

# BASIC SPECIAL REPORT

# **E**uropean Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management

*A BASIC Special Report on Roundtable Discussions  
Held in Washington, D.C., October 2001*

### *British American Security Information Council*

The British American Security Information Council is an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues. BASIC works to promote awareness of security issues among the public, policy makers and the media in order to foster informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. BASIC specifically analyzes issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction, the conventional weapons trade and European security.

*BASIC in the U.K. is a registered charity no. 1001081.  
BASIC in the U.S. is a non-profit organization constituted under  
section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Code.*

### *Acknowledgements*

The author would like to thank the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) for making this project possible. The contributions and time of the following participants were greatly appreciated: Andrea de Guttry, Ulrich Fischer, Jan Hoekema, Andreas Körner, Alessandro Politi, and Anibal Villalba. The author would like to thank Julianne Smith of GMF for serving as the mediator for both meetings. This project also benefited from the assistance of Andre DeMarce, Sandy Ionno Butcher, Andrew Cottey, Ian Davis, Karel Koster, Christine Kucia, Jill Lindstrom, Jeffrey "Steele" Means, Sima Osdoby, Iganacio Saez-Benito, Jack Seymour, Christina Torsein, and Beth Volk.

*The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the project participants or BASIC.  
The author takes responsibility for any errors.*

### *About the author*

Chris Lindborg is an analyst on BASIC's European Security Program. Chris joined the organization in May 2001. She previously worked at the Overseas Development Council and prior to that she was a Scoville Fellow at Federation of American Scientists. She earned her Master's degree in Political Science from the University of South Carolina.

### *European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management*

Chris Lindborg

Published by the British American Security Information Council, March 2002

Price: \$10/£7

© BASIC, 2002

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the copyright holder(s).

ISBN: 1 874533 45 8

## Table of Contents

.....

CHAPTER 1: Introduction .....	2
1.1 What is Civilian Crisis Management (CCM)? .....	2
1.2 Meetings in Washington .....	2
CHAPTER 2: Overview of European Progress in CCM Since 2000 .....	4
2.1 The Role of the EU .....	4
2.2 The Role of the OSCE .....	5
CHAPTER 3: Key Themes in Crisis Management .....	6
3.1 Can and Will Governments Cooperate? .....	6
3.2 When to Use Civilian or Military Intervention?.....	7
3.3 Geographic Scope of European Involvement .....	8
3.4 Building and Organizing Crisis Management Initiatives .....	8
3.5 Preparing to Work with Societies in Crisis .....	10
3.6 The Transatlantic Divide in Managing Crises: Europe and the United States .....	10
CHAPTER 4: Conclusion and Next Steps .....	11
Endnotes.....	12
APPENDIX 1 .....	14
Biographic Summaries	
APPENDIX 2 .....	17
Selected International Organizations in Crisis Management	

## CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Efforts to establish viable crisis management structures are more important than ever. Since the early 1990s, when the Balkans crises erupted and resulted in widespread ethnic cleansing and the deaths of thousands of people, Europe in particular has been trying to make the transition from reacting to crises on an ad hoc basis, to anticipating and preparing for such crises. With the most recent events in Afghanistan and Macedonia drawing the world's attention to local needs amid military instability, the international community must consider how to establish and shape crisis management mechanisms that can fit a wide array of purposes, situations, regional considerations, and security requirements.

### 1.1 What is Civilian Crisis Management (CCM)?

Civilian crisis management (CCM) is the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution.<sup>1</sup> However, experts in this field usually draw a distinction between 'conflict prevention' and 'crisis management,' with the former generally being used to refer only to activities that take place before any hostilities have occurred, whereas the latter usually refers to intervention only after violence has erupted. In addition, post-conflict peace building is seen as another means of preventing subsequent crises, and therefore frequently becomes part of CCM discussions as well.

CCM is comprised of multiple stages and multiple actors; and the lines between CCM and conflict prevention on the one hand, and between civilian and military crisis management on the other hand, are not clearly defined. Some of the confusion over the definition of crisis management may come in part from the different ways organizations participate in the activity. (Descriptions of the more prominent programs are offered in Appendix 2.)

### 1.2 Meetings in Washington

In an effort to understand how European institutions use crisis management tools, and to share these approaches with a U.S. audience in order to broaden understanding of CCM, BASIC held two roundtable discussions in Washington in October 2001. These meetings examined some of the challenges Europe faces in trying to mobilize political support for CCM and in implementing CCM in regional contexts. The impetus for hosting a two-part program on establishing crisis management mechanisms derived from BASIC's research report, *A Conflict Prevention Service for the European Union (COPS)*.<sup>2</sup> This stage of the project aimed to evaluate where CCM efforts stand in Europe, and to bring the views of Europeans on this issue to the Washington community.

The first roundtable discussion, "Stepping Up to the Plate: Can Europe Score with Crisis Management?" focused on the extent to which European governments are motivated to fully develop the CCM concept. Participants included:

- Ulrich Fischer, an advisor on human rights and humanitarian aid to the German Green Party;
- Jan Hoekema, a Dutch parliamentarian with the Democrats 66 Party;
- Andreas Körner, an advisor to the German Green Party; and
- Anibal Villalba, a major in the Spanish Army and professor at the National Defense Studies Center in Madrid.

The second roundtable discussion, “European Views on the Nuts and Bolts of Building a Better Peace,” focused on the practicalities of how to make CCM work more effectively. Discussants included:

- Andrea de Guttry, a professor of international law and director of the International Training Program for Conflict Management in Italy; and
- Alessandro Politi, an independent strategic and Open Source Intelligence analyst in Italy.

Representatives from government agencies and nongovernmental organizations participated in the sessions. The roundtables took place in the weeks following the tragedy of September 11, 2001, so many of the contributions from participants focused on the new security environment and the conflict in Afghanistan.

This report will briefly describe the current status of crisis management efforts in Europe, and then outline the major themes and outcomes of the discussions from the two roundtables. From the meetings, key issues and problems requiring further research and analysis are identified for further exploration.

## CHAPTER 2: Overview of European Progress in CCM Since 2000 . . . . .

Efforts in Europe to strengthen the civilian side of crisis management, especially within the EU and the OSCE, have increased in recent years, partly in an effort to fill a growing ‘law and order/enforcement gap’ (namely, the problem of how to deal with disorder and violence at levels below that of all-out warfare), and partly as a balance to the military approach emphasized through the EU’s emerging Rapid Reaction Force. A *Conflict Prevention Service for the European Union (COPS)* was an innovative effort to address this gap. COPS is a model for a crisis management corps that could react to crises within 24 hours. At its maximum, the proposed corps of 15,000 members would include humanitarian workers, medical personnel, police, and other experts who would be ready to deploy to an area facing a potential or active crisis. Although COPS essentially would be a civilian project, it would have a military-style structure to enable it to deploy rapidly and operate efficiently.

### 2.1 The Role of the EU

The European Union has shown the greatest potential to construct a mechanism such as COPS, and has enacted some of the necessary legislation to bring about some useful CCM structures (see Appendix 2). However, the EU still lacks a coherent and comprehensive division of labor between its key institutions and the corresponding departments and bodies among its 15 member states.

Several developments in the EU over the past two years have demonstrated a heightened commitment to facilitating crisis management development among the member states. Some of the key advances include:

**Policing:** At the June 2000 Feira European Council, a concrete goal for developing a policing capability was established. According to this target, the EU should be able to deploy 5,000 police to support civilian missions by 2003. The Göteborg European Council in June 2001 included a “Police Action Plan” to help realize the previous headline goal of mobilizing 5,000 police, and further outlined contributions from non-EU states to Union police missions.

**Rapid Reaction Mechanism:** Another key development within the EU was the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) that is intended to quickly release funds for CCM operations. The RRM can deploy funds for six months under the first authorization, enabling the Union to deliver interim civilian services while other longer-term measures would be taken to cope with any crisis.<sup>3</sup> The RRM, however, may be used to stabilize crisis situations by preserving existing political structures, which goes beyond the mandate of strictly humanitarian missions for the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).<sup>4</sup>

**Management:** Challenged with administrating resources from 15 member countries, the EU’s own management initiatives have seen some progress. The Feira Presidency Report states that a “coordinating mechanism” has been set up at the European Council Secretariat, which has com-

piled “the inventory of Member States and Union resources relevant for non-military crisis management.”<sup>5</sup> In January 2001, the EU established the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which will serve both civilian and military crisis management projects. The PSC will oversee the implementation of crisis management activities once the European Council has agreed on the overall policy direction of any response.<sup>6</sup> In selecting CCM missions for EU participation, the Feira meeting offered preliminary recommendations for projects to be undertaken, and the Göteborg European Council later offered new goals for these projects and guidelines for cooperation with international organizations on CCM.

Overall, however, the EU remains a long way from having anything resembling a comprehensive organization such as COPS. Much of the EU’s plans for a fully-working CCM capability remain on paper or in the assignments of complicated committees and structures within the EU bureaucracy.

## 2.2 The Role of the OSCE

The OSCE has also made some notable progress, but perhaps without as much recognition as the EU. The OSCE undertakes a broad range of activities and core competencies that place a strong emphasis on early warning and conflict prevention. It also applies a unique cooperative approach to security and has developed a network of field activities that directly influence three dimensions of security: human, politico-military, and economic and environmental.<sup>7</sup> The OSCE’s Rapid Expert Assistance Cooperation Teams (REACT) program, for example, has established a pool and database of experts in CCM who may be called upon to assist with projects.<sup>8</sup> The OSCE has the benefit of having access to more permanent members (55) than the EU (15), which helps to widen its reach when responding to crises.

With its operations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Croatia and Kosovo, the OSCE raised its profile, as well as expectations about the organization’s potential in crisis management. Indeed, with an ever-increasing range and number of field operations, the OSCE can now be said to be at the operational forefront of CCM.<sup>9</sup> The most recent example of the OSCE’s contribution to crisis management and conflict prevention has been its program to help build and train a multi-ethnic police force in Macedonia. The program started in February 2002 with the OSCE training over 100 police cadets. The OSCE hopes to start training an additional 500 police by July 2002 to help stabilize the country. The nine-month training program will include human rights in policing, crime investigation, defensive tactics and law.<sup>10</sup>

CHAPTER 3: Key Themes in Crisis Management

Noting these recent initiatives, the panelists at each of BASIC’s roundtable meetings evaluated the crisis management programs of these European structures, cited successes and failures of previous missions, and offered ideas for constructing more effective CCM models for future situations. The discussions covered the political will for deeper cooperation among governments and institutions; building up the organization of CCM, especially in the areas of personnel and intelligence capabilities; appropriate situations in which to use CCM, including the geographic scope for missions; and working with societies in crisis.

3.1 Can and Will Governments Cooperate?

The theme of the first roundtable discussion was whether European leaders are motivated to fully develop civilian crisis management. CCM is not a burning issue for the European public at present, which makes it more difficult to place the topic on the policy-making agenda of politicians. As Andreas Körner acknowledged, however, the issue has gained much more saliency in the past decade. The recent progress made by the EU and OSCE demonstrates that leaders do have the political will to support crisis management projects.

Governments are realizing the importance of CCM capabilities, and are seeking ways to contribute to the endeavor. Jan Hoekema noted that European parliamentarians have contributed to crisis management policy-making by offering their political expertise and should be urged to continue. For example, European parliamentarians have helped political leaders in Albania and the Ivory Coast cope with conflict in their countries, including the resolution of a parliamentary stalemate between government and opposition parties (Albania). Various national and multinational initiatives have been established to deal with these challenges, including groups such as the Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), an international network of action-oriented MPs. Körner noted the German Green Party’s interest in strengthening civilian capabilities and the party’s effort to develop civilian response units. The German government also has expressed interest in funding police officers for missions abroad.

However, the panelists acknowledged the challenges Europe faces in developing sound crisis management. Anibal Villalba pointed to the concern among European leaders about duplication of CCM structures. With the European Union, the OSCE, NATO and the United Nations all playing roles in crisis management, European leaders must proceed carefully so they do not waste scarce resources on crisis management mechanisms that serve the same function. Hoekema observed that the tools for crisis management will be increasingly diversified. In the past, the military often was seen as one of the few instruments available. After diplomacy, police, administrative, legal and other non-military means are part of this increasing diversification, and the new European Security and Defense Policy is shaping up accordingly.

In sum, European leaders seek to carry crisis management projects forward. CCM is not on the top



of any political agenda, however, because of a lack of public interest which may stem from the less glamorous quality of CCM compared to military projects. Moreover, the challenge crisis management poses may appear overwhelming for some, which could weaken the will of those who might otherwise support the concept. For those who want to continue devising new ways of managing crises, there is a need to develop frameworks for implementing crisis management.

### 3.2 When to Use Civilian or Military Intervention?

One of the most fundamental questions about CCM is, under what circumstances does it work best? And when it fails, what are the reasons for its failure? In general, the answer will depend on whether the parties to a conflict are inclined to resolve it peacefully or not, and thus whether coercion, such as diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions or the threat of military force, may be necessary to back up CCM.

Clearly an uncoordinated, poorly planned and implemented CCM mission will be counterproductive and could even endanger the lives of its participants. The risks involved in CCM, both in terms of potential civilian casualties and the political fallout from a failed intervention, act as a strong deterrent (perhaps more so than resource commitments) to governments and NGOs alike. Choosing the right moment to deploy CCM or military crisis management (MCM) units is critical to reducing such risks.

The complexities of each conflict will determine whether to send in military or civilian crisis management units, or whether to intervene at all. Due to the unique aspects of each case, a formula that will work for every crisis is difficult to develop. Participants in the roundtable discussions offered the following considerations for decision-makers in deciding whether civilian or military intervention is most appropriate.

- What is the level of violence in the crisis?
- How long has the conflict persisted? Does the CCM or MCM organization have a chance of intervening early in the conflict – before it becomes violent?
- Is the conflict un-armed? If not, what quality and quantity of armaments contribute to the conflict?
- Is the situation on the ground one of armed fighting between existing paramilitary groups that are heavily armed?
- How many CCM or MCM units are ready for deployment?
- Is there a leader who is requesting outside intervention, or is the territory in question without a leader?
- What is the length of the mission? How long are the CCM or MCM units prepared to stay?
- What are the root causes of the conflict?
- Are outside forces contributing to the conflict?
- Have military or civilian units been used in the past without success?

In addition to establishing a framework for CCM, Andrea de Guttry explained that civilians require extensive training to prepare for crises. The skills in peacekeeping support in Europe stem more from the OSCE than from other organizations because it is already implementing its REACT program. De Guttry added that European universities are starting to work with the European Union and other organizations to offer special training for civilians who want to serve in crisis management capacities.

In many situations, civilian interventions might have the advantage of being less visibly intrusive.

However, the CCM programs have longer-term measures to prevent crises from recurring. Alessandro Politi warned that outside military intervention, even when done with the approval of the legitimate government on the ground, and within a crisis management context, could escalate a conflict. There are numerous examples of heavily armed soldiers – in the guise of peacekeepers – worsening, rather than alleviating, tensions.

Furthermore, the tasks of peacekeeping and peace-building are difficult to attempt with military personnel who may lack the necessary skills. Turning a soldier trained in war-fighting into an individual prepared to work non-violently and with cultural sensitivity, but within a highly militarized environment, would seem to be a daunting task.<sup>11</sup> Ideally, crisis management and conflict prevention missions should be organized, staffed, and run by civilians and should use military personnel only for specific tasks, such as weapons collection and de-mining.

### 3.3 Geographic Scope of European Involvement

Unfortunately, violent conflicts are more prevalent outside of Europe, and several participants agreed that European governments should contribute to CCM missions beyond their borders. A key challenge, however, is for political leaders in Europe to convince their domestic constituencies that sending ‘sons and daughters’ overseas to potentially dangerous missions is necessary, both in terms of extending the meaning of national self-interest and in promoting international peace and security.

Hoekema affirmed Europe’s responsibility beyond its borders, especially in Africa because of its colonial past. Politi noted that while the Balkans are becoming more of an “integration issue” rather than a crisis management one, the advent of rapid globalization and Europe’s widening economic and political interests require that Europe export CCM abroad. He added that the EU’s security interests lie “at least from the Nordkapp to the Hormuz Strait and from Nigeria to Madagascar.”

European leaders, however, will need to work with regional actors who have a greater knowledge of the situation on the ground. This means organizations such as the EU and OSCE will need to improve efforts to coordinate action with both regional inter-governmental bodies and NGOs, as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, Europe must be careful not to dictate the terms of peace. Cultural insensitivity and a feeling of non-participation on behalf of victims of a conflict could create a backlash against those serving in crisis management missions and destroy any chance for stability.

### 3.4 Building and Organizing Crisis Management Initiatives

The main components of civilian crisis management usually include police, election and human rights monitors, humanitarian aid workers (including medical specialists), legal specialists, mediators, and engineers and other professionals who could contribute to the security, economic, and political development of the area in crisis. These personnel normally are sent in following higher level political intervention, and usually after leaders and diplomats have secured the approval of the government facing the crisis. Weapons collection and destruction are often an integral part of crisis management, although these activities have tended to fall under military tasks, such as NATO’s recent assignment in Macedonia to collect weapons from Albanian rebels.<sup>12</sup>

The right combination of these elements needs to be ready for quick entry into a crisis. This might mean, for example, having at least some election monitors who understand the political practices of

a locality and lawyers who speak the language of minorities. These operational specialists should be capable of deploying within days, and certainly before a crisis escalates. In some circumstances, these monitors and lawyers also might need armed protection.<sup>13</sup> Those components must come together under an organizational rubric.

Politi argued that unlike BASIC's COPS proposal, which recommends that crisis management teams have a military structure to efficiently coordinate operations, CCM units "as a whole will never have the characteristics of military units because their inherent goals are very different." He stated that "structures must be allowed to adapt to the leader" because "behind each success in civilian crisis management, the leader's character was a very important factor."

Participants from both panels recognized the difficulties of employing a full-time civilian force that could leave their everyday lives on short notice and immediately enter dangerous situations for tours of duty that could last for months at a time. Politi suggested that countries receive compensation for contributing police officers to such missions and that countries should rotate commitments. Nevertheless, melding together a comprehensive civilian force has so far proved more difficult than the creation of equivalent military structures notably within NATO. This is mainly because governments traditionally have focused most of their resources on military endeavors when it comes to crisis management.<sup>14</sup> Thus, an effective CCM system will require a shift in priorities and resources to develop the civilian personnel required to carry out the missions that use conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also have an important role to play in CCM. They often have valuable expertise for stemming crises, which may include knowledge of the locality, history, language, culture, and the political situation on the ground, as well as appropriate technical skills. Some examples of NGOs that participate or aid in crisis management include the Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM), the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Crisis Group, and Red R.<sup>15</sup> Hoekema noted that NGOs have become the "eyes and ears of the international community." Politi recognized the importance of including NGOs in crisis management processes, but cautioned that NGOs, just as governments, need to function with accountability and transparency.

Politi also emphasized how reliable intelligence is vital to any CCM mission and that this should become one of the next priorities for improving crisis management. He stressed that preventive diplomacy depends on early warning for the detection of potential crises. The integration of a "situation center" that involves the intelligence and analysis of the circumstances on the ground would be an important building block for CCM operations.

Politi also recommended that CCM operations might benefit from the production of a "warning and indicators matrix" that would help assess the potential escalation of crises. He stressed that political problems can result among participating countries when they do not share intelligence. While the EU has tried to alleviate information problems with the development of its "Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit," in the short term it will continue to rely on its member states for most of its intelligence.

Whether involving a full spectrum of CCM participants from inter-governmental organizations all the way down to NGOs, or just a small observer force from the OSCE, more strategic coordination is needed among these CCM building blocks. This is probably the greatest challenge that will face CCM. Participants agreed that an overarching network may be required to prevent organizations from unnecessarily taking on identical tasks and to ensure that gaps in capabilities are filled.

### 3.5 Preparing to Work with Societies in Crisis

In instances where neither party in a conflict appears willing to work toward a settlement, additional means of persuading them to take peace more seriously might be used by external actors, including diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. Special care must be applied when using these tools, especially in the case of sanctions, because they have a tendency when applied as a blunt instrument to exacerbate the suffering of vulnerable groups in a conflict, especially women and children.

Körner warned that external actors, both governmental and non-governmental, could do only so much in managing intra-state crises. The responsibility for negotiating peace ultimately lies with the conflicting parties. Outside countries and NGOs should support dialogue, with funding if necessary, but the final decision to end a crisis invariably remains in the hands of the conflicting parties.

Recent events and the long history of intervention in Afghanistan provide a prime example of the negative interaction between outside actors attempting to manage conflict and internal actors' responses to that intervention. Ulrich Fischer, who has substantial experience working on Afghan issues, argued that European countries and other allies must show extreme care in managing the current crisis in Afghanistan. In particular, he stressed the need to take into consideration the traditional *loya jirga* model of Afghan decision-making, which is based on reaching consensus among groups of elders. Applying this lesson to CCM more broadly, the indigenous methods of crisis management will need to be respected in the host countries.

### 3.6 The Transatlantic Divide in Managing Crises: Europe and the United States

Combined with the difficult political decisions to deploy beyond national borders, and even beyond Europe, participants in both discussions noted that a division of labor has developed between Europe and the United States. Europe has been tagged as a 'specialist' in the civilian tasks of crisis management, and the United States has taken the lead on military operations. The recent crisis in Afghanistan has developed along these lines as well.

Europeans have acknowledged the United States' military power and agility, and the widening gulf between European and U.S. military capabilities and defense spending. This capability gap was emphasized most notably during the Kosovo crisis. The EU, however, has tried to improve its military crisis management capabilities, especially with the creation of its Rapid Reaction Force.<sup>16</sup>

However, Politi noted the danger of developing only the military side of crisis management: over-reliance on military solutions may prevent states from mediating in conflicts or applying non-military or diplomatic tools. Villalba pointed to the tendency for the United States to work with individual states in Europe, rather than working with the EU as a whole. This is partly due to the lack of a credible common policy within Europe in relation to many security and defense questions, and due to the reluctance on the part of the United States to share sensitive intelligence with EU institutions.

As the EU deepens its foreign policy cooperation and develops its CCM capacity, the United States and other countries should find working with the Union as a whole to be more productive. Given that no one country, not even the United States, has the resources to implement a full-range of crisis management capabilities necessary for preventing and managing conflicts, some degree of EU-U.S. cooperation can be assured. Ultimately, it seems likely that transatlantic relations will become

more, not less, critical to preventing violent conflict.

## CHAPTER 4: Conclusion and Next Steps

Organizations such as the EU and the OSCE are making progress on CCM and are moving in the right direction in terms of developing more effective civilian capabilities. However, movement on the issue will be slow and cumbersome and will demand patience from participants and observers alike. The political will to develop crisis management in Europe and elsewhere is closely tied to the availability of resources and to perceptions about its effectiveness in preventing or resolving conflict. Expectations about what is an acceptable outcome in a crisis may be too high, and the results may lead to frustration. Eventually, leaders might retract from CCM endeavors if they do not receive encouragement from NGOs and other proponents to continue with such policies.

As the panelists in these discussions stressed, the “nuts and bolts” of CCM are complex. Although European coordination has yet to approach the level envisaged in BASIC’s COPS concept, it has made substantial progress in the past two years. Still, the EU will need some time before its political leaders create the right framework for collaborating more efficiently in this area. Once those political decisions are made, the task of developing the necessary components for crisis management duties, assembling the required personnel, and negotiating responsibilities among regional or international institutions will still prevail as critical issues for CCM development.

The participants in these two panel discussions offered useful input into the debate as Europe continues to develop its crisis management structures. As a result of their substantial comments and insight, areas for further research have been identified that may allow the international community to more quickly employ the resources that are required for the challenges at hand. Six areas in particular require additional attention:

- European governments and the organizations in which they participate will need to allocate more funding to civilian aspects of crisis management in the long term, especially to create sufficient standing units that can be deployed on short notice.
- A better division of labor between the EU, OSCE and NATO will need to be established. Once leaders know their organizations’ roles and know what to expect from other organizations, decisions can be made more quickly and wisely.
- Clearer parameters should be set for civilian and military crisis management. Organizations will need to know when situations require civilian or military involvement because using the wrong tools could make the situation worse than not intervening at all.
- Coordination and networking between the respective ground organizations needs to be improved.
- Decisions should result in a specific action plan or “decision tree” for CCM activities.
- Better coordination is needed in intelligence sharing.

These issues are too complex to have been covered sufficiently during these proceedings, but are challenges that must be addressed in the future if CCM mechanisms are to be strengthened. What seems certain, however, is that other countries and regions that are facing cycles of violence could fare better if Europe and the United States were to use a comprehensive and well-organized CCM structure to help them avert war or to make the transition from war to peace.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> For a discussion on the confusion over terminology in crisis and conflict management, see International Crisis Group, “EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management,” ICG Issues Report, Number 2, June 26, 2001, pp. 2-6.
- <sup>2</sup> Daniel Plesch and Jack Seymour, “A Conflict Prevention Service for the European Union,” BASIC Research Report 2000.2, June 2000, URL <<http://www.basicint.org.COPSFinal.PDF>>
- <sup>3</sup> International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 42.
- <sup>4</sup> International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 42.
- <sup>5</sup> “Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management,” Appendix 3 to the Feira Summit Conclusions, p. 25, “The European Union’s Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy,” Denise M. Groves, BITS Research Report 00.3, November 2000, URL <<http://www.bits.de/public/researchreport/rr00-3-1.htm>>
- <sup>6</sup> International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 29.
- <sup>7</sup> For more information on the work of the OSCE, see the OSCE handbook at URL <<http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/handbook.pdf>>
- <sup>8</sup> For more information, see the OSCE’s REACT home page at URL <<http://www.osce.org/react/>>
- <sup>9</sup> For more information on the role of the OSCE in CCM, see the OSCE’s Web site, URL <<http://www.osce.org>>
- <sup>10</sup> “Multi-ethnic Police Training Course in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Welcomes its First Intake,” OSCE Press Release, February 14, 2002, URL <[http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news\\_id=2291](http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=2291)>
- <sup>11</sup> For a debate on the merits of using military versus civilian peacekeepers, see William Nash and John Hillen, “Can Soldiers be Peacekeepers and Warriors?” NATO Review, Volume 49, Number 2, Summer 2001, pp. 16-20.
- <sup>12</sup> For more information about NATO’s mission to collect weapons from Albanian rebels in Macedonia, see “NATO’s Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” <<http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>> Also see Otfried Nassauer, “Assessment of the Risks Inherent to the Weapons Collection Plan for Macedonia,” Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, August 19, 2001, URL <<http://www.bits.de/public/pressreleases/pr200801.htm>>
- <sup>13</sup> For further discussion of these components and capabilities, see BASIC’s COPS report, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> The challenge of recruiting police officers and civilian specialists is a difficult task. Similar difficulties are recounted in the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (“Brahimi Report”), United Nations General Assembly, A/55/305-S/2000/809, Fifty-fifth Session, August 21, 2000, pp. 20-25. See the full report at URL <[http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/a\\_55\\_305.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf)>

<sup>15</sup> The Web sites for these groups include: the Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights - <http://www.canadem.ca/>; the International Committee of the Red Cross, URL <<http://www.icrc.org>>; the International Crisis Group, URL <<http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/>>; and Red R, URL <<http://www.redr.org>>

<sup>16</sup> For more information on the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force project, see Chris Lindborg, “The EU Rapid Reaction Force: Europe Takes on a New Security Challenge,” BASIC Papers, August 2001, Number 37, URL <<http://www.basicint.org/BP37.htm>>

## APPENDIX 1 Biographic Summaries

### Speakers

#### Andrea de Guttry

Andrea de Guttry is the director of the International Training Program for Conflict Management and a professor of public international law at the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna in Pisa, Italy.

Dr. de Guttry graduated with a law degree at the University of Pisa in 1980. He has served as a consultant to the World Health Organization (WHO) for training staff in the area of human rights. Earlier, he was the head of the legal office in the Ministry of European Affairs in Rome and previously had been the director of a cooperation project in Guatemala aimed at training public servants in the field of regional integration.

He has continued to serve as an election observer for various missions with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the United Nations.

#### Ulrich Fischer

Ulrich Fischer is an advisor on human rights and humanitarian aid politics for the parliamentary group of Alliance 90/The Greens in the German Federal Parliament.

He received his degree in political science from the Free University in Berlin, 1973. He has since served as project director for the German Afghanistan Foundation, a humanitarian organization in the field of rural rehabilitation in Afghanistan, based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Mr. Fischer also was a public relations manager for the humanitarian organization, HELP (based in Bonn), then directing most of its publicly and privately funded assistance to the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan.

Mr. Fischer previously had been in charge of foreigners policies with The Greens. He was a member of parliament (MP), member of the Foreign Affairs as well as the Human Rights Committees, and a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

#### Jan Hoekema

Since 1994, Jan Hoekema has been an MP with the Democrats 66 Party in the Netherlands. He studied sociology and political science at Leiden University and received his degree in 1975. After serving in the air force as an officer-conscript, he started his career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1977 where he was director of political U.N. affairs until 1994 and was responsible for



political questions in the U.N. system, U.N. peacekeeping operations, arms control, disarmament and export control matters. He also served in other functions, i.e. in the NATO department and the Policy Planning department. During his diplomatic career, Mr. Hoekema held office for 14 years in the Municipal Council of Leiden, the Netherlands.

Since 1997, he has been the chairman of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission. He acted as general rapporteur for the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly from 1997 to 2000. In 2000, he was elected president of the Defense and Security Committee of the Assembly.

Mr. Hoekema is a member of the Board of Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), a New York-based worldwide network of action-oriented MPs. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on international issues – mainly related to the United Nations, international cooperation, security, and Europe.

## Andreas Körner

Andreas Körner currently advises the Alliance 90/The Greens in the German Bundestag. He also works with MP Winfried Nachtwei, who is a member of the Defense Committee in the German parliament. He studied political science in Berlin and Amsterdam.

He previously held positions at the international magazine Disarmament Campaigns in The Hague. Mr. Körner also edited the peace movement journal *ami*.

## Alessandro Politi

Alessandro Politi is a strategic and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) independent analyst. Dr. Politi graduated with a degree in military history from the University of Pisa in 1983. He is the author of seven books and several essays, and twice received the Golden Candle Award (1993 and 1999) for his contribution to the development of OSINT.

His main fields of interest are: political-military and strategic analysis, European defense industry policy, new risks, multilateral security cooperation, intelligence policy, OSINT and knowledge management. He also is interested in the conceptual definition of a European intelligence sharing mechanism.

Dr. Politi has served as a special advisor to three defense ministers in the Italian government since 1997. He most recently directed the drafting and publication of the “Italian Strategic Defense Review” (2001 New Forces for a New Century). He is a strategic columnist for three main Italian print media.

## Anibal Villalba

Anibal Villalba is a major in the Spanish Army, General Staff Graduated. He has field experience related to crisis management beginning in 1991 when he served as a military observer in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) to validate the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

In 1996, he was appointed as a deputy military advisor to the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same year he was nominated as the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) liaison officer to the EUAM.

In 1999 he served as NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) liaison officer to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). From 1998 to 2001 he worked as a staff officer for NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), Naples, Italy - in the Crisis Planning Branch for Balkan issues. In September 2000, he attended the Crisis Management Course at NATO headquarters and the International Crisis Management Course at the Swedish National Defense College.

He was a High International Studies graduate from the SEI, Madrid. He is about to defend a doctoral thesis in political science, which is related to the role of civilian institutions in the Balkan crisis. He currently teaches strategy to the Joint General Staff Course in the Armed Forces School (ESFAS), National Defense Studies Center (CESEDEN) in Madrid.

## Moderator for Roundtable Meetings

### Julianne Smith

Julianne Smith is a program officer with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).

Before working with GMF, Ms. Smith worked at the Association of the U.S. Army on a project called the Role of American Military Power. Prior to this position, she was a senior analyst at the British American Security Information Council on its European Security Desk. She also worked for the Conflict Prevention Network at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen, Germany where she conducted policy studies for the European Commission and Parliament.

Ms. Smith has received a number of fellowships and scholarships including the Public Policy Fellowship at the American Academy in Berlin, the Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship for work in Germany, and the Fredin Memorial Scholarship for study at the Sorbonne in Paris. She holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the School of International Service at American University.

## APPENDIX 2 Selected International Organizations in Crisis Management

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>
<b>European Union (EU)</b>	Civilian and military
Political and Security Committee (PSC)	Will make recommendations to help guide overall Common Foreign and Security Policy, which will shape crisis response.
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU)	Assesses international developments and looks for nascent crises in an effort to notify rest of EU.
Police – 5,000 by 2003 (1,000 would be deployable within 30 days)	Support civilian missions to maintain law and order.
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)	Immediate distribution of resources for CCM activities.
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) – 60,000 by mid-2003	Military-side of EU’s crisis management; will conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian missions where NATO is unable or unwilling to act.

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>
<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</b>	Military (with part civilian structure). Originally was intended to be defensive military alliance. Over past decade, has conducted ad hoc military missions to stabilize internal crises outside of NATO countries; and created regional-based peacekeeping and disarmament assignments.
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)	Facilitate cooperation with countries outside of NATO. This cooperation mostly has been military in character. NATO leaders emphasize the political dialogue and transparency the groups have offered, especially through the EAPC. PfP organizes military exercises and budgeting consultations, and also promotes cooperation for civil-emergency exercises.
Mediterranean Dialogue	Regional cooperation with non-NATO countries on defense, security, information, civil emergency planning, and science.

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>
<b>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</b>	Civilian
Rapid Expert Assistance Cooperation Teams (REACT)	Pool of experts drawn from fields of human rights, rule of law, democratization, elections, economic and environmental affairs, press and public information, media development, political affairs, administration and support, general staff/monitoring functions, military affairs, and civilian police. These experts listed in database and ready to deploy to crises.
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	Principal institution responsible for promotion of human rights and democracy in OSCE area.
Representative on Freedom of the Media	Observes media developments in OSCE countries and provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression.
High Commissioner on National Minorities	Seeks early resolution of ethnic tensions in OSCE countries.

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>
<b>United Nations (U.N.)</b>	Civilian and military (civilian organization that uses member countries' civilian and military resources)
Secretary General and Special Representatives/ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In some operations, supported by Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, the U.N. Children's Fund and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights	Peacekeeping – monitoring by civilians and military, civilian police, and demining. Other civilian support includes administration and logistics, human rights and public information, expertise on governance of administrations and services, budgetary and fiscal systems, public utilities and health, education sectors, judiciary systems, demobilization, and disarmament.
Department of Political Affairs, including Electoral Assistance Division (EAD)	Includes preventive action, peacemaking and Early Warning. EAD assists in supporting elections when requested and maintains roster of election experts.
Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA)	Works with regional branches to promote disarmament through verification and confidence-building measures.

**BASIC Council Members:**

Peter Crampton  
Ambassador Ralph Earle II  
Lord Healey (Hon. President)  
Susan M Kincade  
Ambassador James F Leonard  
Kenneth Luongo  
Representative Cynthia McKinney (Hon. Vice-President)  
James O'Connell  
Jennifer O'Connor  
Sima Osdoby  
Paul Rogers

# BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL

---

## Recent publications:

*Countries to Confront Obstacles to Strengthened BWC*  
BASIC Reports #79, February 2002

*New Policy Lowers Nuclear Threshold*  
BASIC Notes, January 2002

*The Trials and Tribulations of SBIRS-Low*  
BASIC Notes, January 2002

*Secrecy and Dependence: The UK Trident System in the 21st Century*  
BASIC Research Report 2001.3, November 2001

*Disease by Design: De-mystifying the Biological Weapons Debate,*  
BASIC Research Report 2001.2, November 2001

*A Basic Guide to Biological Weapons Control,* brochure, October 2001

*One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? Upcoming Cuts in the US Nuclear Arsenal,*  
BASIC Paper #38, September 2001

---

Lafone House • 11-13 Leathermarket Street • London SE1 3HN • UK  
+44-(0)20-7407-2977 • FAX: +44-(0)20-7407-2988 • [basicuk@basicint.org](mailto:basicuk@basicint.org)

1012 14th Street, NW • Suite 900 • Washington, DC 20005 • USA  
+1-202-347-8340 • FAX: +1-202-347-4688 • [basicus@basicint.org](mailto:basicus@basicint.org)

**[www.basicint.org](http://www.basicint.org)**