African Crisis Response Initiative and the New African Security (Dis)order

Emmanuel K. Aning*

Abstract

This article examines the role of the US in post-cold war West African security issues. It analyses the impact of the ACRI and the reactions from the continent—from the OAU, ECOWAS and influential countries like Nigeria—given the efforts being made by African governments to grapple with their own security concerns. It concludes with a tentative assessment of the possibilities for ACRI’s effectiveness and its prospects for achieving credibility among African governments and civil society.

Introduction

Civil conflicts are having a massive impact on civilians in Africa. For example, in 1996, fourteen of the continent’s fifty-three countries experienced one form or another of armed conflict. These accounted for “more than half of all war-related deaths world-wide” (Annan, 1998), and resulted in 8.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. By 1997, refugees, IDPs and returnees formed 1.06% of the continent’s total population (UNHCR, 1998).

Because of the ancillary crises spawned by such civil conflicts, regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa have initiated diverse mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. On 29 June 1993, for example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (OAU, 1992; 1993). In the same vein, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) annexed to its original treaty two security-related protocols, which empowered it to deploy its Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990. ECOMOG was decisive in resolving Liberia’s civil war in July 1997, organizing competitive elections and inducting a new president into office (Harris, 1999: 431; UNSC, 1997). ECOMOG forces also re-established democracy in Sierra Leone in April 1997, and supervised a negotiated settlement of the volatile conflict which started in 1991. The settlement called for the initiation of
a power-sharing arrangement in July 1999. However, a signatory to the agreement, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), reneged on the agreement and has since plunged the country into turmoil (Abidjan Agreement, 1996; Lomé Accord, 1999). In the aftermath of these interventions, an extraordinary ECOWAS summit in Lomé, Togo, in December 1997 established a mechanism for conflict management, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Two years later, the protocol establishing the mechanism was ratified (ECOWAS, 1997, 1998, 1999).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has established a security framework, the Organ for Defence, Politics and Security, to tackle conflictive issues facing this sub-region (Cilliers, 1996; Malan, 1999: 45). These endeavours are significant in the light of the OAU’s concern, until recently, with state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. In this paper, I argue that it is the worsening security situation in most African countries which are characterized by wars and the paradoxical developments of increasingly proactive collective African intervention responses to civil wars and other violent crises mark the genesis of a new African security (dis)order.

This paper examines the role of the United States (US) in post-cold war African security affairs. It analyses the presentation and impact of the African Crisis Response Initiative, hereafter (ACRI) and African reactions to this initiative. The objective is to situate ACRI’s presentation within the context of African endeavours at resolving security problems. To appreciate the “renewed” US concern for Africa, and locate the diverse and hesitant African responses in their proper perspective, it is critical that US opinions on Africa and its security concerns are properly highlighted. I propose to achieve this task in four steps. First, I examine US perceptions of security threats emanating from Africa between 1990 and 1996. This serves as a background for introducing the ACRI and appreciating the diverse responses engendered by this initiative. Second, I present and discuss the major features of the initiative. Third, I analyse the disparate reactions to this initiative from the OAU, ECOWAS, and some responses from especially Nigeria. Finally, a tentative assessment of the realistic possibilities of ACRI’s effectiveness, and its prospects of gaining credibility among African states and organizations is presented.


In the post-cold war era, the US increasingly heeded domestic calls for the promotion of democratic governance in Africa, where inter-state conflicts undermined state sovereignty in several parts of the continent. These concerns were reflected in the National Security Strategy of the United States for fiscal year 1992. This document represented a watershed in US policy on African security issues. The preamble stressed US anxiety about “the turmoil and dangers in the developing world ... [which] remains a dangerous place—a place of ethnic antagonisms, national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism” (US Government, 1991: v). Prior to Bill Clinton’s inauguration as US President in 1992, George Bush Snr. issued a presidential
African Crisis Response Initiative

directive for the first comprehensive review of US policy toward Africa in more than a decade. It offered a framework for pursuing US interests in Africa in the light of rapid changes engendered by the end of the cold war. This directive became known as the “National Security Review 30: American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s” (NSR 30). A de-classified intelligence assessment prepared as part of NSR 30, concluded that post-cold war developments in Africa provided both “significant opportunities for, and obstacles to, US interests”. Outlining strategies for realizing these security interests and objectives, NSR 30 concluded that “Africa’s regional or sub-regional organizations ... [have] potential utility for the achievement of US foreign policy objectives”. To attain these goals, five major issue-areas were identified:

- access to selected African air and naval facilities, air space and sea lanes; downsizing African militaries;
- African military support for democracy, human rights and civilian control;
- conflict resolution and African regional peacekeeping operations; and finally
- retaining sufficient US military presence in Africa.

Despite this analysis and its perception of threats from Africa among other places, the US initiated a policy of constructive “disengagement” from Africa through a well-crafted strategy of downsizing the human and material contribution needed to provide a credible responses to African security issues. Simply put, in the calculations of the US, resolving African crises were costly in both political and financial terms. A classic example of how this minimalist strategy was tested was during the collapse and disintegration of Liberia into total chaos and the emergence of predatory warlordism from 1989 to 1997 (Ellis, 1999; Reno, 1998: 79-113). During the crisis, the “expectation” among Liberia’s populace, especially the elite, was that the US would respond quickly and massively to the collapse of its quasi-colony in Africa, by providing military and political support to resolve the civil war (Interview in Lagos, Nigeria, 15 July 1997). Instead, in the calculations of US security experts, the geo-strategic value of its previously close African ally with strong historical links and whose émigrés had dominated its politics had diminished, and did not justify the disbursement of human and material resources (Tanner, 1998; US Defence Security Assistance Agency, 1991). Under the new US policy, unilateral or multilateral involvement in resolving crises in “minor states” were at best scaled down or at worst curtailed (Aning, 1999:335). Such tactical withdrawal continued despite the conclusion of US strategic planners that, instabilities in Africa,

provide fertile soil for insurgency, and are the potential sources of regional conflict. When considered in the light of the proliferation of modern arms, the situation in the developing world poses significant threats to vital US interests worldwide (Gray, 1990: 18).

However, as a contingency measure to prevent such crises from damaging US interests, James R. Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), designated Africa as a priority area (Jane's Defence Weekly, 1990). To demonstrate its new-found concern about threats emanating from Africa, on 1 July 1990, a month prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) established the US Army 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) (3rd SFG) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. A major rationale for the establishment of the 3rd SFG was to contribute to resolving African crises (Volman, 1993: 2). In the calculations of the Pentagon’s strategists, Africa was one of three potential areas (apart from Latin America and the Pacific Rim of Asia) where low intensity conflict (LIC) could require US intervention. The 3rd SFG attained its full strength of 1,370 officers when a third battalion was activated in October 1992. Its chief overseas missions since July 1990 have been dispensing medical assistance and undertaking joint military training exercises with several African countries including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Niger and Côte d'Ivoire (Volman, 1993: 2; 1998).

To appreciate African responses to the ACRI, this paper argues that the interrelations between the establishment of 3rd SFG, the tactical suspension of its activities, and the diversion of these activities to areas of greater geo-strategic importance need to be examined. From 1 July 1990 until September 1996, the 3rd SFG undertook token activities, which partially fulfilled its mission objectives: intervention and support in resolving African conflicts. This reflected the continuity and change that characterized US security policy towards less strategically important areas, and demonstrated the loss of geo-strategic importance of US’s African allies (Wesley, 1997; Tanner, 1998; Aning, 1999). However, during the 1991 presidential campaign, foreign policy statements by the Democratic Party's aspirant, Bill Clinton, suggested that under his administration, the paralysis that had characterized US attitudes to Africa would end.

From Paralysis to Realistic Pragmatism?—The Origins and Development of the ACRI

What potential policy changes could Africa expect from a Clinton presidency from January 1993? In early December 1991, the then presidential aspirant, Bill Clinton presented his conception of international events as they were unfolding. He perceived a world where “[a] new set of threats in an even less stable world will force us ... to keep our guard up ... to protect our interests and values”. To do that, “[w]e ... must maintain military forces strong enough to deter, and when necessary to defeat any threat to our essential interests” (Clinton, 1992: 26–27). Clinton stressed four major foreign policy issues deserving special attention, which would presumably mark a departure from the policy of his predecessor. First, were the issues of separatism and ethnic rivalries that can spark conflicts. Second, was the need to create “small, lightly armed, and highly mobile forces that could be used to intervene at short notice in the Third World” (Volman, 1993: 24). Third, US unilateralism could give way to multilateralism: a new framework within which the burden of gaining collective international goodwill would be shifted to a broader
and wider coalition. Finally, there would be insistence on global democracy. The argument is that, at the time of their presentation, these four points formed the basis of what was eventually to be (i) the criteria for participation in, and (ii) the character and purpose of ACRI.

These ideas and outlines were broadly repeated in Bill Clinton's inauguration speech. As president, he asserted that “as an old order passes, the world is more free but less stable... America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make... we will not shrink from the challenge, nor fail to seize the opportunities of this New World. Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change, lest it engulf us” (New York Times, 21 January 1993). By January 1993, intrastate conflicts in Africa were widespread and, the US's role in resolving them was minimal. At best, it was restricted to the Somali crisis, which was to have serious implications for US foreign policy. Due to the importance of the Somali debacle in shaping US Africa policy, a short discussion of its impact will be undertaken.

Despite Clinton's encouraging campaign statements, the aftermath of the catastrophic Somali debacle on 3 October 1993, irreversibly changed US policy. By the time US forces intervened in Somalia as part of a multilateral team, the relationship between Somali warlords and international peacekeepers had worsened. In an effort by US Ranger and Delta commandos to capture the most recalcitrant of these warlords, Mohammed Aideed, 18 Rangers and 200 Somalis were killed in the ensuing fire-fight (Clarke and Herbst, 1997: 132, 164, 210). In the aftermath of this tragedy, the Clinton administration altered its engagement strategy regarding peacekeeping in Africa. Responding to a growing domestic outcry, the president suggested four policy options for the Somali mission, which eventually shaped US views on international engagements. Clinton's four-pronged strategy sought to: (i) protect US troops and their logistic bases in Somalia; (ii) maintain and keep open communication lines necessary for the relief effort; (iii) pressurize warlords who originally cut off relief supplies and attacked US troops into complying with international demands; and (iv) assist Somalis to resolve their problems and survive as a country after the withdrawal of US forces (Johnston and Dagne, 1997: 200–201).

As a political concession to his critics, the president agreed to withdraw US forces by 31 March 1994. After intense debate by members of both the Republican and Democratic parties, a compromise agreement was reached whereby the scope of US engagement was limited to humanitarian support. Despite the administration's efforts at damage control, senators and representatives in Congress criticized the Somali mission, and demanded an explanation of the fiasco from the President, and the immediate withdrawal of US troops. US troop withdrawal symbolized the start of a shift toward isolationism that was characterized by greater reluctance to become involved in subsequent developments elsewhere, notably in Haiti and Rwanda. For example, the House's National Security Revitalization Act (H.R. 7) and the Senate's Peace Powers Act of 1995 (S. 5) were the most recent manifestations of growing isolationism. Somalia essentially altered the direction of US foreign
policy by contributing to undermining public support for active participation in international peacekeeping.

It can be argued that the Somali crisis fundamentally changed the Clinton administration’s view on peacekeeping and unilateral engagements on the international scene (Clarke and Herbst, 1997: 80). In May 1994, therefore, Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) that forbade US intervention in future crises unless national interests were in jeopardy, and the assignment had distinct and limited objectives as well as a well-defined exit strategy (Malan, 1997:1).2 The first real test of these restrictive new policy guidelines was Rwanda, where the US remained on the sidelines while genocide proceeded apace. However, two major incidents contributed to changing the role of the US in African security issues from one of paralysis to studied pragmatism. First, was the sense of collective “guilt” over international and especially US inaction during the 1994 Rwandan massacres. Secondly, what prompted the suggestion for the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), was the outbreak of the 1996 Burundi crisis (Brown, Freeman and Miller, 1972; Melady, 1974).3

In the aftermath of this crisis, the United Kingdom called for the creation of a regional peacekeeping force for Africa, organized along the lines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Financial Times, 21 September 1994: 4). Subsequently, former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in an address to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in October 1996, emphasized the United States’ preparedness “to create a new political and military partnership” with African states. He stated inter alia that due to the Burundi crisis and its potential impact on other states, “we must develop the capacity for an effective response ... in any future crisis, and we must find new ways for Africans to work together and for the international community to support you.”4 After presenting the ACRF idea, Christopher went on a five-nation African tour that took him to Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, South Africa and Tanzania, where the broad outlines of the scheme were reiterated. He emphasized that ACRF would hopefully “become a strong link in the chain of successful responses to conflict that the OAU [was] building.”

ACRF consists of African troops reinforced by training, equipment, logistical and financial support from the United States and other countries. The immediate aim of the force was not to intervene in hostilities, but to shield designated safe havens from conflicts. This would enable civilians to obtain protection and humanitarian assistance. The intermediate and long-term aims of ACRF are to assemble a rapid reaction capability force from participating African contingents. ACRF will be developed in full consultation with the United Nations and the OAU. Critically, the original plans envisaged a standing force that could be quickly assembled, led by Africans and deployed under UN auspices. According to ACRF’s mission statement, it was “to protect innocent civilians, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and help resolve conflicts in Africa and beyond.”5 ACRF, therefore, looked like a marriage of convenience based on African pro-activism and the disbursement of indeterminate international resources.
A spate of criticism greeted the presentation of the ACRF concept (Henk and Metz, 1997: 24). As a result, a conceptual shift from a standing “force” to an “initiative” occurred, to accommodate diverse concerns (Ginifer, 1997: 2; Berman and Sams, 2000). These criticisms resulted from widespread uncertainty about the proposal. Its outlines were fuzzy and it sounded more like a military standing force. There are several critical issues and questions which the initiative has still not satisfactorily answered, but which will impact on its chances of success. These concern: (i) Training; (ii) Strategic Command and Control; (iii) Operational Command, Control and Logistics; and (v) Criteria for Selection, Participation and Deployment.

Training

The executive agent of ACRI is the US Army European Command (USEUCOM). It is responsible for the military training involved in establishing and maintaining the ACRI concept. USEUCOM is supported by the US Central Command, the US Special Operations Command, the US Atlantic Command, and the US Transportation Command. US forces conducting ACRI training come under the operational command and control of the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), although the training is conducted by the 3rd and 5th Special Forces Groups (Airborne) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and by logistic experts on secondment from the 18th Airborne Corps of the US Army European Command. ACRI consists of a headquarters, support elements, and nine to ten battalions from the participating states.

ACRI, according to its presenters, is primarily a training scheme based on bilateral cooperation with selected African states that seeks to enhance African peacekeeping through capacity-building programmes. The initiative involves 10–12,000 soldiers in well-prepared companies and battalions, commanded by brigade staffs and supported by their own logistic units in a 60-day, multi-echelon, multi-functional programme of instruction. The training of these battalions costs between US$1 and 3.1 million, one-third of which is used to outfit African battalions with a range of “non-lethal” military equipment such as Motorola hand-held radios, water purification devices, radio broadcast repeater systems, mine-detection equipment, high frequency radios for upper-level command and control, satellite communication systems, uniforms, boots, packs, tools and optometric tests.

By October 1999, training had been given to about 5,000 troops, comprising forces from Benin, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Uganda and Senegal. Training enhances troop capacity to undertake peacekeeping activities in Africa and elsewhere. The US 3rd SFG trained African battalions to an average standard based on common doctrines and procedures of peacekeeping. Special emphasis is placed on the development of basic military skills, humanitarian protection of, and working with refugees, operating effectively with humanitarian organizations, and the observance of human rights. ACRI training took place in recipient countries at six-month intervals over a three-year period. Training schemes were divided into two
"phases". In Phase I, 70 US trainers undertake field training exercises (FTX) of African battalions for 70 days. Phase II included six sustainment training modules (ST) and smaller groups of US trainers comprising between 20 and 30 officers who return to the recipient nation every six months for sustainment training. The first series of STs lasted 30 days each. It included command-post exercises that emphasize logistics, battalion and brigade leadership, train-the-trainer skills, and the development of civil-military operations in humanitarian emergencies.¹

The US has been particular about the selection of ACRI participating countries. They should be countries where civilian control over the military is firmly rooted. The type of weapons delivered to ACRI troops and the selection criteria are intended to prevent the newly-acquired knowledge from being used against their governments. However, it is doubtful if such criteria are critically applied. What seems to be the case is that different standards are applied to recipients of different training programmes. Appearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations at the House of Representatives, Vincent Kern, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, asserted that the selection of participants in US military programmes, especially the International Military and Education Training (IMET)"...stress[es] the importance, in fact the paramountcy of civilian control of the military". (US Congress, 105th Congress, 1997: 12). However, Kern's perception of impartiality in the selection of participating IMET states is not shared by some critical observers. First, most participating African states in ACRI have had their officers trained in the US under the IMET scheme. Although IMET is based on the US army stability operations manual, there are reservations concerning the criteria for selecting ACRI's partner states. A study published by the Washington-based organization, Demilitarization and Democracy, concluded that between 1991 and 1995, 71% of African military leaders trained in the US under the IMET programme were from countries with authoritarian governments.¹² These officers often utilized their US training to fight democratic rule in their respective countries. Concurrently, the US has not been transparent with respect to foreign military training assistance programmes (Volman, 1998). Appearing before the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, Vincent Kern posited that,

we do not intend to create a standing African force and we are not providing training to create elite forces for instability. We are solely interested in providing training in those areas which are traditional tasks associated with any peacekeeping operation: establishment of checkpoints, perimeter security, convoy security, the processing of displaced persons and the like (US Congress, 1997).

Despite Kern's assurances to a sceptical Congress and critical African observers, "traditional tasks" as they are innocently presented here, can very easily be converted to controlling and repressing populations and in containing counter-insurgency. Secondly, the type of training obtained is appropriate for quelling internal insurgencies, which, according to a recent study by Omach (2000) most
African Crisis Response Initiative

ACRI participating states are facing. Omach presents a fascinating study of how in the Ugandan case ACRI trained troops are being used for internal insurgency. His hypothesis is, however, undermined when his cases are applied to Ghana and Mali.

Criteria for Selection, Participation and Deployment

A major pre-condition for selection and participation has been the supremacy of democratic governance, and the preparedness of the military to submit to civilian control and transparency (US Congressional Record, 1997). So far, Benin, Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali and Ghana, have fulfilled ACRI’s criteria for military training; namely as stable democratic countries. The issue of when to deploy is difficult because strategic and operational control will invariably impact on deployment. Several issues arise: What level of conflict would require the deployment of ACRI forces? Who decides whether such criteria are considered necessary, restrictive or sufficient? Closely related to deployment is the issue of the sovereignty of the affected state. During deployment, ACRI-trained troops take instructions from their home governments. However, when undertaking interventions, the authorizing organization of the particular operation should seek United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval especially for those relating to Chapters 6 and 7 operations. There are operational and doctrinal difficulties about when to employ peacekeeping or peace-enforcement procedures in the grey areas of “second generation” operations (Weiss, 1997: 211; Ginifer, 1997: 2). Such doctrinal and operational dilemmas become more apparent when the nature and characteristics of recent civil wars in Africa—Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Somalia and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—are taken into consideration. Chester Crocker, for example, argues that the United Nations’ attempt at militarily challenging “peace-enforcement” operations shows that it cannot manage complex political-military operations” (Crocker, 1995: 5; Frazer, 1997; Boutros-Ghali, 1995: para. 77). It is conceivable that ACRI-trained troops can be deployed under different scenarios: (i) in a UN operation under the political direction of the UN; (ii) in a multinational force operation with UNSC approval; and (iii) in a force constituted by the member states and directed by a sub-regional organization like ECOWAS or SADC, and preferably with UNSC authorization. But doctrinal uncertainties still need resolution. Governments having operational control over ACRI-trained troops, however, reserve the right to refuse participation in certain types of operations.

Strategic Command and Control

Several unanswered questions concerning who and which organization has strategic command and control over ACRI forces, still remain. Part of the difficulties relates to the issue of sovereignty and the wave of assertiveness sweeping the continent. Thus, an ACRI force with its control placed under the auspices of the UN, will not necessarily be found acceptable to individual African states, not to mention the OAU as an organization. Developing OAU capacity in this area is increasingly
becoming the more viable option as this can contribute to the oft-mooted need for unity. But so far, no political or military structure has been put in place with the power to order these troops into action or to co-ordinate the activities of ACRI-trained troops among the various countries. ACRI’s former Special Co-ordinator, Ambassador McCallie, asserted that:

ACRI is a training initiative. It is not an attempt to impose a command structure upon our African partners. While we are able to provide bilateral training—including command and staff training and while we can work with African partners to support sub-regional training exercises ... it is for Africans themselves to determine what the appropriate command and control structures will be. They will decide when and how to deploy their peacekeeping troops. And they will decide whether to work through continental or sub-regional organizations to establish stand by command structures (Levitt, 1998: 101).

ACRI’s purpose, therefore, is to secure coordinated endeavours to increase and improve interoperability among African military units designated for future peacekeeping assignments through training, joint exercises, and the development of a common peacekeeping doctrine. There are problems, however, with this approach. Most of the training initiatives undertaken so far are based on “UN peacekeeping doctrine”. These, however, seem to be insignificant in relation to the African security environment in the late 1990s. If the current approach is to tutor African troops on the classical precepts of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force, then the potential for these forces to accomplish their aim will be minimal. This is because all the post-1990 efforts at resolving conflicts either in West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone), Central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo) or Southern Africa (Lesotho) have resorted to enforcement measures without consent.

Operational Command, Control and Logistics

Difficulties have arisen over which country(ies) will and can provide the planning staff. Of course, this issue is closely tied in to the issue of which countries meet the selection criteria as participants and are thus fit for deployment. It is also closely related to the lack of experience in planning and executing operations that will require advanced training. There are, however, four scenarios where operational command and control can be accomplished when:

• A UN operation is approved by the Security Council and paid for through UN assessments;
• There is the deployment of a multinational force, probably approved by the Security Council, but not paid for by UN assessments;
• A sub-regional organization chooses to mount a peacekeeping operation, like ECOWAS in Liberia, and SADC in Lesotho, in which instance it shoulders the expenditures; and finally
• An operation is ordered by the OAU.
The open-ended nature of most peacekeeping operations makes them expensive. Therefore, concerning the prospects of African participation, it is only Nigeria and South Africa that have the financial and military capacity to undertake and sustain peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities over a considerable period of time. Equipment compatibility and inter-operability are problematic, but in terms of communications, this potential difficulty was resolved by the provision of standardized Motorola equipment. ACRI’s presentation emphasized the instances where the US had played positive roles in African conflict situations. For example, the US$8 million support for the establishment of the OAU’s Conflict Management Centre was emphasized. Similarly, Ambassador McCallie emphasized US contribution to the resolution of African conflicts; specifically he noted the $40 million support for ECOWAS’s activities in Liberia, and the much-vaunted Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (Harsch, 1998: 18).

Despite the wide coverage and discussions surrounding the presentation and establishment of a “force”, limited institutional and operational activities were initiated between October 1996 and March 1998; among these was the initiation of the P-3 agreement in May 1997 (Toure, 1999: 28–29). Also, the initial training of Senegalese and Ugandan battalions commenced in the late summer of 1997. However, Clinton’s Africa Trade and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was jointly sponsored by legislators from the Democratic and Republican parties in April 1997, sought to change this immobilism (Africa Confidential, 2 April 1999:1). From 23 March to 2 April 1998, President Clinton undertook a tour of six African nations involving Ghana, Uganda, Senegal, Rwanda, South Africa and Lesotho. The contemporaneous presentation of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and Clinton’s trip to Africa encouraged discussions concerning ACRI and enabled a buoyant President to showcase his new-found concern for and “rediscovery” of Africa. During the trip, Clinton consistently stressed the role that a prosperous and stable Africa could play as a partner for security and stability (Madarashshi, 1998: 12; Vesley, 1999: 36–37). However, as at March 1998, the bill was still stuck in Congress and appeared to be so in 1999 (Bundu, 1999: 17). Eventually, a watered-down version of the Act finally made it through Congress in May 2000.

Prior to, and in the aftermath of Bill Clinton’s Africa tour, a revised version of the concepts upon which ACRI was based, was presented by Ambassador Marshall McCallie. In a further developing of Warren Christopher’s initial ideas, McCallie asserted that ACRI was primarily a training initiative. It envisioned a partnership with African and other interested nations “to enhance the capacity of our African partners to respond to humanitarian crises” (McCallie, 1998:14) ACRI’s aim was to “assist in developing rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions and companies from stable democratic countries” (ibid.: 1). The result was not US withdrawal or disengagement from Africa, but rather an endeavour with its African partners to promote economic growth, democracy and stability. The perception of the US was that through its contributions to ACRI, it was “fulfilling a moral obligation to help deal with humanitarian crises, while seeing to it that they were responded to
quickly” (Benkoil, 1998). In consultation with the OAU, France and the United Kingdom and the US eventually changed the conceptual framework from a “force” to an “initiative” with “interoperable capacity” (McCallie, 1998). Its units could similarly be deployed as part of a multinational force arrangement, and be conducted with the approval and endorsement of the UN Security Council (ibid.). ACRI is to run for five years, and its annual budget has been estimated at US$20 million a year. US$35 million is needed in case of deployment during the five-year period when ACRI is active.

From Suspicion to Grudging Acceptance: the Burden of History and African Responses to ACRI

This section presents African initiatives and responses to continental and sub-regional conflictive issues as a means of situating the diverse responses to ACRI in their proper perspective.

The OAU

According to Jeremy Ginifer, Warren Christopher’s presentation of a “force” concept was a “bombshell” that surprised many Africans and interested observers (especially Western states with concerns in Africa) and provoked critical and hostile responses. Distrust of and suspicion about US intentions as well as the burden of history have contributed to the generally negative response to ACRI (Ginifer, 1997; Schraeder, 1991; Volman, 1984). The immediate post-cold war period saw the collapse of several African states, starting with US’s quasi-colony, Liberia. In this specific crisis, the US refrained from active engagement on the grounds that it was an African problem and deserved an African solution. Similarly, the UN argued that its agenda was full and could not be burdened with Liberia. Despite the expectations raised by Clinton’s election victory, and his inaugural statements, the new administration’s Liberia policy showed an unwillingness to engage in minor conflicts. Instead, training, logistics and non-lethal equipment were given to specific ECOMOG contributing states like Ghana and Senegal. Senegal got US$15 million in 1991 and 1992, while another US$15 million was provided for Tanzanian and Ugandan participation in ECOMOG in 1993 and 1994. Furthermore, US$50 million was provided in 1997 and 1998. An example of US military assistance was the provision of logistic services by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), (Ellis, 1999; Kramer, 1995; Africa Watch, June 1993: 30–33). However, more significant than the totality of the amounts provided was their reactive nature. These came several years after the Liberian conflict had started. Then followed the Rwandan crisis in 1994, in which the US played a minimal role. It is against this background that key OAU member states and major political, economic and military actors within sub-regional organizations, especially Nigeria and South Africa, have been critical of the scheme (Ejime, 1996).

An analysis presented by the OAU’s Conflict Management Mechanism, shows that by 1990, “conflicts [had] turned Africa, the most diverse of all continents in the
world, into a continent unable to turn its trend of diversity into opportunities for development. ... Conflicts have torn the social fabric of the African society ... and separated and split families. Brother has risen against brother; father against son and son against father” (Bakwesegha, 1994; Mwagiru, 1996: 189–200; Mandela, 1994; Mbeki, 1998: 28–29).

Hunger, death, destruction and increasing Afro-pessimism were the consequences. As a response, the OAU initiated a dynamic self-renewal process towards a more vigorous pursuit of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In 1990, a declaration was adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on “The Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World”. In this declaration African leaders dedicated themselves to collectively work towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of both intrastate and interstate conflicts. Its adoption signalled a paradigm shift in the OAU’s raison d’être. While OAU I sought to “liberate” Africa from the vestiges of colonialism and apartheid, OAU II emphasized conflict resolution, economic development and democratization (Interview with OAU Official, 11 December 1996). By 1991, it had become obvious to the OAU that if Africa was to resolve its many conflicts, a concerted and co-ordinated continental effort was needed.

To achieve these aims, the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, took the organization on a high-risk political detour. Salim’s strategy sought to re-interpret Article III, section 2 of the OAU Charter, which bound member states to strictly adhere to the principle of territorial integrity of states, that is, intervention in the internal affairs of member states was deemed illegal. Salim began the process by extending critical political and moral support to ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia, when the international community refrained from supporting this innovative African military and humanitarian intervention (Aning, 1998: 178–186). In July 1992 at Dakar, Senegal, Salim presented his Proposal for Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Consensus was reached on the establishment of an African Mechanism and Apparatus for Preventing, Managing and Resolving African Crises. Members of the secretariat were given the authority to activate the embryonic African Early Warning System in response to conflicts, and the Secretary-General was empowered to establish an interim Arbitration Tribunal. Eventually, at the Cairo Summit in June 1993, the outlines of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) were presented and adopted. The MCPMR sought, in collaboration with the UN and other African organizations, to keep and enforce peace in Africa.

This mechanism is built around a policy-making body known as the Central Organ composed of representatives of the member states with the Secretary-General and the executive secretariat as its operational arm. The Central Organ functions on three levels—that of Heads of State, the level of Ministers and the monthly meeting of Ambassadors accredited to the OAU (OAU, 1996). It is expected to eventually “evolve into a mechanism equivalent” to the UN Security
Emmanuel K. Aning

Council (West Africa, 4–17 May, 1998: 430; Salim, 1996; de Coning, 1996: 13). To achieve the aims of MCPMR, it was agreed that African Chiefs of Defence Staff could meet regularly to plan and exchange ideas. Since the inception of the MCPMR, these experts have been drawing up plans relating to the “Concept of African Peace Support Operations”, which will include basic training in peace support operations at all levels of military academies, and joint exercises at sub-regional and continental levels (Godwin, 1998: 474). Four such activities have taken place: Operations Blue Hunbwe and Blue Crane under SADC between 1 and 20 April 1997 and April 1999 respectively and Cohesion Kompeinga 98 under ECOWAS in May 1998 and again Cohesion Kozah in April 2001 comprising ten ECOWAS states. An early warning unit as well as an operational and training unit have also been established.

It was, therefore, somewhat surprising that without taking cognizance of continental efforts and experiences at keeping the peace, the US presented the idea of an African Crisis Response Force (Salim, 1996: 2–7) to the OAU’s assembled leaders in October 1996. In fact, when the OAU finally put ACRI on the agenda of the Central Organ at its ministerial meeting in November 1997, suspicions concerning ACRI were so embedded that the final communiqué appropriately captured the “OAU’s Position Towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU’s Capacity in Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping” (OAU, 1997; West Africa, 7–13 May 1989: 1279, 1290–1291). Here, the OAU decried the diverse initiatives taken in Africa’s name with minimal consultation either with the OAU or with other sub-regional organizations. Although Salim Salim has since described the pronouncements and clarifications presented by the US as “profound”, both the ministerial meetings in February and the summit in June 1998 have failed to give firm and unanimous backing to ACRI.

ECOWAS

Yet another organization whose experience and support are needed if ACRI is to attain credibility among its member states is ECOWAS. This is the only sub-regional organization that has successfully resolved one of Africa’s most contentious civil wars without any significant international support. What passed for international involvement were offers from five OAU-member states: Egypt, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Tanzania, to contribute troops to ECOMOG. This proved difficult and eventually, only Tanzania and Uganda provided troops through financial support from the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia. Zimbabwe refused to deploy troops because its request for US$100 million in cash and equipment exceeded what the Trust Fund could provide. Although three ECOWAS member states, Ghana, Mali and Senegal are involved in ACRI activities, the three countries have not been given official ECOWAS support. This is important first, because these states are minor actors both in West Africa, and in Africa as a whole, despite US insistence that “Senegal is a leader among the African countries that regularly contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions”. Between 1960 and 1994, Senegal
participated in six operations, while Ghana and Nigeria have experience from thirteen missions respectively (Cleaver and May, 1995: 497). Not only do these countries lack support from ECOWAS for their participation in ACRI activities, sub-Saharan Africa’s two major states, Nigeria and South Africa, have been consistent critics of the timing and presentation of ACRI. There are even suggestions that West African states which are ACRI participants, should be pressured to concentrate their security efforts on ECOMOG. The most consistent criticism of ACRI has not surprisingly come from Nigeria. According to former controversial Nigerian Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi:

It is a matter for concern that every time Africa succeeds in formulating a common position on any critical issue, our external friends always manage to come up with an alternative solution. This has become a pattern on political, economic and social issues ... Now that we have succeeded in establishing a continental mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, we are being confronted with a proliferation of uncoordinated initiatives ostensibly designed to enhance our capacity in peace-support operations (West Africa, 4–7 May 1998: 430).

Ikimi’s suspicion of ACRI was deeply embedded. To him, the “evolutionary processes” encompassed in ECOMOG and the OAU’s MCPMR “[are] being interrupted by the interventionist and divisive policies of countries outside the continent. The naked pursuit of their own political and economic interests often ignores Africa’s own interests. A new scramble for Africa appears to be now underway” (ibid.: 431). To Ikimi, Liberia was ignored and Somalia was abandoned “after the tragic loss of a few soldiers”. Thus, such publicity seeking intervention and undignified hasty retreat could not have occurred and “would have been avoided if they had paid appropriate attention to the complexities of the local situation in their training and preparation” (Olonisakin, 1997; West Africa, 4–7 May 1998: 430). The sense of suspicion and uncertainty concerning the motives underlying the presentation of ACRI is widespread in Africa (Malan, 1999: 45; Hutchful, 1999: 112; Interview in Pretoria, South Africa, 22 October 1999). The African, and especially West African, perception is that instead of the international community striving to complement African efforts, endeavours are being made to supplant them. According to Ike Nwachukwu, Nigeria’s former Foreign Minister:

Any time that in my view we begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel, some extraneous influences from without ECOWAS hold the curtain down, and that flicker of light disappears. Situations like these, in my view are responsible for the stop-go syndrome that we find in our sub-region. When we agree at different fora on how to improve the sub-region, unseen persons advise otherwise and things slow down with the result that our development is stalled (Interview, Lagos, Nigeria, 18 July and 24 August 1997).

ECOWAS, however, is applying its ECOMOG experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone to establish a permanent security framework (ECOWAS, 1998). In this
connection, an extraordinary summit of the Authority was held in Lomé, Togo, in December 1997, to establish a mechanism for conflict management, peacekeeping and prevention of conflict (West Africa, 25 October–1 November 1998: 772). Some of the decisions reached here included the establishment of a Committee for Mediation and Security (CMS) to harmonize decision-making regarding deployment (ECOWAS, 1998). It is an improvement on what during ECOWAS’s Liberia intervention functioned as the Committee of Nine. The CMS is a rotational system with no permanent seats comprising nine countries elected for a two-year period. It operates at the level of the Heads of State and Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassadors. Another decision was the establishment of four Observatories in four countries which are responsible for a series of countries! Their functions are risk-mapping: to observe the social, economic and political situations in the sub-region with the potential to explode into conflict and make appropriate threat perception analyses. Technically, four offices will be established in the sub-region to collect and analyse the requisite information. ECOWAS’s response strategies will be based on such reports. Based on the reports forwarded to the Executive Secretary and subsequently to the CMS. Three options are available for defusing a potential conflict. These are: to set up a fact finding commission; to employ the services of the Executive Secretary; or to call on a Committee of Elders. So far, however, this office to be headed by General Cheikh Omar Diara of Mali is not yet functional.

A Tentative Assessment

How does one assess ACRI’s presentation and performance in the light of what has been described by Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, the Secretary-General of the Pan African Movement as a “new African political order” (Raheem, 1996); and the increasing salience of an afriphone sphere of influence? The major concern is the lack of qualified control over the manner in which ACRI troops and equipment will be used. Other concerns are ACRI’s reference to training in “accordance with ACRI and UN standards”, and the claim by ACRI to have “universal[ly] integrat[ed] tactics, training, and doctrine fused to form one standard” or “a common peacekeeping doctrine”. The first assessment is ACRI’s disregard of the proactive stance and assertiveness with which African states and organizations now tackle their problems. This assertiveness has resulted in what is now generally seen as an “African renaissance”. There is also the issue of patronage. Despite the concerns of African organizations and states, Jeremy Levitt has argued that “conspiracy theories aside, the US initiative appears to be non-patrimonial and transparent, as African states will ultimately determine when, how and where to deploy ACRI-trained battalions” (Levitt, 1998). These issues can only be appropriately answered if and when an assessment is undertaken of ACRI actions, based on the early training schemes and statements by its participants.

In an overview of the nature, purpose and characteristics of ACRI as compared to what African states are themselves attempting to do, the cleavage between the
initiative and African aspirations appears minimal. However, what creates credibility problems for ACRI’s acceptance is the burden of the history on relations between Africa and the US. For example, SADC wants an “official” voice in deciding when and where an intervening African force might deploy, its duties and, composition of their contributing countries. Critical to US efforts at assuaging African suspicions, it is prepared to oblige (International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1997: 4). Furthermore, this article claimed that to diminish African fears of being forced into the acceptance of western-designed and western-controlled initiatives, the USA acquiesced to African wishes that all contributory states would decide for each deployment, the rules of engagement and the nature of the specific mission (Godwin, 1998: 474). Any assessment of ACRI must consider several other issues. Some examples are: (i) the demand that participating member states should be stable democratic countries; (ii) the issue of command and operational control; and finally (iii) when such troops can be deployed. Closely related to all these issues is the extent to which ACRI will eventually become an institutional alternative, not only to traditional UN peacekeeping activities in Africa, but also to African-inspired initiatives like ECOMOG’s Operation Liberty, Cohesion Kompeinga, Cohesion Kozah and SADC’s Operations Blue Humbwe and Blue Crane?

Another thorny issue has been the patronizing attitude of some ACRI officers to Africa’s own efforts. Part of the suspicion about ACRI arises from the dichotomy between the “we” and “them” in descriptions of the initiative. According to David McCracken, the former Commander of the 3rdSFG, undertaking the training, he commanded “a couple of real experts”. In McCraken’s perception “we are raising them to a common peacekeeping standard”. Despite these niceties, there were difficulties: “we worked with them as best as we can in their language, at least in some form of their dialects that their educated folks work in. We don’t necessarily have people who speak Swahili and those things”. Here, McCracken demonstrates apparent ignorance about the troops he is training. First, none of the mentioned participating countries had Swahili either as a national language or a major language. Secondly, characteristic of the patronizing attitude of ACRI trainers, languages which McCracken does not understand become either a “dialect” or “those things”. This critique may be dismissed as unimportant by some analysts but to others, such crudity hardly generates confidence and trust.

To demonstrate the success of his efforts, McCraken went on further to exhibit what he claims was a “nice photo” of the final exercise. This was good for the propaganda, but overlooked the fact that the 3rdSFG had failed to fulfil one of its main mission aims: to enhance African capacity to keep and enforce the peace. According to McCallie, “we were urged to create capacity. I find that a difficult concept and sometimes people that deal in good, solid military structures find that a difficult concept”. In these interviews McCraken and McCallie unintentionally expose some of the problems that ACRI faces in getting enough countries to fulfil the basic democratic and operational criteria that they have established. First, ACRI forces should be ready for deployment in peacekeeping operations within thirty
days. This is a retrogressive development since, for example, ECOMOG troops took only sixteen days to deploy to Liberia in spite of its coordination problems. Second, ACRI forces are to be deployed in strictly humanitarian assistance missions “within their own borders because clearly there will be some of that.”

This implicit acceptance of potential instability should be closely examined. Paul Omach has argued that support for ACRI had more to do with the convergence of domestic politics, an assessment of security needs, and the extent to which alignment with the US through participation in the ACRI advanced national interests and foreign policy goals (2000: 86). In spite of the fact that Omach’s analysis and conclusions may be fitting for Uganda, which is one of his case studies, it certainly does not apply to the Ghanaian case among others.

**Conclusion**

How does one interpret the rather confusing signals concerning the rationale for selection and training of ACRI troops? According to McCallie, “[ACRI] cannot under US law give military assistance to countries that are run by military governments that have misplaced civilian governments”.

This is particularly revealing since Ghana and Uganda (despite their recent democratic gains) had the type of government that the US should not be collaborating with. First, there is grudging acceptance that the five states presently involved in ACRI are themselves unstable, and that ACRI trained forces may have to perform peacekeeping duties in their own countries. But this overlooks the dynamics of recent civil wars in Africa, which do not fit into the classical concepts of wars. These wars are generally non-hierarchal, without any command and control organs and no insignias for their forces.

Yet another difficulty with the ACRI concept arises from end-user controversies between ACRI and several African nations. There is no guarantee that these forces will not turn their weapons against their governments or neighbouring states as is the case in the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict. This raises the issue of the security dilemma: that one state’s (or ethnic group’s) efforts to protect itself threatens the other, even in situations where the weapons involved are non-lethal. Two West African states involved in ACRI, Ghana and Mali, have long histories of political and military instability, but have recently made important advances towards democratic consolidation in recent years. Although Senegal is fighting against domestic insurgents in the Casamance province, the army has never overthrown a democratic administration nor been overtly involved in politics. In East Africa, Uganda is fighting a decade long insurrection in the northern regions against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a fundamentalist Christian sect and is implementing a scorched-earth policy against the Iteso people. It is widely believed that ACRI trained forces have been involved in these activities. The New Vision (Uganda) alleged that the Third Battalion of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (those instructed by the 3rd SFG) have been re-deployed in Fort Portal; they are to undertake counterinsurgency operations against the Allied Democratic (Defence?)
Forces (ADF) in Kabarele District in Western Uganda (Taylor, 1998). These forces are also presently involved in rebel activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (McNulty, 1998). It is no surprise, therefore, that ACRI’s initiators “are especially interested in expanding participation to the politically and militarily secure states in SADC”. Second, is the apparent confusion about capacity building which concerns raising the peacekeeping capacity” of African armies seems an excessively narrow, and ultimately futile, agenda. The notion of plucking a few units out of otherwise decaying military institutions and elevating them into “centres of excellence” for the purpose of executing peacekeeping tasks seems to me somewhat quixotic (Hutchful, 1999). Third, is the issue of paternalism that characterizes both the US’s and EU’s perceptions of African security needs and their responses to these needs.

Another criticism of the initiative has revolved around the doctrinal dilemmas associated with training for multinational peace operations. The references to training “in accordance with ACRI and UN standards” is at best problematic. So is the claim by ACRI that it has achieved “universal integration of tactics, training and doctrine to form one standard”. This claim is perplexing, given the myriad problems and weaknesses that characterize African armies.

Despite these criticisms, there is scope for ACRI to make meaningful contributions to African forces. Several areas are worthy of mention. First, is the issue of interoperability and the second, the specific improvements in certain militaries, especially the issue of optometric tests. Finally, it should neither be overlooked that despite US statements of collaboration with France on ACRI, it is also concerned about France’s perception of its former African colonies as its chasse gardée (private hunting grounds).

Yet another possible role for ACRI’s future role in Africa will be to divert the emphasis from individual state participation to the provision of assistance and support on regionally (OAU) and sub-regionally (ECOWAS and SADC) based type activities. As at now, the interagency working group on ACRI is still considering the possibility of having a presidential directive that would enable sub-regional organizations to receive direct assistance at more substantial levels. This is a logical conclusion from the discussion above as the majority of ACRI recipient states—five out of eight—are members of ECOWAS. As a result, it may more appropriate to make ECOWAS the first sub-regional to benefit from direct assistance, with the possibility of SADC being another beneficiary at a later date.

Notes

*Emmanuel K. Aning is a fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra.


5. See US Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s address to the OAU, 10 October 1994 at http://ralph.gmu.edu.


8. The multi-echelon scheme deals with leaders and officers. At battalion level, training will be aimed at the establishment and operation of a series of observation posts; employment of a quick reaction force; establishment and operation of checkpoint; media plan; liaison with local authorities; negotiation with hostile parties; conduct of convoy escort operations; establishment of lodgement; provision of command and control; and force protection.


10. See ACRI Concept Paper, 16 April 1998 and ACRI Concept and Training Update, 8 November 1997.

11. It must be emphasized that ACRI has changed since its presentation in 1997. These changes have impacted on both phases. While Phase I changes are minor, Phase II underwent substantial restructuring. The number of ST modules have been reduced and recipient states receive four to six STs in one or more of the following areas: (a) logistics and maintenance, (b) battalion headquarters staff operations, (c) operational interaction with international and non-governmental organizations, (d) brigade headquarters staff operations, and (e) human rights and “train-the-trainer” development. STs have also been replaced by Follow-on Training (FTs) modules and are designed to be more flexible and meet the needs of recipient countries. Since April 1999, Aubrey Hooks has taken over the position as ACRI Coordinator.


13. There is a general belief that the bill can potentially increase US imports of African clothing from $250 million in 2000 to $4.2 billion by 2008. This represents an increase in Africa’s share of the US clothing market from its current level of 0.8% to 3.5% by 2007, enabling African states to establish a presence on the US market before the expiry of the present Multifibre Agreement in 2005. For further details, see Mills, Greg, “Sowing Investment”, African Business, October 2000, pp. 75-77.


15. MacCallie, “ACRI: Positive US Engagement”. In a statement, Joseph Wilson, the National Security Council Senior Director for Africa, asserted that “... the
question of American participation in [African crises in] the near term ... is not
currently conceived as an operation that would engage US forces”.
16. African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Fact Sheet released by the US
17. Transcript, USIS Washington File: Clinton addresses Senegalese Troops in
ACRI Training, 1 April 1998.
18. Such comments were given by several officials interviewed at the ECOWAS
Headquarters, Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia.
19. These are Zones 1 comprising Cape Verde, The Gambia Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania and Senegal with Banjul as the zonal capital; Zone 2 is made up of
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Niger with Ouagadougou as zonal
capital; Zone 3 is comprises Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone with the
zonal capital at Monrovia, Zone 4 is Benin, Nigeria and Togo with Cotonou as
zonal capital.
20. See Press Statement by Nicholas Burns, US Department of State, Office of the
Spokesman, 17 July 1996.
21. In this paper, I have not repeated some of the critiques that have been levelled
against African initiatives like ECOWAS/ECOMOG and SADC.
22. Defence Link, Department of Defence News Briefing on the African Crisis
Response Initiative, 29 July 1997.
23. Ibid.
24. Defence Link, Department of Defence Briefing on African Crisis Response
Initiative, 29 July 1997.
25. African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Fact Sheet released by the US
Bureau of African Affairs, 4 December 1997.

References

Africa Watch (1995), Liberia: Waging War to keep the Peace: The ECOMOG
Intervention and Human Rights, Vol. 5, No. 6, June.
Aning, Kwesi Emmanuel (1999), “Eliciting Compliance from Warlords: The
Economy, Vol. 26, No. 81, September.
Annan, Kofi (1998), The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, November, mimeo.
Berman, Eric and Katie E. Sams (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1995), Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position


—— (1998), ECOWAS: Ouagadougou Declaration on Regional Forum on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in West Africa: The Role of ECOWAS Ouagadougou, 8–11 July.


—— Article 58 of Revised Treaty of 1993.


— OAU/Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3 (IV).
— (1998), S/RES/1162. 1 April.


