EXTERNAL STUDY

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: “Improvisation and Confusion” from the Field

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Edward Rees conducted much of the work for this study in early 2005 as an independent consultant to the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with funding from the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC). It was updated in early 2006.

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This paper reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations.

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Executive Summary

The reform and/or development of security sector institutions in the context of peace operations, either under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise, is a relatively new and challenging field. While the international community has managed to achieve some occasional and limited successes, it has to date not been able to sustain a record of consistent and sustainable change in this area. It is in part due to the absence of a clear understanding or consensus of what security sector reform (SSR) is or how to carry it out. This is largely due to the inherent difficulties attendant to engaging with some of the most sensitive and controversial institutions, political processes and personalities in a crisis, conflict or post-conflict setting. However, it is also a result of the fact that the international community has yet to develop a coherent strategy for the execution of SSR in the context of the peace operations it embarks upon.\(^1\) Furthermore, even as it approaches the design of a standard approach (i.e., a doctrine), the international community finds itself without the necessary instruments and tools to implement a coherent SSR strategy.

In general most successes have occurred in the operational implementation of the design and establishment of large bodies of security sector practitioners. Concurrently, the greatest failures have occurred in the design and execution of strategies to provide for the civilian management and oversight of these security sector practitioners and its attendant connections with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and the broader rule of law continuum.

The following study examines SSR in the context of a number of UN and non-UN peace operations with a view to highlighting some best and bad practices, establishing successful trends and identifying strategic gaps – particularly in the civilian management and oversight of the security sector. This study has examined some peace operations in greater detail than others – specifically UNTAET/UNMISET and UNMIK. This is a function of the fact that this study is founded primarily on field experience in these peace operations. It is also due to the fact that sufficient time has elapsed to make critical observations. Other peace operations (UN and otherwise) are referred to in an effort to place the Timor Leste and Kosovo experiences in the context of a broader SSR debate.

This debate will be at the heart of many of the future activities of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office established in December 2006 by the Secretary General.

\(^1\) The work of the OECD (and others) in 2005 – 2006 suggest there is an emerging strategy developing. DRAFT Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR) Handbook Project.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
AFP Australian Federal Police
AUS Advisory Unit on Security
COMKFOR Commander KFOR
CNS Council for National Security
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID Department for International Development
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
FALINTIL Forças Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)
F- FDTL (FALINTIL - Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste)
FRAP FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme
GoTL Government of Timor Leste
IOM International Organisation for Migration
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo Police Service
LNP Liberian National Police
LNPS Liberian National Police Service
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MACP Military Assistance to the Civil Power
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NTAL National Transitional Administration of Liberia
NC National Council
ONSA Office of the National Security Adviser
ODFD Office for Defence Force Development
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Kosovo)
PKF Peacekeeping Force (a component of UNTAET/UNMISET)
PNTL Policia National de Timor Leste
POLRI Indonesian Police
PPF Participating Police Force
RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands
RDTL República Democrática de Timor Leste
RSIP Royal Solomon Island Police
SIG Solomon Island Government
SRSV Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNPOL United Nations Police
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
Introduction

When asked what posed the greatest threat to Timor Leste’s security in 2004, a senior officer in the High Command of the country’s defence force, the FALINTIL-FDTL, and a 24 year veteran of the guerrilla resistance to Indonesian occupation, stated simply, “The police.” That one third of the defence force mutinied in February 2006 suggests that problems run deep.

Despite the United Nations’ achievements in shepherding Timor Leste to independence, the above points towards shortcomings with the international community’s approach to security sector reform (SSR) from the late 1990s in peace operations around the world.

This paper provides a brief examination of the issue of SSR in some peace operations – primarily those undertaken by the United Nations. It is designed to:

1. Illustrate the importance of SSR to the success of peace operations;
2. Illustrate the relationships between SSR and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) specifically, and the rule of law in general; and
3. Propose some practical recommendations to assist future peace operations in designing and implementing SSR programs.

However, this paper will not examine in depth the role of the judiciary in the security sector. The judicial system is particularly complex has been examined elsewhere in this series.

The UN has developed expertise and credibility as a provider of emergency relief, the provision of immediate post-war stability, the delivery of democratic elections, and as a neutral arbiter and monitor of peace agreements. Yet in increasingly complex peace operations, in highly fluid environments, it has yet to achieve a standard of consistent success in its attempts to successfully engage with, and reform/develop, the indigenous security sector. The failure to do so is a prominent cause for the questionable long-term success of said operations. Some best practices in SSR are beginning to emerge out of a difficult decade of grappling with the security sector in post-conflict environments. The UN is on a steep learning curve in this field. It needs to identify and eliminate bad practices

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2 Formerly known as East Timor.
3 Conversation with the author August 2004. Notably, in January 2004, the FALINTIL-FDTL’s First Battalion (made up primarily of ex-combatants) committed a micro – coup d’etat in Timor Leste’s eastern most Los Palos District in response to a dispute with the police. In recognition of UNTAET and UNMISET shortcomings, the Australian and British governments initiated a major police reform initiative in July 2004.
4 Between 8 February and 1 March 2006 approximately 600 soldiers mutinied and were subsequently dismissed from the FALINTIL-FDTL.
5 It is important to note that peace operations lead by the UN are not the sole responsibility of DPKO but are also supported and guided by important UN agencies such as UNDP, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF and the broader UN family.
and expand the identification and implementation of best practices. Furthermore, and critically so, it needs to reorganise its peace operations in such a manner as to have the appropriate means at its disposal when confronted with increasingly complex governance mandates.

This paper will outline that SSR in these peace operations can be broadly broken down into six components:

1) development of national security policy;
2) the reform and development of the executive management and oversight of national security policy and coordination;
3) the reform and development of executive management and oversight of defence forces;
4) the reform and development of executive management and oversight of the public security apparatus;
5) the reform and development of legislative oversight of the security sector; and
6) the development of civil society oversight of the security sector.

Definition

The security sector is defined, for the purposes of this paper, as a broad grouping of institutions, state and non-state alike (see below figure). It embraces a variety of unarmed and non-uniformed actors beyond the traditional understanding of armed and uniformed security sector practitioners.

7 “Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform”, Department for International Development (Dfid), London, UK, 2002, p.7. The OECD has also supplied a range of similar and complimentary definitions.
It implies a holistic understanding of what is security, who is affected by it, and who provides for it. The overlap and interdependence of the security sector actors is captured well in the above figure.

The security sector refers to the intricate network of institutional instruments and/or bodies of people that can either positively or negatively affect public safety and the rule of law. It includes those organs of government which, with the power of coercive authority, execute the will of the state. It also includes the structures that oversee institutions which hold the coercive powers of the state. It also refers implicitly to those bodies which would challenge the authority of the state through force. In this respect, an insurgent, warlord or crime boss is as much a part of the security sector as the police officer, soldier, judge, legislator or human rights activist.

It is the primary contention of this paper that SSR is conducted at a number of levels ranging from the political level of a policy and budgetary debate, to the development of the relevant institutions and finally the capacity of groups or individuals within these institutions. To date peace operations have tended to concentrate on the capacity of individuals without properly addressing the political, financial and policy issues as well as the systems which create sustainable institutions.

**SSR and the Rule of Law**

According to a recent report by the Secretary General, the rule of law,

“…refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions or entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”

The rule of law is a complicated web of persons, institutions, legal frameworks and processes which are guided by a constitutional order established by a majority of citizens with due respect to the rights of minorities, as well as to their neighbours. The rule of law is that system which defines the

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broad parameters of the citizens’ relationship to the state and vice versa as well as amongst themselves. Rule of law is therefore a state of being, an end state, as well as a process in continual motion.

Good governance in the security sector is a *sine qua non* to effective rule of law. In the case of crisis, conflict, and post-conflict settings the security sector is invariably at the heart of the problem as well as its solution. If putting communities on the road to the rule of law is a central goal of peace operations, SSR is therefore of critical importance to peace operations.

**DDR AND SSR**

DDR has traditionally been viewed as a separate issue, or discipline, as it pertains to SSR or the rule of law. This is an inadequate understanding of a complex issue. As noted in the above definition, armed structures, both state and non-state alike, form the components of the security sector. This applies equally to state-related ex-combatants as well as non-state guerrilla, paramilitary, and/or insurgent formations whose roles are to be reconfigured and/or eliminated as part of a peace operation’s mandate.

This is consistently evidenced by the conflicts in Timor Leste, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq and the Solomon Islands referred to in the examination below. As the roles and responsibilities of combatants and ex-combatants develop within the post conflict security sector they will invariably seek to politically and/or otherwise profit from the political process. They will seek to benefit from the development and reform of emerging security sector institutions.

Ex-combatants should therefore be viewed as key players in SSR as they consistently seek to manipulate or dominate indigenous security sector institutions. Without their consent, or participation in, SSR will fail. In understanding the nature of these groups the definition of ex-combatant must extend beyond the armed combatants to include their political leadership as well as those civilians (including women and children) who both supported the ex-combatants, as well as were their victims during the conflict. Ex-combatants form a socio-political class whose conflict experience has prepared them to both frustrate, as well as secure, successful SSR.

DDR is as important to SSR as SSR is at the heart of the process of building rule of law in the wake of war.

“Demobilising combatants is the single most important factor in determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals – such as democratization, justice and development – have little chance for success. In case after case, however, demobilization is not accorded priority by funders”.

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While the UN has developed some expertise in the mechanics of DDR, it is usually under resourced in its delivery, and critically, often gets the politics of ex-combatants wrong due to inadequate knowledge/intelligence of the processes and personalities involved in the conflict.

The UN and SSR

The delivery of successful SSR in peace operations is thwarted in part by a fundamental tension. As a ‘development-like’ activity, based upon institution building, SSR requires planning, sustained energy and ample resources to achieve results over prolonged timelines. Yet, traditionally, UN peace operations have not been provided the luxury of a long-term focus or the programmatic funds and personnel to effectively tackle institution building.

Peace operations are responses to crises. Although peace operations often operate over a five-plus year bracket, they are dependent on six or twelve month mandate extensions. As a result, crisis managers in peace operations may make decisions in the early planning and operational stages that allow for quick wins, yet may set up weak political, legal and structural foundations for development initiatives in the security sector. Both the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the Policia Nacional de Timor Leste (PNTL) have experienced developmental problems due to expedient choices being made in the first 12 months of their creation. In both cases the decision to create and engage with political mechanisms for the management and oversight of the police was postponed until well into the missions’ mandates – in order to have more “effective” control over development choices. These choices have resulted in the prolonged expenditure of resources, in addition to posing challenges to the successful completion of the missions’ mandates. Security sector institutions in Liberia, Iraq and Afghanistan pose major challenges to their relevant peace operations, the nature of which is becoming more, rather than less, acute. This is largely due to the fact that their reform has been dominated by short timelines. Subsequently, SSR is all too often viewed as part of a peace operation’s exit strategy rather than entrance strategy.

Most peace operations have tended to treat the shift from crisis response to developmental state building as an end point rather than a dynamic to be considered and managed from the earliest stages of mission planning. This is a conceptual understanding that needs to take root among all players. In order for SSR to properly take place it needs to be part of planning matrices from the outset. The decisions made in the planning stages and early days of a peace operation have lasting impact on the likelihood of success. At the same time, this complex planning requirement can not be allowed to constrain the need for rapid intervention by a UN peace operation. Finding the right balance of deliberate planning and strategy formulation with the capacity for rapid action is at the heart of this complex business.\textsuperscript{10}

Analysis of Experience to Date

Since the end of the 1990s the international community has embarked on a range of peace operations either under the auspices of the UN, regional coalitions, “coalitions of the willing” or some combination of the aforesaid. These increasingly ambitious peace operations have encompassed a wide range of mandates, from the “heavy” executive UN operations in Kosovo and Timor Leste to advisory UN operations in Liberia and non-UN operations such as the executive operation in Iraq (under the Coalition Provisional Authority) to the advisory mission in the Solomon Islands (under the Australian lead Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands).  

Analysis of these peace operations highlights both the fact that a dysfunctional indigenous security sector was a key motive for the peace operation in the first place, in addition to being a primary inhibitor to the peace operations’ success. A central fact in mission experiences to date is that while some of the elements of a comprehensive SSR approach have been present and may have been implemented to a greater or lesser degree, there has never been a comprehensive strategy from the outset as an integral part of the mission plan.

Important, DDR is a process which provides the backdrop to, and effects, the outcomes of all of the above components.

While sweeping executive mandates will likely be the exception to the rule in the future, the UN’s experience with “whole of government” responsibilities in peace operations is particularly instructive as to where the international community succeeds and fails in SSR. It is important to note that while executive operations may be imbued with broad powers these are inherently undermined by the fact that they lack indigenous credibility. Conversely, while some advisory missions may have the credibility of “cooperation” with indigenous structures, these structures may compromise efforts towards substantive SSR.

Executive Management and Oversight of National Security Policy and Coordination

Policy is clearly at the heart of a state’s politics and political processes. The development and implementation of a coherent and appropriate national security policy usually presupposes a constitutional order upon which the citizens’ various political impulses are expressed through political parties and a resultant government as defined through free and fair elections. Furthermore, it requires that a broad national security policy be coordinated across the spectrum of government departments including, but not limited to, the security sector. However, without a national security policy, in which major political choices are

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11 Executive peace operations are characterized by the investiture of sovereign powers in the peace operation’s administration, while advisory operations are conducted alongside, and with the consent, of the host government, which retains sovereign powers. There are hybrid executive – advisory missions, such as UNMISET – which retained executive powers over the security sector, only to cede them to the Government of Timor Leste in a staged process over the course of a year.

12 Examples being Ministries of Finance, Planning, Transportation, and Infrastructure.
made, it is almost impossible to implement appropriate SSR. Specific security sector institutional development plans necessarily hinge on the development of a national security policy. However, a tension arises when in the wake of state collapse new constitutional arrangements need to be made which require long timelines and run counter to the immediate security requirements of establishing security institutions.

Clearly, when the international community possesses sovereign powers, the parameters of its activities in SSR are greater than those in advisory operations. However, in the case of executive peace operations in Kosovo, Timor Leste and Iraq there were, and have been, serious problems associated with the development of a national security policy. Indigenous security sector actors tend to seek a policy free vacuum either for opportunistic reasons or due to political impasse – as it gives them greater flexibility of action. By mid 2005 after nearly a half decade of executive peace operations there are no national security policies in place in Kosovo, Timor Leste (let alone the short lived executive operation in Iraq). This is a major stumbling block to long-term developmental engagement by the international community as well as being potentially destabilising.

In the case of Timor Leste, policy making structures such as the Council of Ministers, the Council of State and the Superior Council for Defence and Security were created by the 2002 constitution. Despite a constitutional requirement for a consultative Superior Council for Defence and Security it was only created in 2004, only at the strenuous urging of international community as UNMISET phased out, and does not yet exist in a substantive sense. However, to date Timor Leste has no publicly articulated national security policy. One of Timor Leste’s most pressing security sector dilemmas is the poorly defined division of roles and responsibilities of the police services and the defence forces – a prime responsibility of effective national security coordination.

In the exceptional cases where the international community assumes wide sweeping executive responsibilities it must prepare transitional administrations for SSR. In an effort to create national security coordination in the policy, operational and developmental spheres both inside the peace operation itself as well as in the Transitional Administration, created a Council of National Security (CNS) – serviced by an experimental Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). While not without its rough edges this forum served the mission well. Importantly, both UN and Timorese security sector practitioners and politicians were members of the CNS. Furthermore, this body was designed to propagate a holistic view of security within the Transitional Administration, one which encompassed the socio-economic root causes of insecurity, to hard edge law and order matters. It addressed issues as varied and interrelated as DDR, defence reform, economic security, land tenure, local governance and intelligence. It was also charged with developing an indigenous structure which would assist and

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13 Members of the Council were only named in 2005 and it does not meet regularly.
14 The CNS was chaired by the SRSG or DSRSG and comprised the full range of civilian and uniformed actors responsible for the security sector both in UNTAET as well as the transitional administration.
15 The ONSA acted as Secretariat and policy body to the CNS. The intellectual founder of the ONSA and CNS concepts was the then UNTAET Deputy Force Commander, Major-General Mike Smith, AO.
guide the development of national security coordination, executive oversight and management structures for the security sector. The ONSA and the CNS were, however, ahead of their time. The ONSA was supplanted by the Government of Timor Leste (GoTL) in 2003 when it was transformed into a secret intelligence service\(^{16}\), whose roles and responsibilities are vague at best.\(^{17}\)

In the case of Kosovo, as of mid-2005, there was little or no national security policy. The root cause for this is the ambiguity in the future status of Kosovo. However, it is further exacerbated by the political equation as determined by the Constitutional Framework of 2001 which segregates the powers of the UN administration over reserved functions – especially the security sector – from those “transferred” powers placed in the remit of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) such as health, education and public services. Moreover, the divisions between the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU make it virtually impossible to create mission coordination.

Attached to UNMIK’s Office of the SRSG is the Advisory Unit for Security (AUS). As in the case of the ONSA it was a creative idea intended to coordinate between NATO and UNMIK in the security sector, but it is understaffed, dominated historically by technicians, rather than those with governance interests or expertise, and was historically focused on operational crisis management much more than prevention through coordination and policy debate.

Yet, in 2005, at the suggestion of the UK Government the AUS was identified as an engine for the development of a Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).\(^{18}\) The ISSR is the first serious attempt at seeking to establish a broad based and effective security policy for Kosovo. It is however seriously hampered by its inability to tackle foreign and defence affairs, due to the political question marks which linger over Kosovo’s Final Status. Interestingly, the AUS has partnered with a new structure in the PISG, the Office of Public Safety (OPS) in the Office of the Prime Minister. This process is supported by a UNDP project to support the ISSR in conjunction with funding from DFID. In recognition of the fact that SSR is a politicized process in which indigenous processes must be engaged UNMIK allowed the creation of the OPS in 2004 to assist in the development and coordination of SSR policy. To what extent this relationship will bear fruit remains unclear.

Of crucial importance to the development of national security policy is the role of ex-combatants. The predictable political competition over the mantle of “fathers of independence/freedom” inherently encroaches on national security policy. In the cases of Timor Leste and Kosovo the role and attitudes of former guerrillas, be they FALINTIL\(^{19}\) or Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), can act to...

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\(^{16}\) Serviços Nacional de Segurança do Estado (State National Security Service).

\(^{17}\) In a conversation with the author October 2004, a senior East Timorese intelligence official bemoaned the lack of legislation governing this body stating that while he had flexibility he had little legitimacy. By mid-2005 this intelligence organization had expanded to include operatives in every district in the country, as well as West Timor. Predictably, opposition leaders are wary of this organization in light of an election in 2007.

\(^{18}\) The UK Government has also sponsored a similar far reaching review in Sierra Leone.

\(^{19}\) Forças Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)
both support or undermine appropriate policy. In the case of Liberia, early failures in the DDR process and the delayed development of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) suggest that a national security policy, let alone the adequate management and oversight of it, are a long way off.

UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) is mandated with tough Chapter VII powers in order to restore peace, and a broad advisory remit for the provision of SSR, DDR and the restoration of government presence and services to the country. Its primary partner is the National Transitional Administration of Liberia (NTAL), inside of which the presence of warlords and spoilers present a clear and present danger to the peace process and UNMIL’s work. Importantly, Liberia’s neighbours Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire are subject to their own UN mandates and peace operations due to their respective conflicts. Collectively, these facts provide for a particularly complicated backdrop to UNMIL’s operations.

Slightly over one year after UNMIL was mandated, on,

“29 October 2004, the scattered demonstrations, lynchings and criminality that had increased in Monrovia for two months exploded into full-fledged rioting, including the burning of mosques and churches.”

While it is too early to provide a conclusive assessment of UNMIL’s efforts in SSR the violence in Monrovia, along with some stern external criticism, suggests that durable solutions have yet to be found. The International Crisis Group, in a December 2004 report, argues that UNMIL was in danger of treating the peace operation and the process of SSR as simply an operational checklist without engaging the policies, political dynamics and power relations that are at the heart of SSR. These criticisms are particularly resonant, as the process of SSR must commence with developing appropriate policies rather than relying solely upon a checklist of providing basic training, equipment and some cursory institution building.

In 2003 in Iraq the Coalition provisional Authority demonstrated a general disregard for an appropriate DDR process and SSR policy development and institution building...

... the results of which are on display in 2005.

In the case of the Coalition’s intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent period of executive administration by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the resultant period of control by a Transitional Government, the development of a national security policy did not materialize. The CPA was hampered by short time lines, a lack of political credibility and an insecure environment. These were in turn caused by lack of planning prior to the intervention, and a general disregard for an appropriate DDR process and security sector institution building.

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21 UNMIL has noted that the international community is failing to live up to its commitments in DDR in Liberia. Furthermore, “that as the completion of the disarmament and demobilization phases nears, there are some 70 000 ex-combatants seeking to benefit from the reintegration programme, which is currently experiencing a serious funding shortfall [of up to 60 million USD].” UN Document, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 10 September 2004, S/2004/725, p.16.
22 ICG Africa Report, “Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States”, International Crisis Group, No. 87, Dakar/Brussels, 8 December 2004, p.16. (the violence resulted in 237 casualties, 19 of which were fatal.)
One controversial critique of the process in Iraq suggests that the Iraqi population have gone past the “tipping point”. Whereby the levels of trust and respect for the Coalition have dipped below the levels required for useful partnership for SSR so much so that;

“What is required now is dual disengagement: a gradual US political and military disengagement from Iraq and, no less important, a clear Iraqi political disengagement from the US. The new Iraqi state must define itself at least partially in opposition to US policies or it runs the risk of defining itself in opposition to many of its own citizens.”

In such an environment it is impossible to generate the political space required for the development and reform of national security policy. The current constitutional debate in Iraq will likely articulate some broad policy choices but remains some way off from a comprehensive strategy.

On the other hand, in the case of the Solomon Islands the Australian led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) made serious efforts to adhere to the central tenets of successful peacekeeping;

- Consent of the Parties;
- Impartiality; and
- Non-use of force except in self-defence.

This has allowed for the creation of law and order which allows for the political space necessary for the creation of appropriate executive management and oversight of national security policy. Adherence to these principles ensures that the peace operation, in partnership with majority (and minority) concerned parties, is involved, at a basic level, in the participatory decision making that is necessary for successful SSR. This does not preclude the necessity to leverage these parties via the sanctioning of spoilers and the subsidizing of those who support the objectives of the peace operation. This process is centred on achieving a balance between political activism and restraint.

Importantly, RAMSI placed high priorities on the reform and development of proper structures to manage public finances – a primary instrument for the execution of a national security policy.

**Executive Management and Oversight of Defence Forces**

The executive management and oversight of defence forces are normally exercised through a combination of a Ministry of defence and the defence force’s

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25 Strictly speaking RAMSI is not a transitional administration, as it was invited in and the SIG retains its status as sovereign power. For example the head of the RAMSI Police Contingent is the Deputy Commissioner in the RSIP. The RAMSI Special Coordinator was initially a civilian official (from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs) with responsibilities for coordinating the military, police and civilian activities of RAMSI both internally and with regards to their assistance to the SIG. In essence, RAMSI was an effort to insert a backbone into the SIG administration.
High Command, with appropriate shared and separate responsibilities as delineated by law. Typically a Ministry of Defence, lead by a political civilian figure(s), is comprised of a combination of civilian and uniformed personnel with technical expertise in the strategic planning, budgeting and administration of the defence forces. The execution of the policies and plans developed by a Ministry of defence are then operationalised by the High Command of the defence force itself. These institutions are by their very nature highly complex and political, and engaging them in a program of reform and development is equally so, and especially so in a post – conflict setting. This is further aggravated by the oft necessity to conduct a process of DDR alongside the reform and/or development of a Ministry/High Command.

It is impossible to create such complex institutions in a matter of a few months or years, in any society, let alone post-conflict societies with severe resource and/or human capacity limitations. It has been acknowledged that the UN needs to reorganize itself in such a manner as to develop and reform security sector institutions over extended timeframes and needs to join more substantively with a broad range of development partners. The report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and the September 2005 World Summit explicitly acknowledged this issue and called for a Peace Building Commission and a Peace Building Support Office, with specific reference to institution building.26

In December 2004, Jose Ramos Horta, Timor Leste’s Foreign Minister, called for UNMISET to extend its mandate one year from May 2005 to May 2006. In support of this request, “He said that government institutions, including the police and defence forces, ‘are still very fragile’.27 The UN’s record in defence force development in Timor Leste is mixed. UNTAET initially lacked a plan. Subsequently it lacked the political and financial resources to rapidly and appropriately address the issue of FALINTIL in early 2000. UNTAET made critical mistakes, when faced with whether and/or how to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate FALINTIL, or stand it up as a defence force.28 In the period 2000 to 2005, veterans have become a political football for competing interests in Timor Leste – with occasionally violent and fatal consequences. The novel use of bi-lateral advisers in UNTAET/UNMISET’s Office for Defence Force Development (ODFD) was a useful yet ultimately inadequate experiment. In the final analysis UNTAET and UNMISET failed to provide for the development of an appropriate Ministry of Defence. A Secretary of State for Defence was appointed late in UNTAET’s mandate29 and a full blown Ministry of Defence

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26 UN Document, “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility”, Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change”, 1 December 2004, p.84. The Commission “would assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post – conflict peace building; and in particular to marshal and sustain efforts of the international community in post-conflict peace building over whatever period may be necessary.”


28 One positive exercise was Sergio de Mello’s decision in June 2000, with assistance from DFID, to commissioned King’s College London to conduct an independent study to assist in determining the future design of the East Timorese security sector. “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for Timor Leste”, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000.

29 In UNTAET’s final month.
still does not exist.\textsuperscript{30} UNTAET and UNMISET’s efforts to generate donor interest and support for defence force development were ultimately unsuccessful as the donor’s were wary of supporting a potentially politicised defence force, without adequate civilian control, and a publicly articulated defence policy.

UNTAET/UNMISET’s mandates assigned them the responsibility for building effective and democratic public institutions. Despite this, Timor Leste’s ability to defend itself remains questionable. In fact some argue that the defence force may even pose a threat to internal security. FALINTIL-FDTL is poorly managed and remains riddled with discipline problems. Critically, its relationship with its prime partner in the provision of security, the police services, is notable only for its acrimony. One third of FALINTIL-FDTL mutinied in February 2006 and was summarily dismissed on March 1 2006, thus providing further evidence of the weakness of the institution.

In the case of Kosovo, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the successor to the KLA, remains in limbo. Despite the façade that it is a civil emergency service, the Kosovar Albanian population views the KPC as an “army in waiting”. As a result of its peculiar status the KPC has been developed largely behind closed doors and without public or political scrutiny. Since its creation in 1999 it has been developed without adequate civilian ministerial or institutional management. Donors remain hesitant to fully engage in the reform and development of the KPC due to the fact that it operates in a dangerous vacuum without appropriate civilian management, oversight and budgetary mechanisms. While its role as a civilian emergency service falls within the remit of the PISG’s Ministry of Public Services, as a “reserved institution”, its chain of command extends upwards to the SRSG and the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR). Hence, it is beyond the control of Kosovo’s civilians. NATO and UNMIK have created a quasi-military institution and have yet to give it the management and oversight apparatus necessary to keep it within civilian control. The Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC), dominated by foreign military technicians comprises the sole substantive oversight mechanism for the KPC.

Symptomatic of UNMIK and NATO’s problems with the KPC and its future is the fact that they have failed to place the KPC in Kosovo’s broader development matrix. It is securely tucked away from the Kosovans and the development community alike. As a result it is almost impossible for serious development and reform of the KPC to occur. The political and financial resources are not forthcoming because these constituencies are excluded from the decision making process regarding KPC’s future.

To date it is not clear to what extent UNMIL has been able, in partnership with the NTAL, to move forward in the reform and development of Liberia’s defence force, with certain bi-lateral actors assuming responsibility for this activity beyond the remit of broader security sector initiatives. However, given the

\textsuperscript{30} There is little or no civilian management or oversight of the defence force, the FALINTIL-FDTL. It is without a publicly articulated defence policy, defence force development plan and lacks any sense of institutional identity beyond certain key political allegiances of the officer corps and ranks amongst themselves and to the President.
pressures of mixed results from Liberia’s DDR process and the presence of spoilers within the transitional government it appears unlikely at this stage that meaningful reform is taking place. Certainly, there have been no publicly articulated policies based on substantive consultations on the strategic development of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).

In Iraq, during the final days of its administration in late June 2004 the CPA published “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments”. As one of its headline accomplishments it stated that the:

The MOD [Ministry of Defence] was created March 22, 2004 and is completely accountable, transparent, and non-discriminatory, and it’s operating as a modern, democratic, professional and civilian-controlled system.31

This appears to be an overly optimistic self-assessment of the CPA’s institution building activities in the defence sector.

Executive Management and Oversight of the Public Security Apparatus

The provision of public security is, in some ways, a more complicated matter than defence. It spans the police, judiciary, corrections and emergency services as well as some other important auxiliary functions, such as border control, customs and immigration.32 It is also complicated by the fact that the instruments used to provide public security are more closely embedded in the civilian politics and processes of the host society, unlike the somewhat removed defence structures. The provision of public security is also a primary goal of any peace operation mandate. The development and reform of the public security apparatus requires exceedingly high levels of political will, technical expertise and resources. To date these have not been provided in adequate measure.

While peace operations have tended to be moderately successful in the provision of “shell” police services in the form of basically trained and equipped personnel, they have to date failed to appropriately address the problem of building police service “institutions”.

In five years UNTAET/UNMISET were successful in the difficult task of creating the shell of a police service. It provided uniforms for 3 000 officers, gave it basic training and equipped it to minimum standards. However, UNTAET and UNMISET were unable between 2000 and 2005 to develop an appropriate Ministry of the Interior in addition to establishing the internal systems and procedures that provide for the accountable and transparent management and administration of the police service. The PNTL is governed by a Ministry which routinely interferes in operations and internal affairs. Additionally, the PNTL has severe problems managing many ordinary personnel, logistics and procurement functions, which seriously hampers police service delivery. Furthermore, the PNTL suffers from poor relations with its own

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32 This paper tends to emphasise police issues over the other components of the public security apparatus.
community, largely driven by the opportunistic criticism by certain veterans groups and at times its own Minister. But it was also due to the failure of UNTAET/UNMISET to create a police “institution”.

The PNTL (as with the FALINTIL-FDTL) is without a publicly articulated internal security policy, an up to date police service development plan, and lacks any sense of institutional identity beyond certain key political allegiances of the officer corps and ranks amongst themselves and to the Minister (or in some cases opponents of the Minister). Indeed, the general lack of an internal security policy is partially responsible for the proliferation of questionable paramilitary police units within the PNTL. These are a major concern both to the international community and civil society in Timor Leste. The Dili riots of December 2002 highlighted many of the PNTL’s shortcomings, and since 2004 there have been some positive signs with the police services benefiting from a large Australian and UK lead institutional capacity building programme. This was largely modeled on the UNMIK/UNDP Kosovo Police Service Institutional Capacity Building Project (KPSICBP).

The KPS was the UN’s first experiment with the creation of a police service from scratch. In this case, as with the PNTL, there has been some success in the creation of a shell police service but there was little success in the creation of a “police institution” between 1999 and 2004.

A UNDP March 2004 review of SSR undertaken in Kosovo stated that:

“Kosovo in some ways best exemplifies the pitfalls associated with peacekeeping operations that mutate into state-building exercises: the failure of the international community to shift in a timely or early enough manner its mindset from operational fire fighting to transition planning. Driven by the dominant imperative of securing the peace, peacekeeping missions are forced to put aside considerations of participatory governance mechanisms and long-term institution building. While this strategic choice makes sense in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, transition planning requires that a new framework for engagement be adopted. …the focus[should] be on engaging the local population in institution building with the view of promoting democratization, good governance, and sustainable development.”

As noted above the difficulties posed by Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework of 2001 place pressures on the peace operation when it comes to the development and reform of the public security apparatus and the KPS in particular. The fact that the KPS have been placed beyond the remit of local actors has resulted in a territory which, after 6 years of UNMIK, lacks a Ministry of the Interior (or for that matter Justice). UNMIK Pillar One (Police and Justice) has acted as the executive oversight and management body for the police services and judiciary. It has generally proved adequate in an operational sense, but has generally failed to address the issue of institution building. Consequently, the institution building which is a fundamental part of the SSR effort in Kosovo has been left to the attentions of technicians without the necessary expertise or political guidance.

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34 It was only in 2003 that UNMIK Pillar One appointed a single officer to be responsible for donor coordination in police and justice sector institution building.
There are however, some positive signs in the KPS experience. In light of downsizing plans in 2003, and in recognition of KPS’s lack of management or administrative capacity, UNMIK brought in a development partner (UNDP) to provide technical assistance to UNMIK and KPS in the development of an administrative division within the police service. The KPSICBP is funded primarily by the Dutch Government. It has proved a success and is active in establishing and implementing the procedures, processes and systems which are the backbone of KPS’s institutional administrative capacity in personnel, logistics, finance/budget, strategic management and procurement functions. It has also made novel and positive use of UNV civilians with technical and capacity building expertise. Significantly it has also had some success in binding the KPS to the Ministry of Finance and the broader Government as well as in designing and implementing a transition strategy for a future Ministry of Interior.

Furthermore, as noted above, the UK sponsored ISSR is a crucial initiative. While the ISSR programme of action as it pertains to the development of internal security policy and the development of public security ministries may be skewed by Kosovo’s Final Status negotiations, it is a valuable exercise.

Crucially, police services are also subject to the pressures posed by the aspirations of ex-combatants. The presence of ex-Indonesian era police officers in the PNTL has periodically and violently inflamed the passions of former resistance factions in Timor Leste. The insertion of former KLA into the KPS has raised doubts about the institution’s professionalism and neutrality among Kosovo Serbs and others. Again, successful DDR is an important component of SSR and the vetting of personnel (especially ex-combatants seeking entry into security sector institutions) is oft overlooked. Many problems associated with the political foundations of security sector institutions could be avoided with improved vetting procedures.

UNMIL has had some success in police service development as in the case of the National Police Academy. Some constructive efforts were made at vetting in Liberia, but may prove incomplete in the long run. Successful DDR remains a starting point for undertaking successful police service institution building. Law and order remains a problem in parts of Liberia largely due to the slow pace of DDR. Consequently, UNMIL is encountering difficulties in the provision of basic law and order and the work of state building. The politics of two of the main armed groups (and their ex-combatant supporters) LURD and MODEL remain key elements to the peace process. – especially with regards to SSR. The continuing disputes among the LURD leadership pose serious problems for the peace process and the functioning of the NTAL.

However, RAMSI’s insistence on police “institution building” as part of its mandate in the Solomon Islands lies at the heart of much of RAMSI’s success. Significantly, the Australian Government’s review of RAMSI suggests that rolling

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one year mandate extensions undermine RAMSI’s ability to pursue sustainable SSR, and it recommends a 5-10 year mandate, an acknowledgement that institution building is a prolonged and complex process. Notably, RAMSI’s police component, the Participating Police Force (PPF) was tasked with conducting a Strategic Review of the RSIP from the outset of RAMSI’s mandate. Driving at the heart of the politics of police reform the report is preoccupied with the examination of operations, administration, employment and professional standards at play within the RSIP.\(^{37}\) It also recommends that a long term plan and strategy be developed for SSR and that indicators for success be developed. Furthermore, it argues that RAMSI’s traditional peacekeeping agenda be increasingly harmonized with its development activities.

In Iraq, the severe problems associated with developing a functioning and appropriately overseen public security apparatus is the direct result of 1) failing to adequately inform planners about the nature, history and objectives of pre-existing security sector structures; 2) failing to prepare for the provision of basic public security as the cornerstone of SSR and post-conflict reconstruction; 3) seeking to pursue SSR in an environment where participatory decision making is either unwanted or impossible; 4) ignoring the perils of DDR without a plan; and 5) completely dismantling an existing civilian administration, albeit a tainted one.

Interestingly, while the CPA made provisions for the development of a Ministry of Defence prior to handover to an Iraqi transitional government it made little or no attempts to develop a Ministry of Interior.

**Legislative Management and Oversight of the Security Sector**

The role of legislatures in the development of security sector policy and oversight of security sector institutions have traditionally been underestimated by peace operations. As the most comprehensive expression of popular political will legislatures should be engaged earlier, and more substantively, if sustainable SSR is to be achieved.

In the case of Timor Leste the consultative National Council, and subsequently the National Parliament, were often ignored when considering SSR issues. In fact, the relevant committees were not engaged by the UN or its partners early enough and as result the National Parliament of Timor Leste has been relegated to a rubber stamping institution. While some NGO’s, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), have attempted to build capacity within the National Parliament to oversee the security sector it has proved to be too little too late. This is an area where UN agencies (such as the UNDP) and donors with experience in parliamentary development could make positive contributions in the future.

The lack of attention to the role of participatory bodies such as transitional or sovereign legislatures creates a basic and fundamental divide between the peace operations’ SSR programme and the very constituency it is attempting to assist.

Again, Kosovo’s peculiar political situation has placed SSR initiatives at a disadvantage. To date Kosovo’s Assembly is prohibited from participating in the oversight of Kosovo’s security sector. This disconnect is a serious inhibitor to substantive SSR in Kosovo, now and into the future.

In the case of RAMSI the Australian lead intervention was premised upon the Solomon Islands Parliament passing legislation mandating RAMSI’s presence and activities. This assured popular acceptance of RAMSI’s broad SSR programme.

Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector

The development of civil society expertise in security sector matters with a view to providing for external oversight and management of security sector institutions is, as in the case of legislative oversight, often overlooked in peace operations. In both Kosovo and Timor Leste there exists little to no civil society oversight of the security sector with the exception of one or two specialized NGOs which monitor judicial activities. However, defence, police and intelligence activities remain almost “unobserved”.

One positive exception is the recently created Local Community Safety Councils in Kosovo. Intellectually these civil society grassroots organizations are the creation of a community based SSR initiative funded by DFID. However in 2004 and 2005 UNMIK assumed some level of responsibility for the guidance of these groups with a view to coordinating public security and community safety issues and responses by the public security apparatus in Kosovo. It is possible that had these councils been in existence from an early stage many public security lapses, such as the March 2004 riots, could have been prevented.

Future Directions

The UN, and its partners, are challenged with the requirement to holistically address SSR across a range of inter-related and complex governmental and non-governmental institutions and processes. SSR objectives are increasingly more about processes, policies, institutions, legislation and political will as they are about the training and equipping of men and women to act as police officers, customs officials or soldiers. Furthermore, the sustainable funding and oversight of these activities by a responsible government and its partners are key functions which cannot be ignored.

Effective SSR intervention also requires the enforcement of certain standards and the application of sanctions and incentives in order to achieve those standards. This sort of engagement is by definition deeply political in nature. Senior

38 The Judicial Services Monitoring Programme (JSMP) (www.jsmp.minihub.org) is a notable success story and is a model which could be applied in many post – conflict situations.
managers in these interventions will be challenged by politicized positions, and will often have to sanction spoilers who would undermine the rule of law as well as provide incentives to positive agents for change to uphold the rule of law. This concept of activist and principled intervention is highlighted in the groundbreaking 2001 report *The Responsibility to Protect* as well as the recent report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility.” This may, however, require considerable policy debate within UN institutions before such practices can be consistently operationalised in SSR.

The provision of sustainable public security entails a level of political engagement with indigenous structures which is as fraught with risk as it is with rewards. As noted above, SSR is premised on engaging with the power relations of host communities be they the executive, legislature, judiciary, civil society or, importantly, ex-combatants. Successful SSR requires strategies, policies and concepts of operations that effectively balance mandates with means. It is not clear how this will be achieved or indeed if this appetite is there.

The various concepts of operations required are complicated, and they require an integrated and comprehensive program of activities across a broad spectrum of institutions from the very outset of a peace operation. They also require a firm foundation of analysis and understanding of the host country’s political environment, its existing and pre-existing institutions and the tradition of State interaction with the citizen. These are the basic requirements for formulating effective concepts of operations for SSR interventions. Due to the wide range of interests and complexity of the tasks involved, SSR is necessarily the business of multiple stakeholders, but most importantly, the interested parties in the host country.

Under their current configuration, the UN and its partners are not well suited to provide for successful SSR. The distinct and independent tools of peacekeepers and development actors have proved generally insufficient to the task of SSR. A blend of these two sets of approaches is required in addition to the creation of a new set of instruments to achieve successful SSR. At present the UN and its partners currently have tools better suited to 1995 than 2005. Recent initiatives that are being pursued subsequent to the World Summit 2005 such as the Peacebuilding Commission / Support Office, the Standing Police Capacity, and the drive for peacekeeping doctrine are, however, steps in the right direction.

SSR increasingly requires skills in institution building, participatory decision making, public administration and management and legislative and policy development.

However, effective SSR requires the enforcement of certain standards and the application of sanctions and incentives in order to achieve those standards.

This form of engagement is by definition deeply political in nature. It is not clear the UN is willing or able as yet to follow through.

SSR increasingly requires skills in institution building, participatory decision making, public administration and management and legislative and policy development.

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provide the political direction, analysis, and implementation of rule of law, DDR, and SSR programming. Some immediate objectives which could prove useful in managing SSR in current and future peace operations could include, as part of mission-specific strategies the development of concepts of operations in the provision of: 1) executive civilian oversight and management (National Security Coordination, line ministries); 2) Legislative oversight; 3) Defence Force development; 4) Police Service development; 5) Judicial Services development; 6) Corrections development; 7) Intelligence Services development; 8) DDR; and 9) Financing Security Sector Reform. Subsequent to the development of these concepts of operations a new set of structures, staff and modalities will have to be constructed to implement them.

Recommendations for the UN and its partners

1. Consider developing a consolidated UN policy and set of practices in the field of security sector reform.

2. Consider the replication of the ONSA and AUS structures/concepts in future peace operations as a central focus for SSR missions.

3. Consider the prioritizing of the development (through a broad participatory process) of national security policy framework documents from the earliest stages in its peace operations.

4. Consider prioritizing DDR from the earliest planning stages of peace operations. It should identify ways in which is could appropriately resource the DDR process both financially as well as politically.

5. Consider prioritizing the issue of poor intelligence regarding ex-combatants in order to properly inform civilian decision makers involved in DDR and SSR policies. This would also positively inform vetting processes.

6. Consider prioritizing the development of a funding mechanism for DDR which is independent of international donor pledges.

7. Consider prioritizing the early commissioning of SSR and conflict assessments by independent, and informed, bodies in future peace operations.  

8. Consider prioritizing the development of vetting procedures into security sector institutions which it is involved in establishing, strengthening or reforming.

9. Consider prioritizing the development of a concept of operations for defence development/reform, or civil emergency services technical assistance teams such as ODFD and the KPCC. These technical assistance teams should

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41 A useful example being the Kings College London review of SSR Options for Timor Leste conducted in 2000.

42 For more on the importance of vetting see the recent work conducted by the International Centre for Transitional Justice.
include civilian management, oversight and administrative technicians in addition to those with military technical skills.

10. Consider prioritizing the development of, and/or strengthening, the institutions of civilian executive management and oversight of defence forces and police services from the earliest stages of its peace operations.

11. Consider prioritizing the development of (through a broad participatory process) defence and public security policy documents, strategic development plans, and legislation from the earliest stages of its peace operations. In all relevant languages.

12. Consider prioritizing the use of early and regular security sector institution joint assessment missions and donors conferences from the very outset of its peace operations.

13. Consider prioritizing the development of a concept of operations encompassing strategies and tactics designed to thwart and or sanction spoilers, and subsidise positive agents for change, to SSR from the earliest stages of its peace operations.

14. Consider prioritizing the investigation of ways and means for the international community to influence key revenue collection activities in order to both sanction the sources of revenues for spoilers but also create and maintain funding levels for key security sector institutions.43

15. Consider prioritizing the development of its integrated capacities, or use the services of private contractors or UNDP in the design and execution of public administration (defence, police, justice etc) institution capacity building programs in the security sector institutions that it is engaged in establishing, strengthening or reforming from the earliest stages of its peace operations.

16. Consider prioritizing the development of its own capacities, or use the services of donor partners to develop (through a broad participatory process) the means by which it can address the issue of establishing and/or strengthening the institutions of civilian executive management and oversight of police services and other public security providers from the earliest stages of its peace operations.

17. Consider prioritizing the development of a concept of operations for transitional legislative bodies in the development and reform of security sector institutions.

18. Consider the use of UNVs (with relevant technical and capacity building expertise) and civilian specialist contractors to rationalise and improve civilian policing in police administration.

43 This concept emanates from a December 2004 ICG proposal for UNMIL and Liberia.
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