic because of an ideological sympathy and the shared ethnicity and religious beliefs between Taliban/al Qaeda and the local tribes of these areas. This may soon change; NATO forces have recently completed a series of major operations, killing over five hundred insurgents in late summer and early fall of 2006. The NATO commander, General David Richards, has claimed that the south has been broadly stabilized and the opportunity now exists to increase reconstruction and development work in an effort to win over the population. When taking over the area from US command this past summer, General Richards stated that he was planning a different approach – maybe this approach has paid off.

Disarmament is a significant force toward isolating the AGF from their sources of supply as well. Virtually all heavy weapons in Afghanistan have been destroyed or rendered ineffective as part of the heavy weapons cantonment program, although such equipment is of minor importance in an insurgency. Both the numerous ordnance stockpiles and the unexploded ordnance (UXO) that litters Afghanistan are of greater significance as they supply the key components for AGF improvised explosive device (IED) and rocket attacks. Mines are also present throughout the country and can be dug up and used as bulk explosives or left intact and emplaced in new locations by insurgents so as to target security forces. Afghanistan is highly contaminated with explosive hazards like UXO and mines and the sheer volume of ordnance in Afghanistan will take many years to completely eliminate. Disposal of these internal sources of supply has, however, progressed steadily, with over two million pieces of UXO and thirty thousand mines disposed of in 2005 alone. Such efforts will continue and will only accelerate as technology improves and as Afghan demining teams become more experienced. As a result, the AGF will increasingly find themselves restricted in their operations. International security forces are also making continual progress by chipping away at internal AGF assets more directly with military raids and other seizures. In a two-week period this past summer, one Canadian infantry company seized $15 million worth of narcotics, destroyed nine ammunition caches, and dismantled two bomb-making factories. Police in

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the Afghan capital, Kabul, have made numerous raids with similar results. Small successes like these are continuous and will slowly wear away at the internal sources of AGF supply.

The physical geography of Afghanistan is also a problem, although one that is being brought under our control. The sheer vastness and rugged composition of the country represents a major problem in its own right, although modern surveillance technology makes this less of a challenge for current forces than it would have been for the Soviet Army. In addition, Afghanistan’s terrain is saturated with both natural and man-made caves and tunnels. Some natural caves are miles long and many man-made caves remain from earlier conflict. International and Afghan security forces have searched hundreds, disposing of ordnance and closing off entrances. Although it is difficult to determine how many remain, there is continual progress in this area. In general, continued efforts to monitor the more remote areas of the country continue to reveal AGF positions that can then be eliminated. From a terrain perspective, internal sanctuary and sources of supply will continually be denied, thus increasing chances of success.

In most of the country, government control is expanding slowly or holding steady while physical sanctuary and sources of supply for weapons and explosives are being steadily diminished by the efforts of security forces. This represents a decline in the internal support and sanctuary available to the insurgents. The situation in the Pashto Belt is still developing and although NATO claims stability has been achieved, recent combat action and ongoing poppy eradication still make the population there possible supporters of the AGF. At present, the war to isolate the AGF from their sources of internal support is being won.

The War to Isolate the AGF Externally

This war’s objective is to isolate the AGF from regional and international sources of support. It will be won when they have limited sanctuary outside

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57 Ibid, 13.
Afghanistan and are isolated from their main sources of external support. The overall trend in this dimension is negative.

The primary external source of supply and sanctuary is Pakistan, predominantly in the mountainous border area it shares with Afghanistan. The AGF use the area to evade capture, rest, resupply and traffic narcotics destined for Western consumption, a vital source of funding for the insurgency. The area is divided into seven semi-autonomous ‘tribal agencies’ that are populated by 6 million Pushtuns who live by a code that includes a duty to provide sanctuary to anyone that requires it. The cooperation of Pakistan in the elimination of this sanctuary had improved significantly in the last few years but has recently declined since Fall, 2006. Pakistan deployed its troops to these areas for the first time ever in 2002 and until a withdrawal early this fall had more than eighty thousand in just one of the seven tribal agencies alone. Pakistani Government figures claim that hundreds of militants had been killed in the area while fighting what could be considered an insurgency in its own right. The decline came in September 2006 as Pakistan’s leader, General Pervez Musharraf, folded under domestic pressure and signed a truce with militants in the border region, withdrawing his forces and essentially surrendering influence in the area.\(^58\) Pakistan aside, US forces have made progress in the area,\(^59\) although mostly within Afghan territory and are putting forth an increased effort for border security.\(^60\) Unfortunately, if the Pakistani Army could not close off the border with upwards of one hundred thousand troops, then Afghan and international security forces more limited in numbers, will not be able to either. When the freedom of action that the AGF and their allies now have in the border regions on the Pakistan side is combined with the porous thousand-mile border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the insurgency has an open supply line of men and materiel and the capacity to cross over into sanctuary as needed. The prevalence of violence in the Pashto Belt, which lies along the border with Pakistan, quickly demonstrates the end effect.

Afghanistan’s other neighbours play a relatively minor role when compared to Pakistan. In the north, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have cooperated well with efforts to cut off the insurgents from external


sources. Their main role relates to the drug trade. In this regard Tajikistan seized over four thousand kilograms of narcotics last year and Turkmenistan seized nearly two thousand in roughly the same time period. Iran shares Afghanistan’s western border and has also been helpful in stabilizing the country and fortunately does not offer much sanctuary to the anti-Shia Taliban.\(^{61}\) The borders will never be completely sealed off, but progress is being made.

For as long as even one opening remains, external support will flow into Afghanistan and fighters will be able to seek sanctuary. The border with Pakistan is the critical opening in this case and firm action from the Pakistani government is required to close it, and unfortunately such efforts have recently come up short. The war to isolate the AGF from their sources of external support is being lost.

**The War to Stay the Course**

Success in this war is achieved through the sustained support of the intervening powers to the threatened government. Key elements include consistent military support and a high degree of long-term overall commitment. Experience shows that when aid is withdrawn, the likelihood of success is greatly reduced.\(^{62}\) Trends in this dimension indicate that the chances for success in Afghanistan are increasing.

The main challenge of this dimension is derived from what is best termed as an ‘asymmetry of stakes,’ referring to the fact that winning means everything to the AGF and much, much less to the citizens of the troop contributing nations that are thousands of miles away.\(^{63}\) The most critical element of this dimension is the popularity of the Afghan mission amongst the voting public. The stated goals of terrorism prevention and international security seem to have resisted public scrutiny rather well and are perhaps what keep the political will alive. Without such elements of national interest, the humanitarian appeal of the mission alone would not be enough to maintain the necessary support and tolerance for casualties.\(^{64}\) Governments


\(^{63}\) The ‘asymmetry of stakes’ concept originally comes from Vietnam experts Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill. See: Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam.”

have stressed the terrorism and international security aspects accordingly and must continue to do so.

Continued terror attacks in Western countries have kept the perception of threat high and have helped maintain the perceived importance of involvement in Afghanistan. Similarly, the absence of another major attack on the scale of 9/11 can be viewed as proof that the mission is effective in countering terror. Although some of the major troop contributing nations have seen a decline in public support for the operation, there has been no effective opposition. Among these nations are Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands and in most cases the decline comes as a reaction to casualties or from a sense of hopelessness often developed by the media. Many nations involved have stoically accepted what has been a constant stream of dead and wounded and maintained a consistent troop commitment. In fact, the number of nations contributing to NATO’s ISAF mission has not reduced but increased steadily since the outset. As security begins to transfer to the hands of Afghan security forces, troop numbers can be reduced and this will relieve some of the pressure that governments may be experiencing. Nations can also shift their deployed troops to safer advisory and training roles. Such measures will make support more politically sustainable.

Although the SWORD model holds that the outcome of any counterinsurgency is not determined primarily by the military battles that are fought, one aspect of these battles does have a major (albeit indirect) impact on this dimension: the number of casualties. The military success that is important here is not so much the defeat of enemy forces, but minimizing casualties among our own troops while they attempt to do so. Every ounce of protection, be it vehicle or equipment, every edge, from additional training to good leadership or tactics, will prevent the death and injury of soldiers and thereby enable governments to more easily maintain their commitment in the face of a casualty-averse public. In addition, governments of troop-contributing nations have been forthcoming; ensuring their populations realize that restoring stability to Afghanistan will take not years, but decades. They have also prepared them for the eventual deaths of their soldiers. This shows that the politicians understand that a sustained long-term effort is required and also prepares the public for what will surely be a lasting effort. Several militaries, particularly those of NATO nations, have adopted the mission as their principal engagement, accepting Afghanistan and its challenges as the primary point of focus for training, research, and equipment. Many

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governments have done the same in terms of economic assistance funding. At present, the increasing number of troops in Afghanistan (although negative in some aspects) also demonstrates an increasing level of support.

Support of individual nations will certainly waver in the years to come, but on the whole, the international community appears to have the necessary resolve to sustain that support for the long term. The war to stay the course is being won.

The Intelligence and Information War

The goal of this war is to win the support of the population and also gain intelligence that will lead to the defeat of the AGF forces and their operational and leadership structures. In the information war, the security forces must counter the AGF without alienating the local population.\textsuperscript{66} If conducted successfully, the information war will often lead to success in the intelligence war by increasing the likelihood of support from the local population who will be more inclined to provide critical information to security forces. This, in turn, will permit precisely targeted actions to destroy the AGF framework.

The trends used to evaluate this dimension indicate overall progress. In the information war, reconstruction and humanitarian actions balance against the use of force with the latter carrying much more weight. For example, the progress made in winning hearts and minds during several weeks spent building a school can be lost in an instant if a civilian is killed in a nearby operation the next day. This seems to be a source of difficulty in Afghanistan, particularly in the south. Commentaries have described tactics in the area as “heavy-handed”\textsuperscript{67} and journalist descriptions of howitzers ‘pounding’ villages\textsuperscript{68} and 900-kilogram bombs being used on Taliban positions add credibility to the accusation.\textsuperscript{69} A senior Afghan minister summarized the underlying cycle best in stating that “every time there is a bombardment in the south, it affects the credibility of the Afghan government.”\textsuperscript{70} The occasional fatal incident adds to this, as several unfortunate examples can attest. Among them are the Kabul highway accident and

\begin{itemize}
\item Fishel and Manwaring, \textit{Uncomfortable Wars Revisited}, 23.
\item The Economist, “Taking on the Taliban.”
\end{itemize}
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subsequent shooting where seven were killed in May 2006, the death of sixteen civilians in an air strike in Azizi,\textsuperscript{71} and the shooting of an Uruzgan province lawmaker’s family as they approached a US checkpoint.\textsuperscript{72}

Some collateral damage will be inevitable, and we must accept this, but hesitating or refusing to pay for it is an entirely different matter. In a 2005 agreement with the Karzai government, Canada released itself from any legal responsibility for damages resulting from its operations – leaving Afghans with “no legal leg to stand on.”\textsuperscript{73} Although some time and cost savings will be gained, the detrimental impact to the information war far outweighs the financial or administrative burden.\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, limiting access to a financial method of recourse cannot possibly be a wise idea in a country where violence has long been viewed as an acceptable means of conflict resolution. Opium crop eradication has also turned segments of the Afghan population away from the government as farmers have no viable option as a replacement for the crop.\textsuperscript{75} What fortunately has not been seen yet is any kind of intentional retaliatory act by international troops. With the situation as difficult as it is for the troops on the ground, their ability to remain calm and break the frustration-aggression cycle is to be commended.

Although progress has been somewhat hindered by difficulties in the information war, improvements in the intelligence sector have been made continually since early operations in 2001. At the outset, human intelligence was nearly non-existent,\textsuperscript{76} as the result of cultural factors which hindered OEF and NATO’s ability to gather the human intelligence so essential in a counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Associated Press Worldstream, “Troops fire on vehicle carrying relatives of Afghan lawmaker, killing one, lawmaker says,” July 7, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Canadian Press NewsWire, “Deal waives Canadian liability for civilian casualties; property damage,” July 10, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{74} It must be noted that not all nations involved avoid paying compensation; in particular, the US Military has proven rather equitable. See: Associated Press Worldstream, “US Military to Pay US$112,000 in Compensation to Victims of Kabul Traffic Accident;” and BBC, “Compensation to Be Paid to Bombed Afghan Village,” Monitoring International Reports, Aug. 16, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{75} The Senlis Council, \textit{Field Notes: Afghanistan Insurgency Assessment}.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Second Lieutenant Jessica Davis, “From Kosovo to Afghanistan: Canada and Information Operations,” \textit{Canadian Military Journal} 6, no.3 (2005): 38.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Bakhtiyorjorn Hammidov, “The Fall of the Taliban Regime and its Recovery as an Insurgent Movement in Afghanistan,” (Masters Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991), 47.
\end{itemize}
actionable intelligence, particularly from human sources, thus learning to adapt to the counterinsurgency environment. Although considerable gains have been made, armies have not yet had the time to fully evolve cold-war psychological operations and intelligence to the level required for new realities, essentially shifting away from former tech-centric concepts and discarding dreams of “victory through technology.”  

Overall, the intelligence and information war is achieving marginal success. Improvements on the intelligence side have been considerable, but gains in the information war have been overshadowed by inevitable accidents and collateral damage.

**The War for Unity of Effort**

Winning the war for unity of effort requires that parties involved with countering the insurgency cooperate for success. Those involved include the host nation, the intervening powers, a myriad of civilian agencies and the different military elements. All of these actors are interconnected in numerous ways. If authority becomes ineffective and fragmented, problems become much more difficult to resolve and failure will likely follow. Trends indicate that the war for unity of effort is being won.

From a unity of effort perspective, the new realities of globalization and multilateral involvement eliminate any possibility of a straightforward control structure like the one used by the British in the Malayan counter-insurgency several decades ago. In this age, too many parties are involved to allow this – and in Afghanistan, conflicts exist between several of them. The military effort is one example; it ought to be the most rigid and linear, as would be dictated by traditional military ideology. In reality, it is split between two parallel operations, the US Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO ISAF mission. Greater unity of effort has recently been achieved with the transfer of OEF elements to NATO command, but two separate forces with two separate agendas and two separate chains of command remain. NATO itself has described the missions as overlapping in “both territory and function.” Another suggestion is that the EU sees ISAF as its

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79 Fishel and Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, 27.
balance to ‘US power’ in Afghanistan. Furthermore, within both OEF and ISAF, troops are still subject to limitations imposed by their own nations and operate to meet agendas ranging from humanitarian assistance and development, to counter drug and counter terror. The myriad of PRT structures and rules of engagement under the ISAF mission are a perfect example of this. The simple reality is that neither mission has the ability to tell its volunteer contributors how to spend their money and use their troops. Private military entities are also present in Afghanistan, operating with profit first on their agenda and further hampering the military unity of effort.

Arguably even more detrimental has been the disunity between the Karzai government and the international military forces in the country. In June of 2006 president Karzai spoke out against the deaths of several hundred Afghans at the hands of US-led OEF troops in the previous month, commenting that even Taliban fighters are sons of Afghanistan. NATO relations with the Afghan government have been better, the two recently signing a joint declaration that establishes a framework for enduring cooperation, although it is difficult to say how well the two entities will synchronize.

Military forces are also at odds with humanitarian organizations from time to time and are deemed to pose a threat to their ever-important neutrality. Some will work with military forces, others refuse outright. NGO-government cooperation is also an issue. In fact, overall friction between NGOs and the Afghan government led to the 2005 resignation of Afghanistan’s planning minister, Dr. Ramazan Bashar Dost. Dost complained that most NGOs spend for their own benefit and donor funds allocated to them should instead be given to the Afghan government, the entity that is actually accountable to the people for how the funds are spent. With nearly two thousand national and international NGOs operating in Afghanistan, conflicts with military elements and the Afghan government aside, any notion of full unity of effort is near hopeless.

On a more positive note, governments have realized the importance of what is now being called a ‘whole of government’ approach, where a

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coordinated and focused effort is made to bring about the desired strategic effects, and are working toward this vision, structuring organizations accordingly. At the present time, their structures are a convoluted network formed of linkages such as ‘liaises with,’ ‘reports back to,’ ‘advises,’ and ‘has obligations to.’ It is important to realize that these newly established groupings are still in the early years and will remain in development for some time. As they evolve unity of effort will improve. Between nations, frameworks like the Bonn Agreement, the Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy have been developed to serve the same purpose and are also vital for unity of effort, ensuring that at least the desired end state is clear. Overall, progress in this element combined with the shift of US troops to NATO command and the efforts made to improve cooperation with the Afghan government indicate that the chances for success are improving. Nevertheless, the military forces in Afghanistan must be brought under one chain of command and the various other relations must continue to improve.

Multicollinearity

It is at times difficult to determine where one dimension of the SWORD model begins and another ends and under which dimension a certain observation may fall. This is because all dimensions of the SWORD model are intricately related, leading to a high degree of what is referred to as multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is the phenomenon experienced when the predictor variables of a case of multiple regression are highly correlated. Each of the ‘wars’ or dimensions of the SWORD model is actually a collection of related variables that are grouped together. For the purposes of understanding multicollinearity the dimensions can thus be considered as if they are variables. Specifically, when two variables are highly correlated, they both contribute information which is essentially the same. When this occurs, neither one of them may contribute significantly to the model in an individual sense after the other one is included. However, when both are included together they contribute a great deal. This multicollinearity occurs amongst the dimensions of the SWORD model.

86 Ibid.
Two important conclusions must be drawn from the fact that the SWORD model has a high degree of multicollinearity. First, the SWORD model as a whole is more important than its individual parts and proper application of the model requires a “holistic, balanced, and unified” approach.88 Second, correlation between different dimensions of the model indicates that progress or regress in one dimension can affect another. Expressed in other terms, successes may produce positive results out of proportion to what would normally be expected. On the contrary, weaknesses may produce results more negative than what would have otherwise been expected and even if some things are being done rather well, one may be taking a “well-traveled slippery slope toward failure.”89

Conclusion

The SWORD model provides a proven framework for the analysis of counterinsurgencies. While on the whole its use has indicated that the chances of success in Afghanistan are increasing, application of the model has revealed several key areas where improvement can be made, thus further increasing chances of success. The required improvements are:

1. The modification of OEF prisoner policies to bring them in line with international norms must be accelerated;
2. The number of foreign troops in Afghanistan must be reduced and concentration of foreign troops in trouble areas must be avoided;
3. Pakistan must be pressured and encouraged to resume its full cooperation in efforts to secure the Afghan border regions;
4. Collateral damage must be minimized even further and Afghan citizens must be fairly compensated should it occur in the course of operations;
5. Efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation must be suspended until a viable plan to either replace or legitimize the practice is established;
6. The parallel OEF and ISAF chains of command must be unified under a single authority;

89 Ibid.
7. Mechanisms must be established that will enable closer scrutiny of NGOs and ensure greater unity of effort among them.

Continual improvements are being made in Afghanistan as its own government and the involved elements of the international community work together to build a lasting peace. Although they present considerable challenges, the required improvements are essential to progress in Afghanistan and have the power to be deciding factors in the country’s future.
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Measuring the Effectiveness of Reconstruction and Stabilization Activities

Sarah Jane Meharg

Introduction

The international community is increasingly responding to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states, natural disasters and complex emergencies. Reconstruction and stabilization (R/S) operations are a newly emerging activity that aims to do more than bridge peace operations with development; it aims to offer a spectrum of military, economic, political, and cultural activities that net the result of stability in a region. As the Canadian Forces (CF) has added reconstruction and stabilization to its roster of capabilities, it has found itself engaged in social and cultural activities in operational environments. Other Canadian government departments and agencies have additional capacities to lend to the multidimensional characteristic of such operations. The relatively new idea of planning between government departments to improve this engagement has been introduced as the ‘whole of government,’ ‘interagency,’ ‘joined-up,’ and ‘3-D’ approach. Under the rubric of the Canadian whole of government approach, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) now work with the CF to bring their experience to bear in planning and executing the activities involved in ‘social and cultural’ activities of R/S. With the emerging R/S operations has come the need to measure effectiveness of such activities – to ask whether or not activities have a positive effect on recipient populations, amongst other groups. Measures of effectiveness, or ‘MOEs,’ are typically in the form of metrics, which are specific indicators.

1 The phrase ‘reconstruction and stabilization’ is a recent military recasting of post-conflict reconstruction activities, which also incorporates military stabilization and security measures intended to create environments in which reconstruction can succeed. For purposes of this paper, reconstruction and stabilization includes conflict construction, post-conflict reconstruction, and post-natural disaster reconstruction activities conducted by military, civilian police, humanitarian, governmental, private sector, and grassroots agencies in conflict/disaster environments.

2 The three ‘Ds’ are understood as the departments of defence, diplomacy, and development and include other departments such as Justice and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
that are measured in order to assess an intentional impact over time on the physical or social environment. Metrics are most often used with a series of scores and numbers and indicate impacts that are easy to measure.

Members of the international community, including Canada, have become seized with the notion of measuring the effectiveness of R/S activities. This is partially motivated by a need to calculate the costs of these very expensive ventures, but also because activities may not be as effective as intended, despite a whole of government approach supported by Canada. While, on one hand, the international community is interested in measuring the effectiveness of its work in places like Afghanistan, on the other, it may be reluctant to discover if R/S activities are ineffectual, or worse, have negative effects on recipient populations recovering from armed conflicts. The MOE systems available are limited in relation to measuring cultural and social indicators and require a recasting in order to capture the longer-term impacts upon cultural narratives within recipient populations recovering from such conflicts. This paper argues that there is a need to include social and cultural narratives, as well as numbers and scores, in emerging measurement tools to better understand the effectiveness of reconstruction and stabilization activities in war-affected environments. Further, it is incumbent upon interventionists to revisit recipient populations and identify measures of effectiveness from their perspectives.

This paper reviews some of the challenges faced by the international community that have caused a requirement for a sophisticated R/S MOE system. It offers a cursory review of some of the measurement systems available in the development sector and their application to emerging R/S operations. The paper then presents the argument that there is a need to also measure cultural narratives rather than just scores and measures in order to begin understanding true effectiveness in war-affected environments.

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Challenges within the International Community

Since 2003, the international community, namely the US, World Bank and the UK, have experienced the results of reconstruction and stabilization activities that have been far from effective. The results of inadequate metrics and indicator systems to measure progress, and arguably, coupled with inappropriate R/S activities, have created a measure of effectiveness critical discourse. The following section reviews part of the discourse coming out of the United States Accountability Office, the World Bank, and the UK Department for International Development.

United States Agency for International Development

In the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continues to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals* (July 2005), there is a marked need to better assess progress toward achieving government policy goals and to provide a basis for planning future reconstruction. There are significant parallels with the Government of Canada mandate, such as an accountability requirement to analyze the progress and management of Canadian assistance, services, mechanisms, and funds; and, to identify major factors obstructing advancement of the efforts in Afghanistan and the achievement of Canadian policy goals.

The first GAO recommendation was for the establishment of a performance management plan, and that all sub-agencies be required to use the same form of performance management plan. It was also recommended that there be put in place a more complete communication process of relaying performance information from the field to decision-makers in Washington. Like in Canada, there exists no consolidated financial or progress reporting mechanism that tracks obligations and expenditures. There is no way to assess real costs, only targeted expenditures. This has an impact on sound planning in the medium and long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

It was discovered that the primary implementing agency, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the equivalent to the

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Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), could not develop a complete and accurate assessment of the status of its assistance efforts in Afghanistan without a measurement plan that met the requirements set out by the government.\(^5\) In fact, due to weaknesses in field reporting and the lack of a performance management system, the information reported by USAID to decision makers in Washington in 2004 and 2005 did not accurately portray the status of each sector, the overall assistance efforts, or the effectiveness of those efforts.

Numbers of buildings completed, kilometers of roads refurbished, and other tangible, quantitative results were easily relayed, but the intangible results were not easily expressed. By not having a relevant or useful measuring system for stakeholders to use in the field, the funding agent, in this case USAID, could not determine if primary objectives were being met and to what standards. The report has motivated USAID to create a new measuring system. The result has been that decision makers in Washington and Kabul cannot effectively target resources to accomplish the goal of creating a stable Afghan Society.\(^6\)

Each sector of reconstruction has inherent indicators for success. Agricultural indicators are not comparable to judicial indicators and the time scale at which these indicators are measured are not inter-operable or inter-agency. Moreover, those stakeholders/contractors working in particular sectors have different expectations of reporting and measuring and cannot be relied upon to produce adequate and timely performance or result measurements. As well, each department has a different measuring expectation of its sub-agencies, and some departments do not expect any measurement of performance at all.

**World Bank**

Even the World Bank (WB) has difficulty measuring outcomes in its Country Assistance Programs. The WB uses the Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) methodology as a measuring system, which evaluates the outcomes of Bank assistance programs rather than overall client development progress. According to reports, CAEs evaluate outcomes of the Bank’s program, not the client’s overall development outcome, or in other words, the effectiveness of the Bank’s programs on recipient populations. Ambiguous language

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\(^5\) Ibid, 45.

\(^6\) Ibid, 64.
is used in WB evaluations, including the assigning of ratings such as ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ to their project outcomes. This inappropriate, subjective methodology impacts relevant measuring of effectiveness.

The Department for International Development

In 2004, the Department for International Development (DFID) of Britain released a report, *Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools, Country Case Study 2: Afghanistan Study*. Due to the extraordinarily high number of competing actors, projects, and related activities, DFID required an evaluation of its work to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programs in order to learn lessons from them so that these could be applied to current and future work and to help strengthen the government’s accountability.\(^7\)

Again, the high number of actors and projects permitted for only a macro evaluation. As well, their analysis was not systematic or conclusive because it was done after the fact and was based upon an *ad hoc* performance measuring system that was not inter-operable. The report concluded that in order to adequately learn lessons and apply them to current and future reconstruction activities, there is a requirement for more consistent approaches to assessment and the setting of priorities; more determined pursuit of coordinated responses; and a clearer allocation of resources and personnel trained in assessment.

DFID has identified that there are obstacles in relation to inter-operable systems of assessment between the departments involved in the UK ‘joined-up’ government approach, which is equivalent of the Canadian 3-D and the newly emerging US inter-agency approaches. There is a need for a mechanism to ensure that joined-up analysis systematically informs strategy development and programming.\(^8\) Time frames have been found to be unrealistic and inappropriate in relation to reconstruction activity planning projections and actual outcomes. In fact, too little time is allocated to achieve outcomes, therefore benchmarks need to be established that are realistic and appropriate to the country context in which the reconstruction activities are based.

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\(^8\) Ibid, 3.
**Trends in Measuring**

Many industries apply results-based measuring to their work to assess effectiveness. It is usually employed as a tool to gauge the impact of spending and resource allocation over a period of time in a particular program or activity. These systems use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data for formal reporting of results. ‘Results’ are describable or measurable changes resulting from cause-and-effect relationships. A result can be ‘developmental’ (impact in the project country for the recipient population) or ‘operational’ (impact of the project within the agency or for the donor). Results-based measuring (RBM) examines changes through time of multiple and often complex relationships between inputs and outputs. Results are not end states, rather can be considered as variations in behaviour and performance during a process. Figure 1 illustrates a typical results-based measurement system.

**Figure 1: Results-based Measuring**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Program or Project</td>
<td>Immediate measurable consequences</td>
<td>Short-term effect of activity</td>
<td>Long-term effect or consequence of activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic aim of impact assessments and measuring effectiveness is to estimate the net effects or net outcomes of an intervention. Net effects or net outcomes are those results attributable to the intervention, free and clear of the effects of other elements present in the situation under evaluation.\(^9\)

In 1996, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) adopted results-based management as its main management tool for measuring how, why, when, where, and for whom it was spending Canadian tax dollars and who was benefiting from the expenditures. It adopted the new

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\(^9\) Please note that military language has been co-opted by many professions, including the development sector. The term ‘operational’ refers, in this case, to the effects of an activity in mission area to the agencies and donors that supported the event.

system to improve the impact of its work and to achieve increased efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in achieving that impact. CIDA’s system of results-based management aims to:

- Define realistic expected results, based on appropriate analyses;
- Clearly identify program beneficiaries and design programs to meet their needs;
- Monitor progress towards results and resources consumed, with the use of appropriate indicators;
- Identify and manage risks, while bearing in mind expected results and the necessary resources;
- Increase knowledge by learning lessons and integrating them into decisions; and
- Report on results achieved and the resources involved.\footnote{CIDA, Results-Based Management Division, \textit{Results-Based Management in CIDA}, Policy Statement, Performance Review Branch (Ottawa: Results Based Management Division, Performance Review Branch, CIDA, 1996).}

In addition to CIDA, other development agencies use RBM to measure results. For example, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) applied a results-based measuring system to its Humanitarian Intervention Plans in Afghanistan between 2002-2003.\footnote{Channel Research, \textit{Evaluation of ECHO’s Humanitarian Intervention Plans in Afghanistan and Assessment of ECHOs Future Strategy in Afghanistan with Reference to Actions in Iran and Pakistan} (Belgium: ECHO, 2004).} This system, though, continues to be redeveloped because it does not capture the required levels of granularity or relevance for future planning, as shown in Figure 2.

Performance measuring employs a system of qualitative and quantitative data to assess and review targets based on the status of projects at a particular assessment date. It aims to compare actual results with those that were expected or targeted. It serves as a connection between the results of an activity and the priorities of relevant stakeholders.
This system also indicates direct connections between planned and unplanned activity results, or in other words, intended and unintended consequences, both positive and negative. Those involved in reconstruction or long-term development refer to this system as ‘performance monitoring plans’ that are built on a foundation of ‘implementation planning.’ ‘Performance reporting’ is a result of the data embedded in performance monitoring plans. Figure 3 shows the process of performance measurement, where each performance outcome becomes the foundation for the next outcome, and so on in a ‘chain formation.’

Figure 3: The Performance Measurement Process

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This table has been modified from the version produced by Channel Research, *Evaluation of ECHO’s Humanitarian Intervention Plans in Afghanistan and Assessment of ECHOs Future Strategy in Afghanistan.*
If a program’s goals, objectives and performance indicators have been carefully constructed, then measurement will be a relatively mechanical process. However, because there is no way to completely eliminate subjective judgment from any decision-making process, measurement must rely upon an agreed-upon system or stakeholder consensus. Regardless of the clarity of a performance indicator, there may be varying interpretations of the degree of achievement. This variation may be minimized by careful wording of the performance indicators, but it may never be completely possible to eliminate varying opinions. Moreover, any sophisticated form of measuring human conditions, or ‘soft’ indicators, becomes challenging due to the complex nature of human relationships, psychologies, and unknown consequences of activities. Yet, stakeholders continue to try to measure these variables. A typical performance measurement plan is shown in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: The Performance Measurement Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End state or performance expectations</td>
<td>Conditions existing at outset of an activity</td>
<td>Performance, quantitative, and qualitatives</td>
<td>Assessment, monitoring, and reporting of actual end state</td>
<td>Comprehensive overview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The various reconstruction and stabilization activities within the security, governance, economic, judicial, and civil society sectors typically use performance indicator measuring systems, by which activity targets/projections are compared with actual project status. This type of reporting has a low level of granularity and methodologically, can be a flawed practice. As well, due to a lack of coherent measuring systems for reconstruction activities, targets and status are often recorded at the same time, and any major discrepancy between the two can easily be mitigated through *ad hoc* reporting systems. For example, an agency awarded a major contract for reconstructing basic infrastructure can report that there was a “lack of security in sector B, therefore the sector B road was not completed.” Yet, there is

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no way to examine the level of security in sector B, because reporting is not cross-checked between government department reporting systems, such as DND, DFAIT, and CIDA. There is no clear way to determine whether or not the reporting reflects reality. However, if the measuring system is uniform within an organization or agency, it allows for comparisons across organizational programs, program categories, and implementing actors.

Figure 5 employs the ‘time unit’ approach and illustrates the target-status model.

**Figure 5: Ad Hoc Performance Measuring**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Measure</th>
<th>Sept. 30, 2004 Target</th>
<th>Sept. 30, 2004 Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools constructed</td>
<td>517 schools</td>
<td>39 schools completed, 230 under construction and under renovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers trained</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students enrolled</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>169,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another widely used system of measuring is known as ‘measures of effectiveness.’ It is also called ‘effects-based measuring,’ and is an evaluation process, which measures the impact of activities on identified stakeholder groups. It does allow for qualitative data analysis, but is most often applied to evaluating quantitative data, such as numbers of people, type and quantities of supplies/money, and time, as illustrated in Figure 6.

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Figure 6: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Measures of Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Measures of Effectiveness</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| DDR     | • 42,300 soldiers demobilized in 17 months  
         | • 39,121 light weapons registered and destroyed in 18.5 months  
         | • 11,008 ex-combatants re-trained and reintegrated in communities of origin | • Reduced number of trained men with weapons.  
         |                                                                 | • Stabilization of security environment.  
         |                                                                 | • Strengthening of local economies through retraining and new forms of employment. |

Effects-based measuring tends to over-simplify qualitative data and narrative approaches to phenomena, as well as give a false sense of positive impact due to the concept of ‘effectiveness.’ Figure 7 illustrates this point.

Figure 7: A simple effects-based approach to DDR\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Type/Level of Issue Addressed</th>
<th>Potential Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Militias provide the only means of a livelihood for many young men (bottom up incentives). Commanders/war lords need fighters to control political and economic resources (top down incentives). Decentralized violence means that fighters are afraid to disarm.</td>
<td>Creation of alternative livelihoods for fighters. Increased security likely to attract additional funding for reconstruction and under-mine the power of war lords.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For clarification purposes, it is important to note the distinction between effects-based operations and effects-based measurement. Effects-based operations (EBO) is a planning methodology for the conduct of military operations. The US, UK, and NATO are currently adopting this planning process. The concept of EBO is not new and is based on an historical military tradition of shaping the will of an adversary. EBO is most effective in its adaptation of “network-centric warfare, technological, and real-time communications linking all aspects of war fighting into a shared situational awareness and shared understanding of command intent to achieve a unity and synchronicity.

of effects that multiplies [sic] the power of military forces.”¹⁷ This planning methodology maximizes efficiency and minimizes wasted efforts in the pursuit of goals.¹⁸ EBO is intended to influence the thinking and behaviour of an adversary in order to reach an envisioned effect.¹⁹

In theory, there exist some commonalities between EBO planning for military operations and the measurement of effectiveness in reconstruction and stabilization environments. As with EBOs, successful R/S MOEs must be supported by an integrated whole of government approach that is capable of understanding the conflict environment as a complex system of systems.²⁰ Moreover, there is much ambiguity in and between evaluation systems used between government agencies and organizations. Often, terms and their meanings are interchanged, especially within the new environment of a whole of government approach to reconstruction; for example, the terms outputs, outcomes, targets, results, and effects are misused and interchanged. These, though are not interchangeable and can compromise the methodological foundations of the measuring process and confuse the evaluation of activity effectiveness.

Most measuring systems oversimplify complex human conditions and tend to promote a false sense of over-confidence in the international community. As well, analysis of impacts takes time and thoughtfulness – and these luxuries are often diminished in reconstruction and stabilization environments. Moreover, effectiveness is difficult to measure because it may occur over a long period of time. The mere act of measuring outputs and probable outcomes simplifies the human condition being observed, and is further complicated because the identification of impacts and consequences is a subjective process. Furthermore, cause-effect chains cannot be traced

¹⁸ Ibid.
in linear fashion and reliable indicators and/or baseline data applicable to MOEs are often absent in post-conflict environments. These issues have lead to a general inability of the international community to explain reconstruction activities, goals, and results to recipient populations, as well as tax-paying constituents back home. The central challenge remains that R/S environments are significantly complex so as to require a different data analysis procedure to measure the effectiveness of reconstruction activities.

Measuring the Immeasurable?

The critical issue in the evaluation of reconstruction and stabilization activities becomes whether or not activities have produced more of a social-cultural effect than would have occurred without the intervention, or compared with alternative interventions. In other words, if a program, activity, or intervention had not occurred at all, would the eventual outcome be the same or different? These are questions that the social sciences have developed, yet there remains a struggle within this field in proving cause-and-effect relationships, especially related to the social-cultural nexus. Therefore, it is no small thing to ask the professions of defence, diplomacy, and development to measure the cause-and-effect relationships inherent in its R/S activities. Proving causality becomes even more complex when human systems are that which are being measured. The CF have used a robust ‘metrics’ system for more traditional combat operations, which allows them to calculate inputs and outputs to measure the effectiveness of their work. CF metrics systems rely upon quantifiable inputs, such as the cost of armoured vehicles, weapons, personnel, or miles of terrain, types of weather or climatic conditions, as well as pounds of food, number of refugees and internally displaced persons, litres of fresh drinking water, and the number of body bags flown home from theatres of operation. In a word, numbers count to the military. Numbers are easy to report to decision makers, yet, this system does not allow for the qualitative human phenomena upon which the military is coming in close contact, especially in Afghanistan. Qualitative phenomena include the assessment of narratives about space and place rather than numbers and outputs. This ‘hermeneutical’ approach includes non-ending narratives rather than scores and measures; as well as identifying soft-indicators of powerful values rather than a measurement system. Such systems are linear in nature, and reconstruction is a non-linear activity. The powerful

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nuances of culture, place, and identity can best be expressed through qualitative enquiry. To understand culture is to observe non-traditional, non-linear narratives of cultures, places, and identities. Impacts, or effectiveness, are difficult phenomena to measure and are less tied to quantitative realities than they are to qualitative ones. There are few available systems of measurement that allow for the quantitative and qualitative aspects of reconstruction and stabilization to be measured in a way that says something important about effectiveness.

In war-torn societies, the effectiveness of the measurable aspects of reconstruction and stabilization activities is often decreased because of the unknown and un-measurable human factor. We plan for a particular effect, for example within a local community, yet the effects are different than what we planned. Further, as the CF becomes more active in R/S activities, they are less likely to be able to measure the effectiveness of their work because reconstruction has different tenets than traditional combat operations, and must use alternative systems of measurement to show effectiveness. CIDA was instrumental in creating a world standard for project performance measuring. Their ‘Results Based Measurement’ (RBM) system plans for results and outcomes; identifies the actual results and outcomes; and reports on variances between planned and actual results and outcomes of development projects. However, RBM is not necessarily transferable to post-conflict reconstruction because of the differences between development and reconstruction, as well as the emerging and rapidly expanding global marketplace for reconstruction as a profit-driven industry.

Some post-conflict reconstruction activities seem to naturally lend themselves to what we think of as ‘easy’ evaluations of progress—that is, some activities have measurable quantifiable outcomes and results and therefore are easier to measure. These include ‘hard’ post-conflict reconstruction activities like infrastructure, buildings, telecommunications, numbers of returnees, numbers of kilometres of roads cleared, or project budget allocations, amongst others. Alternatively, most post-conflict reconstruction activities consist of ‘softer’ goals, which appear more difficult to measure. These activities involve people, behaviours, and consequences. From a purely normative perspective, it remains critical for the international community to examine the effectiveness and long-term results of R/S activities no matter how difficult it appears to measure their effectiveness.
Conclusion

With the new reconstruction and stabilization trend in post-conflict environments comes the requirement to measure the effectiveness of these types of activities - for the recipient populations of such interventions, the groups planning and implementing the activities, as well as for the groups and agencies financially supporting the activities. Although some of the performance measurement systems emerging from the development sector address components of R/S, they require further advancement to be applicable to R/S activities. In addition, difficulties arise when the international community adopts military-centric indicators and metrics, which are useful in combat operations but do not transfer to reconstruction and stabilization activities because of the cultural and social underpinnings inherent in reconstructing societies. Militaries are, by nature, instrumentalist and bureaucratic and this becomes increasingly problematic when applied to reconstruction in places like Afghanistan, which are not instrumentalist by nature. This creates a different type of problem in a different type of world, which logically requires a different ontology. It follows that new methods and strategies based on qualitative inquiry would result, based on this ontological shift.

The international community will need to discard typical and outmoded indicators and metrics as defined mostly by the defence sector and allow indigenous populations to identify their own measures of effectiveness of reconstruction activities over time. There is a need to include social and cultural narratives, as well as numbers and scores, in emerging measurement tools to better understand the effectiveness of reconstruction and stabilization activities, especially if the emerging R/S operational trend continues. Further, it is incumbent upon the international community to revisit recipient populations and identify measures of effectiveness from the peoples’ perspectives to best analyze the long-term social-cultural effects of reconstruction and stabilization.
Bibliography


What to Measure in Peace Operations

Joseph Schumacher

Introduction

If the first casualty of war is truth then the second may well be perspective. Nothing is more chaotic than armed conflict or more profoundly in need of sound methodologies to evaluate the international community’s efforts to intervene and resolve armed conflict. Yet a conflict zone presents an environment antithetical to the systematic ordering of causality and epistemology towards which evaluation aspires. One of an evaluator’s most daunting propositions is to enter the chaos and tragedy in the aftermath of armed conflict and find a way to gauge progress or regression amongst all that seems senseless and lost. Nonetheless, there is a growing branch of evaluation that seeks to do this.

This essay presents background to the field of evaluating peace support operations. It explores the challenges of using evaluation within the operational context of a peace support operation (PSO), it proposes a generic typology and it concludes by recommending social capital as a relevant tool.

The main innovation of this essay is to posit that evaluating the complex interrelationship between a peace support operation, violence, human security, perceptions, group dynamics and politics is to accept that war is a culture in itself.1 If we accept this, then we need to develop indicators to measure the latent nature of society’s transformation from a culture of war to a society that deals with its problems and fissures through non-violent means. To this end, the essay will adapt classical Social Capital Theory.

In a field rife with imprecise terminology this essay uses the NATO Logistics Handbook, which defines PSOs “to include preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention missions, peacemaking, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and refugee assistance.”2 Obviously, the type of operation determines its evaluation. However, for the purpose of this essay, the analysis generally relates to the evaluation of PSOs in their most robust and

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1 A discussion of war as a culture is to be found in War is a Culture that Gives Us Meaning by Chris Hedges.
perhaps ambitious form; traditional peacekeeping within a conflict zone.

As with any theory driven activity evaluation can be unrealistically portrayed as a potential panacea for the myriad of poor decisions making habits and management ills that bedevil any large-scale operation. The naïveté of this view is magnified when trying to evaluate the task of putting a cap on chaos and rebuilding devastated societies. What evaluation does offer is a system upon which a PSO can base its decision-making framework, evaluate the impact of activities and assess progress made towards its aims. Evaluation and the discipline of crafting its attendant logic framework requires transforming what are often vague aspirations of stopping conflict and spreading peace into detailed methodical assumptions of how the activities of the operation will affect all aspects of a conflict situation. Embarking on a PSO with a strong evaluation plan encourages the operation’s leaders to clearly articulate their criteria for success, what indicators they base their notions of success upon and how to measure progress and impact. It announces its intentions and asks that it be judged on its results.

The scope of evaluating a PSO—its breadth and depth—is in some ways unique. The complexity of evaluating efforts to transform a society, combined with the relative newness of evaluation in the field of peace operations, has meant that a methodological orthodoxy has yet to crystallize. Nevertheless, while ad hoc innovation still characterizes the field, five evaluation approaches are prevalent. These are: participatory evaluation, utilization focused evaluation, impact evaluation, action evaluation, and macro evaluation. Each of these evaluation approaches has particular strengths to commend it to a particular context. Helen Lewis, in her 2004 essay, “Evaluation and Assessment of Interventions,” admirably explains each of these evaluation approaches.

This essay attempts to combine the broad scope of a macro evaluation approach with the monitoring-based vigor of action evaluation. In action evaluation the success of an activity is determined by stakeholders first defining what success means and then monitoring its progress. In attempting this merger the essay draws heavily upon the recent evaluation insights of Mark Friedman’s Results Accountability Model, and as mentioned above, Social Capital Theory.

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4 Mark Friedman, Trying Hard is Not Good Enough ( Trafford, Canada: The Fiscal Policy Studies Institute, 2005).
The macro evaluation approach is the most contentious amongst practitioners. This is due to the understandable wariness of trying to assign attribution to what interventions caused what effect. While it is easy to concede sympathy for the viewpoint that cautions against attempting macro evaluation of PSO, it could also be argued that a PSO is itself one of the riskiest endeavors in the political realm. Therefore, PSO evaluation requires a considered mix of audacity and professional realism accounting for the scope of a PSO in its formulation. As such, macro evaluation is more a statement of ambition than a systematic evaluation approach. It still relies on programmatic evaluation, i.e., putting an aspect of a peace operation under the evaluation microscope. What has to be decided is, if given the interconnected nature of a complex system such as armed conflict, it is just as difficult, rather than impossible, to robustly evaluate a peace operation as a collection of programmes and policies, in conjunction with macro socio economic performance measures. If the answer is yes, a suite of representative evaluations can be used as a launch-pad for “assessing all policy instruments and interventions that affect the dynamics of conflict” to identify the varying manifestations of transformation that occur from the peace operation’s activities, and evaluate the extent of the connections.

Action evaluation is far more grounded in the nuts and bolts of evaluation methodology. Lewis, describes action evaluation thus:

Action evaluation begins with a phase of collaborative goal setting, which clarifies the purpose and functions of an intervention. It commits stakeholders to the achievement of shared goals, and the action evaluator facilitates the continuous monitoring and assessment of these goals. The goal setting stage is repeated throughout the intervention’s life cycle, so the shared goals of an intervention can evolve over time.

Action evaluation is essentially monitoring of progress. Its timetable is not pre-determined but driven by achievement of milestones of well-being for the target population. As each milestone is achieved and progress maintained, a new phase, utilizing different evaluation tools can be engaged.

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5 Ibid, 3.
6 Ibid.
7 Helen Lewis, “Evaluation and Assessment.”
The Critical Choice of Indicators

The various methodologies of evaluating peace operations all share the difficulty of choosing indicators that validly convey progress of their aims. A key decision is determining what our unit of analysis or progress is. The difficulty arises primarily because the question, ‘can we assign attribution?’ is the first question that any evaluation must answer. To what extent can a change in levels of conflict be linked to the actions of the PSO and how can this be proven.

The choice of indicators by an evaluation team is not only important for their functional value – they also pronounce the integrity of the intervention. As such, an evaluation should, as much as possible, be carried out transparently and within public view. A peace operation’s motives and mandate are laid bare in the details and thoroughness of an evaluation, making explicit whom the operation is intended to serve. It is pertinent to keep in mind that an evaluation of a peace operation, far more than programmatic evaluation, inhabits a highly politicized sphere. An evaluator of a PSO has to negotiate the tension between their sponsor’s need to manage perceptions – both domestically, internationally and within the affected populace – with the requirement of factoring in the various cultures and factions that may regard each other as enemies, seeking to frame the external debates that contextualize the evaluation. Even notions of progress and success can differ between cultures. This is especially sensitive when the cultural aspects of equality, civil rights and modernity are considered.

Indicators of Conflict and Control

Underpinning any evaluation are the indicators chosen to determine whether the subject activity is progressing towards its aims. At its most immediate, a PSO is seeking to stabilize a conflict zone by securing an end to the violence between combatants. Evaluation of peacekeeping operations should rely on indicators that provide robust evidence about levels of violence, and indicators that gauge the conditions on the ground for all those living in the conflict zone. Through monitoring and analysis of these indicators – including, where appropriate, a realistic model for casual attribution – it is possible to determine whether a conflict zone is improving or worsening and to what extent humanitarian intervention is impacting on dimensions of security. These indicators could be termed indicators of conflict and control – measuring the severity of conflict and the amount of control the intervening forces have on events and persons on the ground.
However, also implicit within the act of embarking upon a peace operation is the intention of transforming a conflict zone. The idea of change and how best to apply evaluation orthodoxy to transformation has received a great deal of attention from the evaluation community of late.\(^8\) The focus has been on how to shift evaluation reliant upon a traditional mechanistic understanding of inputs, outputs and outcomes to assess change in quantity or quality over time to a change agent model, evaluating improvement of well-being for a target population.\(^9\) When planning and running a PSO, having an overarching aim to improve well-being for those affected by your actions is a good place to start.

While securing a truce is the first step in peacekeeping, maintaining that peace is its ultimate goal. As such, a PSO should also be evaluated as a platform upon which to build solutions towards long-term peace, stability and, ideally, justice and prosperity for the area and its inhabitants. Therefore, evaluation of a PSO may also seek to measure how well the intervention is creating the conditions for these conditions to emerge. To assess this requires the identification and operationalization of indicators for the following, inter alia:

- the desirability and viability of political solutions and structures emerging in the wake of the humanitarian intervention;
- how a humanitarian intervention impacts upon infrastructure and the functioning of state, economy and society;
- levels of reconciliation or the willingness to move on from conflict that exists within the various communities of the affected populace.

Developing indicators for the above dimensions will be relatively straightforward in some indicator domains and very difficult for others. What it definitely requires is progressing from a generic template to developing indicators for each specific PSO in conjunction with the relevant

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8 Based on a review of the literature, and preliminary and detailed case studies, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has identified over 30 theoretical models describing how research-based evidence can influence policy. The first four are cross-cutting models or frameworks, “Theoretical Models,” http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Tools/Theory/Index.html.

9 Mark Friedman, “Results Accountability Model for Evaluation” (seminar presentation, New Zealand Ministry of Social Development, New Zealand, May 29, 2006).
stakeholders. Ideally all relevant stakeholders should be consulted in this process, including representatives from all groups in the target population and integral members of the PSO community. From this point, snapshots of indicators can be used to assess progress or regression in indicator domains.

Need for Different Models of Evaluation at Different Phases

External support for a PSO can depend on the perception that intervention leads to an increase in security and quality of life for a population. The above statement is logical enough but it demands a high standard of evaluation. The statement presupposes that evaluation of peace operations should occur throughout the various phases of the operation’s evolution, assessing its ongoing success or failure as it matures. As such, evaluation of peace operations is a work in progress using real time results-based monitoring and data-capturing mechanisms to inform the appraisal of each stage. This type of results-based monitoring allows for refinement and reaction to improve the performance, planning and policies of the PSO.

One of the chief advantages of the macro evaluation model is its flexibility. In evaluating a PSO different models of evaluating can be used for programs and activities. This allows for the various aims and contexts as well as for assessing results at different stages of program and intervention maturity.

The priorities and immediate aims of the intervening force during the first weeks of the intervention should be different from the goals of the intervening forces one year on. This is in contrast to most evaluations which usually limit an evaluation to the effects of a formed program on its target population. While reference to timetables and achievement of schedules are a valid evaluation tool as marks of progress, the drivers for a humanitarian intervention schedule are often varied and some of the most important will have little to do with actual conditions for those inhabitants of the affected state. Initially, if encompassing military activity, the phases of a PSO rely on the completion of the preceding phase. Generally, as a humanitarian intervention matures, it morphs from being a military operation driven by political requirements to a political operation framed by military considerations. In other words politics, cost in materials and human life, and the pressures of competing factions battling to frame the perceptions of a watching world, all drive the schedule of a humanitarian intervention. So often over the past 20 years the reported progress of humanitarian interventions have been
driven by the need to demonstrate results that were self-proclaimed achievements, determined as often as not by political considerations, such as public opinion, as by reality on the ground.

It is important for evaluators to devise indicators that are verifiable and can provide notions of progress at the different phases of a humanitarian intervention. It is still important to recognize that an intervention will go through different phases and that at each phase different models of assessment and evaluation will be appropriate.

**Questions of Outputs and Outcomes**

In evaluating the impact of a humanitarian intervention the evaluation team is essentially asking what progress has the humanitarian intervention made towards achieving its objectives. This then necessitates determining how progress can be measured; the perennial question over outcomes, outputs and settling the related question of causal attribution.

Traditional evaluation-thinking differentiates between an operation’s immediate goals, measured in outputs, and the operation’s high-level aims, which should be expressed as outcomes. The benefit of using output indicators is that they are usually amenable to measurement and thus make it easy to affirm achievement. An example could be the decommissioning of armed factions within a conflict. The goals of disarming can be operationalized as an output and measured in guns collected or as a reduction in the proportion of weapons remaining with combatants. However, the goal of collecting weapons is only a means to an end, which is to reduce violence. This should be expressed as an outcome and evaluated as such. The aim of decommissioning can be then evaluated as the outcome of reducing gun-related violence. This division of outputs and outcomes enables the direction of causal attribution to go from the actions of the intervention to the changing circumstances on the ground. Furthermore, the use of baseline data allows evaluation to infer progress in outcomes, to the progress in outputs by tracking their correlation through statistical analysis. This is in line with the principles of results-based monitoring, which is prevalent in much of the evaluation of overseas development assistance.
Table 1: Evaluation Typology for Peace Operations\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Potential Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Formative Planning and Sanction | • erect international legitimacy and build a broad consensus as to the intervention’s goals and means for achieving those ends that can be clearly communicated in entry, intervention and exit strategies  
• communicate intentions and mandate within the territory  
• mobilization of operation | • UN support  
• other multilateral organization sanction  
• coalition  
• exhaustion of diplomacy  
• public opinion—both outside and inside country in question  
• military feasibility undertaken  
• compatibility with international legal instruments (Rome Treaty) |
| Stability and Control  | • cessation of hostilities  
• establish control  
• separate warring parties  
• decommission warring parties  
• begin grounds for dialogue between warring parties | • violence—open hostilities  
• attacks on intervening forces  
• attacks between factions  
• attacks on civilians  
• sabotage of infrastructure  
• lawlessness  
• border integrity  
• starvation and poverty  
• sectarianism  
• extent of internally displaced population  
• power bases other than the state, having the ability to affect safety  
• control of natural resources (natural resources as a fuel for conflict)  
• decommission of arms (de-arming of weapons)  
• infrastructure  
• lessening international and regional tensions |
| Safety                | • institute efforts to establish rule of law efforts  
• decreasing violence | • violence—asymmetric warfare  
• rule of law  
• hand-over of duties from army to police  
• resumption of public and state services  
• separated families  
• homelessness  
• public health indicators |

\textsuperscript{10} This table provides a generic evaluation typology for peace operations. It should be read as a work in progress.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Potential Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>• begin rebuilding the political and institutional machinery of the country</td>
<td>• business perceptions • corruption • crime rates • public support for governing administration • language of public discourse (intervention, liberation of occupation) • institutional social capital • environmental indicators • re-establishment of civil regulators of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure Integrity and Viability of State</td>
<td>• begin process to address the latent reasons for conflict and sectarianism within the state • begin efforts to make country self-sufficient • withdrawal strategy • international recognition • economic viability and health</td>
<td>• economic fundamentals • economic activity • tax • border integrity • peace talk activity • decrease in foreign presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regeneration of Civil Society</td>
<td>• begin process of rebuilding civil society • increase inter-group dialogue</td>
<td>• reconciliation and redress activity (tribunals) • extent of analysis within society about root causes and drivers of conflict • social capital (bonding, bridging)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Issue of Causality – To Attribute or Not

Notions such as community reconciliation and the regeneration of civil society are without doubt completely dependent on the preceding outcomes of a humanitarian intervention, yet their ability to be evaluated is problematic. Long-term aims of human security can be resistant to translation as singular outputs and as outcomes, are unable to be sufficiently linked to the influence of a particular agency to assign casual attribution via statistical significance. A combat zone, with an accompanying breakdown of civil society, is characterized by combatants inhabiting overlapping chaotic systems. It provides scant methodological leverage for evaluation of cause and effect relationships such as “this input leads to that output leading to
that community change.”\textsuperscript{11} Another problem is the difficulty of fashioning outputs for the latent underpinnings of cognitive behavior, such as attitudes, societal dynamics and community functioning. As Mark Friedman points out: “While public and private organizations bear responsibility for their own performance, no organization can claim ownership of the well-being of a whole population.”\textsuperscript{12}

The difficulty of assigning indicators to evaluate high-level aims in a peace operation does not absolve evaluators from addressing this puzzle. The decisions and actions of a PSO either help generate an environment in which conflict can be stopped or fails to do so. The ultimate criterion for success or failure is simple, so an approach to assess progress towards that destination should be fashioned. Assisting evaluators is that almost all socio-economic and societal dynamics, the ingredients of high-level human security domains, can be quantified and indicators operationalized. What is needed to address the complexities of evaluating high-level aims is a methodology that can incorporate multiple contributing factors.

One approach that dodges the need for strict application of causality is to apply a change-agent model. Instead of using causality, which sets the bar unfeasibly high, Friedman suggests the concept of contribution: have the activities, actions and decisions of the operation being evaluated contributed to a certain trend?\textsuperscript{13} The use of outputs and outcomes is still useful. The evaluation starts by identifying what indicators the operation is intending to change and in what direction. As a PSO undertakes its tasks these outcome indicators are monitored, and then tracked against indicators of success for the processes and activities (outputs) of the operation that relate to these desired outcomes.

Each desired outcome domain of human security or state well-being should be expressed in as many different output or perception classifications as is practical to give as close an approximation to reality as possible. The model uses regression analysis for measuring and calibrating the inter-relationships between these dimensions, tracking their progress against the performance of a PSO in creating the environment in which they can improve. Social Capital Theory supplies the methodology to track how indicators of societal transformation and well-being are connected. It achieves this by providing interconnected human security and macro socio-economic

\textsuperscript{11} Mark Friedman, “Putting Population and Performance Accountability Together,” in \textit{Trying Hard Isn’t Good Enough}, 147.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 146.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 97.
circumstances with a broad plane upon which to reflect the changing situation within a conflict zone.

The Gap for Indicators of Social Capital in Evaluations of Peace Operations

The concept of social capital is relatively new and has only gained wide credence in the last 15 years. In that time, it has moved from being an academically interesting theory to a tool used by governments and institutions to capture some of their most fundamental aims.\textsuperscript{14}

The following quotes illustrate both the intrinsic idea of social capital and the complexity of providing the idea with measurable corners to operationalize the theory:\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{quote}
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked … to membership of a group” (Bourdieu 2001, 2);

“… features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam 1995);

“… relationships among actors (individuals, groups, and/or organizations) that create a capacity to act for mutual benefit or a common purpose” (Spellerberg 2001, 2, adapted from Coleman);

“… networks, together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within and among groups” (OECD 2001, 2).
\end{quote}

Social Capital Theory differentiates between three kinds of social capital:

1. Bonding, which relates to close social ties, i.e. within a given community;

\textsuperscript{14} UK Government, Economic and Social Data Service Online, “Social Capital and Social Exclusion Theme,” http://www.esds.ac.uk/government/themes/socialcapital/.

2. Bridging, which describes social capital of a looser variety, often cutting across sociological demarcations;

3. Linking, which describes connections between the individual and offices of social hierarchy—often used in accessing support from formal institutions.

Analyzing the above definitions of social capital shows that one of the essential elements is about the integrity of a collective. Often one of the defining contexts in a PSO is its need to protect the integrity and unity of a collective, be that in its expression of national borders or the need to defuse community divisiveness. We have seen these components in recent peace operations in East Timor, Iraq and Bosnia. In the long term therefore, the question of social capital cuts to the heart of the intervention’s criteria for success – can the PSO deliver a state that fulfills its citizens’ needs and also assist in securing the conditions for that state’s body politic and civil society to deal with the state’s long term existential questions.

In quantifying social capital we face a number of difficulties, foremost the challenge of accurately describing how people interact with each other and with organizations. Ascribing weight to horizontal relationships between individuals and groups as well as vertical relationships between individuals and institutions is a key challenge. A further dimension in any social capital formula is to what extent socio-economic variables should factor. Given the complexity of these equations, and the risk of unobserved factors interacting with the proxy social capital indicators and the outcome in question, it is unsurprising if doubts are voiced as to the adequacy of social capital research methodology and its results. However, these challenges are not insurmountable, as Marney Dickson points out in her paper “Investing in Social Capital”:

There is now an impressive wealth of convergent data drawn from a variety of methods including cross-sectional studies, multi-level models and longitudinal studies that consistently find a relationship between indicators of social capital and a variety of social and economic outcomes.16

The primary step in ensuring the soundness of any evaluation seeking to measure social capital is the design of its framework. The integrity of this framework hinges on establishing an operational definition of social capital

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and choosing the indicators that constituent that definition. “This provides an ordered, structured and standardized way of then organizing the collected statistical data.”\textsuperscript{17}

By enumerating and quantifying the components of social capital a plane of benchmarks can be established. This plane of measurements of social capital acts as a balance sheet of constituent indicators, and can be used for “estimating the level of the underlying resources that govern social capital rich (or intensive) interactions that occur in the area of study.”\textsuperscript{18}

If the agreed-upon indicators are sufficiently related, the clustering of variables should yield information as to the underlying form social capital takes within that area of study. The nature of the relationships and correlations between the indicators and between other externals and case studies can be examined through the prism of factor analysis and other quantitative operations. Through treating the overlap of the specific indicators as a measurable variable, a local measurement of social capital can be ground out. This balance sheet can then be expressed as an aggregate of social capital, like a barometer or what has been termed a “social capital index.”\textsuperscript{19}

Identification of the component strands in social capital, through community consultation and survey, is to create a robust framework from which to illuminate social capital. The core notion of social capital is describing the web of social relationships in a particular community and highlighting its value. Therefore, each community’s social capital is unique and quantifiable only through a close examination of that community. A number of social capital measurement tools have been developed, with perhaps the most relevant to assessment of peace operations being the World Bank’s Social Capital Assessment Tool.\textsuperscript{20} This is a mixed quantitative and qualitative social capital assessment tool and is available on the internet.\textsuperscript{21}

This type of social mapping to construct a battery of indicators can take

\textsuperscript{17} Anne Spellerberg, Framework for the Measurement of Social Capital in New Zealand (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand, 1994).
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 18.
place on a micro level of one community for a case study or on a macro level. This opens up opportunities for comparing the dynamics and forces affecting social capital for two similar communities within a conflict zone.

A key question for an evaluation is how to assess any transformation from a culture of conflict to one of peace. To do so requires a link from attitudes and communal dynamics to cognitive behavior and decision-making. A possible entry route to explore this idea through evaluation is a community’s capacity for self-regulation. Capacity for self-regulation can be explored as the critical mass of those wanting and acting for peace outweighing those perpetuating conflict. The challenge for evaluators exploring this route is crafting indicators that operationalize the intangible aspect of communal goodwill and creation of opportunity that social capital embodies, and which is greater than the sum of its constituting parts. One possibility is the use of regression analysis to determine tipping points as social capital is cumulative – civic behaviors are likely to generate more goodwill, social trust and greater social interaction.23

Social Capital as Good News

While social capital is not an evaluation tool that automatically translates into a framework for influencing external public perception about the success of a peace operation, it does provide an entry for analysis into what makes communities heal. By mapping interactions, important healing elements can be held up as examples of success. This capacity can be significant in news coverage of PSOs where the good news is often drowned out by the din of tragedy and conflict.

22 A good starting point in this field of peace studies is the seminal work of Johan Galtung.
23 In discussion with Anne Spellerberg, analyst at the Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, Wellington, New Zealand.
Bibliography


Israeli-Palestinian Bi-level Conflict Zone and Its Implications for International Intervention: What Went Wrong and What Can be Done?

Kobi Michael and David Kellen

Introduction:
The Attempt to Solve the Conflict and the Return to Violence

The collapse of the Oslo process, which began with the outbreak of violence in September 2000, has caused great physical and psychological damage to both Israelis and Palestinians, who, despite the assistance of the international community, have not succeeded in renewing the political process and stopping the violence, at least not in a lasting and meaningful way.

Since the death of Yassir Arafat (Nov. 2004), the election of Mahmood Abbas as Palestinian President (Jan. 2005), and especially since the Israeli Unilateral Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank (Sept. 2005), a new trend of calm and a reduction (not a cessation) in violence have prevailed. Yet it seems too early to speak of a return to a negotiated political process based on the rejection of violence as a legitimate means of achieving political aims, especially in light of Hamas political stance and the violent internal conflict between the Palestinian factions.

The international community, which was harnessed in an effort to secure a ceasefire and return the sides to September 2000 conditions, has not succeeded in generating meaningful change. The question that remains to be answered at this point is “why?” Is the failure of all international intervention efforts a result of conceptual shortfalls, structural failures, the absence of Israeli and Palestinian political will, the absence of determination among the international community or the lack of ripeness and necessary prerequisites? Is it possible to discern a common thread throughout all the failures? Is it possible that the failure of these interventions was known in advance?

This article will explore possible answers to the troubling questions posed above. In addressing the failure of diplomatic intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we will draw on lessons learned from another kind of international intervention, the peace support operation. Although diplomatic interventions are not peace support operations, both are members of the same spectrum of international intervention, and some lessons from
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the latter may prove relevant to the former.

The article will begin with a short review of recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, addressing the main factors that brought about a change in Israel’s conflict management strategy. After a short, critical overview of the nature and rationale of conventional peacekeeping, we will continue with a description and analysis of the characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, addressing its uniqueness as a bi-level arena and explaining the conceptual difficulty of peacekeeping operations in this context. We will then present the characteristics of international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as a typology that explains their failure. We then review a series of lessons learned from the peacebuilding aspects of the American experience in Iraq (stabilization and reconstruction efforts), drawing out the most relevant ones for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We conclude by offering possible recommendations for the reexamination of a number of conceptual foundations of peacekeeping operations, with the aim of developing a more relevant conceptual framework for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone.

Israel Changes Paradigms – The Move to Unilateral Strategy and Conflict Management – From the Roadmap to Disengagement

In 2003, following the completion of a series of large-scale military operations and the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ short and unsuccessful term as Palestinian Prime Minister, Israel chose to adopt a unilateral strategy. In December of that year, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared Israel’s intention to disengage from the Gaza Strip and Northern West Bank.¹

Sharon concluded that time was not on Israel’s side. The Geneva Initiative, which was launched in September 2003 and gradually gained public support, was perceived by Sharon as a danger to Israel.² In the absence of other initiatives, ‘it remained the only game in town.’ Additionally, Sharon concluded that Israeli and international efforts to implement the Roadmap

² The Geneva Initiative is a non-official, final status agreement that both failed to recognize Israel as Jewish state and included the absorption of Palestinian refugees into Israel proper, an idea that was anathema to most of Israel’s leadership and public. For further details see: http://www.geneva-accord.org. See also, Tamar Hermann and Ephraim Yaar, Peace Index, October 2003, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. Oct. 2003 – May 2004, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/.
would lead nowhere. He therefore decided to return the ball to Israel’s court by redesigning the conflict zone and setting new ‘rules of the game.’ The preferable means of doing so was through a unilateral, Israeli course of action, backed by broad international support, which would free Israel from the Palestinian demographic threat and the responsibility for managing the lives and welfare of the Gaza Strip’s large Palestinian population. In doing so, Sharon generated a paradigmatic shift in Israel’s conflict management strategy, based on the recognition that conflict resolution and joint conflict management had lost their relevancy and that Israeli interests compelled the adoption of a new paradigm, unilateral in its nature.³

While the Disengagement Plan, completed in the beginning of September 2005, may arguably have fulfilled Israel’s goals,⁴ it proved disastrous for the Palestinians. After the departure of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the Palestinian Authority did not succeed in reining in the chaos in the Gaza Strip; the rule of law there only deteriorated. Palestinian security mechanisms did not succeed in enforcing authority and maintaining public order. Palestinian Legislative Council elections, which took place on January 25, 2006, and resulted in the impressive victory of Hamas, cast a dark shadow on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to complete, with any internal agreement, the series of steps necessary for the stabilization of Palestinian political, social, and economic systems. Hamas’ victory only further diminishes the chances for a renewal of the political process. A prolonged stalemate and possibly even escalation are now more likely, both of which will only entrench Israel in its unilateral strategy.⁵

Since the beginning of the Second Intifada and throughout the duration of the above-mentioned events, the international community, led by the United States, has worked to end violence and renew the political process. The first of these attempts was the Mitchell Committee, followed by missions of George Tenet and Anthony Zinni. These, in turn, were followed


⁴ Because the unilateral disengagement did not fulfill Israel’s strategic goals and unfortunately, Israel did not gain a reliable Palestinian address, it is doubtful that Prime Minister Olmert or any future Israeli leader will be capable or willing to repeat a unilateral withdrawal in the West Bank.

by the Quartet’s “Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” and the active mediation of the Egyptian government, which produced an agreement for calm (tahediya) in the Palestinian camp. The period ends with the involvement of James Wolfensohn and Generals Ward and Dayton, who worked hard to improve the level of cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in all matters related to the Disengagement and to reform Palestinian security mechanisms.

Most of the international community has, for the time being, presented a substantial challenge to the new Hamas-led Palestinian government, which denies the State of Israel’s right to exist and stands for a continuation of armed resistance (meaning terror) until all the land of historic Palestine is ‘released.’ It is doubtful, at least in the near future, that Hamas will change its political ideology, whose essence relies on religious fundamentalism and denies the very principle of compromise with Israel.\textsuperscript{6} It is also uncertain whether Hamas will be able to maintain a stable government, disarm Palestinian militias and complete necessary reforms to the security apparatus and Palestinian agencies. In light of emerging conditions, the stabilization of the Palestinian arena is now of principle importance and perhaps even a precondition for any advancement towards negotiations.

The dramatic political change in the Palestinian arena has also become a concern to regional stability, mainly in Egypt and Jordan, but also in Syria and Lebanon because of the affinity between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian resistance organizations.\textsuperscript{7} In its present format, the threat (mainly Iranian, demonstrated by its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas) might even spur regional cooperation between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and other moderate Arab states, possibly developing in the direction of a Jerusalem Israel new, regional security mechanism.

Due to these dramatic political changes, the international community’s involvement has grown increasingly important, and given the failure of


\textsuperscript{7} Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Iranian money and Hezbollah are Behind Terrorism in the Palestinian Authority-administered Territories,” Special Information Bulletin, Aug. 2004, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/AUG7_04.PDF.
diplomatic efforts over the past five years, there is a need to consider using a new platform: the peace support operation (PSO). Yet the traditional peacekeeping rationale does not fit the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, which encompasses two concurrent conflicts. Given the inherent weaknesses of the current conceptual system, described in the following chapter, and the unique characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, different PSO rationales should be considered.

A Critical View of Traditional Peacekeeping Rationale

Peacekeeping operations can be considered as a kind of social engineering. The operations are an attempt to alter political, social, and economic structures along Western lines through use of political, military, and economic tools rooted in Western principles and values. International experience with peacekeeping operations raises several questions regarding their effectiveness. The organizing rationale of peacekeeping operations is pacification through political and economic liberalization, which conceals a number of essential structural weaknesses:

1. The organizing idea is clearly ethnocentric. It ignores how the conflict parties view the relationship between peace and war as well as the third party’s ability to act impartially;

2. Efforts are focused on the political-military dimension and on political elites while social-economic dimensions and grass roots organizations are neglected;

3. The rationale has a short-term focus: the physical expressions of violence. The real challenge in resolving conflicts can only be addressed in the long-term by dealing with the “culture of violence,” (ingrained cultural structures that lead to a preference for violence as a means for realizing political goals) or the discourse nature;

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4. Despite the recent proliferation of integrated missions, the rationale was mainly one-dimensional in its essence and did not provide an answer for complex conflict zones, like the Israeli-Palestinian bi-level conflict zone.

In addition to these structural weaknesses, contemporary peacekeeping operations have also suffered from several consistent operational weaknesses:

1. Both single-state and multinational forces have faced serious difficulties in state-building tasks over the past decade. In some cases, peacekeeping forces have undertaken state building without requisite, prior peacemaking operations.\(^{12}\) In others, peacemaking military personnel have been retained for policing functions, resulting in the application of military rationale, might and tactics to delicate peacekeeping contexts and, resultantly, antagonized and alienated local populations;

2. Lack of UN Security Council support, both financial and political, has created resource shortages that have led to the appeasement of locally stronger forces, leaving peacekeeping forces expending disproportionate efforts on force-protection;\(^{13}\)

3. Mandates insufficiently broad in scope have resulted in the presence of peacekeeping forces in conflict zones without the ability to take action to prevent and contain violence;

4. Undisciplined and disorganized multilateral forces have exploited their power in the conflict arena, leading to sexual exploitation and drug trafficking;

5. Competing goals of counter-insurgency and governance as well as poor coordination between regional actors, donor states, multiple UN missions and NGO’s lead to vague mandates, contradicting tactics and redundancy in the conflict zone.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) Richard Garon, “Civil-Military Cooperation Capability in the Middle-East: Counter-insurgency or Governance Model, Which Direction to Take?” (paper prepared for the conference on Peacekeeping Operations as a Means of International Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, April 4-6, 2006).
Beyond these weaknesses, it is doubtful whether current peacekeeping doctrines provide for the unique characteristics that an intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone would have to possess. Peacekeeping operations over the past ten years, especially those carried out in Bosnia and Kosovo, focused on stabilizing intrastate conflict zones where two ethnic communities existed in one state entity. Therefore, efforts to end violence and rehabilitate civil institutions, the economy and social infrastructures were all managed on one level with one organizing rationale. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone is clearly different in that it contains two levels: the Palestinian conflict zone and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone. The two levels necessitate two different rationales, and there are structural tensions between them.

The normal stipulation of both sides’ acceptance of the introduction of peacekeeping forces before their implementation,\(^15\) is clearly an obstacle in this context, given the Palestinians’ expected opposition, especially with Hamas in charge of the Palestinian government. Israeli mistrust in the reliability of international bodies constitutes a further obstacle,\(^16\) especially following recent security breaches resulting from the failure of international forces.\(^17\) These difficulties highlight the importance of understanding the unique characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian Bi-level Conflict Zone, which

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\(^{16}\) The establishment of the UNIFIL II peacekeeping force in Lebanon following UN Resolution 1701 might serve as a positive precedent for international intervention. Never before has the State of Israel accepted such a robust peacekeeping force with such a broad mandate on its borders. If UNIFIL II succeeds, even partially, it might become a conceptual platform that could be used in the Israeli-Palestinian theater.

demands more complicated international intervention. Such an intervention should be a peacebuilding mission that will include soft mission components (policing, institution-building and economic reconstruction) alongside military (strong) components of the mission.

**The Israeli-Palestinian Asymmetrical, Bi-Level Conflict Zone**

Almost all literature on ethno-national conflict accepts a distinction between interstate and intrastate conflict, yet the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not neatly fit into either of those two categories. Unique characteristics from each of the categories are evinced as the conflict is conducted between two ethno-national communities living in close geographical proximity without the clear and defined separation of a recognized international border. Part of the Palestinian population is directly governed by Israel, and the rest, even if indirectly, is at least susceptible to the influence of Israeli actions and military presence in the Palestinian territories.

More than a decade after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (1994), it is hard to point to encouraging signs of progress in the direction of the establishment of a state entity. Palestinian civil agencies are not succeeding in delivering civil services. The Palestinian Constitution is mostly a declaration. The Palestinian economy is faltering and the status of the Palestinian citizen has declined by all measures. Worse than that, the Palestinian Authority is not succeeding in enforcing a monopoly on the use of violent force.

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Israel. The violent conflict’s course is a product of the dynamic power of the different political agendas of the Palestinian factions and the characteristics of Israel’s responses. In this kind of reality, it is doubtful that the sides will be able to reach a ceasefire (at the interstate level), let alone the establishment of a mechanism for its oversight.

The recent Palestinian elections have moved Hamas to political center-stage. Even if the majority of Hamas’ support came as the result of a protest vote against the widespread corruption in the Palestinian Authority,\(^{22}\) it cannot be ignored that their victory will necessarily change Palestinian discourse. Current Palestinian discourse, which reflects the “truth regime”\(^{23}\) of Palestinian society, contains the conclusion that the Israeli Disengagement is an achievement and direct result of violent resistance.\(^ {24}\) The meaning derived from this is that armed resistance is a more efficient tool than political struggle for ending the Occupation, therefore, the armed struggle against Israel must continue.\(^ {25}\)

This influence, which is already expressed in current Palestinian discourse, will continue to become more pervasive. Under current conditions, Israel, with American and European backing, will not enter into dialogue or negotiations with Hamas unless the organization disarms and changes its covenant. Without dialogue, it will not be possible to reach the series of critical understandings that enable advancing in the direction of an agreement. In the absence of basic authorities following both sides’ consent, it will be impossible for any third party to become actively involved in the conflict in any manner short of peace enforcement.

\(^{22}\) At the time of the most recent Palestinian Elections, 85% of Palestinians believed the Palestinian Authority was corrupt and 60% of people who voted for Hamas support reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. See: Khalil Shikaki, “The Polls: What the Palestinians Really Voted For,” Newsweek, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11080943/site/newsweek/.

\(^{23}\) Knowledge, according to Foucault, is a kind of social “truth regime” which enables the domination of some people or institutions over themselves and others. See: Mills, Sara, Michel Foucault. Trans. Ohad Zehavi, ed. Libido Transition Series (Tel-Aviv: Resling Publishing, 2005), 83.

\(^{24}\) Mahmoud al-Zahar, current Palestinian Foreign Minister, stated in a 17 August 2005 interview broadcast by Al-Arabiyya TV that Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip because it had been defeated by “resistance,” not as the result of “useless negotiations.” See: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Disengagement News Update No. 4,” Aug. 19, 2005, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/d19aug_e05.htm.

\(^{25}\) Yale University, Hamas Covenant.
Therefore, in order to facilitate the involvement of a third party, change must occur at the intra-Palestinian level. Even if the nature of the proposed change is hard to define at this stage, it is already clear that it will necessarily include at least two components: the essence of Palestinian discourse and structural change at the political-institutional, economic and social levels in the direction of the establishment of a statehood entity. That state entity must operate from a statehood rationale, whose principles are a monopoly on the use of violent force, exercising civil and state institutions in order to ensure citizens’ welfare and security and the adoption of a responsible behavioral codex, acceptable to other states in the international arena.

Although in every change above there is a component of coercion, changing political culture does not necessitate the blind adoption of democracy and the Western liberal codex; any change would have to be gradual and cannot render null and void an entire value system. Yet without a change there can be no progress on the political front. Worse than that, conflict escalation will likely impact regional stability due to the encouraging effects of Hamas’ political achievements on the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Jordan as well Hezbollah’s efforts to replace the Lebanese government (following the Second Lebanon War) that encourage extremists throughout the region.

Having introduced peacekeeping operations’ inherent weaknesses alongside the unique nature of the Israeli-Palestinian bi-level conflict zone, we have created a broader conceptual platform that will enable us to better understand the experiences of international interventions in this arena during the Second Intifada and to determine where they faltered.

Experiences in International Intervention –
Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and What Lies Between Them

From the outbreak of the violent conflict in September 2000 until today, the international community, led by the Americans, has worked for a cessation of violence and a return to the negotiating table. In most cases these efforts have been conducted by personal, presidential emissaries. In others, international committees or foreign governments played leading roles. Table 1 gives an overview of the major attempts at international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 2000 to 2005, including actors involved and mission domains.
Table 1: Major International Interventions and Diplomatic Initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2000 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Key Players</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell Committee</td>
<td>9 Jan 01 - 30 Apr 01</td>
<td>• Fact finding mission following the outbreak of violence in September, 2000&lt;br&gt;• Recommendations for returning to negotiations</td>
<td>• Suleyman Demirel, former President of Turkey&lt;br&gt;• Thorbjørn Jagland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway&lt;br&gt;• George J. Mitchell, former Majority Leader, US Senate&lt;br&gt;• Warren B. Rudman, former US Senator&lt;br&gt;• Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)</td>
<td>• Mitchell Report&lt;br&gt;• Situation on the ground worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenet Mission</td>
<td>5 June 01 - 13 June 01</td>
<td>• Secure ceasefire&lt;br&gt;• Secure “period of quiet”</td>
<td>• George Tenet, CIA Director</td>
<td>• Ceasefire never gelled&lt;br&gt;• Period of calm was never achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinni Missions</td>
<td>26 Nov 01 - 17 Apr 02</td>
<td>• Implement the Tenet ceasefire steps</td>
<td>• Anthony Zinni, US Special Envoy&lt;br&gt;• Williams Bums&lt;br&gt;• Collin Powell&lt;br&gt;• Dick Cheney</td>
<td>• Sides decide to resume trilateral cooperation&lt;br&gt;• Zinni bridging proposals&lt;br&gt;• Ceasefire never gelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadmap</td>
<td>17 Sep 02 - present</td>
<td>• Conditioned steps for both sides leading back to the negotiating table</td>
<td>• The Quartet (US, Russia, EU, UN)</td>
<td>• Phase I never achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>Key Players</td>
<td>Results</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolf Mission</td>
<td>14 June 03 - 3 Oct 03</td>
<td>• Implementation of Roadmap obligations and commitments</td>
<td>• Ambassador John Wolf</td>
<td>• No agreement reached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>2 Dec 04 - present</td>
<td>• Supporting forces during the Disengagement.</td>
<td>• Silvan Shalom</td>
<td>• Tahediy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward and Dayton Mission</td>
<td>16 Feb 05 - present</td>
<td>• Rebuilding and restructuring Palestinian security sectors</td>
<td>• Lt. General William Ward, US</td>
<td>• Some bridging between the PA and the militant factions, especially Hamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• General Keith Dayton, US</td>
<td>• Presence of Egyptians in the GS and Rafah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Nasser Yusuf, Palestinian Minister of the Interior and National Security</td>
<td>• Egypt provided equipment and training to Palestinian security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfensohn</td>
<td>14 Apr 05 - 30 Apr 06</td>
<td>• Economic issues in light of the Disengagement</td>
<td>• Wolfensohn</td>
<td>• Establishment of the ‘Security Sector Working Group’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Condoleezza Rice</td>
<td>• Security coordination and retraining of Palestinian security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Javier Solana</td>
<td>• Abbas integrated some Hamas and IJ members into security services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gaza greenhouses</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rafah border crossing to the Palestinians with third party monitors</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
None of these interventions, with the exception of the Egyptians (and even then mostly at the intra-Palestinian level), succeeded in producing meaningful change. Even Wolfensohn, who focused primarily on economic matters and worked with incredible vigilance to improve Palestinian economic conditions through the transfer of agricultural infrastructure in evacuated settlements, did not produce particularly impressive results. The possible causes for the failures of each diplomatic intervention are mapped in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Possible Causes for the Failure if International Interventions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2000-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Political Reasons</th>
<th>Structural Reasons</th>
<th>Professional Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of Political Will</td>
<td>Absence of Public Support Legitimization</td>
<td>Absence of Political Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenet</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zinni</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roadmap</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egyptian Involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfensohn</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Citing the impossibility of progress in the current political climate, Wolfensohn decided to retire as Official Quartet Envoy at the end of April. See: Akiva Eldar, “Quartet to Hold Key Talks Over its Mideast Role,” Ha’aretz, May 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt .jhtml?itemNo=711766&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0.
The table reflects conclusions reached inside of our analytical framework, which looked at the missions’ failures on political, structural and professional levels. Conclusions drawn for each mission are based on a thorough examination of newspaper and journal articles published around and about each mission, monthly polls conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research,\(^\text{27}\) and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,\(^\text{28}\) as well as private interviews with select mission participants. While some categorizations may be open to interpretation, the limits of this paper preclude a more thorough examination and should be addressed in future research.

The table demonstrates several trends leading to the failure of interventions. Six of them are most prominent: absence of Israeli political will, absence of Israeli public support, absence of Palestinian political will, the absence of the international community’s determination and support, the missions’ lack of authority and lack of implementation and enforcement mechanisms.

The absence of Israeli political will resulted in poor cooperation and coordination with the intervening bodies and diplomatic initiatives and is evidenced by refusals to allow the intervening bodies’ access to key locations, long lists of reservations to their recommendations and stalling tactics. An additional manifestation of the lack of Israeli political will is the imposition of stringent criteria for the implementation of agreements. Sharon’s infamous demand for a “week of total quiet” is a key example.\(^\text{29}\)

Sharon’s strict policies towards the resumption of the political process

\(^{27}\) The Tami Steinmetz Center produces a monthly *Peace Index*, examining Israeli, Jewish attitudes towards the peace process and other issues of national importance. Measure of Israeli attitudes towards international intervention were taken from an examination of all peace index reports between September 2000 and August 2006. See: http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/.

\(^{28}\) The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research regularly conducts polls examining Palestinian support for the peace process and other issues of national importance. Measures of Palestinian support for international intervention were gathered from an examination of all poll reports produced between July 2001 and December 2005. See: http://pcpsr.org/survey/index.html.

were strongly supported by the Jewish public in Israel, which evinced exhaustion and frustration with the peace process and the ongoing terror. During much of Sharon’s term, the Israeli public shows a high degree of support for unilateral steps and a rejection of international involvement. These trends, which are well documented in the monthly Israeli “Peace Index,” give testament to the absence of Israeli political will to support international presences and efforts.

Lack of Palestinian political will is evinced by Arafat’s two-speak and double-play: saying one thing to the intervening bodies and another to his public. Palestinian political will was hampered by Arafat’s tactic of playing the cooperative, besieged leader to the international community and a strong supporter of Palestinian resistance and terror to his own public. While the

30 79% of Jewish Israelis support Sharon’s policies in February 2001; 52% of Jewish Israelis support Sharon’s policies in April 2001; a majority of Jewish Israelis support targeted assassinations in October 2001; 73% of Jewish Israelis support targeted assassinations in January 2002; 51% of Jewish Israelis support unilateral disengagement of negotiation in May 2002; 80% of Jewish Israelis support reoccupying Palestinian cities in June 2002; 66% of Jewish Israelis support Sharon’s policies in November 2002; 80% of Jewish Israelis support the Separation Wall in July 2003; 57% of Jewish Israelis support Sharon’s policies towards the Palestinians in November 2003; 59% of Jewish Israelis support unilateral disengagement in December 2003. These figures demonstrate the despair of the Israeli Jewish public with the Palestinians and the Peace Process. As long as the Palestinians were perceived as unwilling or unable to make peace, international intervention remained an unwanted distraction. All figures taken from the Peace Index, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace.


33 For example, after a September 2004 double suicide attack in Beersheba, Arafat condemned the attack in international media, stating: “We are against any aggression against Palestinian and Israeli civilians;” while in domestic media on the same day he proclaimed: “We will march towards Jerusalem, we will sacrifice millions of martyrs.” For more information see: Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians Celebrate Beersheba Attacks,” The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 1, 2004, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1093921795440.
Palestinian public may have supported international intervention, they also continued to support the use of suicide bombers against Israeli civilians for the period between 2000 and 2004.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, Palestinian public opinion only supported Arafat’s double policies. After Arafat’s death in November 2004, Abu Mazen emerged to lead a weak and fragmented Palestinian Authority. Yet Abu Mazen had little real political influence, and Palestinian despair from the political process and the international community was aptly demonstrated in the January 2006 elections, when Hamas succeeded in winning a majority in the Legislative Council and taking control of the government.

Beyond the failure of the sides to act on their commitments to international bodies, and beyond their lack of ripeness for conflict mitigation lie the faults of the international community. Many of the interventions, especially those led by the United States, were more political fig leaves than attempts to end the violence. Sending a small team of diplomats into a conflict zone to negotiate a ceasefire dependent on the good will of the conflict parties could never be considered a serious effort at ending violence. Both the international community and the American administration in particular, had their own concerns regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and were loathe to invest the necessary military and political resources to bring an end to violence.\textsuperscript{35} In the absence of international determined will, something had to be done, hence the ill-fated diplomatic missions.

The deficiencies in authority and implementation and enforcement mechanisms are endemic to the lack of international support and determination to end the conflict. Given the unwillingness of Israelis and Palestinians to de-escalate during the period of the Second Intifada, a successful intervention would have had to force the sides to accept international agreements and compliance mechanisms. It may not have been apparent at the time, but anything short of compulsion was destined for failure.

Beyond this, the international community’s intervention can also be criticized for asking the Palestinians to run before teaching them to walk; efforts at international intervention were aimed at mitigating the

\textsuperscript{34} 58% of Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel in July 2001. 52% of Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel in May 2002. 53% of Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel in March 2004. See: the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/.

interstate conflict, bypassing the intra-Palestinian conflict. In order to be successful, international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict first has to consider what kind of change needs to be created and how it can be achieved.

The Purpose of Change – Complex Peacekeeping Operations in Bi-Level Conflict Zones

The unique characteristics of the each level in the Israel-Palestinian conflict demand that change occurs in a graduated manner, rather than to both levels simultaneously. Due to the fact that change at the bilateral level requires two responsible parties that can enforce discipline and prevent armed spoilers from derailing progress, efforts must begin at the intrastate level.

While both Israelis and Palestinians must deal with these challenges, it is the Palestinian Authority that stands to benefit the most from the change. Enforcing discipline and controlling spoilers in the internal Palestinian arena could generate structural change that will strengthen and stabilize the Palestinian Authority, bringing it close to being a state entity, working under a statehood rationale, with a monopoly on the use of violent force.

Efforts at the intrastate level demand concerted cooperation with grassroots organizations to strengthen groups that support structural and political change. This effort is guided by a bottom-up strategy. In the context of Palestine, the challenge is harder to overcome because the Palestinian middle class, which is a foundational element in structural social change, is almost non-existent. Palestinian social stratification rests on a broad layer of low socio-economic status citizens, with a small number of elites, many of whom are embroiled in corruption. The strengthening of the Palestinian Authority and its transformation into a state entity will enable a certain reduction, if meaningful and important, in the asymmetric dimension of the

interstate conflict zone, bringing it closer to a conflict between two state entities working under a statehood rationale.

On the other hand, efforts at the interstate level compel working with political elites. This kind of effort is guided by a top-down strategy whose purpose is to generate agreement on the importance of returning to a political track and the adoption of a recognition that Palestinians have a better chance of fulfilling their national aspirations through non-violent means based on a political process, negotiation and international backing.\(^{39}\)

These two strategies have different purposes, and there exists between them a basic tension in that they are directed to two different audiences and compel different kinds of actions. Therefore, it is difficult to employ both strategies simultaneously.\(^{40}\)

An additional change that international intervention will seek to generate is a change in social discourse. Social discourse represents the “truth regime” in the Foucaultian sense of the term.\(^{41}\) Structural changes lose their validity and importance if they do not actively generate different social and political discourses. In this sense, the aim of peacekeeping operations in the intrastate conflict zone is to locate the ‘agents of truth’ of the society in confrontation and to work with them to change the ‘truth regime.’

All international intervention in the intrastate conflict zone has some characteristics of coercion. That coercion may be expressed in the form of military power, but it can also be expressed by the imposition of values and concepts different from those that shape the current social discourse and truth regime. Peacekeeping operations are ‘Western’ in their essence and are based on the political outlook and conceptual frameworks of the United Nations and leading forces in the international arena.\(^{42}\) They are Western

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\(^{42}\) As Roland Paris observed, “peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.” Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 56.
in all that relates to the characteristics of social-political discourse and the truth regime that they represent. Democracy, individual and human rights, liberalism and capitalism are Western values. It is doubtful that the international community’s agencies are capable of working in a manner that is not subject to these established values, and internal Palestinian discourse does not always rely on this same value system.

The strengthening of Hamas, even if interpreted as a protest against the Palestinian Authority’s corruption, reflects the rise of a different discourse. The Hamas truth regime, which is likely to become an alternative to the Fatah truth regime, will probably constitute an ideological and political obstacle to possible peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the challenge of the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone is doubled.

Using the concept of discourse as an analytical foundation, it is possible to present the aim of peacekeeping operations in the conflict zone as an effort to broaden the common ground between the Israeli and Palestinian discourses. A solid base of common discourse enhances movement towards a political agreement. That agreement, if ever achieved, will come only after a series of interim agreements, which in turn will demand their own peace building efforts.

In this respect, the American state-building experience in Iraq is worthy of thorough examination and study. Some of the lessons learned there are relevant and even crucial to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone.

Between Iraq and Palestine - The American Experience in Iraq and its Relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian Bi-level Conflict Zone

International intervention in the intra-Palestinian conflict zone can take place in three sets of conditions. The first is broad Palestinian support for an operation and an invitation to the international community to intervene in the framework of a state-building operation. The second is at the invitation of the Palestinian President but with the opposition of Hamas, and the third condition is with the broad Palestinian opposition to international involvement, in which case that involvement would be coercive (similar to peace enforcement).

Each of the different scenarios creates a different reality and, therefore, each demands a different force composition, mandate, doctrine, methodology and duration. Yet in each of the above scenarios, the international community will be forced to cope with a series of unique challenges. Some of those challenges are unique to the Israeli-Palestinian context, while others are seen in other conflict zones as well, the most prominent of which in recent years is the Iraqi conflict zone.

The principal dilemma that both peace support operation planners and the conflict parties face is that of deciding priorities in bi-level intervention. Should intervention begin at the bilateral level with a peacekeeping operation whose aim is an end to violence, or is it better to begin with a state-building operation that stabilizes the internal conflict zone? The planners of a peacekeeping operation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone will have to deal with this dilemma. It is doubtful that international intervention carried out simultaneously on two different levels with two different peacekeeping strategies is possible.\textsuperscript{44} The American experience in Iraq, despite fundamental differences between the two conflict zones, underscores this dilemma and offers a number of important lessons.

As the United States enters its fourth year of engagement in Iraq, its hopes of a quick stabilization with the cooperation of the local population have long since passed. The American Army has not succeeded in stabilizing the security situation, bringing public order and rehabilitating of the country’s governance systems. Since the ousting of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, Iraq’s internal stability has crumbled, and the American Army has been pressed to cope with widespread violent insurgency. Despite vast quantities of resources and efforts invested in coping with this problem, the American Army’s success has been partial at best.

In the absence of security stability, and because of continuing insurgency, which has demanded a large allocation of resources and attention to force-protection, the American Army finds it difficult to advance the course of rehabilitation in Iraq. Hendrickson and Tucker have pointed out: “The fatal role that insecurity has played in making progress in every other sector highly problematic… projects for building civil society could barely get off the ground when participants feared for their lives.”\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} Several PSOs in 1990s, especially in Bosnia, suffered setbacks from dealing simultaneously with peacebuilding (development) and peacekeeping (stabilization). The present-day mission in Sudan is another case of one conflict zone with three separate missions.

\textsuperscript{45} Hendrickson and Tucker, “Revisions in Need of Revising,” 7.
American war planners failed to predict the scope of the intercommunal violence, the destruction of civil infrastructure and the flow of refugees. The terror and chaos lead to total anarchy: “Saddam Hussein was not replaced by Governor Bremer so much as by Hobbes,” and a hole was created into which American efforts were drawn. Without control of the security situation, and without neutralizing the armed militias, it became impossible to foster economic rehabilitation and a reempowerment of government institutions: “If you don’t master security, everything else gets washed away like sand castles on the beach.” The American experience in Iraq proves, if anything else, that splitting forces and attempting to deal at once with stabilization and rehabilitation is destined for failure.

The American challenge in Iraq is further complicated as the army is forced to enforce public order and rehabilitate government systems in a state whose government tradition is one of minority rule, absolutism and corruption. The attempt to rehabilitate governmental institutions demands deep changes in political culture, organizations and values whose meaning, among other things, is a change in Iraqi political discourse. Changes like these elicit basic opposition and are viewed as coercive, patronizing and perhaps even condescending. It is doubtful that the American Army was properly organized for such a complicated mission, which actually approaches something of a trusteeship. This kind of mission demands intensive and prolonged preparation and acquaintance with local cultural characteristics and, as needed, the use of skilled, professional forces that rely on civil knowledge and practices. The American failure is made even worse by Bush’s declaration of American victory on May 1, 2003. The Americans declared: “Peace when there was no peace and victory when there was no victory.”

Despite differences between the Iraqi and Israeli-Palestinian arenas, the Iraqi experience might prove important and essential to international involvement in the Palestinian arena, which is also characterized by a governing tradition of corrupt elites (that lost their political position in the last elections but not their political influence) and multiple armed and violent militias whose actions weaken security and stability. The American experience in Iraq proves that without disbanding armed militias, it is not possible to stabilize the security reality. In the absence of security, it is not possible to maintain public order and ensure calm, which are necessary conditions for the rehabilitation of government institutions. A similar conclusion can

46 Ibid, 4.
48 Ibid, 7.
be drawn for the Palestinian arena. It is clear that without disbanding armed militias and ensuring a state monopoly on armed forces (organized violence) it will not be possible to stabilize, rehabilitate and develop the Palestinian governmental system and bring it in the direction of a state entity. On the other hand, it is clear that disbanding the militias will enable the necessary conditions for international involvement at the bilateral level by means of a peacekeeping operation to occur and will enhance such an operation’s chances of lowering the level of violence and stabilizing the security system. At this stage, the international involvement could work at both levels at the same time with two different strategies, whereas an improvement in the internal Palestinian arena will lead to improvement at the bilateral level, and an improvement at the bilateral level will strengthen trends of stabilization in the internal Palestinian arena.

The American experience in Iraq, like the international experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, proves that any international intervention in the Palestinian arena must build and train military and police mission forces with effective enforcement capabilities regarding disbanding armed militias and imposing security and public order as well as groups of civilian experts that can lead the effort to rehabilitate the Palestinian system, train it, and lead it, in a manner similar to a trusteeship, in the direction of a state entity.

An additional dilemma that the planners of any international intervention will be forced to deal with is that of task force size. The international experience in Kosovo and Bosnia,49 as well as in Iraq, proves the importance and need for a skilled and large mission force in order to effectively cope with challenges in the internal arena, maintain public order and return a sense of security to civilians, all of which requires disarming armed militias. The insufficient American task force size in Iraq is viewed by critics as one of the reasons for its difficulty in maintaining public order. The familiar estimations from Kosovo and Bosnia required a magnitude of force much larger than the American presence in Iraq. Hendrickson and Tucker give numbers between 350,000 and 480,000 soldiers,50 compared to the less than 200,000 American soldiers involved in the first stages of the invasion and fewer since.

Maintaining public order demands the informed use of skilled and trained forces that are capable of properly coping with a civilian population.

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50 Hendrickson and Tucker, “Revisions in Need of Revising,” 10.
The secret of success is not only a sufficient number of soldiers, but also the correct and professional composition of task forces and well-established cooperation between military forces, police forces and civilian institutions and organizations. The American experience in Iraq proves the need for the integration of skilled military police forces with other skilled, civilian professional forces that are experienced in problems of public order.

A skilled task force is a task force that is capable of adapting itself to the unique characteristics of the conflict zone in which it operates, understanding cultural and historical backgrounds, and adapting to the changing context. To this end proper training and high-level intelligence capable of working in real-time is needed. Thus, one of the most prominent failures of the American Army in the Iraqi conflict zone was intelligence:

“The problems flowing from bad intelligence seemed virtually endemic to the situation American forces were conducting in Iraq. They were strangers in a strange land. They lacked the linguistic and cultural skills that might have diffused misunderstandings...”

Hendrickson and Tucker claim that the American failure in Iraq is not only an intelligence failure, but a failure of “cultural strategy.”

Relevant and quality intelligence should constitute an important step in stabilizing the internal arena and maintaining public order: obtaining the trust of the public. The rules of armed conflict managed by skilled military forces are not relevant in this regard and even pernicious. The skilled American forces had a very difficult time of obtaining the trust of the public and ‘conquering’ their hearts and minds. Their military skills and training did not give them the necessary tools for this task. Hendrickson and Tucker explain that: “Such restraints, however, had no bearing on the conduct of the U.S. military forces, whose actions were governed formally by the law of armed conflict rather than the protection of individual rights typical of constitutional democracies.” The acquisition of these kinds of skills in peacekeeping forces requires an effort in the development and building of

52 Hendrickson and Tucker, “Revisions in Need of Revising,” 18.
53 Ibid, 28.
54 Ibid.
the operational theory/methodology, systems of training, the recruitment of proper human resources, and the establishment of an organizational framework and professional task forces.

A summary of the American experience in Iraq shows that any international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone that is asked to focus efforts on stabilizing the internal Palestinian arena will have to take the following factors into account: task force size, task force composition, mandate definition, operation time table and, most importantly, training the task force inside of a relation to the operational and methodological challenges they will face. Beyond this, dealing on theoretical and operational levels with the issue of priorities and the correct and demanded order of actions is needed.

Summary and Conclusion

The challenge we attempted to deal with in this article was to understand the reasons behind the almost uniform failure of international interventions and diplomatic initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since September 2000. We discerned a number of factors common to most of the recent interventions: lack of both Israeli and Palestinian political will, the absence of international determination and support and the limited authority granted intervening bodies. These factors underscore the need for rethinking approaches to intervention and critically relating to both the theoretical and practical aspects of peacekeeping operations as well as the unique characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone. International experience in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, as well as in Iraq, demonstrates the need for new conceptual approaches that focus on stabilization and reconstruction instead of peace and reconciliation.

Despite the relatively large number of international intervention attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, and despite the differences between each attempt, it seems that one of the shared failures between all is an absence of sufficient determination of the international community. In the absence of such determination, task forces were not sent to the region and each intervention’s mandate was limited to a short time period. In these conditions, and in the absence of real political readiness of both sides to cooperate, it was not possible to expect more meaningful results, if any results at all.

The absence of progress in the political process as well as the continuation of violence and terror and the suspicion of unwanted political initiatives, led former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to declare a course
of unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the Northern West Bank. The Israeli course of action was perceived by the Palestinian main stream as an achievement and as a direct result of violent resistance. This feeling of victory, together with a strong dissatisfaction with the corruption that had spread throughout the Palestinian Authority and despair from a stalled political process, led to the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 elections. The Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, and a Hamas-led Palestinian government, further reduces the chances of returning the sides to the track of negotiation. Therefore, in the conditions that have been created, the responsibility of the international community has grown, and a more meaningful effort, resembling a peace support operation with a strong component of state building, is demanded to avoid the renewal of violent conflict, which might endanger regional security.

Peace building operations are characterized by an orientation that looks to the distant future. Their purpose is the generation of structural social change with accompanying profound cognitive change whose essence is a change in discourse and the truth regime. This kind of change is a rejection of violence and it compels political processes that create cognitive transformations. As such, peacekeeping can be perceived as a process of learning – for both sides.

The meaning of learning processes in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the recognition of the inefficacy of the use of violence for the fulfillment of political and social interests and the recognition of the greater effectiveness of political means, which are expressed only in a framework of political processes and negotiation.

It seems that in the current reality, there are no shortcuts to the longed for bilateral change. There is no way to hasten the learning process without generating the necessary change at the intrastate level. If the international community wishes to improve its chances of success in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, it will have to recognize its complexity and bi-level nature. The challenge is a graduated one, which demands that initial efforts be

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concentrated first on the intrastate conflict zone. This effort requires peacekeeping operations with strong state building components that will lead to structural changes at the political, social-economic and psychological-individual levels, and the meeting of basic needs of the involved groups.\footnote{Fetherston, “Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding,” 202-204.}

In this reality, the international community is likely to falter on Palestinian refusal to international involvement, and it might be necessary to think in terms of peace enforcement as described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This would enable the Security Council to impose a military presence in the conflict zone (Palestinian theater and the buffer zones between Israel and the PA) based on the danger it represents to the peace and security of the international community. In this case the international community will have to consider the establishment of a trusteeship or something similar for a period of time to rehabilitate the Palestinian system. The international community should consider creating this trusteeship during the next Israeli disengagement from the West Bank. The international community could establish a qualified mechanism that will accompany the disengagement and assume responsibility for the evacuated territories as part of the broader trusteeship mission.

Only after structural change that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state entity has occurred will it be possible to focus efforts in the direction of peacemaking and peacebuilding operations at the interstate level, whose purpose is the cessation of violence and creating the appropriate conditions for returning the sides to a political process. On the other hand, it is clear that the two levels are interrelated and influence each other and that, from a certain point, it will be necessary to work on both levels simultaneously.

The force’s composition, size, authorities, professionalism, and the duration of its operation should be determined in a way that will enable the generation of a change in the direction of the establishment of a stable and responsible Palestinian state entity. The establishment of this kind of entity will reduce, to a substantial degree, the dimension of political asymmetry in the conflict zone,\footnote{The asymmetry between Israel and Palestine is at least two-dimensional, surfacing at the level of military and economic power as well as the level of state/non-state status. See: Kobi Michael and Eyal Ben Ari, “International Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena,” in Old Conflict, New Challenges: Peace-building in Israeli-Palestinian Relations, ed. Sean Byrne, James Fergusson, et al., Bison Paper 8 (Winnipeg, Canada: The Center for Defense and Security Studies, 2006), 45-64.} and provide the necessary conditions for the
commencement of negotiation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This kind of negotiation will generate the kind of political agreement whose application will be supervised by a peacekeeping force.

The international community’s intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone by means of intensive diplomacy has failed, but this does not put an end to the responsibility and capability of the international community to intervene again. This time, however, it should invest the required effort in planning and effectively implementing the intervention in a determined way, with more critical and creative thinking, based upon the meaningful experience that was gained in other conflict zones in the international arena.
Bibliography


Guidelines for Contributors

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