A CASE STUDY FOR BURUNDI

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION DURING THE TRANSITION IN BURUNDI: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>APPM</td>
<td>Armed political parties and movements</td>
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<td>BNDF</td>
<td>Burundian National Defence Force</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>Burundian National Police</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination (Centre)</td>
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<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRS</td>
<td>Commission Nationale pour la Réinsertion des Sinistrés</td>
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<tr>
<td>COFS</td>
<td>Combatants still on foreign soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration in the DRC</td>
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<td>CSNS</td>
<td>Child Soldiers National Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Demobilisation centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Disarmament and demobilisation</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Disarmament point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR-CC</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Co-ordination Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRRP</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES/NCDRR</td>
<td>Executive Secretariat of the NCDRR (also ES)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Forces Armées Burundaises</td>
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<td>FBU</td>
<td>Burundian Franc – Burundian monetary unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
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<td>FDN</td>
<td>Forces Défense Nationale</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Libération</td>
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<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>Front pour la Libération Nationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Forces Technical Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Monitoring Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<td>JLT</td>
<td>Joint Liaison Team</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as part of the reform of security sector institutions in the context of peace operations, either under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise, is a relatively new and challenging field. Although the international community has succeeded in some instances, it has not been consistent. This is partly due to inherent difficulties in engaging with sometimes sensitive and controversial institutions, political processes and personalities in conflict or post-conflict settings. The authors begin with an historical overview, and then examine the political management of the crisis in Burundi, the role players and the political parties.

They attempt to address the very difficult process of agreement and the installation of the transitional government, which resulted in the deployment of South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD), later the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and finally the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB). They emphasise the importance of a negotiated settlement where the Burundian authorities and role players were encouraged to make their own decisions, rather than being forced to accept external imposed judgements.

The Monograph explains in detail the process of DDR followed by AMIB and ONUB. The authors discuss in detail the efforts by the AMIB mission to start the DDR process and the problems of dealing with more than one ceasefire agreement, as well as convincing the role players to accept a joint plan for demobilisation and start the process. Because of the lack of funding by the AU a lot of donor support was used to start the process. When AMIB was taken over by ONUB in December 2004 a significant portion of the planning for the DDR process was completed. ONUB managed to continue with the DDR planning, and this resulted in a successful DDR process.

The problems experienced during the process are discussed in detail, such as defining who is a combatant, the verification process, the identification and logistical management of assembly areas, food provisions to former combatants who were still armed, and protecting cantonment areas, to name a few.

The monograph also emphasises the importance of strategic planning for reintegration and the need for political pressure on a government to find a solution to the enormous range of tasks associated with the disarmament and integration of combatants. Because of ongoing peace processes and preparations for elections, they neglected initially to
spend sufficient time on reintegration planning, an extremely technical process that requires not only careful design, but also logistical support.

This particular operation in Burundi is a good example of what is possible when there is a positive relationship between government and international role players, as well as cooperation amongst international partners. The DDR process in Burundi was once regarded as one of the most intractable problems to be addressed during the transitional period, but it has become one of the positive drivers of the transition since it started in December 2004. Most of the disarmament and demobilisation was completed in nine months. The reintegration process started in late 2005 and if it continues at the current pace it can be completed in a shorter time frame than the four years provided for.

What now remains outstanding is the issue of security sector reform, which is beyond the scope of this monograph. It is clear that this poses a significant challenge to the Government of Burundi.
The formal stages of the political transition in Burundi have now drawn to a close and the newly elected president, Pierre Nkurunziza, was installed on 26 August 2005. The final set of elections, for the collines, were held on 23 September 2005. The whole process was carried out with far less intimidation and violence than many observers had predicted, and turnout was generally high, indicating a considerable level of popular support for a peaceful outcome. Most of the disturbances that did occur were laid at the door of PALIPEHUTU-FNL, the party of Agathon Rwasa and the only armed group that remained outside the transitional process, and the Burundian National Defence Force (BNDF).

The principal focus of this monograph is not the election process, however, but the DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) programme in Burundi that was launched on 2 December 2004. It was, however, preceded by a 14-month period during which combatants belonging to rebel groups were assembled in 12 Pre-Disarmament Assembly Areas (PDAAs) throughout the country. After a long delay, DDR commenced with the disarmament and demobilisation of 216 combatants at the Demobilisation Centre (DC) in Muramvya. Contrary to expectations, the process went ahead smoothly, so much so that Stage 1 of demobilisation and disarmament was near completion at the end of September 2005. This was a very interesting development given that the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) had estimated that it would take one year to complete Stage 1 of the process, and an additional four years to complete Stage 2. The likelihood that the process would be completed in a shorter period bolstered faith in the transitional process and helped to create a stable environment in the run-up to the last round of elections. The disarmament, demobilisation and integration\(^*\) of ex-combatants ensured that the transition process continued and that the elections could take place as planned.

This is not to say that the process of disarmament has been free of problems. These were related to such matters as accommodation, food, health and disputes over rank harmonisation. The Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB), the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and later the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), however, were able to address these problems sufficiently to ensure that the DDR process could continue.
When evaluating the DDR process in Burundi it is important to look at the theory behind it, and specifically the definition of DDR. Massimo Fusato describes the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants as follows:

Disarmament is the first phase of DDR, and logically precedes demobilization and reintegration. However, it is often a long-term process. A major problem is the collection of small weapons and light arms, which are easy to conceal and difficult to account for. The existence of large paramilitary groups and irregular forces also complicates disarmament, which, under these conditions, becomes a long-term process to be carried out over a wide region, by peacekeepers, regular military forces, and civilian police. Demobilisation includes the dismantling of military units and the transition of ex-combatants from military to civilian life. In times of peace, demobilisation programs can be gradual and tuned to the needs of the groups being demobilised. At the end of a conflict, demobilisation presents the same logistical challenge, as do programs of emergency relief and resettlement of displaced people. Demobilisation includes assembly of ex-combatants, orientation programs, and transportation to the communities of destination. These movements of large groups of people should be timed to coincide with phases of civilian life that facilitate reintegration, such as crop and school cycles. After ex-combatants have been demobilised, their effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict. In the short term, ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict. In the longer term, disaffected veterans can play an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarising the political debate, becoming easy targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements.2

The three phases of DDR are interconnected, and have both short- and long-term goals. The short-term goals are the restoration of security and stability through disarmament of the members of previously warring parties. The demobilisation of such groups is another fundamental step towards the improvement of general security at the end of a violent conflict. The more long-term goals are the sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful society.

There are also preconditions that must be met before a DDR programme for large numbers of ex-combatants can be launched. These include establishing adequate security, the separation of previously warring factions, political agreements, a comprehensive DDR plan and sufficient funding.

This monograph will discuss the background to the political transition in Burundi and the preparations and contributions of AMIB, which include its work on the structures for managing the DDR process and the implementation of its advance planning by ONUB. Before drawing conclusions, the authors point out the lessons that were learned and make recommendations for subsequent DDR operations.
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Socio-political environment

Burundi, situated in the Great Lakes region, has experienced cyclic outbreaks of war since its independence in 1962. Of these, two major conflicts have caused the greatest political and social upheaval.

- In April 1972, Hutu rebels from the south, using Tanzania as springboard, invaded the country through the province of Bururi, where they systematically slaughtered Tutsis. The repressive reaction of the Burundian Army (FAB) took the form of equally brutal reprisals against the Hutu members of the population, including members of the elite. This war resulted in the first manifestation of internally displaced people (IDPs) within Burundi and refugees outside its borders, when thousands of Burundians fled to neighbouring countries.
- In October 1993, the first democratically-elected Hutu president, Ndadaye Melchior, was murdered. The reaction that followed was described as an act of genocide against Tutsis and moderate Hutus by a report of the United Nations Security Council. It is estimated that more than 300,000 people fell victim to this massacre.

Socio-economic consequences

The 1972 crisis caused the displacement of more than a million people, more than 20% of the population. The events of 1993 exacerbated this situation. Analysts put the proportion of those displaced and/or scattered during the period 1993–2000 at 50% of Burundi’s inhabitants. Of these, 600,000 were IDPs and more than 400,000 were refugees in neighbouring countries, where they joined other Burundians who had fled their native country in 1972.

The war also caused the destruction of socio-economic infrastructure all over the country. Development indicators deteriorated dramatically during the 1993–2002 period. The proportion of the population living below the poverty line (US$2.15 a day) rose from 58.4% in 1993 to 89.2% in 2002. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell from US$180
to US$110 per capita during the same time, while military expenditure increased from 10.7% of the national budget to 27% during the same seven years, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) statistics. 

**Political management of the crisis**

Since 1993, several governments have succeeded each other as a result of internal negotiations between the Hutu FRODEBU party (which won the presidential and legislative elections in 1993), and the Tutsi party UPRONA. In 1994 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held a conference in Tunisia to discuss the state of affairs in Burundi, and designated former President Julius Nyerere to act as mediator to the Burundian conflict.

The political environment in Burundi changed again in 1996, with the return to power of Pierre Buyoya, following a coup d'état. These developments moved the other countries in the sub-region, together with the international community, to impose an embargo on Burundi that lasted nearly three years (1996–1999), a reaction that forced Buyoya to negotiate. The internal (1993–1996) and external (1997–2000) negotiations lasted more than six years. An agreement was eventually reached in Arusha in August 2000. However, it took another three years, before ceasefire agreements between the warring factions were reached in November 2003, as Table 1 shows. 

The only group still outside the peace process at the time of writing is the PALIPEHUTU-FNL led by Agathon Rwasa. Although this group is small and insufficiently powerful to halt the peace process in Burundi, it has been active throughout the period following the signing of the Arusha agreement. It has created an environment of insecurity in which it has been able to manipulate (mostly rural) civilians and force them to provide support. Many different countries and international bodies have made unsuccessful attempts to persuade PALIPEHUTU-FNL to participate in the peace process. At the African Union Regional Summit held in Dar es Salaam on 16 November 2003, African leaders issued an ultimatum to Agathon Rwasa and his group to join the process within the next three months or run the risk of being considered as an “organisation against peace and stability in Burundi and be treated as such”. On the same subject, those attending the Summit called on the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the international community in general “to support this position of the Region and AU regarding the PALIPEHUTU-FNL”.

Table 1: The Evolution and Divisions of the Hutu Armed Political Parties and Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Date of Establishment</th>
<th>Observation</th>
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</table>
| CNDD           | Leonard Nyangoma                     | March 94              | · Signatory to the Arusha Agreement / 2000  
· TGoB and JCC/ process towards integration and DDR                                                                                       |
| CNDD- FDD      | Colonel Jean Bosco, Ndayikengurukiye | June 1998/ dissidence from CNDD | · Signatory to the 7 October 2002 Ceasefire Agreement  
· TGoB and JCC/ process cantonment/ integration/ DDR                                                                                     |
| CNDD- FDD/ NKUR-NZIZA | Pierre Nkurunziza | October 2001/ dissidence from CNDD-FDD | · Signatory to the 2 December 2002 Ceasefire Agreement  
· Joined the TGoB after 8 Oct and 2 Nov Pretoria Protocols and 16 Nov AU summit  
· Towards cantonment / integration/ DDR                                                                                                  |
| PALIPEHU-UTU   | Etienne Karatasi, Rémy Gahutu, Donatien Misigaro | April 1980            | · Signatory to the Arusha Agreement / 2000  
· TGoB and JCC/ integration towards DDR                                                                                                  |
| FROLINA        | Joseph Karumba                        | February 1990/ dissidence from Palipehu | · Signatory to Arusha 2000  
· TGoB and JCC/ process towards DDR                                                                                                       |
| PALIPEHU-UTU- FNLA  | Agathon Rwasa, Cossan Kabura in February 2001 | December 1992/ dissidence from Palipehu | · Still operating in some parts of Bujumbura rural - Ruyaga, Isale, Mubimbi (no more stronghold)  
· Several defections, including the 200-member group of Ernest Bitaryumunya/ along DRC border (Rukoko forest and Cibitoke province) |
| PALIPEHU UTVU- FNL / ALAIN | Alain Mugaharabona | August 2002/ dissidence from Palipehu-FNL | · Signatory to the 7 October 2002 Ceasefire Agreement  
· TGoB and JCC/ process towards DDR                                                                                                       |
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CHAPTER 2
THE AGREEMENTS AND THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

During the various phases of the negotiations, there were a number of incidents in which parties became divided, for various reasons. This occurred in the Conseil National pour la Défense de Démocratie (CNDD), the Forces pour la Défense de Démocratie (FDD) and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL). This study will not deal with these events and their dynamics. This monograph will however take the outcome of the Arusha Agreements as a starting point for discussion.

The letter and spirit of the signed agreements

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 28 August 2000 and all subsequent agreements\(^1\) provided for the deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force, the commencement of DDR operations and the reform of the security sector with a 50/50 ethnic balance. These processes would be guided by a Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC).\(^2\) All the signatory parties agreed, *inter alia*:

- that the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and other institutions should be all-inclusive;
- that armed political parties and movements (APPM)\(^3\) would qualify to register as political parties as soon as the combatants supporting them were cantoned; and
- that provisional immunity would be granted to the leaders, their followers and the security forces of the government.

The agreements also called for:

- a ceasefire (the definitive cessation of hostilities) within 72 hours of the signing;
- the implementation of the agreement as soon as possible;
- verification and control of the ceasefire to be conducted by a mission mandated by the AU or the UN, following the establishment of Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs

\(^1\) All subsequent agreements refer to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 28 August 2000.
\(^2\) Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC).
\(^3\) Armed political parties and movements (APPM).
composed of representatives of all belligerents, the UN and the AU) that will function at national, provincial and local levels;

- a JCC comprising representatives of all the belligerent parties, the UN and the AU, to be established immediately upon the signing of the ceasefire, chaired by a member the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB), and based in Bujumbura; and

- troops of the armed political parties, movements and militias to surrender their weapons upon arrival at the assembly areas.

The Forces Technical Agreements (FTAs) specified the principles that were to guide the defence and security forces of Burundi in the future. An Integrated General Staff (États Majors Intégrés) for the defence force and police services respectively had to be appointed, and was to be responsible for the complex planning of security sector reform. The constitution governing the new national defence forces and the national police and intelligence service was to be drawn up within one year. The National Defence Force was to be constituted under the supervision of the Implementation Monitoring Commission (IMC) and the JCC, chaired by UNOB and supported by AMIB.

With regard to power sharing in the defence and police sectors, the Pretoria Protocols allocated 40% of the senior officer corps (of the 50% reserved in terms of the Arusha Agreement for the Hutu community) to the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza. That party’s share in the rank-and-file was to be determined by the number of troops once cantonment had been completed, always maintaining the 50/50 ethnic equilibrium. As for the police force, the general structure was based on the principle of apportioning 65% to the TGoB’s supporters and 35% of the 50% Hutu quota to the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza. The gendarmerie was to be integrated into the police, while the militias were to be disarmed and dispersed under the supervision of the AMIB at the beginning of the cantonment and quartering processes. The intelligence services were to fall under the direct control of the president of the republic.4

The Installation of the Transitional Government of Burundi

The transitional government of Burundi was inaugurated on 1 November 2001, in conformity with the terms of the Arusha Accord, which made provision for the sharing of political power between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The OAU’s Regional Initiative, launched in February 2001, suggested to the signatories of the Arusha Accord that the three-year period of transitional government should be divided into two phases of 18 months each. The parties agreed that, during the first phase, a president would be chosen from the Tutsi parties and a vice-president selected from the Hutu parties. In the second phase the Hutu vice-president was to be replaced by the Tutsi president with a Hutu vice-president.5

Power was transferred smoothly from the Tutsi president to his Hutu successor at the end of the first 18 months in office of the transitional government, when President Buyoya handed over office to Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye. The second half of
the transition period was very difficult for the government from the security point of view, as it took place when the TGoB was preparing for the elections that were intended to mark the end of its three-year mandate. The two major challenges it faced during this period were related to guaranteeing and maintaining an equal balance between the two ethno-political groupings, especially during the DDR process, and to bringing about the necessary reform of the security sector.

Although the TGoB had entered a potentially dangerous phase, much had been accomplished. The negotiation and signing of the agreements were a significant step forward in their own right, because they created an environment in which the operations to come could be debated and shaped. However, it is pertinent at this point to provide a context for certain troublesome issues.

- There were two ceasefire agreements and subsequently, two FTAs. Although these contained notable similarities, there were also distinct differences. Setting aside the recalcitrant PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa, one set of agreements was signed between the TGoB and all parties other than CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza. The other agreement (the Pretoria Protocols) was signed between the TGoB and CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza.
- No party other than the TGoB and CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza was consulted in the process leading up to the signing of the Pretoria Protocols. The result was that those parties that had not participated felt denigrated by their exclusion.
- Because there were two different agreements, reaching consensus was made extremely difficult at the JCC because the different parties did not recognise the other agreement, and demanded the exclusion of some parties from the planning for the next phase. The attempts by the JCC to establish one inclusive FTA were successful only after it had designed a new and separate plan for DDR and an Integration Plan for both the Burundian National Defence Force (BNDF) and the Burundian National Police (BNP).
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CHAPTER 3
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROTECTION SUPPORT DETACHMENT (SAPSD)

The AU attempted to put together a small multinational force with the task of providing protection and support to the members of the TGoB. South Africa agreed to contribute, but because no ceasefire agreements had been concluded at the time, no other country was willing to undertake the risk. The South African Protection Service Detachment (SAPSD), consisting of 700 troops, was swiftly deployed to Burundi on 27 October 2001 to provide security for Burundian leaders returning from exile. The original plan was that the SAPSD would undertake this responsibility on a bilateral basis with an inclusive all-Burundian Special Protection Unit (SPU). Although the Arusha Agreement allowed for the establishment and training of a unit to perform this function, the level of political distrust in Burundi was such that the SPU could not at first be set up. However, the SPU was finally established during February 2004, but still awaits international assistance in terms of training and equipment.

The SAPSD has continued to carry out the protection function since October 2001. It later formed the basis of the advance deployment of AMIB, and retained its security function after the UN took over from AMIB. Although the name of the organisations under which it fulfilled its function changed, the SAPSD distinguished itself, in that no principal from any party was assassinated during the period it provided protection.
CHAPTER 4
THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN BURUNDI

Establishment of AMIB

AMIB was established with a desired outcome of facilitating “the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements” and creating a stable “defence and security situation in Burundi” that is “well-managed by newly created national defence and security structures.”

Pursuant to this aim, the main objectives of the deployment of AMIB were to:

- supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- create favourable conditions for the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission; and
- contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi.

The following dates are pertinent to the stages leading up to the granting of the mandate of the African Mission in Burundi:

- In February 2003: the deployment of AMIB was approved by the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, at its 7th Ordinary Session, at the level of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa on 3 February 2003.
- In April 2003: AMIB’s deployment was mandated by the Central Organ at its 91st Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, for an initial period of one year, subject to renewal by the Organ, and pending the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force to be mandated by the Security Council.
- In May 2003: AMIB’s was give a mandate to conduct operations in Burundi in accordance with the Agreement Between the African Mission and the Government of Burundi on the Status of Force of the African Mission in Burundi (SOFA), which was signed on 26 March 2003. Among other things, the SOFA guaranteed AMIB’s freedom of movement, which was crucial to the successful accomplishment of its mandate.
AMIB’s mandate consisted of the following tasks:

- to establish and maintain liaison between the parties;
- to monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- to facilitate the activities of the JCC and technical committees for the establishment and restructuring of the National Defence and Police forces;
- to secure identified assembly and disengagement areas;
- to provide safe passage for the parties during planned movement to designated assembly areas;
- to assist with and provide technical assistance to the DDR process;
- to help with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including aid to refugees and IDPs;
- to co-ordinate mission activities with those of the UN in Burundi; and
- to provide VIP protection for designated leaders returning to Burundi.

Regarding composition and size, AMIB was an integrated mission comprising both a civilian component and military contingents from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique, and AU observers. Ambassador Mamadou Bah, the AMIB’s Head of Mission (HoM) and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, was assisted by three deputies, from South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. The Force Commander of AMIB’s military component was Major General Sipho Binda from South Africa. Altogether, AMIB had a total approved strength of up to some 3,335.

After being guaranteed its mandate on 2 April 2003, AMIB’s deployment progressed in the following timeline:

- 1 May 2003: Transition from SAPSD to AMIB.
- 25 May 2003: Establishment of the Muyange ex-combatant assembly area in Bubanza Province.4
- 26 May 2003: Arrival of 11 advance element personnel from Mozambique.
- 1 June 2003: Establishment of integrated headquarters.

The deployment of the main bodies of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents, which started on 27 September 2003, was completed by 7 October 2003. Until this deployment, the AMIB had been predominantly composed of 1,550 South African troops, in addition to 43 observer members from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia.
CHAPTER 5
THE DDR PARTNERSHIP

THE DDR PARTNERSHIP

Soon after starting its operations in Burundi, AMIB was invited by the World Bank to join the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration programme (MDRP). As a result, AMIB formed part of a joint planning group preparing the plan for the implementation of DDR. This group, whose work started during August 2003, consisted of representatives from the MDRP, AMIB, the Executive Secretariat of the NCDRR (ES/NCDRR), and UNOB, assisted by UNICEF, which specialises in the handling of child soldiers. The relationship developed very well, and resulted in the design of the DDR process. Even though AMIB was replaced by ONUB in June 2004, this planning group, which is known as the DDR Cell, continues to function to this day. It has a link to the international donor community, which enables it to seek funding for activities outside the scope of the World Bank grant. In return, the group provides progress reports to the donors.

Structures managing the DDR process

As a result of the Arusha Accord and subsequent ceasefire agreements and protocols, a number of structures, described in greater detail below, were set up to help implement the agreements. The most important are the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC), the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), National Commission on Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR), and the National Programme on Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NPDRR). They were assisted by AMIB, ONUB, and UNICEF, which supported the National Programme for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers (NPDRS). The DDR process was guided by the Joint Operations Plan (JOP), dated 9 November 2004, for pre-disarmament, disarmament, combatant verification, and demobilisation. The JOP also gives direction to, and serves as a Memorandum of Understanding for ONUB, the JCC, the MDRP, and the NCDRR.
The Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC)

The IMC was one of the most important committees to take part in the transitional process. It was formed on 28 November 2000, with its mandate defined in Protocol V of the Arusha Accord. Its responsibilities included monitoring, following up, supervising, co-ordinating and ensuring the effective implementation of all the provisions of the peace accord. This committee also managed all the committees set up to deal with security sector reform (SSR) and DDR. These included the technical committee implementing the procedures preliminary to the establishment of a national defence and police force, the ceasefire commission, the reintegration commission and the national commission for the rehabilitation of displaced people. The IMC was also authorised to decide whether new parties could be allowed to participate in the national political process.

The IMC included 18 members drawn from the Burundian signatories to the Arusha Accord. Other members were from civil society (six), one each from the UN, AU, the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, and the donor community. There were a total of 31 representatives. The IMC met every second month under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the Burundi mission.

The Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC)

The JCC was created to oversee compliance with the ceasefire accords and the reform of the army. The commission was chaired by UNOB and included members of both the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) and of the different armed groups.

The responsibilities of the JCC were outlined in the Arusha Accord as follows:

- to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- to monitor the parties and investigate violations of the ceasefire agreements;
- to identify armed groups;
- to decide on cantonment areas and the number of armed combatants to be placed in them;
- to monitor DDR and the disarmament of illegally armed groups in the country; and
- to oversee the reformation of the army. \(^2\)

The Arusha Accord spelled out how the political and military powers in Burundi were to be shared, and the ceasefire agreements set out the process that should be followed before the former fighters could be reincorporated into civilian life. Brigadier General El Hadj Alioune Samba, from Senegal, a member of UNOB, was appointed chairman of the JCC. He was replaced in April 2004 by the ONUB Force Commander, Major General Derrick Mgwebi, from South Africa.
The Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)

The World Bank’s MDRP will provide both finance and support to Burundi by assisting the ES/NCDRR. The MDRP’s Secretariat assumes a dual role in the DDR programme, by making grants using its fiduciary funds and by supplying technical support for the different processes involved. The World Bank’s MDRP will evaluate the success of the programme, and set up specific mechanisms for financial management, the provision and the payment of funds, in conformity with the regulations and procedures of the Bank. In addition, the partnership between the World Bank and the MDRP has provided a platform for reflection and consultation with, and inclusion of, other agencies (such as UNICEF) in the preparation of the Joint Operation Plan (JOP).³

The National Commission on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR)

The NCDRR was established by a presidential decree in August 2003 and has been supported by the World Bank, which pledged US$33 million towards the establishment of a demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration programme. However, this offer was contingent on the TGoB’s meeting certain conditions. These included: the promulgation of a law pertaining to donor aid; a presidential decree defining the status of a combatant; and a ministerial ordinance defining the status of the Gardiens de la Paix.⁴ Because of the time spent fulfilling these requirements and many unresolved operational hitches in the field, the DRR programme only started on 2 December 2004.

The National Programme on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR) was launched to implement the demobilisation process and facilitate the reintegration of the ex-combatants. It had four objectives:

- to assist the voluntary demobilisation of members of the FAB and ex-combatants from the APPMs;
- to facilitate the reinsertion of those demobilised into civilian life;
- to promote the socio-economic reintegration of former armed fighters; and
- to lobby for the reallocation of national resources from the defence to the social and economic sectors.⁵

Planning the DDR process in Burundi

The DDR process in Burundi is being implemented according to the guidelines provided in the Arusha Accord and by the structures that were subsequently put in place. The most important legal framework for DDR is provided by the JOP and the NCDRR Strategy for Reintegration. The objective of the JOP “is to indicate an exhaustive set of procedures and mechanisms for the disarmament and the demobilisation of the ex-soldiers/ ex-combatants of the APPM and the FAB.” ⁶
The disarmament and disbandment of militias was not included in the JOP. The TGb published a national decree in May 2005 that their disarmament and disbanding process would be managed under stage 1 of the National Commission for the Disarmament of the Population’s operational plan.7

The concept of operations as outlined in the JOP allowed for the completion of DDR in two stages:

- **Stage 1:** One year was allotted for the voluntary disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of members from the ranks of the APPMs and of the FAB. The target was to create a BNDF of not more than 30,000 men and a BNP with a maximum size of 20,000, always bearing in mind the principle of 50/50 ethnic representation.
- **Stage 2:** A period of two to four years was envisaged as the time frame for ongoing DRR of excess soldiers from the BNDF, in order to reduce its size to an internationally acceptable and affordable security sector structure.8

The JOP spells out the detailed planning for the demobilisation process. The plan makes provision for the members of the APPMs to gather in pre-disarmament assembly areas (PDAAs) in which they will be disarmed and moved to the DCs. Candidates who have volunteered for integration into the security forces will follow another route to either the BNDF or the BNP. During the process the government troops were to return to their barracks if the security situation permitted, while their weapons were to be deposited in armouries.

Ex-combatants who failed to meet the conditions for recruitment into the new army would be demobilised and handed over to the NCDDR. The JOP identified the following six steps illustrated in Figure 1 for the DDR of combatants:9

- Step 1: pre-disarmament assembly or cantonment;
- Step 2: selection for demobilisation;
- Step 3: disarmament of demobilising combatants;
- Step 4: combatant status verification;
- Step 5: demobilisation; and
- Step 6: discharge.

See the following figure for an illustrated overview of activities.26
Figure 1: Overview of Activities

Source: Joint Operation Plan, 2004

For every activity, the following responsibilities were selected:

Table 2: Responsibilities of Role-players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-disarmament</td>
<td>Assembling area</td>
<td>JCC/ AMIB/ ONUB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Disarmament point</td>
<td>AMIB/ ONUB/ JCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilisation (verification status and discharge)</td>
<td>Demobilisation</td>
<td>Joint Liaison Team (JLT)/ NCDRR/ JCC/ AMIB/ ONUB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Handicapped &amp; women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disarmament

It was initially envisaged that AMIB should plan and implement the process of disarmament. However, AMIB was replaced on 1 June 2004 by ONUB, which assumed the operational responsibilities originally undertaken by AMIB. ONUB was given the task of guaranteeing security at the disarmament points and during the movement of the ex-combatants to the DCs. The JOP framework determined that the registration, storage and/or destruction of the weapons handed in should be the responsibility of ONUB and the JCC, while the ES should be charged with the registration of all combatants after disarmament.\(^1\)

Disarmament of former FAB members who volunteer for demobilisation falls under the government. Once disarmed in their barracks, the former soldiers are registered and moved to the DCs, where they undergo the same procedures as the ex-combatants.

Demobilisation

Demobilisation involves a change of status for the individual from soldier or ex-combatant to civilian. This process is implemented by the ES/NCDRR, supported by the MDRP, ONUB and UNICEF where required, and consists not only of demobilisation but also reinsertion support to those returning to civil society.
Table 3: Steps followed in the Demobilisation Centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Each ex-combatant who enters a demobilisation centre is disarmed, and given a paper attesting the fact.</td>
<td>ONUB, AMIB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verification of identity and of a combatant’s status</td>
<td>The JLT (which includes ONUB units) establishes personal identification and the fighter’s status following criteria accepted by all parties to the conflict, and then given a non-transferable identity card.</td>
<td>JLT, JCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical screening</td>
<td>Some medical structures are under contract to the ES/NCNDRR and are have a permanent base in the demobilisation centres. Each ex-combatant is given a medical screening.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>The socio-professional profile of each ex-combatant is established with the help of a questionnaire, to capture information about him or her, and to build up a reliable data bank</td>
<td>ES/NCNDRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of identity cards Orientation before departure</td>
<td>It is planned to take photographs and deliver non-falsifiable identity cards. An orientation talk is given to each ex-combatant in preparation for his or her economic and social reintegration, so that choices about ways of making a livelihood can be made in advance</td>
<td>ES/NCDRR, NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowances for reinsertion and transportation</td>
<td>A fixed reinsertion allowance (to the equivalent value of 18 months’ wages, calculated on the index balance of the FAB) is given to each demobilised person who leaves the DC, to assist with socio-economic reinsertion. The 18 months’ pay is issued as follows: nine months’ wages on leaving the DC, and three tranches of three months’ pay, deposits into the ex-combatant’s bank account at regular intervals. A unique transportation fee of US$20 is also given to every demobilised person, regardless of his or her destination.</td>
<td>SE/NCNDRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of stay in the DC</td>
<td>The length of each ex-combatant’s stay in the DC is between six and seven days. It should not exceed 10 days.</td>
<td>ES/NCNDRR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reinsertion payments

On the basis of the lessons learned from DDR in other countries, such as Sierra Leone and East Timor, the NPDRR adopted the following two-phase approach for post-demobilisation support.

- **Reinsertion package**: This grant was intended to help the beneficiaries of the programme to see to their own and their families’ immediate and basic needs as they re-enter communities and resume civilian life. The total reinsertion benefit (*Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance* — ITS) for ex-combatants and ex-soldiers is differentiated by rank, and amounts to a minimum of FBU 566,000 per candidate (indexed on the ex-FAB salary scale), which is paid in cash. Upon discharge from the DCs, each demobilised person receives the first of the four installments, as shown in Table 4.

- **Subsequent payments**: These are made through the banking system in the place where each former fighter resettles. This approach also enables ex-combatants and ex-soldiers to familiarise themselves with the banking system, and indirectly makes access to credit easier. The remaining three instalments are paid to ex-combatants once they have resettled in their community of choice over a 10-month period. This schedule is also outlined in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Reinsertion payments by rank and schedule (in FBU)³³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank category after demob</th>
<th>In demob after demob</th>
<th>4 months after demob</th>
<th>7 months</th>
<th>10 months</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>88,676</td>
<td>88,676</td>
<td>88,676</td>
<td>566,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Commissioned Officers</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>168,272</td>
<td>168,272</td>
<td>168,272</td>
<td>1,074,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Officers</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>175,162</td>
<td>175,162</td>
<td>175,162</td>
<td>1,125,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>284,179</td>
<td>284,179</td>
<td>284,179</td>
<td>1,822,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,770,000</td>
<td>518,524</td>
<td>518,524</td>
<td>518,524</td>
<td>3,325,572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ONUB, DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006*
The money allows the ex-combatants and ex-soldiers to meet the expenses that come with her or his social re-entry into the community and finance a basic livelihood for about 18 months. Initial findings by ONUB are that ex-combatants are not experiencing difficulty in accessing these payments, and that the money is generally used well.

The phasing of the reinsertion package allows the ES/NCDRR to ensure ex-combatants not only receive assistance for the first 10 months after their return to civilian life, but also “buys” extra time for the ES/NCDRR to prepare reintegration assistance activities in communities where ex-combatants and ex-soldiers have settled.\(^3\)

**The design of reintegration**

The ES/NCDRR is responsible for the overall implementation of the National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR).

- **Reintegration Strategy:** The ES/NCDRR prepared a strategy to support the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-soldiers as they resumed civilian life. This was developed on the basis of the aspirations expressed by the ex-combatants and ex-soldiers at the time of demobilisation, on current socio-economic opportunities and the contributions of a broad spectrum of stakeholders (government and UN agencies, national and international NGOs and donors). It is important to note that the ex-combatants themselves, their dependants and the receiving communities are the central players in the reintegration process.

- **Reintegration support:** Once they have resettled in their community of choice, demobilised ex-combatants may seek in-kind support from the PNDRR to assist their reintegration.

- **Social reintegration:** This is provided through the direct engagement of the staff of the Provincial Offices with the ex-combatants, ex-soldiers and their communities. It is also supplemented through special activities in the communities and through special activities which will be conducted by NGOs and community organisations, contracted by the ES, in the communities.

- **Economic support:** Various options are available to assist each ex-combatant and ex-soldier to start or develop a means of livelihood. The members can select their (targeted) economic support from five “tracks”:\(^5\):
  - targeted community-based assistance — a comprehensive scheme responding to the income-generating preferences of ex-combatants;
  - training and self-employment — the use of institutional agreements with service providers;
  - continued education — the provision of access to schooling by September 2005 for all those who wanted it;
business skills improvement — a scheme to upgrade business skills and training, and possibly to raise funds for those that have already established a credible business; and

promotion of employment — a project to offer referrals and special arrangements with employers who will provide employment that includes a training element.

Partners are being identified and will be contracted to carry out each of these activities. Most of them would have ongoing activities. In each of the five tracks some additional benefits will be made available to those ex-combatants who successfully complete the first phase, as reflected in the following table.

### Table 5: Targeted Economic Reintegration Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Basic support</th>
<th>Additional support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Income-generating activities</td>
<td>Provision of investment and operating inputs for a broad spectrum of income-generating activities</td>
<td>In situ technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Vocational training for self-employment</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>Kits and materials for self-employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Formal education</td>
<td>School fees and subsistence stipend</td>
<td>Assistance with school books and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Promotion of entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Management and business development training</td>
<td>Funding for expansion and improvement of ongoing activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Employment promotion</td>
<td>Subsidized employment and referral</td>
<td>Permanent employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONS AND CHALLENGES FACED

The DDR process, as part of the reform of security sector institutions in the context of peace operations, either under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise, is a relatively new and challenging field. Although the international community has succeeded in some instances, it has not met with consistent success. The DDR process in Burundi is seen as a success because it worked out a way to deal with many of the obstacles it faced. Assembly areas needed to be planned, set up, and paid for; an attack on the Muyange site had to be repelled and food needed to be delivered to isolated communities while the fighting continued. These obstacles and others are discussed in some detail in this chapter. Even though the list of achievements is impressive, there were also weaknesses and areas in need of improvement such as the funding for the DDR process and the capability to set up the assembly areas.

The following are some of the operational challenges AMIB had to address:

Assembly area at Muyange, Bubanza

When AMIB deployed to Burundi in early April 2003, it was under considerable pressure from both the TGoB and the international community to provide evidence that the DDR process was under way. In response, AMIB set up a cantonment site at Muyange during June–July 2003. Some 189 members from CNDD FDD Bosco and FNL Mugabarabona assembled at Muyange, where they were disarmed and kept in a safe custody. The site had no infrastructure, food or medical supplies. Because the JOP was still being formulated, the MDRP could not allocate the necessary resources to meet these needs. Fortunately, EU funding for the delivery of food to CNDD-FDD combatants began during August 2003. The EU was also prepared to include the additional members from the Muyange Camp on condition that AMIB did not accept any more ex-combatants before the commencement of operations. However, because of political developments, the numbers at Muyange eventually increased to 228 during November 2003. AMIB persuaded the EU to provide food for them as well.

When the 11 PDAAs were eventually agreed upon by all parties, between December 2003 and January 2004, the ex-combatants from Muyange were moved to the PDAAs allocated to their parties. Muyange was never identified as a PDAA, but always served
some purpose in the DDR process. It was eventually generally accepted as the twelfth PDAA, and was renamed Buramata when ONUB took over from AMIB.

Providing the necessities of life at Muyange presented extreme challenges. AMIB had barely enough resources for its own forces. For instance, during Christmas of 2003, Ambassador Bah had to raise some funds from private sources in order to provide meat for the ex-combatants. At one stage a member of FNL Mugabarabona died after an illness, and the AMIB troops had to make a collection among themselves to help the family pay for the funeral. Some CNDD FDD Bosco members also died while at Muyange, but the party leadership took good care of their families.3

An attack on Muyange

The site at Muyange had barely been established when the South African contingent of AMIB received intelligence that their position would be attacked. Preparations were made, and the contingent readied itself for any eventuality. Towards the end of July 2003, an unidentified force of unknown strength launched a night attack on Muyange which was successfully repelled. Eight bodies were recovered the next morning. There were some indications that a number of wounded had escaped. Unconfirmed reports received later indicated that there could have been as many as 12 casualties on the side of the attackers. AMIB suffered none. The political or party affiliation of the attackers was never identified because most of them were wearing civilian clothes.

That such an incident should happen was not an auspicious start for the peace mission. AMIB was ready for the attack, however, and its response sent a message to the armed parties that AMIB should not be toyed with. After this incident, neither AMIB nor ONUB experienced any similar threat. Although some high-tension incidents occurred, no offensive shooting took place again.3

Food delivery to the CNDD-FDD

Another challenge related not to violent attacks but to the supply of food, an apparently simple task that actually required careful handling. Even though the ceasefire agreements had been signed, fighting between the FAB and the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza combatants continued throughout the first half of 2003. The CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza looted produce and other goods from the local population to supply themselves with food. The FAB regarded it as their responsibility to protect the population, and therefore the fighting continued. Because these combatants on both sides were armed, no UN agency was prepared to assist them, and help had to be found from other quarters. The international community, and particularly the EU, agreed to sponsor a programme of food delivery to the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza on condition that they remained in their traditional areas and refrained from robbing the local population. Food deliveries to Ruyigi, Makamba and Bubanza started during August 2003. The food was provided through
the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and AMIB escorted the convoys. These deliveries continued on a weekly basis until the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza formally joined the DDR process. By January 2004, the combatants had moved into their PDAAs, making special food deliveries unnecessary.5

Progress on the JOP

Such was the progress made in developing the JOP that AMIB was able to begin consultations with individual parties in October 2003. The comments of all parties except the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza were summarised and presented to the JCC for discussion. The AMIB Operational Manuals, which specified the technical procedures needed, were also ready by the end of November 2003, but because the biggest party, the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza, had yet to present itself in Bujumbura, no further progress was possible.6

Finding appropriate PDAAs and DCs

AMIB, in support of the ES, started reconnaissance missions to locate suitable areas for DCs and PDAAs in November 2003. Its force levels allowed it to operate two DCs. Possible sites were submitted to the JCC, which approved the two suggested locations at Randa Farm (Bubanza) and OTRACO Transport Depot (Gitega), and referred the decision to the TGoB for approval. Long delays in obtaining governmental consent to the use of these facilities prevented AMIB from starting occupation or preparing the sites. The military quarters at Muramvya were made available to the ES for the period during which DDR was taking place, and this site (known as DC 3) was selected for the demobilisation of ex-FAB members.

In addition, AMIB, the FAB and members of the APPMs worked together to suggest appropriate locations for the PDAAs. During December 2003 the JCC eventually agreed to the 11 PDAAs proposed throughout the country. These were camps at which ex-combatants belonging to all the APPMs could assemble while they awaited the start of the DDR process. Each PDAA was allotted to a different party or movement. (PDAA locations are shown in Map 1.)
The movement of all parties into these locations began in December 2003. At the highest count there were 21,000 combatants assembled in these camps. They were not confined, and were allowed to visit their families, take leave and so on. The FAB was responsible for security in the areas around the PDAAs, while the ex-combatants themselves provided for their own security, as they were still armed. Military observers (MiLOBS) from AMIB monitored the situation. There were incidents where FAB soldiers and CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza combatants harassed members of CNDD Nyangoma. Arguments always centred around combatants being in the wrong assembly area and causing trouble for the local population. AMIB had insufficient manpower to provide security but once a supplementary security platoon was deployed to this area, the trouble ceased.

It is also notable that camps had no infrastructure and ex-combatants had to build their own shelters. UNICEF came to their assistance by donating some plastic sheeting to AMIB, which were used by Ambassador Bah to provide some cover for the combatants. Food was provided through a continuation of the EU-funded programme, which was no longer limited to the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza but now extended to all PDAAs. GTZ remained the supplier, and AMIB protected the convoys. Medical supplies were a major problem, however. Once again, the World Health Organisation (WHO) donated medical stores, which were used by AMIB to care for the combatants. The EU later extended its support to include medical aid.
The ex-combatants spent 12–16 months in these conditions, depending whether the individual entered the process first or last. Minor problems occurred in the rural areas because of these deployments, but none presented a threat to the process. By and large, the ex-combatants were reasonably well-behaved.

Minding the gap — providing the necessities of life to ex-combatants in the PDAAs

The financing for the demobilisation and reintegration process for ex-combatants in Burundi was to be provided through the framework of the MDRP. It was envisaged that the World Bank’s MDRP trust would fund transport, encampment and demobilisation procedures, as soon as the combatants had been disarmed. However, there was a period during which a number of armed combatants were assembled in the camps awaiting the start of the process. This “pre-disarmament phase” was lengthy, for the following reasons:

- parties had to agree on the locations of assembly zones and demobilisation centres;
- AMIB required at least 30 days following the signing of an accord in order to establish, train and equip mobile disarmament teams;
- the ES/CNDRR required at least 60 days following its establishment by decree to become operational;
- the JLTs had to be set up; and
- the completion of military integration and demobilisation was expected to last from four to eight months, during which a number of armed combatant groups awaiting DDR would remain in the pre-disarmament stage.

During the waiting period, these groups would require, at the very least, a minimum supply of food and other relief assistance. The provision of this support would require complementary financing, because neither the World Bank’s MDRP trust fund nor any of the various UN organisations, bilateral partners and humanitarian NGOs can provide assistance to armed combatants.

This financial gap was closed when the EU stepped forward and agreed to finance this process, adding to the commitments it had already undertaken. This requirement for supplementary funds eventually extended beyond the envisaged 12-month period, until the end of March 2005, when all remaining combatants had been disarmed and moved into the cantonment sites earmarked for either integration into the security forces, or for demobilisation. The EU’s contribution was a major factor in ensuring the success of the operation.  

8
Donor funding

Although AMIB appreciated the funds contributed by donors, it suffered from a serious lack of critical equipment. This had logistical as well as operational implications. Even when the UN does provide equipment to other organisations, it usually takes four to six months to get to where it is needed. An AU mission must be able to survive on its own during that period. Good opportunities for the AU should not be wasted because of delays in funding.

MoU’s

AMIB’s mandate expired in April 2004, but the MOUs between the AU, the TCCs and Burundi were never finalised. This showed poor management of its own systems by the AU leadership. The Union should also adopt a unified approach to the needs of an integrated mission. It needs to ensure that the forces are deployed in the field with basic amenities and equipment, and that provision is made to overcome cultural barriers and the lack of a common language in the contingents participating in the mission. For example, communications requirements need to be met.

The arrival of the CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura

The first official meeting between AMIB, government forces and CNDD-FDD combatants on Burundian soil took place at Rugazi in Bubanza, close to the Kabira Forest, at the end of October 2003. Provisional discussions were held about the need for PDAAs and the requirement that all parties should work together on this mission. Many combined efforts to identify the best locations followed.

The then South African deputy president, Jacob Zuma, escorted the first official delegation of leaders of the CNDD-FDD, including Pierre Nkurunziza’s deputy, Hussein Rajabu, to Bujumbura on 7 November 2003. Leaders of the CNDD-FDD began returning to Burundi on 3 December 2003. Nkurunziza arrived on 6 December, having travelled in an AMIB helicopter. As previously noted, AMIB was responsible for ensuring the protection of all these delegates, both in transit to Bujumbura and after their arrival.

Now that the leaders were back in the country, a positive step, new challenges arose. The CNDD-FDD demanded that its own men should provide its “VIP protection,” a request that raised the risk of conflict. This situation was never quite resolved. A careful management of the situation was needed: the TGoB was unhappy about the demand, but nothing could change the obstinacy of the CNDD-FDD’s leadership until their demands had been met.
Despite a few tense moments, the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza, now living in Burundi, eventually reached a bilateral agreement with the TGoB to join forces in joint operations against the PALIPEHUTU-FNL in and around Bujumbura. An estimated 7,000 combatants joined the FAB in operations, and withdrew only in March 2005, when they had to move through the cantonment process. Although this situation contributed to an uneasy environment, which could easily have created insecurity, co-operation between the two forces had the positive result of building confidence in the lowest ranks. This collaboration had a far more positive effect on the Burundian security forces than had been anticipated by the international community, which had earlier on expressed fears that it would foster instability. It also indicated to the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza leadership that discipline amongst combatants was fast becoming a requirement for what had been an irregular army; this was a step forward.

The first official structures for the security sector

In January 2004 the TGoB issued a presidential decree appointing the Integrated Chiefs of Staff, as required by the ceasefire agreements. These were not actual appointments to real posts, but rather commissions to certain persons to devise plans for the new structures. Nevertheless, it was the first step towards the new Burundian National Defence Force (BNDF) and the Burundian National Police (BNP). The results of the creation of this forum were forthcoming only after the UN mission had taken over the operation.

Creating conditions for the UN mission

After all combatants had moved into the PDAAs, serious discussions took place on various issues, such as trying to unify all the conditions of the ceasefire agreements, the FTAs and equivalent documents. Long meetings were held on the subjects of rank harmonisation, the possibilities of direct integration, the verification of combatants’ status and the modalities of integration. The operation had reached a point where the participants were sufficiently committed to previous agreements, which made conditions much more favourable for a UN mission. Consequently, the UN Security Council, on May 21 2004, authorized ONUB, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. ONUB was officially launched on 1 June 2004 for an initial period of six months.

Having successfully paved the way for the UN mission, it can be said that AMIB has been one of the AU’s success stories. Although AMIB lacked resources throughout its existence, it had sufficient capacity and willingness to do its best in the difficult circumstances in which it had been placed. AMIB made the task of the UN much easier, and the foundations of good relationships and collaboration that had been laid between Burundi’s opposing political and military forces during AMIB’s period of involvement was to continue under the UN mission. The AU continues to have a presence in Burundi supporting the VIP Protection Force because the UN was not
AMIB’s achievements and challenges

The most significant achievements of AMIB included the following:

- AMIB was deployed at full strength by the end of October 2003. Its mere presence contributed to creating an environment conducive to peace and stability, without which progress toward other goals would have been much more difficult.
- The Force Commander presented various seminars to create better cohesion, and to ensure that all TCCs operated from the same baseline of information. The seminars included topics such as the mission’s mandate, its code of conduct, its structure and its Administrative Order. These played an important role in promoting the “one force” concept favoured by the Force Commander. Another aspect of the preparatory phase was a training course, assisted by ACCORD, a South African NGO, to brief all the contingents on Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) aspects and on what could be expected of them in the future.11
- AMIB assisted the ES to establish the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), and made suggestions for its design, equipment analysis and procedures.
- A highlight of AMIB’s mission was the arrival of the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza in Burundi to formally participate in the peace process. AMIB committed all its resources to enable the CNDD-FDD’s members to travel from all corners of the country.
- AMIB spent much time and effort briefing all the parties concerned about the JOP and addressing the concerns they raised. This contributed to the eventual acceptance of the plan.
- AMIB helped the JCC to achieve the following:
  - agreement by all parties on the establishment and location of the DCs;
  - agreement on the 11 assembly areas for all the parties; and
  - agreement from both the JCC and the ES on the means of financing and the method of food delivery. 12
- AMIB supported the TGoB in Brussels at the pledging conference with a positive presentation on the progress that had been made with the DDR process up to that point. Its contribution was much appreciated by the government and all participants.
- Throughout, AMIB has maintained very good relationships with the APPMs, which contributed to the underlying confidence of all participants in the process.

Unresolved matters facing AMIB when the mission was handed over to the UN included the following:

- obtaining consensus on the criteria for combatant verification;
- exerting pressure to be granted the required number of MILOBS for the mission’s contribution to the JLT, and appropriate equipment;
assisting the BNDF with the training of the Joint Self Protection Unit;
- supporting the newly integrated Chiefs of Staff in the restructuring and reform of the security sector;
- ensuring that the processes for the DDR of combatants and FAB members are well co-ordinated and simultaneously carried out, to ensure the safety of all;
- finding a country willing to assist the BNDF with setting up an independent body for rank verification;
- obtaining foreign sources (countries) willing to assist with officer training for those who will become senior officers of the BNDF in the future;
- discussing the possibility of direct integration into the BNDF to bridge the apparent stalemate reached during the early months of 2004; and
- finding funding for AU missions.
A case study of Burundi
CHAPTER 7
THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN BURUNDI

The take-over of AMIB and UNOB by ONUB

ONUB took over in May 2004, bringing AMIB’s involvement to an end. Although the official launch date for ONUB was 1 June 2004, operations were initiated long before this time. ONUB not only replaced AMIB, but also incorporated the UNOB (UN Office in Burundi), accepting all the latter’s responsibilities. To prevent confusion, the new mission was named ONUB. Caroline McAskie was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), with Ambassador Satti as the principal deputy SRSG, Mr Fall as the second deputy SRSG, and Major General Mgwebi as the Force Commander.

As pointed out earlier, ONUB is a UN peacekeeping operation acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with the mandate to:

- Undertake military actions, such as:
  - monitoring tasks;
  - operations related to disarmament; and
  - provision of security.

- Advice and assist the TGoB and the eventual government of Burundi in matters related to:
  - military and national security;
  - SSR, public safety, elections and justice; and
  - humanitarian activities.

- Co-operate with the TGoB and eventual government of Burundi on:
  - Political matters;
  - civil affairs; and
  - the National Commission for Development purposes (a post-election Stage II activity).
Implementation of integration and DDR, with challenges faced

Direct Integration

The DDR process slowed down after all the combatants had moved into the PDAAs and during the period of handing and taking over between the AMIB and ONUB. This was frustrating, both for the Burundian leadership and the international community. In order to ensure that the integration of former combatants and force members into the security structures maintained momentum, the TGoB entered into a bilateral agreement with the Dutch government, which agreed to accelerate the process by providing camp infrastructure. A base was established at Tenga on the northern outskirts of Bujumbura. Some 2,000 men, comprising former members of the FAB and ex-combatants from CNDD-FDD joined the unit. The other parties were also invited to send members, but the most important pre-condition was that all reporting soldiers must be in possession of their own weapons. The other parties could not adhere to this condition. Once more, the requirement for a proper definition of how combatants could qualify for integration into the BNDF or the BNP was raised. The intake at Tenga became the first integrated unit of the BNDF. Two additional intakes of recruits followed, in which members of all parties were included, after some flexibility had been exercised over the weapons requirement.

Soon after the establishment of the first base at Tenga, a similar process was followed at Bururi, where the Ministry of Defence attempted to create the long-awaited Security Protection Unit. Those assembled constituted combatants from the CNDD-FDD and FAB only. A unit of 1,200 men was integrated and given basic training. This unit remains in existence, but awaits specialised training and resources from the international community to enable its members to carry out its protection duties.1

Launching the DDR process for child soldiers

UNICEF and the NPDRR worked very hard to compile lists of child soldiers amongst the ranks of the FAB and the gardiens de la paix. They traced their families and appointed partners in each province who could supervise the reintegration of the child soldiers with their families. The DDR process for children started in August 2004, while that for the adults was still under negotiation. More than 2,300 child soldiers had been disarmed, demobilised and returned to their communities by November 2004, and although the agencies involved experienced problems with the quality of the services rendered by some of their partners, this first stage of the demobilisation of children was successfully completed.
After the official launching of the DDR process, the NPDRR and UNICEF started the demobilisation of all child soldiers in the PDAAs who had fought for the APPMs. Special arrangements were made to allow this programme the dedicated use of one DC. The process was concluded by the end of December 2004, after more than 600 child soldiers belonging to the APPMs had been demobilised.

The only outstanding target for the child soldier demobilisation programme is those serving in the ranks of the combatants militants. A list of about 120 children has already been submitted to UNICEF and the NPDRR, and the tracing of their families should be completed soon. As soon as this stage has been concluded, UNICEF and the NPDRR will focus their attention on the reintegration of child soldiers. Although such a programme began at the end of August 2005, it is to be extended to include the reintegration of all demobilised children.²

**Launching DDR for ex-FAB members and ex-combatants**

As previously mentioned, the DDR programme was eventually launched in Muramvya, after many delays, on 2 December 2004. Only minor hitches were experienced, and the process has continued ever since. Even though the movement from the PDAAs to cantonment sites was required for political reasons, the demobilisation process proceeded. Excluding the Palipehutu FNL, the ES completed Stage I, when all former APPM combatants were demobilised. Nkurunziza boosted the effect of demobilisation and the transition that Burundi was going through when he presented himself for demobilisation just before he was inaugurated as president of Burundi.

Stage II will involve the demobilisation of sufficient FAB soldiers to reduce the size of the BNDF to a maximum of 30,000 members by the end of December 2005, and a further reduction of numbers to a force of 25 000 by the end of 2007. This process of demobilisation, reininsertion and reintegration of volunteers from the Army, together with the dismantling of the militias and resolving the issue of combatants still on foreign soil (COFS) will be the focus of the ES in the coming months.³

**The cantonment phase**

The delays preventing the start of the demobilisation process and the regional pressure imposed on the TGoB to schedule the national elections presented the administration with a legal dilemma. All leaders had to relinquish control over their combatants before their movements could register as political parties. The text of the Arusha Accord, however, provided that parties could be allowed to register from the time when their troops were cantoned. In order to take advantage of this, President Ndayizeye issued a decree in February 2005 ordering ex-combatants to report to different cantonment sites, as follows:
Gashingwa and Mabanda for CNDD-FDD candidates to be integrated into the BNDF;
Kibuye for candidates from all the other parties to be integrated into the BNDF;
Rugazi for all candidates to be integrated into the BNP; and
Buramata for all candidates awaiting demobilisation.

Although this development caught UNOB by surprise because the movement of ex-combatants happened very quickly, it had the advantage that parties could register to participate in the elections. In addition, the decree made the final disarmament of the remaining ex-combatants possible, although Buramata had insufficient resources available for them. It also made clearer the numbers of those who wished to be considered for integration into the BNDF and BNP. The PDAAs were closed very quickly, and after inspections of the terrain to ensure that it was safe, the sites were handed back to the provincial authorities.

By the end of June 2005 all cantonment sites had also been emptied and returned to the provincial authorities. All troops still to be demobilised were already being processed, and candidates for integration had been moved to their new bases. The expected delay in releasing the cantonment sites did not happen. If anything, the presidential decree assisted in speeding up the integration process.4

**Rank harmonisation**

The harmonisation of rank continued to be a challenge until the eve of integration. All parties were guilty of rank inflation, but the acceptance of some of their members was dictated by political requirements. The Integrated Chiefs of Staff developed a formula to determine the ranks at each level based on the number of combatants from each given party. The result of their deliberations was eventually published in a presidential decree, which specified actual appointments to the BNDF and the BNP. Although it is true that some people were dissatisfied with the entry levels allotted them, all members of the new forces accepted their appointments and are now serving in the BNDF and the BNP.5 It now remains to be seen whether Government will maintain these appointments and whether appointed officers are allocated new responsibilities fulfilling their appointments fully. Early indications are that future problems will still be experienced on this matter and it is already clear that future Security Sector Reform will have to address this matter in more detail.

**Quotas for integration purposes**

Permitted quotas for the purpose of integration were as big a challenge as rank harmonisation. Once again the Integrated Chiefs of Staff developed a formula considering the actual numbers of combatants versus the number of weapons that a
party had in its possession. After these were filled, the remaining members were selected for demobilisation purposes.\(^6\)

**Verification challenges**

As the end of demobilisation approached, it became clear that the government would have to deal with persons claiming to have been combatants whose names were not recorded in the master lists provided by the parties. These lists should have been submitted to the JCC before DDR began. This issue nearly caused a political crisis, but fortunately the combatant status verification procedure allowed for actual testing of skills as an alternative to using the name list. This enabled those administering the tests to determine whether a combatant could qualify for demobilisation benefits. The dual verification procedure made it possible for the last group of combatants to be processed.

Just before the integration exercise came to an end, the JCC issued an instruction that all outstanding party lists had to be submitted by 15 August 2005. Some lists were submitted after the deadline date, and it is now up to government to determine whether it will allow those named on the lists to be processed or not.\(^7\) At present, the Minister of Defence has refused any further demobilisation of combatants who appear on the lists received after 15 August 2005 claiming that if these members were indeed combatants, they had ample time to join the process and elected not to do so.

**Dismantling of the militias**

Another challenge facing the DDR process is the dismantling of the militias. There has been a long delay in finalising the list of the gardiens de la paix and the process seem to have broken down. There are also other concerns. While the World Bank grant allows for the disbanding of a maximum of 20,000 members, more funds would be needed if the government accepts more ex-combatants. Several lists of gardiens, which set the numbers at between 11,700 and more than 35,000, have been submitted. The National Commission for Disarmament of the Civilian Population did not resolve this matter. It was not until late 2005 that the Minister of Defence appointed a Ministerial Commission to finally resolve this matter. This Commission was successful to the extent that dismantling of militia commenced late in November 2005 and was ongoing until the NCDRR closed for the December festive season. Despite these initial delays the process is now on track. At the end of March 2006, 10,059 gardiens de la paix and 5,029 militants combatants were demobilized. The remaining 14,213 members of the militias are scheduled to be disbanded by mid-2006.\(^8\)

On the other hand, the demobilisation of the combattants militants is on track. The World Bank has approved funding for 10,000 members although those on the verified list are below that number. As soon as the list for the gardiens has been finalised, both sets of militias will be disbanded together.\(^9\)
Status of reintegation

When a number of demobilised ex-combatants in two provinces held a demonstration, demanding of the provincial offices and governors that their reintegration support be given to them immediately and in cash. In response, the ES/NCDRR took measures to ensure that the personnel of the provincial offices are appropriately briefed on how to handle the demonstrators’ demands, and to increase the latter’s overall capacity to respond.

Concerns have also been expressed about the ability of the ES to implement the reintegration component of the National Programme at the required and expected pace. The MDRP Secretariat and the World Bank share this concern, and have done the following to help address the situation.

- For several months the MDRP Secretariat has been providing the ES/NCDRR with direct technical assistance.
- The MDRP Secretariat and the World Bank have worked closely with the ES/NCDRR to ensure that the latter proceeds with the recruitment of the required technical assistance without further delay. This entails the appointment of a senior advisor to provide technical assistance on reintegration issues; a consultant to assist in outlining the implementation procedures for reintegration support; and the solicitation of international technical assistance with a focus on contracting executive partners for reintegration projects, to support the procurement section.
- An MDRP-funded institutional capacity assessment of the ES/NCDRR was conducted in July and August of 2005.
- A review of the Information and Sensitisation activities (including the reintegration component) of the ES/NCDRR is also about to begin.

On 14 June 2005 a mission from the World Bank completed an investigation that focused on the reintegration component of the PNDRR. Although those demobilised to date had received reinsertion assistance which allowed them to see to their immediate needs, the mission expressed its concern at the delays in the implementation of concrete reintegration activities under this programme component.

To make the provision of reintegration activities more effective, the World Bank has agreed to work with the ES/NCDRR on the following:

- to devise an action plan for the implementation of the national reintegration strategy that follows a strict timing schedule;
- to adopt a number of measures to strengthen the ES/NCDRR’s Reinsertion and Reintegration Unit, both in terms of staffing and equipment;
- to recruit international technical assistance; and
- the find operational implementing partners as a matter of urgency.
With the demobilisation of ex-APPMs almost out of the way, analysts expect that the management of the ES/NCDRR will be able to focus most of its efforts on making the reintegration programme work.\textsuperscript{10}

**Combatants on foreign soil**

The ES is now turning its attention to the question of arranging the return of Burundian combatants who are on foreign soils. A draft strategy that seeks the best solutions for the cases in hand has been circulated between members of the government. At present this strategy focuses on Burundians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), combatants in refugee camps in Zambia and in Tanzanian jails, and Congolese combatants in Burundi who must be repatriated.\textsuperscript{11}

**Results**

**Demobilisation**

As of 25 January 2006, a total of 19,739 ex-combatants and former soldiers have been demobilised. Of these, 16,242 are adult males, 482 adult females and 3,015 children. During the second half of 2005, demobilisation primarily concerned members of the FDN, mostly ex-FAB and ex-Gendarmes. While activities were interrupted earlier in the period to allow the ES/NCDRR to support Government’s efforts to dismantle the gardiens de la paix and militants combattants by processing the payment to the militias of their one-off service allowance, they resumed and picked up momentum at the beginning of October. The total number of ex-FAB/ex-Gendarmes demobilised since the inception of the programme is 7,332 adults. The Ministry of Defence indeed achieved its targeted strength of 30,000 for the FDN by the end of 2005, releasing some very valuable budget assisting finance from the EU and France. Further downsizing of the National Defence Force by an additional personnel, in accordance with the Government’s declared demobilizing policy, it is expected to be completed by the end of 2006.\textsuperscript{12} The next official target for the FDN is now to reach a target number of 25,000 by December 2007.
Table 6: Summary of Combatants Demobilised as on 25 January 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAB/FDN</td>
<td>7332</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>9605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>5947</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>6977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAZE-FDD</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPE-AGAKIZA</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL-ICANZO</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD- NYANGOMA</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16242</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>3015</td>
<td>19739</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONUB, DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006

Dismantling of the militias

The ES/NCDRR in collaboration with the Ministerial Commission responsible for the name lists made very good progress towards the end of 2005 in the dismantling of the militias. Operations have not resumed in 2006 mainly because of technical errors in budget submissions and the availability of cash to proceed. This matter was easily resolved and operations did resume before the end of January 2006. At the end of March 2006 10,059 gardiens de la paix and 5,029 militants combatants were demobilized. The remaining 14,213 members of the militias are scheduled to be disbanded by mid-2006. 1

Weapons recovered to date

In total 5,640 weapons have been surrendered by the various APPMs, either to the TGoB or the FDN (5,403 weapons were obtained through the direct integration process), or to ONUB (237 weapons recovered during the DDR of ex-combatants). The nature of these arms widely ranges from the traditional AK 47s to light machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers to RPG 7 or SPG 9 guns. Some of these weapons require more than one handler, but for the purpose of this document, the actual numbers were counted as one combatant to each gun. In view of the above, the ratio of ex-combatants to guns handed in can be calculated as follows.
Table 7: Weapons Recovered to Date

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPM members demobilised</td>
<td>10,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPM members integrated into the FDN</td>
<td>9,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPM members integrated into the NP</td>
<td>6,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,295</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONUB, DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006

Calculation 1: 26,295 ex-combatants ÷ total weapons (5,640) = 4.66 troops to each weapon.

Calculation 2: When the 742 demobilized child soldiers formerly associated with the APPMs are deducted from the total of ex-combatants, the same formula indicates a ratio of 4.53 combatants to each weapon.
CHAPTER 8

ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Overall, the DDR process in Burundi has gone reasonably well and is now approaching what its planners envisaged as a its final state, where international actors are in a position to hand over control of the processes to accountable, national actors. Those involved in these sorts of operations have pointed out that the Burundi is a good example of an operation in which the process has followed the plan. It is often referred to as a model for current and future missions. The design of a baseline proposal for a SSR strategy is under way in consultation with donors and senior members of the TGoB (including the president), which the mission hopes to develop into a government-owned ‘roadmap’ for SSR in Burundi.

The following aspects can be counted as achievements:

- designing the SSR Roadmap and Strategy as a government-driven initiative allowing for clear linkages to the PRSP in support of the general development process;
- assisting government in ensuring that the Intelligence environment forms part of the SSR Roadmap;
- resolving the challenges concerning the completion of the demobilization of the gardiens de la paix and militants combattants, as stage 1 of the civilian disarmament plan;
- collaborating with UNDP and assisting the Ministry of the Interior to establish a detailed civilian disarmament strategy and plan;
- monitoring and reporting on progress with reintegration in support of government and the implementation partners (ES/CNDRR and the MDRP);
- completing the demobilisation of members of the Defence and Police services;
- assisting the ES/CNDRR to design and implement a plan for the demobilisation of Burundian COFS, who are present mainly in Tanzania, Zambia and the DRC; and
- collaborating with the UNDP to support the government with the design and implementation of small arms control that will link with existing regional initiatives.
The challenges listed below represent tasks still to be completed rather than problem areas. They are as follows:

- finalising and implementing the SSR Strategy as a government driven initiative allowing for clear linkages to the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan) in support of the general development process;
- assisting the government to design and establish a national intelligence agency for Burundi;
- resolving problems concerning and completing the demobilisation of the gardiens de la paix and militants combattants, as stage 1 of the civilian disarmament plan;
- completing the next three stages of civilian disarmament (including the voluntary surrender of arms, withdrawal of all government issued arms from civilians and finally, forced disarmament through the legal system);
- helping the government to implement a well-designed reintegration programme for vocational and skills training;
- completing the demobilisation of members of the Defence and Police services;
- demobilising Burundian COFS, who are present mainly in Tanzania, Zambia and the DRC; and
- establishing governmental mechanisms for small arms control that link with existing regional initiatives.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The most salient lesson is that those negotiating an end to hostilities should exercise great care to avoid making separate cease-fire agreements which can lead to unnecessary animosity between parties, and cause endless delays in the negotiation and design processes because they always contain an element of exclusion. During the early stages of the transition, such exclusion might undo all the gains already made. Cease-fire agreements also have a tendency to address political aspects rather than other important considerations. For example, if not enough guidance is given to the security sector, the subsequent negotiations may break down and hostilities may resume. Leaders should look beyond political goals to ensure that any agreement made provides substantive guidance for the processes that follow.

The establishment of a JCC was a major step forward. It was a forum where the military leadership of the different parties were brought together and where all cases could be heard. It ensured that all parties were equally informed about planning and provided a forum in which agreement could be sought on future operations, though this was only true when all the parties were present. While CNDD-FDD was still absent from the JCC, the forum was virtually powerless to make future decisions because the biggest role player was not present. Nevertheless, this instrument served the peace process well.
Verification remains an extremely sensitive issue, and although name lists and other measures were in place, the establishment of JLTs was another development in this process. JLTs were representative of all stakeholders and formed the final verification mechanism. Once again, the presence of MILOBS in these teams was crucial to their success.

The financial contribution from the European Union for the feeding of combatants while still armed was a major contribution to the process. The EU contribution removed a source of insecurity in terms of the combatants’ food and basic survival requirements and made it possible for them to be sustained while awaiting the launch of the process. Without this contribution, the process would not have been successful.

Burundi experienced a period during which there was a cease-fire agreement without a cessation of hostilities. This happened because different factions kept fighting with government forces until they were finally assembled in their camps. The AMIB had too few observers to maintain a presence everywhere to report on these incidents and had to rely on reports from the different organisations. The effect was that few incidents were investigated and the JCC was virtually powerless to act. Early missions must have reasonable numbers of MILOBS to perform this function. Once MILOBS are limited in terms of selected deployments, the observance of the cease-fire loses some credibility. MILOBS are normally not protected, but these initial stages will probably require some form of protection. Care must be taken to ensure that protection elements do not limit the purpose of the MILOBS.

A key factor contributing to the success of the transition was that the Burundian authorities and role players were allowed to make their own decisions, rather than being forced to accept externally-imposed judgements that they did not understand. It may be time-consuming to engage in extensive debate, but the results are worth it in the long term. The role of the international bodies is to guide, advise and assist the government concerned, and not to impose decisions whose implementation will be short-lived because they do not carry the wholehearted consent of the local authorities.

It might seem that much time has been wasted during the transition process. If one measures the quality of the process, however, and gives due weight to the need for decision-making by the Burundians themselves, the time spent can be regarded as a sound investment. The same patience should be practised during the early days in office of the newly elected government. When establishing assembly areas such as the one opened by the AU at Muyange, government should consider all logistical and financial support requirements and a formal exit strategy to terminate the process. This will prevent stalemate situations and limit the chance of failure. Another important lesson to be learnt from the AU’s experience at Muyange is that, given circumstances when a force must fight (or defend), it should ensure that it is ready for combat and able to win the firefight. In this way hostile parties are made aware that the role of the mission in the country is to be taken seriously.
Joint operations (such as the ones between the FAB and the CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura Rurale) are risky, but provide an excellent opportunity for confidence-building. Similar collaboration could be considered by all missions.

In retrospect, both the AMIB and ONUB should have had the capacity to protect the assembly areas. This would have limited incidents between government and the APPM and would also have assisted with sensitisation of field commanders on future operations. Confidence is not at such a level at the start of the process to “trust” government forces to perform this function but, on the other hand, the government is blamed by all parties for incidents even in cases in which they have not been the culprit. If possible, the mission should provide this service to the process, or to have at least a permanent observer at the location.

The mission must be careful when planning the location of camps and ensure that government approves the selection. The mission must avoid involvement in negotiations with landowners because over time the use of the land and reimbursement becomes an issue. Government should negotiate the use and approve the location of the different sites.

Direct integration of ex-combatants into the security forces can be applied to overcome situations that appear to have reached a political impasse. The TGoB used this opportunity very well, and although there were some difficulties, this action served as a driver that propelled the process forward. The initial move towards integration also made other parties think about their own position and how they should avoid exclusion from the new army and police services.

Strategic planning for reintegration can never be done too early. Political pressures on a government to find solutions to the enormous range of tasks associated with the disarmament and integration of combatants tends to become all-consuming. As a result, little attention is paid to reintegration planning, which is extremely technical and requires not only careful design but logistical support that takes time to mobilise within the necessary legal frameworks. Time spent on the implementation of the reintegration strategy is not wasted, and can contribute greatly to preventing a recurrence of instability in a country.

This particular operation in Burundi is a good example of what is possible when there is a positive relationship between government and international role players as well as among international partners. Resident country representatives, the AU, EU, MDRP and the missions, AMIB, UNOB and ONUB, contributed to the success of the government through their support of the ES. The partnerships are important and care must be taken to maintain them throughout the process.
Sustainment of any AU mission is a challenge. In AMIB, the contributing nations depended on assistance from international partners. The UK assisted the Mozambique Contingent with equipment and deployment to Burundi. Once in the mission area, they were hugely dependant on South African support to sustain them. The Ethiopian Contingent had US support and the RSA Contingent sustained themselves. This system was difficult because it was always difficult to have proper command and control over support. Arrangements on the ground made it possible for the different agencies to work together. Future AU deployments will always lack the internal resources to sustain forces on the ground and thorough consideration must be given as to how such a system should operate. A centralised system managed by the mission HQ funded from an international partner will always be the preferred option.

The Force Integrated HQ must be planned and implemented with appropriate communications infrastructure not belonging to and/or controlled by contingent commanders, a practice that makes it impossible for the HQ to operate properly. In addition, the HQ must provide the necessary guidance through SOPs governing operations and all participants must adhere to these SOP’s. AMIB had a set of well developed SOPs.

Establishing a functional CIMIC office is an important requirement. This instrument must ensure that deployed troops understand local culture and that they respect the local people. CIMIC must engage the media regularly and have at least weekly media sessions to indicate what has taken place and to report on progress. CIMIC must also establish and maintain contact with local partners, for example the MDRP, UN Country Team, OCHA and donors.

The AU will be used more and more in a role of quick intervention and to prepare the ground for an eventual UN take-over. Because of unstable conditions, participating forces must be ready to engage in combat and/or to come under fire at the initial stages. The forces must be prepared and equipped for such eventualities.

Financing of the mission is a major challenge and AMIB certainly suffered hugely because of lack of funding. The AU should consider alternatives to ensure that international partners are willing to provide funding for such missions, such as the EU support to the African Mission in Darfur. Missions, on the other hand, must understand that once budgets have been approved and funded, they cannot be changed easily according to local preferences. Donors will demand an audit trail and priorities may alter from time to time, but large-scale changes are unlikely. Technical demands lead donors to doubt the ability of the AU efficiently to manage and control approved funds.
A deployed force must have field capabilities as an inherent capacity, for example, tents, field rations and communications equipment. During the initial stages of an operation, forces must be deployed in the field to ensure stability and it is not always possible (or affordable) at this early stage to hire buildings to accommodate tactically deployed forces or to provide full-scale field kitchens.

It is important to note that participation in informal sports competitions is an excellent way in which to develop and maintain good relationships with the host government and belligerents. The more of these, the better the results, because these occasions contribute to confidence building between all members.
CONCLUSION

The DDR process in Burundi was once regarded as one of the most intractable problems to be addressed during the transition period. The TGoB was faced with the dilemma of starting DDR with the two main APPMs, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, still outside the negotiating process. The DDR programme became feasible only after the CNDD-FDD signed a peace agreement. Contrary to expectations, disarmament proceeded well, even though the PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Rwasa) has still not joined the transitional process. DDR has become one of the positive drivers of the transition since it started in December 2004. Although its commencement was delayed, most of the disarmament and demobilisation was completed within nine months. The reintegration process has begun. If DDR continues at its current pace, it could be finished in a shorter time frame than the four years projected by the NCDRR. The political will of the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD have ensured that the short-term goals of the JOP have been accomplished, and that the elections have taken place in a stable environment.

When one measures the successes against the initial concept of operations and the identified two stages of the operation, it can be argued that stage 1 has been completed successfully. The government has also indicated that they are going to implement stage 2 of the operation so there is at reason to believe that it will not be completed.

The biggest challenge for the future will be the reintegration of the ex-combatants into civilian life. This process is only just beginning. Demobilised ex-combatants and former soldiers were given reinsertion payments to support them for 18 months. The long-term goal, however, is their acquiring a sustainable social and economic role in a peaceful society. The accompanying reinsertion and reintegration processes of the ES and the MDRP are well designed and they have started to take effect to the extent that it is reasonably envisaged that they will be completed successfully. The case of Burundi can thus be put forward as a successful DDR operation, and could serve as a model for future DDR exercises.

In the final instance, the Government of Burundi must be challenged with the reform of the security sector. The government has performed very well so far and needs to be congratulated for what they have achieved with DDR but, only once the security sector has been reformed, will Burundian society be ready for sustained development and longer-term poverty relief. It would be disheartening if the Burundian model only serves as a model for DDR and never reaches the stage of security sector reform. Early indications are positive, but final agreements with the government are still pending.
NOTES

1 There is a distinct difference between reintegration and integration. Reintegration refers to the DDR process where demobilised ex-combatants and former soldiers are reintegrated into civil society, whereas integration refers to the process where ex-combatants are formally made part of governmental forces to constitute the new National Defence Force and Police services.


5 Ibid.


7 Ibid.

8 Different national and international reports on the Burundian crisis of 1993 as well as the national opinion accuse these two parties of being responsible for both the origins and the consequences of the 1993 crisis.

9 The distinction suggested by adding the name of the leader is explained by the fact that PALIPEHUTU-FNL was split into two parties, one led by Agathon Rwasa and another led by Alain Mugabarabona. Another distinction is made between the CNDD-FDD led by Jean Bosco, and the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza.
10 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

11 The two ceasefire agreements signed during October and December 2002 as well as the Pretoria Protocols signed during October and November 2003 were each followed by a separate Forces Technical Agreement (FTA) with the parties concerned.

12 Approved by Security Council resolution S/PRST/2003/40, dated 18 December 2002, in which the Secretary-General agreed to provide expertise and advice to facilitate the definition of the mandate and the deployment of the African mission; facilitate logistical assistance; mobilize and co-ordinate donor contributions; and designate a person to chair the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) at the request of the Burundian parties.

13 Ibid.


16 Joint Operations Plan (JOP) for the Pre-Disarmament, Disarmament, Combatant Verification, and Demobilisation, dated 9 November 2004.

17 The lead forces arrived within seven days of notification.

18 This specialised task was never taken over by the UN, but continued as an extension of the AU’s contribution to the peace process in Burundi.

19 This decision followed consideration of the briefing of the three troop-contributing countries by their Ministers of Defence, as well as an update by the AU Commission on the situation in Burundi.

20 Muyange was the first site where ex-combatants were accommodated during this process. It later became the Buramata site when the UNOB took over.

21 UNOB represented the UN Office in Burundi. It was replaced during 2004 by the Security Council-approved UN mission named ONUB – the UN Operation in Burundi.


23 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.
24 The gardiens de la paix were militias associated with TGoB, while the militants combattants, another militia group, had links with the CNDD-FF Nkurunziza.


26 Ibid.

27 This topic will be discussed in greater detail in a later part of the monograph, but it may be of interest to note here that the World Bank grant made provision for the disbanding of 20,000 gardiens and 10,000 combatants.

28 The additional element of combatants on foreign soil (COFS) became visible during 2005 only and will be added to this stage, although it is not intended to last longer than one year.


30 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

31 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

32 The World Bank grant was very specific in requiring all participants, whether ex-FAB or ex-combatants, to be disarmed before they became eligible for any privileges under the programme.

33 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

34 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

35 Minor cases of fraud were observed, but had no major consequences for the process in general.


38 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

39 Later registered as the Kaze FDD Party for the elections.

40 Later registered as the FNL Icanzo Party for the elections.

41 W Vrey, AMIB Chief of Staff Monthly Reports, Bujumbura, August 2003–February 2004.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 The JOP version dated 9 November 2004 was finally approved by a joint sitting of the JCC during December 2004.
45 D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.
47 Vrey, op cit.
48 Ibid.
49 The effects of the training were positive, and the provision of refresher courses at regular intervals should be considered.
50 In this regard the assistance of the MDRP and EU was significant and must be acknowledged.
51 ONUB, DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
59 ONUB, op cit.
60 N Meden, op cit.
61 ONUB, op cit.
Continued Government and donor forums will be a very important requirement. This strategy will focus on good governance, sound financial management and civilian oversight while redesign of ministerial policies, structure, training and facilities will also be required.