EXTERNAL STUDY

EVOLVING MODELS OF PEACEKEEPING
POLICY IMPLICATIONS & RESPONSES

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This paper reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations.

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INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is evolving rapidly, as is the strategic environment in which it occurs. Changing patterns of conflict, changing major power relations and the evolving structure of regional security arrangements shape the evolution of UN peacekeeping. Already the post Cold War era has seen at least three phases of UN peacekeeping evolution: the expansionism of the late 1980s and early 1990s; the disappointments and failures of the mid-1990s, and the ensuing retrenchment; and a new generation of missions, many involving new sets of responsibilities, especially in the civilian, post-conflict sphere, and new actors, often in partnership arrangements – so called ‘hybrid’ missions.

Though the structure and capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has evolved significantly in recent years, the UN’s formal policy framework does not yet reflect the fluidity of peacekeeping evolution (nor indeed is it much reflected in academic analysis). The day-to-day managers of peacekeeping operations in the UN and in troop contributing governments are familiar with the multi-faceted implications of this evolution, but many others (including in the UN Secretariat) are less familiar with the nuances of recent developments. This is reflected in a confused lexicon for referring to the various hybrid or partnership operations that now dominate the peacekeeping landscape. Even among those familiar with recent developments, there is a disparity in views about whether these trends represent a challenge to the primacy of the UN, or a helpful, flexible addition to the conflict-management repertoire. Certainly, the proliferation of regional and multinational force responses to internal conflicts in the past few years has generated a heated debate, requiring clarification. Further, it is arguable that, notwithstanding the ongoing implementation of the Brahimi reforms, DPKO and the UN Secretariat are still not adequately structured to manage both the hybrid nature of many new operations and their increasingly large civilian components – especially in terms of its limited capacity to plan and set policy for the civilian dimensions of operations.

Moreover, it is an open question whether 11 September 2001 ushered in a fourth phase of evolution in peacekeeping, the first elements of which – an assertive US policy, a shift in geographical focus, a more complex security environment, a challenging political terrain for the UN – are beginning to be played out. At the very least, the more assertive US security policy is producing a series of shifts in the approaches of other states and institutions to security issues (particularly in Europe), which are already altering the strategic landscape within which UN peacekeeping operates. Further, a shift in emphasis within the Security Council towards terrorism, the Middle East, and WMD proliferation is likely, over the medium term, to have an impact on the level of organizational resources devoted to strengthening peacekeeping. Ongoing changes in the pattern of conflict, and changing perceptions of security threats, may yet further reshape the peacekeeping landscape.
This paper addresses recent and ongoing evolutions in both the form and context of UN peacekeeping. It has four purposes:

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i. to assist DPKO senior management by capturing recent developments, especially related to hybrid operations, and providing some analysis of recent ‘models’ of peacekeeping;

ii. to raise policy questions about these operations, both for internal deliberation by DPKO, for further research or analysis, and in some cases for engagement with member states;

iii. to highlight evolving strategic factors that may influence peacekeeping in the medium term, providing DPKO senior management with a tool for use in longer-term strategy;

iv. to assist DPKO senior management in identifying short and medium strategies for managing evolving and complex trends in peacekeeping response, locating DPKO in a wider set of peacekeeping capacities.

... and is divided in two sections:

**recent trends…**

To address these purposes, the paper proceeds in two sections. First, it spells out recent trends in peacekeeping and portrays a set of evolving strategic trends, particularly related to US policy, which may shape peacekeeping in the medium term, posing new challenges and new opportunities. This section draws a set of conclusions that could reasonably be taken as planning assumptions for the 3-7 year period. Second, the paper goes into details on ‘hybrid’ operations since these are central to recent missions and will likely continue to be so in the future. It provides a rough categorization of these missions; explores the reasons for their increasing use; identifies some key lessons learned, including with respect to the growing civilian dimension of operations; and explores the policy questions these missions raise for DPKO.

**… and hybrid operations.**

It concludes that the UN’s peacekeeping managers must continue both to balance engagement with regional organizations and MNFs on the basis of presumed and planned cooperation, as well as to strengthen the ‘Blue Helmet’ function. The former will be a lasting reality, is more positive than negative, and can be made more positive still by a more intensive UN Secretariat engagement. The latter will continue to be a necessary part of the response to a variety of forms of conflict in various locations, and should continue to be strengthened. Both require a different level and style of engagement in policy-shaping activities outside the formal UN framework, some options for which are given in the report.

It concludes that UN peacekeeping must balance strengthening its own capacities with engagement with other actors.

**Requested by DPKO, this is an independent report.**

This paper was requested by DPKO’s Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. It is an independent report: DPKO is not responsible for its findings, conclusions or recommendations. It has been prepared as part of an ongoing project of NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, on ‘Transformation of Multilateral Security Institutions’, which is supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the UK Department for International Development, the Danish government, the Norwegian government, and the Ford Foundation. The author is grateful to those foundations and governments for their support.
PART 1:
The Evolution of Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping evolves as a response to changes in power, security or conflict dynamics.

UN peacekeeping evolves in response to changing patterns of conflict, changing great power relations – which create either permissive or constraining conditions on UN action – and changing regional security arrangements. (The form of that evolution can be shaped by effective policy and resource management.)

TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING

Recent trends include an increasing number of deployed peacekeepers due to an increase in internal wars ended, ...

As is well established, the trend in changing peacekeeping responses in the 1990s was a sharp rise in the deployment of peacekeepers to internal wars – usually accompanying a war-ending agreement. The early-to-mid 1990s saw a sharp decline in the number of internal wars. More precisely, there was a sharp rise in the number of internal wars that ended (Marshall and Gurr 2003). The phenomenon of civil wars ending was a major driver of growing demand for peacekeeping in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

A more recent pattern has been a slight rise in the number of interstate wars that have begun in late 1990s and early 2000s (Marshall and Gurr 2003). These include clear-cut interstate conflicts (the US and allies versus Taliban-Afghanistan, the US and allies versus Baathist-Iraq, the clash between Ethiopia and Eritrea), and internal/interstate wars such as the regional war by proxy in Zaire/the D.R. Congo, and trans-border wars in West Africa. These wars have occasioned significant new military and peacekeeping responses.

... and a number of conflicts without international response.

It would be remiss not to stress that despite an enormous proliferation of peacekeeping responses, a number of major conflicts have run – and some continue to run – without any major international responses. The largest such conflicts are Algeria and Chechnya. While Somaliland has largely stabilized, Somalia proper is left in continuing conflict. No peacekeeping response attends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (beyond civilian observers in Hebron), though the issue is periodically mooted. The selectivity of the UNSC and the variable capacity of regional organizations constitute important weaknesses in the international capacity to respond to conflict, including the deadliest.

More generally, peacekeeping in the past decade has been characterized by a number of broad trends in response.

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(‘Coalition of the willing’ and ‘multinational force’ are sometimes used interchangeably; and the term ‘UN peacekeeping’ is often used loosely. This report follows the practice of using the term ‘multinational force’ for missions authorized by the Security Council; the term ‘coalition of the willing’ is used for multi-state operations not authorized by the Security Council; and the term ‘UN peacekeeping’ for UN-commanded operations. However, the author believes it would be valuable to refer to UN-authorized multinational forces as part of UN peacekeeping to ensure that the UN both gets credit and is held responsible for the actions of missions that it authorizes.)
Regional Variation in Response and Troop Deployment

A series of variations in regional patterns of deployment and the scale of response can be identified.

First, there was an important *regional variation in the UN’s peacekeeping responses*. An analysis of UN peacekeeping responses by Stephen Stedman and Michael Gilligan (2001), comparing rapidity of responses to internal wars (measured by the number of deaths that have occurred before a response is generated, as well as number of years) and the relative frequency of responses to the number of wars, by region, highlights the fact that UN peacekeeping was most responsive to conflicts in Europe and Latin America, followed by Africa, and was least responsive in Asia. Also, the UN sends vastly more peacekeepers to Africa than anywhere else; though this is slightly misleading, since the total peacekeepers deployed through the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE would show a more even pattern of deployment.

Figure 1: Conflicts 2003, by Continent

![Figure 1: Conflicts 2003, by Continent](chart)


Figure 2: Peacekeepers under UN Command, by Continent.
However, there was a **significant variation in the scale/density/intensity of peacekeeping responses**. It is important to note a wide variation in the scale or density of mission deployment to different regions. This is perhaps best captured in the 2002 study by Stedman, Rothschild and Cousens, which notes the wide disparities in per capita spending and per kilometer troops levels, for example, between the UN response in Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – indicating that the latter would require several hundred thousands of troops to perform the same tasks that peacekeepers perform in Kosovo. Of course, those two missions have very different functions – but that very fact is reflective of the disparity of response. A comparison of the numbers of peacekeepers per conflict death would reveal an even more extreme disparity.

Second, we have witnessed a **decline in the troop contributions of developed states to Blue Helmet missions, especially in Africa**. This is much discussed, though reference is often made to the overall decline of Western troop contributions without any regional specification. Norway, Canada and France all continue to contribute peacekeepers to operations in the Middle East, while Australia contributes substantially in Asia and the Middle East. Eastern European states have maintained fairly consistent levels of overall contributions to UN peacekeeping, but concentrated outside Africa. According to a recent report by the Stimson Center, developed industrial states contribute 6% of the Blue Helmets currently deployed in Africa – though this figure does fluctuate. The decline in the contributions of troops by developed states to Blue Helmet operations in Africa has generated discussion of a ‘commitment gap’ – discussed further in Part 2.

Conversely, we have seen a **rapid growth in the contributions of troops by developed states to multinational forces**. It should be noted that if we highlight UN-authorized operations, Western troop contributions to these operations more than outweigh the decline in contributions to UN-commanded operations – suggesting that responsibility for skewed regional patterns of troop deployments lies primarily with the Security Council, especially the permanent members, rather than with a broader set of developed state troop contributors.
Developed industrial states also sometimes deploy troops and personnel for *bilateral peacekeeping or peace observation purposes* – for example Norway in Sri Lanka. Such missions operate within the framework of bilateral cooperation and highlight the fact that the UN is not always seen to be an appropriate actor in peacemaking or peacekeeping.
A second set of trends relates to changes in the actors involved in peacekeeping operations.

The 1990s saw the slow but steady rise of regional and sub-regional organizations as important actors in the response to internal conflicts, sometimes in partnership with the UN – a widely documented phenomenon. Here, an important distinction can be made between regions (Forman and Grene 2003). In Europe, the 1990s witnessed a proliferation in the activities of the regional security institutions, often with competing mandates. These operated in varied relationships with the UN, even during the same conflict. In Kosovo, for example, NATO first represented an alternative to the UN in the bombing of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, NATO and the UN have been partners on the ground in the post-conflict operation. In other cases, the relationship has been sequential (e.g. in Bosnia and Macedonia). In Central Europe, and increasingly in Central Asia, the OSCE has played an important role in border security and other issues, such as elections and human rights, and has seen an expansion of its activities in recent years. In Africa, the role of regional organizations was – and is – complex. In West Africa, where ECOWAS has the continent’s most developed (though still limited) response capacity, relationships with the UN have evolved from the strains of ECOMOG’s first Liberian adventure in 1991 through the partnership in Sierra Leone, to the sequenced management of the recent Liberian crisis. Elsewhere, the relationship between the UN and the OAU has also evolved, from competition in the Rwandan civil war to partnership in the D.R. Congo and Burundi. Although this relationship is still shaped by the limited capacity of the re-branded African Union, the UN’s efforts in strengthening the capacity of the AU is emerging as an important priority in Europe. In southern Africa, what was once arguably the most effective African sub-regional organization, SADC, was largely undone – at least temporarily – by the involvement of its members in the Zaire/Congo war.

Outside these two continents, regional organizations have played a less important role in peacekeeping, though such organizations as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have evolved towards more active roles in security and conflict management. More recently, we have begun to witness out-of-area deployments by regional organizations, especially the EU, which has a police mission in Bosnia, took over from NATO in Macedonia and deployed an emergency force in the D.R. Congo. Less well known, the EU – under the authority and office of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy – also mounted a small cease-fire monitoring operation in Bethlehem and Gaza during 2001. NATO has also operated out-of-area, first in its campaign against Yugoslavia, and more recently – with Security Council authorization – through its leadership of ISAF in Afghanistan. This is taken by some to constitute a direct challenge to the UN as the sole framework for deploying peace operations globally.

A further pattern in response to conflict in the 1990s was the use of ‘multinational force’ models for response to conflict. These have been used when the UN Security Council believed that a multinational force under the lead of single state was better placed to respond to a large or fast-breaking crisis. An example of this was the establishment of the Canadian-led MNF in Eastern Zaire in 1996 and the Italian-led force in Albania in 1997. More recent uses of MNFs have been the Australian-led...
Interfet in East Timor and the deployment of ISAF in Afghanistan. A resort to a multinational force reflects real and perceived obstacles to rapid deployment of Blue Helmet troops (see Part 2).

Requested/authorized MNF’s should be distinguished in turn from another pattern of response, namely the occasional resort by groups of states – or by single states with symbolic contributions by others – to ‘coalition of the willing’ actions outside the UN framework. Such responses were used as early as the late 1970s, for example, in the creation of the Multinational Force Observers (MFO Sinai) to establish a buffer between Egypt and Israel after the latter’s withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula – a move made necessary by divisions at the UN that blocked the organization from mounting a mission as called for by those accords (Jones 2003.) Other coalitions of the willing that arose from division in the Security Council include the NATO action against Yugoslavia in 1999, and the recent US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. There are other cases where the lead actor did not seek UNSC authorization – including temporary Peace Monitoring Force in northern Iraq (US, UK, Turkey), the EU mission in Macedonia, and the first Australian-led force in the Solomon Islands. Some coalition of the willing operations are post-facto brought into a Charter framework – for example Australia’s recent decision to bring the Solomon Islands force within the framework of the Pacific Islands Forum; the authorization in motion of the French-led Operation Turquoise in Zaire; the post-bombing authorization of the NATO presence in Kosovo; and Security Council resolution 1511 on Iraq similarly authorizes the US-led force currently in place as a MNF. A partial list of coalition-of-the-willing operations is included in Annex A.

Attention should also be paid to an additional pattern in responses to conflict, namely the growing role of non-state actors, particularly non-governmental organizations. NGOs have primarily been involved in the non-military dimensions of response, particularly in terms of facilitating political dialogue (Conciliation Resources, International Alert, Search for Common Ground, etc.) However, in the case of Aceh, the Henri Dunant Center’s role went beyond this, taking on a direct role in observing the implementation (short-lived) of the peace agreement, including through the deployment of troops supplied by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines. In so doing, the HDC used DPKO-established policy frameworks and standards regarding such issues as the conduct of mission personnel, relationship between host country and deploying organization, etc.

NGOs, as well, have taken on a greater role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding …

Private military companies have been a growing part of the international response in both more and less controversial roles. Little controversy attaches to the use of PMCs such as Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) by the US army to implement US army programs such as the ‘train and equip’ operation in Croatia, or to provide support to other operations, such as the MPRI-managed deployment of an over-the-horizon extraction force (under sub-contract to the US army) for the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) (Singer 2002). Much more controversy is attached to the use of PMCs by governments embroiled in internal conflict, such as Sandlines in Papua New Guinea and Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. USG Guehenno has recently argued that there will not be, in the foreseeable future, an appetite for PMC roles involving the use of force. However, a number of PMCs do undertake logistical support functions that do not generate similar concerns. This model could be extended to vital force multiplier functions, with PMCs providing such functions under UN supervision.
(III) Changing Nature of Peacekeeping Tasks

An extremely important trend in the 1990s was the exponential rise in the civilian dimensions of peacekeeping. In Liberia, the UN’s most recent operation, the civilian dimensions of the peacekeeping operation encompass a wide spectrum of functions. Similarly in East Timor, as well as deploying peacekeeping forces, UNTAET provided a wide range of support to East Timor’s nascent state structures (see below.) Other UN-led operations such as UNMIK and UNAMA are exclusively civilian, although they operate alongside UN-mandated operations (see Part 2.)

Thus, SRSGs are also increasingly required to manage a wide range of non-military issues, such as human rights, gender, child soldiers, aid coordination, etc. This has created enormous managerial demands on SRSGs; it is not clear that the support systems provided by the UN have kept up with these demands. Whereas SRSGs are often called upon to develop strategy for and provide leadership to post-conflict peace-building or state-building functions, this frequently devolves to a more limited role in coordinating humanitarian and inter-agency coordination mechanisms. SRSG involvement in strategy-shaping donor coordination mechanisms is episodic.

A sub-set of this trend has been the increasing resort to transitional administration missions. From its early origins in West Papua, this type of mission – involving extensive civilian dimensions – began in earnest in Namibia in 1990 with UNTAG. The scope of these missions and the degree of their authority then steadily rose, culminating in UNMIK and UNTAET, in which the UN had full governing authority. From traditional peacekeeping missions, which had a minimal civilian staff, the UN mission in Kosovo had a staffing table of 700 civilians, in addition to several hundred other personnel supplied by European regional organizations, covering an extraordinary range of issues (Griffin & Jones, 2000).

MEDIUM TERM STRATEGIC ISSUES

In the evolution of peacekeeping described above, a set of broader strategic forces have been at play. They will continue to shape the evolution of UN peacekeeping.

Undoubtedly, the most significant of these strategic forces has been the evolution of US security policy, both in the 1990s and more recently. Indeed, most of the other strategic forces at play in shaping UN peacekeeping are, at least in part, reactions to US policy, including the evolution of regional security structures that react, at least in part, to both the absence and the presence of US engagement. In considering medium term options for the development of the peacekeeping function, a brief look at the nature of the evolution of US security and peacekeeping policy is warranted.

Two points are relevant in this regard. First, while in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003 some may look wistfully back to the US relationship with the UN in the 1990s, it is worth recalling that those relations were, in fact, complicated at best. Throughout that decade, US policy towards UN peacekeeping was far from uniformly supportive and the US foreign and defense policy establishment focused on a set of issues quite distant from those that dominated the UN’s agenda. Second, current US policy – in its more expansive, assertive mode – is shaping the evolution of foreign policies and foreign policy structures in Europe, in China, in the Middle East, and beyond, in ways that create both opportunities and challenges for UN peacekeeping.
The Evolution of US Security Policy in the 1990s

In terms of UN peacekeeping itself, leadership from within the Clinton Administration occasionally produced congressional support for a UN-related operation, but frequently only after long, intensive negotiations (e.g., over Bosnia) during which support for the UN waxed and waned. Indeed, US policy on peacekeeping fluctuated substantially during the 1990s. It began with an expansionist US role in Somalia, lurching to Presidential Policy Directive 25, which set out tough conditions for US involvement in UN peacekeeping, and then developed in complex ways through the experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. US support for UN peacekeeping operations, and more generally for the UN, only entered a more constructive stage during Ambassador Holbrooke’s tenure at the UN, which coincided with US support for the UN’s intervention in East Timor (albeit over considerable opposition in Congress and even the Administration).

More broadly, US national security priorities were often at odds with the priorities of the UN. US geographical concerns included: the evolution of the regime in Russia; China’s potential expansionism; the prospects of regime failure in North Korea; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stability in southern Europe; terrorism; Middle East stability and peace; stability in India-Pakistan relations; democratization and liberalization in Central and Latin America; and – last and least – what annual defense reports call “humanitarian concerns & Africa”.

Arguably, the US emphasis in the 1990s on democratization and human rights reinforced a normative framework within which the UN operated; but US operational support for UN actions related to gross human rights violations was sporadic at best.

Contrasting this list of US geographical priorities with the agenda of the Security Council during the 1990s is instructive. The latter was dominated (as measured by agenda items and time spent) by Africa — the last and least issue on the US agenda. The overlap between US and UN priorities in the 1990s was minimal, a point which should give pause to those who look back on the 1990s as either an era of international consensus or of positive US-UN relations. Both are true, but only by default or at least by the passivity of the US in the international security sphere during that surprising decade.

These points are important because they give a framework for examining current and evolving US security attitudes — both those of the current administration as well as those that might arise under a new Democratic administration if one is elected in 2004. First, concerning current US threat perceptions and priorities, it is evident that they are not unique to this current Administration (though clearly this Administration takes a particular approach to them). This has broad implications for likely future priorities of the US administration and for multilateral security instruments. Second, this means that, even if in the near future the US administration moves more actively into the UN fold, it is unlikely that this will translate into US support for the kinds of issues and operations that dominated the Security Council agenda in the 1990s, including Africa. Rather, a fuller US engagement in the UN will undoubtedly lead to a further re-orientation of UN attention away from Africa and towards the Middle East, and issues of terrorism and WMD proliferation.
More immediately, shifts in US security policy are already producing important corollary shifts in the foreign policies of key states and various regional groupings, including in their development of peacekeeping structures.

Most notable in this regard is the European Union. The EU responded to a request by the UN Secretary-General to France for peacekeeping support in the D.R. Congo, through the deployment of Operation Artemis. This represents an important shift in the nature of EU-UN relations, which at times have been rather more competitive than collaborative. Thierry Tardy, in his paper for the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, makes clear both the limits and the opportunities of the UN-EU relationship in peacekeeping and it should be emphasized that the current, pro-UN attitude in Europe is real, albeit probably time limited, and warrants intensive attention by the UN. It is also useful to address three concerns. First, that already within Europe, the debate about the EU-NATO relationship is trumping the discussion about the UN-EU relationship, and has major implications for it. The resolution of the EU-NATO debate over self-standing EU planning capacities by adopting a standing EU planning capacity, but not a separate EU operational command capacity, may constrain not the politics but the mechanics of EU-UN cooperation. Second, although the UN has engaged in an active dialogue with the EU about the specific issue of cooperation, it is still more absent than present from the broader European debate about expansion and reform, especially around the recently adopted EU Security Strategy. Third, the EU strategy, in addition to the established European concerns with human security, adopts many aspects of the US security agenda, even if it does take a decidedly less military approach than the US to such questions as terrorism. This is widely, and perhaps rightly, seen within Europe as a necessary way of bridging the emergent transatlantic divide. But it is an open question whether the EU has considered the question of whether the adoption of this wider security agenda among the major northern states will diminish political attention to the strengthening of peacekeeping functions in contexts not defined by a terrorism agenda – especially in Africa, where, it should be recalled, millions of lives are at stake.

Shifting US policy is also shaping national developments in Europe. Armies from Austria to Norway are beginning to reshape themselves in light of evolving possible demands, partially in the context of the US-led ‘global war on terrorism’, and the partnership agreements that have emerged from it. These now constitute a significant part of the strategic environment within which European defense planning must occur. At first glance, this appears likely to help tackle what outgoing NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson has labeled the problem of Europe’s (fossilized) military systems; with supposedly 1.5 million men and women under arms, it is remarkable that NATO is only able to deploy overseas around 50,000 troops at any given time. An increased emphasis on mobility and rapid deployment may give rise to more troops and more deployment capacity available for a range of operations. In principle, this would include UN peacekeeping operations. While this is a positive development, it should be stated with a dual note of caution: first, that this development is only at the earliest stage; and second, that such troops are more likely to be deployed at the request of the US than that of the UN. Although some European states have made it clear through their participation in ISAF but not Operation Iraqi Freedom that they are more willing to support the US when it works through the UN, this is unlikely to lead them to contribute more to UN peace-keeping.
Beyond Europe, shifts in US policy have clearly already contributed to a shift in Chinese policy towards UN peacekeeping, which has resulted in new deployments in the D.R. Congo and elsewhere. China has also reached out to other ‘emerging powers’ – specifically South Africa and Brazil – with the stated intention of coordinating response to ongoing developments in US-UN relations. Although this initiative appears so far to be limited to rhetorical agreements, it bears watching given the positive role both South Africa and Brazil have played in various peacekeeping settings and the new role China has begun to play. Also, Eastern Europe emerges as a key location for the evolution of peacekeeping. The divide in Europe over Iraq and the related deployment of Polish and other Eastern European forces to Iraq suggest that future East European contributions to UN peacekeeping may be heavily shaped by evolving US security roles and demands.

In Latin America, regional organizations have remained focused on political and trade issues. Changing US security policy, particularly in Colombia and the Amazon basin, is arguably impeding, not accelerating, regional cooperation. If deteriorating conditions in some Latin American states continue, we may see new demand for peacekeeping in contexts where there is limited sub-regional capacity for conflict management and where US-led MNFs may be controversial given the perceived role of the US in the region.

Beyond Western Europe, changing US policy has also contributed to shifts in policies towards UN peacekeeping. Meanwhile, the US interest in ‘failed states’, declared in the 2002 National Security Strategy potentially provides a framework for deeper US engagement in managing internal conflicts, the primary arena of peacekeeping engagement in the past decade. The history of peacekeeping has shown that the US can play a vital role in effective peacekeeping, not only in the promoting of apolitical environment at the international level that is generally permissive of UN peacekeeping roles (as it did during the 1990s), but also in terms of offering options for specific operations, such as strategic lift capacity, as well as in the financing of all UN operations. However, the recent experience of minimal US engagement in Liberia suggests that US engagement on failed states will be geographically bound.

Increased US interest in failed states, however, may translate into greater involvement in the UN ...

... but is likely to be geographically bound ...

Indeed, the geographical focus of US defense policy is salient. Within the Department of Defense and in other parts of the US defense establishment, many planners believe that, in the foreseeable future, US defense policy will be primarily occupied with what is referred to as “the Greater Middle East” or the ‘arc of instability’ – encompassing the Horn of Africa littoral, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, parts of Central Asia, and parts of South East Asia. Whether or not this focus shifts under future US administrations, the attention that has already been given to this part of the world by the current administration and the nature of the evolving security concepts at large in the US (well beyond the current administration) are such that it is likely that there will be continued turbulence and US engagement in these regions. Given the absence of meaningful regional security structures in these regions, it is possible that we may see a significant rise in demand for UN engagement in conflict management, including peacekeeping. This will pose a significant challenge, both in terms of logistics and security, but more fundamentally in terms of managing perceptions of the UN that have been profoundly (and largely negatively) shaped by events of the past three years in the Israeli-Palestinian arena and most importantly in Iraq.

In this context, the recent attacks against the UN – in Baghdad and southern Afghanistan – pose an acute problem. Should there be a growing demand for UN involvement in the ‘greater Middle East’, as seems possible, this will confront the UN with the complexity of operating in an environment where its legitimacy has been eroded and where it faces active hostility from some terrorist organizations, notably Al
The first of these challenges is not new: for example, in post-genocide Rwanda, the organization's legitimacy was smashed, but UNAMIR II was still able to operate and contribute. The second of these challenges – direct targeting by a hostile entity – is also not new: witness Somalia. The combination, however, is combustible. The growing use of suicide bombings, usually in contexts of occupation, poses new challenges for the organization, potentially requiring more emphasis on self-protection and increasing the cost and complexity of operations. These issues are, however, in flux. The evolution of the Palestinian situation, in particular, and the UN’s role therein, will continue to shape popular perceptions of the UN in the Middle East.

This will overlap with a growing agenda of counter-terrorism responses and efforts more aggressively to police the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As European and other governments engage in a variety of forms of counter-terrorism response, or engage in peacekeeping operations in contexts where counter-terrorism is part of the operational scenario, pressure may grow for the UN to contribute to this effort in various ways.

Peacekeeping has evolved in unpredictable ways. In 1985, few would have believed that 10 years later, 80,000 peacekeepers would be deployed to internal conflicts. There is no reason to believe that current trends shaping peacekeeping will be sustained. Nevertheless, certain planning assumptions (for the short-to-medium term) can be made, which take the form of conclusions to this section of the report.

**CONCLUSION TO PART 1: PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS**

Notwithstanding a high degree of uncertainty in the strategic environment surrounding UN peacekeeping, the following conclusions could be taken as adequate planning assumptions on which to base decisions on short and medium term priorities for Departmental resources. It should be stressed that there are at present high levels of support for the UN among European and other states, creating an opportunity for the UN to make progress on a number of issues such as standing capacity, rapid deployment and robust peacekeeping. This moment may be short-lived and thus warrants intensive engagement.

**Other Actors**

* Europe’s forces will continue to be more conflict management directed.

- Europe’s security institutions will continue to evolve in the direction of more developed conflict management and peacekeeping capacities; these will variously provide significant support to UN missions, meet demands the UN cannot and periodically displace UN responses – for example, in continental Europe, where we can anticipate no UN peacekeeping operations in the near future:

  o European armies will be progressively transformed towards more responsive, more mobile armies that emphasize specialized capacities over infantry strength;

  o The UK and France will continue to provide occasional short-term military support to UN and AU/ECOWAS operations in Africa.
Multinational forces and regional organization models will continue to be used in the short-to-medium term for the provision of short-term military support or to respond to fast-breaking crises.

African leaders will continue to place emphasis on the development of a security management function through the AU, albeit in uncertain relationship to sub-regional organizations, such as ECOWAS.

Within a planning horizon, no state other than the US will have global strategic lift capacity (though significant private capacity, especially ex-Soviet capacity, will be available).

The US will continue to be intensely involved – whether constructively or combatively – in the set of regions currently being defined as the ‘arc of instability’:

- US policy towards the UN and towards multilateral institutions in general will continue to be characterized by ambivalent, episodic engagement.

The United Nations

Support for UN peacekeeping among key member states will fluctuate in substantial part with respect to shifts in US security policy and to the perceived relevance of the UN as an instrument through which to shape US policy. Shifts in US policy towards more sustained policy engagement with new or traditional allies will tend to diminish the importance of the UN.

The UN will continue to be called upon to mount UN-commanded peacekeeping operations:

- There will likely be continuing demand in Africa – the bulk of troops to such operations will be under UN-command, though the overall response will increasingly be met through hybrid operations – some of these operations will require significant military capacity, along with civilian capacities;
  - Force multiplier components from advance armies for these missions will be available on an inconsistent basis.

- The UN may face demand for new missions in Latin America and Asia, and if so, these will be met through a combination of MNF, regional and Blue Helmet operations;

- The UN may face demand for new missions – including of the transitional administration model – in Asia and the Middle East; these may involve hybrid operations with NATO, the OSCE, MNFs, or possibly the EU.
The UN will continue to perform transitional administration missions or state-building functions ... while also engaging in issues of concern to the US.

The UN may face demands for new transitional administration missions in contexts of state failure or near state failure and will continue to be called on to implement post-conflict or state-building functions. In many such cases, regional organizations will contribute capacities.

The UN will be increasingly drawn towards engagement on issues of sustained policy interest to the US, especially with respect to containment of WMD and counter-terrorism. Over time, this will diminish the amount of attention, research and other resources put towards the strengthening of the peacekeeping function, relative to other security functions.

**PART 2:**

**HYBRID OPERATIONS**

Though they are but one facet of the broader evolution of peacekeeping, the phenomenon of ‘hybrid’ operations is both now so prevalent and has raised such levels of interest as well as concern, that it seems to warrant separate consideration. Moreover, the phenomenon of hybrid missions encapsulates several of the trends outlined above. This section of the report provides an analysis of different models of hybrid operations, and highlights some initial lessons learned.

**Evolving Models of Cooperation**

Although hybrid operations are usually treated as a new phenomenon, there have in fact been variants on hybrid operations throughout the 1990s. A review of the full list of these operations – 13 in all – reveals that no two have been identical, creating a difficulty in terms of description and categorization. This immediately highlights one important lesson: that UN peacekeeping is, perhaps contrary to popular conception, quite flexible in terms of the political arrangements under which it deploys.

**Categories of Operations**

Although it is difficult to categorize hybrid operations, given their *sui generis* character, two possible sets of categories appear. First, it is possible to categorize these missions in terms of the formal relationship between the sponsoring operations. Thus, we could refer to *integrated operations* (Kosovo [UN/EU/OSCE], Haiti) where different regional organizations and the UN operate within a single, or joined, chain of command; to *coordinated operations*, where the UN and other organizations operate side-by-side under separate command structures, but in a coordinated fashion (Kosovo [UN/NATO], Afghanistan, Bosnia, Georgia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sierra Leone 1997, Cote d’Ivoire); to *parallel operations*, where the UN deploys alongside another organization’s force, without formal coordination (Rwanda); and to *sequential operations*, where the UN precedes or follows a multinational, regional or bilateral force (East Timor, D.R. Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone 2000.) Each of these categories, in turn, could be broken down by the nature of the non-UN element: multinational forces; regional organizations; bilateral operations.
However, this categorization obscures more than it reveals. The differences between the UN-NATO relationship in Kosovo, and the UN-CIS relations in Georgia-Abkhazia, are very wide, as are the differences between the Australia-UN relationship in East Timor and the UK-UN relationship in Sierra Leone. Moreover, the differences between a regional organization’s operation and an MNF are fewer than meet the eye. Beyond the political issues, if one examines force structure, command structure and financing, the EU’s Operation Artemis looks more like a French-led MNF, similar in most respects to the Australian-led Interfet, than it does like an operation composed of and commanded by a multilateral organization. Thus, differentiating by sponsoring organization – which is important in political terms – is unhelpful in categorical terms.

The single most importantly reality of hybrid operations is precisely that they are *sui generis* – and that UN peacekeeping proves to be highly flexible in response. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile highlighting a series of functional features of these missions – several of which may be present in given missions.

We can refer to **Short-Term Military Support** – several hybrid operations, for a limited time period, have provided enhanced military support to an existing or newly-deploying UN operation. These include: the UK bilateral operation in Sierra Leone that bolstered UNAMSIL when it was under threat in 2000; the EU Operation Artemis in Bunia, the D.R. Congo, which enabled the expansion of MONUC; the US-supported ECOWAS force in Liberia in 2003, which paved the way for the arrival of UNMIL. The relationships between UNITAF and UNISOM I in Somalia had a similar relationship. A less well known instance of this is the role that the UK played in May 1995 to bolster UNAVEM III by providing landing capacity, military hospitals, etc. Since this was done within the UN mission, however, it does fall into a slightly different category.

A second functional distinction involves **Civilian-Military Division of Labour**. The two clear examples of this mode of operation are UNMIK and UNAMA. In the first case, the UN (along with the EU, the OSCE and UNHCR) provides the civilian and police dimensions of an operation, under single command, while NATO provides the military arm of the operation, under separate (but coordinated) command. In UNAMA, the UN provides the civilian element of the mission, while a multinational force (now NATO-commanded) provides a military dimension, alongside US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Arguably, from December 1995 onwards, Bosnia emerged into a similar style of operation, with UNMIBH providing policing and UNHCR providing humanitarian operations in coordination with OHR and others, while IFOR and then SFOR provided the military element. Also in this category is UNAMI, which provides a civilian dimension alongside the Coalition Provisional Authority (the main civilian operation in Iraq) and the now-UN authorized US/UK-led Operation Iraqi Freedom, which provides the military dimension. The differences between the Iraq operation and the others fall in the political/legitimacy sphere, rather than in legal, operational or institutional distinctions.

A third mode of operation is what might be referred to as **Linked Peacekeeping-Observer Operations** – where the UN and another operation provide a combination of peacekeeping and observer capacities in separate but coordinated commands. The two clear examples of this are UNOMIG, where the UN provides an observer force alongside the CIS peacekeeping force; and UNMEE, where the AU provides an observer force alongside the UN peacekeeping force. A similar arrangement held in Rwanda where the OAU deployed NMOG alongside UNOMUR. One could include in
this categorization the French peacekeeping force deployed in Côte d’Ivoire alongside MINUCI.

A fourth functional characterization refers to **Hand-over Operations** – where the UN precedes or follows a regional or multi-national force operation. Clear examples of this include the move from the OSCE’s KVM in Kosovo to NATO and, in turn, to the UN; and the transfer from ECOWAS to UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone in 1998. Most recently, the Australian-led MNF Interfet filled the gap between UNAMET and UNTAET. Artemis-MONUC also involved handovers of responsibilities, as did the US-led MNF for Haiti in 1994, which was followed by the UN’s Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The relationships between UNITAF and UNISOM II could also be described in these terms – though the handover was disastrous.

Finally we see instances of actual **Integrated operations**. This review so far has found only two truly integrated operations: MICIVIH, the human rights operation in Haiti, which was operated jointly (and under a dual-hated SRSG) by the UN and the OAS; and UNMIK, which had UN, OSCE, EU and UNHCR capacities all under the operational command of single, UN SRSG.

Annex 1 lists hybrid operations and comments on their salient features.

**Why Hybrid Operations?**

Why are states increasingly using hybrid operations, and is this trend to be resisted or embraced by DPKO?

The replacement of UN operations by regional or multi-national forces is caused by several factors:

Institutional competition, ...

... concerns about UN command and control capacity, ...

Several factors can be identified that have led member states to use regional or MNF operations rather than UN peacekeeping operations to solve problems. They include: institutional competition; concerns about UN command and control systems; financial issues; political divisions at the Security Council; and challenges to the legitimacy of the UN.

First, there is a basic level of institutional competition that, particularly throughout the 1990s, was in evidence as the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the UN, driven by state interest, and by bureaucratic and national competition, vied for roles in Europe. Competition within and between governments related to institutional development was probably the most important factor driving the trends towards hybrid operations during the 1990s.

A second set of factors relates to the concerns of Western states at UN command and control capacity. The oft-heard phrase ‘the UN doesn’t have adequate command and control systems’ is used, in particular, by European governments as polite code for two sets of political concerns, and addresses a third, structural concern.

- First, there is concern among some European governments (and in the US) that the Security Council, as an operative body, cannot be trusted to make the right policy decisions when it comes to the hard edge of operations. By remaining outside a Security Council framework, states retain freedom of action;
• Second, there is concern that the UN does not have the right commanders – especially in Africa. Thus, when Western governments say, with respect to putting their troops into Blue Helmet operations in Africa, that ‘the UN doesn’t have adequate command and control’, what they mean simply is that they don’t trust the quality of the SRSGs and Force Commanders that the UN has designated in many African missions;

• Third, a structural concern about command and control is the limited role played by troop contributors in decision-making over UN-commanded operations. This issue is by definition limited to states that are not permanent members of the Security Council. Although troop contributor meetings do provide a consultation forum, actual decisions and real influence are limited to the P5 (sometimes the P3) and to those states with the capacity to penetrate the Secretariat and influence the decision-making of the Secretary-General. This is a cause for concern for all troop contributors and may have led those with other institutional options to exercise their freedom and eschew the Blue Helmet framework. This is a particular bone of contention for former European troop contributors to UN operations in Bosnia. The experience of being excluded from real decision-making during UNPROFOR continues to shape European military officers’ negative perception of UN command and control systems.

Third, an additional impetus toward hybrid operations (especially in terms of NATO and MNF deployments) is the differences between the financial arrangements of organizations. Due to the high degree of burden-sharing through assessed contributions, many UN staff members presume that the question of financing an operation will largely work to the UN’s advantage. Indeed, once operations are agreed and underway, this argument is often salient and part of what brings operations back into the UN fold even when they have begun outside. But in the planning stages, military planning staff have a far larger say than foreign affairs or treasury staff in preparing options for decision-making. Military planning staff in many Western armed forces prefer to operate within their own national financing systems, rather than through those of the UN – with which they are unfamiliar and do not control, and which in many cases provide fewer resources per soldier than their national financing mechanisms. That the overall operation may be cheaper if conducted through the UN, or at least that the national contribution of a given country may be less if done through the UN, is a salient argument at the interdepartmental level. But early in the operational planning stages, it turns into a counter-argument for military command and planning staffs. In fast reaction contexts, these latter arguments may win out.

In a connected point, the cost of re-tooling equipment to meet UN specifications is perceived to be both a significant cost factor and a time-delay factor that contributes to the notion that the UN is an inappropriate vehicle for fast-breaking crisis response. The simple fact of needing to paint military equipment UN-white is an impediment to rapid deployment (occasionally overcome by the simple expedient of not doing it – as occurred in the Central African Republic.)

Fourth, political factors shape some decisions to use non-UN commanded arrangements: lack of consensus in the Security Council, or more generally at the UN (MFO Sinai, NATO in Yugoslavia, Iraq); and challenges to the legitimacy of the UN. The first of these is well understood; the second perhaps less so. Inside the UN, the notion that the legitimacy of the UN has been called into question is rarely acknowledged. Rather, the unique legitimacy of the UN derived from its universal membership continues to be an article of faith. But that UN is a membership of
governments, and in many civil war contexts – Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, etc – rebel forces often see the UN as biased to governments, conservative on the question of separation, and therefore not ‘honest brokers’ in dealing with opponents. This is particularly the case where the government party has an ally in a permanent member of the Security Council. In such cases, the ‘legitimacy’ of the UN as a conflict management instrument is challenged. Moreover, the UN’s legitimacy has been grievously challenged by failure. It is not entirely un-coincidental that the two places where we have seen the most development of regional options – Europe and Africa – have been the site of the UN’s great failures in the 1990s – Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia. Finally, in the Middle East and Asia, the UN’s legitimacy is constrained by a complex set of contradictory factors: concern among non-Muslim Asian and Middle Eastern states that the Arab group at the UN are able to shape the politics of UN decision-making to their detriment, meaning that the UN cannot be trusted to negotiate or implement in their context; and in Middle Eastern Muslim countries, high expectations that arise from Security Council resolutions, now deeply undermined by the mismatch between resolutions and actions, particularly in the Palestinian and Iraqi contexts.

Fifth, and finally, a factor which is little discussed but relevant is that the perceived weaknesses of the UN, vis-à-vis rapid deployment or robust peacekeeping, has been partially internalized in UN headquarters. It is largely forgotten or unknown that UNOC had its own air force; that UNTAC engaged in important military challenges to the Khmer Rouge; that UNTAES had authority in its force; that UNTAET used decisive force in East Timor. Today, even reports of the Secretary-General state that multinational force models should be used in preference to Blue Helmet models when rapid reaction is required. If the UN Secretariat does not portray confidence in its own mechanisms, it is unsurprising that capable member states do the same.

Hybrid Operations: Policy Issues & Lessons Learned

Among the key issues arising from these operations, and lessons learned from them, are:

Transfer Arrangements. One of the features that defines the quality and success of some of these operations is whether there is an effective mechanism for the transfer of command. The mission that stands out here is Interfet. The decision by Australia to keep the Australian contingent of Interfet in the follow-on UNTAET mission is recognized as having contributed to the smooth start to UNTAET. By contrast, the full withdrawal of Artemis prior to the full deployment of MONUC in Bunia is seen as a downside to an otherwise important collaboration. Various arrangements for transfer – including dual-hatting of SRSGs during a transitional phase, co-deployment of SRSGs during a transitional phase, appointment of a liaison officer to plan the transition, etc – have been used to date, with early lessons suggesting simply that this issue will have to be handled in a sui generis manner, based on both the nature of the collaboration, the nationalities involved, and the nature of the continuing relationship.

Follow-on Arrangements for Short-Term Military Support Operations. Related to the above is the question of what is left in the wake of short-term military support operations. One of the concerns with the use of non-UN commanded structures for short-term military support is that it may send signal that Blue Helmets are weak forces, unable to resist military pressure. Some officials have argued that the absence of an over-the-horizon force in the D.R. Congo has weakened MONUC, which is perceived
Similarly, follow-on arrangements are important to ensuring that the perception of the UN force is not weakened. By Congolese rebels as a weaker force than Operation Artemis. A similar case could be made for UNMIL, following the departure of the US marine off-shore presence. To make hybrid operations work, it is important to address this subtle factor: ensuring that perceptions of Blue Helmet operations are not weakened by the immediate departure of the ‘strong force’. Here, the ‘best practice’ could be the UK decision, following their 2-3 month Royal Marine deployment on a bilateral basis in 2000, to leave behind a visible over the horizon force that clearly signaled to the rebel forces that UNAMSIL would still be capable of responding to military pressure.

Financial burden sharing may be the motivating factor behind the push for rapid command transfers … … which raises the question if the UN should financially contribute to MNF deployments.

The ‘commitment gap’ is Africa specific … … and refers to the fact that key states contribute least, in troops, to where the needs are greatest,… … but emphasizing this gap may trigger defensive reactions from governments that are otherwise supportive of the UN.

Financial burden sharing may be the motivating factor behind the push for rapid command transfers … Financing as a Barrier to Flexibility. In the case of Liberia, the US-supported Ecomil advance force into Liberia provided a critical breathing space for the deployment of UNMIL. The Ecomil arrangements were rapidly transferred to the UN, even before the UN was ready to take command of the operation, giving the slow deployment of troop contributors and the limited capacity in critical support structures, such as hospitals, air transport, etc. The push for a rapid transfer appears to have been motivated by the desire to shift rapidly towards financial burden-sharing. This raises a core question, warranting further work beyond the scope of this paper, as to whether UN financing mechanisms could cover some elements of UN-authorized MNF deployments. If the UN asks, why should it not pay?¹⁵

The ‘Commitment Gap’. Perhaps better phrased as an ‘Africa gap’, this issue refers to the declining troop contributions of developed states to UN-commanded missions in Africa. It is Africa specific: developed state contributions to UN-commanded peacekeeping operations are, by most measures, disproportionate to their membership in the UN; they contribute significantly to UN-authorized operations, proportionate to capacity; and their troops are deployed beyond Europe, contributing troops to UN-commanded missions in the Middle East and Asia, and the UN-authorized mission in Afghanistan. Of course, developed states’ financial contributions to the peacekeeping budget are a vital factor in all operations. But none of this quite ameliorates the fact that the UN’s most capable states contribute least to the mission area where death tolls are highest and where the UN’s role – measured in lives saved, not global political impact – is most critical. The UN has been sending confused messages on this issue, alternatively emphasizing European troop presence in Africa irrespective of institutional framework, and European troop contributions to UN-commanded operations. The phrase ‘commitment gap’, and reference to statistics related to participation in UN-commanded missions, emphasize the latter, and tend to generate defensive reactions among foreign ministries, usually the most supportive departments to the UN in European contexts. Too little work is done to communicate (perhaps through others) with national parliaments in Europe, which typically are supportive of engagement with and through the UN.

Inter-Organization Coordination. The simultaneous operation of multiple organizations in hybrid arrangements puts a premium on coordination. This can be loose, as in post-Dayton Bosnia, which is generally seen to have been problematic. It can be structured, as with the relationship between UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo, which was largely positive though not without challenges. Or it can be integrated, as in UNMIK – generally positive, though again, not without difficulties. The use in UNMIK of a Joint Planning Cell, regularly bringing together senior decision makers from all contributing organizations under the chairmanship of the Principal Deputy, was an important innovation, not yet adequately replicated.
Donor Coordination. Whereas the UN has taken some steps forward on inter-agency coordination involving UN entities, it still has a haphazard approach to the question of coordination with donors and the international financial institutions – often the key relationships in the overall international presence. There are some past experiences of SRSG involvement in donor coordination structures (Middle East, Afghanistan pre-UNAMA), and of UN-IFI structured cooperation (Middle East, Guatemala, East Timor) but little has been done to systematize the experience or provide guidance to SRSGs about alternative approaches.

Intra-UN Coordination. A further feature of these missions is that they increasingly overlap with the activities of the UN’s funds, programs and agencies. It is unclear, for example, why an SRSG requires a Child Protection advisor when UNICEF is present in the mission area: this either says something problematic about UNICEF or, more likely, about the weaknesses in existing systems for inter-entity coordination – weaknesses that mean that SRSGs cannot reliably depend on agency heads for programming support and advice on gender, protection of civilians, children and other non-military issues. In effect, the theory of integrated operations has been replaced by parallel capacities, some of which are well integrated or well coordinated, others substantially less so. At field level, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, primarily through Deputy SRSGs, have been modestly successful in reducing the worst dimensions of overlap and ill-coordination, but have not yet gone deeper towards fully integrated UN presences. This issue has been tackled by other studies (for example the Kings College London study, A Review of Peace Operations.) At headquarters, though there have been improvements, some senior DPKO staff acknowledge that the Department is “the US of the UN: we are happy to cooperate, as long as it is on our terms.” The fact that DPKO is not a member of the IASC and UNDG probably contributes to a perception within the Secretariat that DPKO is reluctant to coordinate.

Protection of civilians. In most mission contexts, UN missions operate alongside a host of other organizations involved in either the physical or legal aspects of the protection of civilians. There is as yet little work done to coordinate this activity or ensure that it works within a common, coherent framework. The deployment of a protection advisor to UNMIL is a step towards this, as is the OCHA-sponsored protection coordination process, but further work on this issue may be required.

State-building Policy. A set of more profound questions relate to the way in which the UN does – or does not – set a state-building policy framework in its now numerous post-conflict operations. The International Peace Academy’s program ‘We, the People’ on the UN’s role in state-building has identified a number of theoretical, political and operational challenges to effective UN roles in this regard. The findings from these and other studies16 raise issues that member states and DPKO and DPA (with the international financial institutions) need to address, namely about the models of government and governance that the UN applies in these contexts, whether through advice to constitutional and judicial development processes, through the design of electoral systems or otherwise. A version of this debate has been tackled in the concept of the ‘light-footprint’. Two concepts are conveyed by the light-footprint in transitional contexts: first, that external actors should not play an excessive role in shaping national decisions about forms and systems of government and social relations; and second, that even if they were to do so, the UN is ill-equipped in personnel systems and other terms to deploy adequate levels of civilian staff to occupy the space left by the collapse of national government systems. The most acute example to date was the slow deployment of personnel to UNMIK, which allowed substantial administrative and security space to
be occupied by competing Kosovan factions. The relative merits of a light or heavy footprint approach will likely be shaped by two unrelated factors: the degree of coherence in existing or nascent political systems in the host countries (whether or not shaped as government institutions) and the speed with which the UN can deploy significant civilian capacities. In contexts where national capacity has been gravely eroded, heavier footprint models may be desirable.

Civilian Planning Capacity. Related to several of these questions is the fact that DPKO capacity to plan for the civilian dimensions of missions has not kept pace with recent improvements to its capacity to plan for the military, police and logistics dimensions. Integrated mission task forces have not filled this gap, serving as a partially effective inter-agency coordination mechanism rather than as a planning mechanism. A few states have begun to express interest in renewing efforts to strengthen DPKO’s capacity in this regard.

Conclusions of Part 2: Framework for Response

The lack of confidence in UN member states that UN peacekeeping mechanisms are appropriate tools for tackling the hard military edge of conflict management suggests a structural problem with the UN that goes beyond the questions of DPKO management or UN command and control mechanisms. This lack of confidence seems particularly evident among the permanent members of the Security Council, four out of five of which have in recent years led non-UN commanded operations. Indeed, it raises important questions about whether the UN’s structures are appropriately geared for managing international security challenges in a context of great diversity in state power and capacity. Such questions are often dismissed within the UN Secretariat by resigning to the idea that ‘the UN is what its member states make of it.’ However, this ignores questions of institutional culture and the impact on national decision-making while operating in various multilateral structures. These are structural questions appropriate for broader consideration.

More immediately, it seems evident that in developing a policy response to the question of hybrid operations, division-of-labour operations and to the declining contributions to Blue Helmet operations in Africa by Western states, the critical first step is to shift the analysis away from institutions and to focus instead on the question of the quality of response, particularly as seen from the perspective of those the responses are intended to help, i.e. victims of conflict. This has several implications.

Quality of response should be the major concern, which has several implications:

First, there are gross inadequacies and inequities in the overall response, and non-response, by the UN to various conflicts. Of course, much of the responsibility for this lies in the Security Council. From a Secretariat perspective, continued advocacy to the Council and to member states about the selectivity and variability of response is surely essential.

Second, the UN needs to decide between using hybrid operations or diminishing overall response...

Advocacy about the selectivity and variability of response is essential.

Second, vis-à-vis hybrid operations, especially in terms of short-term military support operations, the framework for judgment and development of a policy response should be whether or not the use of hybrid arrangements expand or diminish the overall response. Issues in the Artemis Operation, such as the psychological impact of short-term responses on the parties’ perceptions of the weakness of Blue Helmet operations are critical. But the solution can be either direct contributions to UN-commanded operations or longer non-UN operations, including options such as over-the-horizon
keeping in mind that the main concern is the quality of response. 

DPKO’s basic framework for the short and medium term can be summarized in the following conclusions:

Thus, for a short and medium term planning horizon, the basic framework for DPKO’s policy response vis-à-vis hybrid operations can be encapsulated in the following core recommendations.

**Part 3:**

**Core Recommendations**

1. Hybrid operations will continue to be a major feature of the peacekeeping landscape and should be welcomed, not resisted, by DPKO as an important contribution to managing costly conflicts.

2. With respect to communication with troop contributors about potential deployments in or alongside UN commanded operations, DPKO should stress the importance of a geographically equitable response (in terms of numbers, but also capability) over the institutional form of response:
   - stress the levels of civilian deaths in African conflicts versus overall peacekeeping responses:
   - provide data and other background material to think-tanks and NGOs in key European capitals who raise these issues with national parliaments (generally, more supportive of UN engagements than contributions to US-supported MNF operations – by contrast to most Western defense ministries);
   - present statistics on contributions to UN-authorized as well as UN-commanded operations, organized geographically (by continent), as well as mission-by-mission;
   - recognize that troop contributors that are not permanent members of the Security Council have valid concerns about their involvement in UN command and control mechanisms and that these concerns have deep resonance among US and European military planning staffs:
   - the argument that UN command and control mechanisms are in fact adequate to operational control needs to be reframed, since it does not address the main concerns of critics;
   - maximize flexibility in terms of accepting contributions to UN operations (including shorter deployments, enabling capacities, and flexible rotation schedules) or support from non-UN operations.

3. DPKO must continue to plan for the continued likelihood of Blue Helmet responses, particularly in Africa, but possibly also in Latin America and parts of the ‘greater Middle East’, therefore, seeking to strengthen (a) UN command and control capacity, (b) the predictability of Western contributions of ‘force
multiplier’ and enabling capacities and (c) perceptions of UN legitimacy, particularly in the Middle East.

4. Renew efforts, working with supportive member states, to strengthen the Department’s role in planning and setting policy for the civilian dimensions of multidimensional peacekeeping, including more effective backstopping to SRSGs on intra-UN, inter-organization and donor coordination.

5. Given the likelihood of no new operations in Europe, progressively re-deploy resources currently deployed in OO/Europe to (a) enhanced policy interaction and operational liaison with the EU, NATO, the AU and ECOWAS, and (b) civilian planning capacities. In future recruitment, emphasize prior experience with another multilateral security institution, while, in the interim, developing a mechanism for personnel exchanges.

Annex 1:
Hybrid Operations – Descriptions

(1) Somalia: UNOSOM I, UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II
In response to a humanitarian crisis, the UN established the UN’s Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I in April 1992. In November 1992, the US offered to lead a multinational operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, with the understanding that eventually this mission would revert to the UN. By December, the UN authorized (SCR 794) the US-led operation known as Operation Restore Hope/UNITAF, to provide humanitarian assistance and establish a secure environment. Formal control of UNITAF was handed over to UNOSOM II in May 1993. Within UNOSOM II, the US deployed a Quick Reaction Force under the tactical command of the UN, but the operational command of US Central Command. Alongside the UN, a small contingent of US rangers remained in Somalia; coordination between these forces and the UN was minimal, as illustrated by the October 1993 ill-fated raid against Gen. Aideed.

(2) Rwanda: NMOG, UNOMUR & UNAMIR
In 1992, the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) authorized a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to deploy in Rwanda. Subsequently, in June 1993, the UN established the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) that mounted observer operations along the Rwanda-Uganda border. NMOG continued operations until August 1993, at which point it was replaced by NMOG II. NMOG and UNOMUR were deployed in Rwanda at the same time, but did not overlap in other ways, either in the territory of their operations, nor in their command structures. Coordination between the two entities was loose and informal. The only exception is that the UN resolution that authorized the creation of UNOMUR also authorized the provision of two UN military experts to assist in the expedition of NMOG II. NMOG II wound down with the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) – into which it was formally absorbed.

(3) Haiti: MICIVIH, UNMIH, MNF (Uphold Democracy), UNSMIH, UNTMIH and MIPONUH
In 1993, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) co-deployed a joint mission, the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti. Recruitment was a shared responsibility between the two organizations. The mission was headed by an SRSG that was dual-hatted, i.e. simultaneously representative of the OAS and the UN. At a later phase, the deployment of MNF Uphold Democracy significantly
bolstered the military presence in Haiti alongside UNMIH. The UN mounted follow-on missions: UNSMIH, and later UNTMIH and MIPONUH.

(4) Tajikistan: UNMOT, and CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force
In December 1994, the Security Council authorized the creation of a military observer mission, the UN Mission in Tajikistan, which incorporated a pre-deployed team of police and military observers (initially deployed under the Secretary-General’s good offices.) UNMOT deployed alongside the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force, and maintained liaison and coordination with the CIS forces. A civilian component was added to UNMOT in September 1997, at which stage its troop numbers were also increased. UNMOT's civilian component collaborated with the OSCE in preparing for elections, culminating in a joint UN-OSCE election observation mission – Joint Electoral Observer Mission (JEOM). Following the withdrawal of UNMOT in May 2000, a peace-building mission was established: the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP).

(5) Bosnia: UNPROFOR, SFOR and IFOR and planned EU operations
The experience of Bosnia is widely known.20 A lead UN peacekeeping operation was, in its first phase, bolstered by NATO military capacities. In a second phase, UNPROFOR was militarily supported by Nato operation Sfor. In a third phase, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) provided some political and largely police capacities and UNHCR provided humanitarian capacities as part of a loosely coordinated multi-organization response, politically led by a coalition of the willing structure (the Office of the High Representative) and militarily led by Nato (Ifor). The European Union is progressively taking over the remaining elements of the UN’s operation.

(6) Rwanda: Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR II
In July 1994, following the launch of genocide in Rwanda and the all-but evacuation of UNAMIR, France led a multi-national force operation into first Goma, Zaire and then the western sections of Rwanda. This mission was authorized in motion by the Security Council. It remained deployed in southwestern Rwanda when the Security Council created UNAMIR II to conduct humanitarian and stabilization operations in Rwanda after the takeover of Kigali by the RPF and the end to the civil war and genocide. The two missions were loosely but informally coordinated, and deployed in non-overlapping territories. UNAMIR II expanded its presence in southwestern Rwanda after the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise.21

(7) Sierra Leone 1997
In 1997, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) into Sierra Leone. In 1998, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNOMSIL, which deployed alongside ECOMOG. UNOMSIL was mandated to monitor the disarming of rebels, restructuring of the armed forces and documenting human rights violations under ECOMOG protection. The coordination of these tasks proved unsatisfactory when fighting ensued and led to the evacuation of all UNOMSIL personnel in December 1999.22

(8) Georgia/Abkhazia
In Georgia/Abkhazia the UN has deployed the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) alongside a pre-authorized regional peacekeeping force mounted by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CIS Peacekeeping Force Georgia. UNOMIG is separately commanded from the CIS Force, and deploys separately. There is robust coordination between the two forces. Although the purposes are set out differently, most observers take the view that UNOMIG provides, in essence, a policy-monitoring presence for the CIS Force, helping by their presence to ensure that the CIS Force operates within understood norms about the behavior of peacekeeping forces. UNOMIG’s presence also ensures that there is Security Council oversight. The context is one in which some parties to the conflict evidently see the CIS Force as partisan or at least biased.

(9) Kosovo: KVM, NATO, UNMIK/KFOR
In phase one of the Kosovo conflict, operational response to the conflict was co-managed by the OSCE, which deployed the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and NATO, which mounted Extraction Force Macedonia (XFOR), an over-the-horizon operation designed to protect KVM’s civilian personnel. Neither mission was authorized by the Security Council. In phase two of the conflict, NATO conducted a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia (Serbia), again without Security Council authorization. In the third phase, a multi-organization response was established, with two principal elements. First was the UN Mission in Kosovo, an integrated mission that put the civilian and police capacities of the UN, the OSCE, the EU and UNHCR into a single operational chain of command under a UN-hatted SRSG. Alongside UNMIK, NATO deployed Kfor. Kfor was authorized by the Security Council (in the same resolution that established UNMIK) and encouraged to coordinate its operations with UNMIK. Coordination between UNMIK and Kfor was robust.\(^{23}\)

\((10)\) **East Timor: UNAMET, Interfet, and UNTAET**

UN Assistance Mission in East Timor was established in 1999 to assist the parties in preparing for and mounting a referendum on the future of East Timor, as agreed in May agreements. Violence erupted in the wake of results that called for East Timor to become independent. UNAMET was scaled down to a minimal presence, and ultimately forced to withdraw. A Security Council mission to East Timor in November 2000 led to calls for a multi-national force to stabilize the situation. Australia led a multi-national force, Interfet, which deployed in East Timor in September 1999 with participation from approximately 22 troop contributing nations.\(^{24}\) Interfet remained in place while a planned follow-on operation, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, began to deploy, starting with its civilian components. Military components of an eventual Blue Helmet operation began to deploy in October 1999. In February 2000, command over force on the ground was transferred from Australia to the UN. The Australian contingent of Interfet joined UNTAET, and the Australian commander of Interfet was appointed as Force Commander for UNTAET and remained in that post for several months. This transfer of capacities along with responsibilities is widely recognized as an essential component of the overall success of the transfer of authority to the UN.

\((11)\) **Ethiopia-Eritrea: UNMEE and AU Observer Force**

In 2000, the UN established the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea to patrol the areas covered by an end-of-hostilities agreement between Addis Ababa and Asmara. The agreement between the parties stated that “a peacekeeping mission shall be deployed by the United Nations under the auspices of the OAU.”\(^{25}\) Alongside the UN’s peacekeeping mission, the African Union (AU) has deployed a small military observer mission. Coordination between the two operations is conducted by a Joint Military Commission, chaired by the UN Force Commander. The AU operation is not significant in military terms. However, some officials have made the argument that the presence of an AU figure in implementation negotiation sessions with the parties bolsters the UN’s political authority and makes it more difficult for the parties to paint the implementation forces as ‘outsiders’.

\((12)\) **Sierra Leone 2000: UK Operation Palliser & UNAMSIL**

In April 2000, UNAMSIL was threatened by the rapid advance of RUF fighters towards their forward positions in Sierra Leone. In face of an impending collapse of the mission, the Secretary-General sent USG Peacekeeping Miyet to Freetown to signal that the mission would not be withdrawn, and called for additional capacities to bolster UNAMSIL. The UK government responded by deploying a contingent of 4500 (at its peak), under bilateral agreement with the government, to bolster UNAMSIL, train the national armed forces, and generally prevent a further deterioration. Following a two month deployment, the Operation was withdrawn, leaving behind an over-the-horizon presence of Royal Marines that periodically mounted demonstration landings and reconnaissance maneuvers. Observers and officials noted considerable tensions on the ground between the UK troops and UNAMSIL’s forces, as neither had a clear perception of the others’ purpose or mode of operation. Generally, however, the mission is widely seen as having forestalled a collapse of the peace process and an embarrassing retreat for the UN. The UK
operation was not authorized by the Security Council (an issue which has raised some concerns) but was actively encouraged by the Secretary-General.

(13) Afghanistan: UNAMA and Isaf
The Bonn Agreements of December 2001, negotiated under the chairmanship of UN Special Representative Brahimi, led to the simultaneous creation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as a civilian and political support to the nascent Afghan authorities and the International Stabilization Assistance Force (Isaf), a multi-national force under US lead. Both were established by Security Council resolution. Isaf provides the military dimension of the international presence alongside the remaining contingents of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), a US-led multi-national force that conducted military operations against the Taliban government (which operated under the self-defense provisions of the Charter, as endorsed in UNSCR 1368). Operational command over Isaf was transferred to NATO with the Security Council’s approval in August 2003.

(14) Democratic Republic of Congo: Operation Artemis & MONUC
The Security Council established the UN Operation in the Congo (MONUC) in 1999 to provide assistance to the various parties in implementing political agreements for the withdrawal of foreign forces. MONUC deployed to a number of sectors in the D.R. Congo. This led to a call for the expansion of MONUC’s presence into the Bunia region. However, given the light military capacity of MONUC (primarily an observer presence), enhanced military capacity was believed necessary to clear a path into the Bunia region. The Secretary-General approached France to request their support in this. France led an EU response, involving the deployment of an EU expeditionary force, led by the French and under French operational command (delegated from the EU’s Political Military Committee.) Operation Artemis deployed in Bunia and secured a cessation of hostilities from various armed groups. In September 2003, Operation Artemis withdrew, being replaced by an expanded MONUC presence. Transfer of authority and command was done without any transfer of resources or capacities. The EU did not agree to leave behind an over-the-horizon extraction force.

(15) Cote d’Ivoire: ECOFORCE, Operation Licorne, and MINUCI
In 2002, fighting in Cote d’Ivoire led to an agreement that ECOWAS should form and deploy an Ecowas Peace Force for Cote d’Ivoire (ECOFORCE). Prior to the full deployment of ECOFORCE, a French expeditionary force Operational Licorne was deployed, largely along an inter-position line between rebel and government soldiers. In February 2003, the UN established the UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) officially as a political mission, in practice as a small observer force to work alongside other international forces in the country. As this report was being finalized, the Security Council was debating the establishment of a larger special political mission in Cote d’Ivoire.

(16) Liberia 2003: Ecomil, the US, and UNMIL
In April 2003, renewed fighting in Liberia led to calls for a renewed peacekeeping presence to forestall a full collapse of the government and the situation. Calls for the US to take the lead in mounting a multi-national force were eventually transmuted into an American agreement to provide financial and transport support to Ecomil, an Ecowas advance force. The US deployed a marine ship off the coast of Monrovia, and deployed to shore some 20 Marines who deployed in the immediate vicinity of the US Embassy. Ecomil deployed an expeditionary force of some 1000 troops, and established control in Monrovia, and along key roads leading outwards before arrival in September 2003 of the first contingents of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The Ecomil force was encouraged by the Secretary-General and authorized as part of Security Council Resolution 1497 (August 2003), which called for member states to form a multinational force. Formal transfer of authority to the UN occurred before UNMIL had fully deployed, according to officials primarily out of an interest of the relevant states to shift the financial resourcing of the mission to the UN. The US did not agree to provide an over-the-horizon extraction force.
Recent events in Iraq bear some similarity to other recent hybrid operations, though the nature of the political conflict surrounding the launch of the US-led coalition of the willing provides a vital, and complex, context. In formal terms, the US-led coalition war against Iraq followed by a Security Council authorized military and civilian management operation, partially operated by the UN in the form of UNAMI, is similar to the sequence of events and arrangements that attended the Kosovo crisis. Resolutions after the war provided for retroactive authorization of the Coalition Provision Authority, the establishment of a UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and later, in effect, the post facto authorization of a US-led multinational force in Iraq. Although the relationship between UNAMI and the CPA is in formal terms similar to the relationship between UNAMA and Isaf, or between UMMIK and Kfor, a wider set of political factors constrain the comparison.

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Endnotes

1 Thanks to Ian Johnstone, Bill Durch and Shepard Forman for insightful comments on drafts. Errors of fact or interpretation are the responsibility of the author.

2 There are of course important exceptions. Principal among them are ongoing efforts by the International Peace Academy to document the evolving role of the Security Council – in particular, Michael Pugh and W.P.Sidhu (eds.) The United Nations and Regional Security. New York: Lynne Reinner, 2003. Also see Shepard Forman and Andrew Grene, “The Security Council and Regional Organizations” in David Malone (ed.) The UN Security Council in the 1990s. New York: Lynne Reinner (Forthcoming.)


5 Latin America and Asia have regional organizations that play more or less important roles in the political management of conflict, but have not developed peacekeeping capacities. In the Middle East, the Arab League abandoned peacekeeping after a limited experiment in Lebanon in the 1970s, the Gulf Cooperation Council has not developed response capacities, and generally the region’s organizations are moribund or divided. In Central Asia, a series of criss-crossing regional organizations played almost no role in managing such conflicts as the internal war in Afghanistan. Thus, when we discuss regional organizations it is really only Africa and Europe that are in discussion. It is notable that regional organizations have been most active in the same regions that the UN has been most responsive.

6 See the excellent paper by Thierry Tardy for DPKO/PBPU.

7 In 1994/5, there was consideration within the UN of deployment of the UK-based PMC Defense Systems Limited to perform security operations in Eastern Zaire, but this met with opposition from member states on the grounds that it was unethical for the UN to resort to privatized security – an ethical argument wholly undermined by the unwillingness of those same member states to contribute troops to a mooted mission (until 1996).


9 This, too, is a complex issue. The ‘Transformations in Multilateral Security Institutions’ project has commissioned more detailed work on this subject from Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, which will be available to DPKO.


11 Also see Thierry Tardy, “French Policy Towards Peace Support Operations”, International Peacekeeping, Vol.6, No.1, Spring 1999, pp.55-78


15 The obvious downside to UN financing of authorized by not UN-commanded missions is the burden that would be imposed on some states by picking up even a modest share of such extraordinarily expensive ‘operations’ as the Gulf War. On the other hand, UN financing of MNFs would create a major incentive over time for these operations to be conducted under a UN framework.


19 For a brief but cogent analysis, see Ian Martin, “Is the regionalization of peace operations desirable?” in Pugh & Singh, The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, pp.48


23 Author’s field notes, Prishtina, June 1999.

