The Sudans: Which Way?

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars
The Sudans: Which Way?

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On cover: Photo of independence, South Sudan, July 2011, courtesy of Caroline Faria
South Sudan became a member of the African Union and the 193rd member of United Nations after it gained its independence on July 9, 2011. The new situation in the Sudan and in Africa was a real test for rethinking old categories in politics.

In this issue of the ACAS Bulletin, the editors bring six different perspectives on the possible paths for the peoples of the Sudan both in the South and in the North. Sudan (or, as some people are now saying, “Sudans”) is a microcosm of Africa with the richness of the cultural, ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic differences. The democratic management of these differences awaits the peoples of the Sudan and Africa as it becomes clearer that there are forces inside and outside of Africa who want a military management of these differences. It is in this sense that the peoples of the Sudan stand at the crossroads of the Africa of wars, conquest and enslavement and a future of peace and reconstruction. Complex historical legacies – slavery, Arabization and Islamization – weigh heavily on all Sudanese, especially the Southerners. The wealth of Sudan attracted invaders into a region and for centuries precipitated resource wars.

In this, as in many edited collections, there is some unevenness due to different foci, but as editors, we believe that the diversity of views of the Sudan should be encouraged. The contribution by Daniel Large, “South Sudan Looks East: Between the CPA and Independence”, brings out clearly the pitfalls of being stuck in old paradigms without an understanding of the changing political environment in Africa. Because of its own myopia on the question of minority rights, the government of the Peoples Republic of China had adopted a formula for engagement with the Sudan that privileged the Bashir National Congress Party (NCP) regime in Khartoum. As Large explained:

The extension of full diplomatic relations and recognition of South Sudan’s new sovereignty represented an immense change in China’s Sudan engagement from 9 January 2005. Between January 2005 and July 2011, China’s relations with South Sudan underwent a dramatic evolution. A sequence of phases led China from supporting the unity of Sudan to recognizing the new Republic of South Sudan. At first, China firmly supported unity; later, it then began to hedge its bets on the South’s political future and to develop relations with the South and the “one Sudan, two systems” framework created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

This was clearly a case where the levels of understanding of the complex issues had been subsumed under a simplistic rubric of opposing secession movements. Pan Africanists have always opposed secession, but the principle of the right to self-determination is as important as the question of the unity of the peoples of Africa. The conclusion
by Daniel Large holds true not only for the peoples of the Sudan, but also for Africa. He argues that:

The major question is not whether but how China can best contribute after Southern independence and the extent to which the Republic of South Sudan can best manage Chinese partnership to its own, sustainable and more broad-based lasting advantages.

Caroline Faria deepens the analysis of the challenges for the new state of the South Sudan in her contribution on “Gendering War and Peace in South Sudan: The Elision and Emergence of Women”. This article confronts a long neglected subject, the role of women in the search for peace in Sudan. Caroline Faria sums up her argument by saying that with women

… representing 60% of the population of the south, the Government has carefully sought to mobilize their support. Bi- and multi-lateral organizations have also targeted women with funding to conduct referendum literacy efforts and to support them in their own political campaigns. And women themselves have been organizing, leading, funding and participating in large conferences, meetings and projects on women’s political participation in and beyond the referendum.

She concludes on a sobering note, that “in these early days of autonomy women … represent a valuable resource” to build a “strong and politically sustainable nation-state. However, although women’s groups … have flourished since the signing of the peace agreement in 2005 they have had to balance both feminist and nationalist struggles. This continues to be a difficult path”.

Elena Vezzadini in her contribution on “Genealogies of Racial Relations: The Independence of South Sudan, Citizenship and the Racial State in the Modern History of Sudan” brings her historical skills and experience to bear to lay the foundations for a new thinking that opposes racism and chauvinism in the Sudan. After providing readers with a grounding in the complex historical causes of today’s problems of citizenship, she concludes that:

It is urgent that the new State of Sudan should not only rethink the importance and role of racial relations in its past, but also acknowledge the necessity for collective debate, in which the dialectic between Northerners as conscious and unconscious perpetrators of racist acts and Southerners as victims resorting to violence may finally be discussed.

Ahmad Sikainga in “Citizenship and Identity in Post-Secession Northern Sudan” also addresses these burning issues of citizenship. He brings a fresh sense of engagement with the history of the Sudan by delving into the past to grasp questions of identity and citizenship. Ahmad Sikainga is not shy to spell out the complex historical legacies – slavery, Arabization and Islamization – that now weigh heavily on all Sudanese. From this historical base, Ahmad brings out the challenges for the peoples of both the North and the South. He argues:

Indeed, as in the case of the new state in the South, northern Sudan itself is going to face numerous challenges, including the loss of vital oil resources, a potential conflict with the South over the unresolved issues, internal struggle within the ruling clique, the ongoing conflict in Darfur, and the possibility of a proliferation of civil wars in the rest of the country. However, one of the most critical issues that will shape the future of northern Sudan and whether it remains a single entity or disintegrates is the struggle over the old issues of the country’s national identity and the definition of citizenship.

Sikainga reinforces the theme that runs through this edition that oversimplified categories have tended to frame Sudanese conflicts within the context of an Arab-Muslim North versus an African-Christian South. However, this oversimplified dichotomy lost currency for a number of reasons. In the first place, it is an inaccurate description of the ethnic, social,
and cultural composition of the two regions and the remarkable diversity of the North itself. Sikainga holds that:

Northern Sudan is a site of deeply entrenched social hierarchies, ethnic cleavages, and subcultures. As mentioned previously, the region’s makeup was shaped by a long history of slavery, miscegenation, and migration. Its inhabitants include a large number of former slaves and their descendants, people of West African origins such as Hausa, Fulani, and Borno, and millions of migrant workers and displaced people from southern and western Sudan. …

Even the northern groups that claim an Arab identity are in fact a hybrid of African and Arab blood. However, the claim of an Arab descent was a byproduct of major historical transformations in the region, including increased links with the Middle East particularly after the rise of Islam, population migration and intermarriage, the pattern of state formation in the Sudan, commerce, and social transformation. These processes became more prevalent in the central and the northern parts of the Sudan, where some immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East settled and intermarried with the indigenous population.

He concludes by nothing that, “If the Sudan is to be salvaged, the NCP’s project must be challenged on all levels, with a new democratic vision of identity and citizenship that recognizes and celebrates the country’s multiple diversities.”

The contribution by Abdullahi Gallab on “The State of South Sudan: The Change is about the New Sudan”, takes the reader through the maze of Northern Sudanese politics and also some of the maze of the foreign policy establishment in the USA and the roles played the Republican Party and the Bush administration. Reflecting on lost opportunities and past and present struggles, he suggest that, perhaps, there may be … a new opportunity for building a new Sudan out of the Sudanese collective order and its emerging good society. By that time, surely, the Sudanese “habits of the heart” that ameliorated and molded the Sudanese character and its deeper sense of civility (not the state or its regimes) would help them examine themselves, create new political communities, produce a new social contract and thus ultimately support and maintain conditions of democracy, freedom, equality and dignity.

Horace Campbell in his contribution does not retreat from raising questions of future war in the Sudan over oil resources. The news that President Bashir was supporting one faction of the National Transitional Council in Libya brought home the militaristic proclivities of this leadership and the provocations that can be engineered for future military triggers in the Sudan. Drawing from the experience of the independence of Eritrea, Campbell notes that:

Twenty years after independence, the peoples of Eritrea are now fighting against the government that was supposed to be a leading force for liberation. Eritrea and Ethiopia have fought wars senselessly over strips of land, mainly Badme. Both societies have diverted scarce resources to military projects instead of concentrating on the health and wellbeing of the people.

Today the remilitarization of Africa has deepened with the new deployment of US military forces to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army and the stationing of American military drones in Ethiopia. There have also been military forays of Kenya into Somalia. In the face of all this dangerous intensified militarism, it is the task of concerned African scholars to work to expose this new militarism and to support those intellectuals and policy makers who want to work for peace.
The Republic of South Sudan and the Meaning of Independence

Horace Campbell

Welcome People of South Sudan to the Comity of Nations

On July 9, 2011, the people of the Republic of South Sudan raised their flag in Juba to symbolize the declaration of political independence. This ascension to independence was one more step in the peace process that is supposed to bring the peoples of the Sudan from war to peace. This peace came after the second civil war. The first civil war, which began a year before the independence of Sudan, lasted from 1955 to 1972. In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed after 23 years of war (1982-2005). This agreement stipulated that after six years there should be a referendum where the people of South Sudan would make a decision whether they would remain part of the Sudan or become an independent state. A referendum was held in January 2011 and South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for independence. The present political leaders of the SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) had campaigned for independence as the option. One other option would have been for the leaders in the Sudan to fight for transformation for all people of the Sudan and to become a force to beat back the conservative fundamentalists in the northern part of the Sudan. We respect the choice of the leaders of South Sudan and this new state will be welcomed to be the 54th member of the African Union and the 193rd member of the United Nations. With more than 2.5 million persons perishing in the last war that lasted for 23 years, the people paid a very high price for this independence and serious engagement will be needed by the pan African community along with all progressive persons to ensure that the sacrifices for independence would not be in vain.

Pan Africanists, African Unity and Secession of States

In welcoming the Republic of South Sudan to membership of the African Union, our branch of the pan African movement does not in any way diminish the call for the urgency of the unity of all the peoples of Africa. With each passing day and the crisis of capitalism, rampant militarism and imperialist military interventions, gradual implosion of the dollar, regional trade blocs and challenges of global warming, it is clearer that only a democratic and united people of Africa can negotiate with the
new emerging powers to ensure that Africans can have the space for transformation, peace, and social reconstruction.

Commenting on this question of South Sudan before the referendum, I highlighted our most recent experience in Africa of an emerging state that was carved out of an existing state, the case of Eritrea. Twenty years after independence, the peoples of Eritrea are now fighting against the government that was supposed to be a leading force for liberation. Eritrea and Ethiopia have fought wars senselessly over strips of land, mainly Badme. Both societies have diverted scarce resources to military projects instead of concentrating on the health and wellbeing of the people.

The people of the Republic of South Sudan have captured their independence 50 years after many African countries became independent. We can learn from the positive and negative lessons of these 50 years of African independence. One of the most positive lessons was the solidarity of Africans against apartheid. It was the organized political, economic, military, and diplomatic cohesion in Africa that supported the peoples of Southern Africa to oppose racism and external domination. There are numerous other positive lessons from the independence of Africa, but the negative lessons seek to completely overshadow the positive lessons. One major negative lesson has been how some leaders have exploited the people’s political independence, and acted as conveyor belt to drain wealth from Africa. From Nairobi to Abidjan and from Harare to Tunis, we have examples of leaders with billions of dollars outside of Africa while the people who fought for independence do not have the basic amenities of food, clean water, clothing, health, housing, decent education, and a peaceful environment.

Already, even before the independence flag was hoisted in South Sudan, one met children of the new rulers of this nascent nation in Nairobi where these leaders have formed alliances with the most notorious exploiters in Kenya and East Africa. Transforming the education and health services in the Sudan will require that these very same leaders build institutions and develop infrastructure along with social services for the people.

The Republic of South Sudan has joined the international community with some of the lowest development indices in the world. In a new country where there are virtually no roads, no organized system of delivering public electricity and sanitation, in fact, the South Sudan has a real opportunity to pursue a project of reconstruction that starts with the prioritization of the wellbeing of the people. Such a project will require that the peoples of the South Sudan learn the positive lessons in all other parts of Africa where the peoples have rejected neo-liberalism and the wholesale give away of natural resources.

Currently, in all parts of Africa, even in Nairobi where the children of the leaders of South Sudan are going to school, the people are demonstrating against high food prices, genetically modified food, and the exploitation of the working poor. In Tunisia and Egypt, young people, workers, women, farmers are still involved in a revolution to oppose neoliberal capitalism. Many Western capitalists converged on Juba for the independence celebration. But the reconstruction of an independent Republic of South Sudan cannot be left to the whims of neo-liberal investors.

The memories of slavery were very much on the minds of the peoples who celebrated independence. Under the new constitution of the Sudan, there are explicit statements on “Freedom from Slavery, Servitude and Forced Labour.” Article 13 of the constitution states as follows: “Slavery and slave trade in all form are prohibited. No person shall be held in slavery or servitude.” “No person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour

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except as a penalty upon conviction by a competent court of law”. ² These clauses must be supported with vigorous support for trade unions so that old forms of enslavement are not replaced by wage slavery and other forms of bondage and peonage.

The reconstruction of the South Sudan requires massive injection of funds to build schools, roads, dams, hospitals and clinics, houses, and parks. Leaving such a project in the hands of foreign private capital will serve to exacerbate growing inequalities. The new tasks of building a society to meet the needs of the people in the South Sudan must be conducted in a manner that puts the interests and wellbeing of the ordinary people above everything else. This reconstruction must be oriented away from the moribund World Bank models that have marred the self-determination projects of many African states.

Paradoxically, the leadership of South Sudan and progressive pan Africanists working for the reconstruction of the South Sudan now have an opportunity to invoke the Nkrumahist sense of integrated and regional reconstruction which fosters African unity, freedom, peace and prosperity for African people. As a landlocked country bordered by Ethiopia to the east; Kenya to the southeast; Uganda to the south; the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest; the Central African Republic to the west; and the Sudan to the north, the management of peaceful relations will necessitate the kind of deft support that has been given by the African Union, with the hard work of the mediator, Thabo Mbeki.

The Wealth of the Republic of South Sudan

The Republic of South Sudan is entering independence as one of the richest and most resource-endowed countries in Africa. There are many areas of wealth that are already outstanding among the vast wealth of this new member of the international community. I will highlight five. The first is the wealth in the more than eight million people of the country. Some of the major nationalities in the South Sudan – including Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Acholi, Lotuk, Bari, Otuho, Zande, and Ubangia – are among the original peoples of Africa who resisted many forms of domination and efforts to integrate the South Sudan into the world capitalist system. These people resisted Arabization, Christianization, and Islamization. Today we know that bio-prospectors are studying these people to try to understand their bloodlines and their genetic makeup for huge profits for the Western pharmaceutical industry. Southern Sudanese were among 43 different African communities whose genes were studied and patented by American academics Sarah A. Tishkoff and Floyd Allan Reed. These people’s genes were discovered to contain what is called the single nucleotide polymorphisms or SNPs, materials associated with the ability to digest milk products (lactose tolerance) in adult African populations.³

The second source of wealth is the water resources of this new nation. South Sudan is one of the states that share the Nile and the wetlands system that includes the vast swamp region of the Sudd formed by the White Nile (locally called the Bahr al Jabal). Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. The wetlands of the Sudd cover an area half the size of France and this is one of the most ecologically diverse spaces on earth. The management of this resource can be a foundation for cooperation or conflict with their neighbors to the north, both the Sudan and Egypt. Though many people focus on oil resources, water resources have to be managed in a way that generates peaceful relations.

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The third resource is the rich agricultural land and genetic resources. Here is a country of 619,745 sq km (239,285 sq miles), larger than Portugal and Spain combined; and with a population of eight million persons with vast tropical forests, swamps, and grassland. The leadership of South Sudan should look beyond the neo-liberal foreign agro-corporations and land grabbers who masquerade as job creators and food security guarantors. So far, these foreign interests have grabbed millions of hectares of South Sudanese land. According to one report,

“In just four years, between the start of 2007 and the end of 2010, foreign interests sought or acquired a total of 2.64 million hectares of land in the agriculture, forestry and biofuel sectors alone (in South Sudan). That is a larger land area than the entire country of Rwanda. If one adds domestic investments, some of which date back to the pre-war period, and investments in tourism and conservation, the figure rises to 5.74 million hectares, or nine percent of Southern Sudan’s total land area”.

The fourth resource is oil. This country is endowed with over three trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserve and more than five billion barrels of oil reserves. Presently, more than 90 per cent of the budget of the South Sudan comes from oil production. This production is dominated by oil companies from China, Malaysia and India, while Western oil companies are lobbying hard to break this investment hold of the Third World countries.

In addition to its petroleum, South Sudan is rich in minerals such as iron ore, copper, chromium, tungsten, silver and gold. With this vast wealth, the leaders have a choice of taking the country down the road of a Nigeria or DRC, or the road of countries such as Malaysia, Norway and Vietnam. In the later three countries, the political leaders made a choice to use the wealth and resources of the country for the people and judiciously entered into foreign relations that strengthen processes of transformation.

The fifth major resource that is linked to the first resource is the linguistic diversity of this new multi-ethnic nation. South Sudan is composed of more than 200 ethnic groups and is, along with the adjacent Nuba Hills, one of the most linguistically diverse regions of Africa. The United Nations recognize that there is a fundamental linkage between language and traditional knowledge (TK) in relation to biodiversity. The Interim Constitution of the South Sudan (as noted above) states that “All indigenous languages of South Sudan are national languages and shall be respected, developed and promoted.” It will require concerted efforts to transcend regional chauvinistic drives among some sections of this new state to ensure that all languages are respected.

The Republic of South Sudan and Its Neighbors

The Republic of South Sudan and its sister nation of the Sudan need each other, and it will be in the interest of all of their people to work for peaceful coexistence and to strengthen relations based on mutual respect. This will be one of the toughest challenges because outstanding issues of militarism, plunder, arrogance, exploitation, and racism will predispose some sections of the northern political leadership towards military engagement with the Republic of South Sudan. In the immediate future, negotiations over the autonomy of Abyei and the questions of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State will prove to be challenging. It is here where the Republic of South Sudan will have to work closely with the neighbors in East Africa and the African Union so that there is an energetic international presence to prevent an outbreak of war.

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Ultimately, there will be need for intensified political work among the people of the north who want peace to remove the cliques around Bashir who use Islamism and militarism to maintain themselves in power. The oil from the South goes through to the north to be refined, and it will be correct for the people of the independent South Sudan to renegotiate the terms of the relations with the north over oil. Plans for the building of a 200 kilometer-long link to the existing South-Eldoret-Mombasa pipeline in Kenya will create tensions with Khartoum and the leaders of the Republic of South Sudan will have to draw on their experiences in negotiations to ensure that Africa is not dragged into another war over oil. With the information on the development of oil and gas resources in Tanzania and Uganda, the leaders of the South will need a comprehensive vision that would link such resources into a grid to serve the needs of Africans first.

Relations with East Africa will be very important to assist the reconstruction project. Leaders such as Yoweri Museveni and Mwai Kibaki do not provide good examples for future forms of governance in the Republic of South Sudan. Moreover, the militaristic traditions that inspire disaffected leaders of the SPLM to create militias to launch attacks on communities provide a lethal cocktail when the forces of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) are already using this region as its base for destruction.

Many South Sudanese have lived in Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and north Sudan. They have relations with trade unionists, cooperatives, schools, churches, mosques, nongovernmental organizations and other sections of what is called civil society. In South Africa, trade union centers such as COSATU can assist and the people of South Sudan should be aware that it is not only the BEE (Black Economic Empowerment program) forces from South Africa who have an interest in the Sudan. Programs such as the training initiatives that have been undertaken with the University of South Africa (UNISA) can be expanded to include other universities and tertiary institutions of learning in South Africa and other African states. The health and wellbeing and education of the people of Republic of South Sudan are a pan African issue.

International Relations beyond the “Lost Boys” Syndrome

During the time of the struggles against militarism in the north there were over four million Sudanese who were displaced by war and destruction. In the midst of this war, sections of the conservative right in America, especially the most racist and fundamentalist Christians, projected themselves as saviors of the peoples of Southern Sudan. This mentality of saving Africans infected one group of young people from South Sudan who were dubbed, “The Lost Boys of Sudan.” While we empathize with the toll of the war on these young men, we wonder where they were lost from or whether the women and the young girls who were also displaced by the war were irrelevant.

The new nation must pursue reconstruction and rehabilitation beyond the limitations of the “lost boys” syndrome. The new constitution of the South Sudan already signals that gender equality is a priority. It provides “for equal pay, benefits such as maternity leave, equal participation in public life, equal property and inheritance rights and the development of laws to combat traditional practices that are harmful to women.” The Constitution further states explicitly that all levels of government shall:

“ (a) promote women participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive organs by at least twenty-five per cent as an affirmative action to redress imbalances created by history, customs, and traditions;
(b) enact laws to combat harmful customs and traditions which undermine the dignity and status of women; and
(c) provide maternity and child care and medical care for pregnant and lactating women. Women shall have the right to own
property and share in the estates of their deceased husbands together with any surviving legal heir of the deceased.

The translation of these principles into substantive reality will be important in supporting the wider struggles for the emancipation of women in all parts of North and South Sudan. This is even more so in the context of reports coming out of the country. As stated in one report, “violence against women and girls is pervasive, devastating, and a tolerated problem in Sudan, a legacy of Sudan's brutal civil war, during which it was commonplace” (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56457)\(^5\)

At the time of the struggles for independence in Angola and Mozambique, leaders of the liberation movements maintained that, “the liberation of women is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition of for its victory.” But today, one can see in Angola and all over Africa that the women are still fighting so that African independence recognizes the centrality of the contribution of women.

The so-called lost boys mentality in Sudan has induced concepts of charity and dependence so that even in some of the most racist communities in the United States, the same racists who see Africans as inferior people sought self gratification by presenting themselves as sponsors of projects of the Lost Boys. This Lost Boys syndrome is one of the most overt symptoms of the scavenging humanitarianism that seeks to take away self respect and dignity from Africans. The Republic of South Sudan has enough resources to mount a credible reconstruction programs that brings together credible international players from every corner of the world – East, West, North, and South – so that the reconstruction program is not based on going around the world with a begging bowl. Indeed, the reconstruction of the Republic of South Sudan must be done with dignity.

Completing the Tasks of Liberation

South Sudan is also launching a new currency. This currency bears the image of John Garang. However, we would like the people of the South to honor the memory of Garang substantively and not devalue him and the principles he stood for by simply putting his face on the currency. John Garang was a member of the Dar es Salam school of liberation, an associate of Walter Rodney and freedom fighters from all parts of Africa. John Garang fought for peace, unity, and the upliftment of all of the people of Sudan. As the leader of the SPLM, his vision of the independence, freedom, and unity of all Africans was something for which he fought. Teaching about Garang (including his strengths and weaknesses) and about the struggle of South Sudan will give the people the pride that is needed. In Jamaica, the Jamaican government placed the image of Marcus Garvey on the currency, but seventy years after the passing of Marcus Garvey, there is still no systematic teaching of his philosophies and opinions. The people of South Sudan cannot afford for the memory and teachings of John Garang to be taken away from them and be used to legitimize a new class of exploiters.

Those who conspired to kill John Garang are real criminals who thought they could kill his dream. The same International Criminal Court that has gone after Bashir has not gone after the other killers and the economic crimes committed against the people of the South. One of the major crimes of Bashir was to perpetuate war to reinforce the historic plunder and exploitation of the people of the South.

However, the people of the South cannot fight to remove the northern exploiters only to pave the way for southern exploiters. It is here where we call on the organized sections of the people to organize against the Africanization of exploitation and oppression. As Frantz Fanon said, “exploitation can wear a black face as well as a white one.” The complete liberation of the people of South Sudan, like that of other Africans, would be accomplished

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when the leaders put the dignity, wellbeing, and peaceful coexistence of the people above and beyond everything else.

We welcome the independence of South Sudan and this independence will alert us to work even harder for the full unity of Africa because we know that the independence of South Sudan will be meaningless outside of the consolidation of full unity, dignity, and respect for all African peoples.
Citizenship and Identity in Post-Secession Northern Sudan

Ahmad A. Sikainga

On 9 July 2011, the region of south Sudan officially split from the Republic of the Sudan to form the independent state of the Republic of South Sudan. The secession was one of the most anticipated events, following the results of the January 2011 referendum in which the overwhelming majority of Southern Sudanese people voted for independence. The long history of bitterness, the way in which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 was crafted, and the subsequent haggling between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the government of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) left no doubt that the people of South Sudan would choose separation over unity. While the independence of South Sudan was met with great jubilation and euphoria in the South, the mood in northern Sudan was decidedly somber and gloomy. To the overwhelming majority of Southern Sudanese, the event represented the pinnacle of their long and arduous struggle for peace and equality. Despite the formidable challenges facing them, most Southern Sudanese viewed July 9th as the beginning of a new era of hope and optimism.

To many Northerners, on the other hand, the split of the South was a national disaster, a cataclysmic event that spawned an acute sense of collective failure, despair, and uncertainty. Indeed, as in the case of the new state in the South, northern Sudan itself is going to face numerous challenges, including the loss of vital oil resources, a potential conflict with the South over the unresolved issues, internal struggle within the ruling clique, the ongoing conflict in Darfur, and the possibility of a proliferation of civil wars in the rest of the country. However, one of the most critical issues that will shape the future of northern Sudan and whether it remains a single entity or disintegrates is the struggle over the old issues of the country’s national identity and the definition of citizenship. This topic forms the central theme of this article. The inquiry is concerned with the way in which the Sudanese government is approaching these vital issues and the implications of its strategies and actions.

The separation of the South represented a huge blow to the Sudanese regime. In addition to the loss of much needed oil revenue, the regime of Omer al-Bashir and his Islamist supporters will bear the enormous historic responsibility of breaking up the country and of paving the way for its total disintegration. However, some Islamist hardliners, both within and outside the government, welcomed the separation of the South and saw it as an opportunity for implementing their Islamization project. From their perspective, southern secession has removed a major obstacle to their project and would leave a monolithic Arabic and Islamic entity in northern Sudan. It is not surprising that on 19 December 2010, less than a month before the

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referendum on self-determination, President Bashir told his supporters in a rally in the town of Gedarif that if the South seceded, he would swiftly move to change the constitution to make shari`a the law of the land. He went on to declare that henceforth there would be no place for any debate about cultural diversity in the Sudan. Such a debate, according to Bashir, is nothing but rubbish. Similar statements were made by his vice president, Ali Osman Taha, on 30 July 2011 at a public rally at the village of Hilaliya where he vowed that Islamic law would be adopted and would specifically target those who oppose it or who oppose the regime: “We will cleave with a sword,” Taha warned, “those who have overstepped their limit, and acted insolently against the Sudanese people, their president, and shari’a.” The pronouncements of the regime’s leading figures should be viewed as a declaration of the NCP’s “manifesto” for the post-separation period. At the core of this manifesto is the establishment of a theocratic state, the imposition of the Arabic-Islamic form of identity, and the suppression of any form of dissent. This article argues that this approach will have grave consequences for the country. The separation of the South will neither lead to the emergence of a monolithic entity in the remaining part of the Sudan, nor will it solve the problems that are the root causes of the country’s endemic instability. The perception that northern Sudan is homogenous is not only a pure fantasy, but also a negation of historical and social realities. It is also a dangerous and potentially destructive notion for the imposition of the NCP’s vision will add fuel to the fires that are already raging in Darfur and south Kordofan and will spread them to the marginalized regions of the Upper Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan.

Framing the Problem

It is not my intention to add to the voluminous and often contentious debate about Sudanese identity. Rather my goal is to examine the premises upon which the notion of northern homogeneity is based by shedding light on some important, yet neglected elements of the region’s makeup.

For a long time, the dominant discourse on Sudanese conflicts tended to frame them within the context of an Arab-Muslim North versus an African-Christian South. However, this oversimplified dichotomy lost currency for a number of reasons. In the first place, it is an inaccurate description of the ethnic, social, and cultural composition of the two regions and the remarkable diversity of the North itself.

Northern Sudan is a vast territory, encompassing Darfur, Kordofan, the Red Sea, the far North, Khartoum, the Gezira, and the White Nile. The social and cultural makeup of this region was shaped by a long history of migration, miscegenation, and enslavement. Its inhabitants consist of a multitude of ethnic and linguistic groups such the Nubians, the Beja, and the Fur, Zaghawa, and the Nuba as well as Arabic speakers such as Ja’alyin, Shaiqyya, Kababish, and Shukriyya, just to name a few. Even the northern groups that claim an Arab identity are in fact a hybrid of African and Arab blood. However, the claim of an Arab descent was a byproduct of major historical transformations in the region, including increased links with the Middle East particularly after the rise of Islam, population migration and intermarriage, the pattern of state formation in the

1 The Guardian.co.uk, 19 December 2010.
2 Sudan Tribune, 31 July 2011.
Sudan, commerce, and social transformation. These processes became more prevalent in the central and the northern parts of the Sudan, where some immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East settled and intermarried with the indigenous population.\(^4\) The northern and central parts of the Sudan were part of ancient Nubia, which witnessed the emergence of powerful states, the last of which were the three Christian kingdoms that survived until the early sixteenth century. However, following the Muslim conquest of Egypt in the seventh century A.D. and the increasing pressure on Nubia, the Christian kingdoms finally collapsed and a new Muslim kingdom known as the Funj emerged, with its capital in Sinnar on the Blue Nile in the early sixteenth century. The rise of the Funj created conducive conditions for the spread of Islam and the Arabic language. Two other Muslim kingdoms—Tegali and Darfur—emerged in the western parts of the country. However, as in other parts of Africa, the spread of Islam in the Sudan was associated with Sufism (Muslim mysticism), which incorporated many local beliefs and developed a less orthodox approach to religion. The fact that Islam and the Arabic language were intertwined in the northern and central parts of the Sudan has contributed to the adoption of Arab ancestry among the inhabitants of these regions. However, in other parts of the country, such as the east, the west, and the far north, the population adopted Islam but retained their indigenous languages and cultures.

The adoption of an Arab decent became a mark of distinction and a base for social stratification. Those who adopted this form of identity came to view themselves as ethnically and culturally superior to the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the country’s southern and western hinterland. This situation persisted under the successive states that ruled the Sudan, particularly the postcolonial regimes that were dominated by the Arabic-speaking northern Sudanese elites.

For geographical and historical reasons, Islam did not make inroads into the present-day southern Sudan where traditional African religions prevailed. The region remained outside the domain of the Muslim states of the north until the nineteenth century when it was integrated into the commercial network of the Turco-Egyptian regime, which ruled the Sudan from 1821 until it was finally overthrown by the Mahdist revolution in 1885.

Under the Truco-Egyptian rule, the non-Arab and non-Muslim communities in Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and the Upper Blue Nile became prime targets of the growing Nilotic slave trade, which persisted until the end of the nineteenth century. Thousands of people from these regions were captured, initially by government-organized raids and later by private merchants from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and northern Sudan. Slaves were sent to Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, and northern Sudanese markets. Slavery and the slave trade left an indelible mark on Sudanese history, ravaging many parts of southern and western Sudan and leaving bitter memories. At the same time, slavery has had a huge demographic and cultural impact in northern Sudan, which will be elaborated below.

**“Unpacking” the North**

The discourse on cultural diversity and regional inequalities in the Sudan has revolved around a number of issues. First, it stressed the fact that the northern Sudan itself is a multiethnic and multicultural entity that includes Arab and non-Arab groups such as the Fur, the Nuba, the Beja, and so forth. Second, even those who claim an Arab ancestry are in fact mixed. Third, political and economic power in the Sudan was held by a small class of Arabic-speaking elites, from the central and the northern parts of the country. While these regions were favored in terms of economic and social development by colonial and postcolonial regimes.

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governments, the remote regions of South, Darfur, Kordofan, the East, and the Upper Blue Nile were neglected. This disparity led to the notion of the hegemony of the “center” and the marginalization of the peripheries. Indeed, this paradigm provided a better and more nuanced understanding of Sudan’s problems than the oversimplified North-South dichotomy. What is missing from this discourse, however, is the fact that the makeup of the center itself is far more complex and needs further interrogation. Unpacking the center will provide a better understanding of Sudanese conflicts and will also play a vital role in shaping the debate about identity and citizenship.

Northern Sudan is a site of deeply entrenched social hierarchies, ethnic cleavages, and subcultures. As mentioned previously, the region’s makeup was shaped by a long history of slavery, miscegenation, and migration. Its inhabitants include a large number of former slaves and their descendants, people of West African origins such as Hausa, Fulani, and Borno, and millions of migrant workers and displaced people from southern and western Sudan. Nonetheless, these groups, who formed a significant segment of the population of the North, have been left out of the discourse on inequality, citizenship, and identity in the country.

The institution of slavery thrived for at least three decades after the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan at the end of the nineteenth century. Slaves and their descendants formed a significant segment of the northern Sudanese population. For instance, during the early years of the twentieth century, the British colonial administration conducted a registration of slaves in several provinces as part of its efforts to combat slavery and the slave trade. Although the registration was not adequate, it did provide some clues about the size of the slave population in northern Sudan. In 1900, Kordofan Province had an estimated 40,000, the Blue Nile Province had about 30,000 in 1912, while the capital cities of Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman had 25,000 slaves in 1900.\(^5\) Indeed, these figures represent a significant decline from the nineteenth century, which represented the peak of the slave trade, but they do underscore the role of slavery and the slave trade in shaping the ethnic makeup of northern Sudanese society.

Former slaves and their descendants formed an important southern and western “Diaspora” in northern Sudan. They brought with them cultural traditions from their original homes, which had a profound impact on northern Sudanese society. These influences can be seen in religious rituals such as zar (“spirit possession”), music, dance, and other artistic activities. Yet even after the official abolition of slavery, former slaves and their descendants have continued to suffer from the badge of slavery and have been relegated to the lower rungs of the social hierarchies in the Sudan. As a social category they were rendered invisible and were left out of the discourse and the agenda of the various political forces in the Sudan, including those who claim to speak on behalf of marginalized groups. However, the absence of overt political action does not mean acquiescence or acceptance of subordination. Former slaves and their descendants expressed their grievances and resisted their subordination through popular culture and other activities. These included religious rituals such as zar as well as music, dance, dress, and other expressions, through which they created a counter discourse against the hegemonic paradigms of the Arabic-speaking northern elites.\(^6\)


Another important category that has been totally neglected in the discourse on identity and citizenship is those Sudanese of west African origins such as Hausa, Fulani, Borno, known collectively as Fellata, whose presence in the Sudan dates back several centuries. They originally arrived as pilgrims on their way to Mecca, but many of them settled in the Sudan. The Fellata played a leading role in the spread of Islam in the Sudan through the establishment of *khalawi*, or Quranic schools, in various part of the country. In the twentieth century, however, the Fellata came as migrant agricultural laborers in the Gezira Scheme. The term Fellata then gained a derogatory connotation and was gradually associated with menial labor and low social status. The exact number of the Fellata in Sudan is unknown, but estimates range from 5 to 10 percent of the population of the country. However, despite the long history of their presence, the Fellata are still considered outsiders and have had great difficulty in gaining Sudanese citizenship.

Northern Sudan has also experienced profound demographic changes during the past few decades. In addition to old patterns of labor migration, violent conflicts and famines in the South, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Blue Nile, and Darfur have resulted in the displacement of millions of people, most of whom have settled in northern Sudanese towns, particularly the capital city of Khartoum. The majority of these people have lived in refugee camps and shantytowns around the capital. The presence of predominantly non-Arab groups in the capital raised the anxiety of the ruling Sudanese elite who dubbed these shantytowns the “Black Belt,” seen as a major political and cultural threat.

Immigrants and displaced people established neighborhoods and vibrant communities. These neighborhoods became unique social and cultural enclaves and remained beyond the reach of government authorities. The inhabitants chose place names that convey a strong sense of defiance, difference, and identity. For example, the neighborhoods of Mandela, Angola, “No Government,” and several others offer a clear affirmation of the African identity of these communities and their rejection of government authority. Despite their destitution, these quarters have become the scene of vibrant leisure activities that involve festivals, sport activities, and clubs where Congolese, East African, Caribbean, and African American music and dance are performed. This is not new, but a continuation of an old pattern that dates back to the nineteenth century, when thousands of people from southern Sudan and the adjacent regions came to Khartoum as slaves, soldiers, workers, and migrants, and shaped the ethnic composition and the cultural tradition of northern Sudanese society. They made Khartoum one of most diverse and cosmopolitan cities in Africa and the Middle East, a trait that it has maintained during the twentieth century, and one that will undoubtedly continue to exhibit in the future.

Contest Over Identity and Citizenship

As in other parts of Africa, the emergence of the Sudan as a political entity was associated with the establishment of British colonial rule in late nineteenth century. Although both the Turco-Egyptian regime and the Mahdist state established a strong presence in the South, they were not able to control the region. The South was officially incorporated into the Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian rule (1898-1956), but was administered by the British as a separate entity and was isolated from the North. While economic and social development was concentrated in the North, the South was totally neglected. However, colonial economic development was concentrated in the central part of the Sudan, particularly Khartoum and the Gezira region, and little attention was given to the peripheral regions of Darfur, Kordofan, the East, and the far North. This pattern persisted during the
postcolonial period and became the catalyst for the regional conflicts that plague the Sudan. It was this reality that inspired the late Dr. John Garang de Mabior, leader of the SPLM/A, to move away from the North-South dichotomy and adopt the concept of “New Sudan” in which there would be no discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, regional origin, religion, culture, and gender. Garang’s vision appealed to the non-Arab groups, particularly in the regions of Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Blue Nile, the East, and even the far North, who felt that they were systematically marginalized by the ruling Arabic-speaking elites from the center.

Although the concept of New Sudan became the slogan of the SPLM/A, the bulk of its rank and file were skeptical about it and continued to see the South as a distinctive entity, with its unique problems and aspirations. However, the concept of the New Sudan was met with profound hostility by the Arabic-speaking northern Sudanese elites who saw it as a serious threat to their hegemony. The successive postcolonial regimes that ruled the Sudan embraced the Arab-Islamic form of identity and tried to impose it on the rest of the country, and it is the Islamist movement that became the most zealous champion of this paradigm and the most vicious enemy of the SPLM and its slogans. The concept of New Sudan became the antithesis of Arabization and Islamization. Throughout the period of the late 1980s, the National Islamic Front (NIF, later the National Congress Party) used its enormous resources to launch a brutal attack on the SPLA and its northern supporters who were dubbed as traitors. It framed the conflict as a Western and Zionist conspiracy and a threat to Northern “honor” and cultural tradition. Finally, on the eve of the ratification of a peace deal that was signed between a northern political party and the SPLA, the NIF moved swiftly to stage the military coup that was led by Omer Bashir in June 1989.

Once in power, the new regime embarked on a vigorous military campaign to crush the SPLA. In addition to conscripting thousands of young men, it created a wide array of paramilitary forces and tribal militias. Most important, the regime framed the war as a form of a jihad, or a Muslim holy war against “infidels.” The military campaign led to the death and displacement of millions of people in the South as well as the perishing of thousands of young men from the North. In the end, the government failed to crush the rebellion, and the war took a heavy toll on both the North and the South. The failure of both sides to score a decisive military victory and the growing pressure on Bashir’s regime as a result of George W. Bush’s war on terror forced the government to engage in peace negotiations. The peace process was sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the US, and other European and African countries, culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, in 2005. In addition to making arrangements for power sharing, and for distribution of oil resources, the agreement asserted the principle of self-determination for Southern Sudan after a transitional period of six years. Although the agreement laid the foundation for a democratic transformation, its major shortcoming is the fact that it adopted the North-South dichotomy as a framework and failed to address the root causes of the Sudanese problems. The ramifications of this omission were immediately felt in the outbreak of conflicts in Darfur and the East, but also in the haggling between the SPLM and the National Congress over the implementation of the CPA itself.

Having failed to impose their Arabization and Islamization project on the South, some hardliners both within and outside the NCP openly advocated the separation of the region. One of the ardent champions of this view was Al-Tayyib Mustafa, a leading Islamicist who founded an organization called kayan al-Shamal (Northern Entity) and established a daily newspaper in which he openly advocated the separation of the South and expressed the most contemptuous views about southern Sudanese. However, Mustafa is not alone and his views are shared by other leading Islamicists such as Abd Al-Rahim Hamdi, the former minister of finance. In a workshop on economic development in...
September 2005, which was sponsored by the NCP, Hamdi unabashedly advocated that development efforts should focus on the central and northern parts of the Sudan, or what he called the Dongola-Kordofan-Sinnar Axis. The former minister argued that this region would likely determine the outcome of the upcoming elections because, in his view, it has a more enlightened population who are better acquainted with the election process. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the population in this region are Arabic-speaking Muslims. It is not surprising that Hamdi’s views incensed many people from the marginalized regions who accused him of blatant racism.

Although the CPA stipulated that both the NCP and the SPLM should strive to make unity attractive during the transitional period between 2005 and the referendum of 2011, in reality the NCP did exactly the opposite. In addition to its continuous maneuvering to derail the implementation of the provisions of the CPA, the NCP made every possible effort to make unity less attractive. Even after the results of the referendum, the NCP continued to adopt a hard line on the major unresolved issues, such as border demarcation, oil sharing, the contested region of Abyei, and the status of Southern Sudanese in the North.

The question of Southern Sudanese in northern Sudan is particularly relevant to the theme of this article. As mentioned earlier, the war has resulted in the displacement of millions of southerners in the North, and many of them were born in the region. The SPLA advocated the establishment of a system of dual citizenship and maintained that Southerners living in the North and Northerners living in the South should be allowed to choose citizenship in either state. The NCP flatly rejected the idea of dual citizenship. Even before the referendum, the government made it clear that in case of secession it would not grant citizenship to Southern Sudanese living in the North. The Sudanese law and public discourse tend to focus more on the concept of nationality and link it to ancestry or belonging to a community rather than citizenship, which involves the rights of individual members of nation states as defined by international and national laws. According to the Sudanese Nationality Law of 1957, which was amended in the 1974, nationality is based on descent, with a provision for naturalization. To obtain Sudanese citizenship, a person had to have been born in the Sudan to at least one parent who was either of Sudanese ancestry or had been naturalized. Under this law it was extremely difficult for immigrants to gain citizenship.

Following the vote for separation, the government amended the nationality law, which was ratified by the parliament in July 2011, a decision that put in limbo the fate of over one million southern Sudanese. The government action raised the anxiety even of people of Southern decent whose ancestors had migrated voluntarily or had been brought as slaves in the nineteenth century. Although the denial of citizenship can be viewed as a reprisal against Southern Sudanese for supporting secession, it is also part of the NCP’s effort to cleanse the North of any non-Arab elements.

It seems that the NCP hardliners are prepared to go to any length to impose their vision, including altering the social, ethnic, and demographic composition of the country. There has been a great deal of chattering about a large-scale immigration and settlement of Egyptian farmers in the northern and central parts of the Sudan under the guise of agricultural development. Indeed, during the past few years the government has leased huge tracts of land to investors from various Arab countries. On 19 December 2010, an agreement was signed...

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9 Munzoul A. M. Assal, Nationality and Citizenship Questions in Sudan after the Southern Sudan Referendum Vote, (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2011; SR 2011;1).
10 Sudan Tribune, 25 July 2011.
11 Rakuba, online newspaper 8 August 2011.
between the Sudanese and Egyptian ministries of agriculture to develop one million acres in the famous Gezira Scheme, half of the area of the scheme, which was the backbone of the Sudanese economy. The movement was vehemently opposed by the Sudanese Farmers Union and Gezira tenants.\textsuperscript{12} However, from the perspective of the NCP, the settlement of millions of Egyptians will not only provide cheap labor, but will also serve their cultural project, by augmenting the Arab population of the country.

The NCP is determined to stamp out any opposition to its project. The existence of several insurgencies among the marginalized people in the western and the eastern parts of the Sudan represented a major threat to the regime. It is not surprising that immediately after Southern independence, Khartoum demanded that the northern branch of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile disarm, a demand that was totally rejected. Dubbing the rebel fighters outlaws, the government launched a lethal military campaign in the Nuba Mountains, which was described by many human rights groups and international organizations as nothing less than ethnic cleansing and an attempt to totally annihilate the Nuba people.

The NCP’s efforts to reshape the country and the government pronouncements and actions in the aftermath of Southern independence have increased the level of discontent among the marginalized people of Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, the East, and the far North, who view it as a continuation of the old pattern of domination and exclusion. It is not surprising that the rebel movements in these regions have begun to think about coming together to form a broad alliance to confront Khartoum. On 8 August 2011, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Kordofan and two factions from the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) in Darfur signed an accord to form an alliance, with the publicized goal of overthrowing the government of Bashir and establishing a secular state in the Sudan. However, Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement distanced itself from the accord over the issue of establishing a secular state and insisted that the focus should be on the creation of citizenship rights.\textsuperscript{13} It is not clear whether this alliance will hold or succeed in achieving its stated objectives. However, if it is able to transcend its regional and ethnic base and create a vision and a program that rally the support of the various strands of opposition, it will present the most serious threat to the NCP rule. It is no secret that the regime itself is cracking and is suffering from internal divisions and power struggles. Sudanese crises have prompted many observers to wonder if the country will experience an “Arab Spring.” Indeed, of all the countries in the region, Sudan has one of the oldest and richest traditions of civil disobedience. This troubled country once had one of the best organized and most dynamic labor movements in Africa and the Middle East. On two occasions, Sudanese trade unions and professional associations led uprisings that toppled two military regimes, that of Ibrahim Abboud in 1964 and that of Ja`far Numeiri in 1985. However, these constituencies have been crippled by the systematic repression by the successive authoritarian regimes, particularly the current one.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The future of what is left of the Sudan after the separation of the South is fraught with uncertainty and danger. The country is currently run by a fractured, ruthless, and corrupt regime that is facing a weak, divided, and disoriented opposition. This situation has created a feeling of invincibility and unbounded power among the regime’s hardliners, who seem to be prepared to engage in recklessness and adventures. They have become so intoxicated with power and wealth that they are unwilling to heed any lessons from the history and the experiences of authoritarian regimes in their own neighborhood and worldwide. The experiences of the former Soviet Union, Germany, South Africa,

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Sudan Tribune}, 19 December 2010.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Sudan Tribune}, 9 August, 2011
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, and many other places have demonstrated the dangers of xenophobia, of the notions of racial purity and racial superiority, and the use of ethnicity and ancestry as a basis for citizenship. If Sudanese rulers insist on following this path, what remains of the Sudan will undoubtedly fall apart and the so-called “North” may shrink to the confluence of the Nile and the Gezira region, an entity that can hardly be considered “homogenous.” If the Sudan is to be salvaged, the NCP’s project must be challenged on all levels, with a new democratic vision of identity and citizenship that recognizes and celebrates the country’s multiple diversities.
Gendering War and Peace in South Sudan: The Elision and Emergence of Women

Caroline Faria

In January 2011, after decades of civil conflict and oppression, the people of southern Sudan voted in an historic referendum, one promised to them as part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. With their vote they have chosen to become an independent nation – a new South Sudan. This is a moment of extraordinary political and socio-cultural tumult and promise, and one in which women are actively participating. Indeed, the Government of South Sudan, civil society leaders, and international development organizations are promoting women as central in the creation of a peaceful and strong nation-state. With women representing 60% of the population of the south, the Government has carefully sought to mobilize their support. Bi- and multi-lateral organizations have also targeted women with funding to conduct referendum literacy efforts and to support them in their own political campaigns. And women themselves have been organizing, leading, funding and participating in large conferences, meetings and projects on women’s political participation in and beyond the referendum. Those in the Sudanese diaspora have also been deeply involved - closely monitoring the referendum process for any delays or violations and actively lobbying the US Government to maintain the pressure for a peaceful and timely vote. In these and many other ways, women have become increasingly visible in this nationalist moment. Speaking in 2008 on the post-referendum era and the development of an independent Southern nation, the words of the Governor of Equatoria State powerfully highlight the gendering of this political moment. “Women”, she said, “we are the ones we have been waiting for”.

Gendering War: Women’s Resistance during the Conflict

To speak of ‘women’ in Sudan is both a challenging and strategic move. South Sudanese women come from a diverse range of ethnic-regional, religious, linguistic communities with lives that varying significantly in terms of class, education and working experience. These differences have made organizing as Women and around gender equality an ongoing struggle. And yet as we move towards Southern independence, recognizing the past and ongoing contributions of women to peace in the

1 H.E. Jemma Nuna Kumba, speech at a conference on women’s empowerment and political participation, Juba, Sudan 18 August 2008.
South, and the significant and ongoing challenges faced by them at the dawn of the new nation, is a vital one. Feminist theorists have considered women’s political subjectivity during conflict, seeking to uncover the often unrecognized, marginalized, or privatized acts and spaces of women’s resistance and struggle (see for example Enloe 1983, 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997; Dowler 1998, 2001; Giles 2003). Such work has highlighted how conflict at the regional, national or international scales can serve to stifle or enable women’s political activism as well as the recognition of women as political subjects by state and society. Central here is a concern with the tensions between nationalist and feminist efforts and the tendency for women to be included, even centered, in resistance efforts only to be sidelined following independence (Bernal, 2001; Oduol and Kabira, 1995). As is common in narratives of women and war, Southern Sudanese women have often been positioned as victims, iconic symbols of threatened cultural, ethnic and regional heritage or, through accounts of for example slavery and state sanctioned rape, as the battleground for conflict –forming part of the literal and metaphorical territory over which the war has been fought (Ringera 2007, Beswick 2000, Aldehaib 2010). Constructed in this way, Southern Sudanese women have been intimately evoked in efforts to produce and defend a shifting notion of the ever-imminent southern Sudanese nation. However women have also actively participated in the struggle for land, resources, greater autonomy and recognition - efforts that rework norms around political subjectivity and the acceptable role of women (Beswick 2000). For example, though published accounts of their participation during the first civil war (1955-1973) are rare, some Sudanese women challenged Government oppression in public protests, secretly sheltering soldiers and war victims, undertaking very dangerous work as messengers or decoys for the guerilla movement, and facilitating efforts towards peace in Sudan whilst based in countries of transition or resettlement (Fitzgerald 2002; pers. com: interviews 06/07, 08/08). During the second civil war (1983-2005) the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), John Garang, sought more formally to incorporate women into the resistance movement and they were recruited directly into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) through the Women’s Battalion (sometimes referred to as the Girl’s Battalion), which was formed in 1984. Women were officially represented in the movement through the SPLM/A’s Secretariat for Women, Gender and Child Welfare and the Department for Women’s Affairs (later Family Affairs), which held workshops and conferences on women’s rights and empowerment from 1994 on and throughout the conflict (Fitzgerald 2002) and which relied on women activists to undertake much of this work.

During both conflicts, women were also relied upon heavily to support their families and communities, frequently taking on many responsibilities traditionally undertaken by men in order to do so (Fitzgerald 2002; Vincent 2001 in Ringera 2007, LoWilla 2006 in Aldehaib 2010). However, this care work also became more formalized at the ‘grassroots’ in SPLM areas through associations, cooperatives, and women’s groups and at a more centralized level through the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), which included women, though in restricted ways, in their operations². Civilians and women in particular (who formed around 67% of the population in South Sudan during the last decade of the conflict [Fitzgerald 2002]) were also implicitly expected to provide the SPLM battalions with food, shelter and water (often under duress). These contributions were of vital importance to the movement though they remain under-valued when compared with the more glorified contribution of military combat (Jok 1999; SWVP 2004 in Ringera 2007; elsewhere see Enloe 2000). It is important to note here that although the class and ethnic lines along which such participation occurred is unclear, certainly women

² For example, all the family coordinators in the SRRA were women and the organization had a sector on Gender and Development, which was headed by a woman (Fitzgerald 2002).
of a diverse range of ethnic groups and socio-economic classes undertook dangerous work in the resistance movement and assisted soldiers with their basic needs. More prestigious positions, such as those with the Secretariat for Women, Gender and Child Welfare may have been more likely to be dominated by Dinka women given that the Dinka formed the majority in the SPLM/A, and by educated women of the working (upper) classes. Certainly, class and ethnic based tensions amongst women in the south exist and are rooted in long histories of differential access to resources and power, even from within the resistance movement.

Justice Interrupted: Gender Inequalities in Preparations for Peace

There has therefore, been a long history of women’s engagement in the Southern resistance movement. Yet southern Sudanese feminist advocates working both within civil society and the new Government of Southern Sudan’s Women and Gender Commission continue to argue that the issue of gender equality has historically been marginalized and sidelined in peace negotiations. This is, in part, due to the poor representation of women in the process. The exclusion of women has occurred both explicitly, for example with the removal of all six women initially involved in the 2002 peace negotiations (Palmberg pers com. Deng, 09/2004), and more implicitly by the exclusion of civil society groups and non-governmental organizations working on issues of peace and nation building in Southern Sudan that often have a greater representation of women and more commonly focus on the issues of gender equality and women’s rights (ibid; IRIN, 10/ 2006). The power sharing formula used for the creation of the transitional Government of Southern Sudan and various commissions developed to implement the agreement only included political parties, with few women sitting on these commissions, and with no involvement of civil society organizations. In addition, and as noted above, access to power amongst women is itself classed and rooted in ethnic-regional affiliations.

This lack of representation is reflected both in the power held traditionally by women in the formal political system of the Republic of Sudan as a whole and within the formation of the New Sudan (Beswick 2000). In 2003, within the unified nation of Sudan, only 4 out of 100 people admitted to the country’s judiciary were women. At this time they formed 6% of the judges in Sudan’s High Court and 26% of judges in the general court. A similar pattern of under representation is evident in the formation of the new government of Southern Sudan where 25% of new seats have been formally allocated for women. These remain to be filled and by 2006 there were only two female ministers in the Ministry of Social Welfare and Social Development and in the Ministry of International Cooperation, with no significant representation in strategic ministries such as foreign affairs, defense or finance (IRIN, 10/ 2006). As I have noted above, in the South those elite women with a higher education, often who have married into powerful political families, and often from Dinka ethnic groups have also tended to be privileged. Within the South another marker of difference also influences access to power – that of language. Those women educated in English in East Africa have distinct advantages in South Sudanese government where the majority of business is conducted in English. In connection there exists a complicated and fraught politics around language since one’s capabilities (or lack thereof) in English and Arabic often speaks to one’s experiences fighting in the bush, getting educating in refugee camps or in a country of resettlement, or

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3 Initially no women sat on these commissions. However, at the gender symposium at the Oslo donor conference for the reconstruction of the New Sudan the political parties involved in the process were pressured to include more women. By 2005, 6 – 7 women sat on one of the most important of these, the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) (IRIN 10/2006). This committee has 24 seats in total and has also been the subject of other critiques around representation along ethnic lines.
as displaced in the North during the conflict. In the post-conflict era, language has thus joined ethnicity, religion, educational status and class in determining women’s access to power.

Inclusion through civil society

Although Southern Sudanese women were active in varied ways in the resistance movement, they were often excluded from key positions of military and political power and marginalized within the formal structures of the SPLM (Fitzgerald 2002; Heyzer 2004 in Ringera 2007). In this situation work in civil society or through informal networks offered avenues to advance or challenge the direction of the movement, not only for women in general but for those women most marginalized from participation due to their ethnicity, educational attainment and English language proficiency. Due to the exclusions within government politics, these grassroots organizations have provided a more inclusive space to promote peace efforts that center gender equality alongside respect racial/ethnic and religious difference. As members of civil society groups, women have demonstrated their political activism most commonly through peace-work, in part because of their marginalization in formal negotiations for peace between high-level Sudanese political leaders and in part perhaps because of the essentialist assumptions that women are natural peacemakers – an idea that can facilitate their inclusion in such efforts. During periods of intense, ethnic violence within the SPLM in the 1990s, women were prominently involved in grassroots peace-building initiatives. For example Awut Deng, one of the founders of the Sudan Women’s Association in Nairobi in 1993, helped to develop and coordinate the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) “people to people” peace process. This was a grassroots effort to heal internal conflicts within the southern Sudan following the 1991 split of the SPLM/A. In the absence of such attempts within the political and military branches of the SPLM/A to resolve the conflict peacefully the NSCC process brought together 800 delegates representing women, youth, elders, traditional leaders, spiritual leaders and members of the church and led to the signing of the Wunlit peace agreement in 1999. A key part of this effort was the mandate that a 1/3 of the participants themselves were women and the process was extended to the US-based diaspora where women also participated in meetings in churches in the D.C area (pers com: interview 08/08).

Another early example is that of the first women’s conference for civic groups in 1994, held by the SPLA/M in Chukudum with over 700 women leaders and grassroots organization members attending. This was a significant moment for Southern Sudanese civil society – seen as the first time that the military institution of the SPLA had recognized the role of civil society and made attempts to co-ordinate its own operations with those of civilian groups. It also provided a valuable opportunity for civic groups to network and coordinate amongst themselves. Since this time a number of women’s organizations, and civil society groups with a significant majority of women in leadership have emerged, including the Sudan Women’s Voice for Peace, the Sudanese Women’s Union, the SPLM Women’s League, the New Sudan Women’s Federation, and the Sudan Women’s Association. Representatives of

4 For example, in 2002, all six women initially involved directly in peace negotiations were removed and implementing commissions included very few women. Civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, which often have a greater representation of women and more commonly focus on the issues of gender equality, were also excluded from the process (Palmberg 2004).

5 Others include the Sudan Women’s Empowerment for Peace, the Sudan Council of Churches and the New Sudan Council of Churches, Women’s Action Group, Nuba Women’s Peace Group, Nuba Women’s Group and the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society (Ringera 2007).
Sudanese women in civil society began over the last decade to participate actively in a number of international conferences working for women’s empowerment and inclusion in political decision-making and peace negotiations (pers. com. speech: H.E Kiden 17/08/08). These have included the Beijing Conference in 1995, the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies conference of 2000 and the Sudan National Women’s Convention in Uganda in 2002.

**Gendering Peace: Post-conflict shifts**

Although the signing of the 2005 peace agreement in Sudan was widely welcomed in the South, it was also criticized for excluding women political leaders and civil society more generally where, as highlighted above, women have been better represented (Ringera 2007, Aldehaib 2010). This problem of women’s representation mirrors the history of women’s marginalization in Sudanese politics. However the signing of the CPA has marked a shift in women’s engagement within formal political structures and the peace and reconstruction process. Though much of the CPA focuses on power sharing in terms of governance and the formal political sphere, the emphasis on social justice and ethnic and faith-based equality, the foundations of the resistance movement at least in rhetoric, has also provided opportunities to promote gender equality. The agreement includes power sharing protocols between Northern and Southern dominated political parties and grants a new measure of autonomy for the South including the creation of a new Government of South Sudan (GOSS) with its own constitution. Now, recognition of the equal rights of men and women is formally included in this document (Machakos Protocol 1.6.2.166) and a number of new laws protecting the legal rights of women have been introduced. This includes the oft-cited 25% reserve for women in political office (Aldehaib 2010).

The institutionalized support for women’s rights and equality has been mirrored and indeed promoted by increasing pressure from the development industry to include women and issues of gender equality in nation building efforts and within negotiations for peace. These have most notably included the emphasis upon, and funding towards, development efforts centering gender equality as part of the Millennium Development Goals signed in September 2000 and the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in October. This resolution calls for member states to acknowledge the unique impact of war on women and the importance of women’s participation in peace and security negotiations. In April 2006, demands for increased women’s participation in the reconstruction process were voiced at the Oslo donor conference for the reconstruction of the New Sudan. This demonstrated a powerful show of support for issues of gender equality given the scale of funding flowing into the country for reconstruction from the international donors present at the conference (IRIN, 10/2006). Indeed the discourse emerging around the reconstruction of the New Sudan clearly demonstrates support within the international community for efforts to address gender inequality and to improve the representation

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6 This reads ‘1.6.2.16 Equal Rights of Men and Women (a) The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and all economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shall be ensured’ (Draft Constitution March 2005; SouthSudanNation.com 03/05).

7 Passed on October 31st 2000, this was the first Security Council resolution to acknowledge the unique impact of war on women and the importance of women’s participation in peace and security negotiations. In particular it urges countries to; prosecute crimes against women, provide extra protection of girls and women in war zones, appoint more women for peace keeping operations, and involve more women in negotiations, peace talks and reconstruction planning (PeaceWomen.org, 10/2006).
of women in the peace and nation building process. This mirrors a tendency exemplified more broadly in development discourse and practice (Sharma 2008), in which women have increasingly been viewed both as ideal objects for improvement and as ideal tools for the broader development of the new nation. These gestures have been supported by an increase in funding and administrative support from international donors for civil society groups working to improve women’s participation in nation building efforts and to promote gender equality in the New Sudan. Challenges remain in bridging the inequalities amongst women, a topic rarely discussed in public discourse but a key challenge to building unity at the grassroots. These mirror broader inequalities within the South between ethnic groups and across class that shape access to political power and that remain highly contentious (see Erickson and Faria 2011).

In part because of these changes, women have begun to be more active in South Sudanese politics and a number of women active in the peace and reconstruction efforts, as well as the women’s rights movement, now hold office within the new Government of South Sudan. In addition, women-centered and women-led civil society groups are beginning to receive greater financial and logistical support from the new Government at the ministry and regional scales. The efforts of new community based organizations (CBOs) registered in South Sudan speak to the greater stability of the country as it enters a post-conflict period of reconstruction and development. Larger international development institutions and organizations such as the varied branches of the UN, Mercy Corps, OXFAM and Save the Children are shifting from a focus on humanitarian relief to more long term and sustainable approaches (pers com: interview 07/08) in which funds from larger international NGOS are channeled to ‘grassroots’ CBOs who act as implementers. Although capacity remains limited (ibid) CBOs are being trained and positioned as service providers for a wide-range of needs including HIV/AIDS education, adult illiteracy, democracy building and trainings on small business enterprise. The new peace has also provided greater possibilities for assistance and connection with Sudanese organizations in the diaspora or charity projects involving several Sudanese coordinators or advisors (pers com: interview 07/08). These provide alternative sources of funding and support primarily for localized and community centered basic needs projects. Greater political stability, new access to international resources, and governmental encouragement of civil society has led such groups to flourish (UNIFEM 2005 in Ringera 2007; pers com, interview 08/08). This marks a significant shift in the support and presence of women-led and women-centered community based organizations and, I argue, an increasingly visible example of women as political subjects in the new South Sudan.

Towards a feminist nationalism in South Sudan?

The post-conflict period has thus seen a flourishing of civil society in South Sudan opening up many new spaces for women’s political and social engagement and activism. Again this is in part due to the growing recognition in political circles of the need to support and rely upon women in the post-conflict era of development as well as the emphasis placed on women as ideal objects of and for development by international donor agencies. Undoubtedly though, women themselves have embraced the new spaces of opportunity in civil society and in the formal political sphere to participation in shaping a new South Sudan. Part of the challenge for those women promoting gender equality and women’s rights is the extent to which these goals can be fought for alongside, and as part of, a broader nationalist ethos of development. The work of one emerging women’s group in the South suggests this remains a complicated but emphasized path to take.

Among those new NGOs registered at the Ministry of Welfare in Juba, South Sudan early in 2008 was the South Sudan Women’s Empowerment Network (SSWEN) – an organization that first formed in the
US in 2005. Created primarily by Sudanese women in the US-based diaspora to serve Sudanese women living there, the group chose to expand its work to South Sudan as the referendum approached. SSWEN’s entry point to work in the South was a conference in Juba in 2008 (described in detail in Erickson and Faria 2011), which was attended by a diverse range of women from across the ten regions of the South as well as Darfur and Southerners based in Khartoum. One of the key goals for the conference was to provide space for women from varied ethnic, class, rural-urban, language and religious backgrounds to talk about the key challenges in their lives and to articulate a vision for the future in a post-referendum South Sudan. Through workshops, discussion and panel sessions women articulated a number of key needs, needs that women in the South (and indeed in much of the rest of the country) have long faced. These centered around education and health-based needs, protection from violence and discrimination in the community and family, gaining gender equality in the legal and judicial realms, and promoting women in business and in the formal political system. The conference was an exciting and groundbreaking moment for those that participated, marking one of the first post-CPA organizing efforts of its size that was organized and facilitated by Sudanese women (as opposed for example to those promoted by international NGOs and multi-later donor agencies). The conference closed with the women articulating a plan of action for their own communities when they returned home and a broader set of demands on the Sudanese state to respect women’s rights and gender equality by signing the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In the months following the conference several SSWEN chapters were created across the South; in Warrap, Western Bhar El Gazal and Central Equatoria. The fundamental challenges that the women participating at the conference articulated remain an everyday part of the lives of many women and girls in Sudan. However, the work of SSWEN is part of a larger - dispersed, fragmented but nonetheless growing – movement around gender justice in South Sudan.

This kind of feminist organizing in the South has not, however, operated in isolation from nationalist efforts. Indeed women leaders within SSWEN have argued that gender equality must be a fundamental part of the shift to sustainable and peaceful sovereignty, and in turn, that without peace the challenges facing women cannot be resolved. This slippage is in part intuitive but it is also one that feminist critics of nationalism have long debated (see for example Nnaemeka, 2003; Abdi 2007, Moallem 1999). Following the success of the conference, and just a couple of years away from the referendum, women leaders have found they must balance carefully, and try to connect, their feminist and nationalist concerns. Since the conference in 2008, SSWEN leaders followed the calls of the women at the event to focus on the basic needs of health and education in the communities where they are based. However they were also influenced by calls from Government representatives in the US to consider taking on voter education efforts across the US - to develop a widespread campaign to provide information on voting from the diaspora, including identification requirements, election dates, and the complex rules (still being negotiated) around the process. As the post-conflict 6-year interim period drew to a close SSWEN members, along with many southerners in the diaspora and Sudan, recognized the importance of preparing well for the elections and the referendum. As such, in the run up to the referendum in 2011 they also chose to be part of a civic education campaign around the vote for all Southerners. They worked on plans to develop voter education workshops across the south that would be open to anyone but that would target women. In connection they decided to develop leadership training programs for selected women who sought to run for political seats at local, regional or national scales.

SSWEN’s interest in educating women in the voting process and grooming them for political leadership was motivated by their feminist agenda for women’s empowerment. However, so too was the decision shaped by their nationalist agenda for
greater Southern autonomy and justice given that women form over 60% of the population in the South and are increasingly recognized as an important political constituency. As part of this work SSWEN members also spearheaded the formation of an umbrella network of NGOs in the US and South Sudan working to educate individuals community by community across the South and the diaspora in the run up to the referendum. Their work involved helping to run informational sessions, create informational packs, and educating individuals on where, when and how they could vote (but not what to vote for). These sessions were held across the US and formed part of a far larger preparation for the vote across the diaspora and Sudan. This marked a distinct shift in focus from explicitly women-centered efforts to a nationalist one aimed at enabling a democratic, well-informed and representative referendum vote. SSWEN have not been alone in these efforts. They now form part of a network of groups based in and outside of the Sudan who are working to include women in the democratic process and engage them in the nation-state building moment. These groups are supported by Southerners based in Sudan and the diaspora, by the Government of South Sudan and by international non-governmental groups like Mercy Corps and UNIFEM whose representative Lucie Luguga has noted that ‘building the capacity of women to participate in the political process is paramount’ (2009).

However, women’s inclusion and participation does not only require education, training, campaign resources, and funding to overcomes challenges of access but also that they negotiate and rework gender norms in the formal political system and in their personal lives. SSWEN leaders recognize the fraught relationship between feminist and nationalist concerns yet they have continued, with care, to pursue these goals in tandem. Following the outcome of the referendum in January 2011, SSWEN organized another large conference entitled: “Mainstreaming Women’s Agenda in the Post-Referendum Arrangements”. This time they collaborated both with the Government of South Sudan (through the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare) and international agencies (primarily the Institute for Inclusive Security) and brought together civil society representatives, government legislators, parliamentarians, members of the South Sudan Referendum Commission and the African Union. This conference had two main goals that exemplified their efforts to connect feminist and nationalist concerns: to improve the representation of women in post-Referendum decision-making and to identify and center the ‘gender-specific priorities of women as they relate to the post-referendum negotiations’ (SSWEN Press Release 02/22/11). The conference participants identified four key areas for general concern but also where particular attention must be paid to the gendered dimensions: around security, citizenship, economic and natural resource access, and international treaties and other legal issues. In particular, women called for improved transparency and accountability in the negotiations process, the appointment of more women to the negotiating teams and task forces, and the establishment of a team of gender experts to ensure that women’s priorities are accounted for in the negotiation process. Recognizing that women have historically found improved opportunities for inclusion through civil society, the participants called lastly for an official mechanism for civil society groups to participate in the negotiation process (SSWEN Press Release 02/22/11). Reflecting their effort to connect nationalism and feminism, the public statement following the conference closes by stating, “the inclusion of Sudanese women’s voices and a gender perspective will ensure post-referendum arrangements are complete and comprehensive. Most importantly, they will help ensure greater equality, including between women and men, and lasting peace. We will not rest until our voices are heard!”

In these early days of autonomy women thus represent a valuable resource for Government of South Sudan and others seeking to build a strong and politically sustainable nation-state. However, although women’s groups such as SSWEN have
flourished since the signing of the peace agreement in 2005 they have had to balance both feminist and nationalist struggles. This continues to be a difficult path. History has repeatedly shown that women are too often made subservient to nationalist interests and in many cases are promised equality only once the struggle for independence is attained. Indeed, in many nationalist movements women’s rights and women’s equality have been deferred or silenced following independence. Yet in South Sudan we see the promise of a more sustainable feminist nationalism. This is reflected in part by women’s growing political voice, the important involvement of women in the referendum process, and the centering of women’s empowerment in Government and non-Governmental development discourse. As the South emerges as an independent state in July 2011, women will undoubtedly play an important role in post-conflict development of the new country. It remains to be seen whether their work becomes subsumed into the nationalist project and their project for women’s rights and gender equality marginalized. Alternatively, and hopefully, we may see feminist efforts such as those promoted by SSWEN recognized as a central part of the nationalist project to build a new South Sudan.

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Genealogies of Racial Relations: The Independence of South Sudan, Citizenship & the Racial State in the Modern History of Sudan

Elena Vezzadini

“The government spokesperson said at a press conference on Saturday that 95% of the SPLM members are now foreigners.”¹

On July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became Africa’s newest state. This event marked the final stage of the roadmap which was laid out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA was signed in 2005 between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and formalized the decision of millions of Southern Sudanese who had voted _en masse_ for independence for the South in January 2011. The South had been at war with the North since 1955, even before the independence of Sudan in 1956, and the conflict lasted until 2005, with a ten-year interruption between 1972 and 1983. It has been estimated that in the period between 1983 and 2005 alone, the conflict left two million victims and four million displaced persons within and outside Sudan. Independence Day was, therefore, a day of jubilation for the overwhelming majority of Southern Sudanese in Sudan and around the world.

In Khartoum, the explosions of joy broadcast by the television channels and the celebrations organized by the Southern communities contrasted sharply with the morose mood of the capital.² There, the South’s independence provoked despair and depression, and some people described it as a “disaster” and a “catastrophe”. The streets were empty in the Three Towns (Khartoum, North Khartoum and Omdurman) on that day: some were too depressed to leave their homes, while others feared an outbreak of riots. In spite of the rumours, however, the day passed calmly: people expressed their feelings in terms of nostalgia and a sad acceptance of a _fait accompli_. Of course, there were other views as well. The Justice and Peace Forum Party, well-known for its racially-charged views, rejoiced in the fact that the Sudan had finally “cut

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1 “Sudan Shuts down SPLM-North Offices in Khartoum”, _Sudan Tribune_ 4 September 2011 online at _http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-shut-down-SPLM-North-offices,40042_ accessed on 11.10.2011

2. This article is the outcome of a half a month follow-up fieldwork in Khartoum and archival research at the National Record Office of Sudan between 1 and 15 July 2011. The fieldwork was made possible through a grant from CEDEJ - Antenne Khartoum. I am very grateful to the CEDEJ, and to the personnel of the National Records Office and the University of Khartoum, for all the assistance offered. The article represents my own views alone, however, and not those of any institutions which supported the project.
out the cancer” of the South. Yet this was a minority view. I systematically raised the question of independence with dozens of friends, colleagues and acquaintances in Khartoum, and the opinion that came out from these conversations was quite homogeneous: “we are very sad that our Southern brothers are leaving, but if this is what they really want, we have to respect their decision.”

But when I scratched beneath the surface of this aggrieved attitude, a number of ambiguities emerged, especially when I asked people what they thought about what is, to my mind, the most worrying and troubling aspect of the separation, namely the planned expulsion from the North of people who are defined as Southern Sudanese. Although the majority regretted this, they also observed that since the Southern Sudanese wanted separation, there was no reason why they should stay in the North, not because they are not wanted, but because “they will be better off there, at home, among their own people.”

This article comprises two sections: in the first, I reflect upon the implications of the new nationality provisions, and interpret them as a worrying form of non-violent racial cleansing. I also discuss the period between the CPA and Independence, which had seemed to point towards a radically new path that has now been severely undermined. In the second part, I attempt to trace a genealogy of racial relations in the Sudan, focusing on colonial times, a period during which the racial state was created as a strategy for combating unwanted social change.

I: North Sudan from the CPA to the Independence of the South

Defining “Southerners”

As far back as January 2011, the Government of Sudan had declared that citizenship would be withdrawn from the Southern Sudanese, and that no dual citizenship would be allowed. It also mandated that Southerners would be given nine months to organize their affairs, sell their property if they had any, and leave for South Sudan no later than April 2012. These were not merely words: in the Three Towns, social services employees contacted small and large enterprises and shops which employed Southerners, and gave orders that they be dismissed, because they would be soon be considered to be foreigners. Employers might perhaps be allowed to re-hire Southerners at a later date, but not as citizens. The justification given was that the State did not wish to incur any social costs for these people – access to services such as hospitals, schools, and pensions. Now that they finally had their “homeland”, their own State had to pay for such things. This is how overwhelming numbers of “Southerners” have been dismissed from all public bodies and private companies, with just a few noteworthy exceptions, notably the Ministry of Energy and oil companies.

During the time of the CPA, the government had created a sort of “Southern quota” in major enterprises and public offices as a part of the agreement, by which 20% of jobs were reserved for Southern Sudanese. There were already signs of problems to come, however. Because companies needed to fill these quotas, they opened the positions up to any individuals who were able to claim Southern “ancestry”, no matter how ancient. Cases were reported of people being hired because they had a Southern connection which could be


traced, through either their mother’s or their father’s side, as far back as the nineteenth century!

Before we proceed further, the meaning of the term “Southerner” is worth exploring. Although it has not been defined once and for all by law, it is implicitly understood that it corresponds to the legal definition which was worked out on the occasion of the Referendum, when it was necessary to establish guidelines of some nature on who could and could not vote.

According to the referendum law, in order to vote, one should either:

“1) be born to parents both or one of them belonging to one of the indigenous communities that settled in Southern Sudan on or before the 1st of January 1956, or whose ancestry is traceable to one of the ethnic communities in Southern Sudan; or,

2) be a permanent resident, without interruption, or any of whose parents or grandparents are residing permanently, without interruption, in Southern Sudan since the 1st of January 1956 […]”

(Manby 2011:11).

It is fairly obvious that in a country like Sudan, the former pre-condition is highly problematic, because, as we shall see, there has been a high rate of intermarriage between people from the South and the North, in particular since the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, the openness of the concept of “traceable ancestry” has very serious implications, because it also affects people who were not even allowed to vote in the Referendum. At the time, it was necessary to provide evidence of “Southern ancestry” in the form of certificates issued by “tribal leaders” in order to vote. This meant de facto that Sudanese with roots in the South from the second, third, and fourth generations on did not vote, due to obvious difficulties in providing evidence of this kind. 6 Now, of course, they risk losing their Sudanese citizenship for the self-same reason. In fact, people are being asked to provide a “tribal certificate” or other evidence of “tribal identity” in order to obtain nationality papers. In cases where this is not possible, nationality papers may be refused, no matter for how many generations a family has been settled in the North. Nationality papers are indispensable: for instance, they are required for candidates sitting for the baccalaureate (and therefore to register for university), to obtain a passport for foreign travel, or to receive social services benefits (Assal 2011: 4-7). Similarly, anyone who has recently secured a job through the Southern quota will have lost it now that all Southerners have to go “home”.

The Stick and the Carrot: Southerners Leaving the North

The National Records Office looked very empty this year following the disappearance of the large numbers of Southerners who had been working there. A year ago, during a conversation with one of them, I asked her if she had any intention of resettling in her “homeland”, as the government was offering free travel to the South. She replied that she had no reason to do so: she was married, and her children had been born in Khartoum, and she did not wish to disrupt their upbringing. In addition, there were many obstacles, the first being the language; she could only speak Arabic, because she had moved with her family to the North when she was just a small child. It is important to realize that the security that she had achieved through her permanent job at the National Archives - extremely low-paid and menial though it may have been - was a much sought-after accomplishment, both by Northern and Southern standards, in a situation in which the urban poor are overwhelmingly

were not allowed to vote because they could not produce a tribal certificate.

6. The question of nationality and ethnic belonging is particularly sensitive in Sudan. Munzoul Assal describes the difficulties encountered in establishing good contacts with interviewees because of the attitude of great suspicion provoked by asking questions about the nationality papers (Assal 2011: 4-7).
unemployed, or partially-employed in casual work. I now realize that my question was similar to the one that used to make me angry, when people asked me when I expected to go “home” to Italy, after I had been living in Norway for many years. My question may similarly have looked at best very naïve to my friend, and at worst outspokenly racist, and it certainly implied a threatening and insecure future.7

When one enquires about the reasons why Southerners have decided to return to the South, it emerges that many have left because they had to. Some felt that Northern society was irredeemably racist, as they had faced numerous episodes of harassment. According to a January 2011 Carnegie Report, Southerners “are often harassed by government authorities and the camps are targets of periodic police raids.”8 Those who wished to stay because they had secure jobs have now been, or are in the process of being, dismissed. In addition, many have started to feel threatened and insecure. Again, according to the same Carnegie Report, “Bashir’s National Congress Party has made threatening speeches about Southerners who continue to reside in the North post-independence”, even though President Omar al-Bashir subsequently reassured Southerners that they will be permitted to live and work in Sudan – albeit as foreigners.

Such international reports denounce the harassment and abuses inflicted on Southerners, but seem to find it “natural” that Southerners would seek refuge in their “home” in the South. This position, after all, is only a shade different from the popular idea that Southerners will be better off “at home”9, an idea which is reinforced by the television and the press. They all give in to this “home” discourse, which is closely connected with the nation-state paradigm that still dominates our understanding of social space. Few things, however, are as unnatural as returning to a certain place because of an undefined “descent” dating back to one to four generations earlier, and even after many years spent living elsewhere. This is why many States permit the naturalization of foreign citizens.10 What is paradoxical is that Sudan itself has quite generous naturalization provisions: according to the current law, any foreigner can apply to obtain Sudanese citizenship after only five years of residence in the country.11

This question reveals an important issue, in my opinion: it is considered sounder and simpler for “Southerners” to leave for a country they may have never seen, rather than to have to address the

7. Several news sources have reported similar cases. It should be emphasized that the majority are in English or from international new sources such as Reuters. The issue is hardly discussed in Sudanese newspapers, as far as I can discern. See for example: Fatima Naib, “Mixed Feelings about Sudan’s Future”, Al-Jazeera 15 January 2011: online at http://blogs.aljazeera.net/africa/2011/01/15/mixed-feelings-about-sudans-future and James Copnall, “Forced to choose between Sudans”, 19 July 2011, BBC News Africa, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14204148, accessed 27 August 2011.
9. Of course, there are many who would disagree with this view. See, for example, Abu Muhammad Abu Amna: “‘ali al-janubiyyin fil-shimal al-tamaska bil-jinsiyya al-sudaniyya” [Southerners in the North should hold Sudanese Nationality] 26 June 2011, online at http://www.sudaneseonline.com/arabic/permalink/5584.html accessed 1 September 2011.
10. International agreements such as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and institutions such as the International Law Commission recommend citizenship be granted on criteria of primary residence and birth. For a review of recent discussions see Assal: 2001, Manby: 2011 and UNHCR-UNMIS Citizenship Symposium.
11. The original “Sudanese Nationality Act” of 1957, amended in 1974, granted citizenship for naturalization after ten years. In 2008, the law was amended and the period was reduced to five years. See: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texts/vtx/refworld/rwmaint?docid=3ae6b56718, accessed 1 September 2011. For the announcement of the amendment, see “Foreigners can obtain Sudanese citizenship after 5 years of residence”, Sudan Tribune 29 October 2008, online at http://www.sudantribune.com/Foreigners-can-obtain-Sudanese,29092, accessed 1 September 2011.
problems, abuses and inequalities that they face daily. This is a somewhat ambiguous sensation if it is contrasted with the desolate reaction of many inhabitants of Khartoum to the departure of their “Southern brothers.” The carrot and stick approach that the government is using to make Southerners leave may appear to be the final confirmation of a consolidated belief: that they have never been fully considered to be Sudanese citizens, no matter how long they have lived in the North.

By withdrawing the Sudanese nationality of the “Southerners”, the government has circumvented problems of social injustice by defining people of Southern descent as legally different, because they are “foreigners.”

_Unsustainable political pluralism_

It would be wrong to suggest that there is no awareness of the importance of racial relations in politics. The most remarkable reflection on this issue is the political ideology of the SPLM, known as the New Sudan vision, and developed by the late SPLM leader, John Garang, who died a few months after the CPA had been signed. The New Sudan vision put the idea that racism has always been one of the most important instruments of domination for the elites. Garang’s brilliant intuition was to present the civil war not as an exclusive problem between the South and the North, caused by religious and ethno-cultural differences, but as a problem for the whole of Sudan. According to Elwathig Kameir, an leading ideologue of the SPLM-North,

“It is, in itself, an attempt at marginalization to define the problem as the “Southern problem.” The problem was, thus, redefined as the “problem of the Sudan” and not the “problem of the South” [...]. It is the Sudanese state, epitomized by the power structure in the Center, which needs to be radically restructured in order to accommodate the Sudan’s manifold diversity and attend to all forms of exclusion and marginalization of its people.”

The disastrous story of independent Sudan, Kameir continues, is a direct consequence of the “distortion of self-perception by which an African-Arab-hybrid racial, cultural and religious minority group identifies itself as monolithically Arab-Islamic”, and attempts to impose this identity on the rest of the country.

There were many signs that this message was starting to be understood by the leading National Congress Party (NCP) and by the Sudanese. First of all, the CPA represented an historical victory, in that it obliged the dominant elites to accept and validate the political needs of the peripheries. In spite of its many critics and detractors, the CPA has been seen as a success story from many angles: it put an end to an intractable and bloody conflict, and all its major promises, including “free and fair” elections, the referendum and the separation, have been kept. The years between the CPA and secession have been an exciting period, both politically and socially. The Government’s puritanical directives were steadily relaxed, freedom of expression was increased, new jobs were opened up to

“Southerners”, the economy expanded, and the country was exposed to a certain degree of democratization. According to Ahmed Einas, “The CPA has created an environment where the NCP, in spite of its majority in the Legislative assembly, could hardly adopt legislations without a minimum of consent of the SPLM and of concurrent northern political parties.” (Einas 2009:145)

But if this is the case, why have all these openings been so drastically reversed following the independence of the South? A wave of violence erupted in Southern Kordofan, and the situation in the Blue Nile has become increasingly tense. According to a leaked UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) report, there have been mass-murder operations in the Nuba Mountains, with house-to-house searches and killings of SPLM supporters, bombs being dropped on civilian neighbourhoods, and kidnappings and executions. Furthermore, the judiciary sought legal means to ban the SPLM-North, using the excuse that it is a branch of a foreign Party; and in September 2011 the SPLM-North was banned. The organ of the SPLM-North, Ajras al-Hurriyya, has been suspended, and attacks on SPLM activists have been reported. It is difficult to understand how the government of North Sudan, after so many efforts to reach peace with the South, and when heavy international sanctions are about to be lifted, can have had the very same reaction to rebellion in the peripheries that has characterized all of post-colonial Sudanese history: elimination by mass killings.

In this light, the expulsion of people defined as Southerners appears to be connected with what is happening in Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Yet it is important to appreciate the wide scope of the expulsion process: with the independence of the South, the government can now legitimately carry out what all preceding governments had tried to achieve, at the cost of great violence and isolation from the international community: the cultural, religious and racial homogenization of Sudan. It is no coincidence that, on the day of the separation, the Sudan government sent the following text message to its citizens’ mobile phones: “Name of country: Republic of Sudan. Dimensions: 1,882,000 k2. Number of inhabitants: 33,419,625. Percentage of Muslims: 96.7%. National currency: the Guinea”. There will be no accusation of genocide hanging over the heads of the NCP as a result of the expulsion of the Southerners, and yet the outcome will be a bloodless racial cleansing.

I believe that in order to understand how the NCP could have forgotten the immense price of the Civil War so rapidly, it is helpful to review the history of racial relations in the Sudan and the way in which they have been embedded into state politics, and the process of the construction of hegemony since colonial times.

II: Northern Sudan for the Northerners: a Short History of a Project

The expulsion of “Southerners” from North Sudan and the separation of the South appear to be the culmination of a project that commenced about a century ago. Although many feel that it had its origins in the nineteenth century, with the opening of Sudan to the slave trade, it is only with the
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium that the idea of the irreconcilability of the two Sudans emerged, and the South became de facto a separate administration, the predecessor of the “one country – two states” system later implemented by the CPA. Therefore most important phases of this history are worth reviewing in order to trace the genealogy of racial relations.

I am using the term “genealogy” in its Foucauldian sense. In its most simple definition, genealogy was for Foucault a point of view of history that focused on the way in which power configures our understanding of reality (Foucault 1984). It is also a history that lacks a transcendental subject at centre stage; in other words, peoples’ acts, choices and behaviours are embedded in interiorized structures, belief systems and truth regimes that assign meaning to reality. The genealogy of racial relations is, therefore, an approach that understands racism to be systemic; that is, embedded in institutions, practices, laws, and habits in a way which helps to interiorize it, and causes them to appear to be the natural order of the world (Omi and Winant 1994, Feagin 2006). One practical example of this is that my circle of friends in Khartoum would be horrified if I told them that they were racist, yet they are the same people who, while sad and shocked about the separation, also wish Southerners to go “home” for their own sakes. Far from being a matter of individual choice, racism is often engendered by impersonal power relations. The short narrative below on racism in the history of modern Sudan is a good case in point.

Racial Beliefs and Society from the Turkiyya to the First World War

The period of Sudanese history known as the Turco-Egyptian Rule, or Turkiyya, (1821-1885) is of special importance in the history of the marginalization of the South. This is why this narrative will begin from there, and with the history of the slave trade in South Sudan.

Generally speaking, the Turkiyya established the beginnings of modern Sudan, inaugurating the very geo-political definition of the country, and setting in motion a complete refashioning of the State, with the introduction of a bureaucracy, a modernized army, a new schools system, and so on. The Turkiyya is perhaps best known, however, because it was in this period that the Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan were “opened up” to ivory and slave traders (Hill 1959). It is a well-known fact that slavery and the slave trade were old- and well-established phenomena in the area (O’Fahey 1973; Spaulding 1985); however, during the Turkiyya, and in particular from 1860 onwards, the slave trade distinguished itself quantitatively and qualitatively from that of previous eras (Prunier 1988). First, the number of slaves drastically increased from an estimated 5,000 slaves per year in pre-Turkiyya times (Prunier 1988: 524) to annual figures of between 20,000 and 60,000 (in peak years) in the 1860s and 1870s. This boom was made possible by the introduction of technological innovations such as steamboats and firearms at a local level. These were initially employed to support geographical exploration; the Western eagerness to discover the sources of the Nile encouraged the Turco-Egyptian government to organize exploratory missions, the main consequence of which was to reveal the treasures of the Nile Basin (Gray 1961). With time, a sophisticated organization, known as the Zariba system, was put into place for the exportation of ivory and slaves. It rationalized and boosted exports, and allowed traders who had initially invested in ivory to reconvert rapidly to the slave trade when ivory stocks dwindled (Johnson 1992).

As a result, a dual population movement took place: first, people who had settled along the Nile north of Khartoum moved to the South to escape taxation and to participate in the slave trade. This had a
powerfully international dimension, as it was carried out by slavers from Europe, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Sudan. At the same time, a flow of people from ethnic groups such as the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, the Azande and so on was enslaved and forced to move towards the North (Moore-Harrell 1998). Some were later resold in Egypt, while others were used locally in agricultural work or domestic labour, or as soldiers in the so-called Jihadiyya, the State army (Johnson 1988, Ewald 1990, Prunier 1992, Hill 1995, Moore-Harrell 1999). Military slavery continued and flourished under Mahdist rule (1885-1898). Because of the wars continually launched by the second Mahdist leader, the Khalifa Abdallahi, able-bodied male slaves were requisitioned from their masters for the army. When the British came to Sudan, escaped or liberated slaves and former slave soldiers became the first local recruits to the Egyptian Army.

Slavery did not disappear with the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, however, and during the first phase of British colonization, government anti-slavery policies were less than half-hearted (Sikainga 1996, Taj Hargey 1998). Significant steps to eliminate it only began after the end of the First World War. It is therefore rather paradoxical that the same period that saw measures against slavery and the slave trade become more effective also marked the birth of the racial State.

To say that the racial state was a colonial project that started after the Great War does not mean denying that people from the centre harboured feelings of superiority to those from the peripheries well before the British occupation of the Sudan. An ideology of slavery which justified the exploitation of enslaved individuals existed well before colonialism, and had solid connections with religious beliefs, such as the desirability of enslaving non-Muslims and the concept of “pagans” as not belonging to the Islamic civitas, and therefore being only partially human (Willis 1985). However, any ideology leaves space for re-interpretation and resistance, is determined historically, and should not be disconnected from actual practices. For instance, the same Turco-Egyptian state that allowed the slave trade to boom also permitted enslaved people to enjoy a certain degree of social mobility, most notably through the army. It is important to bear in mind that Turco-Egyptian rule was a military leadership that, as in other North African States and the Ottoman Empire, relied heavily on a loyal slave army personally owned by the ruler. The army had a privileged position in society, and slave soldiers were assigned administrative roles, and were better off than many Sudanese. The Turco-Egyptian elite itself was trained according to the martial values of the Ottoman Empire, and the Empire had for centuries used slavery as a means of recruiting its highest officers (the Janissaries, the Mamluks, etc.) (Miura and Philips 2000).

Another example of the importance of connecting ideology and practices is the first phase of the Condominium. In accordance with the scientific notions of the time, the British officers who conquered Sudan held firm and outspoken beliefs that there were two races in Sudan, Arabs and Africans, and that the former were superior to the latter. For instance, Sir Reginald Wingate, the Governor-General of Sudan from 1899 to 1916, and his chief advisor, the Austrian Rudolf Carl von Slatin, believed that “African” slaves should not be granted their freedom because they allegedly were incapable of managing their own liberty, prey as they were to uncontrollable instincts and passions. 20 Slatin and Wingate bore a tragi-comic grudge against the employees of the Anti-Slavery Department, and they admitted, not particularly discreetly, that the anti-slavery legislation they devised was created just to mock Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society.

Yet it is during their administration that the most important social mobility for people from slavery backgrounds – called Sudani at that time – took

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20. See, for instance, the oft-quoted letter from Slatin to a friend about the accusations of racism on the part of the Queen, cited at length in Jok 2001:96, and kept in the Sudan Archive of the University of Durham (SAD) 438/653, Slatin to Mr. Bigger, 6.9.1897, Slatin Papers.
place, even if it was carried out on the basis of racial beliefs. The records indicate that Sudani connected with the army could attain the highest military ranks, and were assigned to administrative roles, such as that of sub-mamur (comparable with a Sub-District Administrator), which was at the time the highest level of responsibility a Sudanese could hold (Vezzadini 2010). Because the first colonial administrators were army officers – the so-called soldiers-administrators – they shared the same concerns and preferences as the Turco-Egyptian or Mahdist military leadership: they needed good soldiers and officers to defend the State, and the best soldiers were people of Southern or Nuba descent.

Racial notions also affected the domain of labour policies during the first twenty years of the Condominium. The Sudani, with their “African physiques”, were believed to be the best manual workers; in addition, again because “Africans” allegedly could not control their instincts, they were allegedly “lazy”, and had to be put to work so that they would avoid becoming criminals and parasites.21 In this way, they came to form the country’s first working class. This did not necessarily imply exploitation, however; the Sudani changed employers quite frequently, according to who was offering the highest rates of pay, because they were appreciated as good workers, and were much in demand.22 They left their jobs when they considered the pay to be inadequate, had contracts, and salaries which the British constantly complained were too high (Sikainga 1996). It is not unlikely that this would have allowed them to accumulate a certain amount of capital to be reinvested in other activities. A study of the social composition of the Three Towns in 1924 shows that people defined as Sudani were present in professions as different as shopkeepers and clerks, army officers and artisans, and unskilled workers and soldiers (Vezzadini 2008, 380-405). A British administrator complained in 1925 that the Sudani were one of the social classes most ready to embrace the educational opportunities offered by the colonial State.23 This is partly confirmed by statistics from the Department of Education, which showed that a few elementary schools, such as Khartoum, included 25% to 50% of pupils from this background.24 The British soldiers-administrators racially defined people from the peripheries as workers and soldiers, and yet did not erect definitive institutional barriers against attempts by this group to become something more.

A certain degree of social control was already in place, however. For instance, the only colonial secondary education institution, Gordon College, which provided access to good government jobs, admitted a maximum of 5% of Sudani each year.25 There were some professions, such as the judiciary and education, which were completely barred to people of this extraction, because it was believed that it would hurt the feelings of the “Arab” establishment to admit them. The reason was that the colonial state sorely needed to rely on the alliance of the establishment as its intermediary in the management of power. It was necessary to protect their privileges in order to obtain their loyalty and assistance in dealing with the masses. Nevertheless, colonial racial policy remained

21. Slatin to Wingate, 27 January 1900, SAD 270/1/99: “A great part of the formerly male slaves who have not been enlisted in the Black Battalion have no money, no land, and by nature all blacks are lazy, they are consequently obliged to steal or beg in order to support themselves.” There are many other examples of this kind of narrative in Sudan-related documents at the National Record Office (hereafter NRO), Khartoum, and the National Archives of the UK (previously Public Records Office (PRO)), London.
22. Memorandum on agricultural labour in the Sudan [1910], Intel 4/4/29, NRO.
24. In 1913, people defined as Sudani represented 54% of elementary school pupils in Sennar, 28% in Khartoum, and 26% in Tokar. The percentage was lower elsewhere. For a complete table, see the Annual Report of the Education Department 1913, in Reports on the Finance, Administration and Condition of the Sudan 1913, vol. 2: 247-8.
25. “Statistic Showing Nationality of the GMC boys, 1914 & 1925 to 1933”, in MacMichael to Simpson, Ministry of Education, Cairo, 16 November 1933), Palace 4/1/4, NRO.
confused and inconsistent during this early phase. It was a rather uncertain period with regard to where racial lines lay, and, more concretely, to what people of Sudani extraction could or could not be allowed to become.

The 1924 Revolution

Changes were already under way after the First World War and the departure of Wingate when the 1924 Revolution took place, shattering long-held beliefs, and helping colonial administrators to see more clearly where these race lines lay and how society had to be structured. Wingate and Slatin having left, the military administration was slowly turning into a civil administration. The new Governor-General, Lee Stack (1916-1924), was a military man, but the role and governmental authority of the Financial, Legal and Civil Secretaries strengthened, and they were all civilians. The situation in Northern Sudan was mostly peaceful, and the “soldiers-administrators” government was no longer required; it remained in place only in the South, where the security situation needed more violent “pacification” (Daly 1986, Johnson 2003).

Similarly, steps toward the creation of a separate administration in the South had already been devised before the First World War, and a slightly faster pace was achieved after the war ended. In 1903, the South was “opened up” to Christian missionaries. Sunday replaced Friday as a holiday in 1913 in the Lado Enclave, and in 1917 in Mongalla province. The first important provisions of what would be later known as the Southern Policy arrived after the war, with the Closed District Ordinance, the Passports and Permits Ordinance, and the Permit to Trade Order, issued respectively in 1920, 1922 and 1925, yet these ordinances were initially among the many unimplemented laws present in Sudan. More important, in view of the future administrative separation, was the absence of colonial schools and development plans for the South. Missionary schools compensated for this, but they obviously adopted a different approach to, and language of, instruction from the Northern government schools (Beshir 1968, Sanderson 1981).

In the North, the government was beginning to perceive the need to formalize their reliance on “tribal” and religious leaders, but not in an exclusionary manner. This is why the period of the Stack administration is known as that of the “Dual Policy”, and it included both a program of devolution of powers to local authorities, and the creation of consultative and advisory councils in urban centres. (Daly 1980).

After the First World War, the winds of nationalism also started to blow in Sudan. The British government was not completely opposed to this, as they believed that a carefully-monitored nationalist movement would be a positive counterweight to Egyptian political “machinations”. Egypt played a fundamental role, in particular as a catalyst for political change. In 1924, Egypt was leading a strong campaign against British rule in Sudan, and was attempting to alter the balance of power that had made Egypt a rather weak partner within the framework of the Condominium Agreement. The British were quite confident of their grip on the hearts of the Sudanese, however. Signs that this grip was shaky at times did not alarm them, perhaps because the relationship with the local establishment appeared to be so cordial.

The socially subversive impact of the 1924 Revolution was immediately visible, and yet its racial implications emerged only later. The leadership of the national movement known as the White Flag League – Jama’iya al-Liwa’ al-‘Abiad - included one Sudani, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Latif, one Northern Sudanese, ‘Ubayyd al-Hajj al-‘Amin, and three individuals defined as “muwalladin”, a term used to indicate those of recent Egyptian descent (usually because either the father or the mother was Egyptian, as intermarriage was quite widespread among the Sudanese elites since the Turkiyya). They were all relatively young, had been educated in colonial schools, and worked for the government. Yet the League managed to attract the support of
many different sectors of Sudanese society, from various professional categories, social classes and ethnicities. Officers from the Egyptian Army were among them, but the government did not realize they were involved until very late. A series of demonstrations was organized in June, and in July a wave of arrests led to the incarceration of many League members, but it was only in August that the government discovered a list of army officers who were members of a secret society called the Sudan Union, affiliated to the White Flag League. In the same month, all the cadets from the Military School mutinied. But the most serious episode occurred at the end of November, when Governor-General Lee Stack was assassinated in Cairo, and the British High Commissioner ordered Egypt to withdraw all her battalions from Sudan. The 9th Sudanese Battalion in Khartoum refused to obey orders, and attempted to join the Egyptian battalions which were being evacuated.

The White Flag League and its sister organizations represented a socially subversive movement, not because social revolution was a part of its program, but because Sudanese of all extractions and origins participated, including those from Sudan’s peripheries. The movement demanded that people overcome religious and “tribal” differences in the name of the anti-colonial struggle. For instance, during interrogations and trials, some White Flag League members refused to state their ethnic group. Inspired by the mass revolution in Egypt in 1919, they insisted that a successful national movement had to include all social components, and that any emphasis on ethnicity, Arabism or blood meant playing the divide and rule game of the colonial powers (Bakheit 1965, Abdin 1985, Kurita 1989 and 1997, Vezzadini 2008).

As Sudanis were deemed to have been responsible for the events, the colonial rulers adopted a more repressive and hostile attitude towards them, and became more prudent when it came to making status, education and occupation coincide. For instance, the elitist Gordon College rapidly became the only avenue for government jobs. The Military College, the institution that had been most open to students from peripheral Sudan, was closed after 1924. In this way, a more homogenous educated elite, which was defined, and defined itself, as “Arab”, emerged. The nationalist intelligentsia would no longer be able to overcome its identification with Arabness, to the detriment of a

Sudanis is the result of a colonial operation that it is very important to analyse because it sets a precedent which still has relevance for present-day politics. The colonial rulers solved the problem of the social threat posed by the nationalist movement by adopting the following strategy: they created the notion that “Arabs” and Sudanis had different degrees of responsibility for the events, and that the nationalists were not all the same. The Sudanis were described as a sort of Caliban, dull but arrogant people whose ambition was to be part of the “cream of Sudanese society”, lured by malicious Egyptians.26 They were responsible for having led astray innocent but weak “Arab” youths. Consequently, the latter obtained lighter sentences, typically in the form of exile to very rural locations and extremely mundane jobs. The Sudanis people – together with those “Arabs” who refused to apologize - received harsher sentences: for example, of the five founding members of the White Flag League, Ali Abdel Latif was the only one who served a life sentence, and he eventually died in a mental hospital in Egypt in 1948 (Kurita 1997). ‘Ubayyid Hajj al-'Amin died of illness in the prison at Malakal. Among the four sentenced to death for the November mutiny, the only one who received a last-minute pardon was from a notable Sudanese family, while the three executed were all Sudanis.

26. The most important document which consolidates this interpretation is the Ewart Report, in the National Archives of the UK, FO 407/201.
A more comprehensive Sudanese identity. Many of the 1924 “Arab”-defined activists (such as 'Abdalla Khalil, Shaikh al-Bushi, and 'Uthman al-Hashim) would later become protagonists in Sudan’s march to independence, while the 1924 Sudanese nationalists would never return to the forefront of Sudanese politics, with rare exceptions (Kurita 2003). 1924 was for a long period a neglected chapter in Sudanese history, until the ideology of the 1924 Revolution was rediscovered by Garang and the SPLM ideologues, and the revolution has now been appraised to be the most significant historical precedent to the New Sudan Vision.

The 1924 Revolution revealed to colonial officers the urgency of putting a more racially-defined state in place in order to protect social hierarchies. In addition, it set a pattern for dealing with the peripheries: marginalization and political neutralization were used as a means of resolving political instability.

**The Aftermath: Indirect Rule, Southern Policy, and Social Construction**

British reaction to the nationalism of 1924 and its connection with the construction of a racial state become easier to comprehend if placed in the context of the broader paradigmatic shift in colonial policy after the end of the Great War, known in Sudan and in British Imperial Africa as the turn to Indirect Rule. This policy is indelibly associated with Lord Lugard’s book, *The Dual Mandate*, published in 1922. In *The Dual Mandate*, Lugard affirmed that it was essential to let Africans “develop along their own lines”, and that every attempt to govern Africa according to European standards was dangerous, and destined to fail. This also meant that different “races” and ethnic groups were to follow their own, authentic patterns of development exclusively.

A great deal has been written about Indirect Rule, and on its consequences for, and impact on, Sudan, with particular regard to the South (Daly 1991, Sanderson 1989). My objective here is only to give the “big picture” of how the colonial state, once the shock of 1924 had been absorbed, attempted to influence the structure of Sudanese society, informed by the Indirect Rule paradigm.

Indirect Rule provided an authoritative official narrative for interpreting the events of 1924 and learning from the experience; another way to see it is that the 1924 Revolution helped to justify political choices that would scarcely have been acceptable previously. The blame attributed to the Sudanese was turned into a generalized blame aimed at “detribalized” Sudanese. This term indicated people like 'Ali 'Abd al-Latif, Sudanese of Southern or Nuba descent who, having been born in the North, had lost their connections to their “home”, and those Northerners who had only weak connections to their “tribes”. The government especially defined educated north Sudanese working for the State, such as Ali Abd al-Latif’s friends, in this way. Consequently, the colonial rulers concluded first that detribalization had produced nationalism, and second that the “modern” state was responsible for detribalization.

The connection between detribalization and nationalism can be quite easily understood if we think about the definition of nationhood as a community of “brothers” who share the same (imagined) origin and the same values (Gellner 1983, Anderson 2006). This imagined national community was not consistent with the theory that Sudan was made up of diverse “tribal” cultural clusters, each with its own “authentic” set of values, customs and beliefs. Therefore, at least for the moment, the concept of nationalism was seen as inappropriate to Sudan, and national feelings represented no more than a dangerous aping of something which had been imported from the outside, namely from Egypt. If Sudan had to evolve

27. It should be remembered that there is a difference between narrative and practice, and the narrative interpretative lens on 1924 was slightly different from the practice of differential punishment mentioned above, which was carried on without much fuss. Again, the main source for the “detribalization” theory is the Ewart Report, FO 407/201.
“along its own lines”, on the other hand, the State had to encourage the development of ethnic aggregations or “tribes” as the only authentic social units of Sudan. It is interesting to note that this not far removed from the language adopted by the NCP, as noted in the recent case of tribal certificates.

Secondly, the fact that the leaders of the nationalist movement were State employees reinforced distrust of the applicability of “modern” state ideas to Sudan. It should be remembered that since the eighteenth century, the modern bureaucratic State had conceived society to be a homogeneous continuum of individuals – citizens – who, in theory, were all equal before the State, and were all entitled to have access to the same basic services. The flattening out of social relations implied by this concept of the State was deemed as not only unsuitable for Sudan, but was also dangerous, in that it corrupted the “tribal” nature of Sudanese society.

These theories were concretized by a set of practices and legal structures known as “devolution”, according to which State services were to be as limited as possible, while judicial and fiscal powers were to be devolved to tribal leaders. In practice, the expansion of State services ceased from the late 1920s, and administration was reduced to a minimum. The number of pupils in schools, from the elementary to the secondary level, did not increase until the 1940s. Egyptian administrators who were dismissed in 1924 or during the subsequent economic crisis of 1929 were not replaced.

Similarly, the state was to control all other detribalizing influences. With the completion of the Gezira Cotton Scheme in 1925, the agricultural expansion of Sudan made it easier for workers to settle in urban areas. Soldiers from the newly created Sudan Defence Force were recruited locally, and not nationwide as before, and the movement of troops to areas far from their ethnic origins was discouraged. The government tried – rather unsuccessfully - to limit the powers of the religious “sada” (leaders). Furthermore, it attempted – also unsuccessfully – to restrict the movement of individuals by instituting a system of permits granted by the “sheikh of the tribe”. The contrast with the period before Indirect Rule can be appreciated by studying, for example, the career of an officer such as Said Shahata, a supporter of the White Flag League, who from 1914 and 1924 was transferred eleven times and sent to places as different as Tumbura in Mongalla (later Equatoria) province, El Obeid, Khartoum, Wad Medani, Wau, and so on.28

From the late 1920s, the Southern Policy became a reality: the North and the South no longer shared the same lingua franca, missionary educational institutions expanded in the South with financial assistance from the State, the army recruited soldiers and officers only locally, and Northern traders and Muslim fuqara (wandering holy men) were kept out, so that the influence of Islam in the South virtually disappeared. The two parts became de facto administratively separated, and even the styles of administration differed substantially, remaining military and personalistic in the South and becoming more and more formal and distant in the North (Daly 1991). To sum up, the social project of Indirect Rule was to create a racially logical and ethnically organized space, using the Southern Policy, which barred Arabs and Africans from dangerous intermingling, and Indirect Rule, which limited ethnic confusion to the extent possible.

Indirect Rule itself was not to last, and the Southern Policy was officially abandoned in 1946. What did last was the hierarchical formation of society, and the impossibility of communication between the centre and periphery. The Juba Conference in 1947 represented the first important opportunity for discussion among Northern nationalists, the Southern intelligentsia and the British administration. However, none of the promises or

28. Vezzadini 2008: 220, from the account that Said Shahata left of his own life, which was tape-recorded and is kept at the archive of the Afro-Asian Institute of Khartoum University (IAAS): Said Shahata, IAAS 1455.
recommendations that came out of it were followed. The competition between Britain and Egypt, heightened once again by the 1952 coup by the Free Officers, brought Sudan to an independence unilaterally imposed on the South, without the interests of the Southerners being safeguarded in any way. Thus, in the transitional period between 1953 and 1956, the basic requests of the Southern leadership were disregarded, most notably that of making Sudan a confederation to respect the cultural specificity of the South. On top of this, people from the North began to fill overwhelmingly the posts left vacant by British administrators in the South. The mounting tensions exploded with the mutiny of the Equatorial Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force in Torit in 1955; this was the first episode in the longest-lasting African civil war.

In their march to independence, Northern nationalists did not need the support of the Southern intelligentsia, and did not need to develop an ideology or policies that were representative of the whole of Sudan. They grew up reflecting an image of themselves as the people best-qualified to lead Sudan to independence, on the grounds of their education, blood and high cultural levels. They sincerely believed that they knew what was best for the South, because they were better-trained and more educated than their Southern “brothers.” The self-referentiality of the nationalist elites, and their identification with high Arab culture and Islam, barred those who could not identify with these cultural references from being included, and from shaping the nation-building project. Very early on, armed resistance became the only way to make oneself heard.

In conclusion, whilst during the Turkiyya notions of otherness and the opposition between the centre and the slaving frontier revolved around ideas of Islamic belonging and the dichotomy between freedom and slavery, colonial rule reconstructed the meaning of difference by attributing a racial content to it. More importantly, it devised a set of State mechanisms and institutions that consistently translated notions of racial inferiority into the practices of daily life. While stigma may have been attached to Southern descent before the First World War, this had not necessarily led to economic or social marginalization. The situation that emerged after 1924 contributed to make the social and working conditions of people labelled as Sudani consistent with cultural notions of their inferiority.

**Conclusion**

The history of racial relations is a fundamental aspect of modern Sudanese history, but it is a distressing, painful, and very political saga. It is very difficult for Northern Sudanese society to acknowledge that racial relations are a primary source of conflict, social suffering, and injustice. Yet to ignore them means not only to forget an important part of the past, to invalidate the experience of millions of Sudanese who have experienced and continue to experience forms of structural racism, but also to create all the conditions necessary for this saga to repeat itself constantly, as is happening now with the upsurge of violence in Southern Kordofan.

This is why Garang’s program for a New Sudan was ideologically so radical: it gave political legitimacy, voice and weight to perceptions whose invalidation has been instrumental in the perpetuation of the marginalization of the peripheries. Like the White Flag League, the New Sudan vision warned against claims of racial differences, and aimed to deconstruct them by exposing their nature as a political ideology in the service of maintaining the hegemonic system. Yet the New Sudan vision has become a minority view since the death of Garang, and has been defeated politically with the secession of the South. It is, perhaps, because the aim of the top SPLM leadership was to reach independence that the SPLM made no serious attempt to press for the creation of a reconciliation commission, where issues such as racism and war crimes could be discussed, or to initiate a public debate on the

29. This analysis owes a great debt to Gramsci (1972) and his interpretation of the Italian Southern Question.
psychological and emotional ravages of civil war displacements and the situation of Southerners in the North. Today, the New Sudan’s ideology has been inherited by the SPLM-North, but it is struggling to overcome its image as a rebel movement that represents only the armed periphery.

It is urgent that the new State of Sudan should not only rethink the importance and role of racial relations in its past, but also acknowledge the necessity for collective debate, in which the dialectic between Northerners as conscious and unconscious perpetrators of racist acts and Southerners as victims resorting to violence may finally be discussed.

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The State of South Sudan: 
The Change is about the New Sudan

Abdullahi Gallab

July 9, 2011, will go down in history not only as a momentous day for the newest state of South Sudan, but also as a significant signpost in the lives of millions of people in that state, in the greater Sudan, in Africa and in the world at large. So it does in “time future”: in the words of T. S. Eliot, “Time present and time past, / Are both perhaps present in time future.” True, it was a day of euphoria, self-actualization and high hopes for many Sudanese; but at the same time, it was a day of tears, feelings of failure and disenchantment for others in the two Sudans—or, for the time being, the greater Sudan. Hopes, tears and fears all depend, of course, on expectations and on gained and/or missed opportunities.

In appreciation for and recognition of what the men and women of the new Republic of South Sudan have gained, all good wishers from the greater Sudan, Africa and other parts of the world congregated and wholeheartedly congratulated them. Everyone expressed their respect and support to the decision that the Southern Sudanese made according to their free will.

But, if there has been a potential for social change and nation and state building for a new Sudan, then it behooves us to envisage how such an opportunity came to exist. Yes, history has vacillated from such a lateral of opportunity to the other. This is not said lightly. Like all events of scale, a historic moment made itself available for the Sudanese people to grasp and to use to rebuild a new country, a nation and a state. It was an opportunity for the world—and for especially concerned entities such as the United States—to help facilitate the emergence of the new Sudan as they played a major role in securing the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Whatever some may think of the merit of the CPA, its achievement and content corresponded with the three main influences on President George W. Bush’s policy toward Sudan: the American evangelicals, the war on terror, and oil interests. It will not be a hasty assumption to conclude that, intransigence of the Khartoum regime notwithstanding, President Barack Obama will go in history as person who missed capturing the

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historical moment for encouraging a new model for rebuilding newer African states and nations through negotiating a social contract based on citizenship. The latent potential for that availed itself at that critical juncture, marked a missed opportunity for President Obama to midwife the birth of a new model for rebuilding such a new country, a nation and a state. Such a model, in principle, would represent one of the most prominent endorsements—citizenry—of Obama’s choice as an American president. This step was to some extent empowered by and empowering to a vibrant virtual global civil society. His election re-energized a citizenry impulse eager to actively and effectively transform the world into that direction and he was widely expected to offer “hope” and “change.”

That is, the change dimensions that availed themselves and stood head and shoulder above all other issues could have brought the Sudanese together to make the CPA a comprehensive peace plan or to make possible a new social contract for Sudan; or as I say elsewhere, for “Sudan the possible”.² This social contract would be in essence the changing whole of the political terms, conduct and philosophy on which the colonial and post-colonial states were made. That means, the Sudanese themselves have to seek, write down and endorse a system that could work under the aegis of citizenry and not the ghost of the old Sudan colonial and post-colonial-state. Since the early time of Sir Francis Reginald Wingate (1861–1953), Governor of the Anglo-Egyptian colonized Sudan to time Omer al-Bashir it was the visible hand of that ghost that has been functioning and regulating things to satisfaction of the immoral sentiments of the old Sudan but not to the welfare of the Sudanese citizens, growth and power of their civil society.

² See articles under the same title, “The Possible Sudan”, by Abdullahi Gallab published in Arabic in Sudanese newspapers and a number of websites such as: http://www.sudaneseonline.com/cgi-bin/sdb/2bb.cgi?seq=msg&board=300&msg=1278983504

and a state that would create the conditions where all citizens could experience their life chances as worthy human beings who has control over their fate.

The Sudan has recently been singled out as an example of internal strife, especially as stereotyped by different regional and Western journalists. Others categorize the Sudan as an example of a failed state. However, many Sudanese and non-Sudanese rue such impositions because they do not produce “objective, positive knowledge” upon which a program of action can be built. It is true that the Sudanese state is a product of a unique and complicated encounter between imperial designs of exploitation, hegemony, ideology and control,³ which acted violently as an anathema to civil society, inhibiting its discourses and repressing its liberating forces. But it is also true that the Sudanese struggle for a possible new Sudan is noteworthy for the range and depth of this program of action. Underlying that program of action is an embedded multi-faceted chain of events of different forms of rejection of the entire system of ‘old Sudan’ and its edifice of intellectual, ideological, governance and their system of power and its dark consequences for the Sudanese themselves. That chain of events has not only reproduced conflict but it also prompted other experiences that made their appearance in the Sudanese practice and materialized in a significant relationship to the twilight and the intellectual and political edifice of a foundation of a civil society deferred that could have led to the transformation of the old Sudan and its system and state of power structures. Here, three important developments merit further attention.

First, the October 1964 Revolution that launched a general civil disobedience movement lead by unarmed civilians that spread throughout the country and was consciously pursued for the first

time in Africa and the Middle East a discourse and a strategy of organized fields of power relations to a successful end by forcing a dictatorial military regime out. The Ibrahim ’Abbud’s regime (1958—1964) was chased out of power by the same organizations and groups (professionals, workers, students, farmers and political parties) the regime impinged upon to dominate and control the affairs of the country and its citizens. The civil disobedience as a collective social and political practice and the successful execution of this revolutionary process, added to the value and power and the political capital of the Sudanese civil sphere. Like as in any and every time and place there are those who are less fascinated by such narrations and the type of predictions that could come of it. Nevertheless, although progress is not an automatic or stance of a historical determinism, there are continuous forms and forces collective and “quit non-collective encroachment”4 have been working. These forces are embedded in and inspired by that civil imagination. It is true that “history of modern nations shows that segmentary rational politics is not enough. No one has changed a great nation without appealing to its soul.”5

Second, the complexity of the construction of such a political discourses and movements representing the forces of the civil sphere as a counter-power that disputes and even sometimes nullifies the institutional power of the ‘old Sudan’ and its state represents and defines one of the most profound developments in the Sudanese political experience in itself. Those lessons gained from this experience confirm the general Sudanese belief that the military can take power by force, but there is no way for them to remain in power indefinitely. Similarly, this belief has been confirmed by the successful execution of the April 1985 intifada against the Ja’far Nimairi dictatorship (May 1969—April 85). This belief is nowhere more apparent than in the understanding that has grown into a form of dual political imagination that has been persistent in the Sudanese collective mind and political culture. Out of this dual political imagination, what could be described as a Sudanese civil religion has emerged. This civil religion has its rituals that commemorate the October 1964 Revolution and April 1985 Uprising and renew the nation’s commitment to their ideals. Moreover, this Sudanese civil religion has its shrines, such as the University of Khartoum, the birthplace of the October revolution. It has its poets, entertainers and artists who contributed to the national discourse and the articulation of the values of that existential experience; examples of such artists, entertainers and poets include Mohamed al-Makki Ibrahim, Fadl Allah Mohamed, Hashim Sidiq, Mahjub Sharif, Mohammed Wardi, ’Abd al-Karim al-Kabli, and Mohammed al-Amin to name a few. The dual nature of the Sudanese political imagination reflects itself in the considerable nationwide appeal and motivating power of collective action and in the enormous fear military regimes on the other side would feel as an outcome of their breach of social, political and constitutional contracts. This unique Sudanese political experience, however, has given many groups within the political and intellectual sectors in the country a deterministic presumption that an expected uprising or intifada to overthrow the Islamists’ regime is inevitable as long as these modern forces could be organized and mobilized the same way as times before. In an interview with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party and the Imam of the Ansar sect, he explained that he and his party are promoting what he calls al-jihad al-midani or a civil jihad to unseat the Islamist regime through civil disobedience. Similar attitudes have been reflected in most of the Sudanese political literature published or delivered by groups opposing the Islamists regime, in political and media forums, for the last seventeen years. On the other hand, and for a considerable period of

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time, all the lessons learned from fighting this Islamists regime seem to indicate that the ruling regime is not only aware of that but has been taking measures to avoid a new uprising against its hold on power.

Third, through the October Revolution the country witnessed the rise of a new generation of politicians and a new and younger leadership in most of the political parties and associations. This new leadership was eventually to take over from the old generation, whether by default or by design. Chief among this new generation of leadership was Dr. Hasan al-Turabi of the Islamist movement, ‘Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub of the Sudanese Communist Party, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi of the Umma Party, Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani and al-Sharif Hussein al-Hindi of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Wiliam Deng of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), Abel Alier of the Southern Front, Philip Abbas Ghaboush of the , Ahmed Ibrahim Diraj of Darfur Front, al-Shafi‘ Ahmed al-Shaikh of Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF), Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim of Women's Union, Ja‘far Nimairi the army officer, and Babikir ‘Awad Allah of the judiciary. This new generation of politicians and leaders entered the Sudanese political scene with competing interests and a tendency toward resolving political conflicts through different forms of violence exercised on each other. Yet, above and together with this has been the continued war of attrition between rival political entities and self-contained models of political representations. This impulse of self-regard has created a culture of an external power based around the military coup as a mode as a mode of change and the regime that emerges around it as system of an uneven distribution of rewards, oppression and inequalities that in one way or another reinforces the authority of the state as a coercive force.

This multi-faceted chain of events—including the collective grievances and the hierarchies of discontent within their violent and non-violent forms that have been reflecting themselves for half a century—is in its essence a quest for change. An opportunity availed itself for a negotiated comprehensive peace agreement that would incorporate the different visions for the new Sudan and the collective demands of the Sudanese for rebuilding their nation, state and socio-political order. But, he Sudanese can only succeed if they can see now, in this unhappy hour that their long and complex experiences of failure and success do point to matters of considerable weight. These things can also enable them to draw upon a deep repertoire to make sense of a history of experiences, values, and complex inheritances. All of this has yielded a variety of responses that shaped their life-world and endeavored to constrain their social sphere. These have been combined with violent actions and reactions, which the State, along with the enterprises they involved themselves in, caused either to further certain agendas or to use the State’s power to subjugate each other. Yet, they can see through the thin line separating things; they have the potential to reconstruct a civil society. A new generation of Sudanese citizens and a new order are emerging. They can see them “emerging from the outer shadows of these ‘zones of waiting’ unprecedented social life within which they can create a space where active and peaceful engagement is vital over the long term. This could be achieved by building up their inner resources to construct their State within their all-encompassing self-definition.

Hence, these multi-faceted chain of events—the collective grievances and the hierarchies of discontent that have been reflecting themselves for half a century—is in its essence a quest for change. An opportunity availed itself for a negotiated

comprehensive peace agreement that would incorporate the collective demands of the Sudanese for rebuilding their nation, state and socio-political order.

Yet, as the Indian epic poem Shri Ramcharitmanasan says “the chariot that leads to [such] victory is of another kind.” Had Naivasha—the Kenyan town where much of the negotiation over the CPA took place—been the starting point for a sovereign citizen system—one that would have endorsed a vision of a new social contract—it would have refashioned the old regime into a nation-state that promotes, protects and maintains communal harmony and welfare. This is the vision of the new Sudan, where collective propensities, all-embracing responsibility and long-awaited democracy, freedom, equality and dignity will be observed. This new approach could have been negotiated and supported by the Sudanese experience of past and ongoing struggle for a comprehensive peace agreement; it could have shaped the Sudanese future. The citizens themselves could have set a model—through all the Sudanese parties and the civil entities in a round-table conference—for a stable, free and equitable future to be shared by all the Sudanese people. If the CPA of 2005 (which has been criticized by many Sudanese as a non-comprehensive arrangement) is considered a seminal peace-building attainment of the United States, then an abundant opportunity has availed a significant shift of direction with profound social and political change that could have provided for a new model for nation building. For President Obama and the United States to continue to steward such an ongoing process would have provided a model for others to follow to peacefully resolve similar situations. That was the missed opportunity within the grasp of a historical moment.

The aftermath of the signing of the CPA was “a race to the bottom” as the orphans of the late John Garang’s10 vision compromised with the Islamists of the regime—Hasan al-Turabi’s children of divorce—and hence underbid and parted company with the grand ideals of the new Sudan. For many Sudanese from a different generation, political affiliations and intellectual orientations, the new Sudan is an idea and a dream for which too much blood and mental and physical resources have been devoted. The idea of the Sudan is mainly concerned with both the surface issues and the underlying realities of Sudanese life. Such thoughtfulness reveals the honest concerns of millions of Sudanese individuals and communities who have been engaged in all aspects of Sudanese life from the social, to the intellectual, religious and political. It includes freedom of religion, separation of religion and state, democracy, human rights and—over and above the formation of a democratic and legitimate order—a new social contract and a state where citizens can attain and exercise their human rights.

Had the CPA or the Naivasha agreement been taken as the starting point for reconstructing a new Sudan—of which John Garang was one champion—one where civil society could be revitalized and the state rebuilt by changing the environment of public discourse to accommodate and adopt to the inner resources, the historical resentments and the self-definition of a new Sudan—these and other conditions could have produced a new social contract out of the collective aspiration of the Sudanese people for a good society. This could have also provided for the much-needed subversion of the vicious cycles of totalitarian rule and could have paved the way for the reconstruction of a new state built on citizenry,

8 A creative rendering of the Sanskrit epic Ramayana by 16th-century Indian poet Goswami Tulsidas.
9 On the CPA see, for example, Elke Grawert (ed.), After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (Rochester, NY: James Currey, 2010).
10 John Garang (1945–2005), leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), died in a plane crash six months after the signing of the peace agreement.
justice, inclusive social and political life and a solid foundation for the repair of the social sphere. The Sudan could have provided and presented to itself and the world a new model for creating a nationality, a state and a country. For these entities are neither simply there nor God sent; they are creations and processes of action that people build according to their fortitude and imagination. It is this fact that those who believe and work for a new Sudan regard as their dream that motivates their past, present and future involvement.

Yet things took a different turn. People of the Southern Sudan decided to liberate themselves from an oppressive regime and a state that had a long track record of violence and an uneven distribution of power and material resources that resulted in inequalities; a state that only brought to the Sudanese people dictators and misery, starting with its grand manufacturer, General Sir Francis Reginald Wingate (1861–1953), Governor of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan between 1899 and 1916, and continuing to its existing one, Omer Hasan al-Bashir, who came to power through a military coup in 1989. There are clear indications that there has been progressive deterioration, from the walkout process of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as a partner to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), to the runaway world of the Islamists and their regime.

Many have argued, and would argue still, that the Islamists’ hostile attitude toward the South is a complex reality that defies simple explanation. Each wave of change accepting this attitude, in the end, has reconstituted the South in the eyes of the Islamists as the categorical enemy of their ideological pursuit and political designs. Even before assuming power, through a military coup in 1989, the Islamists perceived the South as an idea that was born out of an opposition and antagonism to Islam and Arabism in the country. Against such a background, the Islamists’ hostility towards the South ignited one of the most vicious cultural and real military wars in the history of the Sudan. Meanwhile, their call was: let the South go if it is going to be the obstacle against the implementation of Shari’a in the Sudan.

During the Numeiri Era (1969-85), the Islamists other involvements were clearly in support of separation, and during the early days of the Islamist state, they launched Jihad against what they described as an unholy alliance of crusaders and communists under the leadership of John Garang in the South. Through the long negotiations in Kenya, first at Machakos (a town in Kenya where a protocol on principles of government and governance was reached between the NCP and SPLM) in 2002 and then at Naivasha producing the CPA in 2005, the Islamists were forced to seek negotiations after their regime was weakened by a number of internal and external factors. Chief among these factors were the inability to achieve a decisive victory against John Garang and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the South through Jihad, the encroachment and the progression of the regime’s incessant unpopularity and the split (the uneasy divorce) within the Islamists ranks that led to the downfall of Hasan al-Turabi in 2000.

At a more profound level, however, the National Unity Government (2005–2011, between the SPLM and the NCP after the signing of the CPA) was a sort of control of the SPLM from without by the NCP. Aggressive rhetoric, suspension of participation in the government and even military posturing were the main characteristics of that agonizing relationship between the two partners. Given this pattern of conduct, it was not surprising at all to see the cultural divide going far beyond disagreement among them. The man of the moment, Al-Tayib Mustafa (Omer al-Bashir’s uncle), whom journalistic sarcasm describes as ҡ al-Khal al-Riasi (the presidential uncle), completely devoted himself and his paper al-Intibahah to the ugliest form of hate speech against everything that related to the South Sudan and southerners before, during and after the official separation of the two partners on
July 9 2011.

Although the debate over the aftereffects of peril facing the Sudan as a country stretches and sidesteps forward by the minute, one might say that, although the Southern Sudanese have walked away from the regime and its state, they have not walked away from the Sudan. Instead, it could be the idea of the Sudan that they scrambled to—and to an extent, that is true; they named their country the Republic of South Sudan. One would agree with many that when an understanding of the Sudanese consciousness influences their walk out of the regime and its oppressive state is realized at this plane, a new and a trustworthy debate might become a starting point to initiate and evoke the virtue of a new Sudan, bigger than what the colonial borders mapped out in their day. Was there a missed opportunity? Yes; but nonetheless, the wind of change is blowing all over the Middle East and Africa. The street’s chant for freedom is al-sha’b yurid isqāt al-nizām (“The people want to change the regime”).

The Sudanese, who are experienced in leading successful uprisings and civil disobedience movements against dictatorial rule (which they did in 1964 and again in 1985), are certainly able to do it for a third time to finally liberate themselves from the tyranny and totalitarianism of the inherited state and its current and similar regimes. Then, perhaps, there would be a new opportunity for building a new Sudan out of the Sudanese collective order and its emerging good society. By that time, surely, the Sudanese “habits of the heart” that ameliorated and molded the Sudanese character and its deeper sense of civility (not the state or its regimes) would help them examine themselves, create new political communities, produce a new social contract and thus ultimately support and maintain conditions of democracy, freedom, equality and dignity. Then, the gentler side of the Sudanese life, and the people’s propensity for it, will, as Alexis de Tocqueville describes, “spontaneously [help create] the bonds of friendship, trust and cooperation that lie at the heart of civil society.”

The dominant impulse by that time, I would say, will be that a change for the State of South Sudan will also be a change for the new Sudan. Let us keep our fingers crossed.

South Sudan Looks East: Between the CPA and Independence

Daniel Large

On 9 July 2011, the special envoy of the Chinese President conferred his government’s blessing on, and support of, the independence of South Sudan. The extension of full diplomatic relations and recognition of South Sudan’s new sovereignty represented an immense change in China’s Sudan engagement from 9 January 2005. Between January 2005 and July 2011, China’s relations with South Sudan underwent a dramatic evolution. A sequence of phases led China from supporting the unity of Sudan to recognizing the new Republic of South Sudan. At first, China firmly supported unity; later, it then began to hedge its bets on the South’s political future and to develop relations with the South and the “one Sudan, two systems” framework created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In the face of the strong momentum towards secession, Beijing finally began to prepare for relations with an independent state. This article briefly considers aspects of this process and what China’s relations with the Republic of South Sudan now mean for the new state.

In the Shadow of North Sudan

Sudan’s relations with China have mostly been viewed through a narrow prism privileging formal interactions between northern central state and corporate elites. Analysis had thus been limited in terms of its political, economic and geographical purview. This dominance of northern-centric approaches to Sudan’s China relations can be attributed to a combination of historical circumstance, neglect, and recent, more political factors. The historical mythology of Sudan’s China relations mostly concerns northern Sudan, as evident in official narratives of shared colonial oppression or the more recent history valorizing Chinese oil operations in Sudan in the 1990s. Exceptions to this prevailing coverage mostly reinforce constructions of the South as merely an object of external intervention, when, it can also be seen, including with regard to China, as a more active agent in developing relations in line with its own political purposes.

Khartoum had good reasons to want to control access to and influence relations between China and the SPLM. The NIF had long defined and controlled China’s relations with the South. China, in turn, only dealt with Sudan’s sovereign central government. The Government of South Sudan sought to develop relations with various external powers as part of its efforts to develop a foreign policy of its own. Alongside the US, China stands out as being unquestionably of major significance in view of its economic role in Sudan, relations with the NCP and permanent seat on the UN Security
Council. In this context, the historical departure represented by the recent growth of relations between Juba and Beijing reflects changes in wider Sudanese politics.

China’s Changing Role in Sudan

China’s engagement in Sudan developed after the 1989 National Islamic Front (NIF) coup and the entry into the country of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1995, to become a more multifaceted, complex role by the time the CPA was signed in 2005. Over this period, China became progressively more immersed in Sudan’s domestic politics; its array of economic and military assistance coupled with international political patronage evoked US-Sudan relations under Nimeiri, albeit with notable differences. Beijing’s policy of non-interference in Sudan’s internal politics is a defining marker of difference from European states or the United States. This defining principle, so rapidly deployed by defenders and targeted by critics of China’s foreign policy alike, was prominently brought into question by the Chinese government’s actions in helping persuade the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) to accept UNAMID (the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur). As it transpires in practice, this sits uncomfortably with Beijing’s multi-faceted support for the NCP, and while stretched over Darfur, there was no clear transgression. A more pressing question for China has been whether the principle is becoming a constraint on securing China’s established interests. The non-interference principle might be rationalized by its proponents as a coherent, defensible normative position and policy intent; it has also factored into China’s political role over the CPA (being the reason, for example, for Beijing’s unwillingness to be involved in the question of Abyei). It does not, however, comfortably square with the actual nature and effects of Chinese investment. China’s heavy involvement in Sudan’s oil sector was influential in solidifying the NCP’s interests. The most emphatic rejection of non-interference prior to 2005 had been in South Sudan where the Chinese role – together with that of oil companies from Malaysia, Canada and after 2003 India, to mention but the most prominent – had been experienced as functional partisan interference.

Arising from this recent wartime history before the CPA, illustrated only too vividly over Darfur from 2004, two associations with China are commonly articulated in the South. One is that China, as an active, willing supporter of Khartoum, was a wartime enemy. This receives various expressions, from understated views to more direct criticism and overt opposition. As the CPA negotiations continued during 2004 in the Kenyan town of Naivasha, and the UN was planning its future mission in Sudan, the refrain that the Chinese were “not welcome” summed up a common attitude in the South. Second, the active equation between China and the economic exploitation of the South is often cited, linked to views that the northern-based NCP had benefited from southern oil. China is regarded as engaging in narrow resource exploitation without corresponding benefits for the South in general and for affected populations in oil-producing regions in particular. China, then, was hardly well placed in the South.

The SPLM’s approach towards China after the CPA was predicated upon “turning enemies into friends”. With Darfur overshadowing Sudan’s CPA politics, it took time for substantive relations to develop. The first, semi-official post-war contact between Beijing and Juba took the form of a high-ranking Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) delegation visit to Beijing in March 2005 to discuss possible “economic cooperation”. The pioneers of the Chinese post-CPA engagement in South Sudan, however, were entrepreneurs, not diplomats, who rapidly moved in pursuit economic opportunity in the South after the CPA (and in some cases before it). This was a different form of business engagement to the oil industry and the likes of the CNPC, which mostly continued business as usual.
Juba and Beijing Engage

A key turning point in political relations came after the July 2007 state visit to China by Salva Kiir Mayardit, then the President of Southern Sudan. This mission was one part of the Government of South Sudan’s wider strategy of external engagement aimed at attracting investment and securing international support for implementation of the CPA. Due to China’s important relations with the NCP and role in north Sudan, and the oil sector in particular, as well as Beijing’s UN Security Council permanent seat, however, the stakes were disproportionately high. During Kiir’s meeting with President Hu Jintao on 19 July 2007, he explained two fundamental issues: the geography of Sudan’s oil and the CPA’s referendum clause. As he reported back to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly not long afterwards: “At least China is now aware that most of the oil produced in Sudan is from Southern Sudan and that people of Southern Sudan will exercise their right of self-determination in a referendum to be conducted by 2011”. With some 75% of Sudan’s proven oil reserves in the South, and in view of the SPLM’s preference for independence despite legally binding “making unity attractive” politics to the contrary, clearly China needed to recognize and respond to a new political reality it appears not to have been fully cognizant of before. From the SPLM’s perspective, despite suspicions in some quarters that China might use its Security Council veto against Juba, connecting with China represented something of an empowering coup in its domestic struggle with the NCP. The best friend of their enemy had little choice but to become their strategic ally, and did so in an eminently flexible, pragmatic way.

After this trip, relations between Juba and Beijing expanded. At the beginning of September 2008, in the presence of the Government of South Sudan’s Vice-President, Riak Machar, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun inaugurated the new Chinese consulate in Juba. China stepped up its bilateral assistance to South Sudan in tandem with, and as an important part of, its efforts to improve its standing with the Government of South Sudan and in the South more generally. Beijing defined and then sought to deploy a multi-stranded program of “development assistance in the South”. An important pillar of China’s policy with the Government of South Sudan was initiating and enhancing economic relations. One strand of pre-referendum Government of South Sudan – China diplomacy also concerned potential post-referendum development cooperation, and saw thickening links between Juba and Beijing as the months to the referendum and independence counted down. Relations were not, however, confined to economic matters but feature greater exchanges between both governments, and between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the SPLM.

Unlike Khartoum, China was more involved in multilateral forums in Juba. Beijing was clearly more exposed in the South. While sticking to its bilateral interests, China sought to engage other international partners more, and to fit its activities around these to some extent whilst driving forward its own position through a determined strategic push.

The Government of South Sudan sought to secure Beijing’s support for an independent South Sudan ahead of its referendum. China was one of a number of countries that Government of South Sudan delegations visited as this vote approached, to secure support for the CPA’s final stages and plan ahead, but clearly, China was particularly important. Southern leaders, including the Government of South Sudan Vice-President, publicly emphasized their demand that China support the outcome of the referendum. At times, such demands were openly linked to China’s future role in the oil industry, bound up in an apparent bargaining process in which both Juba and Beijing held shared vested

1 Salva Kiir Mayardit, speech at the opening of the second session of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Juba, 10 September 2007.
stake. Beijing also took steps to enhance relations, expanding its aid program in the South, and standing ready to offer financial assistance to the Government of South Sudan. The CNPC sponsored a visible new computer facility at the University of Juba and, rather less conspicuously, sought to negotiate with the Government of South Sudan. One indication of the forward-looking elevation of the South in China’s Sudan engagement came in October 2010 with the upgrading of diplomatic relations and appointment of Ambassador Li Zhiguo to be China’s new Consul General in Juba. In the same month, a CPC delegation visit to Juba provided confirmation of high-level engagement by Beijing ahead of the referendum. In the period after the referendum and before 9 July 2011, the Chinese engagement ramped up noticeably in Juba and in the South more generally.

Two Sudans: post-secession relations

The creation of a new Republic of South Sudan formally enshrines the triangular pattern of relations connecting Beijing with both Khartoum and Juba. These are set to overlap both in terms of China’s approach to the new Sudans, summarized in August 2011 by its Foreign Minister as “inextricably interdependent” but most significantly because of the underlying relations between the North and the South amidst new patterns of conflict, ongoing tensions and unresolved final status negotiations. China, and others, could well face difficult choices in maintaining relations with Khartoum and Juba if faced with difficult choices, depending on how North-South relations across a new international border, however that is finally defined, develop. While separate but connected two Sudan policies might work on paper, they are certain to be tested by ongoing conflict in new peripheries of northern Sudan and Darfur.

A contrast now exists between China’s established role in northern Sudan, and its emerging role in South Sudan, which is caught up in wider regional and geopolitical trends. These relations also are assuming regional dimensions: Sudan is more bound up in the regional North Africa and Middle East, and South Sudan within east and central Africa. Furthermore, there are geopolitical aspects at play too, defined by Sudan’s current default alliance pattern characterized by China’s support for Sudan and American support for South Sudan. This is not a zero-sum situation and remains subject to ongoing political uncertainty but is a present factor.

Overall, China’s role is subject to uncertainty surrounding conflict in South Kordofan and other border regions of Sudan’s “new South”, unresolved oil sector negotiations and fraught relations between the new Sudans, and questions concerning review of inherited oil sector contracts. One outstanding question is the nature and extent to which Beijing is willing and able to play a political role in mediating ongoing negotiations between Khartoum and Juba about final status issues, including (but not only) future oil industry arrangements. China has expressed a willingness to mediate, and has not just self-interested reasons to work towards this end by virtue of its more developed economic interests but also leverage with the NCP.

From the Republic of South Sudan’s perspective, and in face of the daunting development needs, a China policy could be an important part of future development strategy. China’s potential budget support to the Government of South Sudan, in view of the expected time lag between independence and the process of the Government of South Sudan becoming eligible for concession lending from international financial institutions. With the basis of relations established by July 2011, China’s major

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2 On her return to Juba, Dr. Ann Itto (Minister of Agriculture in the Cabinet of South Sudan) was quoted as having told Chinese officials that “if they want to protect their assets, the only way is to develop a very strong relationship with the government of Southern Sudan, respect the outcome of the referendum, and then we will be doing business”: “South Sudan Says China Must Recognize Referendum Result to Retain Oil Assets’, Sudan Tribune (Paris), 20 August 2010.
contribution in South Sudan could be yet to come. China’s future role in an independent South Sudan could come to be significant, beyond oil. There are certainly widespread expectations among certain government figures and international agencies in Juba to this effect. Budget support is one area of possible Chinese assistance. Any future public finance crisis will present Juba with the option of turning to Beijing, which is able rapidly to deploy financial assistance. Chinese assistance offers a potentially significant means to finance and deliver rapid infrastructural benefits, advance practical steps to overcome severe infrastructural challenges, and establish the transport and energy foundations on which South Sudan’s economic development might be based. The major question is not whether but how China can best contribute after Southern independence and the extent to which the Republic of South Sudan can best manage Chinese partnership to its own, sustainable and more broad-based lasting advantages.