

## ***Frustrations of Regional Peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad, 1977-1982***

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### **I. INTRODUCTION**

The conflict in Chad is a microcosm of the widespread instability in Africa. Since its independence in 1960, peace, security, and stability have eluded Chad just as they have been scarce in most of Africa. Since 1960, 18 full-fledged civil wars have been fought in Africa. Eleven genocides and politicides occurred in Africa between 1960 and the late 1980s, compared with 24 elsewhere in the world. <sup>1</sup> During the decade of the 1980s alone, it is estimated that conflict and violence claimed over 3 million lives. <sup>2</sup> At the beginning of 1990, 43 percent of the global population of refugees were African, most of them fleeing from political violence. <sup>3</sup> The mediation and resolution of conflicts should indeed be the primary preoccupation of the continent's leadership.

In 1977, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initiated a mediatory process in search of a peaceful resolution of Chad's conflict. The OAU's intervention in Chad from 1977 to 1982 was unique because it was, at the time, the only internal conflict in Africa in which substantial intervention by a regional organization was permitted by the state in crisis, contrary to systemic norms and organizational principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.

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The highpoint of the OAU's mediatory efforts in the Chadian conflict was the introduction of peacekeeping forces in 1981. This paper analyzes and evaluates the OAU's intervention in the Chadian civil war primarily in the framework of the principles and practice of peacekeeping as they have evolved in the United Nations (U.N.) system. Peacekeeping missions have become the primary instrument of intervention in contemporary internal conflicts, a current example being the peacekeeping intervention in the Liberian conflict by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This paper aims to shed light on the ramifications, challenges, and prospects of peacekeeping interventions by regional organizations in African conflicts. This however, is not all that we can learn from the Chadian crisis. African states seem gripped in a

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convulsion of intense internal conflicts as autocratic one-party and military regimes are challenged by aggrieved and alienated groups. This is the season of a crisis of legitimacy for African regimes. The sources and dynamics of the Chadian conflict, the process of third-party intervention, and the reasons for its failure, should offer much-needed lessons to improve our perception and understanding of African conflicts and the process of mediation by third parties.

## **II. PEACEKEEPING: THE CONCEPT, NORMS, AND REQUIREMENTS**

In the context of U.N. application, peacekeeping has been defined by the International Peace Academy as:

The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational military, police and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace. [5](#)

The distinctive aspect of peacekeeping is the absence of coercive force. It is a concept of peaceful action, not of persuasion by force. Peacekeeping has appropriately been identified by Forsythe as one of three interrelated functional elements the international organization may undertake to intervene in a conflict situation. [6](#) The objective of the first functional element, peacekeeping, is to limit and, if possible, curtail violence of a conflict already initiated. The second functional element is peacemaking, the objective here being to help resolve the substantive issues of the dispute. The third distinctive element is peace servicing, which is targeted to avoid or reduce conflict through socioeconomic programs such as technical assistance and quasi-governmental programs. Peace servicing incorporates the notion of peace-building, that is, the rebuilding of institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by conflict in order to strengthen and solidify peace and, thereby, avoid relapse into conflict. [7](#)

A peacekeeping venture, by itself, does not resolve a dispute; it is a stop-gap measure or a holding action. [8](#) The primary purpose and function of peacekeeping is to contain and constrain violence to provide an atmosphere of calm and stability in which peacemaking and peace-servicing efforts would be better able to resolve the roots of the conflict. Thus, peacekeeping is essentially a third-party supervised truce that enables a peaceful settlement to be negotiated. Used in isolation, or where other modes of conflict management are ineffective, peacekeeping only freezes the status quo but does not resolve the dispute. [9](#)

Although there has not been any formal protocol to regulate peacekeeping operations, the U.N. system, through its peacekeeping experience and practices, has over time developed a body of principles, norms, and requirements for an effective peacekeeping operation that must form the backdrop to the analysis of any peacekeeping undertaking. Some of these norms and requirements are highlighted below. [10](#)

### **A. Consent**

Peacekeeping operations are non-mandatory. They therefore require the consent of the parties to the conflict and the countries contributing troops to the multinational peacekeeping force. If

any of these consents is absent, it is almost impossible to launch a peacekeeping operation, and if launched, it will be ineffective.

### **B. Cooperation**

Peacekeeping is essentially a non-coercive military mission; cooperation is therefore the crux of the operation. Active and consistent cooperation of the former belligerents or parties to the dispute is essential to effective peacekeeping. In any case, peacekeeping operations invariably have very limited capacity for enforcement and are limited in their use of force to self-defense in the last resort. A peacekeeping force can therefore be effectively defied if any party decides not to cooperate. Under circumstances where cooperation is lacking or withdrawn, the peacekeeping mission is frustrated in implementing its mandate, as we see with the U.N. peacekeeping mission in South Lebanon and ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. The cooperation of the constituent units of the authorizing body is also essential; the absence of cooperation from this quarter can undermine the capability, the credibility, and the impartiality of the peacekeeping force. With unity "come leverage and persuasive power to lead hostile parties toward negotiation." [11](#)

### **C. Non-Use of Force**

The norm of non-use of force is basic to the concept of peacekeeping. Experience, however, would seem to indicate that the emphasis on the concept of peaceful action may be too restrictive and subject to misrepresentation. A peacekeeping force may serve as deterrent, as stabilizing presence, and as interpositional buffer; and for these functions the confrontational, if not coercive, aspect of force may be essential. Thus, for its interpositional and policing functions the peacekeeping force may use the minimum force necessary to back up the mandated task. The key is to use force in a certain way: as deterrent, buffer, and interpositional. The operative distinction is not between use or non-use of force but its use to *police* a situation (as mandated) and as *enforcement action* that falls outside the concept of peacekeeping.

### **D. Clear Mandate**

The nature and scope of the mandate of the peacekeeping mission is a key determinant to its success or failure. A successful peacekeeping operation requires an unambiguous mandate, restricted in scope and application and not liable to varying interpretations. The terms and interpretation of the mandate must have the prior and specific agreement of the parties to the conflict. Specific tasks and duties of the force must be defined and agreed upon. Where these requirements are fulfilled, like the mandates of the Second U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF II) and the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Arab/Israeli conflict, future operational problems are avoided. A mandate cast in broad and ambiguous terms, with unrealistic objectives and without prior agreement by the parties to the details, is often bound to give rise to difficulties later with regard to interpretation and application. As the experience of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has indicated, a loosely crafted mandate contributes to the impression of failure of the peacekeeping mission. [12](#)

### **E. Institutional Capacity**

Institutional capacity may be defined in terms of material, operational, and political resources. Material and operational resources include funds, logistics, trained and disciplined infantry and logistic troops, and adequate personnel with high-level expertise in complex fields. Such high-level personnel will include civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee, and humanitarian aid specialists. The timing of peacekeeping intervention is often critical to the success of a peacekeeping mission; the timing is in turn often immensely influenced by the availability of material and operational resources. Political resources in the context of institutional capacity comprise moral authority, leverage, and the political strength to gain adherence to agreements.

U.N. experience indicates that peacekeeping can only be a productive conflict management device under the conditions discussed above. Where these requirements are absent, or norms disregarded or difficult to observe, peacekeeping tends to function ineffectively, frustrates all the parties involved, and becomes counterproductive. Some of the questions this essay attempts to answer are: How did OAU's performance measure up to the norms and requirements of peacekeeping? What aspects of the results of OAU's intervention in Chad depended specifically upon OAU's application of the concept of peacekeeping? And what do these factors tell us about the prospects of regional peacekeeping interventions in African conflicts?

### **III. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT**

The roots of Chad's conflict started far back in the country's colonial history when peoples of different cultures and with histories of enmity were lumped together on paper without even a pretense of integration made by the colonial overlord. As a colony, Chad was one of the most neglected of France's charges, and much of Chad's instability and violence can be attributed to its belated emergence as an organized territory. What the French bequeathed to its wards at independence was simply a frame inside of which was nothing to hold the country together; <sup>13</sup> since independence, the benighted country has reaped from these roots, a whirlwind of conflict precipitated by intractable interethnic animosities and the incompatibility of existing subnationalism.

The Chari River basically divides the country into two parts. The North comprises the Sahara desert region known as the B.E.T. (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibetsi) and the dry Sahel region that may properly be described as central Chad. The North is almost completely Muslim with strong historical, religious, and emotional links with the Arab world. The South is a rainy forest savannah with cotton cultivation and subsistence farming as the major forms of economic activity. It provides the primary source of revenue for the state. The population in the South is mostly Christian and animist.

The most prominent and homogenous are the sedentary Black Sara and related groups of the South who have been influenced by Western and Christian cultures. The most important groupings in the Sahel north are the Ouaddaian tribes, the Arab tribes, the Kanembou, and the Hadjerai. These groups are mostly semi-sedentary Muslim pastoralists. In the Saharan north reside the semi-nomadic, highly independent Toubou who are divided into two main divisions: the homogeneous Teda of Tibetsi and the heterogenous Daza of Borkou and Ennedi. <sup>14</sup>

The pre-colonial history of relations between various groups in Chad was replete with animosity and conflict. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the three Muslim kingdoms of the Sahelian north (Kanem, Ouaddai, and Baguirimi) continuously fought one another for control of the Sahel. Relations between the ethnic groups of the Saharan north and the Sahelian north were similarly hostile and tense. Thus, in addition to the basic cleavage between Muslim North and non-Muslim South, there was historic rivalry and antagonism within the North. <sup>15</sup>

Pre-colonial relations between the Arabized Muslim North and the Black African South were even more conflictual. For centuries the principal economic activity of the northern kingdoms of Ouaddai, Kanem, and Baguirimi consisted of slave raids into Sara country to capture human commodity for their lucrative slave trade. The segmentary structure of the Sara in the South, organized in small villages, clans, and subtribes, made them an easy prey to the military might of the Sahel sultanates. <sup>16</sup>

French rule had a most dramatic impact on power relations among the various ethnic groups and contributed directly to the emergence of conflict after independence. Cultural and religious differences among ethnic groups and their relative attitudes toward the French produced different values, exposures, and responses to modernization. The Muslim north vehemently rejected Christian penetration and secular western education, thus falling far behind in acquiring modern skills. On the other hand, southern ethnic groups had no problem with acquiring French culture or adopting Christianity. They tended to grasp whatever meager opportunities presented themselves for western secular education and the consequent upward mobility during the colonial era. With education and modern skills, the Sara filled almost all the administrative positions reserved for "natives" in the whole of Chad, while thousands also flocked to serve in the French Army.

French rule also disrupted traditional commercial routes and economic relations. Prior to the advent of the French, major trade routes went from south to north, from Chad to Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan. The major commodity was black African slaves from Chad. The French not only suppressed the centuries-old slave trade, but also introduced and emphasized new commercial links from southern Chad to Europe via the ports of Nigeria and Cameroon. <sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the French introduced commercial crops, especially cotton, into the fertile south, and concentrated all their investments in the south.

French rule thus broke the political and military power of northern ethnic groups and undermined their economies while it provided southern ethnic groups with economic resources, administrative skills, and military power. <sup>18</sup> The result was a dramatic reversal of the historical relationship: "the former slavers were pushed into an inferior position while their erstwhile slaves acquired the skills and capabilities for ruling Chad after independence." <sup>19</sup> When sovereign independence was achieved in 1960, the Sara of the south dominated the government, the economy, and the army. Naturally, once the French imperial Leviathan withdrew, northern ethnic groups attempted to undo the calamitous results of French intervention and revert to the pre-colonial power structure.

#### **IV. THE CONFLICT**

Historic animosities between ethnic groups and the opportunities for vengeance that independence afforded, were the major causes of conflict in Chad. On the one hand was the

refusal of northern ethnic groups to accept as final the dramatic shift of power to southern ethnic groups, their former source of primary commercial commodity--slaves. They were determined to rearrange the power structure in their favor, or at least to regain their autonomy from the central authority that was dominated by southern groups.

On the other hand were the bitter memories of southern groups. Stories about depopulation and ravaging of whole areas and destruction of entire tribes by Muslim slave raiders were still alive among the Black southern ethnic groups. <sup>20</sup> Recalling the injuries and humiliations that their ancestors had suffered at the hands of the northern Muslims who had raided and sold them into slavery, the Black administrators of independent Chad savored their new power and ruled with brutal vengeance. The venality and oppression of the Sara administrators and the behavior of a poorly paid and poorly led Sara-dominated army in the North were other major factors that sparked the conflict.

The French had maintained their administration of the B.E.T. after independence until 1965, when nationalistic sentiments led the independent government of François Tombalbaye to call for French withdrawal. The Toubous and their traditional rulers were left to the mercy of the southern Blacks (particularly the Sara) who replaced the French as administrators and garrison troops in the B.E.T. Maladministration, caused mostly by the corruption, insensitivity, and brutality of Sara military and civilian officials, made the B.E.T. erupt in rebellion. The brutality and humiliation of Sara rule prompted the flight of the Derde and the Toubou <sup>21</sup> to Libya while sons of the Sara led the insurrection in the North.

In 1966, the various liberation movements that sprang up to channel the course of the insurrection in the North merged to form Front Liberation Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT), initially led by Ibrahim Abatcha. FROLINAT, however, was plagued by factional divisions from the beginning, and the merger disintegrated even before the death of Abatcha in 1968. Although the rump retained the acronym FROLINAT, the insurrection spawned a bewildering array of self-appointed war-lords, movements, and armies.

By 1968, the insurrection had reached a regional scale in the North (both Sahelian and Saharan North) and had turned into a civil war. With his country at the brink of disintegration, President François Tombalbaye requested French intervention to prop up his regime. The French responded with a total reform package consisting of civil and military components. In addition to the Military Delegation that was given the task of containing the insurrection, the French despatched to Chad a "Mission de la Reforme Administrative" (MRA) with far-reaching powers. This civilian component of the French intervention was to help alleviate inter-ethnic frictions that undergirded the conflict, to retrain the army, to purge and reform the administration, and to review unpopular laws and taxes.

The French intervention was primarily a military holding operation designed to contain the civil war while Tombalbaye introduced a series of reforms and reconciliation measures prescribed by French advisors. By 1971, the insurrection had been largely contained, and the French gave a new lease on life to their client state. Tombalbaye, however, was beyond redemption. His rule, erratic and venal from the beginning, sank to new depths that gave credence to the classical Greek adage that those whom the gods want to destroy they first make mad with power.

From 1960 to 1970, President Tombalbaye, like most African leaders of the time, had gone through the process of his conception of political consolidation and nation-building by relying primarily on naked force and the strategic use of violence. Opposition parties had been declared illegal; a one-party state had been instituted; opposition elements had been intimidated and decimated with incarceration and assassination; and all political power had been concentrated in the hands of Tombalbaye.

Tombalbaye now aggravated the consequences of his paranoia and oppressive rule with strange political contortions. He not only neglected French advice, he launched an anti-French diatribe. He indulged in a fleeting flirtation with Libya; he antagonized the Sara-dominated armed forces by humiliating and purging the higher echelon with demotions and arrests, and, finally, he managed to alienate his own Sara people with the introduction of a singularly inappropriate "cultural authenticity" policy that required civil servants to undergo Sara initiation rites. [22](#)

Tombalbaye's end came as a result of a coup d'etat on April 13, 1975. His downfall was not caused by the armed insurrection, although it certainly contributed to it. His downfall was more a direct result of his loss of support and progressive alienation of those Sara compatriots who constituted the civil service, the intellectual elite and, above all, the armed forces. General Felix Malloum, Tombalbaye's former chief of staff who had been under house arrest since June 1973 for "political sorcery" in the so-called Black Sheep Plot, emerged as the chairman of the new Supreme Military Council and head of government. [23](#)

Political stability eluded Malloum's regime as the country continued on its path to total disintegration. From 1975 onward the north-south dichotomy was no longer a valid reference axis for identifying insurgents and loyalists. Serious dissensions began to emerge within the ranks of both insurgents and loyalists that triggered a process of complex fragmentation. There were at least three major armies--Habre's FAN, Goukouni's FAP, Kamougue's FAT--and five small splinter groups. During mid-1978 FROLINAT forces, heavily armed and logistically supported by Libya, defeated government forces in the B.E.T., captured Faya Largeau, the regional capital, and eventually controlled roughly half of the country. As rebel forces continued their advance toward the south, it was only a matter of time before the fall of N'Djamena and the total collapse of central authority, an event that transpired in 1979.

## **V. OAU'S INTERVENTION IN THE CHADIAN CONFLICT**

Although the conflict in Chad had been raging since 1965, it was not until 1977, at its Libreville (Gabon) Summit that the OAU first addressed itself to the question of Chad. Following charges brought by the Malloum regime of Chad against Libya over the latter's support of FROLINAT, the Libreville Summit appointed an Ad Hoc Committee (comprising Gabon, Algeria, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroon) to mediate the conflict between Chad and Libya. Although there had been a civil war in Chad for 12 years, the Chadian government still maintained the facade that its conflict was with Libya, and that OAU's intervention was constitutionally permissible only in that situation of inter-state conflict. The efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee and the active involvement of Libya produced the first ceasefire agreement between the Chadian government and the FROLINAT signed on March 27, 1978, at conferences in Sebha and Benghazi in Libya. This ceasefire, like many to follow, never took effect.

The Chad situation was transformed in February 1979 with the defeat of the Malloum regime by the FROLINAT faction led by Hissene Habre. The defeat of Malloum's regime meant an end to southern domination over the Muslim north; but it also transformed the conflict into a struggle for power among the Muslim leaders themselves as Hissene Habre was challenged by his longstanding northern rival, Goukouni Weddeye. The second development in the conflict was Nigeria's assumption of a leadership role in the regional mediation efforts to resolve the conflict. In fact, from 1979 onward, the OAU appeared to follow Nigeria's mediatory initiatives that were legitimized because they were pursued in the framework of the OAU mediation.

Nigeria's leadership role began with the convening of a conference on national reconciliation in Kano, Nigeria, on March 11, 1979. The conference was attended by representatives of four Chadian factions: President Malloum; Hissene Habre, leader of the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN); Goukouni Weddeye representing the FROLINAT; and Aboubakar Mahamat Abderaman, leader of the Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation de Tchad (MPLT, supported by Nigeria). Delegates from Nigeria, the Sudan, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, and a representative of the OAU participated in the conference. This conference (Kano I) was the first attempt to bring together all important factions and interested parties, within and without Chad, for the purpose of seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

After five days of intensive negotiations, the participating parties on March 16, 1979, signed a peace accord to take effect on March 23. The provisions of the peace accord were rather ambitious. They comprised the following:

1. A general ceasefire in Chad and the establishment of a neutral peacekeeping force to be provided by Nigeria.
2. Setting up an independent monitoring commission under the chairmanship of Nigeria and comprising delegates from the countries attending the Kano conference and from representatives of the Chad factions.
3. The establishment of a "transitional government of national union" to prepare a program leading to the installation of a freely elected government composed of all factions with its leader selected by them.
4. The demilitarization of the capital city of N'Djamena to a radius of 100 kilometers.
5. A general amnesty for political prisoners and hostages and the release of prisoners of war, the pardon extending also to those living in exile.
6. The dissolution of all political organizations and the gradual integration of military factions into the national army. [24](#)

The first contingent of Nigerian troops reached Chad in late March 1979. As it turned out, this was the only provision of the Kano I accord that was fulfilled. The control commission never materialized; N'Djamena remained a city under siege; and the motley parties retained their independent fractious identities. Independent of the Kano I agreement, a Provisional State Council led by Goukouni Weddeye was appointed by General Malloum, prior to his resignation, to govern the country's affairs until the establishment of a transitional government of national union. Goukouni Weddeye thereupon became a de facto head of state as chairman of the provisional council that comprised the four factions represented at Kano.

Dismayed by the deterioration of the situation in Chad, Nigeria hosted a second Kano peace conference on April 3, 1979, and yet a third conference on national reconciliation in Lagos from

May 26-27, 1979. Both Kano II and Lagos conferences ended inconclusively. Rather the principal mediator, Nigeria, became embroiled in the conflict. Relations between the principal Chadian factions (Weddeye's and Habre's) and Nigeria became increasingly contentious. Nigeria, incensed by what it perceived as the recalcitrance of the Chadian government, resorted to an economic boycott, cutting off oil supplies to landlocked Chad in an effort to pressure the principal Chadian factions to be more receptive to Nigeria's mediatory initiatives. <sup>25</sup> The principal Chadian factions, on the other hand, denounced the high-handed behavior of Nigeria in the Chadian conflict and demanded the withdrawal of the of Nigeria's peacekeeping force that the Chadians now viewed as an "occupation army." <sup>26</sup>

The frustration that Nigeria's peacekeeping troops encountered in Chad was a foretaste of what was in store for the OAU's subsequent efforts at peacekeeping. Launched by a broad and overly ambitious mandate, neither the Nigerian peacekeeping troops nor the Chadian factions appeared adequately briefed on what was required of them. The Chadian factions each perceived the neutral forces to be either with them or against them; their neutrality was not understood or appreciated, <sup>27</sup> and consent was either lacking, misunderstood, or withdrawn. As relations between Nigeria and the major Chadian factions soured, the peacekeeping force was perceived as part of the conflict and not an instrument for its solution; the neutral force was subjected to harassment and attack. <sup>28</sup>

On Aug. 14, 1979, Nigeria, with the support of the OAU, hosted the second reconciliation conference in Lagos (Lagos II) with the participation of all the eleven Chadian factions, including Weddeye, Habre, and Kamougue. The accord that emanated from Lagos II incorporated many of the elements of the Kano I Agreement, and included the establishment of a broadly-based transitional government (under the presidency of Mr. Weddeye) that was to prepare for elections within 18 months. <sup>29</sup> A most significant provision of the Lagos II accord was the directive to the OAU Secretary-General to assemble an OAU neutral force to supervise the ceasefire and head a monitoring commission to oversee both the peace process and the peacekeeping operations. The Congo, Benin, and Guinea were invited to supply the peacekeeping troops. By the end of 1979, none of the key provisions of the Lagos accord had been implemented except the formation of the transitional government that had met only once. Worse still, none of the countries which were to provide the neutral African force appeared able to bear the cost of such an undertaking; nor had the OAU provided any funding.

The OAU's role during and following the Lagos conference was rather vague and left many vital questions unanswered. It was certainly arguable whether the Lagos accord was based on OAU authority. Even if one were to consider the Lagos conference as falling within the the ambit of the activities of the ad hoc Committee on Chad, the provisions of the accord requiring substantive institutional involvement like chairing of the monitoring commission and launching of a peacekeeping mission should have benefitted from prior consideration and approval by the heads of state and government before any attempt at implementation. The OAU seemed to have allowed its proper role to be usurped by a constituent member, and in consequence failed to give comprehensive consideration to all the ramifications of its peacekeeping involvement in Chad. In any case, the Lagos accord became the nucleus of all subsequent efforts by the OAU to manage the Chadian conflict with peacekeeping operations. One would in fact find it difficult to delineate when the Nigerian initiative terminated and OAU initiative took off.

As it turned out, of the projected Neutral OAU Force, only the Congolese contingent of 500 troops showed up in Chad on Jan. 18, 1980, reportedly "transported in Soviet planes belonging to the Algerian Army and piloted by Angolese." [30](#) Like its predecessor, the Nigerian Neutral Force, this second African attempt at peacekeeping failed to mitigate the conflict. The Congolese contingent was actually sequestered in barracks till they were evacuated by the French between March 30 and April 3, 1980, against a background of heavy fighting in the capital.

During 1980, as the Chadian conflict reached new heights of intensity with widespread destruction of life and property, the OAU watched with pathetic impotence, except for the reiteration of its call, at various meetings, for the implementation of the Lagos accord. At its Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session in Freetown from June 18 to 28, 1980, the Council of Ministers attempted to inject some vigor into the lame process of organizational intervention in the Chadian conflict. In a resolution on Chad, the Council recommended specific measures that subsequently were adopted by the 17th OAU Summit. The following are the operative paragraphs of the Council's resolution:

1. Reaffirm the validity of the Lagos Accord as the basis for the settlement of the Chadian crisis;
2. Make one further attempt to find an African solution to the crisis, particularly with regard to the provision of the Neutral OAU Force by requesting African states that could provide peacekeeping forces at their own expense in accordance with conditions to be determined at the Summit. Logistic and operational costs would be met from voluntary contributions;
3. Decide that if the OAU failed to raise the necessary funds for the peacekeeping force after two months, the U.N. Security Council would be asked through the African Group for financial assistance to restore peace in Chad. [31](#)

The rationale underlying the two provisions relating to funding of the peacekeeping mission and U.N. involvement is not very tenable. First, the peacekeeping mission, subsequently estimated to cost about \$162 million, was to be financed from voluntary contributions within an organization whose members have difficulty paying their assigned annual dues. [32](#) The peacekeeping mission was later to feel the impact of this uncertain funding. Secondly, U.N. assistance was only a contingency measure to be sought after two months if the OAU failed to fund the mission. This implied that the OAU did not consider seriously incorporating the U.N. in the initial planning of the projected peacekeeping mission, preferring to rely on its own resources whose limitations should have been obvious from the start. Further, given the urgency of the crisis, the two-month time frame did not indicate a sense of purpose by the OAU. Rapid intervention, when a mandate and an agreement have been obtained, is essential for effective peacekeeping.

The language of one of the operative paragraphs of the Freetown resolutions--"Make one further attempt to find an African solution to the crisis"--was specifically meant to placate the member-states who had been contending, since the 16th Summit in Monrovia (1979), that the Chadian conflict was beyond OAU's management capability and should therefore be handed over to the U.N. to resolve. Thompson and Adloff have correctly observed that Nigeria was largely instrumental in persuading those attending the economic conference at Lagos in April 1980 and the OAU summit at Freetown in July to postpone placing the conflict in Chad on the U.N. agenda. [33](#)

The Chadian conflict changed dramatically toward the end of 1980 following the large-scale intervention of Libyan troops in support of President Weddeye. In a concerted anti-Habre campaign, Libya and its clients put Habre's troops to rout from N'Djamena by the end of December 1980. On Jan. 6, 1981, Libya and the government of Chad announced their decision to work toward achieving a merger of the two countries, immediately encountering the furor of almost total African opposition. Ghadaffi and Weddeye eventually were shaken by the intensity of African leaders' furor, France's anger and warning to Libya which it underscored by reinforcing French military presence in Africa, and widespread internal opposition in Chad to the proposed merger. Both the Libyan and the Chadian governments began to play down the notion that the communique on the merger provided for a full union of their two countries, stressing that they planned a unity of their peoples in historical, ethnic, and ideological terms and not a fusion of their two countries. <sup>34</sup> Libyan troops, however, remained in virtual control of Chad until President Weddeye buckled under further pressure from African leaders who unequivocally made Libyan troop withdrawal a condition to deploy peacekeeping troops in Chad. Upon the direct request from the Chadian Government (much to the chagrin of Ghadaffi), Libya had her troops withdrawn by mid-November 1981. <sup>35</sup>

The withdrawal of Libyan troops paved the way for finalizing the modalities and protocols for dispatch of the African peacekeeping mission. On the question of finance, the Heads of State of the troop-contributing countries (Senegal, Zaire, and Nigeria), <sup>36</sup> at a meeting in Nairobi from November 26-27, 1981, directed the General Secretariat to work out details of the budget and requested "the OAU Chairman to raise such a fund from the Member States, the United Nations and *other friendly countries*" (emphasis added). <sup>37</sup> The budget for the first year of operation subsequently was estimated at \$162,897,500.00 and later revised to \$192,000,000 upon the advice of a U.N. technical team. <sup>38</sup> Among the issues covered by the protocols or Status of Force Agreement were the principles of consent and request and the mandate of the peacekeeping missions. The mission's mandate included supervision of the ceasefire; demilitarization of N'Djamena and the surrounding district, financial and material assistance to train and establish an integrated Chadian armed force; and the defense and security of Chad while awaiting the integration of Government forces. <sup>39</sup>

Subsequent to the Nairobi meeting, the peacekeeping troops under the command of a Nigerian, General Geoffrey Ejiga, were deployed in their respective operational zones as follows: 2,000 Nigerians by Dec. 17, 1981, 700 Zairians by 27 December 1981, and 600 Senegalese troops by Jan. 8, 1982. The transportation and the provision of general logistics for the Senegalese troops were borne by France. The United States committed \$12 million for logistical help to Zaire and Nigeria. <sup>40</sup>

Immediately after becoming operational, the peacekeeping mission encountered immense logistic and financial difficulties. The enormity of these problems compelled the Chairman of the OAU (Kenya's Arap Moi), in accordance with the recommendation of African Heads of State, <sup>41</sup> to ask the U.N. Security Council for financial, material, and technical assistance for the OAU's peacekeeping effort in Chad. <sup>42</sup>

The Security Council, however, would not commit itself to any extensive financial or operational contribution to a peacekeeping operation that would not be under its own political authority and military direction. Such an action would be unprecedented. The farthest the U.N. Security Council would go was to adopt a consensus resolution calling on the U.N. "Secretary-General to

establish a fund for assistance to the peacekeeping force of the Organization of African Unity in Chad, to be supplied by voluntary contributions." <sup>43</sup> That was the end of the OAU request. The contributing countries of the OAU peacekeeping force (and their foreign patrons) had to bear the cost of their own involvement.

Meanwhile the politico-military situation in Chad continued to deteriorate with Hissene Habre's forces making tremendous advances, virtually unimpeded, toward N'Djamena. The OAU peacekeeping mission was constrained by inadequate logistics and finances for any effective operations, and its peacemaking efforts were frustrated by the absence of political will on the part of the Chadian factions to pursue a political settlement of the conflict.

President Arap Moi of Kenya, the chairman of the OAU realized that the sad politico-military situation in Chad made nonsense of the peacekeeping mission's purpose and mandate. Consequently, he convened a meeting of the OAU Standing Committee on Chad in Nairobi from Feb. 10-11, 1982, to review the Chad situation and OAU involvement. The Nairobi meeting issued another peace plan reiterating the neutral character of the OAU peacekeeping force as far as internal conflicts were concerned, demanded that a ceasefire be established by February 1982, and decided to withdraw the OAU peacekeeping force by June 30, 1982. <sup>44</sup>

President Weddeye, on the other hand, insisted that the OAU force in Chad should participate actively on the side of his Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) at suppressing the rebellion. He rejected the ceasefire call, charged that the OAU Standing Committee had no legal basis, claimed a betrayal by the OAU, and walked out of the meeting with his delegation. <sup>45</sup>

Habre's forces captured N'Djamena on June 7, 1982, while Weddeye fled the capital for Cameroon. As the government signatory to the Status of Force Agreement was no more in power, the existence of the OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad was no longer legal after June 7, 1982. In spite of Habre's request to the OAU to maintain its peacekeeping force in Chad and pursue its original mandate, the then-Chairman ordered immediate termination of the mission and withdrawal of troops by June 30, 1982.

## **VI. EVALUATION AND LESSONS**

The OAU's peacemaking initiative in the Chadian conflict was an unmitigated failure due to serious lapses in the mediation process and the peacekeeping operation. Although the sources and results of defective peacemaking and inefficient peacekeeping are interrelated, these two broad categories of problems are discussed separately for analytical clarity.

### ***A. Defective Concept and Process of Mediation***

Peaceful settlement of conflicts through negotiations should involve (1) a search for a formula whose definition of the problem would encompass the optimum combination of interests of the disputants under a common notion of justice, and (2) implementation of details within for formula through the exchange of proposals, concessions, and agreements. <sup>46</sup> None of the agreements, accords, and resolutions on Chad contained any notion of a formula for peaceful settlement. The repeated calls for a ceasefire, demilitarization of the capital and free and fair elections were details that were unrealistic and unavailable because they were not based on any

negotiated peace formula like power devolution (autonomy) or equitable distribution of power in control of the state. Once the parties were agreed on such a formula, it could be interpreted and implemented in details to the mutual satisfaction of the parties.

The one substantive solution in the peace proposals on the Chadian conflict was the call for free and fair elections. African leaders appeared enamored of free and fair elections--so long as they were not going to be held in their own countries. In Chad the results of free and fair elections were predictable; the largest ethnic group, the Sara in the south, would win such elections as they did to dominate the government at independence. The predictable results were unacceptable to the northern ethnic groups; it was the issue of southern dominance that had precipitated the northern rebellion in the first place. What was needed was a new negotiated formula of power relations which would confront the fundamental sources of the conflict and encompass the optimum combination of interests of the major Chadian parties.

The mediating body seemed incapable of comprehending the fundamental sources of the conflict: frustration of basic needs for group identity, security, recognition, autonomy, and dignity, [47](#) perhaps even compounded by the fear of group extinction. [48](#) In Chad this fear of group extinction was real. Stories of genocide perpetrated by Muslim slave raiders were still alive among Black Southern groups. Nor would the northern and Sahelian ethnic groups ever submit again to the venal rule and brutalization at the hands of Black administrators. Any peace formula should have been informed by a thorough analysis by the parties to the conflict (facilitated by the mediating third-party) of the deep-rooted sources of conflict. Without a handle on the source of a malady, an effective cure is hardly possible.

The most pertinent lesson from the Chad imbroglio may well be that forging a winner-takes-all Euro-centric constitution and despatching former combatants in Chad, Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, and elsewhere in Africa to an electoral race would not constitute a lasting solution to the communal (ethnic) conflicts raging throughout Africa. It sadly amounts to the creation of conditions for self-perpetuating bloodshed and progressive ruin of societies. Where the pursuit of absolute "national unity" is a recipe for continual violence, more ingenious peace strategies that will guarantee life, limb, property, and identity must be formulated. Unity should not be absolute; nor should sovereignty be sacred. Feasible peace strategies may encompass administrative decentralization, autonomy, federalism, and separation. [49](#)

### ***B. Problems of Inefficient Peacekeeping***

The OAU's peacekeeping not only failed to have any positive impact on the conflict, it also resulted in institutional frustration and regional disillusion. [50](#) The sources of frustration could mostly be attributed to the fact that the mission violated almost all the norms and requirements of peacekeeping. In the first place, the *mandates* for the peacekeeping initiatives, Nigeria's and the OAU's, were too broad, overly ambitious, and unrealistic.

The two peacekeeping missions were to supervise a ceasefire where none had ever taken hold; to ensure freedom of civilian movement throughout Chad, a feat never accomplished by the might of imperial France; and to help organize an army, disarm a population, and ensure peace and security of the whole country when the country had never been functionally integrated and was at the time no more than "a patchwork of urban centers, linked mostly by air only." [51](#) The

unrealistic and ambiguous mandates violated the operational norm of a limited, precise, and clear mandate for an effective peacekeeping mission.

The peacekeeping operation also was plagued by loose terms of reference and operating procedures. The role and functions of the peacekeeping force in the Status of Force Agreement were too vague and liable to several interpretations. There was no prior agreement on details with regard to the status and specific functions of the peacekeeping force. The parties in conflict were never made to understand the neutral interpository role of the peacekeeping force. Weddeye, head of the recognized government and the only signatory to the agreement with the OAU authorizing the peacekeeping intervention, was arguably right in his interpretation that the phrase to "safeguard the security of the Chad State" obligated the peacekeeping mission to assist his government to repel any threat to the security of his government. <sup>52</sup> Thus, under siege, Weddeye demanded the military assistance of the neutral force.

Further, unlike UNEF II and UNTSO mandates, there was no precedent agreement between the belligerent parties which could have determined the specificity and realism of the mandate. What was even a more serious lapse on the part of the OAU was the failure to specifically obtain the *consent* and *cooperation* of all the major parties to the conflict prior to the initiation of the peacekeeping mission. With limited military capacity, the mission was doomed to fail without the consent and consistent cooperation of the belligerents. Habre, the other major party to the conflict, was not even a signatory to the agreement authorizing the peacekeeping mission, and he defiantly pressed on his assault on the capital, N'Djamena, while the OAU force hunkered down in impotence.

The one requirement the peacekeeping operation faithfully observed was the principle of *non-use of force*. The mission had no choice. With limited military capability and without the cooperation of the parties, the peacekeeping troops were often at greater physical risk than the belligerents. <sup>53</sup> Any attempt at enforcement action by the peacekeepers would have been suicidal.

Compounding the problems of the peacekeeping mission was the absence of cooperation *among* the constituent units of the authorizing body, the OAU. Libyan involvement in the Chadian conflict was a most divisive element among African leaders, precipitating a stormy meeting of the ad hoc committee in Lagos in December 1980, <sup>54</sup> and resuscitating the ideological cleavages within the regional organization. Throughout the process of mediation, OAU member-states appeared to have differing motivations for involvement in the process. The differing motivations of member-states tended to sap the political strength of the intervening institution by undermining its unity of purpose, impartiality, credibility and, ultimately, capability. For example, Hissene Habre had no reason to seek a negotiated settlement since some member-states of the OAU, particularly Egypt and the Sudan, were more than willing not to act as a conduit for U.S. arms to promote Habre's objectives in the conflict. <sup>55</sup> And Weddeye had every reason to question the OAU peacekeeping force's neutrality since some of the governments which had contributed sizable forces, especially Senegal and Zaire, wanted to see Habre succeed. <sup>56</sup>

Perhaps the major operational constraint was the *limited institutional capacity* for the peacekeeping mission. The Chad operations were simply beyond the financial capability of the OAU. The OAU's budget for 1981-82, the critical period of the Chad operations, was \$19.5

million in U.S. dollars, while the operational budget for the peacekeeping mission for the first year was \$162.8 million. <sup>57</sup> The OAU was able to collect only \$500,000 for a special fund established for the Chad operation. <sup>58</sup> Troop contributing countries (with the assistance of their foreign patrons) had to bear the brunt of the cost of operations and logistics for their respective troops. The uncertain funding impaired command and control and undermined morale of some of the troops. <sup>59</sup> This situation adversely affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission. With mounting bills and increasing logistical problems, there was no way the OAU could have sustained a drawn-out peacekeeping mission even if the belligerent parties had cooperated.

Another point glossed over by the OAU was that the conflict situation in Chad was the type where peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace servicing should effectively be integrated to assure any chance of success at managing the conflict. The OAU was involved with peacemaking and peacekeeping. But Chad, after 15 years of bloody conflict, was a bankrupt nation with a starving population, whose capital lay in ruins with virtually no water or electricity, and with the administrative and commercial center of the city completely paralyzed. <sup>60</sup> The peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts by the OAU should therefore have been complemented with a heavy and sustained dose of peace servicing. Of course, the OAU was in no position to provide this. The OAU's peacemaking effort in Chad was therefore conceptually defective; the peacekeeping was operationally inefficient and underfinanced; and its peace servicing was totally non-existent. In the Chadian conflict, African leaders undertook a task which bore no relationship to the strengths and weaknesses of their regional organization.

African leaders should be wary of leaping into regional conflicts whose complexity could defy even the U.N. The pattern and level of conflicts in Liberia, the Sudan, Angola, Chad, Somalia, Mozambique, and elsewhere in Africa (including the proliferation of potential flash points) typically demand an extensive outlay of deployable resources and a high level of expertise in complex fields. These may include peacekeeping, monitoring of truces by air, sea, and land which would demand modern surveillance technology; organization of constitutional conferences, referenda, and elections; and critical humanitarian assistance and peace servicing targeted to reducing conflict through socio-economic programs. These are areas in which African regional organizations are particularly weak.

A vital asset of a mediator is reputation based on the perception of impartiality or at least trust, leverage, respect and moral credibility. In addition to such ideal resources <sup>61</sup> for third-party intervention, the search for a peaceful resolution to a conflict by a regional organization must be informed by substantive (systemic) principles which would govern various situations of conflict. For the current spate of intrastate conflicts, such principles may include self-determination, basic human needs of identity and recognition, popular choice and decision-making through open and fair referenda and elections, popular participation in governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The development of such universal principles in the African regional system is in its infancy. It is interesting to note that when Mr. Taylor of Liberia launched his rebellion and civil war in 1990, the chairman of the OAU was Uganda's Museveni, who had himself hewed a similar bloody path to power. Major players in the ECOWAS' "peacekeeping" intervention in Liberia, Nigeria's Babangida, Ghana's Rawlings, Guinea's Conteh, and Sierra Leone's Strasser all lay claim to power through the barrel of the gun; all are facing challenges to the legitimacy of their hold on power.

It is no wonder that Taylor continues to blatantly defy and dissemble before ECOWAS mediators some of whose motives for armed intervention might have included their apprehension of the demonstration effect of a successful civilian insurrection against a military regime. [62](#)

Sub-regional intervention in local conflicts may have some advantages, [63](#) but the enthusiasm for this level of armed intervention must be tempered by the real possibility that the more intense sub-regional ambitions, rivalries, antagonisms and, most importantly, the overlapping of ethnic groups across state boundaries, could turn an intra-state conflict into a more intractable surrogate conflict among the states in the subregion. [64](#) For these and other reasons (including a more severe lack of resources), while a sub-regional organization may offer its good offices as a mediator in local conflicts, the initiation of armed intervention appropriately may be reserved for the regional organization (OAU) and the U.N.

The success of any regional peacekeeping and, especially, peace enforcement which can only be initiated under the authority of the U.N. Security Council, [65](#) will largely depend upon the mediating body's physical capacity and the level of ideal resources the intervening body or parties bring to the mediation process. For the moment, and in the foreseeable future (hopefully, not beyond year 2000), there is a dire scarcity of these requisite resources for regional peacekeeping. What then are the feasible options for regional peacekeeping?

## **VII. OPTIONS FOR REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING**

Peacekeeping intervention in African conflicts would stand a better chance of success if they are conceived, planned, and initiated as multilateral missions coordinated and directed by the U.N., with the OAU playing a complementary role as a vital but junior partner. The objective of this multilateral initiative is to take advantage of the salience and ideal resources of the OAU as a mediator, while employing extra-regional powers and agencies to furnish other mediatory resources such as leverage, moral authority, credibility, legitimacy, and physical resources.

Whatever resources the OAU lacks in peacekeeping, the U.N. has in abundance. The U.N. has the expertise and experience in all aspects of peacekeeping. It has the global mandate, the legitimacy, the continuity or "staying power," and the political strength to gain adherence to agreements. Pressure and sanctions imposed on recalcitrant parties by influential global actors would seem less "bullying" if they are initiated under U.N. Security Council auspices. While the U.N. can insulate reluctant external powers from direct intervention in conflicts in some remote corner of Africa, logistic and other material assistance from these powers could be channeled through the U.N. system and thereby made more acceptable to all shades of African opinion--and the domestic public opinion of external powers.

Unilateral external assistance to peacekeeping missions through bilateral arrangements with troop-contributing countries was ineffective in Chad and may in all likelihood prove similarly futile in Liberia. Uncoordinated assistance in drips and droplets to African peacekeeping initiatives may keep the operation barely functional without a perceptible impact on effectiveness. Furthermore, U.N. coordination of multilateral initiative in regional peacekeeping would enable economic powers like Japan and Germany, medium powers like Italy, India, Ireland, and the Netherlands, and nongovernmental organizations to play some role in African peacekeeping, each emphasizing its particular area of strength.

To alleviate Africa's misgivings about opportunities for increased foreign involvement, Africa can supply the bulk, if not all, of the troops for peacekeeping missions. At least the combat troops could be African, while the logistic and other support units could be extra-regional. The peacekeeping mission can be commanded by an African who would report to the U.N. Secretary-General; the latter and his pertinent staff would liaise and consult closely with the OAU Secretary-General and his staff. Indeed, a joint directorate may be set up for a particular peacekeeping mission.

OAU collaboration with the U.N. should go beyond the transmission of a shopping list by African leaders to the U.N. for financial and logistical support. It would be unrealistic to expect the U.N. to commit its resources and political prestige to sensitive and complex peacekeeping operations in Africa without the political authority to direct it. African leaders can initiate and sell the mode of intervention to the U.N. system, while the U.N. Security Council assumes the leadership role in sponsoring and directing the peacekeeping operation in collaboration with the OAU.

Africa could be better served if regional influential actors would purposefully enlist the assistance of global actors in devising U.N./OAU peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace servicing packages for Africa's troubled spots along on the lines of U.N. intervention in Cambodia. There a mission of 22,000 U.N. personnel comprising peacekeeping troops, administrative personnel and technicians has been despatched to restore peace, stability, and socio-economic viability. In this regard, African leaders should initiate a review of the components of the operational costs for peacekeeping missions for possible savings. Should the level of U.N. payments to troop-contributing African countries be maintained for African conflicts? Should professional African troops be paid a U.N. level of allowance for peacekeeping in Africa?

At the political level, global powers and regional influential actors, through regular and informal meetings (within) the U.N. system), can establish the parameters and components of regional peacekeeping interventions, an articulated relationship between the U.N. and OAU as joint peacekeepers, and coordinated diversification of roles under U.N. auspices. At the operational level, the U.N. and OAU Secretariats may be mandated by appropriate authorities to formulate the modalities of joint peacekeeping missions, and specify and apportion responsibilities among the various players, including specialized institutions of the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations that can assist in furnishing the peace servicing and peace-building components for intervention and resolution of conflicts.

## **VIII. CONCLUSION**

These are trying times for the African regional system. Several African states are under severe stress from the threat of disintegration at "natural" (ethnic) seams. The turmoil within the constituent units of the OAU and their consequent weakness pose a challenge and an opportunity to the OAU. It can be the anchor of stability and at the same time furnish the compass to guide the region to a safer haven of new, constructive systemic principles and norms.

This challenge falls to the executive leadership of the OAU. It can be proactive; it can enlarge the formal constitutional powers granted to the office of the Secretary-General through practice and the consequent development of conventions. It can start by devising a feasible mechanism

for effective peacekeeping interventions in Africa. It is hoped that this essay's analyses and prescriptions would help in initiating the search for such a mechanism.

## Notes

**Note 1:** . Ted Robert Gurr, "Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (ed.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 153-155. [Back.](#)

**Note 2:** . Raymond W. Copson, "Peace in Africa?" in Deng and Zartman, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, pp. 22-23. [Back.](#)

**Note 3:** . This figure comes from the U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey: 1989 in Review (Washington, 1990). [Back.](#)

**Note 4:** . Charter of the OAU, Article III/2. [Back.](#)

**Note 5:** . Indarjit Rikhye, Michel Harbottle and Bjørn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) p. 10. [Back.](#)

**Note 6:** . David P. Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 1-3. [Back.](#)

**Note 7:** . Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (U.N. Department of Information, New York, 1992), pp. 8-9. [Back.](#)

**Note 8:** . *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1985), p. 3. [Back.](#)

**Note 9:** . Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 16. [Back.](#)

**Note 10:** . For a discussion of the norms and requirements of multinational peacekeeping see *The Blue Helmets*; Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon* (SAIS Paper #3, Boulder, Westview, 1984), chapters 1-3 and 7; Henry Wiseman (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983); Indar J. Rikhye, *Strengthening U.N. Peacekeeping: New Challenges and Proposals* (United States Institute of Peace Report, 1992); and Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 29. [Back.](#)

**Note 11:** . Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 21. [Back.](#)

**Note 12:** . For discussions of UNTSO, UNEF II, and UNIFIL see *The Blue Helmets*, Chapters II, III, and VI respectively. [Back.](#)

**Note 13:** . Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad* (Berkeley: University of California, 1981), pp. 11, 21-22. [Back.](#)

**Note 14:** . For a more detailed description of ethnic groups in Chad see Thompson and Adloff, *Conflict in Chad*, pp. 3-5; and Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strive in Chad," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 18, No. 1 (1980), pp. 25-29. [Back.](#)

**Note 15:** . Benjamin Neuberger, *Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Ghadafi's Libya and Chad, 1969-1981* (Occasional Paper No. 83, Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1982), p. 12. [Back.](#)

**Note 16:** . Ibid., pp. 12-13. [Back.](#)

**Note 17:** . See Neuberger, *Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal*, p. 13. [Back.](#)

**Note 18:** . Thompson and Adloff, *Conflict in Chad*, pp. 6-22. [Back.](#)

**Note 19:** . Neuberger, *Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal*, p. 14. [Back.](#)

**Note 20:** . Ibid; pp. 12-13. [Back.](#)

**Note 21:** . Weddeye Kichimedi, spiritual head of the Toubou and the political leader of the Tomaghera clan of the Teda branch of the Toubou. [Back.](#)

**Note 22:** . Alex Rondos, "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Chad," *Current History*, Vol. 84, May 1985, pp. 209-210. [Back.](#)

**Note 23:** . On the Black Sheep Plot see *West Africa*, July 9, 1973. [Back.](#)

**Note 24:** . *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, Feb. 1, 1980, p. 30065. [Back.](#)

**Note 25:** . *West Africa*, June 4, 1979. [Back.](#)

**Note 26:** . *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, Feb. 1, 1980, p. 30066. [Back.](#)

**Note 27:** . Henry Wiseman, "The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution" in El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman (eds.), *The OAU After Twenty Years* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 131-32. [Back.](#)

**Note 28:** . See Alex Rondo's observation that Nigerian troops "had to be withdrawn when it became obvious that they would be at even greater physical risk than the belligerents," (*West Africa*, Sept. 29, 1980). [Back.](#)

**Note 29:** . *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, Feb. 1, 1980, 30067. [Back.](#)

**Note 30:** . Ibid; p. 98. [Back.](#)

**Note 31:** . OAU Document CM/Res. 794 (XXXV). See also CM/Res. 790 (XXXV) by which the Council approved the dispatch of the OAU peacekeeping force. [Back.](#)

**Note 32:** . See *Report of the Board of the External Auditors on the Accounts of the OAU for the 1985/86 Financial Year*, OAU Document CM/1408(XLV). [Back.](#)

**Note 33:** . Thompson and Adloff, *Conflict in Chad*, p. 115; also interviews. [Back.](#)

**Note 34:** . Ibid; 31161. [Back.](#)

**Note 35:** . *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 6-11, 1983, OAU Document AHG/109 (XIX) Part I, p. 2. [Back.](#)

**Note 36:** . Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Zambia provided observers for the peacekeeping mission. [Back.](#)

**Note 37:** . *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 6-11, 1983, OAU Document AHG/109(XIX) Part I, p. 3. [Back.](#)

**Note 38:** . Ibid; pp. 5 and 14. See also declassified OAU document, *Operational Budget for the Peace-keeping*. [Back.](#)

**Note 39:** . See OAU Document *Agreement Between the Transitional National Union Government of the Republic of Chad and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Regarding the Status of a Pan-African Peace-Keeping Force in Chad*, Nairobi, Nov. 28, 1981. [Back.](#)

**Note 40:** . See *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 1984; p. 39; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, Sept. 3, 1982, p. 31678. [Back.](#)

**Note 41:** . See Nairobi Summit Resolution AHG/Res.102(XVII), par. 5. [Back.](#)

**Note 42:** . Letter to the Security Council, Dec. 2, 1981, circulated at Security Council document S/15011, April 29, 1982. [Back.](#)

**Note 43:** . Security Council Resolution 504, April 30, 1982. [Back.](#)

**Note 44:** . See *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad*, OAU Document AHG/109(XIX) Part I, pp. 12-13; and OAU Document AHG/ST/CTTEE/CHAD/Res. 1(III). [Back.](#)

**Note 45:** . *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad*, op. cit. [Back.](#)

**Note 46:** . See I. William Zartman, *The Negotiation Process* (Sage Publications Inc., 1978), Chapter 4. [Back.](#)

**Note 47:** . For a succinct discussion of the relationship between the frustration of basic human needs and ethnic conflicts, see Dennis J. D. Sandole, *Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era: Dealing with Ethnic Violence in the New Europe* (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Working Paper No. 6, October 1992). For an in-depth study of the theory of Basic Human Needs and Conflicts, see various works by John W. Burton, especially, *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979). [Back.](#)

**Note 48:** . Genocides and politicides are unfortunate realities. See Ted Robert Gurr and James R. Scarritt, "Minorities' Rights at Risk: A Global Survey," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 11, Aug. 1989, pp. 375-405. [Back.](#)

**Note 49:** . For a cogent argument against an alarmist view of "internal" self-determination, see Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), Chapter 3. [Back.](#)

**Note 50:** . See Amadu Sesay's assertion that the OAU suffered a crushing blow to its prestige, credibility, and confidence as a result of its pathetic failure in its first peacekeeping undertaking. "The Limits of Peacekeeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad," *Conflict Quarterly*, Winter 1991, p. 21. [Back.](#)

**Note 51:** . Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad," p. 40. [Back.](#)

**Note 52:** . For a similar argument, see Amadu Sesay, "The Limits of Peacekeeping by a Regional Organization," p. 20. [Back.](#)

**Note 53:** . Gebre Dawit, the OAU's Secretary-General's representative in Chad confirmed this much. Interview, New York, Feb. 11-12, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 54:** . *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, February 20, 1981, p. 30696 and October 30, 1981, pp. 31159-31163. [Back.](#)

**Note 55:** . *Africa Contemporary Archives*, London, 1982-83, p. 3363. [Back.](#)

**Note 56:** . Ibid., pp. B59 and B361. [Back.](#)

**Note 57:** . Confidential Operational Budget for Peacekeeping in Chad. [Back.](#)

**Note 58:** . Interview with Gebre Dawit, the OAU Secretary-General's Special Representative in Chad for the peacekeeping operations, New York, Feb. 11, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 59:** . There was uneven force sustenance and maintenance. Troops from wealthier countries were better fed and maintained. Ibid. [Back.](#)

**Note 60:** . *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, October 30, 1981, pp. 31163-64; *West Africa*, December 6, 1982; and *The Economist*, Dec. 18, 1982. [Back.](#)

**Note 61:** . For a discussion of ideal and material resources for third-party mediation, see Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 80-91; and Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1971), pp. 133-135. [Back.](#)

**Note 62:** . For an insightful analysis of regional politics and the motivations of the major players in ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, see *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 16, May 17, 1991, pp. 2-4. [Back.](#)

**Note 63:** . See I. William Zartman, "Conflict and Conflict Management in Africa," paper prepared for the Second Advisory Committee Meeting of the Global Coalition for Africa, Kampala, Uganda, May 8-9, 1992, pp. 10-11. [Back.](#)

**Note 64:** . His Excellency Mr. Jose Louis Jesus, Permanent Representative of Cape Verde to the United Nations, expressed the same view during an interview in New York on Feb. 10, 1992. See also Holman Jenkins, Jr., "Caldron of Emotions in West Africa," *Insight*, Dec. 10, 1990, Vol. 6, No. 50, pp. 30-31. [Back.](#)

**Note 65:** . Article 53 of the U.N. Charter stipulates that "No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures against an enemy state..." [Back.](#)