Overview

Togo will have the presidency of the Security Council in February. Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé is likely to preside over a high-level debate on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel, as well as on the growing piracy problem in West Africa. The Secretary-General and representatives of ECOWAS and ECCAS are expected to brief. A presidential statement is a possible outcome.

A debate is also expected on women, peace and security, with a focus on the newly released Secretary-General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence and a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on this issue, Margot Wallström. The expected outcome is a presidential statement or possibly a resolution.

Also planned is a debate on Kosovo, preceded by a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIK, Farid Zarif.

Several more briefings are expected during the month:

- on the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), either by its head, Roger Meece, or Hervé Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to be followed by consultations;
- on the Middle East, by the Secretariat, to be followed by consultations;
- on the Secretary-General’s report on specialised anti-piracy tribunals in Somalia, by the Secretariat;
- on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) by its head, Ian Martin, to be followed by consultations, and a briefing from the chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee, also to be followed by consultations;
- on the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA), to be followed by consultations;
- on the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) by its head, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ameerah Haq, with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão or President José Ramos-Horta also addressing the Council, to be followed by consultations;
- on the work of the DPRK Sanctions Committee (in consultations) by its chair, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal);
- on developments in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) by its Chairperson-in-Office, Irish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Eamon Gilmore; and
- on issues of current concern, as part of the monthly horizon scanning practice (in consultations), by the head of the DPA, B. Lynn Pascoe.

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Sudan Sanctions Committee and a resolution on the enhancement of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The Council is also likely to undertake a trip to Haiti in mid-February.

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Threats to Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel Region

Expected Council Action

In February the Council is expected to hold a high-level debate on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel region. The focus of the debate will include concerns arising from the situation in Libya, including illicit trafficking networks and arms flows in particular, an upsurge in terrorist attacks and other forms of destabilisation in the Sahel and the growing piracy problems in West Africa.

Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé is likely to preside over the high-level debate. The Secretary-General and representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
Status Update since our January Forecast

- **Syria**: The Council condemned a 6 January terrorist attack in Damascus in a press statement (SC/10513). On 10 January, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed Council members on the Syrian situation in informal consultations as part of its regular monthly horizon scanning exercise. The Arab League’s 22 January decision to facilitate political transition in Syria and seek Security Council support was a focus of the 24 January open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.6706 and res.1). At press time, the Arab League was expected to brief the Council on 31 January. A new draft resolution (coordinated by EU members of the Council, the US, and several Arab states) supporting the Arab League’s approach to Syria was introduced to the Council on 27 January by Morocco. However, at press time it was unclear when it might be put in blue for a vote.

- **Guinea-Bissau**: On 10 January, Pascoe briefed Council members on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. The Council issued a press statement (SC/10521), expressing condolences to the government and people of Guinea-Bissau on the death of President Malam Bacai Sanhâ on 9 January. The statement condemned what appeared to be an attempted military coup on 26 December 2011 and welcomed Guinea-Bissau’s decision to investigate the incident. The statement called on the government to “continue to pursue important reforms for the consolidation of peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau, especially regarding security-sector reform.”

- **Iraq**: On 10 January, Pascoe briefed the Council on the worsening security situation in Iraq. Council members met in consultations on 17 January to discuss Iraq’s progress towards ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in accordance with resolution 1957. Council members also discussed the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1956, which was released on 22 December.

- **UN-AU Partnership**: On 12 January, the Council unanimously passed resolution 2033, reiterating the importance of establishing a more effective relationship between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), particularly in the area of conflict prevention, resolution and management, electoral assistance and regional conflict prevention offices (S/PV.6702 and res.1). The vote followed a Council summit chaired by South African President Jacob Zuma. The resolution recognised that regional organisations are “well positioned to understand the causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region,” and welcomed the “increasing contribution” being made by the AU in conflict resolution. The resolution committed the Council to improving consultation and coordination between it and the AU PSC. The resolution also called for elaboration of “further ways of strengthening relations between the two Councils including through achieving more effective annual consultative meetings, the holding of timely consultations, and collaborative field missions of the two Councils, as appropriate, to formulate cohesive positions and strategies on a case-by-case basis in dealing with conflict situations in Africa.” On 25 January, the AU PSC issued a communiqué welcoming the resolution.

- **Israel/Palestine**: On 18 January, Valerie Amos, the head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members in informal consultations on the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories with a particular focus on the impact of settlement construction in the West Bank. On 24 January Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernández-Taranco briefed the Council at its quarterly open debate on the Middle East on Israeli and Palestinian efforts to renew direct negotiations and adhere to the timeline proposed by the Quartet on 23 September 2011. Other than a series of exploratory talks hosted by Jordan in January there had been little progress. Fernández-Taranco also said that settlement activity continued to contribute to tensions on the ground (S/PV.6706 and res.1).

- **ICJ**: On 19 January, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2034 without a vote, setting 27 April as the election date to fill the vacancy on the International Court of Justice, caused by the resignation of Judge Al-Khasawneh (Jordan) (S/PV.6704).

- **Rule of Law**: On 19 January, the Council held a debate on “the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”. In a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/1) the Council called on states to cooperate with international courts and tribunals, including the ICC, in accordance with their respective obligations and requested the Secretary-General to report within 12 months on the effectiveness of the UN’s support to the promotion of the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations.

- **Cyprus**: On 25 January, Council members held consultations on Cyprus and were briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Alexander Downer. The consultations took place the day after the conclusion of the “Greentree II” talks, involving the leaders from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and hosted by the Secretary-General. Despite the Secretary-General’s call on 1 November for the sides to move to the “end game” of the negotiations, “limited progress” was achieved.

- **Yemen**: On 25 January, Special Adviser Jamal Benomar briefed the Council after his 8th visit to Yemen. On 26 January, in a press statement (SC/10529), Council members welcomed the formation of the government of national unity and the political progress made since the signing of the GCC initiative and the implementation mechanism. The statement also called for peaceful elections on 21 February and expressed concern at the worsening security situation.

- **Côte d’Ivoire**: On 26 January, the Council was briefed by Special Representative Albert Gerard Koenders, head of UNOCI, on the latest developments in the country. Koenders said that the political, economic and security situation in the country was improving but that key challenges remain. He mentioned the conduct of legislative elections in December 2011 and noted the incidents of violence since then. No action was taken by the Council.

- **1988 Committee Report**: On 30 January, the Council was briefed by the chairman of the 1988 Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany), in closed consultations. This was the first briefing since the separation of the Taliban sanctions committee from the Al-Qaeda sanctions regime in resolution 1988 on 17 June 2011.
A number of these developments have already been described in various reports, including the Secretary-General’s report on UNOWA, issued on 20 June 2011, which noted that large caches of combat weapons might have been transferred from Libya and fallen into the hands of terrorists or anti-government forces in the Sahel. That anxiety led, on 31 October, to the adoption of resolution 2017, which drew attention to “the risk of destabilisation posed by the dissemination in the Sahel region of illicit small arms and light weapons.”

The Sahel assessment report amplifies those anxieties. Soon after the conflict in Libya erupted, the report notes, countries in the Sahel region had to “contend with the influx of hundreds of thousands of traumatised and impoverished returnees as well as the inflow of unspecified and unquantifiable numbers of arms and ammunition from the Libyan arsenal.”

The report cites estimates of the number of returnees to Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania at approximately 420,000, adding to populations already facing food shortages and in some cases even famine due to drought and other natural causes. This has created a humanitarian crisis that has “negatively impacted the capacity” of governments and the UN. In some areas, “the humanitarian vacuum is being filled by AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and/or criminal elements who are reportedly providing services and humanitarian assistance in remote areas.” This situation has in turn enabled the terrorist group to “develop recruitment and local support networks for gathering information, supplying arms and ammunition, and other logistics.”

The report gives considerable space to wider security concerns relating to the proliferation of arms, including advanced weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles and Man-Portable Air Defence Systems, that were previously safeguarded in the Libyan government arsenal but have now been transferred to the Sahel region and possibly are in the hands of terrorist groups. Already, the report notes, there has been an increase in the arms trade, noting that terrorist groups may well be at the centre of the trade.

The report notes “an increase in terrorist and criminal activities” in the region since the situation in Libya erupted, suggesting that the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram—which has been behind a spate of bomb attacks that have killed hundreds, including UN employees in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital—has established links with AQIM and that some of its members have even received training in AQIM camps in Mali. The report states that seven of Boko Haram’s members were arrested while crossing Niger on their way to Mali “in possession of documentation on manufacturing of explosives, propaganda leaflets as well as names and contact details of AQIM members.” On 20 January, members of Boko Haram killed more than 170 people in shootings and bombings in Nigeria’s northern commercial capital of Kano.

A key recommendation of the report is for the UN to “strengthen its security capacity and presence on the ground” in the region, as well as to encourage the exchange of “relevant information and analysis between the UN and the AU”. The report also recommends that the UN and the AU “should pursue efforts for resource mobilization for the socio-economic integration of the African migrant workers in their communities.” Another key recommendation of the report is “an overarching mechanism or framework” that would bring together all the affected countries in the Sahel region “in a coordinated manner to discuss and proffer solutions” to the spreading problems.
The most likely option for the Council would be to adopt a presidential statement in which it:

- highlights its concern about the problems;
- requests the Secretary-General to facilitate a regional summit, including the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and other relevant partners, to discuss the problems and map possible solutions;
- recommends possibly strengthening the interoperability of the various UN presences in the region as none has an overarching mandate that covers the vast region of the Sahel; or
- the Council could support the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum Sahel Working Group and recall pending obligations to incorporate into domestic law the provisions of the relevant counter-terrorism instruments.

Council Dynamics
The Council appears to be unanimous on the need to tackle the problems in a concerted and effective manner, but there seem to be important differences in emphasis among Council members. It appears that France, the UK and the US are keen to stress the longstanding nature of the threats in the Sahel region, long predating the Libya crisis, while acknowledging the need to tackle these threats and expressing support for the affected countries. South Africa, on the other hand, seems to want a proper acknowledgement of the direct impact of the NATO intervention in Libya on the Sahel, as well as an appreciation by the Council of the role of the AU in bringing the problems to the Council’s attention. Morocco also appears to support full discussion of the fallout from Libya on the Sahel, and seems to support Togo, which has replaced Nigeria as the lead on these issues.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to devise a strategy to deal comprehensively with the range of related threats and criminality in the Sahel and elsewhere in the region.

An effective coordination with the AU and other regional players such as ECOWAS and ECCAS is a related issue.

A further related issue is ensuring improved information exchange and coordination of efforts among regional countries, regional bodies and other key international players in the anti-piracy efforts in the region.

Also, since West African countries are the most adversely affected, another related issue is the role of UNOWA in monitoring the situation and in providing support to regional governments and ECOWAS.

Options
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Key Recent Developments
On 5 January, Georg Charpentier, deputy head of UNSMIL and the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Libya, said he had been impressed by the rate of return of displaced residents after his visits to the cities of Bani Walid, Sirte and Misrata.

On 10 January, Martin and Libyan Foreign Minister Ashur Bin Khayyal signed a Status-of-Mission agreement between UNSMIL and Libya’s interim government in Tripoli. Speaking at the ceremony, Martin highlighted three priority areas for Libyans: elections, public security and transitional justice.

Martin briefed the Council on 25 January and stated that criticism of Libya’s interim leadership by the Libyan populace had grown in recent days, whereas security continued to be a major problem. Martin also noted that “the combination of a tight timeline, inexperience in drafting electoral legislation, shortcomings in communication and the lack of proper mechanisms for consultation have set limitations to the process of drafting the electoral law.” He said that UNSMIL was finalising its integrated mission planning process in consultations with the Libyan authorities regarding its long-term role. Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, Libya’s Permanent Representative to the UN, also addressed the Council and acknowledged that Libya faced many challenges, namely political and security-related. Shalgham said that he was aware of four incidents in which civilians had been killed as a result of NATO’s bombings; however, many more lives were saved due to NATO’s actions in Libya. As for Navi Pillay,
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, she emphasised the urgency of ending the ongoing human rights abuses, “particularly those occurring in detention.” This echoed an earlier point raised by Martin who said that only limited progress had been made with regards to the situation of detainees since his last briefing to the Council on 22 December 2011.

Several recent developments involved the issue of accountability. During a visit to Tripoli on 2 January, Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki promised to hand over former Libyan Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmudi if the Libyan authorities guaranteed a fair trial. (Mahmoudi was arrested in Tunisia in September 2011 for illegally entering the country.)

On 10 January, the International Criminal Court (ICC) extended its earlier deadline of 10 January to 23 January for Libyan authorities to confirm whether Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s son, would be surrendered to the court. (The ICC Registry had received a letter on 9 January from Libyan authorities saying that they were unable to meet the original deadline due to the poor security situation. The ICC is seeking further information regarding Qaddafi’s whereabouts and his right to legal representation.) On 23 January, Fadi El-Abdallah, ICC Spokesman, said that the court had not decided whether Saif Qaddafi should be tried in Libya, refuting claims made by Ali Humaida Ashour, Libyan interim Minister of Justice, on the same day.

In a joint statement on 12 January, the Metropolitan Police Service of London and the Crown Prosecution Service of the UK said that they will investigate claims that UK intelligence services were complicit in the rendition to Col. Qaddafi’s security services in 2004 of Abdul Hakim Belhaj, head of the Tripoli Military Council, and Sami al-Saadi, a Libyan dissident.

Libya continues to suffer from sporadic violent incidents. Clashes between rebel fighters from Tripoli and Misrata reportedly led to five deaths on 3 January. On 13 January intermittent clashes broke out 80 km south of Tripoli between rival militias from the towns of Gharyan and Assabia and lasted for several days. Two people were reported dead and 36 wounded.

On 23 January, four deaths were reported due to clashes between pro-National Transitional Council (NTC) forces and local armed residents in Bani Walid, 170 km southeast of Tripoli. Local residents had accused the pro-NTC militia of harassing people, taking prisoners and abusing them. Osama al-Juwaili, Libya’s interim Minister of Defence, held talks with local elders in Bani Walid on 25 January to broker a deal. (Bani Walid, along with Sirte, was one of the two final strongholds held by forces loyal to the ousted regime.)

Other notable events included the appointment of Yussuf Al-Mangush as the new head of the Libyan Army on 4 January. The Coalition of Libyan Revolutionsaries rejected Mangush’s appointment the following day. (The coalition represents powerful factions of former rebels from major cities, such as Benghazi, Misrata and Zintan.)

Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, deputy head of the NTC and its official spokesperson, resigned on 22 January. Ghoga’s resignation followed earlier protests in Benghazi on 19 January against the alleged lack of transparency in the NTC. On 23 January, Jalil praised Ghoga for his role during the revolution and said “we (the NTC) are not going to resign because it would lead to civil war.”

Speaking to reporters on 10 January, Khayyal said that most of the approximately $20 billion worth of Libyan assets thus far had been released by the US, France and other European states.

Libya was referenced several times in a 12 January high-level Council debate on the relationship between the UN and the AU. South African President Jacob Zuma, who chaired it, complained that “the AU’s plan was completely ignored in favour of bombing Libya by NATO forces.”

AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping, held talks with Khayyal and Prime Minister Abdel Rahim al-Keib, in Libya on 16 January. Ping reportedly told Libyan authorities that “the past is the past, no matter what happened. We must turn the page and look to the future.” (The AU only recognised Libya’s new authorities in September.)

Key Issues
The Council’s role in ensuring a peaceful transition and preventing large-scale reprisals and killings in a post-conflict Libya is a key issue.

Ensuring that sporadic violence between different armed rebel factions does not jeopardise the stability of Libya and that the NTC remains unified before the interim government is fully functional is a related issue.

Ensuring UNSMIL’s full deployment and effective functioning and also determining its subsequent long-term role and timeframe are key related issues for the Council.

Handling Libya’s assets freeze in an efficient manner is another key issue for the Council, as is its role in the implementation of resolution 1970 with regard to the referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC and any referral-related trials.

The prevention of proliferation of heavy weaponry in a post-conflict Libya as well as the spill-over effect in the Sahel region will continue to be an issue for the Council.

Mitigating the impact of the recent conflict and its aftermath on the civilian population and delivering humanitarian assistance remain two closely related issues for the Council.
The continued coordination of efforts by various stakeholders and other international bodies in supporting the interim authorities is also an issue for the Council.

Options

Regarding UNSMIL, the Council could wait until it receives the Secretary-General’s report, as well as the Assessment-of-Needs report by the Libyan authorities.

With regard to the ICC, an (unlikely) option for the Council is to recall, in a statement, the obligations that Libya and other states have toward the ICC under resolution 1970.

Other options include revisiting outstanding Libya sanctions and considering further measures on weapons proliferation after receiving an assessment of threats and challenges from the Libya Sanctions Committee, as requested by resolution 2017.

Council Dynamics

Some Council members feel that UNSMIL should have an integrated mandate; however, other Council members feel that the UN should only focus on a few key tasks, such as assisting the Libyan authorities with the forthcoming elections and the disarmament of rebels.

Resolutions 1970 and 1973 continue to generate heated debate among Council members. NATO’s role and the extent of its involvement in Libya remain a source of contention extending to other items on the Council agenda. Some Council members feel that other members were wrong to take it upon themselves to use military force. Russia strongly feels that the Council should either authorise an independent investigation or permit a joint UN-NATO probe into the reported civilian deaths as a result of NATO’s bombings because the Council had authorised NATO’s mission in the first instance. The US, the UK and France hold the view that a separate investigation would be redundant because the Commission of Inquiry on Libya as well as the ICC are already looking into these matters. Furthermore, different Council members revised their approach to this issue after the briefings by Martin, Shalgham and Pillay on 25 January. Russia felt that the hint towards civilian casualties as a result of NATO’s actions in the briefings was a constructive measure as was the mention of a recent letter, by Pillay, reportedly sent by NATO to the Commission of Inquiry on Libya. Council members seem to recognise the perils of a divided Council on Libya when the situation in the country remains fragile.

The UK is the lead country on Libya.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2022 (2 December 2011) extended the mandate of UNSMIL until 16 March 2012 and asked UNSMIL to assist the Libyan authorities in addressing the threat of proliferation of arms, in particular MANPADS.
- S/RES/2017 (31 October 2011) discussed the non-proliferation of MANPADS, chemical weapons stockpiles and other small arms.
- S/RES/2016 (27 October 2011) lifted the no-fly zone and the provisions for the use of force for the protection of civilians.
- S/RES/2009 (16 September 2011) authorised the deployment of UNSMIL and partially lifted sanctions.
- S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a panel of experts.
- S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions and established a sanctions committee.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/727 (22 November 2011)

Latest Meeting Records

- S/PV.6673 (2 December 2011)
- S/PV.6689 (28 November 2011)

Other

- S/2012/32 (12 January 2012) was the letter from the chair of the Sanctions Committee submitting an annual report the committee’s activities.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

In February, either Roger Meece, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), or Hervé Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, will likely brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report on MONUSCO. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

Though the Council does not currently plan to hold additional meetings on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), they may be scheduled if the situation on the ground deteriorates following the announcement of the results of the legislative election, which has been postponed indefinitely.

MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 30 June 2012.

Key Recent Developments

Presidential and legislative elections were held in the DRC on 28 November 2011. On 2 December, Meece briefed the Council by videoconference on the elections. Following the briefing, Council members issued a press statement, stressing the importance of maintaining a peaceful and calm environment, exercising restraint and resolving any differences through established legal and mediation mechanisms. Council members
urged all candidates and their supporters to refrain from acts of violence and called on the authorities to investigate any such acts and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The statement also highlighted Council members’ concern about the logistical and technical difficulties encountered during the voting process.

On 9 December 2011, the Independent National Electoral Commission declared incumbent President Joseph Kabila the winner of the 28 November presidential election with 49 percent of the votes. (The opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, who received 32 percent, claimed to be the true victor of election and has “sworn” himself into office.) At press time, the legislative election results, also held on 28 November, had yet to be announced. International and national observers, including the EU observer mission and the Carter Center, have reported irregularities in the vote count as well as the loss of significant numbers of ballots. AU, South African and other African observers have expressed the view that despite technical and logistical challenges, the elections and their results are credible. On 12 December, MONUSCO released a press statement citing the findings of these observer missions “relating to the significant irregularities in the management of the results process, in particular the counting and tabulation of the votes” and expressing concern. MONUSCO also called on all parties to settle election disputes by peaceful means through established institutions and to desist from incitement to violence.

Meece briefed Council members again via video-teleconference on 15 December. He updated them on election observer reports of irregularities in the election process, the security situation on the ground and MONUSCO’s preparations for possible developing scenarios. He noted that despite some violent incidents, on the whole the elections had not caused an escalation in violence and riots.

There have been several sanctions-related developments. On 29 November, the Council renewed the DRC sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts for a period of 12 months. The resolution welcomed measures taken by the government to implement the due diligence guidelines. It also asked the experts to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the guidelines on the economic and social development of the relevant mining areas in the DRC.

At press time, the Council has received an advanced copy of MONUSCO’s latest report. The report calls on the Congolese authorities to conduct a comprehensive review of the electoral process to ensure that lessons are learnt for the next electoral cycle.

With the end of Brazil’s term on the Council, Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan) was appointed chairman of the sanctions committee for the period ending 31 December 2012. The two vice-chairs for 2012 are Morocco and Pakistan. (Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil had briefed the Council on the 2011 activities of the committee on 21 November.)

On 16 November 2011, the DRC sanctions committee was briefed by the Group of Experts on their annual report (officially released on 2 December, the Council received an advance copy in late October). During the meeting, the experts also handed the committee a confidential file containing information regarding potential additions to the sanctions list.

The report stresses that despite reorganisation efforts, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) are afflicted with a parallel chain of command, due mainly to the loyalty of elements of the integrated Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) to Gen. Bosco Ntaganda (for whom there is a standing arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court). Both the FARDC and the CNDP continue to recruit minors. The report found much progress had been made in the implementation of the due diligence guidelines for the purchase, sourcing, acquisition and processing of mineral products from the DRC. It found that untagged tin, tantalum and tungsten had no buyers, with the exception of several Chinese companies that do not require tags of due diligence. The group then connected the profits of these traders to the financing of criminal networks and armed groups within the DRC. The report also highlighted that illegal exports of gold were on the rise and becoming a main source of finance for armed groups. Finally, the report noted that elements within the FARDC continue to provide armed groups with arms and ammunition.

On 6 December, at the request of Germany, the DRC sanctions committee was briefed by Margot Wallström, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, on issues related to her mandate in the DRC. Wallström provided the committee with one name for potential listing in the near future for acts of sexual violence. (Wallström and Meece had briefed the Council on 8 November after which the Council issued a press statement expressing deep concern about the persistent high levels of violence, especially sexual violence, and human rights violations and abuses against civilians.)

On 30 December, the sanctions committee issued a press statement highlighting several recommendations contained in the Group of Expert’s report relating to natural resources, addressed to private companies conducting business in the DRC.

Violence in parts of the DRC persisted. On 20 January, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said that fresh violence in the Kivu provinces had forced more than 100,000 civilians to flee their homes since November. Additionally, MONUSCO has received reports that in early January, about 45 civilians were killed and at least 50 were wounded during a raid in South Kivu’s Shabunda territory by members of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in two attacks.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 18 January the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) examined the DRC’s initial report, under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the involvement of children in armed conflict. A key issue was the DRC government’s efforts to end the recruitment of child soldiers and ensure that they are successfully returned to civilian life. The CRC considered inputs from NGOs, including the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. The coalition said that although a
Key Issues
A key issue is keeping a close eye on the possible escalation of violence following the announcement of the legislative election results.

Another issue is re-evaluating MONUSCO’s role in assisting the DRC government in the continuing election cycle, with elections for the provincial assemblies scheduled for 25 February and local elections scheduled in January 2013.

Meanwhile, another issue for the Council is maintaining a grasp on other continuing areas of concern, such as sexual violence and protection of civilians in the eastern provinces.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- issuing a press statement on the election process, specifying a greater role for MONUSCO in the next election cycle;
- monitoring the reaction on the ground to the election process and convening additional Council meetings as necessary; or
- taking no action unless extraordinary events occur on the ground.

Council Dynamics
As with the contradictory reports on the 28 November elections, Council members have divergent views on their credibility and how vocal the Council should be regarding the validity of the election process. Nevertheless, many Council members are of the view that lessons should be learnt to improve MONUSCO’s role in supporting the upcoming elections for the provisional assemblies in February, in order to mitigate the state of political uncertainty and instability.

Several Council members feel that the reported irregularities show a need for MONUSCO to provide more than logistical support. Some ideas are for MONUSCO to provide more technical assistance and advice, including in the process of counting election ballots. Currently Council members are not considering a certification role for MONUSCO.

One variable that will be influential in the assessment of MONUSCO’s engagement in the election process will be the view of Kabila and his government, once formed, on the role MONUSCO should play. A request for assistance from the DRC government may persuade reluctant Council members to support a more substantial role for MONUSCO in the next elections. Another unknown at this juncture is MONUSCO’s own assessment, and Council members will be eager to gain a better perspective from the anticipated report and briefing. Finally, MONUSCO’s future involvement in the election process may also depend on whether election-related violence in the DRC escalates, in particular following the announcement of the legislative election results.

Sudan/Darfur
Expected Council Action
The Council will likely renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, which expires on 19 February.

The Council may also discuss the road map for peace in Darfur, although consideration of this document may be deferred to a later date depending on the timing of its release. Whether there will be an outcome after these discussions remains unclear. (While the Council had planned to discuss the road map in January, its release has been delayed and it had yet to be circulated at press time. The document is expected to focus on implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur [DDPD], engagement with rebel groups that have not signed the DDPD, dialogue with the people of Darfur on the peace process, and coordination among international partners assisting efforts toward peace.)

The mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) expires on 31 July.

Key Recent Developments
Khalid Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was killed by Sudanese Armed Forces on 23 or 24 December 2011. In the days preceding his death, JEM forces had crossed from Darfur into Northern Kordofan, apparently on route to Khartoum, in an effort to overthrow the Sudanese government. On 31 December,
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir called on the JEM to join the peace process.

Gibril Ibrahim, the brother of Khalil Ibrahim, was elected the new leader of the JEM on 26 January. He said that the JEM would continue its rebellion against the Sudanese government and that the DDPD does not address the Darfur conflict’s underlying causes.

On 29 December, Sudan sent a letter to the Security Council, in which it said that 350 JEM troops were in Tumsaha and Raja (South Sudan) and that these troops had access to 79 armoured vehicles and 28 stolen trucks filled with Libyan weapons and property stolen from Northern Kordofan in Sudan. The letter further claimed that the JEM had access to guns, machine guns and launchers acquired while fighting beside the forces of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. The Sudanese government further stated in the letter that the South Sudanese government “should… refrain from offering…(the JEM) any assistance” and “disarm those forces…(in South Sudan)…and extradite wanted individuals to face justice in the Sudan.”

On 11 January, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNAMID. During the briefing, Ladsous highlighted progress that had been achieved in implementing the DDPD. He said that on 18 December al-Bashir had appointed the Secretary-General of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, as Minister of Health in his cabinet. (The LJM is the Darfur-based rebel movement that has signed the DDPD with the government.) Ladsous added that Tijani El-Seise, the leader of the LJM, had been appointed chair of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), which was established to manage the implementation of the DDPD. Ladsous noted challenges to the peace process during the briefing. In particular, he noted that rebel groups that have not signed the DDPD have not been negotiating with the government of Sudan.

Ladsous added that restrictions placed by Sudanese authorities on UNAMID, including on flights and land patrols, had inhibited the mission’s ability to fulfil its mandate. He further noted that 935 visa requests for mission personnel were still pending and that access to Western Jebel Marra had been repeatedly denied to humanitarian organisations.

Ladsous also emphasised the need for the government of Sudan to hold accountable those who commit violence against UNAMID peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. (On 21 January, unidentified individuals ambushed a UNAMID patrol in Saleah, killing a peacekeeper and wounding three others. The Council issued a press statement on 23 January condemning the attack. Thirty-five UNAMID peacekeepers have been killed since the mission’s deployment on 31 December 2007.)

David Buom Choat, the acting Permanent Representative of South Sudan, and Daffa-All Elhag Ali Osman, the Permanent Representative of Sudan, addressed the Council after Ladsous. Buom Choat said that the violence in Darfur needed to be resolved through negotiation and political will, expressing concern that the instability in Darfur could have negative implications for security in South Sudan. He added that the security challenges facing Sudan needed to be viewed in a holistic manner and expressed the hope that progress on negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan could contribute to progress in stabilising turbulent regions of Sudan such as Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

Ali Osman said that the peace process was making great strides in Darfur. He indicated that 25,000 copies of the DDPD had been distributed to members of civil society in Darfur and that LJM forces would be allowed to either integrate into the Sudanese Armed Forces or become civilians. While indicating that Sudan was open to pursuing peace with rebel groups that had not signed the DDPD, Ali Osman said that those that do not join the peace process should be punished. He suggested that the recent return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes in Darfur signified an improvement in the security situation in Darfur and that, as a consequence, the UN should consider reducing the size of UNAMID.

Ali Osman said that while Sudan was sincere in wanting to resolve its differences with South Sudan, it did not perceive a similar commitment from South Sudan, accusing the new country of arming rebel groups in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and hosting fighters from the JEM who had crossed into South Sudan.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNAMID raised concerns about the humanitarian and human rights situation, including gender-based violence. The number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID had also increased significantly since the previous reporting period. In addition, the overall number of documented human rights violations increased from 77 cases involving 142 victims between 1 June and 30 September to 116 cases involving 273 victims between 1 October and 14 December. The Secretary-General called on the government of Sudan to ensure the protection of the people of Darfur and pledged that UNAMID itself would continue to focus on protection of civilians. While the government must take the lead in ensuring security, protection and access to all areas for civilians and humanitarian workers, he said that the UN humanitarian community would maintain its support for the peace process, facilitate the delivery of aid and assist voluntary returns of displaced people.

Key Issues

A key issue is the extent to which the road map for peace in Darfur will offer a workable strategy for nurturing the peace process. The fact that the government of Sudan has not lifted the emergency laws in the region and that several key rebel groups have vowed to overthrow the regime in Khartoum present significant challenges to the peace process.

A related issue is how the Council decides to engage with the road map, including:

- how to develop a strategy that facilitates an improvement in the government’s human rights policies;
- what instruments, including incentives and disincentives, are at its disposal to
facilitate the engagement of non-compliant rebel groups in the peace process and how these instruments should be employed;
- how to support the implementation of the DDPD and facilitate enhanced understanding of, and support for, the DDPD among the inhabitants of Darfur;
- how to strengthen coordination and coherence among international actors in supporting the DDPD; and
- whether, and how, to incorporate its approach to Darfur into efforts to develop a more cohesive and integrated strategy toward Sudan and South Sudan.

A further important issue is the impact that ongoing delays in the Sudanese government’s issuance of visas for UNAMID personnel and its restrictions on their movement has on the ability of the mission to perform its mandated responsibilities. A related key issue is how the Council decides to address ongoing restrictions to humanitarian access in Darfur.

A key issue with respect to the panel of experts is whether it has had time to produce a comprehensive report, considering that all of the experts were appointed only this fall and have therefore only had a couple of months to conduct their investigations in Darfur. (At press time, although not publicly available, the report had been circulated to Council members.)

Options
With respect to the panel of experts, the most likely option is to adopt a resolution renewing the panel’s mandate. The Council may also consider including language in the resolution that expresses support for the newly constituted panel and highlights key findings of its report.

Concerning the road map for peace in Darfur, the Council may opt to receive the document and take no action at this time. Another option would be adopting a statement that:
- welcomes the road map;
- encourages rebel groups to join the peace process;
- signals the possibility of imposing sanctions on the rebels in certain cases to compel their participation in the peace process;
- signals the need for the government to enhance its respect for human rights in Darfur in order to facilitate
- implementation of the road map; and
- recognises progress that has been made thus far with respect to the DDPD, including the establishment of the DRA and the appointment of Abu Garda as Minister of Health.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem eager to review the road map for peace in Darfur. There is general agreement in the Council on the importance of the DDPD to the peace process. Some members think that greater pressure could be put on rebel groups that have not signed the DDPD to accede to the document. At the same time, some members believe that the government of Sudan could demonstrate greater flexibility in terms of negotiating certain aspects of the DDPD. (The Sudanese government has indicated that it is willing to negotiate only parts of the DDPD that focus on security arrangements and political appointments; these elements are part of two chapters out of seven in the DDPD.)

While some Council members are encouraged by the recently reported return of large numbers of IDPs and refugees, there is widespread concern on the Council about human rights violations in Darfur and how this affects the peace process. Several members also appear concerned about delays in the issuance of visas for UNAMID personnel and believe that it is important for the Sudanese government to demonstrate greater cooperation on this front.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur, while Colombia chairs the sanctions committee.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1982 (17 May 2011) extended the mandate of the Sudan sanctions panel of experts until 19 February 2012.

Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2011/814 (30 December 2011) was the most recent quarterly report on UNAMID.
- S/2011/252 (15 April 2011) was on implementation of the Darfur Political Process.

Meeting Records
- S/PV.6700 (11 January 2012) was the Council’s discussion of the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNAMID.

Other
- SC/10526 (23 January 2012) was a press statement condemning the attack on a UNAMID patrol on 21 January that caused the death of one peacekeeper and wounded three others.
- S/2011/810 (29 December 2011) was a letter to the Council from Sudan claiming that JEM forces had entered South Sudan and requesting that the South Sudanese government disarm them and extradite them to Sudan.

Other Relevant Facts
UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur
Ibrahim Garmabri (Nigeria)
UNAMID: Force Commander
Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)
UNAMID: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration
Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6,432)
Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia and Senegal
Military strength as of 31 December 2011: 17,778 troops and 262 military observers
Police Strength as of 31 December 2011: 4,950 police personnel
Annual Budget: $1.69 billion
Duration: 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2012
Sanctions Committee Chairman
Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

Sudan and South Sudan
Expected Council Action
The Council expects to hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA). At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

Given the unpredictable and fluid nature of events in South Sudan and along the Sudan and South Sudan border, it is also possible...
that unfolding developments in these regions may warrant heightened Council attention in February. (At press time, the Council was negotiating a press statement addressing the humanitarian and security situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, although it is unclear if and when the Council will reach agreement on the statement.)

The mandate of UNISFA expires on 22 May, while the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) expires on 8 July.

**Key Recent Developments**

In December 2011, the Council adopted resolutions 2024 and 2032 on Abyei, the disputed territory straddling Sudan and South Sudan. Resolution 2024 expanded UNISFA’s mandate to include a border-monitoring support role. In particular, the resolution gave UNISFA several additional tasks to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) agreed by Sudan and South Sudan, including, inter alia, supporting the JBVMM with monitoring, verification, reporting, information-sharing and patrols. Resolution 2032 renewed UNISFA for a further five months, incorporating the additional tasks outlined in resolution 2024.

On 21 January, the AU issued a communiqué in which it announced that a meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) that had been scheduled from 21 to 26 January in Addis Ababa had been cancelled. (In resolution 2032, the Council urged the parties to use the JPSM, which they established as a part of their 29 June 2011 agreement, “to resolve outstanding issues related to finalization of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, the resolution of disputed border areas, border demarcation, and the mapping of the border zone.”)

On 4 January, Nafie Ali Nafie, the deputy chairman of the ruling National Congress Party in Sudan, during a rally in Khartoum, warned South Sudan against attacking Abyei, which he claimed is part of Sudan. (According to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the Second Sudanese Civil War, a referendum was scheduled for January 2011 to determine whether Abyei would become part of Sudan or South Sudan. It never took place because the parties could not agree on criteria for voter eligibility.)

Jonglei state in South Sudan witnessed high levels of inter-communal violence in late December and throughout much of January. On 3 January, Lise Grande, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and humanitarian coordinator in South Sudan, briefed the press in New York via videoconference. During the briefing, Grande described how a heavily armed column of approximately 8,000 youth from the Lou Nuer ethnic group marched toward settlements in Jonglei inhabited by the Murle ethnic group in late December 2011.

UNMISS was able to provide warning of the impending attacks to inhabitants of two towns that were targeted, Lukangole and Pibor. According to Grande, much of the population had fled Lukangole by the time the Lou Nuer column arrived on 30 December. When the column reached Pibor by 1 January, UNMISS troops supporting Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) troops, created a defensive perimeter that protected part of Pibor, although the youth entered the town and set part of it on fire. The column left Pibor with large numbers of cattle on 3 January after being shot at by SPLA troops.

Grande emphasised the serious humanitarian crisis resulting from the displacement of thousands of people from Lukangole and Pibor, noting that the displaced had been left without food, shelter, water or access to medical attention. She added that various UN entities had rescued and evacuated civilians, provided relief and deterred additional violence. She also noted that the UN would continue to provide emergency assistance and track the movement of the column of Lou Nuer youth.

Meanwhile, according to Grande, the South Sudanese government had taken steps to promote reconciliation and quell the violence between the ethnic groups. Reich Machar, the Vice President of South Sudan, met with delegations of Lou Nuer and Murle in the region, while President Salva Kiir said in an address to the nation that political leaders stoking the violence would be held accountable.

On 5 January, Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council in consultations on the violence in Jonglei. At the stakeout afterwards, he underscored the gravity of the inter-ethnic crisis, saying that the situation was “very serious” and that UNMISS personnel had seen several dozen corpses. (Joshua Konyi, the Pibor county commissioner, claimed that 3,141 were killed in the violence; however, the number of deceased has not been definitively confirmed).

Ladsous emphasised the challenges facing the mission and fuelling the violence in Jonglei. The lack of roads in Jonglei and an insufficient number of helicopters hindered UNMISS’ ability to respond to crisis situations. He added that the large quantities of weapons in South Sudan were a cause for concern.

On 9 January, the Council issued a press statement in which it expressed deep concern at the inter-communal violence between the Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei and called for an end to the violence through reconciliation. While welcoming the efforts of the South Sudanese government in mediating between the two groups and commending the response of UNMISS to the situation, the statement also expressed concern with UNMISS’ lack of aircraft and with the level and sophistication of weapons used in the attacks. It further called on UNMISS to continue its support to the government of South Sudan with security sector reform, including the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former rebels.

On 16 January, Murle conducted a series of retaliatory attacks in Akobo, Uror and Duk counties in central Jonglei, claiming the lives of more than 51 people from the Lou Nuer and Dinka groups. In a 19 January press conference in Juba, Hilde Johnson, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS, said that “all concerned should redouble their efforts to put an immediate end to the cycle of violence, which is putting thousands of lives at risk and threatening the stability of the whole area.” She subsequently urged the South Sudanese government to send more soldiers and police to areas between rival ethnic groups in Jonglei in order to protect civilians and quell tensions.
On 17 January, the Council held consultations on the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, and Antonio Gutierrez (participating via video-conference), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, briefed the Council on their recent trip to Sudan. It seems that they painted a grim picture of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil income escalated in January, as the two countries have been unable to agree on a transit fee for oil from South Sudan shipped through Sudan. Sudan prevented two ships filled with South Sudanese oil from leaving port, and according to Stephen Dhieu Dau, South Sudan’s Minister of Petroleum and Mining, began diverting approximately 120,000 barrels of South Sudanese oil per day, apparently in response to the lack of progress in negotiations on a transit fee. On 22 January, South Sudan began to shut down its oil production as a retaliatory measure.

On 24 January, the South Sudanese government signed an agreement in Juba with the Kenyan government for the construction of an oil pipeline from South Sudan to the Kenyan port of Lamu. (Currently, the only outlet to the sea for South Sudanese oil is through Sudan’s Red Sea port at Port Sudan.)

On 23 January, the AU issued a communiqué that expressed concern with the deterioration of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Noting Sudan’s diversion of South Sudanese oil and South Sudan’s decision to stop its oil production, the communiqué cautioned that “these reciprocal unilateral measures threaten grave damage to the economic prospects of both countries and relations between them.” The document also noted that the AU High-Level Implementation Panel had presented a proposal to Sudan and South Sudan to resolve the impasse on “the question of oil and transitional financial arrangements” that both parties were considering.

On 24 January, the Russian government announced that it would withdraw its remaining four helicopters from UNMISS by 1 April. In December 2011, it withdrew four helicopters from the mission after attacks on its helicopters in South Sudan.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir issued a republican decree on 11 January to form a National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR). The decree is in line with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, under which the government committed itself to ensure the effective functioning of the NCHR. The commission is required to establish “decentralised, independent, autonomous and resourced Human Rights Sub-Committees for Darfur” to monitor and promote human rights in Darfur. Those sub-committees will also report on progress made toward implementing the principle of equality between states and among citizens in Sudan.

### Key Issues

Regarding UNISFA and the situation in Abyei, key issues for the Council include:

- supporting negotiations between the parties on border-related issues, whose resolution will help to enable the parties to operationalize a border-monitoring mechanism supported by UNISFA;
- determining how to address the presence of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and South Sudanese police in Abyei;
- determining how to compel Sudan and South Sudan to provide maps of mined areas to facilitate the demining efforts of UNISFA; and
- assisting the parties in resolving their differences over the establishment of an Abyei Area Administration, as they have been unable to agree on mutually acceptable candidates to fill high-level positions in the administration.

Concerning the violence in Jonglei, key issues for the Council include:

- ensuring that the mission has sufficient mobility to prevent and quickly respond to crisis situations, including through obtaining and employing requisite aerial assets;
- supporting the South Sudanese government in providing security for and promoting reconciliation between various ethnic groups; and
- addressing the proliferation of weapons in Jonglei, in accordance with the recent press statement on Jonglei, which expressed concern about the quantity and sophistication of weapons used in recent inter-communal violence.

With respect to South Kordofan and Blue Nile, key issues for the Council include:

- ensuring that humanitarian access is provided to both regions; and
- addressing the ongoing violence in these states.

### Options

Options for the Council concerning Abyei and UNISFA include:

- receiving the briefing and taking no action at the current time; or
- issuing a statement in which the Council reiterates its calls for unauthorised armed personnel to leave Abyei, as well as for both parties to redouble efforts to negotiate the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration and to provide detailed maps of mined areas in Abyei.

Depending on how events on the ground unfold in Jonglei throughout February, the Council could consider holding an Arria-formula meeting with NGOs with a presence on the ground to gain a better understanding of the inter-communal dynamics in South Sudan.

With regard to the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the Council could request a follow-up briefing with Amos, if it is felt that additional information from her regarding events transpiring in these regions would be helpful. It may also consider adopting a statement condemning the violence in both areas, expressing concern at the gravity of the humanitarian situation and calling for improved humanitarian access.

### Council Dynamics

After the adoption of two resolutions on UNISFA in December, Council members were not primarily focused on the situation in Abyei throughout January, as their attention was largely engaged on other regions in Sudan and South Sudan. It appears that the Secretary-General’s report on Abyei, scheduled to be released on 27 January but still pending at press time, will provide an opportunity for Council members to renew their substantive engagement on Abyei. There was widespread support in the Council for tasking UNISFA with a border-monitoring support role (although it is unclear if and when conditions on the ground will enable the mission to carry out...
this role in a meaningful way, given the lack of trust between Sudan and South Sudan).

Regarding the situation in Jonglei, it seems that several Council members are worried about the escalation of retaliatory attacks among different ethnic groups. Some members believe that more aircraft are needed to enable UNMISS to respond more quickly to crisis situations before they escalate. Most members are concerned about the proliferation of weapons in Jonglei, and are keen for enhanced progress on the demilitarisation and reintegration of former rebel groups.

Many Council members are troubled by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan and believe that there is a need for enhanced humanitarian access to these regions. The US in particular has underscored the enormity of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in both areas. However, it seems that concerns persist among some members about the need to respect Sudan’s sovereignty, especially in regard to the government’s efforts to fight rebels challenging its authority. It also appears that some members question the severity of the crisis.

The US is the lead country on UNISFA and UNMISS.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2032 (22 December 2011) renewed UNISFA’s mandate.
- S/RES/2024 (14 December 2011) added a border-monitoring support role to UNISFA’s mandate.
- S/RES/1997 (11 July 2011) liquidated UNMIS.
- S/RES/1996 (8 July 2011) established UNMISS.
- S/RES/1990 (27 June 2011) established UNISFA.

Letters

- S/2012/40 (17 January 2012) was a letter from Sudan to the Council on the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
- S/2012/37 (16 January 2012) was a letter from the US to the Council on the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Sudan and South Sudan
Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

UNISFA: Force Commander and Head of Mission
Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede Tesfay (Ethiopia)

UNISFA: Size, Composition and Duration

Maximum authorised strength: up to 4,200 military and 50 police
Deployment as of 31 December 2011: 3,798 total uniformed personnel
Troop contributor: Ethiopia
Duration: 22 December 2011 to present; mandate expires 22 May 2012.

Somalia

Expected Council Action

At press time, Council members were anticipating a report from the Secretary-General with more details on the new strategic concept recently endorsed by the AU for the next phase of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including options for enhancing the mission’s UN-financed support package.

A new AMISOM resolution is expected to be adopted before 23 February, when the UK will host an international conference on Somalia in London, which many Council members are likely to attend. The aim of the conference is to promote increased international engagement on Somalia and develop a more effective approach.

The Council is also expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on specialised anti-piracy tribunals in Somalia and other countries in the region issued on 20 January, which provided detailed proposals on the kind of international assistance needed. A briefing by the Secretariat is expected, but it is unclear whether there will be any follow-up Council action in February.

In the Sanctions Committee on Somalia and Eritrea, the Monitoring Group is due to provide its midterm briefing as requested by resolution 2002.

Key Recent Developments

On 9 December 2011, the Secretary-General visited Mogadishu together with the President of the General Assembly, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser. (It was the first-ever such joint visit to Somalia and the first visit by a Secretary-General since 1993.) At a press conference there, the Secretary-General said Somalia was at a critical juncture and that there was a “very limited window of opportunity.” He also stressed the importance of moving ahead quickly with the implementation of the road map for ending the transitional period in Somalia and emphasised that any extension beyond the August deadline would be “untenable.” Additionally, he announced that the UN Political Office in Somalia would relocate to Mogadishu in January to strengthen UN support for the road map. (The official relocation took place on 24 January.)

Also on 9 December, the Secretary-General issued his latest report on Somalia. Among other things, it noted that a number of the agreed deadlines on the implementation of the road map had been missed and that, as of 30 November, the mechanisms charged with monitoring implementation—the Regional Political Initiative and the International Coordination and Monitoring Group—had yet to meet. (The monitoring group held its first meeting on 9 January.)

On 13 December, the Secretary-General briefed the Council, emphasising again that the international community was facing “a moment of fresh opportunities” in Somalia and that it must consolidate gains already made, offering additional support and ensuring that the military strategy was aligned with political objectives. After the briefing, Council members held informal consultations and, in a subsequent press statement welcoming the Secretary-General’s visit to Mogadishu, underlined the seriousness of the problems in Somalia and the need for a comprehensive strategy. The statement also supported the Secretary-General’s call for faster implementation of the road map, while noting that future support for Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) would be contingent on its completion.
From 21 to 23 December, the first Somali national constitutional conference was held in Garowe in Puntland, bringing together the signatories of the road map as well as civil society. (Finalisation of a new constitution is one of the key tasks of the road map.) The conference adopted “the Garowe principles on the finalisation and adoption of the constitution and the end of the transition,” which set out a series of deadlines and next steps for the adoption of a new constitution and also decided on the details for a post-transition parliamentary structure that would reduce the number of parliamentarians from 550 to 225.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) held a series of meetings on Somalia in December and January to discuss a new strategic concept for AMISOM. In a 2 December communiqué it urged the Council to “review and consider thoroughly the need to adjust the mandated troop levels of AMISOM” and reiterated previous calls “to adopt a resolution that enforces measures to control access to the ports of Kismayo, Haradhere, Marka and Barawe and an air-exclusion zone to cut off arms supplies to Al Shabaab,” the Islamist rebel group.

On 22 December the PSC agreed that it would consider the finalised strategic concept in early January for adoption and transmission to the Security Council and requested the inclusion of “an item on Somalia and the efforts of AMISOM” on the Council’s January programme of work. The PSC met again on 5 January to endorse the strategic concept and urged the Council “to expeditiously consider and authorize the support required” for its immediate implementation. It also extended AMISOM’s mandate for another 12 months until 16 January 2013.

Key elements of the strategic concept include:
- an increase in AMISOM’s authorised level of uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731 troops (which would allow for the re-hatting of Kenyan troops and deployment of additional troops from Burundi, Djibouti and Uganda);
- deployment of AMISOM troops to areas outside of Mogadishu;
- provision of force enablers and multipliers as well as logistical support to AMISOM; and
- strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and “allied” forces to enable them to play a greater role.

In response to the AU’s requests, the Council held a meeting on 11 January with briefings by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, and AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra. Kenya and Uganda also spoke. Lamamra briefed the Council on the new strategic concept for AMISOM and reiterated the AU’s call for Council support.

In a press statement following the meeting, Council members noted the 5 January communiqué and underlined their intention to keep the situation under review. They also urged the TFIs to remain united and focus on implementation of the road map while reiterating that further support would be contingent on its completion and expressing their readiness to take action against spoilers.

The political dispute that began on 13 December with the parliament’s no-confidence vote against speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden remained unresolved. In another vote on 4 January, Madowe Nunow Mohamed was elected the new speaker, but Aden’s supporters refused to accept the results. According to media reports, the Somali president also called the vote illegitimate. On 6 January, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Augustine Mahiga, expressed deep concern over the continuing dispute, while on 9 January the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which also expressed concern, said the election of a new speaker was illegal, as did the chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, on 16 January.

In a separate development, Somalia sent a letter to the Council on 4 January requesting adoption of a resolution prohibiting UN member states from purchasing charcoal from Somalia. The objective would be to cut off an important source of revenue for Al-Shabaab and also prevent further environmental degradation caused by the charcoal trade.

On 5 December, the Council adopted resolution 2023, which condemned Eritrea’s violations of resolutions 1907, 1862 and 1844, and called on it to cease all efforts to destabilise other states, including through support for Al Shabaab. The resolution also imposed new restrictions on Eritrea relating to the diaspora tax, mining sector and financial services to prevent further violations. (For further details on this, please see our 1 December 2011 What’s In Blue story on Eritrea.)

On 19 January, the International Maritime Bureau reported a significant decrease in the number of successful piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia from 49 in 2010 (out of a total of 219 attempted attacks) to 28 in 2011 (out of 237).

On 20 January, the Secretary-General issued his report on specialised anti-piracy courts. It provided a detailed overview of the existing arrangements in place in the region to prosecute suspected pirates and the international assistance that would be required for specialised anti-piracy courts in Somalia, Seychelles, Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania. The report suggested it might be helpful as a first step to assess the number of piracy incidents where suspects are apprehended and then released and the reasons for these releases as well as the anticipated number of piracy suspects likely to be transferred to countries in the region. (According to the report there were only four such transfer requests in 2011.) It also emphasised the importance of increasing prison capacity to match the number of convicted pirates.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo, made an official visit to Somalia from 9 to 16 December 2011. Manjoo visited camps for internally displaced people and police stations and talked with individual victims of gender-based violence. In a statement at the end of her visit, she noted what she described as the government’s “tentative” efforts to address the issues of violence against women, including a draft law by the Puntland authorities on female genital mutilation, the creation of a Task Force on Gender-Based Violence by the TFG and the appointment of women as ministers. Nonetheless, she found that in the absence of accountability mechanisms, impunity for acts of violence against
women and girls was the norm. The internal conflict that had affected the country for the past 20 years could not in her view justify the lack of attention to such violence. “Somalia has the opportunity at this crucial time to promote human rights for all,” she said, “and importantly, to place the issue of violence against women on the national agenda.” Manjoo called on all stakeholders to make this a reality. She will report to the Human Rights Council in June 2012.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council in February is how to respond to the AU’s requests with regard to the new strategic concept for AMISOM.

A related issue is the need to ensure that the new military strategy supports the political process as well as humanitarian action and promotes compliance with international humanitarian law.

Another key issue is the implementation of the road map and the Garowe principles. A related issue is the unresolved political dispute over the speaker of parliament and whether the Council should follow up on its previously expressed readiness to take action against spoilers of the peace process.

A further issue is whether to take any follow-up action on the basis of the proposals of the Secretary-General’s report on specialised anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other states in the region.

Humanitarian access also continues to be an issue. (On 12 January, the ICRC, one of the few international organisations operating in areas controlled by Al Shabaab, announced that it was suspending operations in southern and central Somalia due to “obstruction by local militia.”)

Options

Depending on the Secretary-General’s recommendations (the Secretary-General has indicated he wants to engage the Council in discussions on the possible inclusion in the support package of reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment and the provision of force multipliers such as helicopter units, transport and engineering capabilities), main options for the Council include:

- adopting a resolution on AMISOM that would endorse all elements of the new strategic concept, including measures to prevent access to ports controlled by Al Shabaab, and bring UN support to the same level as for a UN peacekeeping operation;
- authorising less than what the AU has requested (which seems the more likely option both with regard to AMISOM’s troop ceiling and the UN-financed support package);
- considering further targeted sanctions against spoilers in the sanctions committee;
- adopting a statement welcoming the Secretary-General’s report on anti-piracy tribunals and encouraging follow-up action as proposed in the report; and
- adopting a resolution imposing an international ban on the import of charcoal from Somalia.

Council Dynamics

With regard to AMISOM, Council members are keen to get more clarity on key elements of the new strategic concept, including on command-and-control issues, coordination with the political strategy, timetables and benchmarks, definition of tasks by sector, support for TFG forces and financial costs. They expect the Secretary-General’s report to provide answers to these questions.

In the absence of more detailed information, clear Council positions have yet to emerge, but there appears to be a greater willingness than before to consider expanding the use of UN-assessed contributions to support AMISOM. At the same time, some Council members, in particular among the P5, still seem very cautious about any proposal that would significantly increase the financial burden on member states.

Some members also seem to question whether the increase in troop levels requested by the AU is too high. This seems at least partially to be motivated by cost concerns. It is therefore expected that the Council will authorise a smaller increase than requested, perhaps raising the troop ceiling to 15,000 or 16,000 troops.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council, while India chairs the sanctions committee and Russia has taken the lead on legal issues related to piracy.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/2023 (5 December 2011) condemned Eritrea’s violations of Council resolutions 1907, 1862 and 1844.
- S/RES/2015 (24 October 2011) called for additional measures to strengthen prosecution of Somali pirates and requested a report from the Secretary-General within 90 days.

Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2012/50 (20 January 2012) was the report requested by resolution 2015.
- S/2011/759 (9 December 2011) was the latest regular report.

Meeting Records

- S/PV.6701 (11 January 2012) was an open meeting with briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security.
- S/PV.6681 (13 December 2011) was a briefing by the Secretary-General.

Other

- SC/10517 (11 January 2012) was a press statement noting the new strategic concept for AMISOM.
- S/2012/4 (4 January 2012) was a letter from Somalia requesting the Council to support an international ban on purchasing charcoal from Somalia.
- SC/10481 (13 December 2011) was a press statement welcoming the Secretary-General’s 9 December visit to Mogadishu

Timor-Leste

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to hold a briefing and consultations on the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in February. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste, Ameerah Haq, is expected to brief the
Council. Timor-Leste will likely be represented by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão or President José Ramos-Horta, possibly accompanied by others at the ministerial level.

The Council is expected to renew UNMIT until 31 December 2012, in line with the Secretary-General’s recent recommendation, at which time Council members envisage the mission will conclude. (Resolution 1969 extended the mandate of UNMIT until 26 February 2012.)

Key Recent Developments
Since the Council’s last debate on Timor-Leste on 22 November 2011, the security situation in the country has remained generally stable and calm. The reported crime rate has remained low since the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNLT, the national police force) assumed full responsibilities for law enforcement in March 2011.

Presidential and parliamentary elections are due in the first half of this year; parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in June, and the presidential election is set for 17 March. (If a second round of voting is required, it would be held in the third week of April.) It will be the third such election since Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002.

President Ramos-Horta—who is eligible for a second and final term—was reported as saying in mid-January that he had not made a decision whether to run but would announce his intentions in early February.

The Secretary-General’s 18 January report on UNMIT (S/2012/43) notes that as the election period draws closer, party leaders have continued calls for security and stability. “Steady progress” has been made in the preparations of the elections, the report observes. This included the approval of subsidiary legislation by the National Electoral Commission on 28 December, which comprises legislation on electoral campaign regulations, voting and counting. These steps complete the legal framework for the upcoming elections.

On 22 December, Timor-Leste’s Council of Ministers suspended the activities of martial arts groups in the country for one year. The approved measures “to ensure public order and internal security of the country” were in response to general security concerns arising out of fights between rival martial arts groups. The Secretary-General’s report suggests that while last year’s general stability is expected to continue in 2012, heightened localised tensions, including the martial arts groups, could pose a test for the PNTL. It notes that the PNTL has made operational planning for the elections a priority and that UNMIT police will stand ready to provide operational support to the PNTL as required.

On the issue of accountability for those responsible for crimes and human rights violations during the 2006 crisis, the report observes that progress continues to be slow. Special Representative Haq expressed concern to the government that at least one former member of the Timorese armed forces, convicted of killing eight PNTL officers in 2006, occupies a senior post in the defence ministry. The Secretary-General’s report notes that further progress toward the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and the Commission of Truth and Friendship would positively impact Timor-Leste’s long-term peace and stability. It expresses hope that the country’s parliament will resume a debate on the draft laws on reparations and on the commissions’ successor.

Concerning the UN’s future in Timor-Leste, the report recommends that UNMIT’s mandate be extended until 31 December. (A UN country team is expected to continue its engagement in Timor-Leste following UNMIT’s departure.) The report also notes that the UNMIT police component will gradually downsize “as soon as possible” after the elections, as will the number of military liaison officers. It is anticipated that the newly elected government will be sworn in around August, and the Secretary-General intends to submit a report to the Council within 60 days of the new government’s formation. This will contain suggestions on final preparations for UNMIT’s anticipated withdrawal and for the UN’s post-UNMIT presence in the country.

On 17 November, following the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Bali, Indonesia, the chair’s statement welcomed the formal application of Timor-Leste to join the 10-nation grouping. The ASEAN Coordinating Council, which includes a working group established to discuss Timor-Leste’s bid, will address the application—and its implications for ASEAN—and make recommendations. This will include determining whether Timor-Leste has the “ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership,” as per Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter.

On 12 January, Ramos-Horta convened a ceremony in Dili marking the closure of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Timorese capital. UNHCR’s regional coordinator for Southeast Asia praised the country’s “impressive achievements” with respect to refugees and asylum seekers, noting that Timor-Leste was one of the few countries in the region to have ratified the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. (UNHCR opened its office in Dili nearly 12 years ago, just prior to the violent 1999 referendum on independence from Indonesia that compelled nearly a quarter of a million people to flee across the island into West Timor.) In total, UNHCR helped 220,000 refugees return to Timor-Leste.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The report from the examination of Timor-Leste by the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review was published on 3 January. The Group’s report disclosed that its members had tabled 125 recommendations of which 88 were immediately accepted by the government or regarded by Timor-Leste as already implemented. Recommendations accepted by the government included providing further resources for Timor-Leste’s human rights office and the Commission for rights of the child as well as becoming party to the Disabilities Convention. A further 36 recommendations are under consideration by the government which will report to the Human Rights Council at its next session this March. One recommendation seeking the repeal of legislative provisions that were regarded by a group member as discriminatory towards women in respect of inheritance, land ownership and legal capacity, was not supported by Timor-Leste.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council remains the security situation in Timor-Leste and stability on the ground in the months leading up to its elections.
UNMIT’s anticipated withdrawal at the end of 2012 gives rise to several important issues. These include the composition and role of the UN country team following UNMIT’s departure and the development of the transition process based on the Joint Transition Plan, which was signed by the government and Haq on 19 September 2011.

A related issue is the timing and the size of reductions in UNMIT’s police and military liaison units following the elections.

A further issue remains accountability for past crimes—in particular the lengthy amount of time it has taken to complete cases—and rule of law questions.

Options
In line with the Secretary-General’s recommendations, the Council could adopt a resolution renewing UNMIT’s mandate until 31 December 2012. (If this option were taken, it would be a change in practice: since UNMIT’s establishment in August 2006, its mandate has been extended every February for one year.)

The Council could also choose to go into detail about the nature and scope of the UN country team that would be UNMIT’s successor. Alternatively, it could leave such decisions until later in the year, once the elections period has been completed and the new government has been formed.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The core group on Timor-Leste, established in 1999, has five members on the Council: France, Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US. The remaining six states are Brazil (which took the lead on Timor-Leste issues until it left the Council at the end of 2011), Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Malaysia and the Philippines. (At press time, the new “pen-holder” for Timor-Leste in the Council was under debate.)

It seems that Council members are generally comfortable with the content of the Secretary-General’s report and the expected recommendation that UNMIT complete its mandate at the end of 2012. The focus of discussions is likely to be the UN’s presence in Timor-Leste from 2013 onwards and the specificity the Council should go into at this juncture.

Some elected Council members, and others in the core group, suggest that it might be too early to determine how this political mission might look. They indicate that those decisions could more appropriately be made once the elections have been completed and the stability of the country assessed. In particular, with respect to endorsing a specific transition model, they indicate that it would be appropriate to wait until the formation of the new government in the second half of the year.

Others on the Council might seek more clarity on the role of the future UN country team and the potential resources involved. But it seems unlikely that there would be appetite to adopt language in the resolution that does not allow flexibility for the UN to react to the realities of the post-elections environment. South Africa, which took the lead on Timor-Leste when it was last on the Council (2007-2008), has emphasised—as has Portugal and others—that decisions made about the UN’s presence in Timor-Leste should be guided by the needs and preferences of the government in Dili and should be led by Timor-Leste.

DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In February, the Council is expected to be briefed in informal consultations by Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal), chair of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee.

The committee’s panel of experts, whose mandate was extended in resolution 1985 (2011) until 12 June, is due to submit its final report to the committee by 13 May.

No Council action is expected following the regular 90-day briefing in February.

Key Recent Developments
On 17 December, Kim Jong-il—the leader and top military commander of the DPRK—died at age 69 from what the country’s official KCNA news agency said was “great mental and physical strain.” The announcement of his fatal heart attack was made two days after his death. Kim Jong-il had been the supreme leader of the DPRK since 1994. (In that year he succeeded his father, Kim Il-sung, the so-called “great leader” who is designated in the country’s constitution as the “eternal president” of the DPRK.) Kim Jong-il’s funeral took place on 28 December. Tens of thousands of people lined the streets of Pyongyang in what appeared to be a meticulously choreographed event to bid farewell to the leader.

On 29 December, Kim Jong-il’s third and youngest son, Kim Jong-un, became the DPRK’s supreme military commander. (Kim Jong-un is reportedly in his late 20s.) The country’s official news agency reported that this decision was in accordance with a will made by the late Kim Jong-il on 8 October.

Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Chang Song-taek, is reported to be a close advisor to his nephew and is expected to play a significant role as the “great successor” gains experience and consolidates power. Chang, who is married to Kim Jong-il’s sister (Kim Kyong-hui), is vice-chairman of the National Defence Commission. This position is considered second only to that of the supreme leader.
In response to Kim Jong-il’s death, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry said that it hoped the two countries could carry on working together for peace in the Korean peninsula. Similarly, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said that his country enjoyed friendly relations with the DPRK and expressed hope that the loss would not negatively impact the two countries’ bilateral relationship.

In a brief press statement issued by the White House, the US reiterated that it was committed to stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as to the freedom and security of its allies. William Hague, the UK’s foreign secretary, said that the death could be a turning point for the DPRK. Germany said that its expectations of the DPRK remained the same: give up its nuclear programme and improve the “catastrophic social situation of its own people.” France called for the continuing of dialogue with the DPRK and others, including China, so that the country would renounce its nuclear weapons.

On 19 December, coincidentally the day that Kim Jong-il’s death was publicly announced, the General Assembly adopted its annual (since 2003) resolution condemning the DPRK’s human rights record (A/RES/66/174). The resolution, which passed by a vote of 123-16 with 51 abstentions, urged the government in Pyongyang to end its “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights”, which included public executions and arbitrary detentions. The DPRK rejected the resolution, saying it was politically motivated and based on fabrications.

On 11 January, the country’s official news agency reported that a spokesperson from the DPRK’s foreign ministry said that the US had offered food aid and a suspension of sanctions if the DPRK halted its uranium enrichment programme. A State Department spokesperson denied that the US was linking the issues and said that Washington was still considering the DPRK’s longstanding request for food assistance.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 20 January, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in DPRK, Marzuki Darusman, called on the new leadership of the DPRK to address pressing human rights concerns and resolve outstanding issues, including the abduction of Japanese and other foreign nationals. The comments came at the end of a five-day visit to Japan. Darusman said that positive engagement on the part of the DPRK with the international community would be welcomed “by all quarters,” as in the case of the reform processes in Myanmar. He said that the recent succession was an opportunity for the DPRK to secure global confidence. Darusman’s requests to visit the DPRK have been rejected on several occasions in the past, and he has said that he would carry forward his mandate by gathering information in Japan on cases of abduction of Japanese nationals by agents of the DPRK. He has already visited the ROK. The Special Rapporteur will report to the Human Rights Council in March 2012.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is the security situation on the Korean peninsula and stability in the region following the death of Kim Jong-il.

A related issue is the possible resumption of the six-party talks, which has as its core goal the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

**Underlying Problems**

The recommendations made to the DPRK sanctions committee by the panel of experts in its report in May last year have yet to be implemented. The report has still not been published, despite protestations from several Council members that the UN membership at large has a right to read the report. (Decisions within the committee require consensus, which is absent.)

**Options**

One option for the sanctions committee would be to review the lists of entities subject to the sanctions imposed by resolution 1718 (2006). (Council members in favour of this action say such an endeavour would not need to expand the lists but rather could be limited to making changes to companies’ names and other “house-keeping” measures.) This list has not been updated since 16 July 2009.

In order to give greater guidance to member states concerning the ban on supplying, selling or transferring luxury goods to the DPRK, the committee could provide an Implementation Assistance Notice, without the need to agree on an exhaustive list.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

The sanctions committee was deadlocked on a number of issues in 2011. Within the Council, China, Russia and the US are the lead on DPRK issues. The countries have had differences concerning conditions that they say must be met by the DPRK before returning to six-party talks. The US says that Pyongyang must halt its uranium enrichment programme, permit international nuclear inspectors to return to the DPRK and improve inter-Korean relations as a pre-requisite. Russia says that the talks should re-start without any such preconditions, while China considers that the parties involved must seize the opportunities created by positive interactions to resume the negotiating process.

Following its recent trilateral meeting with Japan and the ROK, the US released a statement saying that the three countries reaffirmed their goal of a peacefully denuclearised Korean peninsula. The countries agreed that “a path was open” to the DPRK toward the resumption of talks and improved relations through dialogue.

Council members are likely to wait to see if some of the tentative steps made at the political level in the second half of 2011 continue under Kim Jong-un. The DPRK leadership has presented an image of continuity and stability in the wake of Kim Jong-il’s death. In the absence of any provocative steps being taken or a deterioration of the security situation, there seems little appetite for the Council to take action that might be seen as undermining the resumption of six-party talks. There will likely be significant interest in the Council as the DPRK approaches the 100th anniversary of the “eternal president” Kim Il-sung’s birth on 15 April, which is likely to be a monumental event in the country.
government in Pristina to send more border guards to the crossing. Since July 2011, several violent clashes had occurred at two border security checkpoints, known as Gates 1 and 31. In his statement, the Secretary-General called on all parties to honour the IBM agreement, “to refrain from unilateral action and to actively support the de-escalation of tensions on the ground.”

On 9 December, the European Council—following a meeting in Brussels—issued a statement welcoming Serbia’s re-engagement in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and its moving forward with the IBM agreement. But it stopped short of granting Serbia EU candidate status, saying there should be more assessment of the progress being made by Belgrade with respect to “inclusive regional cooperation” and actively enabling EULEX and KFOR to execute their mandates. It said that the EU Council would take a decision on candidate status at its 27-28 February meeting, immediately prior to the EU summit on 1 March, at which the decision could be confirmed. Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister, in charge of EU integration, resigned in December following the decision to delay Serbia’s EU candidate status.

On 25 December, the mayor of Mitrovica announced that a referendum would be held in the predominantly Serb northern Kosovo areas on whether to acknowledge the government institutions in Pristina. The date of the referendum, which at press time was still planned for 15 February, is Statehood Day in Serbia and is less than two weeks before the EU Council meeting at which Serbia’s candidature is to be discussed. The Serbian government has not backed the referendum. Serbian President Boris Tadić said that a vote at this stage would not contribute to a solution on the Kosovo issue and might exacerbate the situation. Kosovo’s government called the proposed referendum “illegal”. On 19 January, Serbia’s Minister for Kosovo met in Belgrade with the mayors of the Kosovo Serbian municipalities to discuss postponement of the referendum.

On 14 January, police in Kosovo arrested 146 people after clashes with protesters who were attempting to stop Serbian vehicles and products from entering Kosovo. About 50 people, mostly police officers, were reportedly injured. Five of those arrested were said to be members of the Kosovo parliament from the Self-Determination Party.

In December, Russia circulated a draft Council resolution concerning inhumane treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo. The draft document, which was circulated seemingly at the request of the Serbian government, called for an investigation into the illicit trafficking of human organs. The Council has so far not met formally to discuss the draft.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 12 January, the government, in cooperation with the UN Development Programme, published a report on conditions of persons with disabilities in Kosovo. The purposes of the report were to facilitate data collection, to shed light on the most urgent needs and priorities of persons with disabilities as well as their caregivers and to increase knowledge and understanding of how difficulties experienced by disabled people were amplified because of neglect or outright discrimination. The report found that approximately 150,000 people with disabilities suffer from exclusion in one or more respects from access to health care, the right to equal education, equal employment opportunities, and participation in political and public life. The report also found insufficient mainstreaming of the rights of the disabled in public policies and weak coordination among monitoring bodies in reporting progress in this field.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is ensuring that tensions do not escalate in Kosovo. Political developments and the situation on the ground are likely to be the focus of the debate. The security situation at the border posts in particular is likely to be followed closely by Council members. Ensuring that the diplomatic dialogue continues between Belgrade and Pristina is likely to be a priority for the Council.
Another related issue that the Council might address is the freedom of movement of people and goods throughout Kosovo.

A further issue is the call for an investigation into the illicit trafficking of human organs in Kosovo.

**Options**

As with previous debates on Kosovo, the Council has the option of receiving the briefing from the Special Representative, hearing interventions from members and not taking further action. (In past debates, Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić and Enver Hoxhaj, a representative from Kosovo, have also addressed the Council.)

Another option would be to adopt a statement on the situation in Kosovo if Council members consider that the security situation on the ground warrants it.

It is conceivable that action might be taken on the illicit trafficking in human organs draft. Russia has indicated that it will consult with Belgrade on the timing of any next steps.

**Council Dynamics**

There is broad agreement among Council members on the need for a return to calm in northern Kosovo and for the parties involved to refrain from actions that might further aggravate tensions. All members emphasise the need for continued dialogue. But there are stark divisions in the Council, including on Kosovo’s status. (Among the P5, the US, UK and France have recognised Kosovo’s independence but Russia and China have not. Nor have any of this year’s new Council members.)

Russia and China emphasise that both EULEX and KFOR operate as mandated by the Security Council and reiterate the Council’s primacy with respect to the situation. In his address during the last debate on Kosovo on 29 November 2011, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin of Russia cautioned against “selective implementation” of the mandates of KFOR and EULEX, which “openly played into the hands of the Kosovo authorities”.

European Council members, including Germany, have said that both forces act in full compliance with relevant Council resolutions and fulfil their mandates to ensure a safe environment. Furthermore, Germany said that attacks against KFOR personnel should be considered as “attacks against the integrity and authority of the Security Council [itself]”. The US, UK, Germany and others express concern both at actions taken in northern Kosovo to restrict freedom of movement and at the violence that has resulted in the injury of KFOR soldiers while they have attempted to deal with these obstructions.

With respect to the proposed resolution on trafficking in human organs, several Council members have a number of concerns about the draft circulated in December. However, China says Serbia’s concern about the matter is justified and it supports the UN carrying out investigations. Others on the Council, including the US and Germany, have maintained that EULEX is the appropriate authority to undertake the investigations.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Resolution</th>
<th>S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest Secretary-General’s Report</td>
<td>S/2011/675 (31 October 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latest Council Meeting Record</td>
<td>S/PV.6670 (29 November 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>S/2011/256 (19 April 2011) was from Serbia to the Secretary-General requesting the creation of an ad hoc mechanism to undertake a criminal investigation into allegations of trafficking of human organs in Kosovo.</td>
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</table>

**Other Relevant Facts**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</th>
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<tr>
<td>Farid Zarif (Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size as of 31 December 2011: 407 personnel (150 international staff, 9 military staff, 26 UN volunteers and 215 local staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost: $45 million (1 July 2011-30 June 2012 budget)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR (NATO-Led Force)</td>
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<td>Size as of 4 January 2012: 5,977 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX (EU Rule of Law Mission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size: 1,700 internationals and 1,200 locals</td>
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**Expected Council Action**

In February the Council is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s annual report (S/2012/33) on conflict-related sexual violence. Margot Wallström, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the issue, will likely brief the Council. A debate, with a presidential statement or resolution as an outcome, is possible.

In addition, at press time the Council’s outstanding review of the mandates of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence and the associated Team of Experts (taking into account the creation of UN Women) was expected to occur either in the same context as the review of the Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence, or just before.

**Background**

The Council adopted resolution 1960 on 16 December 2010 requesting the Secretary-General to establish monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements (MARA) on conflict-related sexual violence in situations on the Council’s agenda. The resolution also calls upon parties to armed conflict to make specific, time-bound commitments to prohibit and punish sexual violence and asks the Secretary-General to monitor those commitments.

In addition, the Council asked the Secretary-General to include in his annual reports on conflict-related sexual violence an annex listing the parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the Council’s agenda. The forthcoming report will therefore be the first to include this mandated annex. The Council expressed its intention to use the list as a basis for more focused UN engagement with those parties, including, when appropriate, taking measures through the relevant sanctions committees. Resolution 1960 also requested that the Secretary-General’s next report be submitted by December 2011.

**Key Recent Developments**

In a 15 September 2011 letter, the Secretary-General requested an extension of the deadline to submit his next report on sexual violence to 31 January 2012. The
letter noted that after an extensive and rigorous interagency consultation process, UN entities had agreed and finalised the MARA modalities requested by the Council. However, an extension would provide time to generate more reliable information for the Council.

On 28 October 2011, the Council held its annual open debate on women, peace and security. Nigeria, which chaired the event as Council president for the month, provided a concept note for the debate that focused on the participation and representation of women in decision-making forums and institutions related to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. Participation was seen as lying at the core of the Council’s five resolutions on women and peace and security: resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). It was noted that many gaps and challenges remain in guaranteeing women’s participation in decision-making in all stages of peace processes. The note called for more to be done to integrate women and peace and security issues in preventive diplomacy, early warning, and human rights and security monitoring.

The open debate was well-attended, with all Council members and more than 40 member states at large and international and regional organisations making statements broadly supportive of ensuring women’s participation in decision-making throughout all stages of conflict. In the course of the debate the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRSR/2011/20) that welcomed the Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2011/598) and took note of its recommendations, but the Council remained concerned about “the persistence of gaps and challenges that seriously hinder the implementation of resolution 1325”, including continued low numbers of women involved in conflict prevention and resolution (particularly preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts). The Council noted the increased coordination and coherence in policy and programming for women and girls within the UN system since the creation of UN Women. The statement underlined the importance of the mandate of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to the women, peace and security agenda. The Council also recognised the need for more systematic attention to women, peace and security commitments in its own work and expressed willingness to ensure that measures are taken to enhance women’s engagement in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is maintaining consensus around the importance of the overall women, peace and security framework and ensuring that it is integrated into all of the Council’s work. A related issue is how to best respond to the information contained in the Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence. How to quickly, yet effectively, act with regard to those included in the annex of the report (those parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence) will be a key consideration for Council members.

Another issue is assessing the mandates of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence and the associated team of experts (as decided in resolution 1888) and how best to frame their relationship with UN Women going forward.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- adopting a presidential statement or resolution that directs relevant country-specific sanctions committees to take steps to make parties named in the Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence subject to existing sanctions measures;
- adopting a presidential or press statement that takes note of the parties named in the Secretary-General’s report and expresses the Council’s intention to consider appropriate action;
- adopting a presidential statement that specifies in some detail the relationship between the Office of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence and UN Women going forward; or
- adopting a presidential statement or press statement expressing the Council’s intention to revisit the Special Representative’s relation to UN Women at some point in the near future.

Council Dynamics
Council members generally continue to view the women, peace and security agenda as important and necessary. There is a sense that this issue has developed significant traction and momentum. It seems that all Council members remain fully supportive of the framework established by the related resolutions.

With regard to the review of the Office of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence, the Council will need to consider how to best position the office in relationship to UN Women. Members have closely followed the establishment of UN Women and seem genuinely appreciative of its contribution so far to increased coordination and policy coherence among UN agencies. However, it is also generally acknowledged that it may take several years before UN Women can completely fulfill its anticipated function (and the Office of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence is still a relatively new entity, as well). Some Council members may prefer at present to protect the unique advocacy role that the Special Representative for Sexual Violence has begun to carry out, while choosing to revisit the relation to UN Women at some point in the future.

Council members expect the annex of the Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence (which is to be used to aid the Council in taking decisions on the possible use of sanctions in some circumstances) to include a number of groups that are parties to conflicts rather than specific individuals. (Members received an advance copy of the report in January.) The review of the report will provide members the opportunity to comment on the pace of identifying and reporting likely perpetrators, as well as offering advice to the Secretariat on how best to continue this work.

Some members view the overall women, peace and security agenda (including sexual violence) as entering something of a period of consolidation and emphasise the importance of preventing any backsliding by the Council on the issue rather than seeking further refinement at present.

The UK is the lead country on women, peace and security in the Council. The US has the lead for sexual violence issues.
With 66 resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2011, the year saw an increase in the number of resolutions relative to 2009 and 2010, but a consistently lower total number of decisions relative to the entire 1992-2008 period (please see chart below).

In 2011 the total number of Council decisions (resolutions and presidential statements) decreased by 1.1 percent from 2010 (from 89 to 88), the second-lowest number since 1992 (2009 was the lowest). However, when one breaks down the 2011 figures, a more interesting picture emerges, as the number of resolutions actually increased by 11.9 percent relative to 2010 (59 to 66), mostly attributable to the various situations arising from the Arab Spring. By contrast, presidential statements dropped by 26.7 percent relative to 2010 (30 to 22) and continued the downward trend set in 2006.

The apparent stagnation in decision-making by the Council is all the more surprising taking into account the marked increase in the number of formal Council meetings relative to 2010. The number of meetings grew by 11.9 percent (210 to 235), with the situations in Sudan considered at 35 meetings (an increase of 118.8 percent), Somalia at 16 meetings (an increase of 50 percent) and 23 meetings to address just one of the situations arising from the Arab Spring—Libya. Other outgrowths of the Arab Spring that came to the attention of the Council in 2011—under the catch-all agenda item “The Situation in the Middle East”—were Syria with four meetings, not including meetings pertaining to the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and Yemen with one meeting. In total, the Council considered the Arab Spring at 28 meetings, accounting for all of the increase in formal activity in 2011.

In contrast, situations that required comparatively less attention by the Council include Nepal (a decrease of 71.4 percent relative to 2010), Iraq (a decrease of 66.7 percent each), Central African Republic (a decrease of 64.3) and Côte d’Ivoire (a decrease of 26.7 percent).

When the number of meetings per agenda item is contrasted to the number of decisions, an interesting perspective is offered into the difficulty the Council has encountered in responding to certain situations due to the absence of consensus (please see the chart on page 23).

Whereas “The Situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian Question” stands alone with 14 meetings and no decisions taken (one draft resolution was the subject of a veto), interestingly the seven other meetings held to address other situations in the Middle East registered the second highest decision-making ratio for the Council in 2011, allowing for the adoption of five decisions (one draft resolution was the subject of a double veto) and a decision-to-meeting ratio of 0.71. Country situations with five or more formal meetings and high decision-making ratios also included Côte d’Ivoire (7 decisions in 11 meetings, or a ratio of 0.64), Somalia (9 in 16, or 0.56), Afghanistan and Liberia (3 in 6,
(3 in 6 each, or 0.50), Central African Republic and Haiti (2 in 5 each, or 0.40), Sudan (13 in 34, or 0.38) and Democratic Republic of Congo (3 in 8, or 0.37). Within country-specific items, Kosovo (Serbia) registered the lowest ratio with no decisions taken and 6 meetings held, while Libya recorded a below average ratio (6 in 23, or 0.26).

As for other agenda items, the maintenance of peace and security (5 in 6, or 0.83) and international tribunals (6 in 8, or 0.75) registered high decision ratios, whereas non-proliferation (2 in 6, or 0.33), and the International Court of Justice (0 in 10, or 0.00, due to a stalemate in filling one of the judicial vacancies concurrently but separately from the General Assembly) registered the lowest ratios.

The attention of the Council in 2011 was also very different from region to region, with agenda items pertaining to Africa totaling 126 meetings (54.2 percent, the highest since 1990); Asia, 45 (19.1 percent); Europe, 14 (5.9 percent) and only five (2.1 percent) for the Americas (all related to Haiti). Items relating exclusively to Sub-Saharan Africa were covered in 97 meetings (41.3 percent) whereas 53 meetings (22.5 percent) considered items relating to North Africa and the Middle East.

The year 2011 also showed a marked increase in attention to situations in Africa (30.6 percent relative to 2010) and more specifically relating to North Africa and the Middle East (42.5 percent), as could be expected from the Arab Spring. Meetings relating to Asia declined (26.3 percent relative to 2010) as did those pertaining to Sub-Saharan Africa (6.1 percent), whereas the number of meetings on situations in Europe or the Americas remained practically unchanged.

Analysis
As indicated in our February 2011 Monthly Forecast, quantitative benchmarks do not provide a complete picture of Council activity, productivity or efficacy. Moreover, the statistics provided here cover only one formal layer of Council activity, not the informal layers nor the vast underworld of its subsidiary bodies. One factor accounting for a lower overall number of decisions is a steadily declining number of presidential statements (from a high of 67 in 2005 to 22 in 2011) and a far greater resort to the use of press statements (whose pronouncement does not necessitate a formal meeting).

Among the possible factors contributing to the stagnation in Council activity—which in fact translates into a decrease in overall activity were it not for the Arab Spring situations—and one that seems to be in line with the global financial crisis, is a greater apprehension about the financial implications of additional peacekeeping mandates. Reluctance to increase deployments, combined with an eagerness to explore enhanced intermission operability, and improved coordination between agencies and programmes to avoid duplication of efforts, will probably accompany the Council into the future.

Unlike 2010, when the atmosphere in the Council seemed comparatively more constructive, dynamics between the members have deteriorated in the aftermath of resolution 1973. The allegations of “mission creep” voiced by some Council members in regard to the enforcement of the no-fly zone and the protection of civilians in Libya by NATO have had an obvious impact on the ability of the Council to advance other work, on Syria in particular, and has had further secondary effects on other agenda items. The interest shown by some Council members to initiate an investigation into NATO operations in Libya has likewise not contributed to a more harmonious relationship. The increasingly complex situations arising along the border between Sudan and South Sudan have also led to some marked discrepancies between Council members. Interestingly, Palestine’s application for membership did not become as divisive an issue as some feared, in part due to the fact that the issue was allowed to take a backseat to other situations emerging from the Arab Spring and remained within the purview of the Committee for the Admission of New Members.
Notable Dates for February

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<td>early February</td>
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Mandates Expire

26 February  Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

Other Important Dates in February 2012

mid February  The Council is scheduled to visit Haiti.
21 February   A debate on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel region, will be held.
23 February   London Conference on Somalia