THE CONTRIBUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING TO EARLY PEACEBUILDING: A DPKO/DFS STRATEGY FOR PEACEKEEPERS

I. Objective and Scope

The immediate aftermath of conflict affords a window of opportunity in which rapid, appropriately-prioritized and sequenced initiatives can provide a platform for longer-term stability and development. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated to the Security Council on 16 April 2010, peacekeepers are peacebuilders and they must “seize the window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of conflict. They are the first to set priorities.”

As the Secretary-General’s 2010 report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations indicated, an integrated approach to early peacebuilding can only be successful if every actor is clear on its contribution, is capable of delivering on it and works in cooperation with partners. Currently over a dozen peacekeeping operations are implementing Security Council-mandated tasks in the areas of rule of law and security institutions, protection of civilians, human rights, civil affairs, gender equality, and child protection. The Secretary-General has referred to many of these tasks as recurring, critical peacebuilding priority areas in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The credibility of a UN
peacekeeping operation derives from its ability to play a catalytic role in critical peacebuilding areas, and “achieve success through creating the conditions for security and sustainable peace on the ground, thereby allowing for reconfiguration or withdrawal of the mission.” Yet mandates often assign general tasks, or tasks for which resources are lacking, and peacekeepers have limited direction in determining how to carry out early peacebuilding mandates.

Within the UN Secretariat, DPKO is responsible for providing UN peacekeeping operations with policy guidance and strategic direction, while DFS is responsible for providing logistical and administrative support. The present DPKO/DFS strategy for peacekeepers guides the desired scope, prioritization and sequencing of early peacebuilding initiatives that: provide basic security, including in the areas of protection of civilians, mine action, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening of policing, justice and corrections systems, human rights, the initiation of security sector reform; support political processes; and restore and extend state authority. The strategy fully recognizes that “security and development are closely interlinked” and seeks to ensure that peacekeepers contribute to this mutually reinforcing dynamic in the most efficient manner possible.

This strategy guides the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) in the implementation of early peacebuilding tasks resulting from mandates or other requests for assistance, both in the immediate aftermath of conflict and at any other appropriate stage in the evolution of a peacekeeping operation (e.g., post-referendum Sudan, post-earthquake Haiti). While recognizing the importance of reliable partnerships for the delivery of prioritised peacebuilding support to a specific country, this strategy does not seek to determine the work of other organisations.

II. Peacekeepers are early peacebuilders

UN peacekeeping is one of the main tools used by the international community to manage crises, including complex ones, which pose a threat to international peace and security. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, (hereinafter referred to as the Capstone Doctrine) states that the core functions of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation are to:

- create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; and
- provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

The high level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations called on UN peacekeeping to “develop peacebuilding strategies, and programmes in support of those strategies.” The report defined peacebuilding as “in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict”. The sources and drivers of conflict have evolved, and peacekeepers are now deployed into conflicts or post-conflict settings characterised by transnational organised crime, terrorism, piracy,
cyber-crime, ideological extremism, economic and natural resource-driven as well as sectarian violence and egregious human rights violations. The activities mandated and undertaken by UN peacekeeping operations contribute to peacebuilding, which entails a range of measures intended to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Early peacebuilding does not refer to activities undertaken within strict temporal limits, but rather connotes the contribution peacekeepers make throughout their deployment to what is virtually always a very lengthy peacebuilding process led by national stakeholders and development partners long after the departure of a peacekeeping operation.

Since the 1990s, the Security Council has assigned peacebuilding tasks to peacekeeping operations, and these tasks have evolved from largely passive activities, such as ceasefire monitoring, to active tasks such as disarmament and demobilization, police, justice and corrections reforms, and support for the restoration and management of core government functions and transitional justice processes. Peacekeeping operations are well-suited to undertake specific types of peacebuilding tasks.

In 2009 DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) produced a non-paper, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, to engage peacekeeping stakeholders in the effort to meet the challenges of modern peacekeeping. The non-paper articulates a partnership-based approach in which cohesive mission planning and management, clear political strategy, achievable objectives, rapid deployment and early deliverables are essential to more responsive peacekeeping. Subsequently, DFS elaborated the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) as a roadmap for achieving its “New Horizon” objectives. This strategy, the New Horizon non-paper and the GFSS are complementary; each aims to improve the predictability, efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and each reflects extensive research and consultation with Member States, UN senior management, UN system partners, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and their field staff, as well as external experts and other key partners.

### III. Peacekeeping principles underpin early peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE PRINCIPLES of UN PEACEKEEPING</th>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Consent of the parties</td>
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<td>✓ Impartiality</td>
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<td>✓ Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate</td>
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In addition to the normative framework for UN peacekeeping, comprised of the **UN Charter**, **international human rights and humanitarian law**, and **Security Council resolutions**, three mutually reinforcing principles underpin DPKO’s unique identity as a tool for maintaining international peace and security.8

The consent of the main parties to a conflict is highly desirable to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation and provides the necessary physical and political freedom of action the operation requires to execute its mandated tasks. All peacekeepers must work continuously to ensure that the operation does not lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the peace process advances. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but is not synonymous with neutrality or inactivity; peacekeepers do “not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds. The principle of *non-use of force except in self-defense* includes the use of force at the tactical level, with Security Council authorization, when acting in self-defense or defense of the mandate. The use of force in defense of the mandate in specific circumstances has enabled some operations to succeed at “improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding.”9
IV. Early peacebuilding prioritization criteria for peacekeepers

Three criteria define the activities to prioritize when planning and implementing peacekeeping operation mandates or fulfilling requests from Member States. This prioritization framework provides a point of departure for discussions within the context of the Integrated Operational Teams and the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), and must be considered in light of the “success factors” outlined in the following section of this strategy. Strong leadership, focus and restraint must be equally employed to ensure that limited resources, capacity and time are dedicated entirely to core priorities that will have a considerable short and long-term impact on the peace process.

**EARLY PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIZATION CRITERIA FOR PEACEKEEPERS**

Peacekeepers will prioritize and sequence their activities considering the “critical success factors” below and asking: does the proposed activity….

- **Advance the political objectives of the mission or peace process**, AND:
  - Ensure security (Track I)
  - Lay the foundation for longer term institution building (Track II)

- **Ensure security (Track I)**

Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are fundamentally political tools, typically assisting with the implementation of a peace agreement or supporting a political process. “The fact that multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations enjoy a high degree of international legitimacy and represent the collective will of the international community gives them considerable leverage over the parties. This leverage can be used to build and sustain a political consensus around the peace process, promote good governance and maintain pressure on the parties to implement key institutional reforms.”

UN peacekeeping operations have the additional, “unique ability to employ a mix of civilian, police and military capabilities, under a unified leadership to support a fragile peace process” and advance early peacebuilding. These attributes constitute the comparative advantages of UN peacekeeping.

Too often, peacekeepers approach early peacebuilding tasks as technical responses occurring in a long-term, development context, where peace generally prevails, the political situation is relatively clear, and a legitimate government seeks assistance with the development or reform of its institutions. Instead, peacekeepers must frame early peacebuilding initiatives within a peacekeeping operation’s overall priorities, such as supporting the political process and national reconciliation, creating a secure environment, and helping extend the authority of state institutions while avoiding the strengthening of an inappropriate institutional status quo. This strategy recognizes that these are fundamentally political tasks; mission components must see their role as primarily political, rather than technical.

- **Ensure security**

Peacekeepers are often mandated to support national authorities in the performance of immediate stabilization and security tasks, or even to undertake executive action in the event of an authorizing mandate. The provision of immediate security engenders confidence in the peace process among the host population, and provides space to build support for longer-term institutional reform. National
actors performing functions critical to the peace process must be supported to the extent possible, from the earliest possible stage, and consistent with a conflict-sensitive approach. Peacekeepers must be prepared to transfer essential skills and knowledge to national actors responsible for security even at this very early stage. Further description of appropriate activities can be found below under Track I activities (pp. 10-11) and in Section VII of this strategy.

- Lay the foundation for longer-term institution building

Assistance intended to strengthen a State’s ability to provide security and to support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance risks failure if divorced from a national strategic framework and a fact-based analysis of the root causes of the conflict. Sound political judgement and planning are needed to determine how best to initiate the process of strengthening the capability of the State to embark on longer-term institution building and reform. Responsibility for sustaining these efforts often rests with UN agencies (and their implementing partners where relevant and appropriate) and other international actors; however, ultimately responsibility rests with local and national authorities. Plans should be developed jointly with partners and must reflect the way in which partners are engaged in the long term project of institutional reform, providing benchmarks for the earliest possible Mission drawdown and transfer to national responsibility.

The nature and scale of a peacekeeping operation’s role in the area of institution building will depend on its mandate, the local context, the availability of resources and an assessment of the availability of capable, credible and legitimate partners within the host nation. Mandated activities should be focused, based on peacekeeping’s comparative advantages and capacities to deliver effectively, tailored to achieve the clearly-defined early peacebuilding benchmarks and end-state, and built on pre-existing structures if these are assessed to be sufficiently accountable. Further description of appropriate activities can be found below under Track II activities (p.12) and in Section VII of this strategy.

V. Critical success/risk factors for early peacebuilding in peacekeeping operations

The process of identifying feasible priority initiatives for peacekeepers starts with the application of the prioritization framework outlined above, and proceeds with the consideration of critical success/risk factors. Some of these factors are described in the Capstone Doctrine and others reflect years of peacekeeping experience. Each of these factors should be considered before and during the planning and implementation of early peacebuilding tasks, yet only some of these factors are within the Departments’ ability to control. The significance of each factor will vary depending on the specific context.
1. **Political will at national, regional and international levels**
   The extent of political support among national, regional and international actors must be taken into account when determining whether to proceed with specific early peacebuilding activities. A UN peacekeeping operation “can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process”.\(^{13}\) “A managed, positive and supportive regional engagement strategy can pay enormous dividends in encouraging the parties to stay the course and prevent the spread of conflict.”\(^ {14}\) The political support of the UN legislative bodies is critical, and while only nine votes in the Security Council are required to establish a UN peacekeeping operation, “anything other than unanimous Security Council backing can be a serious handicap,” emboldening spoilers and discouraging Member State contributions essential for peacebuilding.\(^ {15}\)

2. **Local knowledge through strategic, on-going, in-depth assessments**
   Knowledge of the host country’s history, culture, the root causes and impact of the conflict, the role of national institutions in the conflict, and the interests and capacities of national actors, enables peacekeepers to determine short and medium-term expected accomplishments for the mission, avoid engaging with national actors whose role or interests limit their credibility and legitimacy, and eschew templated solutions to sensitive problems. Such knowledge is essential to the formulation of an achievable mandate and a realistic end-state for UN peacekeeping operations.

   The UN Guideline on Strategic Assessment and related training will improve staff capacity to design and conduct in-depth, consultative assessments of national and local institutions and stakeholders, inform planning and budgeting, determine the early peacebuilding end-state, and continuously gauge progress towards strategic objectives. As prescribed in the Capstone Doctrine, the Secretariat and its partners must conduct a rigorous assessment of requirements for longer-term engagement, including worst case scenarios.\(^ {16}\) The Security Council has requested the Secretary-General to report on conflict analysis and contextual on issues that drive conflict, including social and economic issues. DPKO and DFS intend to engage or partner with experts capable of assessing and analysing these issues, which “represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace.”\(^ {17}\) DPKO and DFS will also coordinate closely to expand the language base and regional expertise of standing and rostered capacities, establish links with local and regional institutions of higher learning, think tanks and other centers of international expertise, engage the country-specific expertise (including national staff) necessary to guide the planning of early peacebuilding interventions, and attract and retain the expertise necessary to ensure adequate, appropriate communication with local counterparts.

3. **Clear and achievable mandate supported with adequate financing**
   From the earliest stages of mission planning, the Secretariat must help to ensure that the Security Council mandate is clear and achievable and that contributing nations are able and willing to provide the requisite resources to support the mandate, lest mission credibility suffer from an inability to deliver on mandated tasks.\(^ {18}\) Clear mandates contribute to reasonable expectations among key stakeholders and to the definition of realistic end-states for peacekeeping operations.
Demonstration of early, decisive results in mandated early peacebuilding areas will contribute to the credibility of the mission.

In January 2011, the Security Council reaffirmed the critical importance of timely, flexible and predictable funding for peacebuilding, including institution and capacity building. Integrated UN presences must be able to draw quickly and efficiently from disparate financing streams of varying speed and reliability (e.g., assessed, voluntary, Peacebuilding Fund) and with different funding and planning cycles across different parts of the UN system. Resources should be sought jointly with partners to extend peacekeeping quick impact projects that catalyze priority initiatives.

4. **Strong Leadership**

Strong leadership and effective managerial skills by the SRSG and senior management team are needed to ensure that the UN system coalesces around an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) in support of system-wide objectives. Political, humanitarian, human rights and development sectors are expected to bring their distinct but potentially complementary mandates, planning and budgeting processes to bear in support of the peace process. As note below, SRSGs lead the integrated planning process at the country level, but they require tools to ensure compliance with strategic frameworks, and flexible resources to support them. The significance of senior mission leadership’s direct engagement in coordination among mission components and with UN system partners, regardless the structure of the mission, cannot be overstated. DPKO will provide training for senior mission leaders and will take measures to ensure compliance with professional leadership standards, including the development of senior mission leader compacts.

5. **Partnerships: an integrated and coordinated approach based on comparative advantage to ensure predictable and accountable delivery**

Peacebuilding relies on collegial and complementary partnerships among UN system partners, Member States, international, regional and sub-regional organisations and actors, donors, the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions, the private sector, other multilateral partners and civil society.

The willingness and ability of all UN partners to contribute to the shared vision and agreed results reflected in the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is essential to the success of a multi-dimensional UN peace operation. Each UN partner is expected to fulfil its roles and responsibilities in accordance with its comparative advantages, capabilities, and presence on the ground, whether executing a priority task independently or jointly. Existing UN institutional arrangements describe the roles and responsibilities of UN actors in specific areas and seek to ensure more effective, accountable and predictable delivery of early peacebuilding objectives.

While the “members of the UNCT come under the overall authority of the SRSG/HoM, they are governed by mandates, decision-making structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from those of the UN peacekeeping operation.” Consequently, activities in the service of shared early peacebuilding objectives require constant coordination, “dialogue and negotiation” among those concerned. In 2008, the Secretary-General decided with the Policy Committee that a ‘strategic partnership’ between the UN mission/office and the Country Team, led by the SRSG with the RC/HC coordinating the UNCT, would be the means to achieve the purpose of integration, which is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace. In 2009 and 2010, guidelines were promulgated to support implementation of this integration policy, including a description of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), which is designed to unite all UN entities around shared peacebuilding priorities. Joint resource mobilization initiatives will be most effective when they demonstrate support for the ISF.

6. **National ownership and capacity**

The Security Council has underlined that “the primary responsibility for successful peacebuilding
lies with governments and relevant national actors, including civil society, in countries emerging from conflict.” Security Council and other mandates and/or peace processes frequently assign UN peacekeeping operations the task of stabilising a situation and assisting post-conflict countries to rebuild the institutions of a functioning State. In some instances, State and local capacity may be so weak that the mission is required to temporarily assume certain functions, either directly, as in the case of transitional administration (e.g., interim policing), or in support of the State. Other situations require less intrusive support or none at all. When a peacekeeping operation does perform such state functions as the provision of general security and maintenance of public order, it must strive for national assumption of these functions at the earliest possible time.

Effective approaches to national and local ownership will contribute to a mission’s legitimacy and to the sustainability of efforts to build accountable national institutions and capacities. To this end a peacekeeping operation must ensure that credible, capable national actors are visibly in the lead in managing the national peacebuilding process. Peacekeepers must balance the need to avoid substituting for national actors and generating dependency, with the cost of investing in time-consuming training and mentoring of national actors, whose absorptive capacity in some specialised areas of work may be limited.

7. Popular engagement in prioritization
A peacekeeping operation must ensure that its activities are responsive to the aspirations and hopes of the broader population. Supporting national dialogue and public consultation is a critical step towards understanding public perception of the peace process, engendering legitimate national ownership and moderating public expectations of the peace process and of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers must reach out to all groups in society, and support public awareness and education campaigns and public consultation initiatives that include local communities, civil society, vulnerable groups and traditional structures, women, children and minority groups, human rights groups. Peacekeepers must engage with a wide range of national actors, particularly when national institutions and organized civil society are not representative of all social sectors or lack legitimacy or capacity. Consultations should help peacekeepers focus their priorities and their communications strategy.

8. Appropriate skills and equipment
In his remarks to Security Council on 13 October 2010, the Secretary-General stressed that UN efforts to build peace depend for their success on getting the right people in the right place at the right time, with the necessary equipment. The recent UN administrative reform initiative and the GFSS are expected to address certain recruitment challenges. Contributing countries will be urged to provide the required specialist skill sets. DPKO staff will need to build skills in several cross-cutting areas such as programme and project management, strategic and operational planning, emerging technology, outreach and communication. Staff charged with national capacity or institution building requires experience in mentoring, administration, finance, logistics, procurement, communications and other aspects of institutional development and management. Improved interoperability with various international partners would increase the likelihood of matching the right expertise to a given situation or task. DPKO will seek to establish close cooperation with other actors including the EU, AU and bilateral actors, bearing in mind the sensitivities involved.

Specialized in-house civilian capacity must be supported by rapidly deployable assets, equipment and services and a reliable platform for delivery. Such a modular approach may allow for maximization of “early peace dividends” by producing a measurable impact on public security from the earliest days of peacekeeping presence. DPKO works closely with DFS to implement the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) modular approach to supply equipment to police, DDR, and mine clearance teams, for example. Core peacekeeping requirements will be reflected in the new mission budget start-up templates. In addition to core staffing needs, a model budget may seek to include, inter alia, rapidly deployable police equipment or uniforms, basic infrastructure, rapidly deployable modular court houses and prisons that can be rapidly constructed using locally
9. Rapid deployment

Standing, standby, and rostered capacities have proven an important innovation in the rapid deployment of specialists to carry out early assessments and planning, to fill gaps in expertise, and to coordinate international efforts in peacekeeping settings (see box below). In addition to specific mechanisms, the DDR Section mobilizes particular skill sets or additional capacity to address surges or to implement a specific activity requiring targeted expertise in field operations. The success of these mechanisms will depend in large part on the ability of DFS to recruit and retain the staff necessary to perform these specialized functions and to deploy them with the necessary equipment and logistic support. In this regard, Member State support for improved conditions of service and for implementation of the GFSS is crucial.

EXISTING STANDING, STANDBY, AND ROSTERED CAPACITIES
(examples as of 2011)

- The United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) comprises military capabilities that can be deployed at short notice. There are two levels:
  - The Rapid Deployment Level (RDL). Resources pledged by Member States (MS) can be deployed to a UN Mission within 30/90 days of a Security Council mandate, following the appropriate government approval, enabling the Secretariat and the Member State to save time through detailed pre-deployment planning and preparation of a draft MOU.
  - The Military “On-Call List” consists of pledges from Member States and Regional / Sub-Regional or International Organisations to rapidly deploy individuals, to form the nucleus of a new Mission HQ, or to fill vacancies / replace individuals in on-going missions.

- Standing Police Capacity (SPC) – Based in the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, this rapid response unit provides immediate start-up capability for police components in new UN peace operations and provides police and law enforcement expertise, including in the administration and management of law enforcement institutions; to existing operations.

- Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity – Based in UNLB this small standing surge capacity will complement the SPC and will rapidly deploy justice and corrections specialists for mission start up and support, including experts in the administration and management of justice and corrections institutions, prison security, agriculture, health, and engineering.

- Human Rights Rapid Response and Peace Mission Section – Based in OHCHR, the PMSRRS manages a roster of rapidly deployable human rights experts who address human rights crises and assist mission start-up and support, including experts in planning, monitoring, investigation and PoC.

- Standing Mine Action Capacity (S-MAC) – Based in Geneva in close proximity to the Protection Cluster, the S-MAC responds to emerging or evolving mine and ERW threats. The S-MAC will have programme management, planning and information management and support functions necessary to establish mine action coordination in emergency and immediate post conflict settings.

- UN Roster of Security Sector Reform Experts – The multi-national roster of SSR specialists offers a global pool of expertise, including academics, civil servants, technicians and former armed forces and
VI. A phased approach to early peacebuilding in peacekeeping settings

The implementation of priority tasks proceeds in two phases: a pre-deployment phase followed by an operational phase. Activities in the operational phase commence as early as possible and, in addition to advancing the peace process or political objectives of the mission, will tend to: ensure security (Track I activities) and/or (ii) lay the foundation for longer-term institution building (Track II). Both tracks – or baskets – of activities may serve to bolster essential national capacity, and some initiatives serve both priority objectives. Activities in both tracks are sequenced in accordance with the order of priority deemed appropriate and feasible within each specific context, based on the prioritization framework and success factors articulated above.

Pre-deployment Phase

In the pre-deployment phase, peacekeepers: (1) work closely with DPA colleagues, particularly the Mediation Support Unit, to actively support the peace process, serving as advocates for early peacebuilding priorities in the negotiation of a peace agreement; (2) build relationships with parties, civil society/citizenry in the field; (3) map local stakeholders and assess local capacities in the relevant areas of expertise, including capacities situated in diaspora populations; (4) conduct early assessment and planning exercises, with partners when appropriate, in accordance with the IMPP; (5) define the necessary civilian, police and military skill sets and equipment for short and long-term mission staffing, budgeting and deployment; (6) seek to encourage a clear and achievable Security Council mandate backed with adequate financial resources. Peacekeepers will apply the prioritization criteria rigorously at this stage to ensure that the Headquarters-supported IMPP is focused on an appropriate set of tasks.

Operational Phase

The operational phase encompasses rapid deployment, mission start-up, field office start-up and mandate implementation.

Track I: Security measures that advance the peace process
Failure to deliver on the reasonable expectation of minimal security in the aftermath of a cease-fire or peace agreement can irreparably damage the peace process and the peacekeeping operation’s credibility. Track I tasks include critical activities that address or prevent immediate security problems, which, as noted above [p.4], will serve to create political space for longer-term peacebuilding and development. See the box below for an indication of possible Track I activities.

Track I tasks may be implemented directly or jointly with and through partners, depending on the capacity of partner organizations to act quickly. These activities often do (but are not required to) lay the groundwork for, or catalyse, longer-term institutional reform. When conducting Track I activities with national actors, peacekeepers must employ knowledge transfer and mentoring skills to initiate essential national capacity building. Rapid deployment capacity may be particularly critical here, to achieve the goal of improved physical security that can generate confidence in a peace process. DPKO/DFS will bear in mind the criteria dictated by the programme criticality strategy when determining the feasibility and sequencing of Track I tasks.
Examples of TRACK I activities that:
STABILIZE, IMPROVE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS

• Protect UN personnel and property, key legitimate governmental figures, key government installations, including cultural sites, ports, airports, prisons and other vital infrastructure
• Deter forceful attempts to disrupt the peace process
• Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence
• Facilitate provision of humanitarian assistance
• Assist national authorities to maintain law and public order
• Conduct patrols and restore the perception of public security
• Assess women’s security priorities and increase patrols where women are particularly vulnerable to attack
• Design measures to prevent further human rights violations
• Monitor conduct of local security forces
• Monitor, investigate and report on human rights violations and seek to address impunity
• Address critical security infrastructure gaps (secure corrections facilities, adequate police stations and vehicles, communications equipment)
• Initiate activities to prevent child recruitment, pursue immediate release of children from armed forces or groups, special attention to girls associated with fighting forces
• Early analysis of relationship between local and national level dynamics, local context and conflict analysis, identification of potential partnerships and coordination with local partners
• Informal dispute resolution to defuse conflicts that risk undermining peace process.
• Facilitate consultation processes providing a platform for local populations and constituencies to input into national processes and discussions
• Determine whether second generation DDR measures, including community violence reduction programmes may be required
• Avoid unsustainably large security sector
• Establish special chambers to adjudicate serious crimes
• Deploy emergency mobile courts to areas where justice institutions are absent
• Standardize basic criminal justice procedures and practices (e.g., for recording arrests; serving court documents; and executing judicial decisions)
• Subject to the agreement of the host country, deploy international judges, prosecutors and lawyers to perform line functions for a limited time period
• Upgrade prisons and/or deploy modular prisons that are rapidly operational and offer humane standards/conditions
• Conduct in theatre mine/ERW clearance and risk assessment and education to facilitate mission deployment, humanitarian aid delivery, and enable safe population movements
• Initiate local ‘quick impact’ projects that build confidence in the peace process
• Restore/initiate essential components of local administration
• Consider emergency job creation to defuse political tensions
• Coordinate among UN actors in support of integrated strategic priorities

Track II: Consolidate the peace process by laying the foundation for longer-term institution building

A UN peacekeeping operation has the political leverage and credibility necessary to lay the groundwork for longer-term institution and capacity building efforts that will be carried out by
national authorities and supported by development partners. Although multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations have not traditionally been designed or equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts, “experience has shown that, in the short-term, a UN peacekeeping operation may have little choice but to initiate longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts, due to the inability of other actors to take the lead.”

When undertaking such activities, it is essential that DPKO engage actively during the pre-deployment phase to establish realistic short and long-term expectations with the legislative bodies and host authorities, seek assurance that the necessary resources will be forthcoming, and emphasize the pivotal nature of national compliance with accountability measures, without which the international community’s investment in national capacity building and institutional reform will be fruitless. Once deployed, a peacekeeping operation must prioritize those initiatives that will advance the peace process and the mission’s political objectives, monitor initiatives closely to ensure the strengthening of legitimate and accountable actors and institutions, and ensure that the operation’s efforts “remain focused on preparing the ground for those actors within and outside the UN system with the mandate to provide longer-term peacebuilding assistance”.

Track II tasks most often entail: (1) the provision of strategic level advice to local and national authorities to support the development of a national strategy, drafting of fundamental legislation, and the design of basic training, for the sector; (2) coordination of the efforts of the various international actors prepared to engage in the provision of support to national authorities, and (3) the provision of initial technical assistance and monitoring required to ensure sufficient, essential national capacity for the basic functioning of weak institutions. See text and boxes in Section VII, below, for an indication of possible Track II activities.

Joint or complementary planning with capable partners that have proven their ability to deliver is essential to the sustainability of these long-term initiatives and to the eventual transition of full responsibility for the institutional reform agenda to national actors supported by development partners.

VII. Applying the strategy to prepare, support, and implement peacekeeping mandates

The following sections, and the matrices annexed to this strategy, illustrate the possible application of this strategy in a manner that ensures that specialist functional areas common to many multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations plan and execute their initiatives in support of the political objectives of the mission or peace process. There can be no one-size-fits-all template for UN peacekeeping. Thus, peacekeepers supporting or representing the various components of a UN peacekeeping operation should be guided by this strategy as well as departmental policies (e.g., on gender equality and gender mainstreaming) when engaging in the IMPP process, led by the Integrated Operational Teams.

Political Affairs

The deployment of a peacekeeping operation must fit within a clearly defined political agenda and the role of political affairs experts is at the heart of mandate implementation. The fundamental concern of political affairs officers at Headquarters and Political Affairs components in missions is to analyze the dynamics of an armed conflict and develop strategies to help the parties to the conflict resolve their disputes through peaceful means.

In the pre-deployment phase, political affairs officers actively participate in the strategic assessment aimed at devising concrete recommendations to the Secretary-General on how the UN system might respond to a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation. Once it is decided that a mission will be deployed, political affairs officers lead and participate in the production of key planning products, including: Planning Directive(s), Commitment Authority, Technical Assessment Missions, report of
the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Mission Concept, Mission Results-Based Budget, and the Directive to the SRSG. Political affairs officers work closely with the Security Council on the formulation of the mission’s mandate, based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General. Once the Mission is established, political affairs officers lead and participate in the Integrated Operational Team at Headquarters, which serves as the principal entry point for political, as well as integrated planning and operational issues for the mission, as well as for troop- and police-contributing countries, Member States and other relevant partners on mission specific issues.

During the early stages of the operational phase, the role of the Political Affairs component is critical, particularly if a peace agreement has not been concluded or if a long-term political transition is under way. As conflict decreases in intensity and immediacy, the Political Affairs component monitors the national, sub-regional, regional and sometimes international political context relevant to the mandate and helps ensure that institutions or systems are established to prevent, mitigate or resolve political differences peacefully. Political analysis continues to play a critical role in informing and implementing the mission’s exit strategy. Political Affairs components also advise the SRSG and other mission components on the potential political implications of any activity.

Activities performed by Political Affairs components that advance the political objectives of the mission or peace process may include: developing strategies to achieve or implement peace agreements, and to implement Security Council mandates; advising the SRSG on mandate implementation, taking into account the political context; providing early risk/threat assessments and situational awareness of the mission’s political environment; developing systems to monitor the progress of a peace process; identifying and compiling profiles of key players in a conflict or peace process; establishing contacts with parties to the conflict at all levels; designing confidence-building and conflict-mitigation measures, including deterrence of potential spoilers; supporting national reconciliation by preparing the ground for higher level mediation exercises; maintaining close contacts with political authorities of the host country (the cabinet, parliament and the relevant local authorities), as well as with diplomatic missions, international and regional organizations and civil society groups and leaders; assessing which external partnerships are appropriate to pursue within the mandate of the mission; advising the SRSG on key messages that need to be sent to the parties to the conflict or other stakeholders; providing clarity about the central messages that all components of the mission will convey to the outside; fulfilling the integrated reporting obligations of the Mission, providing the overall account and analysis of developments on the ground, and working with Headquarters in seeking political support from Member States, in particular the Security Council; interacting with donors to mobilize resources for peace negotiations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRACK II ACTIVITIES IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS MAY INCLUDE:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Providing policy advice to government officials and other national stakeholders, including the development of roadmaps for political progress;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing support for the strengthening of political and governance institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conceptualizing, planning and establishing new political institutions under a transitional administration mandate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interacting with donors to mobilize resources for peacebuilding activities.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The political will of national, regional and international actors, strong leadership, and a clear and achievable mandate supported with adequate financing are the success factors most essential to the political affairs work of a peacekeeping operation. The unity of the Security Council is a significant factor in the success of peacekeeping endeavours. Though skill sets must be tailored to the political objectives of the mission and the nature of the conflict, political affairs officers will ideally possess a combination of local knowledge, an aptitude for mediation, and strong analytical, drafting and coordination skills.
Military

In most cases military peacekeepers will be the first to deploy to a region in the aftermath of conflict. The Force Generation process to obtain new peacekeepers can only begin following authorisation from the UN Security Council, and this invariably imposes a delay in initial deployment. Military enablers are also key at the earliest stages to provide critical transport, medical and engineer assets. It should be noted that peacekeepers from the neighbouring mission in Liberia were deployed quickly into Côte d’Ivoire to augment them at a time of need. This excellent example of inter-mission cooperation has set a very useful precedent.

The immediate mandate of military peacekeepers will be to support the restoration of security and to provide a secure environment within which the humanitarian agencies and others can operate. Track 1 activities for military peacekeepers are likely to include the provision of security at specific locations, such as national institutions, key installations, IDP camps, or working with UN Police (if deployed at this stage) in containing public disorder. Military peacekeepers will quickly establish a patrolling routine that can do much to calm a volatile situation, reassure the population, and provide a visible demonstration of external support in a time of need. As UN Police arrive, patrolling is likely to be joint, with the lead gradually shifting to the UN Police as the situation calms. Engagement will subsequently be made with key national civil and military leaders to provide reassurance and mutual awareness and understanding. Patrolling can then be expanded, and may include targeted patrols addressing recurrent human rights violations such as sexual and gender-based violence. This could, for example, include escorting women to gather firewood or crops, when they would otherwise routinely be attacked or assaulted.

Track II initiatives may include support to or training of some national forces, and could even be a step towards joint operations, if so mandated, as seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These activities require basic military skills, which are then adapted to the peacekeeping environment to provide effective protection of civilians. The skills required to implement protection of civilians mandates are being addressed in peacekeeping training centres but work is underway to incorporate this into core military training; this is more effective than training contingents prior to their deployment, after their arrival in a mission, or using train-the-trainer schemes. Special-to-mission skills also need to be included in core military training to optimise effectiveness upon arrival in theatre, and these can include language training, training in specialist skills such as long-range patrolling and communications, and effective liaison with other contingents and factions. Reporting skills are also vital, to enable military components to ensure that accurate and timely information is provided to the force headquarters, the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Military Analysis Cell (JMAC) to inform the senior leadership. Other skills that can be developed include integrated planning; public information and Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

Police

UN Police contribute to basic security in the aftermath of conflict and is often charged with police development. In exceptional circumstances the UN may be mandated to serve in an executive policing function but in most cases is deployed in support of the host-state police who remain the primary provider of public security. UN Police activities in peacekeeping operations must be carefully prioritised to effectively manage local security demands and unreasonable expectations. DPKO is the designated lead entity within the UN system for policing and law enforcement issues.

Track I initiatives for UN Police (Formed Police Units and individual officers are referred to jointly as UNPOL) include improving the public perception of security and providing security support in specific locations, such as IDP camps, during public disorder incidents or in the context of the protection of civilians. UNPOL may also support the provision of security in electoral process, for example by training host-state police and other law enforcement agencies. In their capacity as mentors and advisers, UNPOL help to ensure that local police respect human rights standards in the exercise of.
their police functions. However, UN Police are only equipped to cope with situations below the level of a military threat. Joint patrolling – with host-state police (where appropriate) or military peacekeepers – and other measures that increase the visibility of the police presence are valuable and effective contributions to the overall stabilisation effort.

**Track II** activities in the area of policing and law enforcement aim primarily at rebuilding relations between the police and the community they serve. The pace and sequencing of police development efforts will be influenced by a number of nationally-driven factors. National decisions on the overall size and financing of the public sector; national measures and commitment to dealing with corruption and rights violations; the state of the wider security system; including the parent ministry and oversight mechanisms, will all affect the pace and sustainability of police development efforts. Absent progress or political commitment in these areas, Track II initiatives must proceed with extreme caution.

If the appropriate and required specialised policing capacities are made available, then a number of Track II activities can be undertaken. Specialised skills include experience in mentoring, training and knowledge transfer skills, knowledge of relevant legal frameworks, ability to develop policing and law enforcement administrative structures and regulations, organisational change, and a solid understanding of the local context as well as the time and language support to build relationships of trust with counterparts. This calls for a more flexible approach to recruitment and rotations that would facilitate the deployment and retention of qualified staff. DPKO will engage with PCCs to ensure the recruitment of appropriate level or types of skill. Support that UN Police provides to police development must be based on solid guidance and training and quality assurance must be conducted on the basis of clear performance standards.

**Justice**

The restoration of peace and security in countries emerging from conflict is inextricably linked to the restoration of the rule of law, including a functioning justice system. Justice systems in post-conflict settings almost invariably lack sufficiently qualified officials, adequate legal education, and the necessary administrative tools and physical infrastructure to administer justice properly, fairly or effectively. The absence of strong state institutions, particularly in rural areas, inadequate legislation, low salaries for judges and prosecutors, rampant corruption, and the lack of a secure environment for courts, judicial personnel, victims and witnesses severely undermine the capacity of the legal system to act independently and impartially thereby contributing to the low level of public trust and confidence in these institutions. Judicial Affairs Officers can help to address justice-related issues that are highlighted in peace agreements and were core to the conflict, or that are otherwise essential for the successful implementation of the peace process.

In the pre-deployment phase, Judicial Affairs officers contribute to assessments of local stakeholder capacities, the role of rule of law institutions and actors in the conflict, the nature of legal disputes that may be sources of conflict, and the manner in which local populations tend to resolve these disputes. Assessments, often undertaken jointly with partners, inform mission planning and the recruitment of specialised staff. Rapid deployment can help ensure that progress towards rule of law objectives is made in the early days of a mission, when it may have the leverage necessary to obtain important commitments from national counterparts. Standing capacities are necessary and the establishment of the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity in UNLB Brindisi is a positive step.

To assist national authorities in ensuring public security, Judicial Affairs officers can undertake such **Track I** activities as supporting: the establishment of appropriate formal and/or informal justice mechanisms to resolve disputes that could significantly hinder the peace process; the immediate functioning of the criminal justice system, particularly with regards to serious crimes; the establishment of special chambers to adjudicate serious crimes; the deployment of emergency mobile
courts to areas where justice institutions are absent; and the standardization of basic procedures and practices (for example, for recording arrests; serving court documents; and executing judicial decisions). Subject to the agreement of the host country, international judges, prosecutors and lawyers may be called upon to perform line functions for a limited time period.

Judicial Affairs officers may also undertake tailored Track II interventions aimed at laying the foundation for longer-term institutional reform, which will increase and become more extensive as security is re-established. Such efforts should emerge from a national strategy for the rule of law sector. For example, judicial affairs officers may assist in amending or drafting laws to ensure compatibility with international norms and standards or to enable the justice system to address serious crimes. They may: support the constitution-making process as indicated in the peace agreement; help to establish or develop law schools; ensure appropriate linkages between informal or customary justice systems and the formal system; enhance the independence of the judiciary (through greater judicial control over administrative and budgetary matters and improvements in conditions of service for judicial personnel); and promote the integrity and accountability of the legal profession (through public awareness campaigns to improve public confidence in the justice system). Although these tasks will need to be continued beyond the early peacebuilding period, failure to initiate them during this period may greatly jeopardize the prospects for peace consolidation.

Capacity gaps in areas such as local stakeholder and context assessment, constitution making, judicial reform, prosecution, legal aid, court administration, juvenile and gender justice, customary law, land and property rights, present risks to implementation. Specialist skill sets are in limited supply, particularly at short notice, and as is the case in the police and corrections sectors, new approaches are required to facilitate the deployment of qualified experts. Ensuring a large and diverse pool of pre-vetted and approved high calibre experts on standby rosters with efficient and effective modalities to deploy them rapidly is essential.

**Corrections**

The state of a national corrections system rarely constitutes a source of armed conflict, yet the extreme level of overcrowding and human rights abuses common in post-conflict prison settings may pose significant security risks, which should be assessed in coordination with law enforcement, justice, SSR and DDR experts. National security assessments may identify the most serious threats to be internal, including within the corrections and law enforcement sectors. The staffing of corrections facilities can also be a source of volatility. Former combatants with few prospects for economic self-sustainment are often placed, without proper vetting, within security institutions – including prisons – as a means of employment until longer-term reintegration is feasible. As the peace process gets underway in any post-conflict setting, police, justice and corrections specialists should anticipate a rise in crime and can prepare for the presence of former combatants among the population. The physical state of detention facilities is usually poor and provides neither adequate security nor reasonable living conditions. These problems are often compounded by an influx of pre-trial detainees as the country deploys police to establish public security, often before the courts are operational. Lack of food, water, medical treatment and appropriate sanitation has led to numerous deaths in custody.

As a Track I measure, corrections components rely on quick impact projects to build trust and credibility while assisting in improving conditions, including: provision of food (often through prison gardens), water, sanitation and medical care; and essential infrastructure repairs. Treatment of prisoners is improved through immediate training for prison officers. Training of trainers at this stage may contribute to Track II initiatives. Modular prisons also present an opportunity to deliver visible early results.

DPKO corrections specialists coordinate support with partners to lay the groundwork for longer-term support to the corrections sector. Track II activities will entail assistance in policy development and
long-term strategic planning for the sector in line with international standards, and advocacy in support of nationally-owned corrections priorities with international partners and donors.

The capacity of national corrections officers to absorb the mentoring and advising of international corrections officers, and the concomitant capacities of international staff to transfer knowledge and skills to national counterparts, will be crucial to the success of corrections initiatives in peacekeeping settings. As noted with regard to Judicial Affairs officers, above, the ability to rapidly deploy corrections officers with appropriate skill sets is essential. Corrections Contributing Countries are encouraged to make officers with the necessary skills available on short notice, and the establishment of the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity is a positive step.

**Human Rights**

The protection and promotion of human rights are essential elements of United Nations efforts to build peace. In many post-conflict contexts, human rights violations are a conflict-driver and persist after peace agreements have been signed. Continuing threats to physical security and impunity for past human rights violations, combined with a lack of trust in the security sector, which may have participated in past violations, all serve to undermine the host population’s confidence in the peace
Human rights officers in peacekeeping operations contribute to peacebuilding by promoting the protection of human rights, in particular the protection of civilians, supporting the restoration of the rule of law and the fight against impunity, strengthening relevant national institutions and empowering the local population to assert their human rights and to seek recourse for violations.

The deployment of UN peacekeepers raises expectations that action will be taken to stop gross human rights violations. In this respect, in the predeployment and operational phase Human Rights Officers provide advice to the SRSG on human rights issues relevant to the political situation or peace processes, participate in assessments of the local human rights situation, the role of various stakeholders and institutions in the violation or protection of human rights, and map the capacities of relevant national partners.

Once deployed, human rights officers undertake such Track I initiatives as: conducting monitoring, reporting, advocacy, early warning, and devising protection strategies to prevent, and respond to, serious human rights violations. Human rights officers also support the ability of formal judicial and informal dispute resolution mechanisms to immediately address on-going human rights violations. In pursuit of security, human rights officers may advise the head of mission on human rights concerns to raise within the peace process, pursue quiet diplomacy with relevant authorities, or make public statements at local, national and international levels. The above activities also serve to strengthen local human rights capacity.

Track II interventions take advantage of the mission’s political leverage and seek to lay the groundwork for institution-building by, for example, assisting in constitutional and legislative reform to ensure compatibility with international human rights norms and standards or to fill gaps in national law. Human rights officers support the establishment of transitional justice frameworks and mechanisms, and judicial mechanisms to address past violations; contribute to the reform of judicial and police and other security institutions including through vetting and establishment of oversight and accountability mechanisms; support the establishment of national human rights plans and the functioning of independent National Human Rights Institutions and, provide human rights training to national authorities. In the context of security sector reform, human rights officers may provide assistance and technical expertise to national authorities, including military, judicial, and police authorities, and relevant UN counterparts to incorporate human rights perspectives into their work. Human rights officers also support civil society, including building the capacity of human rights defenders to monitor the human rights situation and promote change, assist victims of human rights violations (including victims of sexual violence) to seek redress, and to develop human rights programmes.

Rapid deployment of human rights officers at the earliest stages of mission deployment and provision of adequate logistical and security support to carry out monitoring and investigations is essential to respond to the urgent demand for security within the host population. Political will at the national, regional and international level is essential to ensure these activities are sustainable and that national institutions will take full responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights.

Civil Affairs

Deployed widely at the local level to support social and civic conditions for peace, and acting as the primary interface between the mission and local interlocutors, Civil Affairs components are at the forefront of the mission’s local peacebuilding effort. The core roles of Civil Affairs components include: 1) cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level; 2) confidence-building, conflict management and reconciliation; and 3) support to the extension of state authority. Although some tasks serve both Track I and II objectives, the following is an indication of typical tasks in each phase and track.
In support of Track I objectives and through their presence at local level, civil affairs officers ensure regional and local considerations are integrated into national negotiations or priority-setting processes; test assumptions at the community level about the peacebuilding process and help monitor countrywide progress; provide mission leadership with information about the local environment; conduct conflict analysis and early warning about potential and imminent local conflict, including in relation to efforts to protect civilians. Through early analysis of the relationship between local and national level dynamics, identification of potential partnerships and coordination with local partners, civil affairs officers facilitate consultation processes and provide a platform for local populations and constituencies to input into national processes and discussions, which can help facilitate peace processes and support buy-in at the local level. Through community outreach, civil affairs provide information and promote public discussion about key issues, including electoral issues, which fosters early stability and lays the groundwork for longer-term popular engagement in institution-building, where relevant.

Within missions civil affairs officers help uniformed and non-uniformed components engage with communities and ensure they are well briefed on the socio-cultural contexts in which they operate. While this role is performed through the lifecycle of a mission in support of both Track I and Track II objectives, it is particularly critical during the early phase, when missions seek to establish relations with host communities. Civil affairs officers may conduct small-scale capacity building activities in areas where longer-term development actors are less well represented.

Civil Affairs components advance Track II objectives by: strengthening the capacity of public authorities to function, primarily at the local level and supporting the development of structures for dialogue and cooperation between authorities and relevant interest groups, with a focus on creating long term, local level platforms for ensuring popular engagement in political life and in ensuring government accountability. Civil Affairs components may provide administrative and logistic support to help government representatives return to areas where local government has been minimal or has diminished during the conflict, thus supporting the extension of state authority and laying the foundation for longer-term institution-building efforts.

The rapid deployment of international and national officers at the local level is essential to ensure integration of regional analysis and facilitate community engagement at the early stage. Civil affairs officers at Headquarters are currently developing tailored training to ensure that personnel have the relevant skills for the specific mission context in which they operate.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a complex process with political, military, humanitarian and socio-economic aspects. DDR provides pivotal confidence-building measures to foster stabilization and progress in the peace process, while also serving as an enabler for longer-term political and security arrangements initiated in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Most activities therefore serve Track I objectives.
The engagement of DDR experts should begin in the pre-deployment phase, with the provision of DDR technical advice to negotiators of the political settlement, including special envoys, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General or country-level UN staff. During the operational phase, progress in dealing with fighting forces through DDR programmes or weapons management strategies may contribute to an environment conducive to the implementation of other aspects of the peace agreement.

The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) – a common set of guidelines for UN practitioners – contains guidance on key aspects of Track I DDR activities such as the development of a DDR operational plan, establishment of a coordination body to facilitate planning and implementation of the DDR process by a wide range of national and international actors, as well as the development of a communications strategy. DDR may contribute to capacity-building as national actors become engaged in the DDR process, though DDR entities are generally transitional. DDR often has an impact on the size and structure of the security sector, which must be addressed from the earliest planning stages together with SSR colleagues and national actors. The IDDRS includes a module on linkages between DDR and SSR [6.10]

Peacekeeping operations are increasingly deployed in situations where the preconditions for successful DDR, specifically a negotiated peace agreement and a minimum degree of security, are not met. Consequently, practitioners have increasingly adapted community-based measures, recently referred to as “Second Generation” DDR, which serve the same core objectives as traditional DDR: to create political space, support the peace process and contribute to improved security. These measures may be conducted instead of, alongside, or after traditional DDR and include post-conflict stabilisation (e.g. sub-national/community approaches); programmes targeting specific groups (e.g. disarmament and dismantling of militias, commanders and senior officers incentives programmes); alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons (e.g. weapons management). In Haiti, MINUSTAH’s Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Section was established following a decision by the Security Council in 2006 to address the fact that armed groups, in particular urban gangs, were the main source of insecurity. CVR provides alternative livelihoods, primarily for at-risk youth and gang members.

Whether or not there is a comprehensive peace agreement in place, programmatic work should take into account the inherently political nature of DDR. A DDR process will only be successful if there is sufficient political will to drive it forward. The sensitive issues involved touch directly on internal power relations, and decisions in this area create ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ DDR should be flexible, and grounded in a solid understanding of context-specific political, cultural, socio-economic and security factors.

Security Sector Reform

“SSR is an essential component of efforts to re-establish and strengthen rule of law. Progress in the area of SSR is critical to the success of a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation and helps define its ‘exit strategy,’ which is largely dependent on the ability of national security actors and institutions to function effectively.”28
During the pre-deployment phase, SSR and DDR experts are engaged in ensuring that the synergies between SSR and DDR processes are raised during the peacemaking process and reflected in any peace agreements or ceasefire arrangements. These are highly sensitive issues that bear directly on the distribution of political power and the potential for spoilers (disaffected former combatants or armed groups) to disrupt the peace process in the post-conflict period. Yet they are nonetheless crucial to address early on, to ensure a smooth DDR process and long-term security for the host country.

SSR officers conduct needs assessments, develop coordination structures, and mobilize resources throughout the phases of a UN peacekeeping operation. SSR expertise complements and informs the planning and implementation of Track I initiatives intended to provide immediate security. For example, SSR officers advise and monitor the way in which former combatants are vetted (or not) into formal or informal security sectors in the immediate post-conflict period, as this can have repercussions for long-term SSR planning.

Similarly, the provision of salaries for formal or informal security sector personnel in the immediate aftermath of conflict may prevent the emergence of armed spoilers and instil confidence in the peace process. SSR expertise is required to balance this initiative, which may foster immediate security, against the longer-term, Track II objective of devising a sustainable national security strategy and budget.

UN peacekeeping operations may be called upon to undertake such Track II activities as: supporting national actors in developing and implementing comprehensive SSR reviews, strategies and legislation that address the security needs and priorities of the entire population, assisting in the restructuring, reform and training of the national security personnel, developing national management and oversight capacities, and assisting with the coordination of international support to the security sector.29

Mine Action

“In many post-conflict settings, landmines and other [explosive remnants of war] constitute a threat to the safety of civilians” and UN personnel, impede mission deployment, and restrict or endanger population movements that often accompany the end of hostilities.30

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As the identification of contaminated areas and access to them for clearance is essential to create peace building space, Mine Action guidelines for Ceasefire and Peace Agreements were developed in 2003. This allows negotiators and representatives of combatant parties to understand the minimum mine action requirements to be included in any agreement. The need to include mine action references in such agreements and the potential of mine action as a peace and confidence building measure has been noted in General Assembly Resolutions. From Cyprus to Afghanistan to the Nuba Mountains of Sudan, the utility of mine action to unite former warring factions in common cause that allows former combatants to become healers has proven itself time and again.

**Track I** initiatives include clearance of routes for mission deployment, to enable delivery of humanitarian aid, and to reduce the supply of raw materials available to potential spoilers of the peace process. Mine risk education, often through partner agencies, is a **Track I** priority and when coupled with effective victim surveillance systems can target at-risk groups with specific messages and assistance to reduce casualties. Rapid survey, as part of **Track I**, is an essential element to highlight not only areas suspected of contamination but to confirm areas known to be free of contamination and ready for use by the local population, the Mission and partners. Mixed demining teams comprised of former combatants from opposing parties working together to clear land in affected communities can instil confidence in the peace process and ease the reintegration of combatants.

**Track II** initiatives include the reduction of previously suspect areas and a more concentrated application of assets on areas known to contain hazards, based on a refinement of the initial data. Where a national counterpart can be identified, UNMAS will seek to collaborate with and enhance national capacity. This is accomplished through the measurement of current national capacity compared with the projected future capacity requirements in light of a diminishing mine and ERW problem through on-going land release efforts. Where gaps are identified, UNMAS will provide capacity development support, upon request and within available resources.

**Gender**

Peacekeeping operations seek to ensure that the needs of women, men, boys and girls are taken into account in all mandated peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. Gender components ensure that a gender perspective informs the assessment and implementation of activities undertaken by all mission components and ensure that peacekeeping operations engage in strategic partnerships and planning processes with the UN Country Team, to define the gender-related aspects of the integrated strategic framework. Gender components also ensure that the mission is working in a complementary manner with international partners, in support of national objectives to enhance women’s participation in the peace process in collaboration with civil society.

During the pre-deployment phase, gender advisers participate in the planning process and provide training support to ensure that gender issues are reflected in the assessment process and to promote the recruitment and deployment of female peacekeepers. Activities include gathering information to establish the impact of the conflict on women and men, the roles played by women and men during the conflict and in peacebuilding, the capacities available in national government and local communities and organizations. This initial assessment enables the identification of priority initiatives that may promote women’s rights and gender equality.

Gender advisors support the **Track I** objectives of advancing political objectives and ensuring security by establishing a consultative platform with local women’s organisations to ensure that their perspectives continuously inform the mission’s broader analysis of security risks; promoting the engagement of women in efforts to support peace and reconciliation. Gender components coordinate on-going training for all mission components and work with them to, for example, ensure that military and police components identify and respond to specific security concerns of women and girls when patrolling, information-gathering, or providing election-related security; support outreach efforts to identify and include women former combatants and women associated with armed groups in DDR programmes; advise corrections components on the conditions of female detainees; assist justice
components to ensure that formal and informal justice mechanisms are accessible to women and work to protect and promote their rights; monitor effective targeting of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to address sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response; collaborate with military components to ensure military escorts for victims of sexual violence to mobile clinics or hospitals as required.

A gender component will work closely with national counterparts and mission components to advance Track II objectives by, for example, ensuring that legal reform, security sector reform, and the training and capacity-building provided to government partners are gender-sensitive. The gender component assists governments to elaborate national plans of action to protect women and girls from sexual violence, and to implement Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

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<tr>
<th>TRACK II TASKS IN GENDER EQUALITY MAY INCLUDE:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Support female lawyers associations in efforts to establish legal clinics and sensitise local women on their rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Advocate for gender justice mechanisms to provide legal support for victims of sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Training magistrates, advocates and the police on strategies to promote effective judicial support in the management of victims of sexual violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide technical support for the adoption of gender-sensitive security sector policies, drawing on international instruments to promote women’s rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Advocate for increased recruitment of women in local police and military institutions within the framework of security sector reform</td>
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Child Protection

Armed conflict disproportionately affects children, who are often subject to abductions, recruitment, rape and sexual violence, killing, maiming, displacement, separation, and deprivation of basic social services and education. The destruction of traditional and formal government support structures during and after conflict may exacerbate children’s vulnerability.

The Security Council has acknowledged the importance of ensuring the protection of children’s rights throughout the processes of peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. To this end, Child Protection Advisers (CPA) in peacekeeping operations advise the SRSG and others of critical child rights concerns to be addressed in peacemaking efforts and peace agreements, ensure that relevant child rights concerns are raised with government authorities and other political interlocutors (representatives of armed groups, national authorities of neighboring countries, regional organizations, bilateral partners), and seek to create an enabling environment for programmatic child protection agencies.

CPAs participate in mission planning in the pre-deployment phase to ensure that child rights and protection issues inform early assessments, and provide on-going training for mission components throughout the operational phase to ensure that on-going assessment and planning exercises and interventions account for the particular needs and rights of children and advance Track I and II objectives. CPAs work with national, local, and community-based, organizations to engage children as agents of political change and peacebuilding. Finally, CPAs help to ensure that a peacekeeping operation has clearly delineated strategic partnerships with UN Country Team and other partners and is using its credibility and political leverage to advance child rights and protection in accordance with its comparative strengths and in support of the shared objectives reflected in the integrated strategic framework.
The Child Protection components of peacekeeping operations have the political leverage to advance the Track I security objectives of war-affected children by: serving as coordinator of the monitoring and reporting mechanisms mandated by Security Council resolution 1612; advocating against impunity for violations children’s rights; ensuring that relevant components of the peacekeeping operation contribute to effective monitoring and subsequently use the information to inform its security analyses and physical protection activities; and including child rights concern in negotiations with parties to conflict who are developing child protection actions plans as required by the Security Council.

Child Protection components do not implement programmatic Track II initiatives, but do use the political leverage of the peacekeeping operation to lay the groundwork for institution-building by helping to ensure that specific child protection concerns figure prominently on the political agenda.

The ability of a Child Protection component to contribute during the pre-deployment and operational phases will depend largely on the availability of expertise with the requisite skill sets, which include: the capacity to conduct thorough assessments of the impact of a particular conflict on children, the role children have played in a conflict and the capacities of local stakeholders to address priority child rights concerns; the ability to effectively interject child rights concerns into political processes; the ability to coordinate a wide variety of mission components and partners, and to mobilize resources, in support of the objectives reflected in the integrated strategic framework.

**TRACK II TASKS IN CHILD PROTECTION MAY INCLUDE:**

- Advocate for political support and resources for the establishment of juvenile justice systems structured for rehabilitation rather than punishment.
- Urge national actors to strengthen the protective environment for children, including adoption of a comprehensive Child Rights Bill.
- Sensitize local communities on the rehabilitation and reintegration of children affected by armed conflict.

**Integrated mission capacities – Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs), Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) and Joint Logistics Operations Centres (JLOCs)**

The integrated mission capacities play a critical role in supporting senior mission leaders to plan and direct the execution of integrated and coordinated early peacebuilding efforts. Track I activities performed by JMACs include: the production of mission threat assessments; early warning; incident analysis; trend analysis; scenario papers; key actor profiles and risk mapping. JMACs can also contribute to Track II efforts to lay the foundations for longer term institution building. Track I activities performed by mission JOCs include: providing 24/7 situational awareness; developing and disseminating integrated operational reporting; providing a 24/7 communications service for senior leaders and others, as required; and supporting crisis response management initiatives. JOCs do not implement Track II initiatives. JLOCs provide coordinated, integrated logistics support to early peacebuilding activities carried out by all mission components.

**Conclusion**

This strategy aims to improve the capability of peacekeeping operations to deliver predictably, effectively and accountably in the complex areas of security, basic service provision, support to political processes, restoration and extension of state authority. A communications and outreach effort, as well as guidance and training in support of this strategy, will be produced as required.
ENDNOTES
1 Report of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/64/573
2 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881,
   as the “Capstone Doctrine”), 2008, p.26
3 S/PRST/2011/4
4 ST/SGB/2010/1, para.2.1(a) and ST/SGB/2011/2, para. 2.1 (a)
5 S/PRST/2011/4
6 Capstone Doctrine, p. 23
7 Report of the High-level Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (hereinafter referred to as the “Brahimi Report”),
   A/55/305
8 Capstone Doctrine, chapter 3, pp 32-34
9 Capstone Doctrine, p 34
10 Capstone Doctrine, p.24
11 Capstone Doctrine, p.69
12 Capstone Doctrine, p39
13 Capstone Doctrine, p.49
14 Capstone Doctrine, p. 50
15 Capstone Doctrine, p.50
16 Capstone Doctrine, p. 51
17 S/PRST/2011/4
18 Capstone Doctrine, p.51, see also S/PRST/2011/4, para. 5, emphasizing the importance of clear and
   achievable mandates.
19 S/PRST/2011/2
20 Capstone Doctrine, p. 53
21 Capstone Doctrine, p.71
22 Capstone Doctrine, p. 71
23 S/PRST/2011/2, see also S/PRST/2011/4
24 Capstone Doctrine, pp. 39-40
25 Capstone Doctrine, pp. 62-64
26 Capstone Doctrine, p.28
27 Capstone Doctrine, p.29
28 Capstone Doctrine, p 27
29 Capstone Doctrine, p.27
30 Capstone Doctrine, p. 26
31 A/RES/64/84, OP10