ACF-INTERNATIONAL
BRIEFING PAPER

DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT FOR INSECURE CONTEXTS
Disaster Risk Management for Insecure Contexts

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Author: Dr. Andrew Mitchell with Dr. Erin Michelle Smith
Design Graphic: Céline Beuvin
Cover photo: Refugees fleeing the famine and conflict of Somalia arriving at the Hilloweyn refugee camp in Ethiopia. Two-thirds of all children under 5 years of age were found to be suffering global acute malnutrition.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

People living in insecure contexts are facing terrible problems – and they’re getting worse. Insecure contexts are often characterised by conflict, weak governance, insufficient food, little clean water, scarce medical services and malnutrition. The people living there are very vulnerable to natural hazards, such as flooding, drought and earthquakes because there is insufficient infrastructure or planning to help them cope. For very similar reasons, they are also vulnerable to the threats of insecurity, criminality and conflict. Many of these insecure contexts are in areas suffering from a self-reinforcing spiral where conflict creates more vulnerability to disaster and more vulnerability to disaster creates further conflict. This is compounded by climate change, environmental degradation, market fragility, economic marginalisation, migration and unplanned urbanisation – some of the drivers which are exposing more people to more hazards. At the same time, they are eroding the resilience of people to these hazards.

Aid institutions are trying to help, but many are too disjointed to do so effectively. Each has disparate policies, teams and operations for disaster risk management (DRM) and for insecurity programming (IP).

Paradoxically, where ODA investment in peacebuilding, governance and security operations has greatly increased over the last decade, investment in DRR by donors remains at pitiful levels. This also mirrored in low DRR investment for humanitarian assistance. This means that the powerful benefit of DRM investments have not been understood by both long- and short-term donor initiatives and by those investing in insecure contexts.

This paper demonstrates how the integration of disaster risk management with insecurity programming can expand the scope of risk management to the mutual benefit of communities and aid agencies.

To get there without danger of causing harm, DRM programming has to be ‘conflict sensitive’ and peace-building has to be ‘hazard-proof’. The common objectives and the combined impact of the various approaches to DRM, IP and relief and recovery operations can be harnessed to develop a long-term strategy leading to peace and a resilience to all forms of threats and hazards. The integration of these approaches would lead to more streamlined operations and a more efficient use of funds. This is particularly important because diminishing aid budgets will find it more and more difficult to meet humanitarian and development needs.

The choice of applying DRM should not be limited to whether a context is secure or insecure, because insecurity is a matter of degrees. However, there are two thresholds in that continuum where DRM objectives and modalities should be adapted:

1. When low threat on people becomes medium threat: programming should concentrate on being prepared and on intervening in order to reduce vulnerability and mitigate disaster.

2. When medium threat on people becomes high threat: programming is less feasible at the community level, and should expand at the household level where aid agencies should intervene directly to save lives and livelihoods. This means altering the objectives and the complexity of activities to something less ambitious, striving for short-term impact. At the same time, though, the seeds of stability are being planted for later sustainability by structuring activities for long-term peace building.

In conjunction with IP, many of the existing approaches to DRM used in ‘normal circumstances’ can also be used in insecure contexts. These include livelihoods and conflict, climate change and security, environment and conflict, social protection and fragile states, and, human rights. Furthermore, there are approaches to DRM and IP which benefit the community, by fomenting social cohesion and equity, by building resilience to insecurity and by improving local governance and institutions.

1 - For the purpose of simplification, we have introduced in this briefing the concept of ‘insecurity programming’. Insecurity programming (IP) is a blanket term - shorthand - for the policies and operations that deal with conflict, fragile states and crisis management.
Concretely, programming can be adapted to many insecure contexts by using a graduated management system based on multi-hazard threats surveillance and an early warning system (EWS). This calls for an ‘open vision’ of risk that encompasses all hazards and threats and places insecurity at the heart of programming, rather than as a filter or as a ‘risk and assumption’. Here, the changes in the way that communities, external actors and institutions relate to each other define the way that operations are conducted and how much the community can get involved. At the same time, expert organisations are welded together under a shared and long-term strategy.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAH</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim international network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACH</td>
<td>Accion Contra el Hambre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Climate Change Adaptation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMAM</td>
<td>Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>The European Commission Humanitarian Aid department’s Disaster Preparedness Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM-DAT</td>
<td>Emergency Events Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisations of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FSL</td>
<td>Food Security and Livelihood</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Global Acute Malnutrition</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GFDRR</td>
<td>Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery:</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income Generating Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEA</td>
<td>Political Economy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCVA</td>
<td>Participatory Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Severe Acute Malnutrition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNRM</td>
<td>Sustainable Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCN</td>
<td>United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCA</td>
<td>Vulnerability and Capacities Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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1. Introduction

Many countries face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and instability. One in four people on the planet (more than 1.5 billion) live in fragile and conflict-affected states – none of which have managed to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG). Climate change and unplanned urbanisation are likely to make matters worse. Continued interaction of climate change with economic, social and political problems could lead to further political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity and large-scale migration in 46 countries.

There are many contexts where a self-reinforcing spiral of insecurity is eroding people’s resilience to disaster, which in turn leads to further conflict. Due to conflict, the risk to natural disaster dramatically increases, with large disasters fuelling even more conflict. In other words, where there is conflict and natural disaster occurs, the consequences and effects on people are far worse than in a stable context. As a result, the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has tripled over the last 30 years. Over 80% of those displaced are women and children. Conflicts almost always raise the risk of disaster, through increased environmental degradation, reduced viable household coping mechanisms, a focus on the issues arising from the conflict at the expense of disaster risk management (DRM) and an inability or reluctance on the part of governments to address the risk of disaster.

In particular, conflicts over limited natural resources in fragile environments are more likely to be the result of slow-onset disasters such as drought and desertification. Gender-related violence and the inequality of livelihoods are reinforced where disaster overlies conflict zones. In this situation, the ability to prepare for disaster and to follow contingency plans is undermined. The provision of aid in insecure environments can, instead of helping, trigger or fuel conflict, if not undertaken in a manner that is conflict-sensitive.

This complex ‘risk architecture’ requires the aid community to juggle various forms of programming depending on the circumstances. This includes operations which, during conflict peaks (managing both external and internal sources of conflict), address the risk and impact of cyclical external hazards and seasonality, in addition to ‘backbone’ operations that move toward a long-term conflict and multi-hazard mitigation. However there is a lack of coordinated strategy, programming and tools between humanitarian and development actors and with those working on various key issues including DRM, human rights and advocacy, conflict negotiation and relief assistance. Further, the changing nature of conflict is leading to a narrowing of ‘humanitarian space’ – the neutral, globally monitored environment where aid agencies operate during complex emergencies.

At present, many institutions run disjointed aid efforts in insecure contexts. They have separate policies, teams and operations for insecurity programming, disaster risk management and for emergency and recovery operations. Kostner and Meutia (2011) make several suggestions to explain why this is so. Firstly, because IP is perceived as being more politically sensitive than other aid operations, they employ experts that are frequently not well-versed in other aid thematic. Secondly, because tying different operations together may create delays for the DRM component, which is seen as being simpler to run. Lastly, from an administrative and management perspective, merging together different aid thematic finance lines is considered complicated.

Aid financing is an additional challenge. Those financing aid operations often apply equal standards to risk-taking of aid funding in insecure contexts as they do to stable contexts. Thus, there is a great volatility in finance and a lack of coordinated and strategic instruments, which leads to a degradation of security and governance once crisis operations have ceased. This lack of continuity of funding has also dogged the disaster risk management community. There is a failure of strategic and shared responsibility between the short and long-term funding mechanisms that bridge preparedness, relief and reconstruction operations, even within a single donor organisation.

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3 - The term ‘natural disaster’ in this paper recognises the combination of natural phenomena with man-made factors that lead to disaster.
4 - Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2011 – Disaster conflict interface, comparative experiences - UNDP
The main purpose of this briefing paper is to examine how international agencies operating at the community level, can negotiate the complex architecture of risk surrounding complex emergencies, by tying DRM to other IP. This leads to a series of inevitable questions for the developmental aid community, all of which need to be answered in order to achieve the end-goals of poverty alleviation and peaceful societies:

1. With the purpose of enlarging the scope of risk management beyond natural disaster, how can we apply DRM to insecure contexts, while ensuring that this action does not fuel further conflict and put people in danger? This is what we shall refer to as **making DRM conflict-sensitive**.

2. How can we protect insecurity programming (IP) from external hazards and shocks and, at the same time, minimise the impact on a common set of phenomena driving natural disaster, conflict and a range of humanitarian needs? For example, avoiding the promotion of short-term livelihood strategies that, in the long-term, harm the environment – particularly where natural resources are a key factor leading to conflict. This is what we shall refer to as **hazard-proofing**.

3. How can we **integrate DRM and IP** to maximise aid impact and the efficient use of resources? By adding DRM to operations, can we enlarge the range of tools used to counter the impact of insecurity and better diffuse the causes and fuelling of insecurity?

The achievement of the MDGs and the eradication of poverty are not possible unless the impact of natural disaster and man-made shocks for aid operations is considered in aid and development policy and operations. This means that the international community must extend risk management to insecure contexts more effectively. There needs to be a larger investment in DRM, especially during periods of transition to more stability, ensuring that DRM encompasses both threats related to insecurity and to hazards related to external events such as natural hazards, market shocks and so on. Aid interventions that do not recognise the link between disasters and conflict in insecure contexts can worsen tensions and increase risk. As such, the purpose of this exercise is to make links with existing policy and practice – ‘building on better’.

As a whole, this paper is a starting point from which to investigate the adaptation of DRM programming to insecure contexts and its integration with IP. It supports theoretical discussions with operational realities, but focuses on programming at the community level and in particular, the periods just before, during and just after complex humanitarian emergencies. It is written from the perspective of an international non-governmental organisation, and thus valorises the contribution of civil society that often acts as a neutral bridge between conflict parties and communities.

**Divided into sections, the paper has various functions:**

- Section 2 provides an overview of the dynamics of disaster risk and insecure zones, showing how the enabling factors for DRM are affected by insecurity.
- Section 3 analyses how certain aid approaches undertaken in insecure contexts are aligned to DRM objectives.
- Section 4 analyses the overlaps of DRM with IP at community and national levels.
- Section 5 proposes modifications to aid programming leading to conflict-sensitive DRM, hazard-proofed IP and the integration of DRM with IP.
- Section 6 concludes with key recommendations and presents a scope for pursuing further development of programming adapted to insecure contexts in the future.
- A glossary is available in Annex 0 that defines DRM terminology.
2. The dynamics of disaster risk and insecure contexts

The world is becoming a more dangerous place for people working in insecure contexts. Targeted violence against aid workers is increasing, leaving organisations with difficult decisions to make on how to protect both national and international staff while attempting to support people who require assistance. Making such programming choices is challenging, to say the least: "...aid workers in the most dangerous settings face few options. In places like Sudan (Darfur), Somalia and Afghanistan, the choice boils down to reducing or withdrawing essential aid from needy populations, or running intolerable risks to the lives of staff and partners."9 However, by developing an understanding of today’s levels of insecurity and its characteristics, DRM can be better adapted to these contexts. In particular, DRM practice for insecure contexts can be better adapted to the context by using a set of indicators that define changes in the context. ‘Threshold points’ can be defined as specific changes in the context requiring an adaptation of DRM programming in terms of activities and operational modalities. This promotes more effective and secure DRM and other humanitarian programming in challenging contexts.

2.1 - Insecurity and its characteristics

The nature of insecurity and its impact falls globally within three dimensions: (i) intensity, (ii) timeframe and (iii) causal and fuelling processes. Many of the insecurity indicators, such as political/institutional, socio-economic, conflict/security and resource/environment categories,10 are related or dependent on these dimensions. Thus, these dimensions may help to define thresholds (or points of significant contextual changes) for programming. The following section looks at the nature of these dimensions and the associated risk architecture, particularly before, during and after complex political/humanitarian emergencies. The impact of insecurity on the enabling factors for DRM will be examined to better define the challenges of applying DRM to insecure contexts.

Many countries face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and instability. One in four people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, live in fragile and conflict-affected states, where no low-income, fragile or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single MDG. 90% of civil wars in the last decade have occurred in countries that already suffered civil war in the previous 30 years,11 with 40% of post-conflict contexts falling back into conflict. Conflict dramatically increases risk to natural disaster, with large disasters fuelling yet more conflict.12 Climate change and unplanned urbanisation are likely to make these issues worse. For example, the continued interaction of climate change with economic, social and political problems will potentially lead to further political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity and large-scale migration in 46 countries.

The characteristics of insecure contexts are similar in countries vulnerable to the impact of natural hazards:13

- Poverty is higher in countries affected by violence.
- Institutions are weak with limited capacity, normally accompanied by a lack of trust between people and institutions.
- Preferential focus of aid to the people most badly affected by disaster creates conflict with those not targeted.
- Unemployment is high – youth unemployment in particular is a key factor which fuels insecurity.
- Weak institutional capacity leads to greater vulnerability to external shocks. For example, violent uprisings in weak states occurred during the food and fuel price increases in 2007.

12 - Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2011 – Disaster conflict interface, comparative experiences - UNDP
However, making the transition out of conflict and insecurity may take a generation, which is a much larger timeframe than recovering from many disasters arising from natural hazards. Where natural disasters overlay the problems of insecurity, these may widen existing ruptures in the social fabric. Here, the recovery period from natural disaster may be much longer than in stable contexts.

The changing nature of conflict is leading to the narrowing of ‘humanitarian space’ – the neutral, globally monitored environment where aid agencies have operated within humanitarian, often insecure, contexts. Conflict arenas are now more frequently intra-state and concerned with localised interests of identity, livelihoods and resources. Conflicts around the world (see Figure 2.1) feature higher numbers of civilian casualties, with mass, prolonged levels of displacement and food insecurity, and long-term recurring patterns of violence which create cyclical periods of instability. The numbers of refugees and IDPs has tripled over the last 30 years. Over 80% of those displaced are women and children, whereas men represent 90% of those missing in conflict. Conflict escalates “where state markets and social institutions fail to provide basic security, justice and economic opportunities for citizens”. Conflict reinforces pathways leading to insufficient livelihoods and increased humanitarian needs. This, in turn, results in increased levels of vulnerability to disaster, undernutrition, poverty and social unrest.

Post-conflict contexts remain unstable with fluctuating levels of insecurity, with around a 40% chance of a relapse into violent conflict. These contexts have been called the ‘post-conflict decade’, reflecting long-term fragility, and are characterised by:

- Fragile governance, state structure, and state capacities.
- The return of displaced people and the demobilisation of former fighters.
- Political uncertainty with the formation of new or amended political systems.
- Risk factors related to differences in ethnicity, clans or lifestyle: poor governance; limited access to services, and scarcity of natural resources form an explosive mixture. These differences are often manipulated by the local and national elites in order to attain their own economic and political interests.
Intensity of insecurity can range from non-violent, low intensity to violent, high-intensity (see Table 2.1). Situations within conflict can be (a) intensified and prolonged, with sustained periods of insecurity; (b) continued and cyclical, with periods of insecurity interspersed with periods of quiet; (c) conciliatory, with the parties involved in the conflict attempting to move towards a peace process; (d) in negotiation, where serious discussions are being undertaken for peace, and (e) in transition, where peace processes are implemented.  

### CONFLICT INTENSITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of violence</th>
<th>Intensity group</th>
<th>Level of intensity</th>
<th>Name of intensity</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Latent conflict</td>
<td>A positional difference over definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Manifest conflict</td>
<td>An manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the stage preliminary to violence force. This includes for example verbal pressure, threatening explicitly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>A crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Severe crisis</td>
<td>A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is used repeatedly in an organized way.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>A war is a violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.</td>
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</table>

Table 2.1: Definition of conflict types according to intensity (Source: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2011 - Conflict Barometer 2010, Heidelberg University, Germany).

Detailed characteristics of how intensity affects key contextual parameters, based on the ACF experience, are outlined in Annex 2, and further discussed in Section 2.3.2.

A generalised cycle of insecurity (outlined in Figure 2.2) underlies the different scales of cycles and intensity that makes programming challenging, particularly for complex humanitarian or political emergencies. At present we mostly encounter three kinds of cycles:

1. An overall, long-term cycle, analogous to a classic ‘disaster cycle’, where a context moves from open conflict, to post-conflict, to some sort of stability (still as yet fragile) and the degradation of the context back into an extended period of open conflict.
2. A major ‘conflict relapse’ cycle back into open conflict during a commonly unstable post-conflict period (occurring in around 40% of post conflict cases, where the post-conflict context often lasts more than 10 years).
3. Smaller and frequent regression loops during open conflict, leading to the fluctuation between emergency and early recovery contexts.

It is important to recognise the differences in these insecurity contexts because the overall aid approaches (including DRM) used within each part of the long-term insecurity cycle need to be adapted or greatly modified in accordance with any of the changes in the context cited above. It is here that objectives and programming choices can greatly change. Given the volatility of insecure contexts, they require a form of managing uncertainty which is similar to that needed to manage long-term ‘disaster drivers’ such as climate change.

21 - DFID, 2010 - Building Peaceful States and Societies
Figure 2.2: Generalised cycle of insecurity showing different domains for risk management, including (1) complex humanitarian and political emergencies, (2) post-conflict with risk of relapse and (3) fragile states with the risk of degradation toward insecurity. The timeframe of the overall cycle is commonly decades long.

Actors running programmes are further challenged in complex emergencies (see Figure 2.3) by a range of hazards and shocks from natural phenomena superimposed onto differing conflict risks (or threats). These are all, in turn, affected by seasonality and longer-term effects associated with ‘disaster drivers’, which include climate change, environmental degradation, market fragility, economic marginalisation and unplanned urbanisation.

This complex ‘risk architecture’ requires the aid community to juggle different forms of programming: operations during conflict peaks (managing both external and internal sources of conflict); around cyclical external hazards and seasonality, and ‘backbone’ operations that move toward longer term conflict resolution and multi-hazard mitigation. The ability to articulate these differing operations requires highly reactive (and, ideally, proactive) programming changes directed by an EWS and a surveillance analysis package. This leads to flexibility in planning and managing different axes of uncertainty. Concrete propositions for achieving this are outlined in Section 5. Although the overall progression of conflict is often linear, many parts of managing overall risk relate to the disaster cycle management approach. That is to say, informed by surveillance and solid analysis, ‘doing the right thing at the right time’. The level of participation and the way communities are engaged in programming will also vary along a spectrum ranging from direct intervention by external agencies, to community-based approaches, to community-managed approaches (see Annex 3).

Operating in these contexts requires a continuous assessment of insecurity as it changes over time. Causes of insecurity evolve into a different set of fuelling factors that feed off the effects of conflict. Protracted conflicts can have moments of stability, but the risk of a return to insecurity and violence is ever-present. A number of triggers operating on both short and long timelines can force an aggressive return to conflict from seemingly stable levels, such as has been witnessed in North African nations in 2011. Half of the world’s current conflicts have lasted more than 20 years. ACF has worked in a range of these emergencies, which commonly last more than five years. This suggests that planning strategies at least three years into the future is necessary for effective humanitarian programming in these contexts.
Characteristically, these emergencies have complex social, political and economic causes, with fluctuating intensities of violence. During this period, shorter or longer term activities may be undertaken, depending on the level of insecurity. For example, Annex 1 presents a range of livelihood interventions undertaken in different contexts of conflict.

But how do we know when to do the right thing? Correctly timed action is critical in order to mitigate (through proactive action) and address (through reactive action) the extreme needs of people in great peril. Furthermore, programming that can successfully negotiate the inherent complexity and uncertainty of insecure contexts requires the identification of key indicators and thresholds that inform changes in operations. These changes include operational objectives, timing, modality and the partnership structure and community approach. The following three steps are used in the rest of this section to examine how to determine these changes.

1. **Understanding the characteristics of threats a community faces** (at individual, household, community and local levels), and how these threats change as the conflict changes (see Annex 2). The focus should be on the threats which have the strongest impact on programming. This impact is normally determined by the degradation of the quality of relationships or interaction between vulnerable members of the community and more powerful members or external groups and agencies. This is because this multi-stakeholder relationship is a key for successful DRM and IP. These characteristics can change according to the intensity and duration of the conflict, or the nature of the causes of the conflict.

2. **Defining how the characteristics of insecurity impact on the main factors that enable successful DRM programming** (see Section 2.3.2).

3. **Defining ‘threat thresholds’** along the dimensions of intensity, duration and factors which cause or fuel insecurity, and adapting DRM objectives and operational modalities once these thresholds are passed (see Section 5.1.1).
2.2 - Aid initiatives for insecure contexts

Aid initiatives for insecure contexts incorporate principles of risk management such as mitigation and prevention. This is the case along the progression of approaches used from the start to the end of open conflict and into post-conflict contexts: from conflict prevention and peace-building, to peacemaking, to peacekeeping, to protection. The concepts of ‘do no harm’ and ‘conflict sensitivity’ also aim to minimise further impact for both aid organisations and communities, in a way similar to risk management.

The major forms of IP (defined in Annex 4) are indicated on the insecurity cycle of Figure 2.4 where they are the dominant focus of operations. The figure reflects that these initiatives focus on different parts of the insecurity cycle, although many of them may be overlapping in time. This is similar to the different DRM components of disaster cycles. ‘Conflict sensitivity’ and ‘Do No Harm’ are taken into account by all initiatives. In particular, stabilisation, humanitarian aid and protection operations occur around regression loops or relapse cycles within a broader context of peace-making during complex emergencies. Where conflict prevention attempts to avoid conflict, peace-building attempts to both reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict and at the same address the longer-term impact of conflict. The most common way of constructing IP has involved:

1. the use of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid which provides security and addresses the immediate needs in the aftermath of conflict,
2. diplomacy that prevents further conflict by mediating between conflict stakeholders, and,
3. development and capacity building during stable periods that promotes long-term and sustainable national stability and prosperity.25

At present, the provision of aid in insecure settings is becoming more difficult due to an increase in violence against aid workers and the use of humanitarian crises as a tool of control and conflict. For aid agencies, this has meant that national staff faces higher levels of risk than their international colleagues and attacks on agencies are increasingly politically motivated.26

The nature of insecure contexts is changing. There have been significant increases in the number of people living in conditions of protracted displacement.\textsuperscript{27} There has been a shift in the way conflicts are conducted because the factions are lead by ‘less disciplined’ non-state actors who are also ‘less inclined to respect the rules of war’\textsuperscript{28}. Finally, conflicts being waged as ‘unregulated, intra-state battles’ rather than ‘organised inter-state warfare’.\textsuperscript{29} Civil war as opposed to the conventional declared war between countries has become the norm.

Operations for insecure settings therefore call for context-specific and conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian initiatives and peace-building at all stages of programme intervention. This assertion is grounded in conflict analysis (See Figure 2.5).

![Figure 2.5: Circles of conflict analysis and the project cycle, linked by interactions between the context and project. Source: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-building: Resource Pack 2004:2](image)

Applying conflict-sensitive methodology to DRM makes it more likely that aid action does not increase the risk of people to further conflict and that the impact of activities will be enhanced. Including considerations of human security and rights-based approaches in DRM also makes it more appropriate for insecure environments. Existing guidelines for conducting conflict assessments (e.g. DFID, 2002; USAID, 2005\textsuperscript{30}) already recognise that disasters increase the vulnerability of people to conflict. Therefore, the analysis from conflict assessments can be directly applied to DRM programming undertaken in insecure areas. This means, for example, harnessing the steps of the frameworks that outline the ‘negative effects of conflict on programmes’, ‘risks of programmes or policies exacerbating conflict’ and ‘opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction’.\textsuperscript{31}

Comparisons in donor investments for insecurity programming versus disaster risk reduction demonstrate the disjointed approach applied by donors\textsuperscript{32}:

\textsuperscript{27} - McDougal and Beard, 2010- Revisiting Sphere : new standards of service delivery for new trends in protracted development. Disasters, Vol. 35(1) pages 87-101
\textsuperscript{28} - Stoddard, Hermer, Haver, 2006- Providing Aid in Insecure Environments - Trends in Policy and Operations. London : Overseas Development Institute
\textsuperscript{30} - DFID, 2002 - Conducting conflict assessments: guidance notes ; USAID, 2005 – Framework for Strategy and Program Development
\textsuperscript{31} - DFID, 2002 - Conducting conflict assessments: guidance notes
\textsuperscript{32} - The following sections on donor investment, including diagrams, are drawn from Development Initiatives, 2011 - Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011. Development Initiatives, Somerset, UK
• The investment in DRR, can potentially save 4 to 7 times that spend on relief operations where DRR is not used. Already there is not enough humanitarian aid to support emergency needs: less than 60% of consolidated appeals for emergencies and crises were fulfilled in 2010.

• Despite, the potential savings of DRR, global expenditure on DRR in 2009 reached US$835m in 2009 – this represents a mere 0.5 per cent of total annual ODA.

• In contrast, growth of investment in peacebuilding, governance and security operations increased by 165% between 2002 to 2009, to total around 13% of ODA funding. This growth far outstripped that of 68.1% for total humanitarian aid and 50.3% for ODA as a whole (excluding debt relief and based on net disbursements).

![Figure 2.5.1: Growth in aid spending on government and civil society, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, and, humanitarian aid.](image)

This means that the potential benefit of DRM investments have not been understood by both long-term donor investments and by those investing in insecure contexts.

![Figure 2.5.2: Proportion of total official humanitarian aid received by recipients affected, and not affected, by conflict.](image)

Furthermore, the amount and duration of humanitarian investments is increasingly focused on insecure contexts, yet the investment in DRR remains extremely low.

• Only 2 out of the top 20 countries receiving humanitarian aid over the last decade have not been conflict-affected, and spending in conflict-affected contexts has systematically increased over the last decade.
• Of the 26 countries that are long-term recipients of humanitarian aid, 18 are conflict-affected or in a post-conflict transition.

• However, only 0.75% of humanitarian aid to these countries was dedicated to DRR, despite millions of people affected by cyclical ‘natural’ disaster. For example, US$33.3 million to 7 key conflict-affected African nations that had 17.5 million people affected by ‘natural’ disasters

• Current investments in key Horn of Africa countries suffering the impacts of insecurity, drought and famine also mirror low DRR investment by both ODA and humanitarian assistance, as indicated in the Table 6.1.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All figures in $US</th>
<th>Average annual donor investment on disaster prevention and preparedness</th>
<th>Average donor investment on disaster prevention and preparedness as a percentage of humanitarian aid</th>
<th>Average annual donor disaster prevention and preparedness investment per beneficiary of the current drought US$</th>
<th>Donor spending on DRR as a percentage of total ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2,22 million</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>59 cents</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3,3 million</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>69 cents</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.7 million</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>19 cents</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1.1 – Donor investments in DRR in countries strongly affected by the 2011 crisis in the Horn of Africa. 
Note: disaster preparedness and prevention projects are a subset of an overall investment in DRR. (Source: adapted from Oxfam, 2011 - Disaster Risk Reduction – fundamental to saving lives and reducing poverty. Briefing on the Horn of Africa Drought, August 2011, UK.)

Those supporting aid operations often apply the same standards of risk-taking of aid funding to insecure contexts as they do to stable contexts. This is because donors working in insecure contexts, as outlined in Figure 2.6, are caught between two risks:

1. Risks associated with taking action – especially where corruption and lack of accountability and transparency, often rife in insecure contexts, may mean funds are being misused. This leads to difficulties in the accountability of donors to their domestic constituencies.

2. Risk associated with not taking action – the absence of donor support for insecure contexts often leads to new conflict and the further weakening of institutions. This leads to problems of donors meeting their self-professed mandate for helping vulnerable people and developing nations. 33

Caught within this ‘dual accountability dilemma’, donors can often become conservative in their aid assistance, referring to how donor programming is done in stable contexts to guide their other programming in insecure contexts.

However, the reality is that donors need to assume a higher level of investment risk than that applied to stable contexts: "because returns to successful programmes are high, international assistance can afford a higher failure rate in violent situations... pilot many different types of approaches, see which work best; accept a higher failure rate; evaluate rigorously and adapt quickly, and scale up approaches that are working". 34

**Other donor agency practices which are not optimal for insecure contexts:**

1. Assistance in emergencies is slow to arrive and arrives in small fragments. This does not help host governments to concentrate on a few key results.

2. Donor funding is too small to ensure institutional transformation and it is often set up in uncoordinated funding mechanisms parallel to government systems.

3. Skewed donor investment on short-term, post-conflict operations at the expense of longer-term prevention operations, especially in contexts which are becoming more unstable. Furthermore, greatly fluctuating levels of aid constrain national transformation from insecurity to stability: a country that experienced 20 years of conflict experienced twice the volatility of aid investment compared to stable countries.

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2.3 - Impact of insecurity on risk and the enabling factors for DRM

2.3.1 - Disaster risk within insecure contexts

Disasters happening in a conflict context heighten the risk of future insecurity while eroding resilience to future disasters through increasing poverty and decreasing capacity to cope. The experience of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in a range of contexts has demonstrated key negative linkages between conflict and disaster risk, including:

• Conflict over limited natural resource in fragile environments is more likely to be an outcome of slow-onset disasters such as drought and desertification. For example, civil conflict is more likely to follow years of poor rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, small-scale disasters have a significant impact on local-level conflict. Here, the increasing vulnerability of people and their migration to areas which are perceived as being better-off leads to greater stress on natural resources and inevitable tensions as has occurred in Sudan, Kenya and Papua New Guinea (PNG). This is reinforced by inadequate legislation over land and natural resource management, which leads to a lack of cooperation when it comes to sharing resources between communities. It also leads to increased disaster risk due to environmental degradation, as has happened in Aceh, a region of Indonesia, and PNG. Those migrating away from conflict and disaster are commonly forced to resettle in dangerous locations, such as what occurred in Haiti after the earthquake of 2010.

• Conflicts almost always increase disaster risk because of increased environmental degradation, a reduction of viable household coping mechanisms, a focus on conflict issues at the expense of DRM, and the lack of government capacity or will to address disaster risk. Haiti, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Bolivia are some of the cases in point.

• Inappropriate aid can add to the risk of further conflict and vulnerability to disaster. For example, poorly planned IDP and refugee camps can lead to conflict between IDPs/refugees and host communities (as in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and PNG). Another effect is that non-participative or politically motivated operations can increase existing conflict within communities (as in Bolivia, Kenya, Haiti and Indonesia).

• Gender-related violence and livelihoods inequality is reinforced where disaster overlies conflict zones. In Sri Lanka, for example, the mobility of women and their access to external resources and assistance diminished with conflict.

• The ability to prepare for disaster and to follow existing contingency plans is undermined in insecure contexts. Negative impacts on community cohesion and the ability to work together, coupled with the fear people have of moving from their homes to safe areas or shelters, means that the contingency planning process and its execution are compromised – Haiti is a good example of this.

Insecurity is a pervasive element of risk which erodes people’s resilience to disaster. Conflict can exacerbate or maintain great vulnerability to disaster, paving the way for disasters and, in their turn, disasters themselves can increase vulnerability, leaving communities more at risk to insecurity. In spite of recognising this self-reinforcing negative spiral of vulnerability, engaging with the management of disaster risk in insecure contexts is limited due to operational challenges and additional layers of complexity of risk in these regions. Both conflict and disasters can result in further environmental and social upheaval, resulting in protracted humanitarian crises and negative impacts on levels of livelihoods.

With conflict today becoming more protracted, its impact on livelihoods and subsequent vulnerability and risk normally persists for a long time. Different types of risks and vulnerabilities exist at the household, community and external level, therefore the impact of conflict and insecurity varies by scale. Within households, violence can directly affect security levels and destroy assets. Chronic conflict and insecurity at the community level can further erode services, support systems, community organisational capacities and

36 - BPCR, 2011 - Disaster-conflict interface. Comparative experiences. UNDP, New York
the social fabric. All are elements required for resilience. Chronic conflict can also hinder risk management by limiting mobility, forcing displacement, violating rights (basic human rights, as well as rights of ownership, such as land or property) and causing humanitarian crises.\textsuperscript{38}

From a livelihoods perspective, effective \textbf{programming that manages risk} needs to be aimed at a specific scale and adapted to include three basic objectives:
1. Filling basic needs and supporting civil protection.
2. Protecting and recovering assets.
3. Strengthening assets to build processes, institutions and policies, which function within and can be used to move out of insecurity.\textsuperscript{39}

The nature of insecure contexts \textbf{mirrors slow-onset phenomena driven by climate-change}. Long-running vulnerabilities, such as conflict and resource insecurity, lead to increases in risk. External shocks can lead to triggers or tipping points toward insecurity. Long-term disaster drivers contribute to slow-onset changes driving insecurity or can be triggers themselves where significant vulnerability has built up over time. A good example is the food and fuel price increases of 2007-2008 which pushed around 100 million people into hunger and proved a tipping point in government-civilian tensions leading to rioting in countries such as Haiti and Nepal.

The provision of humanitarian aid in insecure environments can prompt or fuel conflict, adding to risk if not undertaken in a manner that is conflict-sensitive.\textsuperscript{40} At the local level, the parties involved in the conflict can manipulate humanitarian assistance or the information gathered for programming may be used against those communities who need assistance. For example, household-level survey data to determine the location and number of beneficiaries could be used to identify household members that could be targets for violence or forced combat.

\textbf{2.3.2 - Impact of insecurity on the enabling factors for DRM}

Risk management serves to meet an end-goal of fostering communities that are able to build resilience, work towards sustainable development and meet and strive to even exceed the MDGs. Here, \textit{the Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community} by Twigg (2007) can be used to outline \textbf{the generic enabling factors for sustainable DRM}. Twigg identifies five thematic areas:
1. Governance
2. Risk assessment
3. Knowledge and education
4. Risk management and vulnerability reduction
5. Disaster preparedness and response

These areas group a number of corresponding components of resilience (see Annex 5). The areas are broad and, generally, individual aid organisations address only some of these components.

These enabling factors are affected by the social, political, economic and physical forces at play in complex humanitarian and political emergencies. Ideally, they are created and supported with the appropriate political and social support for each factor, strong social networks and responsible governments. However, in environments experiencing the effects of conflict (violence, restricted movement, displacement, rights violations, discrimination, attacks, forced recruitment and so on), some of these factors are no longer feasible.

\textsuperscript{39} Jaspars and Maxwell 2009 discuss objectives for livelihoods programming in conflict areas, and includes frameworks for these initiatives which are further discussed in Section 3.2
\textsuperscript{40} Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-building: Resource Pack 2004:7
Table 2.2 demonstrates how insecure environments impact on the Twigg components of resilience. Once these impacts are identified, organisations can determine which components of resilience remain feasible in insecure settings and which components may be delayed until a more secure environment has been established. These can also be regarded as entry points, with DRM activities targeting vulnerabilities with the aim of building or restoring components of resilience and setting up a positively-reinforced virtuous cycle out of vulnerability.

Annex 1 shows the changing intensity of insecurity impacts on key factors for DRM, based on the experience of ACF in contexts where the government (and government-supported local stakeholders) discriminate against or actively target groups of people. The key factors examined include:

- Impact on lives and livelihoods
- Scale of the conflict
- Evolution of the conflict (who is involved and impact on society)
- Location of affected people
- Social and organisational structure of communities,
- Quality of institutional and community relationships
- Quality of local stakeholder and community relationships
- Ability of international agencies to work with vulnerable people in terms of access to people, acceptance by conflict parties and availability of funding
- Impact of external hazards and shocks – including seasonality – on livelihoods

Although there are many permutations possible when looking at individual contexts, this generalises the trends in order to provide a basis upon which to analyse the feasibility of DRM objectives and approaches as the context degrades.
## Components of Resilience

### Governance
- Policy, planning, priorities and political commitment
  - State of emergency limits political agency and vision.
  - Violence and insecurity shifts the priorities toward conflict and away from long-term development goals.
- Legal and regulatory systems
  - Lack of rule of law.
  - Failure of trust in systems.
  - Disputed control of systems.
- Integration with development policies and planning
  - Failure of establishment or implementation of development policies and planning from national to local levels.
- Integration with emergency response and recovery
  - Failure of establishment or implementation of emergency response and recovery from national to local levels.
- Institutional mechanisms, capacities and structures; allocation of responsibilities
  - Limited capacity for institutional mechanisms to function effectively.
- Partnerships
  - Inequitable/non-exclusive actions.
  - Low levels of social capital (weak partnerships, including at the community level).

### Risk Assessment
- Accountability and community participation
  - Corruption/lack of neutrality, and a lack of an active or vocal civil society.
- Hazards/risk data and assessment
  - Lack of knowledge, tools or technical skills to assess risk.
- Vulnerability and impact data and assessment
  - Lack of knowledge, tools or technical skills to assess vulnerability.
- Scientific and technical capacities and innovation
  - Lack of access to education or training opportunities.

### Knowledge and Education
- Public awareness, knowledge and skills
  - Limited access to knowledge and education.
- Information management and sharing
  - Failure of communication mechanisms.
- Education and training
  - Limited or no access to consistent and appropriate education and training opportunities.
- Cultures, attitudes, motivation
  - Weak social capital; low levels of trust in institutions.
- Learning and research
  - Limited or no access to consistent and appropriate learning and research opportunities.

### Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction
- Environmental and natural resource management
  - Failure of mitigation/management of hazards leads to disasters.
- Health and well being
  - Low levels of health and human development.
- Sustainable livelihoods
  - Livelihoods assets threatened or affected.
- Social protection
  - Violation of human rights.
- Financial instruments
  - Lack of secured financial support for vulnerability reduction.
- Physical protection; structural and technical measures
  - Limited mobility and access.
- Planning regimes
  - Failure to establish or implement planning activities from national to local levels.

### Disaster Preparedness and Response
- Organisational capacities and coordination
  - Security limits mobility, resources and planning.
- Early warning systems
  - Lack of knowledge or technical skills to create/operate/maintain systems.
- Preparedness and contingency planning
  - Limited financial/social/knowledge/political/economic resources for planning beyond short-term needs.
- Emergency resources and infrastructure
  - Use of resources for immediate humanitarian needs.
- Emergency response and recovery
  - Lack of access to targeted regions.
- Participation, voluntarism, accountability
  - Eroded respect for institutions leads to low levels of voluntary (non-coerced) participation.

### Table 2.2: Impacts of insecurity on the components of resilience (components from Twigg, 2007)
Figure 2.7 summarises the above analyses of insecurity trends and impact on the enabling factors for sustainable DRM practice leading to resilient communities. It demonstrates that as insecurity worsens, different forms of DRM are possible, however the expectations of what can be achieved and the approaches used must be adapted. It also provides a guide as to when great changes in the feasibility of objectives and approaches occur, and hence, where to place a threshold for programming.

Figure 2.7: Generalised representation showing how the feasibility/relevance of different disaster management objectives and approaches changes according to the intensity of insecurity.

The following basic assumptions were made to evaluate the feasibility of each of the DRM objectives and approaches summarised in Figure 2.7:

1. The degree of forward planning, organisation, linkage to external information services and community/household participation (and contribution in time and resources) required for successful action, rises in incremental stages from:
   - saving lives and livelihoods to,
   - preparing for disaster to,
   - mitigating disaster to,
   - building resilience/addressing impact of disaster drivers/preventing disaster.

2. Increasingly longer periods of insecurity at the same level of intensity render many DRM methods less feasible with time.

3. Community-based and community-managed approaches are less feasible where conflict is internal to
the community, and where people are excluded from active community participation or discriminated against by other groups within communities.

4. Government participation and partnership are less feasible where the government is negligent or actively discriminates against, or physically targets certain groups of people.

5. Local stakeholder partnerships with international agencies are less feasible where these groups are politicised and aligned with conflict groups that actively target civilian groups.

6. The ability of people to invest in the medium to longer-term diminishes once they become displaced from their permanent home.

7. Sustainable livelihoods strategies are progressively converted from adapting, to coping, to survival mechanisms with increasing insecurity. This negative progression in strategies increasingly limits the ability for households to take risks in new or diversified livelihood strategies. In addition, it decreases the number of choices available to counter the impacts of insecurity, while increasing the exposure of households to violence and harm.

The analysis in Figure 2.7 suggests that there are two critical thresholds in the continuum from low threat to high threat on people where disaster management objectives and the approaches used significantly change:

1. **Across the threshold from low to medium threat on people:** Programming should focus on preparedness and simple interventions that reduce vulnerability and mitigate disaster with a focus on local stakeholders (who have limited capacity) rather than working through institutions. Community-based or community-managed approaches, working with institutions and aiming for DRM objectives such as building resilience, disaster prevention and minimising the impacts of disaster drivers become less relevant and feasible.

2. **Across the threshold from medium to high threats on people:** Household-scale approaches, direct interventions by external aid agencies and a focus on saving lives and livelihoods with limited vulnerability reduction become more relevant for programming. Community approaches in general, international agency partnerships with local politicised stakeholders and programming objectives such as disaster mitigation and preparation are less feasible and relevant. DRM programming that focuses on politically ‘neutral’ external hazards, rather than encompassing all potential risk, should be prioritised as an entry.
2.4 - Summary of the challenges for DRM and IP practice

The increasingly complex nature of conflict and the impact of external shocks and hazards, both driven by a wider and more long-term set of disaster ‘drivers’, challenge the way initiatives in insecurity contexts are currently operating and the lack of disaster risk management applied here. Those working with conflict-affected people need to take into account the internal dynamics of insecurity along with the range of external factors not directly linked to the conflict which further reinforce the causal and fuelling factors of insecurity. This complex ‘risk architecture’, which opens up the notion of risk to include all natural phenomena and man-made factors, can be represented by the following insecurity-modified risk equations that simplify the main dynamics that need to be addressed. These reflect contexts where insecurity affects a community homogenously, that is, where the community-level is the basic programme building block:

\[
\text{Risk} = (\text{hazard} + \text{threat}) \times \text{vulnerability/capacity}
\]

or where conflict occurs within a community, that is, where households become the basic programming building block:

\[
\text{Risk} = (\text{hazard} \times \text{vulnerability/capacity}) \times \text{threat}
\]

Opening up risk to a ‘threats’ dimension creates a bridge to the objectives and practice of a range of insecurity programming. IP includes conflict prevention, stabilisation and protection, peace-making and post-conflict peace-building, along the three axes examined in Section 4:

1. Social cohesion and equity
2. Resilient livelihoods
3. Governance.

This section has outlined that DRM is not a ‘yes or no’ question for insecure contexts, rather expectations and methodology should be adapted step-wise as the context degrades and/or becomes prolonged, and where causes are replaced by other conflict-fuelling processes. The following section looks at different attempts to link risk management to insecure contexts that will augment the analysis of this section, further feeding into initiatives outlined in Section 5 for better applying DRM to insecure contexts.
3. DRM applied to insecure zones – an analysis of what is currently done

3.1 - Introduction: An overview of the stakes of disaster risk management

Disaster risk management normally acts to reduce, avoid or transfer disaster risk through the approaches of disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, sustainable natural resource management, social protection and the prevention of undernutrition.\footnote{See ACF DRM Policy, 2011, Section 4, for a more detailed description of each approach.}

As demonstrated in Figure 3.1 (and emphasising short-onset disasters), DRM recognises that many hazards and resultant disasters are cyclical. Here, operations should specifically respond to the context of risk (see the ‘blue’ and ‘green’ cycles) and disaster impact (shown in the ‘yellow’ cycle). DRM objectives (shown in white) will therefore be emphasised at different points in time, depending on how the context itself evolves and the role that communities and actors can play.

**DRM can be applied to both secure and insecure regions.** The concept of vulnerability ties the field of DRM to development, undernutrition, poverty, conflict and other operational areas. Disaster risk therefore...
is never limited solely to the dangers posed by natural hazards, but is also tied to other threats which have an impact on vulnerability levels. The DRM response to these vulnerabilities is to build resilience, both in order to recover from and to prepare for disasters. Frameworks from other relevant fields, including the sustainable livelihoods approach, can be used to identify ways in which DRM can be undertaken in complex settings – a violent crisis or an area with chronic humanitarian needs, for example – where risks other than those posed by hazards have an effect on vulnerability levels.

**DRM efforts are currently not sufficiently pursued in insecure zones.** Often due to perceived and real challenges of managing disaster risk in a complex environment where communities are facing threats to their livelihoods and related assets, security and conditions of governance. There is a common perception that the conditions necessary for DRM to function sustainably and effectively may not be found in insecure environments. The result is a lack of willingness to undertake programming at all stages of the insecurity cycle (see Figure 2.2). Existing DRM objectives, such as those outlined in the Hyogo Framework for Action, are currently incompatible with key conflict programming objectives, such as stabilisation, protection or peace-building, and therefore need to be adapted to be appropriate for insecure settings.

Developing an understanding of how to undertake DRM in conflict environments is possibly one of the most significant steps that actors in humanitarian response can take in attempting to strengthen community resilience. Donor policy seems to be shifting towards recognition that security and development need to be linked to protect and increase the effectiveness of funded programmes. Humanitarian organisations are examining ways in which they can engage, particularly on a community level, in protecting the security of individuals and groups. Such a shift means examining issues of neutrality and independence, particularly when embarking on DRM interventions during conflict means taking on state responsibilities when, for reasons of insecurity or governance, the state itself lacks the capacity or will to undertake social protection.

Some conditions have already been identified which allow **laying the groundwork for successfully undertaking DRM in insecure regions.** Some of these conditions are, for example, strong relationships between communities and humanitarian actors, strong partnerships with local and national governments and community solidarity. By shifting our perceptions of timelines for DRM – that is, shortening the time allotted the consideration of programming while compromising on longer-term sustainability –, worthwhile actions can be taken that make a difference to disaster risk levels and triggers of conflict. These initiatives may have the potential to ground later DRM work once the context has been stabilised.

**Lessons can also be learned from existing approaches adapted for insecure zones,** including discussions on livelihoods and conflict; climate change and security; environment and conflict; social protection and fragile states; human rights and DRM, and conflict operations and trends. Each of these approaches is examined in terms of their relevance and application to DRM.

### 3.2 - Livelihoods and conflict

Livelihood programming in conflict regions conducted at the community level needs to be carefully considered against how conflict influences livelihoods through changes in (i) the social (power relations), (ii) physical (limitations of mobility or resource availability), and (iii) political (governance) landscapes.

The traditional livelihoods framework has been adapted for use in conflict settings. Here, the overall context of vulnerability is modified from being an external shock to a central or even overarching influence on all elements of the framework (see Figure 3.2).\(^{42}\) This recognises the pervasive impact of conflict on households that pits people against each other within communities. Figure 3.3 presents a more general adaptation of the livelihoods framework demonstrating how both assets and liabilities need to be considered for livelihood analysis in times of violent complex humanitarian emergencies.

\(^{42}\) Also see USAID, 2005 - Livelihoods and conflict – a toolbox for intervention. Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID, Washington DC
The role of policy, institutions and processes further complicates disaster risk: \(^{43}\) Household or community resources may become liabilities (people are targeted because they have assets, for example), livelihood strategies become dangerous (for instance, when people are forced to take physical risks in order to continue past practices) and different groups within a community may become the source of risk.

Poor government practice reinforces the impact of hazards that may in turn, accelerate long-term disaster drivers, resulting in further disaster and risk. Some examples include:

- A lack of regulation of extractive natural resource industries, such as forestry or mining, and underinvestment in sustainable agriculture, both of which lead to ecosystem degradation.
- A lack of planning for population movement and changing demographics leads to an unsafe living environment in urban settings.
- A lack of responsible economic policy leads to fragile markets for basic necessities.
- Poor policy on disaster management results in poorly educated and ill-informed communities, in a lack of pre-positioned resources and planning for relief operations and in a lack of extension services through which people can access assistance to manage risk.

Livelihood programming in conflict regions can be comprised of livelihood provision, protection and promotion, depending on the needs of communities and the objectives of programming (see Annex 1). As insecurity increases, the focus of programming shifts from supporting systems and basic services to protecting household livelihoods with an emphasis on physical materials rather than other ‘softer’ aspects, as shown in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Types of livelihood interventions undertaken at various stages of conflict - Source: USAID, 2005 - Livelihoods and conflict – a toolbox for intervention. Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID, Washington DC

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Risk management aims to limit the degradation of assets and to prevent livelihoods strategies from falling into non-sustainable or harmful practices. Similarly, programming that considers the future impact of other insecurity after the height of a crisis, when the physical and economic rehabilitation of livelihoods systems occurs, can also be valorised as DRM. Annex 1 details this range of livelihoods interventions, which include:

- Proactive supply of cash, food and materials to bolster food – and income generating activities.
- Supply of individual and community training on technical skills and organisation.
- Strengthening the infrastructure in order to link communities with markets.
- Strengthening the links between community and, where possible, institutions involved with planning, policy and land-use issues.

### 3.3 - Climate change, security and conflict

The relationship between conflict, security and climate change has been flagged as significant in both academic (e.g., Barnett and Adger, 2007) and humanitarian circles, with the UN Security Council establishing climate change as a global security issue in April, 2007. However, there are few studies providing empirical evidence of links between security and climate change as direct causes, and research that specifically examines these issues is relatively new. Their findings acknowledge that the impact of climate change further adds to the challenges of operating in insecure settings and increase the vulnerability of communities affected by both hazards and conflict. Livelihoods, economic security, social stability and risk levels for disasters all have the potential to be affected by climate change either separately or together via knock-on effects, with natural resource scarcity and other environmental factors often significant climate triggers for conflict.

Though climate change processes occur on a global level, the impact of climatic trends on resources, health and livelihoods can already be felt at local levels. It is at this household or community level where appropriate DRM measures have the potential to reduce vulnerability to risk of hazards and, subsequently, to conflict. Figure 3.5 indicates where DRR and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) processes overlap.

![Diagram of DRR and CCA processes](image)

Figure 3.5: DRR and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) process intersection. Source: Mitchell and van Aalst: Convergence of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation, IDS, Brighton UK

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46 - (ISD)’s report on Climate Change and Conflict focusing on Kenya found that “the threat of increased conflict in Northern Kenya as a result of climate change is real” (2009), and the organisation has also produced studies on linkages between climate change and violent conflict, with similar conclusions, in other regions including the Middle East.
47 - See Nordas and Gleditsch (eds), 2007- Climate change and conflict. Political Geography, Special Issue 26(6) : 627-638.
49 - Also see Tearfund, 2008- Linking Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction
However, while DRM and CCA programming are starting to be linked in policy, actions for their convergence are still largely developing in practice. Aligning these approaches would increase the effectiveness of both fields, particularly in insecure environments where challenges such as coordinating resources and sustaining support for initiatives are further compounded by the impact of conflict. Linking considerations of security, climate change and disaster risk would also assist organisations in limiting the destabilising impacts of mal-adaptation, e.g., forced shifts from food to fuel crops or changes in resource ownership. In a best case situation, pursuing CCA and DRM activities in insecure regions may limit the extent that climate change and disaster risk evolve as destabilising forces to already fragile peace processes.

3.4 - Environment and conflict

The connection between conflict and climate change and their impact on natural resources and the environment have been examined in terms of the risk of environmental degradation and further violence. Conversely, opportunities to use sustainable resource management initiatives to prevent conflict or to address risk of further conflict have been identified (see Figure 3.6): “a safe environment is the goal... but is also the means. Reducing vulnerability to disasters will be shown to be tied up with increased resource access and empowerment of marginal groups.”

Conflict has been linked to:

1. Environmental scarcity, leading to both local and national population movements and violence over the securing of resources.
2. Control of natural resources, i.e., competition over the use of resources (“over the last sixty years at least forty percent of all intrastate conflicts have a link to natural resources”).
3. A heavy dependence on natural resources. Collier et al., (2003), found that the risk of conflict for countries with one quarter or more of their national income based on primary commodities was five times higher than those with more varied exports.

Environmental initiatives such as assessment, mapping, protection and engagement of the environment in peacemaking/peacekeeping processes are proposed for all stages of the conflict cycle in Figure 3.6, irrespective of the causes of conflict. This is even more crucial in rural communities largely dependent on land, water and forest for their livelihoods or where the irresponsible exploitation of natural resources, like minerals, wood, oil and gas, fuels the conflict.

Agencies such as the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) suggest that “environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict”. However, it is well accepted that, where environmental degradation leads to worsening community vulnerability and disputes, that results in a decreased capacity of communities to manage their disaster risk.

This view has been used to support calls for environmental management, conflict management and DRM to be linked to each other as well as to poverty reduction and livelihoods programming. As noted by Brown, Crawford and Hammill, “for the poorest, access and control over natural resources are an important determinant of vulnerability and resilience” (2006:8), and furthermore, “… clear, predictable and equitably allocated resource rights help poor and marginalised communities increase their resilience to natural disasters” (2006:8). Tearfund has also stressed the importance of integrating environmental considerations into relief programmes in vulnerable contexts, based on existing global operational standards: “Sustainable resource management is required by both Sphere and UNHCR environmental guidelines”. They go on to recommend that sustainable resource management be used as both the framework and foundation for

50 - See Mitchell, van Aalst and Villanueva, in progress, ‘Assessing Progress on Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in Development Processes’, on the linking of these fields.
52 - United Nations Environment Programme, 2009- From Conflict to Peacebuilding : The role of Natural Resources and the Environment. Nairobi : UNEP
55 - United Nations Environment Programme, 2009- From Conflict to Peacebuilding : The role of Natural Resources and the Environment. Nairobi : UNEP
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5.7. Their approach integrates such recovery efforts with activities relating to relief, development, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA).

3.5 - Social Protection and Fragile States

Discussions on social protection in fragile states focus on the need for flexible and adaptable programming that can meet the demands of operating in a fragile setting. Assistance in fragile states is often short-term and limited in scale and coordination because of political instability, poor governance, insecurity and limited capacity to operate. Opportunities to sustain longer-term social protection programmes can develop, if the experience of emergency food and cash transfers in these states can be built upon. These opportunities can then be used to reduce community risk levels to a variety of threats, including conflict and hazards.

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58 - Harvey, 2009- Towards good humanitarian government: The role of the affected state in disaster response. HPG Reports 29; Harvey, 2009- Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development South Sudan Case Study. Raising the Bar: Enhancing Transatlantic Governance of Disaster Relief and Preparedness, Global Public Policy Institute Case Studies.
Figure 3.7 outlines the different forms of social protection and examples of activities, many of which are closely aligned with those in DRM programming. It shows that shorter term and protective social protection activities, characterised by low inputs and capacities to execute these and a shorter time frame for impacts, are more relevant as insecurity heightens. As insecure contexts stabilise, the types of social protection activities that best contribute to DRM alter, as follows:

1. Protecting the degradation of livelihoods assets, via conditional food and cash transfers (protective social protection).
2. Reducing the risk of income variation, via conditional food and cash transfers together with public works, social insurance, investing in child and mother nutrition and health and education (preventive and promotional social protection).
3. Build resilience of livelihoods via diversification, increased access to inputs and markets and links with institutions via community-driven development (promotional social protection).

Social protection is defined by the (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) as a set of “public actions that enable people to deal more effectively with risk and vulnerability to crises and tackle extreme and chronic poverty” (2006). But, when social protection is applied to fragile states, questions of how to maintain impartiality and neutrality must be raised. Organisations operating in fragile zones often attempt to pursue neutral lines of humanitarian programming, leaving longer-term social protection agendas to the state.59 However, according to DFID’s definition, fragile states are “those countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people”60 (2008). Thus, the lack of capacity or will of the state to provide social protection during times of fragility means that international agencies may provide social protection if they have the support of their donors and other actors in the local environment. Ideally though, social protection activities undertaken by international agencies will occur with state support, particularly at the local level where activities such as DRM could be developed with the assistance of local community groups.
Operating in fragile states entails facing the risks presented by conflict, challenges with governance and working with communities that have limited resources and a lot of vulnerabilities. However, there are examples of interventions that can be used to build social protection in these situations, including community-based DRM, livelihoods programming and Social Funds (a World Bank programme which focuses on rapid dispersal of support for small projects in a post-disaster context).61 The DRR Consortium Niger62 is one example of such a programme. Working in a fragile state, the Niger DRR Consortium aims to reduce community-level chronic vulnerability by using livelihood strengthening, EWS and advocacy. The identification of lessons learned from the programme members (CARE International, Tearfund, ACF, Concern and Relief International) on the Niger initiative may present opportunities to take similar social protection mechanisms to other fragile states.

3.6 - Human rights and DRM

Disasters affect those most marginalised and further entrench existing inequalities. Ignoring human rights in DRM efforts, as has happened in insecure contexts, results in the exacerbation of vulnerability to both conflict and hazards leaving those in greatest need at most risk. Human rights-based approaches to conflict link “economic, social and cultural development to the achievement of political and civil rights.”63 These approaches include a holistic approach to poverty, considerations of links between rights and conflict, and between elements of participation and accountability.

Different hazards have specific implications on human rights. Drought can impact the rights to food, life and social security, whereas flooding could infringe the right to shelter, health and a proper living environment. Many hazards affect the right to economic, social and cultural development and can have specific consequences for different groups. For example, flooding might keep children from attending school and therefore have an impact on their right to education.64 For such rights to be guaranteed, DRM efforts that include human rights considerations should identify infringements on a per-hazard basis, as well as identifying the context of governance required – even at the local level. They must also promote principles of equality, extending from considerations of ethnicity to social and economic standing. It should include considerations of rights to protection, equitable assistance and information, which can lead to the building of trust, designing of appropriate and effective activities and increased engagement on the part of civil society, particularly at the community level. These are also important stakes for communities in insecure contexts.

Discussions on human rights and DRM are evolving as it is recognised that disasters, the marginalisation of people,65 poor governance and damaged social contracts between the state and its people66 are all aspects which are clearly linked together. The role of rights-based approaches has been suggested to promote “disaster-resistant” communities67 and protect people displaced by disaster.68 Calls for human rights to be considered in DRM are taking root in programming efforts, as international agencies are starting to produce guidelines for the promotion of rights in disaster situations and disaster management activities.69 Though the Humanitarian Charter of the Sphere Project has already established minimum standards for disaster

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64 - Such rights are protected in agreements including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights, the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Paris Declaration, the Accra Declaration and the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
66 - Pelling and Dill, 2009- Disaster Politics : Tipping points for change in the adaptation of socio-political regimes. Progress in Human Geography.
69 - The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement has piloted the Human Rights and Natural Disasters Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster (2008), and UNDP Pacific Centre and OHCHR Regional Office for the Pacific have published Checklists for Integrating Human Rights in Natural Disaster Management in the Pacific (2007).
assistance and has specific technical outputs relating to these activities, new guidelines with a human rights focus are less systematic in identifying ways in which rights can be protected and promoted.

Those efforts are being supported by actions undertaken at national levels, as some countries have examined specific disaster events through a human rights lens. Under the new Human Rights Protection guidelines, the responsibilities of the state include not only assisting with response and recovery, but also include prevention, laying the ground for governments to see risk reduction, not just disaster response, as being their obligatory goal. Organisations pursuing DRM at the community level therefore have the opportunity to support the state in considering human rights in their efforts, to support communities in advocating for DRM and to ensure that programming is designed in a way that will be supportive, without marginalising affected communities – particularly those in fragile states which may not be receiving state assistance.

Examining how hazards and shocks (that are external to the politics of an insecure context) impact human rights may serve as an entry point to a broader revision of all impacts on human rights that include insecurity and conflict at community and national levels.

### 3.7 - Summary: opportunities for DRM

Table 3.1 summarises how the approaches reviewed in Section 3 can be applied to DRM. Many of these approaches, as is the case with DRM itself, are continuing to develop. This briefing document attempts to begin to draw these strands together into common programming. Where there is conflict internal to a community, there are only so many factors and indicators to work with as programming becomes focused at the household scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXISTING APPROACHES</th>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES TO USE WITH DRM</th>
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| Livelihoods and conflict | - Centralisation of vulnerability in livelihoods frameworks for situations of insecurity makes the new model more suitable for DRM.  
- Demonstrates how livelihood strategies can be dangerous in conflict, or even be a trigger for insecurity; these conditions can be exacerbated by disaster risk, and DRM can raise awareness of how livelihoods can safely be pursued. |
| Climate change, security and conflict | - More research on linking security and climate change is needed; if undertaken, this knowledge will support understandings of how disasters also influence this relationship.  
- Recognition that natural resource scarcity and environmental factors are often the most significant climate-drive triggers for conflict; such conditions are also influenced by disasters. |
| Environment and conflict | - Recognition that environmental factors are often not a sole cause of conflict demands that environmental management needs to be pursued in linkage with other programming, including poverty reduction, livelihoods support and DRM.  
- Integration of environmental considerations into relief programming, particularly in insecure environments, is a suggestion that can also support DRM. |
| Social protection and fragile states | - Challenges faced by provision of social protection in fragile states also apply to DRM in the same contexts therefore knowledge of ongoing risks and examples of ongoing interventions can be built upon.  
- Categories of social protection programming are closely aligned with DRM (protection, prevention, promotive and transformative systems). |
| Human rights-based approaches | - Ties development to rights to strengthen both, and considers linkages to conflict and elements of good governance.  
- Can be used to determine how disaster risk at the community level can be quantified regarding how rights are at risk or have been affected by specific events or broader programming. |
| Conflict operations and trends | - Identifies what security trends need to be considered when operating in insecure regions.  
- Presents conflict assessment frameworks that can be adapted to ensure DRM is conflict-sensitive. |

Table 3.1: Opportunities to use existing approaches to programming and conflict with DRM

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70 - Such as Sri Lanka, with 2006 State of Human Rights report from the Sri Lankan Law and Society Trust focusing on the impact and aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.
4. Analysing the linkages between DRM and Insecurity Programming

There are many similarities in the objectives and approaches of an expanded notion of risk management, articulated with response and those outlined in a range of peace-building guidelines including the OECD-DAC principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations (i.e., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee). These similarities occur within aid action applied to insecure contexts before, during and after violent conflict (outlined in a cross-section of analyses of IP including DFID, 2010; Care, 2010; and GSDRC 2009 and 2010). Common interests between DRM and IP at community-scale initiatives are aligned to the three axes commonly cited as the focus of IP for aid agencies. These are:

1. Ensuring social cohesion and equity.
2. Building the resilience of livelihoods to insecurity.
3. Improving local level governance and institutions. This articulates with national-level peace-building efforts that
   a. Build ‘inclusive enough’ ruling coalitions.
   b. Restore national confidence at each transition point towards stability with rapid and tangible efforts.
   c. Reform security, justice and employment systems.
   d. Adapt development to the political context.
   e. Transforms governance and institutions over the long-term.

Beyond the commonality of the above objectives, DRM and IP are broadly aligned in four major ways.

Firstly, DRM impacts on political processes at community, local and national levels, in a similar way that conflict transformation programming does at top-range, mid-range and grassroots levels. A series of national-scale initiatives, led by the UNISDR and UNFCCC, work with governments to set up institutional structures to promote resilience to disaster. Measures promoted include responsible natural resource management and other forms of vulnerability reduction that touch both the causes and fuel factors of insecurity. The mid-term analysis of the impact of the Hyogo Framework for Action has led to initiatives aiming to increase accountability and political linkage of communities to institutions. These initiatives have the particular purpose of obtaining a better and more sustainable engagement of local government in risk management and helping to build community resilience. Most DRM practice has focused on the community level, on building on existing organisational and traditional power structures, on assuring links to external parties and on strengthening livelihoods systems.

DRM initiatives that address hazards that are not connected to the political processes of insecure contexts (but do have an impact on the same human rights that insecurity does) present an opportunity to question and adjust the power structures and political processes that cause or fuel insecurity.

Secondly, disaster management puts short and long-term aims in sequence, according to the evolution of the context. Here, saving lives and livelihoods is linked with sustainably building resilience to disaster. As was broadly indicated in Figure 3.1, DRM is staggered as a continuum and can:

1. act as a stabilisation tool protecting people and livelihoods from, at the minimum, future external shocks,
2. address risk beyond natural disaster, and insulating people against further effects of the conflict on livelihoods, creating the enabling environment for future development (a key axis for peace and state building), and,
3. help build resilience to a relapse back into conflict in post-conflict contexts.

71 - DFID, 2010 Building Peaceful States and Societies. London
73 - For example, Case, 2010. Improved governance, social cohesion and resilience of conflict-affected communities. Internal Report
The key for DRM and IP to be integrated is to predefine a clear long-term strategy, coordinating with other long-term strategies for peace-making and peace-building. Each aid agency must define its specific role and exit strategy. This strategy should be articulated with those strategies of a broadly coordinated set of agencies (e.g. the UN Cluster System) striving for joint and continuous action as the context evolves. In the end, moving from a complex emergency to a stable state can take at least a generation, so a broad and sustained commitment by international agencies in support of national institutions and agencies is the most likely sustainable solution.\textsuperscript{75}

Thirdly, DRM, like IP, requires a broad-based analysis of the context regarding what causes vulnerability to disaster, the nature of different shocks and hazards that people face and their ability to address them and the underlying factors leading to disaster. This is supported by early warning systems and surveillance systems tracking risk indicators and informing actors when to act. A participation analysis, adapted for insecure contexts, underlines how the relationship between an international agency and other partners should modulate intervention from direct, to community-based, to community-managed and, finally, disengagement.

Fourthly, and finally, the added value of DRM and the way that it must be adapted to the contexts hinges on the quality of the multi-party partnership, i.e., communities, external agencies and local agencies. This partnership is normally at the core of good DRM practice and is a transversal theme of peace. This involves the coherent and equal participation of diverse community groups leading to a common community approach that is connected to active and responsible civil society groups and organisations and with government institutions. International agencies are part of this partnership when local capacities are unable to cope with the challenges. DRM practice evolves according to how the community structures itself and to the quality of different partners and their relationships. Where this partnership degrades in insecure contexts, DRM objectives and actions must change. However, the very nature of DRM practice, particularly applied to common and politically neutral issues such as natural disaster, may also act to halt or start to repair the degradation in relationships, a key objective of IP.

4.1 - Overlapping characteristics of insecure programming with DRM at the community-level

Beyond the general overlaps cited above, the following sub-sections focus on the common interests aligned to the three axes cited as the focus of IP for aid agencies supporting community-level action.

4.1.1 - Contributing to social cohesion and equity

DRM can act as an entry point to rebuild relationships, to assure inclusion and participation and to rebuild the social fabric of communities, based on addressing common goals with common solutions. These entry points can be established before and, when moving into post-conflict, bring together diverse civil society structures to work on common community challenges. Specific points of commonality include:

- Strengthening individual members and linkages through a partnership between communities, institutions and civil society and local stakeholders.
- Setting up or using existing inclusive local community committees, structures or systems and combining local systems with external knowledge.
- Disaggregating the assessment and understanding of communities in order to focus on most-at-risk groups and attempt to bring different groups together ensuring participation and inclusion in community projects. Equal and effective participation of people in programme definition and planning can serve as a neutral space where insecurity factors may be discussed – potentially leading to local mediation opportunities.
- The focus on key vulnerability groups requiring protection, including women, children, the elderly and
those living with disabilities or illness. In post-conflict this extends public works to protect livelihoods and mitigate risk to include IDPs returning home and demobilised fighters.

- The focus on building community structure, organisation and social cohesion; working on shared goals that affect everyone in the community; using livelihoods and, particularly, infrastructure as an entry point.

- Reinforcing the capabilities of different community groups and aligning them with community-level disaster preparation and initiatives, or planning how to address vulnerability to disaster.

- Ensuring transparency in decision-making with an emphasis on clear communication and social accountability, especially the allocation of resources and finance (e.g., public panels outlining project details including budget).

4.1.2 - Moving from conflict towards resilience of livelihoods

DRM helps to protect and build resilience of basic services and livelihoods to external and internal hazards, threats and shocks leading to the strengthening and diversification of livelihoods, the improvement of people’s socio-economic position and the stabilisation of peace. Securing income and employment are some of the most important components of livelihoods to strengthen – a key peace building action.

Specific points of commonality include:

- Focus on strengthening basic services and community systems and, while diversifying livelihoods, assuring sensitivity to the causes of conflict, its fuelling factors and other disaster ‘drivers’.

- Short-term public works, such as cash or food-for work, backed up by longer-term livelihoods programming, with an emphasis on youth employment.

- The protection of basic services and livelihoods as an entry point for other peace-building initiatives working on partner relationships, which leads to more positive governance and inclusion of communities in local and national processes.

- Articulating saving lives and livelihoods with DRM protection activities, helping communities to negotiate and move out of ‘regression loops’ (periods of intense conflict).

- Adapting risk management of livelihoods, integrating the notion of political capital (or proximity of people to political power) in strategies, acknowledging that livelihoods are a liability as well as an asset during conflict (e.g., exchanging income generating activities for food-generating activities, as was done for ACF operations in Myanmar). and minimising the exploitation of livelihoods for war economies or contributing to fuelling factors of conflict.

- Focus on supporting livelihoods of vulnerable groups and assuring that these are carried out in a way that protects them from risk of violence (e.g. water and sanitation infrastructure located in “safe areas”).

- Focus on risk-proofing services and infrastructure, assuring a continuing basic service delivery that helps to stabilise and protect people at risk of insecurity (e.g. strengthening water and health services against external hazards).

4.1.3 - Aiding improved governance

DRM can create a neutral entry point for rebuilding links and confidence between communities and institutions, leading to better governance, using the following initiatives:

- Capacity building of civil society, of local NGOs and of local institutions to promote better community participation in planning and roll-out of local government policy.

- Advocacy and organisation of communities to call for institutional changes, accountability and adherence to responsible development and humanitarian goals related to disaster management (including development sectors necessary for addressing vulnerability, e.g., Health, Water and Sanitation, Agriculture and Livestock and so on).

- Setting up civil society platforms to represent the voices of communities with the purpose of influencing
national initiatives.

- Working on a ‘culture of safety’ to reinforce positive aspects of informal or cultural beliefs and systems that may act as the main local authority system.
- Decreasing the dependency of communities, local organisations and institutions on relief and humanitarian aid (and, in the process, minimising other negative impacts) by improving local and national systems of preparedness and contingency planning.

### 4.1.4 - Differences between DRM and IP

Although his briefing paper analyses similarities between DRM and IP, there is also a set of distinct differences, where DRM:

- does not systematically carry out a detailed context analysis focusing on key insecurity factors (see next section),
- does not address all conflict grievances,
- has not systematically used a detailed political or conflict analysis,
- does not normally specifically target ex-combatants,
- has not been systematically linked to human rights, but is moving in this direction,
- has not addressed conflict resolution and conflict-party dialogue directly, and,
- has not focused on promoting a combined accountability, participation and legitimacy good governance package – it rather focuses on the first two elements.

This means that where DRM is applied to insecure contexts, it would have to closely coordinate with other initiatives working on creating and stabilising peace in order to maximise its impact and for the above gaps to be assured.

### 4.2 DRM contributing to national-level political transformation

There is a potential role for DRM and civil society to better contribute towards a broad and long-term transformation of an insecure context into a stable and resilient society that integrates the similarities and differences outlined above. The World Development Report (2011) describes a political framework aiming to move states from fragility and violence to institutional resilience via a transformation of citizen security, justice and jobs (see Annex 6). It demonstrates how the transition periods to greater stability involve restoring confidence as a precedent to actions that progressively transform institutions. This process is insulated from external regional and international stresses and shocks, while benefiting from support and incentives to keep the complete process on track.

DRM, where articulated with disaster response and the role of civil society, potentially plays a vital role in supporting political transformation as follows:

1. Establishing an enabling environment for transformation
   During complex emergencies, efforts are required to create an initial enabling environment to begin national transformation while protecting people from further degradation in their needs. A gradational management system is proposed in Section 5 that articulates DRM with relief, coupled with a set of guiding principles. This overall system can continue to be used until humanitarian action has been phased-out. These principles and programming suggestions can also be taken up in longer-term operations, following on from the withdrawal of humanitarian aid.

2. Restoring confidence
   DRM helps to create intra and inter-community coalitions from diverse groups, united around a single issue (e.g., management of natural or external hazards), leading to local ‘inclusive-enough coalitions’. Threats and multi-hazard risk and response assessments coordinated within a wider assessment package, can be made both before and after disaster or conflict.

3. Transforming institutions
   Building resilience means using multi-sectoral holistic community livelihoods models that better manage local natural resources and ecosystems. These models emphasise income-generating activities, access to markets and diversification of livelihoods in order to be more resilient to internal insecurity issues and external shocks. This also means connecting community to local institutions, empowering marginalised groups and reconstructing community organisation and cohesion. DRM measures that prevent and reduce risk are articulated with aid operations which address the impact of externally sourced disasters and local insecurity. All measures are coordinated within a larger strategic package with the combined efforts of organisations expert in DRM; relief and recovery; human rights and advocacy, and conflict negotiation. This would define the sequencing, articulation and entry-point and exit strategies for each organisation according to the cyclical nature of disaster and conflict.

4. Action to address external stress
   National transformation initiatives are better insulated against the external shocks of natural hazards; seasonality and man-made shocks, and the key drivers leading to external shocks by using an ‘open’ vision of DRM. As mentioned, minimising key disaster drivers means acknowledging climate change, environmental degradation, economic marginalisation and market fragility, unplanned urbanisation and displacement in programming. This does not necessarily mean solving these drivers. Community efforts can be linked to national systems of risk management and can also extend to regional initiatives to counter trans-border disaster risks (e.g., flooding in South Asia, drought in Sub-Saharan Africa, global epidemics, and so on.).

5. Indicators to demonstrate progress
   Civil society can add an extra layer of credibility to the collection and analysis of government data. For example, progress on the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), a self-regulated initiative, has been triangulated with a global grass-roots civil society network that showed clear discrepancies in what governments and communities reported. This is most important in the early transition periods of transformation in aiding the positive ‘signals’ that help to restore confidence between governments and citizens.

The above actions, which work on reducing the risk of further insecurity both before and after conflict, are normally informed by an integrated surveillance and EWS and by joint assessment and analysis initiatives. The key for scaling up sustainable action is to make linkages between external aid, local civil society and institutions and the private sector. These are practices already embraced by the DRM community.

77 - The Hyogo Framework for Action, an international initiative for action on DRR, signed by 168 countries, and supported by the UNISDR
78 - Summarised in the ‘Views from the Frontline’ reports of the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction
Organisations focusing on insecure contexts often use an insecure context analytical package that is the cornerstone for programming decisions. This normally feeds into a scenario planning exercise that defines the programming that addresses the impact of insecurity as well as the management risks for further impacts. These collect a range of political/institutional, socioeconomic, conflict/security and resource/environment insecurity indicators, which allow an analysis of the causes, processes and fuelling factors of conflict; who is involved, and the impact of insecurity on people.

One of the most comprehensive packages comes from DFID, which groups together different specific analyses under a general analysis, termed Country Governance Analysis, which informs governance programming:79

1. **Political Economy Analysis** (PEA) ‘is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society; that is, the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’.80 This is done before, during or after conflict; at global, national and sector scales, and is a prerequisite for the following analyses:

2. **Gender Inequality and Social Exclusion Analysis**: gender and social discrimination; done before, during or after conflict.

3. **Human Rights Assessment**: mapping and accountability of governments’ responsibility towards human rights; done before, during or after conflict.

4. **Strategic Conflict Assessment** (where conflict has started): causes, dynamics and impact of stakeholders on conflict; done once violent conflict has started.

A second general analysis, the Countries at Risk of Instability Analysis, is made before and after conflict, focusing on (1) risks of instability (internal and external), (2) country capacity and resilience and (3) external stabilising factors.

Figure 4.2 summarises these tools and their relationship to one another. It notes which analyses can be normally carried out international NGOs, where they are able to pool information and access thematic experts/organisations (e.g. gender, human rights). Combining these all together under the two general analysis tools is a large and laborious exercise, normally beyond the resources of a large INGO. Different analyses are made at specific times with reference to the timing of conflict. The PEA is a core tool used by other analyses and is worth further attention in Section 5.3. Here three different forms of PEA can be used around the Programme Cycle to understand the interests and incentives of different groups, the roles of formal and informal institutions (social, political and cultural norms), and the impact of beliefs on human, political and economic interactions:81

1. **A country-level analysis** investigating the role and impact of national level policy and institutions in relation to the citizens; useful for defining the country strategy and for making the initial programme identification.

2. **A sector-level analysis** used to investigate specific sector dynamics with implications for external agency programming; useful for understanding the connections of local and national-level institutions with communities, and,

3. **A problem-driven analysis** that focuses on specific issues at programme or project level; useful for local-level field assessments.

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80 - OECD DAC definition available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance/politicaleconomy, consulted 1/6/11
Figure 4.2: A summary of the context analysis package for insecure contexts from DFID, taken from their Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations Briefing Papers (2010). It shows when different analysis tools are used with respect to the timing of conflict. It also shows those that are global and general tools versus more specialised tools and how this fits into the country programming process. The ticks beside each tool indicate which tools are feasible with the resources of a large INGO (but require the intervention of experts), whereas those with a cross would normally be beyond the capacity of an INGO.
5. Programming for insecure contexts

Much DRM practice has not been applied to insecure or conflict contexts because of perceived ‘killer assumptions’ that presumably discount its feasibility. These include:

1. **Conflict is internal to the community**, therefore community approaches are unlikely to work.
2. **The government is a conflict party targeting communities**; therefore, capacity building and sustainability are impossible.
3. **People are not self-sufficient**, therefore, they will not prioritise DRM or are incapable of investing too far into the future or experimenting with their livelihood strategies.
4. **People are displaced**, therefore they will not invest in their location, environment or in the future. They cannot access land, so resource-based management is out of the question.
5. **People cannot actively participate with agencies**: If we cannot access households directly, then we cannot do DRM.

This section will demonstrate that the application of DRM is not a ‘yes or no’ answer. This section suggests some principles and the programming required to adapt and adjust DRM to meet the needs of insecure contexts and to exploit overlaps and common purposes. It draws upon the previous sections which underlined the similarities between initiatives used to manage risk and conflict.

5.1 - Ten key principles for applying risk management to insecure contexts

The following ten principles are suggested as the basis for adjusting DRM practice. These are underpinned by a graduated management system using thresholds based on surveillance and early warning systems. Programming is divided into four phases, Identification, Planning (that includes assessment, analysis and design), Delivery and Control, and Closure. Projects fit as components within each programme, aligned by the objectives of the programme. Annex 7 gives an example of how programming and projects fit within the institutional structure of ACF.

1. **Open the vision of risk management**

Integrating DRM into insecurity programming requires a more open vision of the DRM practice which is commonly dominated by natural hazards and climate change. Here; the future impact of natural hazards, insecurity and other man-made shocks, and closer links between management of risk with emergency response should be considered at each step of the programme cycle. This concretely means converting current snapshot assessment tools used for insecure context into something which is better able to look forward and backwards in time as well as making linkages between different processes of risk and conflict. Alternatively, it means adapting the natural-hazard methodology that currently dominates DRM to something which is better able to include threats, economic shocks and environmental degradation around the programme cycle, in order to manage the risk architecture outlined in Figure 2.3. This involves investigating a great set of context variables and, essentially, making linkages between different thematic-specific policies, information systems and assessment methodology and field operations. The following principles and Section 5.2 more specifically outline what it means to manage an ‘open’ vision of risk.

2. **Placing insecurity factors at the heart of identifying, assessing and designing DRM programming.**

The way operations are prepared will determine failure or success, thus it is important that insecurity is placed in the centre of the initial programme steps, rather than as a filter applied after the programme has been defined. There are two ways to modify the start of programming. Firstly, a lot more effort should be spent during the identification phase of programming. This should involve a careful analysis of secondary data regarding the dynamics of insecurity and politics (i.e., causes and fuelling factors of insecurity); a mapping of actors and the way power is exerted and, finally, a security analysis for external agencies and the community. Here, a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) begins to inform a country level risk analysis.
Once an area of interest is identified for follow-up field assessments, Participatory Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis (PCVA) methodology, articulated with other disaster-impact assessments, are similarly rigorously prepared to consider the political dimension of the context investigated. The PEA is downscaled to cover the assessment area. To this is added a Participation Assessment and a local security analysis (see Section 5.3.1). Preparation is crucial to minimise personal risk to those running the assessment and to those receiving assessment teams.

Secondly, PCVA is run following certain steps as a multiphase process (outlined in Section 5.3 on assessments) which incorporates and further explores the political and power dynamics of an insecure context:

- **Step 1**: Significant preparation and articulation with comprehensive secondary analyses are made. Assessment methodology is adapted to protect the people being assessed and the assessment team.
- **Step 2**: A light-weight and rapid PVCA overview is led by a small team of generalists, identifying specific thematic which, if necessary, require a second intervention of thematic experts.
- **Step 3**: A second small team of experts carries out very specific follow-up assessments to collect extra critical data required for the design of operations, e.g., gender issues, climate change, environment or protection experts.

The PCVA should ideally be organised to articulate with a protection assessment. Concretely this means ensuring that teams are briefed to recognise signs or criteria that would indicate people at risk of harm. Much of this can be pre-determined during a secondary data analysis before the assessment is made, however, those carrying out the assessment need clear guidance on the decision to stop a PCVA assessment, to start a protection assessment in its place or to continue a PCVA assessment understanding that protection issues need to be accounted for. This is outlined in more detail in Section 5.3.2.

### 3. Changing traditional DRM partnerships and operational modalities.

Where regimes undermine the autonomy and safety of people or where governments are one of the conflict parties, then alternative operational arrangements need to be investigated. In some of these situations, local NGOs, the local Red Cross branch and other civil society groups are not politically neutral and may favour only certain groups of people in need of assistance. Here, a consortium of international NGOs in partnership with the least politicised civil society groups (including community based organisations themselves) may be the best short and medium term solution. The consortia recognises the added value of the different agencies, including (a) human rights and protection, (b) conflict negotiation, (c) technical conflict and risk management agencies and (d) experts in local culture and networks.

It is never the best long-term solution, as this may encourage governments to forego their responsibility and a dependence on international aid, while discouraging community autonomy and ownership in projects. In extreme cases, different forms of remote management are used where international staff is unable to access communities directly. Here, national staff or partner organisations carry out programming.

In all the cases above, key parameters of risk management would need to be adjusted, including:

- Decreasing the complexity of assessments and operations, and the expectation of project outputs.
- Shortening the timeframe of each activity.
- Building-in extra for programming and anticipating delays.
- Some quality standards may need to be compromised.

The set of analyses in both the ‘identification’ and ‘assessment’ phases will clearly determine the modality of operations and the adjustments required. The evolving quality of relationships within communities; local and international civil society, and the government/conflict parties is central in determining the most relevant DRM action and the modality used to carry this out.
4. Households as a key scale of action

Community action is emphasised as a cornerstone of DRM practice. However, community approaches are obviously less effective where different groups within communities are pitted against each. Here, the household becomes the basic unit of programming, until entry points can be exploited to repair the social fabric and bring groups together on a peace-building pathway. Operating at the household level is more costly in time and resources, than it is at a community level. Targeting is also more complicated, because singling out different groups for the project may actually lead to further community friction. For example, in south Asia it is common to duplicate water infrastructure for both low and higher caste groups, given that low caste people are not permitted to use high-caste infrastructure. The particular attention to insecurity and power dynamics and community disaggregation are necessary to implement household programming safely.

5. Adapting the role of the community

There should be no prescribed community approach for DRM action: the context and the capacities and wishes of the community will dictate the approach used when working with communities. For example, communities are often totally dependent on external aid in cases where massive emergencies or conflict situations are beyond their capacity to cope (whether or not contingency planning is in place). This dependency is heightened where local institutions do not have capacity or at the point where they directly target communities through discrimination, corrupt and exploitive practices, looting or through physical violence. Similarly, during complex humanitarian emergencies the capacity of communities to organise, unite and take total responsibility is limited where there is internal discrimination due to caste, ethnicity or religion, or in post-emergency contexts. The capacity and commitment of external actors that have a responsibility towards communities can also be limited. Choosing the appropriate community approach is critical in selecting the best protection approach for those at risk of harm, and for choosing the best security approach that protects aid workers.

Alternatively, the capacity of people to participate is frequently underestimated in emergency contexts. Indigenous knowledge for managing disaster risk should be harnessed wherever possible and added to the external scientific analysis, thus providing the most relevant options for communities. Informal power structures, for example, Buddhist monks in Myanmar or Muslim elders in the Sahel, also have great capacity to help mobilise people, mediate with the government or help diffuse local tension.

Therefore, ACF acknowledges a spectrum of community approaches, with community participation at each step of the project cycle wherever possible. This is summarised in Annex 3) which compares the characteristics of the main approaches:

- **A direct approach**: used to save lives and livelihoods and to enhance the protection of people; normally used during emergencies and early response.

- **A community-based approach**: where communities have limited participation and planning capacities or do not wish to be totally autonomous; normally used in early recovery and rehabilitation contexts.

- **A community-managed approach**: where communities can fully participate and have planning capacities; normally used in rehabilitation and stable contexts.

Defining the level of participation is therefore paramount during the preparation and execution of PCVA – as the level of participation sets the basis for programme design and implementation and is a vital factor for successful implementation of programmes.
6. Changing the emphasis on sustainability

Sustainable action is commonly emphasised where DRM is envisaged as a development action. DRM is still possible for insecure zones where meeting people’s humanitarian needs are paramount if the emphasis on sustainability is modified. This means (a) aiming for shorter-term impacts while planting the seeds of sustainability by building-in activities to prepare for longer-term peace-building objectives and (b) emphasising technology for displaced populations.

Articulating short and long-term aims requires at the outset an open vision in terms of time and level of operations: the past and future needs to be analysed as far as possible (e.g. rainfall forecasting for the next season), while understanding how individuals and/or communities are linked to initiatives at national level, such as peace processes. Although a set of activities may have been defined in the short-term, they must fit into a predetermined longer-term strategy, which is desirable, 3 years in length. In an atmosphere of political volatility combined with the uncertainty of natural hazards and other economic shocks, this is obviously challenging, but a robust integrated surveillance system together with EWS are the key to adapting this strategy (see Principle 6).

Displaced people located either in officially recognised camps that benefit from the UN system of aid or in illegal or unrecognised settlements that may benefit from local or international agencies, pose special technical challenges. Here, portable technical responses offer more flexibility for those that are landless or may be forced to move. Examples of this include metal fuel-efficient cooking systems, family kitchen garden techniques using locally available materials, the use of cash or vouchers for social protection systems, household water treatment and storage systems, and so on (see Annex 1 for some examples of assuring food security for IDPs).

7. Managing different parameters of uncertainty

Opening up a vision of risk and working with a medium-term strategy (3 to 5 years long) in a context of volatility requires measures that manage uncertainty. There are parallels between managing uncertainty for insecure contexts, that is, politically volatile, and other long-term trends – particularly climate change. However, only shorter-term coping mechanisms that negotiate spikes and rapid changes in insecurity, rather than longer-term adaptation measures are normally realistic. For aid agencies, this involves flexibility built into programming for unplanned events and fluctuating access to vulnerable people. This means increasing the timeframe of programmes and of operational modalities, i.e., the ability to move from remote programming, to direct intervention, to simple community-based approaches, depending on the context. It also means being able to adapt to the changing nature of relations between communities, civil society and conflict parties – in many cases clear communication lines are needed between the agency and all parties, which requires great efforts and experience.

One of the most critical tools required to negotiate this uncertainty is an integrated surveillance and EWS that merges analyses of natural hazards, hunger and political/conflict issues. This is challenging, but necessary, given that in many countries, multi-natural hazard EWS have still not been incorporated into a single system, nor translated into an output that can be used by uneducated and poor households. Maintaining a solid insecurity surveillance system is key to having the necessary information to navigate complex emergencies and, while tying this with other systems monitoring external shocks, managing an open vision of risk. This often requires solid, yet discrete, coordination between a range of organisations analysing an assortment of sensitive contextual information, such as the ICRC.
8. Emphasis on the political dimension of programming

Although DRM is perceived by some humanitarian actors as ‘apolitical’, if it is applied to insecure contexts, it needs to address key challenges of humanitarian space. Although this is not an exhaustive list, the challenges that should be addressed during the programme cycle could include:

- Both conflict actors and communities themselves have a political perception of agencies carrying out DRM. That perception can cause problems. It is important for technical DRM specialists not to be seen as associated with foreign policy objectives of conflict parties or those supporting them.
- The non-conditionality of aid in humanitarian contexts and the acceptance of foreign financing with political ‘strings attached’. Choices need to be made by agencies in accepting resources from those connected to conflict parties versus direct and indirect security threats to aid workers and their partners.
- The association of civilian and military aid as part of ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns by military forces. Aid actors need to better understand the potential perception and security impacts and either, (a) advocate against the practice or, (b), adapt communication strategies to communities and security protocols to minimise risk to aid workers.
- The questions of independence and neutrality where organisations accept resources from non-neutral sources, or have religious or ethnic affiliations that place the perception of neutrality in question.
- The link between the security of aid agencies and those of the community. This means equally assuring protection of people at risk of harm whilst protecting the safety of aid workers and their partners using a common protection/security strategy.
- The use of sanctions or ‘common positions’ that prevent aid agencies from engaging with different conflict parties, or accessing resources to those impacted by conflict, e.g., the EU common position on Myanmar, did not allow certain operational partnerships with the regime, negating different DRM activities.

DRM programming would need to adopt a mixture of humanitarian principles, rights and standards, as well as core DRM initiatives, to address these challenges. Annex 8 provides a summary of these international codes and initiatives that would support DRM operations in difficult contexts.

9. Natural hazards as an entry point

Different case studies have encouraged the use of DRM action for natural disaster as a ‘neutral’ entry point that was used to promote reducing conflict. For example, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 led to peace discussions between the rebel Aceh movement and the Indonesian government, and also between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTEE) and the Sri Lankan authorities. Similarly, after significant international pressure, the Myanmar junta finally opened up the Irrawaddy Delta, following the international response to cyclone Nargis in 2007.

Emergency and recovery operations and accompanying DRM may help the facilitation of fragile states during periods of transition to progress to a more secure context. These operations may offer tangible proof that things are becoming better to people who are mistrustful of institutions. These actions can be incorporated into prioritised actions as part of a large sequencing of operations. Here international civil society often plays a key role in facilitating these actions in insecure contexts. In these cases it is important to take care not to create a parallel system to that of institutions without a planned exit strategy. These short-term wins should be supported by capacity-building and risk management initiatives to prepare for the future.

Other positive benefits include:

- Significant inflow of funding that may also be mutualised for peace-building activities.
- Well-executed and inclusive programming can rebuild social cohesion within and between communities, and it can strengthen local DRM capacities for future disaster.
• An increase in the number of humanitarian actors, who also have a range of human rights and advocacy skills, can increase transparency in governance due to the presence of eyewitnesses.
• Opposing political parties may be brought together when responding to disaster.

However, there is no guarantee of lasting peace. To be able to build on the opportunities of natural disaster, it is necessary for external actors to have a long-term commitment beyond humanitarian and media-friendly action. The examples just used demonstrate what can happen without a long-term commitment: War was declared again in Sri Lanka in 2007; the anticipated progress in a sustainable peace solution has not yet materialised in Aceh, and the Irrawaddy Delta was gradually closed by Myanmar authorities in the lead-up to national ‘elections’. Furthermore, DRM action should not be co-opted by conflict actors as part of a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy, as this may further blur the boundaries between neutral humanitarian aid and political foreign policy, leading to a blurring of roles and an increased security risk for civil society actors.

10. Integrated advocacy

The programming suggestions made above are not sufficient for some of the operational hurdles that will continue to challenge aid agencies working in insecure contexts in the future. These challenges include:
• The politicisation of aid and donor sanctions.
• The involvement of non-state actors in conflict and targeting of aid workers, who are often difficult to negotiate with or are fronts for organised crime.
• The overall decreasing humanitarian space and increasing governance challenges and stress on government services.
• Working with states which largely cause risk or support others that cause risk.
• Forgotten conflicts and post-conflict contexts face sustainability issues for aid operations. Here there is often great difficulty in maintaining public and donor-government focus to ensure the continued and sufficient aid investment required for long term action.

These challenges sit alongside other long-term issues and trends linked to disaster drivers. Many of the issues causing disaster and undernutrition continue to be inadequately addressed by global and national decision makers. Here are some examples:
• An accountable commitment to the reduction of greenhouse gases and the compensation of those who suffer from climate change is far off.
• The chronic disagreement in the world trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round coupled with the continuing unsustainable development by the new economic superpowers continue to create a gap between the poor and the rich, while degrading the environment.
• Accelerating population growth and settlement in unplanned and unsafe urban areas exposes more people to hazards.
• Economic fragility and austerity measures, coupled with continuing significant expenditure on national security continues to lead to inadequate spending on social sectors.
• Many factors are leading to burdened government sectors, poor governance, and a lack of consideration of those most vulnerable to disaster in national planning.

Given the immense scope and sensitivity of these issues, there are many cases where advocacy and sensitisation of all actors and the public remains the sole avenue to resolving these issues. For many agencies this involves a separate strategy and a set of actions operating at global and national levels that should be closely articulated with field actions both to mutualise impact and to provide field experience and data. This coordination is also critical to ensure that advocacy does not compromise the safety of communities and aid agency actors involved in field operations. As the Copenhagen climate change negotiations (COP 15) in 2009 demonstrated, the convergence of a diverse network of organisations across traditional aid communities towards the same message multiplies the impact of advocacy.

5.2 - Graduated risk management for insecure contexts

There are three dimensions of factors that determine programming:

1. Intensity of insecurity.
2. Duration of insecurity at a given intensity level or ‘time’.
3. Causes/fuelling mechanisms of insecurity.
   a. Political and institutional factors.
   b. Socio-economic factors.
   c. Resources and environmental issues.

These shape contextual thresholds that may be used to plan and adjust programming as the context evolves, where:

\[
\text{Programming} = f (\text{intensity} \times \text{time} \times (\text{causes} + \text{fuelling factors}))
\]

Here, a graduated management system sets limits in terms of what DRM objectives and expectations are formulated and how they are carried out. It is articulated with disaster cycle management, which guides operations for when activities are carried out. In summary: doing the right thing, at the right time, in the right way. The system aims to encourage:

- confidence for decision-making and forward planning to better manage the uncertainty which always accompanies insecure contexts (and taking into account uncertain external factors, e.g., climate change);
- confidence for agencies, governments and donors about what can be expected and achieved;
- more precise and reactive programming with improved real-time serving of needs and risk;
- the maximisation of the use and impact of aid resources, and,
- a better linkage of programming with the commonly used ‘five levels of security management’ to allow a mutual analysis of both context and agency security indicators.

The graduated system presented here mainly considers two of the three dimensions that affect programming for insecure contexts. The principles outlined in Section 5.1 and the programming recommendations take into account the third dimension of causes and fuelling factors. However, more work is necessary to refine the thresholds using this third dimension, which connects Political Economy Analysis and Conflict Assessment methodology. Here, the set of parameters initially defining how conflict works (i.e. causes) transforms into another set of parameters that requires a significant shift in programming (i.e. fuelling factors). For example, natural resources may not be a key cause of conflict, but major DRM objectives and livelihoods activities will need to greatly change in cases where people do not have sustained access to the natural resources they normally rely on for their livelihoods, or where insecurity leads to the degradation of marginal ecosystems (e.g. pastoral ecosystems), or where ecosystems become part of war economies (e.g. extraction of minerals or timber).

The graduated system proposed as a preliminary version is guided by an overall objective table, which recommends that the main objectives, the scale of objectives and the most likely partnership configuration change in proportion to the intensity and duration of conflict (see Table 5.1). This can already give a vision of the structure of DRM programming during programme identification when secondary material is analysed, ahead of field assessments. Follow-up technical and agency security assessments will better define the needs, proposed risk management and relief solutions. Also, it will analyse the main boundaries within which insecurity and impacts will fluctuate.
Table 5.1 outlines a set of major DRM objectives and how their feasibility changes both with intensity of conflict and duration of insecurity. The four major DRM objectives have been taken from ACF: (1) preparedness, (2) reducing vulnerability, (3) building resilience and (4) reducing the impact of disaster drivers (e.g., climate change, economic marginalisation, market fragility of food and fuel, unplanned urbanisation, governance). To this is added the response (or relief work) to the impact of insecurity. The main findings from Figure 2.7 have also been incorporated into this table, guiding the most likely scale of programming and the main type of partnership modality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>Preparedness</th>
<th>Relief/ Recovery</th>
<th>Reducing vulnerability</th>
<th>Building Resilience</th>
<th>Disaster drivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punctual</td>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Punctual</td>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Punctual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest Conflict</td>
<td>CB-D IA-LA-GA</td>
<td>CB IA-LA</td>
<td>CB-D IA-LA-GA</td>
<td>CB-D IA-LA-GA</td>
<td>CB IA-LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>D IA-LA</td>
<td>CB-D IA-LA</td>
<td>CB-D IA-LA</td>
<td>D IA-LA</td>
<td>D IA-LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Crisis</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
<td>D IA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Feasible | Challenging | Not feasible
---|---|---

D = direct intervention at household level
IA = international agency
LA = Local agency
GA = Government agency
CB = Community-based

Table 5.1: DRM objectives and their potential to be undertaken in insecure environments, showing how partnerships, scale of intervention and operational modality change with intensity of conflict and duration of insecurity.

This table is a generic starting point and should be modified according to the specific context. It is based on the general assumptions outlined to construct Figure 2.7, notably, that less inclusive partnerships and operational modalities are possible with increasing intensity and increasing duration at a given intensity. It also assumes that a real community-managed approach is unlikely while there is still conflict in a community. Finally, it does not take into account the beneficial impact of successful programming. For example, if the recommendations of this report are put in place, then the ability of the community to manage risk will increase the field of feasibility – particularly at a given intensity level that continues for an extended period of time.

85 - In the context of ACF meeting acute and structural humanitarian needs, reducing vulnerability aims to restore the livelihoods system to the pre-disaster state using traditional livelihood activities. In contrast, building resilience aims to improve the pre-disaster state of a community through building on vulnerability reduction measures and by introducing new livelihood activities and promoting changes to traditional practices.
5.3 - Overview of specific recommendations regarding the programme cycle

This section follows-on from the principles and the graduated risk management system presented in Section 5 to present specific recommendations for programming around the programme cycle, as defined in Annex 7. It focuses on the ‘identification’ and the ‘assessment and planning’ phases of programmes, noting that the principles detailed in Section 5.1 guide much of the ‘programme delivery’. These recommendations are a starting point for further development of DRM programming adapted to insecure contexts and the linkage between DRM and Insecurity Programming.

5.3.1 - Identification of programmes – context analysis

The identification of programmes takes into account the following issues and tasks:

- The key factors for context analysis: merging DRM and conflict-related data from analyses, EWS and surveillance.
- Articulation with the country strategy process, defining major objectives and first-phase feasibility.
- The role of country risk analysis
- The role of PEA and conflict analysis

Ideally, the country strategy process collects DRM data at general level, but also at national and provincial-level to define a global strategy that considers the main issues of risk when identifying programmes. This is carried out using a country disaster risk analysis, where the data used is normally dominated by secondary information, leading to a country strategy paper:

1. What hazards and threats exist? How will they change and what are the potential future scenarios?
2. How are people vulnerable to these hazards and threats and what are the long-term issues contributing to changes in hazards and the worsening of people’s vulnerability?
3. How does the context contribute to potential vulnerability and future disasters? What is likely to happen in the future?
4. Who is doing what to cover disaster risks (from threats and hazards)?
5. With what institutional frameworks does ACF need to coordinate?

A simple country risk analysis follows four major steps (an example from ACF is summarised below in Figure 5.1):

1. **Context analysis**: looks at the main vulnerability to disaster and capacity to address disaster within the country.
2. **Hazard analysis**: outlines the type and probability of potential hazards and threats.
3. **Risk analysis**: determines and ranks risks (based on the above analyses), and provides a spatial (risk map) and temporal overview (seasonal calendar) of these risks.
4. **Constructing risk scenarios**: provides an overview about the uncertainty of risks for the future.

Risk analysis ranks different hazards and threats according to a general and qualitative ranking of impact versus probability. To assess impact it is important to judge the overall vulnerability of communities to hazards taking into account the capacities of both the communities and other external stakeholders (government systems, INGOs, local Red Cross, other civil society groups) to address risk and respond to hazards. They key challenge for understanding capacity is to separate what is on paper and what actually exists.
This type of risk analysis applied to insecure contexts will bring in a more detailed political and security dimension than normally used in DRM. This concretely means:

- **Connecting with the range of political, power and security analyses that are commonly carried out by donor governments and the UN.** International civil society should profit from the vast resources spent on this work at national and regional levels, adding a local level analysis to this work (see sections 4.2 and Principle 2 in section 5.1 for a vision of some of these tools).\(^{86}\)

- **Adding to this material with the additional focus at community and local government level**, using existing (and sometimes discrete) networks known to agencies and downscaling the detail to the potential area of operation. This uses secondary data and acts as a starting point for field assessments after a positioning is taken to go further in the country strategy.

- **Focusing on a specific problem as initially defined in the context analysis that meets the specific mandate of the organisation.** This entails not only building on previous analyses, but focusing on the specific thematic PEA. For example, ‘studying the system of risk management and its application to communities’.\(^{87}\) Given that sector-specific thematic are now the focus of the new generation of PEA, there is still added value to develop PEA that can manage multi-sectoral thematic such as risk management and undernutrition.

- **Clarifying how much extra expert resources are required or coordinating analyses with other organisations to mutualise resources.** This may require extra specialists in risk and conflict management or training to generalists. Some organisations make their analysis in consortia (ACF alliance) or use external facilitators (e.g. World Vision).

- **Defining the boundaries of a general country analysis, followed by specific follow-up analyses** on specific areas highlighted by the country analysis – preparing for later field assessments with direct contact with communities and households. The initial general country analysis should resolve such issues as what data needs to be analysed rapidly (particularly in highly insecure contexts), the scale of the data and, again, whether specialist resources are necessary.

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\(^{86}\) Additionally, the DFID, 2009- How to Note on Political Economy Analysis outlines the range of tools available, see www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis, consulted 1/6/11

\(^{87}\) ACF would additionally study the thematic of ‘why undernutrition exists’. 

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**Figure 5.1: A quantitative risk ranking matrix for the Philippines.** Scores are given for the impact (severity) and likelihood (frequency) for potential disaster for each form of hazard, giving a risk index. This is ranked on the table to prioritise each risk.
PEA methodology has been used to enhance the country strategy analysis or country risk analysis by:

- understanding the political context and how it affects aid strategy and programming;
- supporting risk management and scenario planning;
- opening up dialogue between the agency and other stakeholders (it may give insights on the best way to engage insecurity stakeholders and helps to build agency credibility and trust);
- helping to define who the agency will work with and how, while ensuring that harmful consequences of programming are avoided and finding which programming may work best;
- defining the main interests and incentives that can enhance the feasibility of programming and finding who the ‘winners and losers’ are in different aid sectors, thus outlining strategic entry points for programming;
- better understanding of the dynamics of DRM or other related thematic (e.g., undernutrition) what blockages and opportunities there are across sectors;
- feeding into and benefiting from specific security analyses that collectively help to define operational feasibility.

**BOX 5.1: A SELECTION OF CONFLICT AND INSECURITY INFORMATION SITES**

**INTERNET SOURCES**
- AlertNet - Humanitarian news network on humanitarian crises. Includes information on many different topics, including conflict resolution. Includes region and country profiles: [http://www.trust.org/alertnet/](http://www.trust.org/alertnet/)
- Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Germany: [www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org)
- CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) of IGAD: [www.cewarn.org](http://www.cewarn.org)
- CPR (Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction) Network: [www.cprnet.net](http://www.cprnet.net)
- FAST International Early Warning Program / Swisspeace, Switzerland: [www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm)
- FEWER (Forum for Early Warning and Early Response): [www.fewer.org](http://www.fewer.org)
- International Alert, Great Britain: [www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org)
- ISS (Institute for Security Studies), South Africa: [www.iss.org](http://www.iss.org)
- SIPRI Internet-Based Early Warning Indicators System for Preventive Policy, Sweden: [www.sipri.org/contents/it/ewi.html](http://www.sipri.org/contents/it/ewi.html)
- WARN (West Africa Early Warning and Early Response Network) of WANEP: [www.wanep.org/programs/early_warning.htm](http://www.wanep.org/programs/early_warning.htm)

**NEWS LINKS**
- Crisisweb: [www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org)
- IRIN news: [www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org) The Integrated Regional Information Network of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides news summaries on humanitarian issues from Africa and Asia.
- ReliefWeb: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int) by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides country-by-country news and analysis from a range of sources.

89 - Modified from von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller, 2006 - Conflict Early Warning Systems: Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa, GTZ
Context analysis and the use of PEA and Risk Analysis is a dynamic process that involves the use of surveillance and EWS data. This report will not go into the available hazard, hunger and other continuous data collection processes, but some key information sources and EWS on conflict and insecurity are presented in Box 5.1.

**5.3.2 - DRM assessments for insecure zones**

Programme assessments are characterised by the collection of primary data, which commonly add to a pre-analysis of secondary data linked to the country strategy process. Assessing for risk management for insecure contexts is characterised by comprehensive preparation and an adapted PCVA methodology.

**PREPARATION**

A comprehensive preparation that builds on other secondary studies following the country strategy process is important given the security stakes for both assessment teams and community members themselves. The identification phase should have mapped tensions, divisions, lines of weakness in communities and all forms of sensitivities. This is used to then modify the set-up, design, and approach of the PCVA.

Key components of this include:

1. **A problem-driven PEA**, focusing on the dynamic of risk management at the community level, which may be connected to a sector-level analysis understanding the linkages between community and local government (see Box 5.4).

2. **A participation assessment**, is a critical component that defines to what level the team will engage with community, defines the scale of the assessment (individual, households or community) and will consider protection issues for the assessment (see Box 5.2). The key issues to address include:90
   a. How can the participation of affected populations in the assessment phase enhance their security and that of humanitarian personnel?
   b. Which means of communication and which participatory assessment methods (focus groups and interviews) can put participants at risk and how can this be avoided?
   c. How information is used: What kind of information can put the lives of informants in jeopardy? Is collecting this type of data necessary? Where do you store the information? Should it be kept confidential? How do you guarantee that it remains so?’

3. **A security analysis** that reviews a series of indicators for the field area to be assessed in order to define the local security level (that fits within an analysis framework, normally with five levels of security). This analysis helps define what actions and measures are to be taken for the field team, following an overall set of standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which normally have been previously defined.

4. **Making a careful choice of assessment team profiles and preparation** that will minimise risk to the assessment while being able to best exploit opportunities.

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**BOX 5.2: WHAT IS A PARTICIPATION ASSESSMENT?**

Participation assessments define the participative strategy used for assessments (later adjusted after the experience of the assessment during programme delivery). It comprises:

1. A revision of:
   - b. Different actors to consider.
   - c. The dynamics of how to balance risks for people and aid workers.

2. A classification of the level of community participation, using the following definitions describing an increasing level of participation:
   - a. Passive – action of communities is limited to the supply of information.
   - b. By consultation – where material incentives are required for community engagement through the supply of materials/cash/labour.
   - c. Interactive – where communities actively pursue local initiatives.

3. A definition of an assessment strategy for participation taking communication, security management, protection, discrimination/exclusion and humanitarian principles into account.

To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyse the factors that both constrain and support participation of community members in aid programmes. These factors are related to three key elements of any humanitarian situation: (i) the context, (ii) the population affected by conflict or disaster and, (iii) the mandate, strategy and practice of the aid agency carrying out the project.

**PCVA ASSESSMENT**

Paradoxically, a more detailed contextual understanding is required, compared to many PCVA carried out in stable contexts, yet the ability of those affected by insecurity is normally compromised to receive a large field team for an extensive period of time. Therefore it is suggested to use a multiphase methodology with an ‘open notion’ of risk, finalising the PEA with additional conflict analysis questions and investigating the range of external shocks that may also add to insecurity. This is briefly outlined in Principle 2 of section 5.1:

- **Step 1**: Significant preparation and articulation with comprehensive secondary analyses. Adapting assessment methodology to protect the people being assessed and the assessment team.

- **Step 2**: A small team of generalists lead a light-weight and rapid PVCA overview, identifying specific thematic which, if necessary, require a second intervention of thematic experts.

- **Step 3**: A second small team of experts carries out very specific follow-up assessments to collect the extra critical data required for the design of operations. This team may include experts on gender issues, climate change, ecosystem/natural resource management or protection.

The **PCVA is normally linked to other baseline assessments** because agencies are usually interested in responding to the impact of insecurity and other hazards, while working towards managing the risks of further disaster. Much of the vulnerability and capacity data will be contained in these other baseline assessments. Therefore it is recommended that a basic PCVA is made by technical generalists or sector specific experts running baseline assessments, together with the baseline assessment where insecurity intensity allows it (usually related to the time able to be spent with households and communities). More work needs to be done to integrate risk management with the range of rapid assessments that are used when (1) major external shocks (such as natural hazards) affect insecure contexts, (2) when reaching specific vulnerability thresholds that rapidly lead into crisis or (3) where there is limited access to those in need.

It is recommended that the PCVA should have:

- A component following-on from the PEA begun during assessment preparation, this may require an additional expert in Step 3. There are overlaps with PCVA methodology including data triangulation, representative participation and joint analysis. To note that full disclosure of findings to local institutions under difficult political contexts needs to be measured in order to prevent fuelling tensions and distrust.

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An extra protection component, which minimises potential insecurity risks to those participating in the PCVA. This pays attention to what is asked, how it is asked and who is present during the assessment. This may lead to a full protection assessment being carried out. Box 5.3 summarises how protection can be articulated with PCVA.

**BOX 5.3: HOW IS PROTECTION ARTICULATED WITH PCVA?**

In the course of PCVA assessment the team may become aware, through visual signs or ‘stories’, that a particular group (e.g., women, ethnic or religious minority, economic group, etc) or perhaps the entire community is actively or passively marginalised – or worse. The circumstances may or may not allow the completion of the PCVA. Consequently the decision to stop a PVCA and consider a Protection Assessment could happen at any point during the PCVA.

However, before conducting a Protection Assessment, it is vital to consider the safety and security of all those at risk, not only during the assessment but post assessment.

**STEP 1:**
A set of indicators are examined to identify the level of protection issues. These include:
- Indicators of human rights violations (not exhaustive), e.g., killing civilians; forced displacement; aggression against civilians; destruction of housing, land, crops and property; torture or arbitrary arrest; endemic (pervasive, systematic) sexual violence; domestic abuse; people trafficking; forced prostitution; forced labour or slavery.
- Quality of governance (adapted from DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets) that examines issues such as how political power is exercised, the integrity of government organisations, the adherence to law and human rights, property rights, local legal and justice system, and so on.
- Gender issues (adapted from DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets), that look at the roles and responsibilities of men and women in community decision making, labour-intensive activities within households, access to assets and resources, access to power, inheritance and land rights, and so on.

**STEP 2:**
A decision is made on whether to conduct a Protection Assessment or not. This considers:
- What the role of different parties are in the protection issue and their likely response if investigated/risk to those who may be harmed as a result.
- Is the assessment feasible in terms of collecting, storing and transmitting data?
- Are there the right people available to carry this out?

**STEP 3:**
The assessment is prepared for – including further training of the team on the questionnaires, on how the assessment is to be carried out and on the team’s behaviour during the assessment. The team reviews security measures and formulates a contingency plan to stop the assessment and leave the area, if necessary.

**STEP 4:**
The assessment is carried out – paying attention to how information is gathered, recorded and stored; whether the right people are present and able to communicate during questioning, and whether the ambience of the context is being monitored.

**STEP 5:**
Post-assessment data is managed and analysed for future action. How to secure data and ensure confidentiality and triangulation of information? How the information is to be shared with expert human rights and protection agencies, if necessary. Do the findings mean that PCVA is not pursued? Can the assessment feed into the findings of the PCVA? Are other specific protection measures a priority or should they be integrated into future risk...
• An extra focus on disaggregation of the community where conflict is internal to communities, linking this with considerations on participation and protection:93
  - How can one make sure that minorities and marginalised people are involved in the assessment phase, without stigmatising them or offending influential groups or individuals?
  - Do intermediary or national colleague enable one to have access to all groups? If not, how can access be gained? With whom can one interact to secure this access?'
• An attempt to maintain impartiality and independence or being perceived as such. This will depend on who is consulted and how this is done during the assessment:
  - Has a stakeholder analysis been undertaken before interacting in a preferential manner?
  - Is there the ability to engage with various political, religious and social groups? If not, how can one do so?
  - Have I communicated my principles to my intermediaries, and do they understand my position?
    Are my actions in line with these values?'
• planning that keeps in mind security of staff and of who we work with, with a key focus on the perception of different actors

**BOX 5.4: WHAT IS A PROBLEM-DRIVEN POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS? 94**

‘Political Economy Analysis can also be deployed to enhance understanding and resolve a particular problem at the project level or in relation to a specific policy issue, which may cut across a number of sectors. The World Bank has been at the forefront of work to develop a “problem driven framework to governance and political economy analysis”, which they define as being “focused on specific issues and challenges rather than developing broad overviews, in order to generate operationally relevant findings and implications”. It is emphasised that “problem-driven” does not mean focusing exclusively on areas of difficulty, but also identifying opportunities and learning from where success has been achieved. The advantage of the problem-driven approach is that it encourages users to delve deeper to understand why a specific problem has not been successfully addressed’.

The framework encourages users to distinguish between three layers:
1. Identifying the problem, issue or vulnerability to be addressed;
2. Mapping out the institutional and governance weaknesses which underpin the problem; and
3. Drilling down to the political economy drivers which constrain or support progressive change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What vulnerabilities/challenges?</th>
<th>Evidence of poor outcomes to which GPE weaknesses appear to contribute.</th>
<th>Eg: repeated failure to adopt sector reform and poor sector outcomes. Continuous food insecurity. Corruption continues to undermine the business climate even after anti-corruption law.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political economy drivers</td>
<td>Why are things this way? Why are policies or institutional arrangements not being improved?</td>
<td>Analysis of stakeholders, incentives, rents/rent-distribution, historical legacies &amp; prior experiences with reforms, social trends &amp; forces (e.g. ethnic tensions) and how they shape current stakeholder positions and actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2 provides a basic example of some key parts of the structure to be articulated with standard PCVA methodology that incorporates parts of the preceding suggestions:
5.3.3 - Programme planning

The programme planning process reviews different solutions to the problems identified and it formulates the structure of the response: a programme, its project components and the activities making up each project. Great attention needs to be paid to this part of the programme cycle in the key areas of security and protection, particular groups most affected by insecurity and issues of impartiality and independence – this will greatly determine whether the programme delivery works or not. The most delicate steps in planning are the ‘prioritisation’ of activities and the ‘targeting’, because, although many people can be involved in the assessment stage, not all will benefit equally from the programme. Here, an international agency may mediate between different groups within a community, which requires good communication and facilitation skills.

Where possible, this planning process is made in close collaboration with stakeholders – in particular members of the community. International agencies can act to facilitate the process by proposing the most suitable solutions, based on an analysis of the situation in partnership with the community and proposing the most feasible DRM actions and processes suited to the situation. Ideally, decisions are taken jointly, but, as noted above, the level of involvement of the community and local partners in the decision-making process depends on several context-specific factors, knowledge and resources. Therefore, it is important to readjust the participatory approach based on the experience of the PCVA.
The main elements to be decided upon during planning include:

1. The overall risk management approach to adopt: reduce, accept or avoid the risk?

2. What are the main risk management objectives and what are the potential activities to achieve them? How can short-term confidence-building activities be linked with longer-term activities constructing resilience to all forms of risk? How are these related to the different thresholds defined by the graduated risk management system (see Section 5.2) and scenarios anticipated where these thresholds change?

3. How can these activities contribute to managing insecurity, decreasing insecurity impacts and risks, while creating opportunities to build social cohesion and unity, creating livelihoods systems which are more resilient to insecurity and external shocks and helping the relationship between people and local institutions (see Section 4.1)?

4. A brief overview of how different DRM activities are integrated with other initiatives addressing the impact insecurity and other disaster: either mainstreamed into a larger operation or as a separate, stand-alone intervention.

5. The partnership and coordination strategy with other local or international stakeholders.

6. The participatory approach to be adopted with the community during programme delivery.

7. Security and protection protocols to be adopted by all stakeholders in the programmes and project components.

8. The preliminary strategy and timeframe to achieve the different DRM objectives. Planning may be further adjusted according to the timeframe of resources available and to the local capacities and partnership/coordination opportunities. In addition, to manage uncertainty, there needs to be extra flexibility and contingency plans in terms of timeframe, supply chain, operational modality and articulation with relief operations.

The following key factors related to insecure contexts should also be considered when planning:

- Where specific groups are targeted by programmes, this may put them at risk of dispute and increasing social tensions. The whole community needs clear communication and explanation of any decisions made. The people targeted have to be consulted because they have the clearest idea regarding personal risks and potential protection measures. Key issues to address include:
  - How can participatory prioritisation and targeting be done in a way that minimises the risk of social tension and dispute?
  - How can one ensure that the rationale for decisions is clearly communicated to all members of the affected population and that the explanations are understood and accepted?
  - How can the participation of the affected populations in the design of programmes help to ensure that programme activities do not generate risks for them? How can it help to reinforce their protection?
  - How can the participation of affected populations, especially marginalised groups, in the design of programmes serve to ensure that these groups are not wholly excluded?
  - How can participation in programme design guarantee that programmes targeting marginalised groups do not further stigmatise them, but, rather, support them in a way that they find appropriate?

- The selection of affected people to play key roles, to be hired as staff and of local partners needs to be done carefully to ensure that there is not a perception of favouritism, unfairness or that the agency is aligned with other external interests (i.e. Western donor foreign policy). Here participation
by all stakeholders in the process, together will public accountability measures, can support the agencies perceived independence and impartiality. This is important to minimise social tensions while maximising the security of all. Key issues to address include:

- How does one ensure that the design process is conducted according to the needs of the population and not in response to pressure applied by a particular stakeholder?
- To avoid potential bias, are various population sub-groups represented in the groups that are defining the programme?
- Is one’s communication strategy adequate to ensure transparency and that the population understands the rationale behind decisions made, including one’s organisation’s position on impartiality and independence?

Many DRM activities in conflict zones are likely to focus on hardware and simple capacity building, to rely more heavily on the support of aid organisations and to be more locally contained in their scope. They are less likely to be linked with national initiatives given the weakness or lack of commitment to the most vulnerable people by government institutions, if they exist. Interventions can go beyond the provision of basic needs and protection of assets, to include new livelihoods in periods of relative peace. Additionally, it is possible to have the support of informal institutions and civil society groups and to improve access to services, however, it is unlikely to lead to sustainable long-term results. Remote management and control modalities, careful consideration of the perception of external aid agencies and their partners, working with displaced people, extra project contingency time and clear communications to all parties are essential for running DRM activities.
6. Conclusion: the way forward for linking DRM with Insecurity Programming

There is an increasing awareness from the DRM community that the bulk of its tools and approaches are not best suited for insecure contexts. This is an important technical gap because, for families living in insecurity, vulnerability and the need to manage multiple layers of risk are heightened. Similarly, those working on conflict and fragile states are working towards more integrated insecurity programming by bringing together the humanitarian and aid communities with various international agencies. However, there is a gap in focus and action just before, during and directly after complex humanitarian emergencies. Furthermore, insulating programming initiatives from external hazards requires more emphasis, one of the key lessons learnt for why the MDGs have not suitably progressed.

Within the context of a broad political economy framework, the way in which DRM can aim to stabilise insecure contexts includes (1) a focus on the timing of transitions aiming to release pressure and risk leading to further disaster and conflict (2) within a long-term strategy coordinated with other agencies, (3) with action regulated by a graduated management system defined by contextual thresholds (4) derived from an integrated threats-multi-hazard surveillance and early warning system (EWS). This action is structured using disaster cycle and programme management principles. DRM, as an entry point should aim to insulate fragile contexts against the impact of external stresses including natural hazards, negative seasonality and other shocks not linked to local insecurity. Where possible, this long-term strategy should be a joint effort between international and national agencies, involving agencies with specific roles (e.g., negotiators, protection and human rights, community and technical DRM and relief-reconstruction agencies), coordinating both humanitarian and developmental action. After, the management of threats can be integrated with that of external hazards, building on the confidence and positive impact demonstrated by DRM.

This briefing paper has the aim of traversing the various conceptual and operational territories in order to define a way forward to fill some of the operational needs listed above. Essentially, the end aim is to put the tools necessary to fill these gaps in the hands of policy makers, decision makers and those running field programmes. It requires effort at different levels, which should build on what already exists, rather than coming up with something new or another ‘brand’. To bring about widespread operational changes on the ground, it is recommended to (1) better study synergies around complex humanitarian emergencies, (2) emphasising linkages between existing insecurity, risk and relief/recovery frameworks, and (3) the key agencies involved in field programming, (4) leading to the construction of a practical tool box integrating action. A list of entry-point projects to better merge DRM with IP accompany these key recommendations:
1. **Better definition of integrated programming just before, during and immediately after complex humanitarian action.**
   a. Prevention of the degradation of insecure contexts into conflict.
   b. Co-management of external hazards and internal threats of a context and linking this with programming which focuses on the impact of disaster/insecurity.
   c. Preparation of an enabling environment for a broad-based transformation leading to political and social stability and livelihood security.

   **Entry points:**
   i. A detailed revision of how to extend current benchmark insecurity context frameworks (such as the World Development Report, UNDP Disaster-Conflict Interface and Human Development Report) to incorporate complex humanitarian emergencies. The output would be a document to influence civil society, donors, multilaterals and government ‘positioning’ (in policy, organisation strategies and plans of action).
   ii. An extension of work done in this paper to bring together ‘best practice’ field-based programmes and projects that draw together insecurity with DRM and relief and recovery in complex humanitarian emergencies, within a framework of varying intensity, duration and causes or fuelling factors of conflict. The output would provide concrete recommendations for modifying field practice.

2. **Improvement of links between existing international, multilateral and operational frameworks covering DRM, conflict and fragile states; tying this with any extension or expansion of the MDG system and the renewal of the Hyogo Framework for Action after 2015. Key target initiatives would include:**
   b. UNFCCC and IPCC outputs on climate change adaptation.
   d. EC, World Bank and UN Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning.
   e. UN Cluster System, including IASC.
   f. Key civil society consortia aligned with a coherent DRM or IP vision (e.g. the Global Network for Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction, the Climate Alliance Network)

   **Entry points:**
   i. A mapping of existing international and multilateral initiatives, processes (together with their timeframes) and potential overlaps and synergies; complemented by a mapping of key decision-making structures and ‘champions’ already engaged in or able to carry out DRM-IP integration recommendations.
   ii. Feeding in from point 2i, above, each of the frameworks should be engaged to demonstrate how practical links can be made. Integration would better demonstrate the linkages between existing initiatives.

3. **Improvement of links within single donor agencies and the UN and between existing conflict/fragile states, risk management (including ecosystem/natural resource management) and relief units.**
   a. Linking existing policy and operational tools, such as conflict management, DRR, CCA, livelihoods, ecosystem/natural resource management, social protection and emergency relief (ACF would also bring in undernutrition into this linkage, given that it represents the nexus of many forms of humanitarian needs).
   b. UN inter-agencies groups working on different conflict and post-conflict issues, with Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) sub-working groups on DRM and with environmental agencies.

c. Targeting donor countries within the top 10 Development Assistance Committee (DAC): US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Canada, Norway and Sweden, assisting with improved coherence and contributions of individual thematic or sector policy and practice towards ‘larger’ goals or resilience.

d. Other key multilaterals: World Bank, EC and other regional governance bodies and development banks.

Entry points:
i. A mapping of existing initiatives, processes (together with their timeframes) and potential overlaps and synergies within the individual agencies listed above; complemented by a mapping of key decision-making structures and ‘champions’ already engaged in or able to carry out integration recommendations.

ii. Strategy for integrating the findings into organisational processes that determine and execute field-based programming, with a careful targeting of ‘command’ documents or structures that determine agency processes (e.g., the guidelines for the next round of EC Country Strategy Papers, defining how EC delegations should construct their 5-year country planning.

4. Provision of a multi-purpose toolbox with programming field tools for a spectrum of actors in an approach which both integrates DRM, Insecurity Programming and Relief and Recovery, and structures this using disaster cycle and programme management principles.

a. Developing a country strategy process supported by an integrated analysis package using secondary data (and previous primary data where the agency already has experience), boosted by an open vision of risk analysis and by a Political Economy Analysis.

b. Developing EWS and surveillance that integrates current insecurity, natural hazard and man-made shocks. Refining a Graduated Management System, connected to this EWS-surveillance package, by reviewing indicators and more field examples.

c. Field assessment package, structured in a multi-phase process with rapid and full-versions applicable to contexts in the disaster cycle:

   - Integrating PCVA with a PEA and conflict assessment downscaled to the community-level.
   - Articulated with an agency security analysis and community participation assessment and protection element.
   - All articulated to ‘baseline’ assessments that analyse the impact of disaster.
   - Articulated with a protection assessment component.

d. Construction of a programme design methodology which emphasises the co-benefits for managing external hazards, internal insecurity issues and the regional and global processes driving disaster and conflict in a given context. This would include a menu of project and activity options, organised according to the thresholds of insecurity and according to the context position on the disaster cycle. Gender, environment and the role of employment would to be further emphasised.
DRM Glossary

Adaptive capacity: The ability of a system to adjust to changing shocks and trends, to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities or to manage the consequences (Adapted from Crahay, 2010).

Climate change adaptation: An adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2007).

Complex emergencies: A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency (Adapted from IASC, 1994).

Coping capacity: The ability of people, organisations and systems, using available skills and resources, to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters (Adapted from Villagran de Leon 2006).

Disaster: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 2009).

Disaster risk management: The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping and adaptive capacities, in order to address vulnerability and lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster. Generic risk management employs various strategies to reduce, avoid or manage risk including mitigation, deferral, sharing, transfer, acceptance and avoidance (Adapted from UNISDR, 2009).

Disaster risk reduction: The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment and improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR, 2009).

Exposure: The degree to which people, property or other elements are located within zones affected by hazards, and thereby subject to potential losses (Adapted from Crahay, 2010).

Hazard: The probability or possibility that a harmful event manifests itself in a certain geographical area within a certain interval of time. Hazards can be classified as natural or man-made (Adapted from Villagran de Leon, 2006).
  - Rapid onset hazards refer to hazards that occur suddenly and that cannot be predicted long in advance (e.g. flooding or a cyclone).
  - Slow-onset hazards refer to hazards that develop throughout a limited period of time (a few months/years), and that can generally be predicted

Mitigation: Any action taken to minimise the extent of a disaster or potential disaster. Mitigation can take place before, during or after a disaster, but the term is most often used to refer to actions against potential disasters. Mitigation measures are both physical or structural (such as flood defences or strengthening buildings) and non-structural (such as training in disaster management, regulating land use and public education) (Twigg, 2004).
Permanent emergencies: These are the result of widespread structural poverty that requires more or less permanent welfare, but can be made worse by natural hazards (Byrne and Baden 1995).

Preparedness: Specific measures taken before disasters strike, usually to forecast or warn against them, take precautions when they threaten and arrange for the appropriate response (such as organising evacuation and stockpiling food supplies). Preparedness falls within the broader field of mitigation (Twigg, 2004).

Prevention: Activities to ensure that the adverse impact of hazards and related disasters is avoided. As this is unrealistic in most cases, the term is not widely used nowadays (Twigg, 2004).

Resilience: The ability of a community, household or individual to resist, absorb and recover from shocks and stresses while fulfilling its needs, retaining its functionality and developing its ability to learn, cope with or adapt to hazards and change (Adapted from IPCC, 2007; Mayunga, 2007).

Risk: The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions (Olhoff and Schaer, 2010).

Risk analysis: The systematic use of information to identify hazards and to estimate the chance for and severity of, injury or loss to individuals or populations, property, the environment, or other things of value. (GTZ, 2003).

Scenario: An account or synopsis of a possible course of events that could occur, which forms the basis for planning assumptions (ACH 2009, Contingency Planning Package).

Sensitivity: The degree to which a community, household or individual is affected by, or responsive to, hazards (Olmos 2001).

Social protection: All public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect vulnerable people against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of marginalised people; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004).

Sustainable natural resource management: The identification, monitoring and sustainable management of ecosystem services to support resilience and sustainable livelihoods. This includes ecosystem services with direct material benefits to human livelihoods such as water, food, energy sources, or construction material as well as those ecosystem services which have protective functions for livelihoods (Adapted from Sudmeier-Rieux et al., 2006).

Vulnerability: A function of the character, magnitude, and rate of hazards to which a community, household or individual is exposed, its sensitivity.
# The change in key characteristics for DRM for conflict contexts

Formulated according to changes in the intensity of insecurity or the level of threat. There are many permutations possible for individual contexts, this generalises the experience of ACF in contexts where groups of people are discriminated against or actively targeted by governments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict intensity/Level of threat</th>
<th>Late conflict/low threats</th>
<th>Manifest conflict/medium threat</th>
<th>Crisis/high threat</th>
<th>Severe crisis/very high threat</th>
<th>War/extreme threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on lives and livelihoods</td>
<td>People beginning to be unsafe, and start adapting livelihoods</td>
<td>People unsafe and adapting their livelihoods</td>
<td>Death, injury or illness beginning, switching of coping to assets</td>
<td>Death, injury and illness due to direct or indirect causes common, coping mechanisms nearly exhausted, survival mechanisms become more common</td>
<td>Widespread death, injury and illness due to direct or indirect causes, livelihoods limited to what people can carry, coping mechanisms exhausted, survival mechanisms dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of conflict</td>
<td>Low impact over local or large area</td>
<td>Pockets of medium impact over localised area, low impact over a large area</td>
<td>Insecurity spreads to a large area</td>
<td>Insecurity becomes provincial or national</td>
<td>Insecurity becomes national or trans-border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of conflict (who and impact)</td>
<td>Traditional actors and vulnerability to conflict, and existing latent causes begin to have an impact</td>
<td>Risk to assets and vulnerable/excluded people, traditional causes driving conflict</td>
<td>Assets becoming liabilities, people becoming exploited, war economies being set up and causes begin to evolve to factors that fuel the conflict</td>
<td>Assets are liabilities, people are exploited, war economies thriving</td>
<td>Assets are liabilities, people systematically exploited, war economies thriving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of affected people</td>
<td>At place of origin</td>
<td>At place of origin, problems to move</td>
<td>Beginning of local displacement, problems to move</td>
<td>Local displacement common, however movement restricted, camps and peri-urban locations become key areas</td>
<td>Refugees and IDPs, far from home, much of those affected are located in camps and peri-urban locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of communities (social/political focus, organisation and exclusion/ vulnerable groups)</td>
<td>Organised and structured according to their underlying level of vulnerability, internal factors may be driving insecurity</td>
<td>Structural lines of weakness increase impacting on excluded and vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Community fractured/disorganised/Vulnerable groups actively targeted/ neglected</td>
<td>Dissolution of community proceeding, increase in scope of who is vulnerable and excluded, actively or by negligence</td>
<td>Community structure dissolved, large displacement of many households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of institutional-community relationship</td>
<td>Mistrust, relationship according to underlying vulnerability, variable facilitation of assistance to communities</td>
<td>Tense, great distrust, partial facilitation of assistance to communities</td>
<td>Very tense, widespread distrust, potential active and negative targeting of excluded/vulnerable groups by institutions</td>
<td>Fear of institutions, active targeting on an increasing cross-section of the community</td>
<td>Community flees the institution, where possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of local stakeholder-community relationship</td>
<td>Mistrust, relationship according to underlying vulnerability, variable facilitation of assistance to communities</td>
<td>Tense, different groups with different roles actively threatening others, particularly vulnerable/exclude groups</td>
<td>Physical violence and destruction/appropriation of livelihoods more widespread between local stakeholders and those within communities</td>
<td>Active conflict between different local stakeholders or exactly directed against vulnerable/excluded parts of the community</td>
<td>Widespread anarchy/criminality, systematic harm of vulnerable/excluded groups widening to more general parts of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability of international agencies to work with people targeted by governments (access, acceptance, assets)</td>
<td>Access and acceptance, longer-term and competitive funding</td>
<td>Access becomes limited, active lobbying against international agencies by conflict parties, longer-term funding only available</td>
<td>Agencies are targeted, essential staff on the ground, systematic use of national staff and partners for all roles, downscaling of projects, humanitarian funding becoming available. Movement limited by conflict parties.</td>
<td>Agencies stop field operations, only essential national and partner staff where security is assured, humanitarian funding widely available, access to displaced population only. Movement extremely limited by conflict partners. Risk of expulsion of agencies who work with government targeted groups.</td>
<td>Agencies may evacuate all non-localised staff, freeze all operations, large amounts of funding but difficult to spend, access to displaced population who have managed to access safe zones. Risk of expulsion of agencies who work with government targeted groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of external hazards and shocks on livelihoods</td>
<td>Communities use traditional methods to manage risk, in partnership with institutions, local actors and international agencies. National DRM system and other structures responsible for longer-term issues (e.g. climate change, environment degradation, urban planning) functioning.</td>
<td>Significant increase in vulnerability and erosion of capacity markedly increases impact on livelihoods for significant hazards and shocks. National disaster management system and other institutional structures breaking down.</td>
<td>Marked lowering of the threshold for hazards and shocks having significant impact on livelihoods. National disaster management system and other institutional structures not functioning.</td>
<td>High impact of hazards and shocks, dependence on external assistance where available. Real potential to fuel the conflict.</td>
<td>High impact of hazards and shocks, dependence on external assistance where available. Real potential to fuel the conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Community Participation Spectrum

It is important to recognise that we need to do the right thing at the right time in the right way. This means recognising that the context and the capacities and wishes of the community will dictate the specific approach we take for DRM. For example, in massive emergencies or conflict situations that go beyond the capacity of communities (whether they have contingency planning in place or not), communities are often totally dependent on external assistance. This is heightened where local institutions do not have capacity or to the point where they directly target communities due to discrimination or conflict. Alternatively, the capacity of the community to organise, unite and take total responsibility is limited in complex humanitarian emergencies, in communities with internal discrimination due to caste/ethnicity or religion or in post-emergency contexts. Similarly the capacity and commitment of external actors that have a responsibility towards communities can also be limited.

Therefore, ACF suggests a spectrum of approaches, summarised in table below, which compares the characteristics of each:

1. **A direct approach**: used to save lives and livelihoods and to enhance the protection of people, normally used during emergencies and early response.
2. **A community-based approach**: where communities have limited participation and planning capacities or do not wish to be autonomous, normally used in early recovery and rehabilitation contexts.
3. **A community-managed approach**: where communities can fully participate and have planning capacities, normally used in rehabilitation and stable contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct response</th>
<th>Community-based DRM</th>
<th>Community-managed DRM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In emergency and early recovery contexts</td>
<td>In recovery and rehabilitation contexts</td>
<td>In rehabilitation and stable contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised and top-down, managed by the external agencies, process owned by outsiders</td>
<td>Centralised and top-down, managed by the external agency, process owned by outsiders</td>
<td>Decentralised and bottom-up, managed by the community, process owned by the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driven by extreme needs-saving lives and livelihoods, and protection</td>
<td>Supply-driven</td>
<td>Demand-driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target oriented</td>
<td>Target oriented</td>
<td>Process oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dependency of the community on external actors</td>
<td>External agency as key player, dependency of the community</td>
<td>Community-based organisation as the key player, self-reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal participatory and planning capacity</td>
<td>Reduced participatory and planning capacity</td>
<td>Significant participatory and planning capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community reliant on external agencies</td>
<td>Community used to service providers</td>
<td>Community open to autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid agency staff implement directly</td>
<td>Aid agency staff implement directly</td>
<td>Facilitating people to implement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Externally financed</td>
<td>Externally financed</td>
<td>Cost sharing with the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological approach dominant</td>
<td>Technological approach important</td>
<td>Social approach dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporates expert’s knowledge into project assessment, design/planning and implementation</td>
<td>Incorporates expert’s knowledge into project assessment, design/planning and implementation</td>
<td>Incorporates local people’s knowledge into project assessment, design/planning and implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E by professionals</td>
<td>M&amp;E by professionals</td>
<td>Participatory M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term timeframe (except complex humanitarian emergency)</td>
<td>Short/medium term time frame</td>
<td>Long-term time frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible donor funding rules</td>
<td>Rigid donor funding rules</td>
<td>Flexible donor funding rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Examples of livelihoods interventions in different conflict situations


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihood provisioning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid to all affected groups</td>
<td>All (rural, IDP, returnee). Acute conflict and post-conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel-efficient stoves</td>
<td>IDPs: Acute/protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of grinding mills</td>
<td>IDPs: Acute/protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vouchers to meet non-food needs (e.g. milling, NFI, clothes)</td>
<td>IDPs: Acute/protracted conflict and post-conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash grants/cash for work</td>
<td>Rural. Protracted conflict/drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDPs, populations suffering economic blockade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periods of relative stability: DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihood protection</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds and tools distribution</td>
<td>Rural (rebek-held areas), IDPs, returnees. During and post-conflict,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in most conflict settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed vouchers and fairs</td>
<td>Rural. Protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash grants/cash for work</td>
<td>Returnees (livelihood recovery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder distribution/safe places for livestock</td>
<td>IDPs: Acute conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restocking (e.g. donkeys as essential assets for</td>
<td>IDPs, returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firewood, water collection; small stock as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source of food and income)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income generation (including market gardens/savings and loans)</td>
<td>Protracted IDP and refugee contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People affected by conflict but not experiencing open hostilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. stable rebel-held areas). Returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary care/provision of veterinary drugs</td>
<td>Rural/IDP. Acute/protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural extension: seed multiplication/</td>
<td>Protracted conflict. Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crop protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihood promotion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills and vocational training</td>
<td>IDPs, refugees, ex-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening community organisation to increase</td>
<td>Protracted conflict. Government- and opposition-held areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to services (e.g. community livelihood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups and disaster-preparedness planning, farmer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field schools, savings and loans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting localised peace initiatives and</td>
<td>Protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional governance, for example in opening up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migration routes, efforts to stay neutral, conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resolution*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market access programmes – road rehabilitation,</td>
<td>Protracted conflict. Periods of relative stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farmers’ cooperatives, linking producers with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markets, voucher programmes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy on compensation, voluntary return and</td>
<td>Acute/protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom of movement, access to land, opening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>borders, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapping land-tenure systems and land occupation</td>
<td>Acute/protracted conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Definitions of a range of insecurity programming

**Conflict Prevention:**
“Activities undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times aiming to identify situations that could produce violent conflict, reduce manifest tensions, prevent existing tensions from escalating into violence and remove sources of danger before violence results. It may include confidence-building and security-building measures, early warning and/or preventative peacekeeping. Mainly refers to short-to-medium term activities occurring before the outbreak of open violent conflict”. (Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies 2008)

**Peace-building:**
“A generic term to cover all medium-to-long-term activities intended to encourage and promote peaceful relations and overcome violence. A long-term process seen to positively alter structural contradictions, improve relations between conflict parties and facilitate overall constructive changes in attitudes. It also may refer to activities that create framework conditions suitable for peaceful and equitable development; e.g., economic development, social justice, reconciliation, empowerment of disadvantaged/strategic groups and humanitarian support. It applies to all stages and levels of conflict”. (Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies 2008)

**Peacemaking:**
“Intervention consisting mainly of negotiation and mediation after the outbreak of open violent conflict. Such efforts aim to move towards an agreement to end violence. It is a process that usually strives for a political settlement with legitimate or de facto leaders. It is normally result-oriented, but also may seek to change the attitudes of the main protagonists”. (Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies 2008)

**Peacekeeping:**
“The interposition of a third-party military force to separate the armed forces of conflicting parties and reduce violence, normally at the request of the parties as part of a ceasefire agreement. Peacekeeping is now often associated with civil tasks, such as monitoring, policing and supporting humanitarian intervention. It may involve restoring the status quo, even if this preserves the underlying conflict and structural violence. Peacekeeping can be used both before the outbreak of open conflict as a means of prevention or after violence has ceased”. (Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies 2008)

**Do no harm:**
“A maxim that acknowledges that any intervention carries with it the risk of doing harm. Practitioners should proceed with programmes only after careful consideration and widespread consultation, including with other institutions in the field so as to not duplicate or undercut their efforts. In assistance activities, the maxim recognizes that resources inevitably represent the distribution of power and wealth and will create tensions if careful attention is not given to how they are distributed and delivered”. (United States Institute of Peace 2011)

**Protection:**
“A concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law. Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse and restoring dignified conditions of life through repatriation, restitution and rehabilitation”. (OCHA 2003)
Conflict sensitivity:
“This means the ability of your organisation to understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context and act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts”. (Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-building: Resource Pack 2004:1)

Stabilisation:
“The stabilisation approach is designed to reduce conflict, provide sufficient stability to kick-start a political process and begin to address the underlying causes of conflict. It is the ‘first step’ towards progress on state-building and peace-building in very insecure environments. It comprises: (i) Preventing, stopping or reducing violent conflict – often using military engagement and sometimes only in small areas, (ii) Protecting people and their livelihoods, and, (iii) Preparing for peace. This helps to lay the groundwork for a more inclusive political settlement, and a minimum level of state functionality through support to core state functions”. (DFID 2010)

Fragile state:
“A state is understood to be fragile when it is unable to meet its population’s expectations or manage changes in expectation and capacity through the political process”. (OECD 2010)
### Thematic Areas and Components of Resilience for Disaster-Resilient Communities


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic area</th>
<th>Components of resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Governance</td>
<td>- Policy, planning, priorities and political commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legal and regulatory systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Integration with development policies and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Integration with emergency response and recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Institutional mechanisms, capacities and structures; allocation of responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Accountability and community participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Risk assessment</td>
<td>- Hazards/risk data and assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Vulnerability and impact data and assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Scientific and technical capacities and innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Knowledge and education</td>
<td>- Public awareness, knowledge and skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Information management and sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultures, attitudes, motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Learning and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Risk management and vulnerability reduction</td>
<td>- Environmental and natural resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Health and well being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sustainable livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Financial instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Physical protection; structural and technical measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Planning regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Disaster preparedness and response</td>
<td>- Organisational capacities and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Early warning systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preparedness and contingency planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Emergency resources and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Emergency response and recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Participation, voluntarism, accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
World Development Report Core Tool Framework

Core tools and approaches (in boxes on the right) aligned with a political framework (image on the left) aiming to move states from fragility and violence to institutional resilience in citizen security, justice and jobs. It demonstrates how transition periods to greater stability involve restoring confidence as a precedent to actions that progressively transform institutions. This process is insulated from external regional and international stresses and shocks, whilst benefiting from support and incentives to keep the complete process on track.

### RESTORING CONFIDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signals: Future policy and priorities</th>
<th>Signals: Immediate actions</th>
<th>Commitment mechanisms</th>
<th>Supporting actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen security goals</td>
<td>Credible appointments</td>
<td>Independence of</td>
<td>Risk and priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key principles and realistic timelines for political reform, decentralization, corruption, transitional justice</td>
<td>Transparency in expenditures</td>
<td>executing agencies</td>
<td>assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of state, community, NGO, and international capacity</td>
<td>Budget allocations to priority areas</td>
<td>Independent third-party monitoring</td>
<td>Communicating costs of friction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redeployment of security forces</td>
<td>Dual key-national/international systems</td>
<td>Simple plans and progress measures on 2–3 early results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of dictatorial key functions</td>
<td>International execution of arms and other key functions</td>
<td>Strategic communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundational reforms and “best-fit” approaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security sector reforms: Designed to deliver citizen security benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity increases linked to repeated realistic performance outcomes and justice functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantling criminal networks through civilian oversight, vetting and budget expenditure transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of new capital systems for rural and community policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NATIONAL ACTION TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL STRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military, police, and financial intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FEASIBLE RESULTS INDICATORS TO DEMONSTRATE OVERALL PROGRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short term</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent deaths</td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception surveys by groups (ethnic, geographical, religious, class) on whether their welfare is increasing over time and in relation to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception survey data on increases in insecurity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception survey on trust in national institutions and on corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Longer term</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim surveys</td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceptions of whether employment opportunities are increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance indicators focused on outcomes and degree of progress within historically realist timeframes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price surveys for real income implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household survey data on vertical and horizontal inequalities and access to justice services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Household data on employment and labor force participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Structure of DRM Action

The figure below demonstrates an example of how ACF structures DRM action, articulating an Institutional Strategy with programmes and projects. Here, operations are supported by a **Disaster Risk Management Platform** that supplies technical and strategic guidance, supports research and advocacy initiatives, and ensures resources and capacity building to operations. Overall DRM action is structured using **programme management**, helping to define the basis of DRM in the country strategy and ensuring coherence between the different DRM objectives in operations. Each of the programme components, or projects, is managed using Project Cycle Management, the main operational management tool of ACF. Where programme management aims to choose and integrate the right projects, **project cycle management** aims to effectively manage and monitor a project.

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## International codes and initiatives acknowledged by ACF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE</th>
<th>WHAT IS IT?</th>
<th>HOW DOES IT WORK?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>People in Aid – Code of Conduct</strong> <a href="http://www.peopleinaid.org/code">http://www.peopleinaid.org/code</a></td>
<td>An internationally recognised management tool that helps humanitarian aid and development agencies enhance the quality of their human resources management.</td>
<td>Seven principles on 1. health, safety, security; 2. learning, training, development; 3. recruitment and selection; 4. consultation and communication; 5. support, management, leadership; 6. staff policies and practices, 7. HR strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Sphere Project</strong> <a href="http://www.sphereproject.org">http://www.sphereproject.org</a></td>
<td>A voluntary initiative aimed at improving the quality of assistance to people affected by disaster and improving the accountability of states and humanitarian agencies to their constituents, donors and the affected populations.</td>
<td>Minimum standards common to all sectors as well as sector-specific standards (WASH, Food Security, Nutrition, Shelter and Settlement, Health). SPHERE is based on human and humanitarian rights, refugee law and IRC Code of Conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Right to Food</strong> <a href="http://www.ohchr.org">http://www.ohchr.org</a></td>
<td>The human right to adequate food is defined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).</td>
<td>“The right to adequate food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has the physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement” comment 12 on ICESCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Right to Water</strong> <a href="http://www.humanitarianreform.org/WASH">http://www.humanitarianreform.org/WASH</a></td>
<td>The right to water is has not yet been officially recognised under the ICESCR, but several organisations including ACF-IN advocate for its official recognition in human rights law.</td>
<td>“The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols protect the right to water and sanitation of people in the context of armed conflict. For instance, in times of armed conflict, under international humanitarian law it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless drinking water installations or irrigation works”. Global WASH Cluster, 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)</strong> <a href="http://www.unisdr.org">http://www.unisdr.org</a></td>
<td>An international framework for action on DRR, signed by 168 countries, endorsed by the UN General Assembly, and supported by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR). Contrary to the UNFCCC, the HFA does not contain an inherent financial mechanism and is not legally binding.</td>
<td>Five priorities for Action 2005-15: 1. DRR as national and local priority, 2. risk identification, monitoring, assessment, 3. a culture of safety, 4. reducing underlying risk factors, 5. strengthening disaster preparedness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNFCCC and Bali Action Plan</strong> <a href="http://www.unfccc.int">http://www.unfccc.int</a></td>
<td>The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was initially concerned with mitigation – reducing carbon emissions. With the Bali Action Plan (2007), adaptation to climate change was recognised as a key area of action alongside mitigation.</td>
<td>Enhanced action on adaptation including international cooperation, risk management and reduction, disaster reduction, economic diversification, cross-level synergies, technical support and cooperation, and funding.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict sensitivity</strong></td>
<td>A concept developed in response to the realisation that humanitarian operation can sometimes exacerbate conflict situations rather than improving them.</td>
<td>The ability of an organisation to understand the context of operation and the interaction between an intervention and its context, and to act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Do No Harm</strong> <a href="http://www.cdainc.com">http://www.cdainc.com</a></td>
<td>The core principle from the Do No Harm Project developed in the early 1990s by local and international NGOs. It acknowledges possible interactions between humanitarian assistance and conflict and calls for avoiding negative impacts.</td>
<td>Main steps: understanding context; analysing dividers and tension, connectors and capacities for peace, the assistance programme, the programme’s impact on dividers and connectors; considering and generating programming options, testing and redesigning programming.</td>
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