Human security and the separation of security and development
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This article advances a counter-intuitive argument about what are argued to be the links between security and development in human security. The argument is counter-intuitive because the merging of development and security is explicitly part of the human security discourse. However, this paper will argue that human security can better be understood not through its own discourse, but placed in the context of the changing relationship between the developing world and the developed world after the end of the Cold War. Rather than the merging of security and development it will suggest that human security is representative of a period in international relations in which there is a separation of security and development. The broader international context is one in which the developing world is less of a security concern to the developed world than was the case during the Cold War.

Introduction

Human security is argued to be one of the most significant shifts in the way that security has been understood since the end of the Cold War. Central to the idea of human security is the belief that human security presents a radical challenge to the way in which the international system is currently constituted. For example, for advocates of human security this is a way of thinking and ‘doing’ security that challenges the state-centric security framework and promises to empower the poorest and most vulnerable people in
the world. One of the key aspects of this radical potential of human security is argued to be the linking of security and development.

To date most criticisms of human security have focused upon the expansive nature of the concept and the related problems of measurement and definition, suggesting that human security fails to be a workable or useful policy tool because it lacks conceptual clarity. However, an important number of critics of human security have argued that there are more profound problems with the human security framework. Critics such as Mark Duffield have argued that rather than being a tool for empowerment of the most vulnerable, human security represents a new form of control and domination of the developing world by the developed. One of the key aspects of this critique is that the linking of security and development within the human security discourse is not a positive development but a highly problematic one.

This article advances a counter-intuitive argument about what is argued to be the link between security and development in human security. The argument is counter-intuitive because the merging of development and security is explicitly part of the human security discourse. However, rather than remaining at the level of discourse, this article will place human security within the context of the changing relationship between the developing world and the developed world after the end of the Cold War. By drawing upon material that demonstrates that the level of material and strategic engagement with the developing world has fallen since the end of the Cold War, this paper will argue that rather than representing the merging of security and development, human security is representative of a period in international relations in which there is a separation of security and development. The broader international context is one in which the developing world is less of a security concern to the developed than was the case during the Cold War.

In conclusion, this author will argue that radical critics are correct to argue that the human security framework does not pose a challenge to contemporary power relations and is not therefore an emancipatory framework. However this author will argue that, contrary to the arguments made by radical critics such as Duffield, this is not because it represents a new methodology of control and domination but it in fact is symptomatic of a disengagement of the more powerful nations from the developing world and represents the end of attempts to substantively alter non-Western societies in a way that may have been assumed during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the developing world is less strategically important to the developed.
The argument proceeds as follows; the first section sets out both the central claims of contemporary advocates of human security that it represents an emancipatory challenge to contemporary power relations and discuss the crucial focus on the global linking of security and development. The paper then sets out the main critiques of human security. It begins with critics who worry that the concept is too vague to be useful and then discuss the critique of the linking of security and development in the human security discourse and critical arguments that human security represents a tool of domination to be used by the developed states against the developing world.

The second and third sections offer a challenge to the arguments found both within the human security discourse and within critical accounts that human security is symptomatic of the merging of security and development. In order to make this argument the article moves beyond a focus on the actual discourses of human security, which both supporters and critics tend to engage with. A key problem with a focus on the claims within human security that development and security are two areas of policy that ought to be intimately linked, is that there is an unexplored assumption that hitherto security and development have been separate policy spheres. However, this reveals a striking historical absence both within the human security discourse and within work by radical critics of that discourse — the substantive relationship between security and development that pertained during the Cold War. The discussion on both sides largely ignores the nature of the Cold War and specific and key role accorded to the developing world in the ideological and material struggle between America and the Soviet Union. This author argues that the Cold War was marked by an intimate (although not explicit) relationship between international security and the development of the Third World.

This understanding of the relationship between development and security during the Cold War and the specific political role accorded to development during the Cold War is crucial in order to be able to think about security and development today. This broader political understanding of the Cold War role accorded to developing and Third World counties in the international political order leads us to consider the material impact of the end of the Cold War on the role of these states. Drawing together material about the post-Cold War decline in aid from the developed world to the developing world, and arguments about the clear lack of strategy evident in contemporary interventions and ‘nation-building’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, this study will argue that the end of the Cold War has had serious implications for the role of developing and Third World countries in the
international political order. The fate of Third World and developing countries no longer plays an intimate role in international political alignments.

This is not to imply that there is no intervention in the developing world by the developed. Indeed much contemporary political discourse in Western countries posits that underdeveloped states serve as a base for global insecurity. However these are seen more as risks to be managed than as existential threats. This argument is necessarily a contextual argument; it will not, for example, be definitively ‘proven’ that human security represents the separation of security and development. What will be argued however is that this is a policy shift that can best be understood not in terms of its own discourse but in the context of a changing international political environment.

The fourth section will argue that a consideration of some projects and initiatives that go under the human security rubric in the United Nations (UN) and other organisations lends support to this hypothesis. Superficially the human security agenda seems to represent a vast and expansive agenda of control by Western states and agencies of the developing world. However, the paper will argue that the superficial expansiveness masks the essentially piecemeal and heterogeneous nature of projects done under the auspices of human security. Far from being a systematic form of control, it will be argued that human security is little more than a label that can be stuck onto a hodgepodge of small charitable interventions none of which, while they might alleviate individual suffering, can have any kind of transformative social impact. This poses a challenge to radical critiques which argue that human security represents a global agenda of control. This author will argue that the less radical critique of human security, that human security appears to be unworkable due to the expansive and heterogeneous nature of the concept, gestures more towards what human security represents. In fact this lack of precision and workability is the essence of human security. Under the rubric of human security anything, however minor, can be framed as a major engagement with global poverty and underdevelopment, yet it signifies very little.

**Human security and the merging of development and security**

Emerging after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the concept of human security has been highly influential in terms of international and national policy, for example, within the UN and the European Union. It has been explicitly incorporated into the foreign policy of Japan and Canada, but has also featured in the policy of other states, for
example Britain. The concept of human security is one that has become the site of much academic argument, discussion and different policy approaches. Within the last decade human security has generated a large secondary literature. This article does not aim to give an overview of these extensive debates as this has now been done in several articles and it would be superfluous to repeat the material here. For those who are unfamiliar with this literature references are provided. The first section of this article focuses upon key human security policy documents and the core claims made within them. In the second section, the focus will be on selected secondary and critical literature.

The key claim made within human security documents and by advocates of human security is that, first and foremost, human security shifts attention from the state to the individual, it ‘puts the individual at the centre of debate, analysis and policy’. Human security is argued therefore to represent a paradigm shift away from the old state-centric model of security. A key development of human security in terms of the claimed paradigm shift to the security of the individual and away from the state-centric model of security is that human security purports to draw attention to what should be two interlinked aspects of policy, development and security.

As King and Murray argue:

In the 1990s, the two dominant strands of foreign policy—economic development and military security—became intertwined. The development and security establishments have also each undergone a period of conceptual turmoil with the end of the Cold War, the recognition of highly uneven patterns of change in different components of development, and the technological and political changes often labelled globalization. One consequence has been the emergence of the concept of human security.

The importance of establishing links between security and development are held to be key within the human security discourse because it is claimed that the old state-centric security framework simply ignores the fact that for most people in the world the real threats are not from military invasion by neighbouring states but from problems associated with poverty and lack of opportunity.

The first full exposition of human security was in the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR). In this report both the importance of the shift to the individual and the linked importance of understanding that the real security threats are related to problems associated with poverty and related problems were explored:
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust[...]. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, employment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.11

Human security claims to draw attention to vital human insecurity that the traditional state-centric model simply ignores as irrelevant. This shift from a state-centric model of security in which the focus is on military threats to the state to a people-centred one in which problems associated with poverty and associated problems are key security concerns is part of all major human security policy documents.12

Moreover, as the UNHDR makes clear, the links between security and development mean that human security is interdependent, the consequences of human insecurity and problems associated with poverty and lack of opportunity spread beyond the confines of the state affected:

When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.13

This crucial theme which encompasses the alleged links between poverty, and associated problems, and the resulting global interconnectedness of security have been developed in other major human security reports. This has also been a theme in other major UN reports that, while not focusing specifically on human security, have stressed the interconnectedness of problems emerging from a lack of development and global security.14

The UN’s Human Security Unit15 expands upon the idea of the merging of development and security, its global implications, and spells out the expansive implication that such a conception of security potentially has in terms of its impact on daily lives:

Human security brings together the ‘human elements’ of security, rights and development. As such, it is an inter-disciplinary concept that displays the following characteristics: people-centered; multi-sectoral; comprehensive; context-specific; prevention-oriented [...]. Human security is also based on a multi-sectoral understanding of insecurities. Therefore, human security
entails a broadened understanding of threats and includes causes of insecurity relating for instance to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Moreover, human security emphasizes the interconnectedness of both threats and responses when addressing these insecurities. That is, threats to human security are mutually reinforcing and interconnected in two ways. First, they are interlinked in a domino effect in the sense that each threat feeds on the other. For example, violent conflicts can lead to deprivation and poverty which in turn could lead to resource depletion, infectious diseases, education deficits, etc. Second, threats within a given country or area can spread into a wider region and have negative externalities for regional and international security.  

Through highlighting the linkages between security and development, human security appears to promise an expansive and progressive agenda that seeks to address the true sources of insecurity in people’s daily lives. This assumption also directly challenges aspects of international politics that were seen to be crucial during the Cold War, for example state sovereignty. In a departure from the classic liberal idea in which the state represents a mechanism through which people can achieve more security (through the fictitious device of the social contract) states are here understood to be ‘[…] more often part of the problem than the source of the solution’. Thus advocates of human security claim that human security represents a reversal of power from the state to the individual. In fact through the human security framework, advocates argue that the most vulnerable and powerless ‘communities, for example women or other ‘voiceless’ groups, will be given power and agency. Thus the human security framework is argued to represent a transformation in security away from the state and, through the merging of development and security, a paradigmatic shift towards protecting and empowering the individual, protecting human life and promoting social progress.

The radical critique of the merging of development and security

One of the earliest criticisms of the human security framework to emerge is that it is simply too broad and too vague to actually be useful either as an intellectual device or as any kind of a transformative tool or policy tool. This classic critique is to be found in an article by Roland Paris in which he argues that as an idea human security is simply too vast
and ill defined to serve any kind of practical goals such as either academic research or policy work. Paris argues that human security advocates seem either to define it as an extensive laundry list of all the bad things that can possibly happen to an individual, or in such broad terms such as ‘the realisation of human dignity’ that it is impossible to quantify.20

In turn, new ways of defining and/or measuring human security have been proposed in order to make the idea workable. Taylor Own for example has developed a methodology for measuring human security.21 Gary King and Christopher Murray have proposed ‘[…] a simple, rigorous, and measurable definition of human security: the number of years of future life spent outside a state of ‘generalised poverty’’.22 Thomas and Tow have proposed that the ‘narrow’ definition of human security should be the one adopted.23 Other authors have argued that a focus on gender will help.24 David Roberts has argued that reposing the debate in terms of human insecurity will help to make human security a reality.25

However, a growing number of authors have argued that the real problems with the human security framework do not lie in its vagueness as a concept and associated problems of measurement or definition. Rather, they suggest that human security is a fundamentally problematic construct. In particular, these critics have argued that the purported emancipatory aspect of the merging of development and security is in fact the opposite. Far from serving as a potentially emancipatory framework for people in poor countries and the developing world, human security, and the merging of development and security therein, represents a form of domination and control by the developed world of the developing world.

For Duffield and other critics such as Grayson, Elbe, Larrinaga and Doucet, the concept of biopolitics, drawn from Foucault’s writing, can help us understand this aspect of the human security framework.26 For Duffield and other authors, human security can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population.27 Grayson for example explains how Foucault can assist us in understanding that human security is a field of knowledge and power:

At its most simple, biopolitics is about the identification, classification and management of populations in order to ensure that the dimensions of life, that are said to define them, are amenable to specific forms of governance, systems of belief and cultural propensities or what one might want to call ‘ways of life’
The biopolitical project is therefore primarily concerned with (governing) the ‘contingent or “aleatory” features that are displayed by populations’ in order to mitigate risks and control threats that may arise from these features [...] To govern effectively in this fashion requires knowledge of populations, their natural and abnormal characteristics and their range of potential contingencies, as well as a means of calculating the economies of intervention when help is needed to reproduce natural equilibriums.28

In this reading the West seeks to assert control over the developing world in order to protect itself from disorder emanating from the South. Duffield discusses the particular form that this takes within human security, that of sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop Third World states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. While we in the West are ‘insured’, that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on; sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third World populations must be taught to be self-reliant as they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival.29 Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the Left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society-wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states.

Sustainable development and human security are, for critics such as Duffield and Grayson, therefore global technologies of security which aim to create self-managing, self-reliant and docile subjectivities in the Third World, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world.30 Thus for these authors we can see that human security represents a new form of control by the developed world over the developing. This ‘biopolitical’ strategy is security on a global scale, a massive expansion of security from the national to the international, a control of populations and recreating of subjectivities on a global scale so that the developed world is not threatened by unruly citizens of the developing world reacting to situations of extreme poverty and underdevelopment.
This author is sympathetic to the argument that human security does not challenge contemporary international power relations. Moreover, there is also no doubting the language of Western institutions and the explicit framing of threats from the developing world in the human security discourse, as the report of the *International Commission in Intervention and State Sovereignty* argued:

*Human security is indeed indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a faraway country of which we know little’ [...] In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere.*

The sheer scale of what is suggested and posed in terms of a general focus on global poverty, underdevelopment and human rights as the only way in which to ensure global security implies a truly expansive and global agenda and strategy. However, this critique is problematic. The critique is posed at the level of the human security discourse itself without a broader political consideration of the question of security and development in historical and political context. Yet this broader context is crucial in order to begin a critical engagement with what human security represents.

In the following section, this author offers an alternative understanding of human security as representative of a period in history when there has been a separation of development and security. In order to do this, we begin in the following section with a missing part of the discussion both within human security policy documents and within the radical critique of human security, and that is the relationship between security and development during the Cold War. The following section does not attempt to introduce a new understanding of the Cold War, rather to draw upon existing material in order to introduce a missing aspect of the academic argument.

**Security and development during the Cold War**

Human security claims about the separation of security and development during the Cold War ignore recent international political history. Contrary to the claims made within human security discourses, during the Cold War, although development and security were officially separate policy spheres, they were *in practice* linked for the developed world.
The links between security and development were a function of the relationship between the developing world and the developed that pertained during the Cold War. In order to illustrate this, we need to revisit the fundamental break that occurred with the end of World War II and the expansion of the legally independent sovereign state as the main form of political organisation under American hegemony.

The end of the World War II began a new era in international politics. In particular, the old European order of colonial trade and control was over. In continental Europe the political elites in the major states of France and Germany and Italy had been fatally compromised by their links with Fascism. Communist rebellions threatened in Italy and Greece. The war had resulted in incredible devastation Europe-wide to both human life and property and the entire economic and social system that had pertained up until World War II hung in the balance. As Van der Pijl argues, ‘On the European continent, the power of the working class and the general mood of change at the end of the war jeopardised the entire framework of capitalist relations of production’. It is of note that in this new political context, the very first post-war example of aid was the American Marshall Plan which was designed to resuscitate Western Europe and stave off social revolution.

The new political situation allowed America the opportunity to remake the post-war international order in accordance with its own economic and political preferences for a more open and liberal trading and financial regime. Crucially for our purposes, an ostensibly liberal international order entailed the breaking down of the old colonial order and the establishment of ostensibly free states in which trade rather than imperial rule was to form the basis of the relationship. In the dying days of World War II in April 1945, America invited over 40 nations to participate in the United Nations founding conference in San Francisco. The charter of the United Nations established for the first time purportedly global principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and the right to self-determination. This also entailed breaking down protected trade arrangements and inconvertible currencies, dismantling the Commonwealth trading block, establishing the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and supporting currency liberalisation and multilateral trade arrangements.

During the 1960s and 1970s radical theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank argued that the international order was constructed so as to allow the exploitation of the developing world by the West. Legal equality in the international realm masked substantive real inequality in power and position. However, this does not directly concern us here. What does concern us is that even the legal equality of the developing world also presented
America (and ultimately Europe) with a new problem in relation to the developing world. After World War II, the end of the old European order, the rise to hegemony of the USA and the subsequent Cold War had ushered in a new era in international relations, no longer was the non-Western world simply *terra nullius* to be conquered by Europe (and America), but with the expansion of the independent sovereign state as the main form of political organisation and the break-up of the old European empires, newly created states had a role to play in the new (and for the first time) global system.

In particular, as the Cold War developed, the Soviet Union presented both an ideological alternative to liberal capitalism and, crucially for developing states, material support. Thus the legal freedom of the Third World was not in fact without some real (albeit limited) content, developing world states did have some room to manoeuvre in terms of material support and could ultimately join the Communist bloc. As Mark Neocleous has argued, the Third World became a key site of capitalist-Communist confrontation.\textsuperscript{38} Thus while development aid and support to the developing world by the advanced capitalist economies was framed in universalist terms of bringing progress and development to the Third World\textsuperscript{39} these universalist terms covered what was a specific concern with the *security* of the developed world. To be more precise, specifically the security of a particular set of political and social arrangements, namely the capitalist system. A key concern for the Western bloc was that newly independent states would become Communist.\textsuperscript{40}

As Vanessa Pupavac has argued, Western development aid was used by the West to promote Western style economic growth, industrialisation and modernisation in order to ensure that these new states did not join the Communist bloc:

*Indicative of the security preoccupations underlying economic development policy, Walt Rostow’s famous treatise on The Stages of Economic Growth is subtitled A Non-Communist Manifesto (Rostow, 1960). Consequently, Western qualms over development’s potential to destabilize the existing international order were suppressed by concerns that if the West did not promote a development programme for industrialization then the new states would turn communist. The Western model of modernization was to promote Westernization and secure the developing countries to the Western bloc.*\textsuperscript{41}

Foreign development aid therefore has during the Cold War had a specifically conservative security function; to maintain in power regimes favourable to the West and to keep these
states within the Western bloc. Therefore the kind of capitalist development promoted by the West in the developing world was one in which the developing world played a specific and subordinate role to the developed, it was not one which allowed genuinely free development. Thus aid and trade, development in general played a key role in terms of attempting to control the developing world:

_The origins and objectives of foreign aid cannot be understood outside the global political context. Foreign aid is a product of the Cold War, of the division of the globe into First, Second and Third Worlds and of the hostility of the two superpowers. Were it not for the Cold War there would have been no foreign aid programmes worthy of the name, for without the Cold War it would have been impossible to generate the domestic political support in the donor countries necessary to sustain foreign assistance for more than four decades._\(^42\)

This kind of discussion was quite apparent during the Cold War both from conservative theorists and policy-makers such as Walt Rostow (discussed in Pupavac above) and from radical commentators such as Teresa Hayter who argued in a book entitled _Aid as Imperialism_ that development aid was simply a cover for Western control.\(^43\) Thus as Mark Neocleous has argued, during the twentieth century, security and development were intimately related. Development aid was a tool of control used by the developed world against the developing. Cold War development policy was _intimately_ linked to the security of the developed world.\(^44\)

### The end of an era; the de-linking of development and security after the Cold War

Neocleous’s statement needs to be somewhat qualified. While the broader links between the development of the Third World and the security of the First remained intimately linked, the content of what was meant by development began to change during the latter decades of the Cold War as the political context changed. As Pupavac argues, by the late 1960s and 1970s, Western states were already beginning to re-think earlier ideas about development and the non-Western world (and indeed development within the West). The oil crisis and recessions of the 1970s gave rise to Western arguments about the problems of economic growth and industrialisation and anxieties about the destabilising impact of rapid economic growth and change on the individuals in developing states.\(^45\)
However, it is with the end of the Cold War that a more fundamental change occurs in the relationship between the Western bloc and the developing world. As we have argued above, the links between security and development were fundamentally related to the relationship between the developed world and the newly independent Third World that came into being after World War II. The claims within human security that development and security are globally linked, and the radical critics of that shift, imply that the relationship between the developing world and the developed world is deepening. In the following section we draw upon different discussions about the changing post-Cold War relationship between the developing world and the developed. These different discussions point to a less intense relationship between the developing and the developed world then that which pertained during the Cold War.

The first thing we consider is the fall in aid that occurred after the Cold War. In Africa for example, foreign aid from American and Western Europe fell rapidly. Roger Riddell wrote in 1999:

*In the six years after the Berlin wall came down, from 1990 to 1996, official aid disbursements to sub-Saharan Africa fell in real terms by one-fifth (21 per cent), contracting, on average, by 3–5 per cent a year, though, in the last two years of the period, the fall averaged over 8 per cent a year, a contraction of over 83 bn in real terms. Indeed in 1996, this region received 82 bn less aid in real terms than it had received 10 years earlier in 1986. Whereas, in 1991, aid per capita to sub-Saharan Africa stood at an average of 833, by 1996 this had fallen to 826.*

Moreover, Riddell points out that an increasing amount of the aid given is targeted at emergencies rather than development. This is quite a significant point as it implies that aid that is given is directed less strategically but simply as short-term emergency palliative care.

This drop in aid at the end of the Cold War is clearly explicable if we understand the intrinsically political role of Cold War development aid. The end of international ideological contestation between West and East in effect removed the potential importance of developing nations for the West. The security of the developed world was no longer existentially linked to the developing world. In the context of the end of the Cold War there was no alternative social system that aspiring Third World states could look to to provide both political and material support. An example of another way in which this withdrawal
has been noticed but not fully understood is in the idea of ‘new wars’ or the increasing focus on ‘commodity’ driven wars. As Christopher Cramer has perceptively pointed out, what has occurred is that the source of funding for Third World and developing world conflicts has simply dried up, leading combatants to seek other sources of funding for conflicts.

Thus it is of note that human security as a discourse arises exactly at the time in the early 1990s when aid from the developed world to the developing, representing material strategic involvement in developing countries by the West, drastically falls. Human security trumpeted the links between development and security at precisely the time when the development of the Third World was no longer linked to the security of the political and economic system of the developed world. This has not just been limited to the developing world. Smaller states within Europe which had played a specific Cold War security role also lost vital material support from America. Susan Woodward discusses the impact of the end of the Cold War upon Yugoslavia, which was shortly to descend into civil war:

For forty years Yugoslavia had had a special relationship with the United States, including the implicit guarantee of special access to Western credits […] Now, however, Yugoslavia was unnecessary to U.S vital security. It was being moved from a special category in the US State Department and international organizations … and returned to its pre-1949 category, defined geopolitically, of eastern and southeastern Europe… Yugoslavia’s special relationship with Europe seemed to become obsolete overnight.

There are two apparent countertrends to this seeming decrease in involvement. The first countertrend is that at the same time as the decrease in material strategic aid (i.e. actual material involvement in developing states by the developed world) and the rise of human security discourses during the 1990s, it became increasingly accepted that powerful Western states had both a right and a duty to intervene in poorer and developing states. This was claimed ostensibly in order to ensure human rights or bring democracy. The second is that the fall in aid has in part been reversed after the suicide attacks in New York in 2001 and the subsequent (so-called) War on Terror—specific developing states linked to the war on terror have received large amounts of aid and involvement.

We consider the first trend first. Humanitarian intervention generated a great deal of scholarly and political debate in the 1990s. Almost immediately with the end of the Cold War the UN announced a new approach both to sovereignty and intervention in the
Agenda for Peace report. Here the then Secretary-General of the UN argued that ‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty [...] has passed’. As the 1990s progressed powerful states such as America and Britain proclaimed that the old Cold War doctrines of state sovereignty and non-intervention were both anachronistic and immoral. The landmark report The Responsibility to Protect attempted to develop these claims into a coherent doctrine.

Scholars such as Fernando Teson and Anne-Marie Slaughter claimed that there was a developing norm of humanitarian intervention while critics such as Noam Chomsky argued that humanitarian intervention was a new form of imperialism. In itself of course this debate does not contradict the arguments found within human security. Indeed a significant aspect of human security discourse is, as we have seen above, that it ostensibly challenges the assumptions of state sovereignty and promises a way of thinking and doing security that focuses on the individual rather than the state—thus questions of human rights and the idea that human rights abuses and disorder in one state threatens the security of another (e.g. Blair’s Chicago speech), fit in very well with human security and implies a more interventionist mode of regulating the developing world. These arguments would then support the idea that human security implies greater intervention in the developing world by the developed.

Yet actual humanitarian interventions (by which this author means interventions that were termed humanitarian intervention, she is not making any claims about the nature of the interventions) were few and far between and the results inconclusive. Interventions that were claimed to be examples of humanitarian intervention, such as Somalia, Haiti, East Timor and Kosovo did not amount to a sweeping reordering of the globe. The Kosovo intervention in fact is argued to be the high point of humanitarian intervention or liberal interventionism. The soaring rhetoric did not match the action. Furthermore, while it had been argued that the War on Terror put an end to the era of interventions for human rights, ushering in a reversal to a ‘hard’ security agenda, in fact the era of liberal interventionism had already withered in the face of both international opposition (for example to the Kosovo intervention) and domestic accusations of hypocrisy. Despite the adoption of the principles of the Responsibility to Protect by the UN in 2005, the doctrine has in fact amounted to little. The ad hoc irregular nature of the interventions and the withering away of the supposed doctrine of humanitarian intervention suggest that it did not really signify a great amount of control of the developing world by the developed, and
cannot be explained in terms of a strategic plan by the developed world to control the developing.

The second aspect to consider is the rise in aid associated with the (so-called) War on Terror. The War on Terror and the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the amount of aid being sent to specific regions associated with terrorism. In particular for radical critics, the War on Terror was symptomatic of a new form of American control and domination. Even more sympathetic critics pondered to what extent America was becoming an empire. In this respect the bio-political reading of human security is part of the more critical, radical wing of analysis of post-Cold War international relations.

There is no doubting that vast amounts of money have been poured into Iraq and Afghanistan. In terms of the justifications for intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan there were familiar themes from human security; the interconnectedness of security and threats from the developing world, underdevelopment as a threat to security, the rights of individuals and human rights abuses. However, upon closer inspection one of the really striking things about both interventions is how both have been marked by complete confusion in terms of the ultimate goals and the actual processes of intervention.

It is a now commonplace critique that the invasion and occupation of Iraq suffered from a severe lack of planning, resulting in subsequent chaos, death and destruction within Iraq. Although at the time of writing (November 2010) America has declared its ‘mission’ in Iraq over, the Obama Administration has been particular in that it has not declared victory. Despite the claims that Afghanistan was a war of necessity rather than choice, that campaign too has suffered from a striking lack of strategy both in terms of long-term goals and in terms of the actual processes of the occupation. In answer to General Stanley McChrystal’s arguments that the Afghan campaign was failing due to lack of resources and a failing strategy, President Barack Obama announced that he would not decide whether to send more troops until he had ‘absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be.’ Such is the uncertainty about what victory in Afghanistan might actually mean for America that even the US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan could not say what it would be, Richard Holbrooke stated that ‘we’ll know it when we see it’, a rather surprising comment upon a campaign that then had already lasted eight years, cost billions of dollars, resulted in thousands of deaths and is supposed to be addressing a major threat to the West. And finally it seems that the West may well accept a negotiated settlement with the Taliban anyway, yet the defeat of the Taliban was claimed to be one of the main reasons why the West supposedly went to war in the first place.
It is beyond the remit of this article to attempt to offer an explanation for Western motivations for the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. The only claim here is that these paradigmatic examples of ‘new-imperialism’, or new kinds of Western control and domination, are upon closer inspection revealed to be strikingly lacking in any clear planned outcomes or strategic purpose. While during the Cold War Western aims were to achieve certain levels of development in order to stop developing nations from joining the Communist bloc, there is a lack of evidence of strategy or planned outcomes for the interventions in either Afghanistan or Iraq.

It is in this context that it can be argued that post-9/11 policies have not signalled a reversion to a more interventionist agenda in the Third World or greater control of certain areas. Even in specific sites which are held to be sites of serious security problems for the West and which have been on the receiving end of both direct military intervention and large amounts of aid, there seems to be a major problem in terms of actually identifying what the point of Western intervention actually was.

In the following section we turn to consider some of the policies that are pursued under the auspices of human security. It will be argued that a consideration of these policies suggests that they too cannot properly function as a new form of strategic control.

**Human security policies**

As we have discussed above in section two, radical critics of human security such as Duffield have argued that human security represents a vast and expansive agenda of control over the developing world by the developed. What then is being done under the rubric of human security? The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) lists 33 UN related bodies which have participated in human security projects through the auspices of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. Japan has adopted a ‘broad’ definition of human security. Examples of the some of the projects sponsored include; rebuilding informal settlements of displaced and vulnerable households in some areas in Afghanistan; removing cluster bombs in areas of South Lebanon; training medical specialists in Tajikistan; community learning centres in areas of Nepal; rehabilitation of boarding schools and provision of refresher training courses for headmasters and teachers in the Drought affected Gobi Desert provinces of Mongolia; mitigating arsenic poisoning in areas of Bangladesh; waste management project in Drenica, Kosovo and many more.
Canada, on the other hand, has adopted a ‘narrow’ definition of human security in which the focus is on the ‘freedom from fear’ aspect. This means that ostensibly the focus in Canadian policy is aimed at a more limited ‘protection’ agenda rather than on empowerment. Projects supported by the Canadian government’s Glyn Berry Programme for Peace and Security (formerly known as the Human Security Programme) include support for projects in three broad themes: democratic transitions; human rights; international accountability and the rule of law. Projects supported under these auspices include various workshops, academic centres and international institutions to do with democracy; financial assistance towards a manual to assist training for the Red Cross/Red Crescent Society; support for a UN-sponsored radio station in Afghanistan; financial support for a peace camp to bring together 20 Israeli and Palestinian young people. The Canadian government also gives some of the following examples of the means by which a people-centred approach to security may be achieved; the Kimberly process; the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use of landmines; the Kosovo war; the establishment of the International Criminal Court; intervention and peace-building in Haiti, and Sierra Leone; and international agreement on terrorism.

The UN Human Security Unit has published a booklet which focuses on a representative selection of nine examples of human security initiatives in various countries which are purported to both protect and empower people. These include, for example, initiatives focusing on the sexual health of women and girls in three central American countries, a regional programme in Africa which is giving small engines to local communities (to be run by the local women’s groups), a project to raise awareness about ‘human trafficking’ in Cambodia and Vietnam, giving ‘voice to the voiceless’ in Africa and Afghanistan through establishing a radio network that broadcasts interviews with impoverished and marginalised members of society such as street vendors.

Certainly a superficial consideration of policies that go under the human security umbrella do appear to cover a vast range of activities and policy areas and to reach into many aspects of the lives of those in developing states. Even if one considers human security projects done under the auspices of the ‘narrow’ perspective, for example projects sponsored by Canada, there is superficially a ‘vast and ambitious’ agenda. However, the sheer volume and variety of policies does not necessarily lead to any clear conclusion about what these policies actually mean. Reading through the assorted policies that go under the human security framework one is struck both by how small they are (a local radio station,
training head teachers in an area of Mongolia, removing mines from a certain area) and, crucially for our purposes, heterogeneous.

While ‘giving voice to the voiceless’ through, for example, the establishment of a local radio station could be interpreted as a way of trying to create some sense of empowerment and resilience in the absence of real material development (or in the terms of the radical critics, the creation of robust subjectivities which can cope in a situation of no development) this author would argue that this would be reading too much into such policies to frame them in that way. These various projects suggest that human security, or projects done under the auspices of international human security programmes, represent the replacement of material aid for state development with smaller and ad hoc charitable projects. While each project may quite possibly be very beneficial for the individuals involved it does not add up to a transformative agenda or development agenda (even of the sustainable variety).

Moreover, some of the projects are clearly much more of the emergency palliative type—removing cluster bombs, rebuilding shanty towns etc. which have been rechristened as human security initiatives. Many of the projects mirror contemporary Western preoccupations—empowerment of women for example and other marginalised groups. To what extent these kinds of projects even make sense in conditions of extreme poverty, total absence of modern infrastructure and a society still organised in terms of pre-capitalist social relations is one that that clearly merits discussion. Through programmes that aim to ‘empower’ Afghan women (for example), the West imagines that post-industrial social relations and mores can be created in a pre-industrial society, bypassing the question of material development altogether.77

Radical critics have argued that the expansiveness of human security policies should be understood as the colonisation of every aspect of life into a system of global security controlled by the developed world. Yet when virtually any problem can be understood to be linked to human security, and virtually any policy from getting rid of landmines to collecting rubbish can be thought of as contributing to human security, then the concept has little meaning and certainly no strategic value or transformatory potential. Despite the wide scope of projects done under the auspices of human security there is little evidence of a serious or comprehensive attempt to influence a developing society or recreate subjectivities. This author would argue that an overview of current human security policies and projects represent little more than a jumble of charitable interventions led by current Western preoccupations and wrapped up in highly moral and grand rhetoric.
This author would argue that the more radical critics have to some extent engaged too much with the discourse of human security policies and taken it at face value. Rather, the less radical critics such as Roland Paris, who have pointed to the basic problems associated with human security such as a lack of definition and vagueness, point towards the nature of human security.

**Conclusion**

Human security promises much, little less than a transformation in thinking about and ‘doing’ security. A transformation that promises to empower and secure the most marginalised global inhabitants. In particular, as we have argued, by drawing attention to the links between development and security, human security promises a radical and transformatory programme. It is precisely this aspect of human security that radical critics have argued is highly problematic—for critics such as Duffield human security promises new forms of control of the developing world by the developed.

Yet the rhetoric is at odds with the changing international context. As we have shown, during the Cold War real material aid had been a tool of the developed world to control the developing and had been intimately linked with the security of the developed world. The aim had been to stop the developing world from becoming part of the Communist bloc. However, material aid dropped quickly once the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, just as human security discourses became prominent. The developing world no longer had an alternative. In the absence of the international split between East and West the developing world lost its security role. This is visible in terms of the decrease in aid but also in the withdrawal of aid from countries that had been strategic for the West in Europe such as Yugoslavia.

Other candidates for control of the developing world such as humanitarian intervention and the so-called war on terror, upon closer inspection, do not live up to their rhetoric or indeed critical accounts. While such doctrines promised much, upon closer inspection doctrines such as humanitarian intervention have faded away while the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, hugely destructive of life as they were, appear to be interventions with little strategic direction nor any particular planned outcome.

Human security policies and projects while covering a huge number of different things do not reveal any coherent programme. Virtually anything can be called a ‘human security’ project. No doubt this can be useful for non-governmental organizations or charities.
seeking funding for specific projects, but when a term can cover anything from seminars for Israeli and Palestinian youth to rubbish collection in Kosovo, one can reasonably make the argument that such a heterogeneous range of projects do not amount to a new form of control, even of the ‘sustainable development’ type, by the developing world of the developed. These projects also, while quite possibly beneficial for those participating are small and heterogeneous and decidedly lacking in society-wide transformatory potential or programme of social control. Human security policies demonstrate through their ad hoc and heterogeneous nature that they are not about social control or transformation. A far cry from the state-wide industrial development that was championed by the West during the Cold War.

Thus rhetoric tells one tale and actual policies seem to tell another tale. This author would argue that a summary of these various initiatives presents us with a very different picture to the one portrayed by radical critics. What we seem to be looking at is a picture in which the developing world is simply not important to the security of the developed. Critics such as Duffield are correct when they argue that the human security framework does not pose a challenge to contemporary power relations but this author would argue that this is not because it represents a new methodology of control and domination but because it is symptomatic of a disengagement of the more powerful nations from the developing world and represents the end of attempts to substantively alter non-Western societies in a way that may have been assumed during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the developing world is less strategically important to the developed. Thus the human security label is something that can be stuck on to any number of initiatives or projects, giving an appearance of strategic purpose and coherence but with little content.

Endnotes

2. UN, United Nations Human Development Report, 22.
5. Eg, Rasmussen, The Risk Society.
6. For overviews see McCormack, Power and Agency; Paris, Human Security; Glasius, Human Security.
8. Development is a highly contested concept. For the purposes of the first section of this article which discusses the linking of security and development within the human security literature, the concept of development found within that literature is taken. Within the concept of human security, the concept of development implies a situation in which individuals are free to achieve their potential, e.g. UN, United Nations Human Development Report, Chapter 1. Threats therefore to the individual are associated with situations in which there is a lack of, for example, economic opportunities or health problems, see e.g., UN, Human Security in Theory and Practice. Such problems might be assumed to be associated with a lack of material development within a given state. However, as is made clear in the major human security documents such as the United Nations Human Development Report, the model of development associated with human security is that of sustainable
development which is not necessarily associated with material development in a state. See for example Pupavac, Human Security for a discussion of the difference between material development and sustainable development. The problems associated with sustainable development within the human security literature are also highlighted by Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.

12. UN, United Nations Human Development Report, 22; also see page 23 for an elaboration of the way in which development and security should be linked.
16. Suhrke, Human Security and The Interests of States, 271–272; Macfarlane, A Useful Concept That Risks Losing its Political Salience, 368; see McCormack, Power and Agency.
22. Roberts, Human Insecurity.
26. UN, United Nations Human Development Report, 22; also see page 23 for an elaboration of the way in which development and security should be linked.
27. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 16.
29. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.
31. ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, 5.
34. Griffin, Foreign Aid, 645.
36. UN, Charter.
39. See for example President Truman’s inaugural address in 1949.
40. For a discussion see Christian Aid.
42. Griffin, Foreign Aid, 647.
43. Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, 9.
44. Neocleous, Critique of Security, 175.
46. Figures for Europe may be found in Olsen, Europe’s Relations with Africa, 300; and for America in Tarnoff and Nowels, Foreign Aid.
47. Riddell, ‘The End of Foreign Aid?’, 313.
48. Ibid.
49. Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
50. Cramer, Civil War, 77–78.
51. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 104.
52. UN, An Agenda for Peace; ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.
53. Tarnoff and Nowels, Foreign Aid.
54. UN, An Agenda for Peace, 44.
55. For example see Blair’s famous Chicago speech, Doctrine of the International Community.
56. ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.
57. Teson, The Liberal Case; Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent; Chomsky, Rogue States; Zolo, Invoking Humanity.
59. For example in reaction to the Kosovo intervention see McCormack, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ and domestic accusations of hypocrisy see for example, Pilger, ‘Blood on Our Hands’.
60. Hehir, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’.
61. For example, Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War.
63. Tarnoff and Nowels, Foreign Aid.
64. For example, Blair, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister’.
68. Woodward, ‘McChrystal: More Forces or “Mission Failure”’.
69. Tiedemann, ‘Holbrooke on Success’.
70. MacAskill, ‘White House Shifts Afghanistan Strategy’.
71. See endnote 15 for literature that explains the differences between the two schools of human security.
73. For details see http://www.international.gc.ca/glynberry/index.aspx.
74. McRae, ‘Human Security’.
75. UN, Human Security for All.
77. My thanks to Dr Vanessa Pupavac for this point.

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Tiedemann, Katherine, 2009. ‘Holbrooke on Success: “We’ll Know It When We See It!”, report on conference on Afghanistan hosted by the Centre for American Progress,


