

# Regional Security, Gender Identity, and CPA Implementation in Sudan

A joint publication of Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares



*Africa Peace Forum*



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## **About this Publication**

The two commissioned papers in this volume were prepared for, and presented at, a December 2007 workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, held in support of the *Building Capacity for Sustainable Peace in Sudan* project, a joint project of Project Ploughshares and Africa Peace Forum. The workshop brought together key stakeholders, including civil society representatives and government officials, to discuss emerging issues related to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This project is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency.

## **Africa Peace Forum**

Africa Peace Forum (APFO) is a nongovernmental organization based in Nairobi, Kenya, which carries out research and analysis on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and security issues in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region. APFO engages civil society and the political community in ongoing and joint exploration of new approaches to security arrangements in the region. APFO is a founding member of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

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## **Project Ploughshares**

Project Ploughshares is the ecumenical agency of The Canadian Council of Churches established to work with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and nongovernmental organizations, in Canada and internationally, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo, and is a founding member of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

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## Preface

Both papers in this volume address the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, but deal with very different aspects of this process. One paper focuses on the micro-level concern of gender identity, militarization, and disarmament in Southern Sudan, while the other paper looks at how CPA implementation in the whole of Sudan is also necessary for peace in the Horn of Africa region. Both papers demonstrate that the security situation and the political solution in Sudan are intrinsically linked and must be addressed comprehensively. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently remarked after a visit to the region, a peaceful solution “cannot be piecemeal. If peace is to come, it must take into account all the elements that gave rise to the conflict.”

The papers were reviewed by academics from the University of Nairobi prior to presentation at the workshop in Nairobi in December. Following the workshop, the authors revised their papers to integrate feedback and perspectives from the discussion, thereby enriching the final product, which is presented here.

The December 2007 workshop in Nairobi was the final activity of the current CIDA-sponsored Project Ploughshares–APFO project. The policy-relevant research on the CPA has been designed to help the emerging governments and civil society of north and south Sudan to build conditions conducive to sustainable peace. The series of dialogues that took place from 2005 to 2007 have complemented ongoing initiatives by political, economic, and humanitarian actors to ensure continuing progress.

Past workshop reports and research publications related to the Sudan peace process can be found at <http://www.ploughshares.ca/build/Sudan.htm>.



# Regional Security and the Implementation of the CPA in the Sudan<sup>1</sup>

By Jessica Davis

## *Executive Summary*

Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan is necessary for peace in the country, and in the Horn of Africa as a whole. There are, however, challenges to preserving and extending peace in Sudan. Security issues among the Sudan's neighbours are potential threats to the peace process. The issue of Nile waters, support for opposition groups within each other's boundaries, internal power struggles, and tribalism are very real issues in the implementation of North-South peace. The following article will describe these issues, present an analysis of the region, and recommend policy options for the governments of the Sudan and Southern Sudan, the international community, and nongovernmental actors operating in the region.

## *Regional Issues and Stability in the Sudan*

The decades-long civil war in the Sudan between the North and South officially came to an end on January 9, 2005. Since then, the journey to peace has been fraught with difficulties and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has proven challenging. The political will of the National Congress Party (NCP) has been questioned, and the capacity of both the northern and southern governments to implement the peace deal has repeatedly come under question. One of the challenges to CPA implementation that has not been discussed at length in the existing literature is the involvement of regional actors. In the Sudan and the Horn of Africa, war has regional determinants and implications that transcend the implementation of the CPA, and a long tradition of local conflicts fostering interstate tensions and war (Young 2006, p. 595). Virtually every aspect of building a lasting peace in the Sudan will have an impact on the region as a whole.

War in the Horn of Africa can be described as resource-based, as critical resources are scarce and unevenly distributed. Water and land are constantly under strain, and the nature of these resources is changeable depending on weather and season. Further, these resources are shared by countries with nomadic peoples, whose very existence depends on the ability to move across large swaths of land. As a result, tensions between countries are often high, and conflict in the region has a level of interconnectedness unknown in most other parts of the world.

In the Sudan, a framework of resource-based, interconnected wars can be applied to conflict. It is helpful to think of the Sudan not as a coherent country but as a collection of zones. The zones are most often at odds with the central government, and rarely in Sudan's history has the central government had effective control over the whole country. The peoples of these zones are very different, and often have ties to other countries through tribes and clans, thus fostering regional tensions when one area is in conflict with the central government (Markakis 1994; Johnson 2004). To diffuse these tensions and make peace in the Sudan

attractive, any sustainable peace agreement will need to address the various conflicts in the Sudan as well as the security interests of Sudan's neighbours. Therefore, for a lasting peace to be successfully implemented, and for the CPA to hold, the regional and national security situation must be clearly understood and addressed by the national and regional actors and by the international community.

The implementation of the CPA in the Sudan is a complex process that affects many groups, including non-signatories to the agreement. The CPA deals with power- and wealth-sharing, security arrangements, contested areas, elections, and the self-determination of the south, among other things (Morrison & de Waal 2005, p. 161). Virtually all the states in the Horn of Africa have a vested interest in the Sudan, and all of them have different ideas of what a peaceful Sudan should look like. Necessarily, implementation of the CPA will have an impact on regional politics, economics, and security, all of which will also affect the implementation of the CPA. This research paper aims to examine the regional issues that pose challenges to the implementation of the CPA and to present policy options to address them. Regional issues will be examined first, followed by thematic and internal issues, and an analysis section will assess their impact on the CPA. Finally, policy recommendations will be presented for a variety of programming options.

## *War in the Sudan: Historical Background*

### *The civil war*

British rule in the Sudan was interrupted by a brief period of independence from 1885 until 1898. The Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the Sudan lasted from the 1890s until January 1, 1956 (Johnson 2004, pp. 9, 21, 31). The roots of the current conflict, however, date back to the condominium period and the transition to independence. After the 1954 elections, the rapid increase of northerners in the South as administrators, senior officers, members of the army and the police, teachers in government schools and as merchants increased southern fears of northern domination and colonization (Johnson 2004, p. 27).

The beginning of the first civil war is commonly cited as 1955, when a mutiny broke out in the southern military garrisons. The mutiny was neither coordinated nor well executed, and the mutineers soon fled. The war truly began during the 1960-1962 period when senior political southern figures and a greater number of students joined with the remaining mutineers from 1955 to form both an exiled political government and the core of a guerrilla army. During the period, the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU), known colloquially as *Anyanya*, was formed. The political goal of SANU was self-determination rather than secession, largely due to an unfavourable political climate in Africa for secessionist movements (Johnson 2004, p. 31).

During the first few years of the civil war, the guerrillas were relatively united, but had no external military support. They relied on thefts from police stations or army patrols to arm themselves. Eventually, SANU managed to commandeer shipments of weapons from the government of Sudan to the Simba movement in neighbouring Congo (Johnson 2004, p. 30).

SANU did not last long as a cohesive rebel group. The first major split came when General Ibrahim Abbud relinquished power and was succeeded by a civilian caretaker government in Khartoum. The transitional government invited SANU to negotiations. Members of SANU who were in favour of a federal solution to the problems of the south became known as SANU 'inside' while those favourably disposed to separation became known as SANU 'outside'. Fighting between the various *Anyanya* groups was common until a united military command was formed under Colonel Lagu (Southern Sudan Liberation Front [SSLF], later renamed the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement [SSLM]) (Johnson 2004, pp. 32-33).

In February 1972, the Addis Ababa agreement was negotiated between the SSLF and the government of Sudan (GOS), halting much of the fighting. It lasted for eleven years, but fell apart largely because of international actors. The perceived Libyan threat to the Sudan during the Cold War allowed the Sudan to procure arms from the United States. Eventually, the former military ruler of Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri, became convinced that he could deal with the South militarily, and that the US would continue to supply weapons to him regardless of what he did (Johnson 2004, pp. 58, 39). The lack of political will to fulfill the Addis Ababa agreement plus insufficient military capacity to deal with the southern rebels created the circumstances in which the Addis Ababa agreement failed.

In 1983, the Sudanese army battalion 105 refused to move north, as required by the Addis Ababa agreement. John Garang, then head of the Staff College in Omdurman, was sent to Bor where the battalion was located, and ended up joining it. His joining simply hastened plans that had already been laid. The former *Anyanya* veterans who had been forced into exile by the government formed the basis of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (Johnson 2004, p. 61). John Garang would become the movement and army's leader.

The SPLM/A did not by any means form a united front, but they were united in one cause: overthrowing the government of Sudan. However, the leadership "relied on force rather than persuasion to maintain cohesion" (Johnson 2004, p. 91). Despite attempts at cohesion, the SPLM/A again suffered a split, which grew between 1992 and 1995 (Johnson 2004, p. 116). After nearly a decade of negotiations, the CPA was signed in January 2005, bringing an end to one of the many civil wars raging in the Sudan (Johnson 2004, pp. 117, 221).

### *Causes of war*

In the study of war, determining the cause of war is critical to ending it. Unfortunately, the causes of conflict are often coloured by political ideology or incentives. As Collier et al (2003, p. 53) describe in *Breaking the Conflict Trap*,

Most people think that they already know the root causes of civil war. Those on the political right tend to assume that it is due to long-standing ethnic and religious hatreds, those in the political center tend to assume that it is due to a lack of democracy and that violence occurs where opportunities for peaceful resolution of political disputes are lacking, and those on the political left tend to assume that it is due to economic inequalities or to a deep-rooted legacy of colonialism. None of these

explanations sit comfortably with the statistical evidence...the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development.

For the Sudan, the causes of war, often cited as a range of issues from race, religion, ethnicity, and politics to economics, are significantly over-determined in the existing literature (Morrison & de Waal 2005, p. 161). Popular analyses frequently describe the conflict as ethno-religious, with 'black African Christians and animists' fighting domination by northern 'Arab Muslims'. The conflict has at times been blamed on the artificial division of states imposed by colonial powers (Johnson 2004, p. xii). In reality, extensive racial and cultural fusion exists in the whole of Sudan (Anderson 1999, p. 65). Religion, local perceptions of race and social status, economic exploitation, and colonial and post-colonial interventions are all aspects of the Sudan's history and war, but none of these elements by itself explains the war.

British rule laid the foundation of conflict in the Sudan. British policies of development, such as teaching English in the South and Arabic in the North, led to diverging identities for northern and southern Sudanese. The South was also isolated from Arabic and Islamic traditions, and was opened to Christian missionaries (Nyong'O 1991, p. 104), thus creating deep religious divisions between the North and the South. In an attempt to stave off Egyptian influence, Great Britain granted independence to the Sudan despite the lack of a working constitution and in the face of highly unequal development and education standards between the North and South. Further, there was no national consultation on the issues of independence (Johnson 2004, p. 29).

The competition for resources, the role that the state plays in allocating these resources, and economic concerns have significantly contributed to conflict in the Sudan (Markakis 1994, p. 218). The weakened economy of the 1970s and the subsequent underdevelopment of most areas left the people disaffected and angry at the inequalities in the distribution of the country's resources, most of which ended up in the North. The subsequent discovery of natural resources and the continued underdevelopment even in the areas that had ample resources such as oil was a major spark to conflict (Johnson 2004, pp. xvi-xvii). Essentially, the North has been developed at the expense of the South and other peripheral areas. Attempts at development, even in oil-holding regions, have been sparse and certainly not in keeping with the value of the resource being extracted.

Since the state controls the production and distribution of material and social resources, it has become the focus of conflict in the Sudan (Markakis 1994, p. 217). Access to state power has never been equally available to the people in the Horn of Africa, and particularly in the Sudan. Those who control state power (and therefore access to resources and development) have used it to defend their position, while dissident groups have sought to restructure the state in order to gain access to its power, resources, autonomy, or independence (Markakis 1994, p. 217).

The issue of race, ethnicity, and tribalism is important to conflict in the Sudan, since political groups tend to form along ethnic or tribal lines. Even when political groups are based on ideology, they often splinter along ethnic or tribal lines. The issue of ethnicity or tribal affiliation in the Sudan often relates to political inclusion or exclusion based on these

categories. The tribes in the Sudan are not universal or exclusive, and their alliances are changeable and subject to political manipulation (Johnson 2004, p. xv).

Religion has been similarly used. The civil war in the Sudan is frequently described in religious terms as a war between the 'Islamic' North and the 'Christian or Animist' South, although these terms have little descriptive value. When the civil war in the Sudan began, religion was not a factor. However, over time, it has been transformed into a reason to fight, particularly with the revival of militant Islam in the North in the early 1990s (Peterson 2000, p. 174). Religion has become an increasingly important factor in the wars in the Sudan as politicians have invoked religion to stoke the fires of war (Johnson 2004, p. xvi).

After independence, the northern ruling elite attempted to create a united Sudan by framing the national identity along Arab-Islamic lines (Nantulya 2003, p. 105). In doing so, they excluded a large portion of the population. In particular, the South was heavily affected, since the North's concept of Islam was also based on Arab ethnicity, and the South is primarily black African. The northern political parties have repeatedly tried to impose *Sharia* law or adopt Islam as the national religion. However, the South has remained resistant to racial, cultural, and religious assimilation into the Arab-Islamic model of the North (Nantulya 2003, p. 105).

Two other contributing elements to the conflict in the Sudan were the international politics of the Cold War and foreign interests and interference in water and oil (Johnson 2004, pp. xvi-xvii). The Cold War allowed easy access to weapons and international support for ideological wars, or wars that could be sold as ideological. Foreign interests in oil and water created a situation of instability by generating competition for scarce resources, the winners of which were those who controlled access.

Certainly, the causes of war in the Sudan are many, and the exacerbating factors are numerous as well. At root, the causes of war in the Sudan are a lack of even economic development and control of political power. These causes are, however, exacerbated by the way in which the country was granted independence after British rule, political groups based on tribal/ethnic/religious identities, and the division of power based on these group categories. Further, regional and international interests in the conflict have greatly exacerbated the conflict, which will be examined in further detail in the regional analysis portion of this report.

## *Regional Analysis and the CPA*

### *Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*

The CPA was the culmination of lengthy negotiations. It provides for a six-year interim period, elections by 2009, an autonomous southern government, a referendum of self-determination for the South and power- and wealth-sharing agreements aimed at ending decades of political and economic marginalization of the South (ICG 2006a, p. 1). The CPA is a fragile document, as are most peace deals. Without implementation, the conflict in the Sudan will undoubtedly resume, and even with partial implementation, renewed war is a

possibility. The CPA should be viewed as the first step towards building a lasting peace and, with the right tools to address its weak points, a good foundation for peace.

Delays in CPA implementation are threatening stability in the Sudan. The national government has not become a new hybrid government as was intended. Instead, it is still fully run by the NCP, and most of the important ministerial portfolios have gone to NCP members, with only a token to SPLM/A delegates (HRW 2006, p. 1). The SPLM/A has been too tied down with internal administrative problems to challenge the NCP for real partnership in the government (HRW 2006, p. 2). In October 2007, BBC News reported that the SPLM/A had suspended participation in the Government of National Unity (GONU), protesting lack of progress on implementation.

Implementation has thus far been slow on a number of important issues. Of primary importance to regional stability are elections; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process; and oil and the management of natural resources. The national census, a prerequisite to the elections, was supposed to be completed in 2007, but due to funding issues has not been completed. As a result, the elections are likely to be pushed back well past the already rescheduled date of January 2009 (HRW 2006, p. 6). Successful elections are critical to maintaining peace in the Sudan and in the region as a whole. If the South perceives the elections to be unfair, a return to war is likely.

The DDR process has been extremely slow. The redeployment of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from the South and the SPLA from the North is far behind schedule, especially the redeployment of troops from Unity and Upper Nile states (ICG 2006a). The DDR process itself has come under fire from the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) because there is no security force in place to ensure the safety of the population.<sup>2</sup> Further, the national reconciliation and healing process has yet to start (UNMIS 2007, p. 2), and the National Security Service Bill and the National Police Bill have yet to be passed.

Oil management and resource sharing have started, but not in a way that is at all satisfactory to the SPLM/A. Issues of oil management and marketing remain top priorities, and, since internal borders have not been established, the division of wealth remains a major source of conflict. Indeed, the recommendations of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) have not been accepted by the NCP, and this lack of resolution continues to be a major stumbling block for GONU (UNMIS 2007, p. 1). The lack of implementation of the ABC report was one of the reasons for the withdrawal of the GOSS from the GONU in October 2007.

The peace in the Sudan is fragile, and any lack of real or perceived political will can end the current settlement and spark a return to war. The NCP has the capacity to implement the CPA, but is often perceived as lacking the political will, while the SPLM/A is committed to the agreement, but faces challenges in implementation and organization (ICG 2006a, p. i). Much of the lack of political will of the NCP is based on the simple fact that fully implementing the CPA ultimately poses a threat to its power. The NCP's priority is to ensure its own political survival, something which will be quite difficult with full implementation of the CPA (ICG 2005b, p. 6). To fend off pressure over Darfur, the NCP will likely continue to implement elements of the agreement without permitting its grip on power to be weakened (ICG 2006a, p. i).

The CPA has come under significant criticism since its signing. It is often criticized as the product of international pressure, which the parties involved—the SPLM/A and the NCP—lack the political will to implement. The peace deal was signed by neither the northern opposition groups nor any other factions involved in fighting in the Sudan and thus lacks support from these groups (ICG 2006a, p. i). The CPA is also considered elitist because it only includes the views of a small portion of the population of both the North and South. It is seen to be concerned with achieving stability at the expense of lasting peace and, while claiming to be comprehensive, in fact is extremely exclusive and does not address the need for democratic transformation (Young 2006, p. 594).

The CPA, despite its flaws, is the only thing keeping the North-South civil war from resuming. The culmination of significant diplomatic efforts, it represents the foundation for peace in the Sudan. Any undermining of the CPA brings the possibility of a resumption of war between the North and South closer, as do the delays and lack of implementation.<sup>3</sup> According to a GOSS official, each delay threatens the peace process, since it increases the possibility that the referendum will be delayed. It has been said that any delay in the referendum will inevitably mean a return to war.<sup>4</sup>

### *Regional and international interests in the Sudan*

The Sudan forms an integral part of a complex geopolitical region. The Sudan borders nine countries: Egypt to the north; Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east; Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south; and the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya to the west. Five of these countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Uganda, and Chad) have used their relations to prop up or destabilize the Sudan through political parties or population movements (Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005, p. 65). Examining security issues between the countries in the region and their impact on CPA implementation and peace in the Sudan is of paramount importance.<sup>5</sup>

The main themes that emerge when discussing regional security around the Sudan are: oil, water, religion, tribal affiliations, and support for cross-border insurgents or opposition movements (ICG 2002, p. 53). Control of the scarce resources in the area is an important factor in regional security. Other factors, such as religion and politics, have more to do with exerting influence in the region and vying for leadership than with outright conflict. However, they can pose very real security threats and must be addressed systematically to achieve lasting peace in the Sudan. Countries in the region are potential spoilers to the peace agreement, and therefore their concerns must be treated with the utmost respect. For the purposes of analysis, the following section will be broken down into country reports followed by reports on thematic issues.

*Egypt.* During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period, Egypt was heavily involved in the Sudan's internal affairs. Since that time, the relationship between Sudan and Egypt has been characterized by tensions over Nile waters and Islam. Egypt wants to maximize its supplies of Nile river waters and is also sensitive to Arab League pressure not to allow another Arab country to divide (Morrison & de Waal 2005, p. 173) and potentially produce a new non-Islamic or even Christian state. Egypt is also sensitive to the Sudan's potential export of radical Islam, with which Egypt struggles domestically.

During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period, Egypt played a major role in shaping the Sudan's institutions and political framework. After the Egyptian Free Officers coup of 1952, Egypt renounced all claims to sovereignty over the Sudan. There was a brief movement in the Sudan to seek union with Egypt, but that idea died after an anti-unionist majority was elected to parliament (Johnson 2004, p. 26).

In 1982, Egypt and the Sudan signed an integration charter, which reflected Egypt's preeminent concerns to protect its water interests in the Nile and prevent successful secessionist movements in the region. This new tie created concern in the South that, despite its being anti-Islamist, the regime in Egypt would support the northern suppression of the South. At the same time, the Sudan's other international ties convinced many Southerners that the central government was drifting closer to becoming an Arab Islamic State. This was one of many factors that led to renewed fighting in 1983 (Johnson 2004, p. 54).

Relations between Egypt and the Sudan have sometimes been strained. For example, in 1995, the Government of Sudan was accused of involvement in the attempted assassination of Hosni Mubarak on his way to attend the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Addis Ababa (Kalpakian 2006, p. 58), an incident which also strained relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan. While Egypt's influence in the Sudan has been waning for some time, the GOS was not above manipulating Egypt into supporting their war effort. A Sudanese opposition figure (ICG 2002, p. 55) has noted that

Khartoum has tried to rile up the Egyptians on the basis of a Zionist threat and a U.S. conspiracy to divide the Sudan. The line is that southerners are being used by Israel and the U.S. to separate the south. The Egyptians are gripped by this conspiracy.

An important point of reference with respect to Egypt's diminishing relationship with the Sudan is the Machakos Protocol of July 20, 2003, a peace agreement between the government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A concluded before the CPA, which was negotiated without Egypt (Kalpakian 2006, p. 52). Culturally, Egypt still functions as Sudan's bridge to Arab and Islamic culture (Kalpakian 2006, p. 53).

*Ethiopia.* Relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan have been volatile since Sudan's independence. With the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, a rapprochement occurred between the two countries, but shortly thereafter, the Sudanese government began supporting Eritrean separatists, causing a rupture in relations. In no uncertain terms, Ethiopia threatened to give active military and political support to the *Anyanya* remnants in Ethiopia who had not accepted the Addis Ababa agreement if Sudan did not stop supporting the rebels (Johnson 2004, p. 59), a threat that was carried through.

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was founded in eastern Ethiopia in 1975 and, with the assistance of the Sudanese army, opened a front in Wallega province in 1980, often garrisoning inside Sudan (Johnson 2004, p. 87). While the OLF was fighting for representation in the Ethiopian government or for an independent Oromia, its troops often found themselves fighting the SPLM/A at the behest of the GOS.

During the Cold War, the SPLM/A obtained Soviet-made weaponry from Ethiopia. Ethiopia also provided cross-border artillery fire and air support for attacks within the Sudan (Anderson 1999, p. 71; ICG 2002, p. 56). Further, the Mengistu government allowed Sadiq al-Mahdi to transmit anti-Nimeiri radio broadcasts to the Sudan after the failure of the 1976 coup attempt (Johnson 2004, p. 59). By 1985, the SPLM/A had nearly unlimited military support from Ethiopia, which cemented the personal alliance between Mengistu and Garang (Johnson 2004, p. 88).

Ethiopia and the Sudan have enjoyed a close relationship for the last seven or eight years. Sudan provides Ethiopia with critical supplies, including refined fuels. Ethiopia depends on the Sudan and Djibouti for port services, since it lacks access to the ocean. Recently, Sudan handed 30 political refugees over to the Ethiopian government despite international protests, signalling the closeness of the relationship.<sup>6</sup> Still, the relationship between the Sudan and Ethiopia is complicated by the fault line between Orthodox Christianity and Islamic fundamentalism (Clapham 2006, p. 32).

*Eritrea.* Eritrea and the Sudan have had volatile relations since Eritrea's emergence as a distinct nation in 1993. The GOS supported Eritrea's independence movement and fostered radical Islamic groups within its borders. In 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in the Sudan began arming opposition groups from countries in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond. In Eritrea it provided support to Islamist and secular armed guerrillas, especially the Eritrean Islamic Jihad movement (EIJM or EIJ), and factions of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (Connell 2006, p. 77). The EIJ was launched at a conference in Khartoum in late 1998, and drew from disaffected guerrilla fighters and the Eritrean refugee community in the Sudan (Connell 2006, p. 78). The NIF supported rebel groups from bases in eastern Sudan and armed groups along Ethiopia's western frontier in an attempt to impose Islamist governments on its neighbours (Young 2006, p. 596).

There was a massive rupture in diplomatic relations when Eritrea called for the overthrow of the NIF government. Eritrea opened its doors to the SPLM/A, and moved them into the old Sudanese embassy, which acted as their headquarters (Connell 2006, p. 79). The Eritrean government is currently accused of supporting not only the SPLM/A, but rebel groups in Darfur. Eritrea views the Sudan as a national security issue, and has supported the deployment of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) forces across its border into eastern Sudan (ICG 2002, p. 58). Since early 2004, the implosion of the Eritrean state has created instability on Sudan's eastern border (Morrison & de Waal 2005, p. 173).

The situation in Eritrea is akin to a one-party police state. According to Dan Connell (2006, p. 65), "all political parties are banned, all but a handful of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are prohibited...national elections have repeatedly been postponed, public criticism has been silenced, independent media are shut down...and dissidents indefinitely detained."

With deepening repression causing fissures in the fragile Eritrean society, old and new opposition groups are on the rise and are increasingly looking for support from outside groups. In particular, Islamist opposition groups are based in the Sudan and are tacitly obtaining support from the Sudanese government (Connell 2006, p. 65).

*Kenya.* Kenya is the economic powerhouse of the Horn of Africa, and the most stable democratic player in the region (Carson 2006, p. 174). While Kenya's involvement in the Sudan's civil wars has been limited, Kenya will have an impact on the implementation of the CPA. Kenya has been widely viewed as a supporter of the southern Sudanese (Anderson 1999, p. 211) and so cannot be viewed as an impartial player in the region. Despite this, and with the knowledge and consent of the Sudanese government, Kenya hosted and successfully concluded the signing of the CPA in early 2005.

Kenya is an important partner for the GOSS. Kenya hosts many Sudanese refugees, and has a major influence on security and stability through its role in IGAD. Southern Sudan looks south for its cultural and ethnic ties. Further Kenya is an important transportation hub for the South and is a strategic ally of the GOSS.<sup>7</sup>

*Libya.* Libya's involvement in the Sudan is complex and changeable. During the Cold War, Libya alternated between supporting the GOS and various rebel and opposition groups. In recent years, Qaddafi's focus has been on asserting leadership in the region by mediating peace.

During the Cold War, Libya was frequently accused of supporting the Southern rebels in the Sudan. These alleged Libyan military threats to the Sudan gave the US the excuse to deploy ships off the coast of Libya in 1983. The government of Sudan benefited from these allegations by receiving weapons shipments from the US. Further, the US used the defence of the Sudan as a useful propaganda tool against Libya (Johnson 2004, p. 57). Indeed, the US was reluctant to abandon the GOS because of Cold War politics.

Libya furnished the SPLM/A with Soviet-origin weaponry until the overthrow of Nimieri in April 1984, when it rallied to the northern side of the Sudanese conflict (Anderson 1999, p. 71). In 1985, a military pact was signed with the Sudan, and Libya was to train personnel and provide transport, air, and naval facilities to the Sudan. In return, the Sudan would be openly hostile to Egypt. Libya then used the Darfur region to stage its operations against Chad (Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005, p. 70).

While al-Mahdi was Prime Minister (1986-1989), there was a blatant terrorist presence in the Sudan. The NIF (part of the governing coalition at the time) started off wary of Libya, but eventually became pro-Libyan as a party; however, the vast majority of Sudanese had no enthusiasm for Qaddafi or his schemes of Arab unity (Anderson 1999, p. 213).

In Darfur, Libya's connection is more complex. Libya has some economic links with Darfur, and a large number of Darfurian Sudanese live in Tripoli (ICG 2002, p. 62). However, in the Sudan, Libya's greatest interest is in promoting Qaddafi's image as a continental leader (ICG 2002, p. 71).

*Uganda.* When Idi Amin came to power in Uganda, the SPLM/A benefited greatly. Not only was he from the ambiguous border region between the Sudan and Uganda, but he was "a willing client of the Israelis" (Johnson 2004, p. 36). After the Arab-Israeli war, the Sudan's militant espousal of Arab causes resulted in the Israelis' supporting the SPLM/A, through Amin's government, with a regular supply of arms, plus access to modern training (Johnson 2004, p. 37).

Because Uganda was supporting the SPLM/A, the GOS backed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (ICG 2002, p. 59). The LRA had bases in southern Sudan and often resorted to terror tactics, including the abducting of several thousand children (Finnstrom 2006, p. 200). The LRA has been operating out of eastern Equatoria since the mid-1990s and has been aided by the GOS in destabilizing Northern Uganda and countering the SPLM/A. A formal cessation of hostilities between the LRA and the SPLM/A was negotiated in 2006 (ICG 2006b, p. 5).

*China.* China became involved in the Sudan's oil sector after political pressure forced other countries to withdraw (Large 2007, p. 59). Since then, China has become increasingly involved. Since the mid-1990s, the vertical integration strategy pursued by Chinese oil companies has enabled the Sudan to begin to function as an oil exporter rather than just an importer. China has been building the required infrastructure as well as drilling for and extracting oil. As much as 80 per cent of the Sudan's total crude oil exports went to China between 2001 and 2004 (Large 2007, p. 58).

Africa as a whole interests China because of its natural resources, its political relations, and its potential as a market for Chinese business (Large 2007, p. 51). Recently, Chad began receiving military support from China, right after Chad withdrew its international recognition of Taiwan.<sup>8</sup> China's economic and political involvement in the region is likely to remain strong over the next several decades.

*Chad.* Chad has one of the most volatile and complex relationships with the Sudanese government in the region. According to Mr. Elkhazin, all changes of government in Chad in the past several decades have originated with the Sudan.

In the early 1980s, the Chadian civil war was internationalized as a battleground between Libya and the West. The GOS allied with the US, and facilitated the shipment of arms through the Darfur region to Chad in its struggle against Libya (Johnson 2004, p. 140). President Idris Deby launched his march against Hussein Habre from Darfur when he took over Chad in 1990 (Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005, p. 72).

Libya countered Sudanese and US military assistance by arming the Arab groups that straddled the Chad-Libyan border. When Nimeiri fell from power, relations between Libya and the Sudan eased somewhat, and Libya contributed financially to Sadiq al-Mahdi's election campaign (Johnson 2004, p. 140).

### *Thematic issues*

*Oil.* In many ways, because the war in the Sudan has been so long, the motivations for waging it have shifted dramatically. During the first civil war, there was no knowledge of oil reserves in the country; in fact, only after the Addis Ababa agreement was signed did the size of Sudanese reserves become clear. To a certain extent, the recent civil war has been about control of natural resources. As Johnson (2004, p. i) notes, "a war that was once described as being fought over scarce resources is now being waged for the total control of abundant hydrocarbon resources." Reserves are estimated at between one and five billion barrels (Ali & Elbadawi 2005, p. 155).

Oil is one of the most contentious factors in the CPA. It underlies the negotiations of the border between the North and South, which will determine control over the portion of the country in which the oil exists; and it is central to the wealth-sharing agreement, which involves the transfer of oil funds (UNMIS 2007).

Most of the oil is in the South. Because, under the terms of the peace agreement, the southern portion of the country will have a self-determination vote, there exists the very real possibility that the South will choose to secede from the North, taking the bulk of the oil reserves with it. The major oilfield currently being developed is largely within the historical borders of the South (Ali & Elbadawi 2005). The NCP faction of the coalition government has attempted in recent years to redraw the boundaries between the North and South to include most of the oilfields in the North. As a result, the border is currently a major source of tension in the implementation of the CPA.

Transferring oil funds has become increasingly problematic. The agreement was based on static (2005) oil prices. Since then, the price of oil has gone up significantly, but the South has not seen those prices reflected in the money that it has been receiving. Further, according to Ambassador John Andruga Duku at a December 2007 APFO/Ploughshares roundtable, the South frequently receives only a small portion of the oil profits, well below the required amount, and well below what is necessary to develop the South.

*The Nile waters.* For the people of the Horn of Africa, water is an issue of survival. Water resources are scarce and both Egypt and the Sudan are essentially dependent on the Nile. Sharing the Nile waters is, and will continue to be, a sensitive issue between the two countries. Currently, the Sudan and Egypt have a water-sharing agreement. However, the 1959 Nile Waters agreement was concluded without the involvement of other countries through which the Nile runs (Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005, p. 81). For example, Ethiopia and Eritrea could very well start using the water, since it originates in their territories.

The main sources of fresh water for the region are the Ethiopian-Eritrea plateau regions and East African highlands. The plateau is a water divide between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, and is the major water reservoir of the Horn. The plateau is drained by 11 major rivers, the largest of which is the Nile, which runs 60 per cent of its course within the Sudan. The major source of water for the Sudan is the Blue Nile, which originates in Lake Tana in northern Ethiopia and meets the White Nile in Khartoum. The Takaze River drains the northern section of the plateau and joins the Atbara River in the Sudan, while the Gash and Barka Rivers rise in the Eritrean section of the plateau and flow into eastern Sudan (Markakis 1998, p. 33). Ethiopia supplies water to Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt, but retains only 3 per cent for its own use (Markakis 1998, p. 53).

Egypt is the biggest user of the freshwater resources of the Nile basin and is totally dependent on the river. Because Egypt's water needs are increasing, Egypt is unlikely to make allocations for upstream states (Markakis 1998, p. 35). However, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Sudan all have drought problems that could be substantially eased by using some of the water claimed by Egypt for their own irrigation projects (Nyong'O 1991, p. 96).

Irrigation projects take most of the water from the Nile. Much of Egypt and northern Sudan is irrigated. Unfortunately, the people living in northeastern Sudan have lost valuable

pasturelands to irrigated farming. The pastoralists of the Horn of Africa have voiced their resentment over the loss of land and have taken up arms on occasion (Markakis 1998, p. 33). The incomplete Jonglei canal, a major water asset in the Sudan, has been a source of contention since the beginning of the civil war. The Jonglei canal is the meeting place of numerous rivers from Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, and Central Africa. Much of the water coming into the Sudan is dispersed through the great central swamps of the South, and never reaches the North (Johnson 2004, p. 47). However, the completion of the Jonglei canal would, in theory, drain much of the swamps and increase the flow of water to the North. The people who live in this area of the Sudan have been opposed to the canal since its inception because of the lack of cattle crossings and development plans for the area and general mismanagement by the central government.

*Militant Islam.* After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the Sudanese government embraced a more militant Islam, to the discomfiture of several of its neighbours. In particular, Ethiopia became more sympathetic to the southern guerrillas, and Uganda, with the help of the Israelis, began to fully support the southerners (Johnson 2004, p. 36). Since then, the tide of militant Islam has ebbed and flowed, and tensions in the regions have risen and fallen accordingly. Following Nimeiri's removal in 1985 and the instalment of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), Sudan's relationship with pan-Arabism and Islam reached new heights. The TMC sought support from Arab states in the form of money and arms for the defence of 'Arabism' and Islam (Johnson 2004, p. 67).

During the 1990s, Hamas, Hizbullah, and Abu Nidal found a safe haven in the Sudan. The government opened its doors to Muslims and Arabs from all over the world and the country quickly became a hotbed for opposition radical groups (Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005, pp. 72-73). During the late 1990s, the Sudan was home to Osama bin Laden and, as a result, Sudan's relationship with the US cooled dramatically. Today, responding to pressure from primarily western governments, the Sudan is no longer a major source of international terrorism.

One of the major issues in the Sudan is the NCP's desire to impose *Sharia* law in the North. The SPLM/A has made it clear that it is committed to the secular rule of law. Christianity and Islam have both been used as political tools—Islam in an attempt to unify the country, and Christianity and African religions to encourage support from the western Christian world. In an interview, Mr. Elkhazin suggested that Islam may no longer be considered an important unifier in the Sudan, and may cease to be an issue.

### *Internal issues*

*War in the Darfur region.* During the 1980s, conflicts in Chad and Libya created instability along the border areas of Darfur, forcing nomadic herders to move closer to the highlands, and thus increasing the amount of fighting over scarce resources between the herders and the settled population of Darfur.

The Zaghawa tribe gained power and immunity when Idris Deby came to power in Chad. They moved through the Darfur region, stealing livestock from the largely Arab nomads, who went to the GOS and received small arms for personal security. The nomads began

reprisals not only upon the people who had stolen their livestock, but upon the entire population of Darfur. In response, each village formed its own defence militia (Rolandsen 2007, p. 156; Marchal 2006, pp. 469-470).

The insurgency in Darfur is usually said to have begun on February 26, 2003, when a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) issued a statement. However, by this time, the war was already well underway (Flint & de Waal 2005, p. 76). In 2002, the village defence groups (rebels) further organized, and began fighting for political and economic concessions from the GOS (Rolandsen 2007, p. 156). Soon it became clear that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the main rebel groups, had evolved from a political to a military movement. They were fighting for better representation at the local level and an end to ethnic discrimination (Rolandsen 2007, p. 159). JEM first appeared in the spring of 2003, and was allegedly inspired by former NIF leader al-Turabi (Møller 2006, p. 66). JEM has strong links to the Islamist movement, and strong representation from former NIF members. It has attracted Sudanese from across the political spectrum, but continues to be plagued by its tribal and Islamic tendencies (Flint & de Waal 2005, p. 89).

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) (formerly known as the Darfur Liberation Front) emerged in February of 2003, and by 2004 had established a loose alliance with the SPLM/A (Møller 2006, p. 66). The SLM/A denies any links to the SPLM/A except ideological (Flint & de Waal 2005, p. 81). The government responded to the formation of these groups by letting paramilitaries (Janjawiid) conduct campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, resulting in the displacement of tens of thousands of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa residents (Kalpakian 2006, p. 57).

The Janjawiid have been Khartoum's main weapon against the Darfur rebels, but the Sudanese Army and Air Force have also been active in the conflict (Rolandsen 2007, p. 151). The Janjawiid have mainly targeted civilians in villages believed to be backing the resistance. The role of the regular Sudanese army has been to provide transport and ammunition, and they have only rarely participated directly. The Air Force has on many occasions participated in the attacks with gunships and bombers. These raids are intended to displace, loot, and humiliate. The Janjawiid are government-sponsored militia from the Baggara Arab Tribes. They have some prior experience with counter-insurgency warfare, as in the Masalit war of 1994 against the SPLA (Rolandsen 2007, p. 159).

On May 5, 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by the GOS and one rebel faction, Minni Minawi's block of the SLM/A. However, other splinter groups of the SLM/A and JEM refused to sign, demanding a greater share of wealth and power. Following the DPA signing, the SLM/A and JEM split into even smaller splinter groups, some along ethnic lines (Pronk 2006). As a result, the DPA is a weak and unstable agreement (Machenheimer 2007, p. 7). As Ambassador Duku remarked at the APFO/Ploughshares roundtable, it is easy to understand why the rebel groups would not want to sign an agreement with the NCP, since it has yet to fully, and in good faith, implement the CPA. On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council authorized a 26,000-strong UN-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force for Darfur.

## *Analysis*

### *Regional analysis*

*Egypt and the Nile waters.* Egypt has significant interest in maintaining the Sudan as a unified state (ICG 2002, p. 54). Egypt has recently tried to impede the latest attempts at peace in an effort to stymie the potential creation of a southern Sudanese state, either in or outside of the Sudan (Kalpakian 2006, pp. 58-59), as self-determination for the South could change the Nile waters agreements. Essentially, Egypt benefits from the status quo in Sudan (de Waal 2004 p. 14).<sup>9</sup> Egypt is also interested in bolstering its influence in Khartoum in order to reign in more extreme Islamist elements.

While Egypt has not been a major participant in the CPA negotiations, it still has an important role to play in supporting implementation. But Egypt will only embrace the CPA and all its possible outcomes when the issue of water is resolved. A comprehensive water-sharing agreement, negotiated between Egypt and both portions of the Sudan, must be started in anticipation of potential southern secession. Otherwise, if Egypt sees its share of the Nile waters threatened, its direct or indirect undermining of the CPA could result in a resumption of conflict. As Tag Elkhazin noted in a 2007 interview, at a recent meeting about water in the Horn of Africa, Egypt brought two delegates: the Minister of Water and the Minister of Defence.

Water is a matter of life and death in the Sudan and the region as a whole. Current irrigation and future plans are upsetting significant populations of the Sudan, and could spark renewed conflict. Further, any constraint on Egypt's use of the water could easily result in war, since Egypt sees the Nile as a strategic resource. Egypt will likely remain neutral throughout the CPA implementation process, but may work to prevent Southern secession during the referendum.

*Ethiopia: Islam and separatist groups.* Ethiopia's interest in the CPA is mainly directed at the role of Islam and regional autonomy. Ethiopia has a vested interest in seeing the Sudan maintain as much autonomy as possible. In particular, Ethiopia does not want to see the regime in Khartoum controlled by Egypt, since it needs Sudan's oil, its port, and existing security arrangements (ICG 2002, p. 57).

Ethiopia supports the idea of self-determination for Southern Sudan, which would act as a counterweight to any unfriendly regime in Khartoum. Further, a wholly Islamic Sudan would heighten Ethiopia's security concerns. The Sudan and Ethiopia have a fundamental disagreement over governance (secular vs. religious), and they are paranoid over each other's support for opposition groups. They also have economic tensions and historic rivalries (ICG 2002, p. 58).

It is likely that Ethiopia will support CPA implementation while attempting to ensure a secular government is elected in the Sudan. Ethiopia will also attempt to develop friendly relations with the autonomous government of the South in the event of secession. However, Ethiopia's loyalties are by no means fixed and, given domestic instability, the relationship between Ethiopia and the Sudan is assessed as highly volatile.

*Eritrea: Opposition groups and relations with Ethiopia.* Eritrea and Ethiopia share a common suspicion of the Sudan's intention to install an Islamic government; both fear the potential influence over Eritrea's and Ethiopia's Muslim populations (Clapham 2006, p. 33).<sup>10</sup> It can be expected that Eritrea will promote a secular government in the Sudan during the upcoming elections, and may also work to create a separate south Sudanese state to limit the power of the northern ruling elite.

The unresolved dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the readiness of both governments to support insurgencies in each other's territory threaten to create any number of security issues in the region (de Waal 2004, p. 17). To secure a lasting peace in the Sudan, the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia must be addressed in the context of a regional peace process. In negotiating peace with the North and South, and Ethiopia and Eritrea, their involvement in each other's conflicts must be taken into consideration.

The Sudan has "unsuccessfully offered" to stop supporting the EIJ insurgent group if Eritrea stops supporting Sudanese opposition groups on the eastern front (ICG 2002, p. 59). Eritrea continues to host the SPLM/A, umbrella NCP opposition groups, Eastern front rebels, and Darfur insurgents, and has a sustained determination to see the NCP regime defeated (ICG 2005b, p. 9). Because of this desire to see the NCP regime defeated, Eritrea is likely to support the CPA, since the CPA will, with full implementation, greatly weaken the NCP.

*Kenya: Channelling aid to the Sudan.* Kenya is the primary channel for the massive international relief effort for the Sudan, since it is the most stable neighbour. As a result, Kenya obtains port fees, road taxes, and the financial benefits that come from the presence of thousands of NGO workers, including infrastructure improvements (ICG 2002, p. 61). Whenever the government of Sudan expels foreign aid workers, they flock to Kenya, undoubtedly taxing Kenya's infrastructure, but at the same time providing a capital injection to the economy. As it is clear that NGOs will be in the region for a long time to come, there is no great concern on the part of the Kenyan government about a sudden loss in such input.

Although Kenya gains some economic advantage from conflict in the Sudan, it is still seen to favour CPA implementation. Kenya has been unable to develop its northern region because of the Sudanese civil war, and would welcome a prolonged peace.<sup>11</sup> Ambassador Duku believes that Kenya will likely benefit from a stable Sudan and seems likely to support a separate Southern Sudan, given its history of support for the GOSS in such areas as funding, peace process, and transportation access.

*Libya: Darfur.* Qaddafi is attempting to assume a leadership role for the Darfur rebels, and believes that Darfur could form a part of a regional alliance in the future. Further, there is some water in the Darfur region that is of interest to Libya. Yet, as Ambassador Duku noted, a positive relationship with both Darfur and the government of Sudan is of interest to Libya. Like Egypt, Libya opposes self-determination for the South (ICG 2002, p. 61). Libya would likely be interested in seeing the NCP stay in power, and is therefore assessed as a potential spoiler to the CPA implementation process.

*Uganda: LRA in Southern Sudan.* The ongoing conflict between the government of Uganda and the LRA is basically internal, despite efforts to blame it on Sudanese destabilization (de Waal 2004, p. 17). Unfortunately, the LRA will continue to have a destabilizing effect on the South until, as a result of current peace talks, the LRA ceases to exist, or until an effective deterrent security force is put in place in the South. This should be one of the top priorities for the government of the Sudan, as porous borders in the South only create more instability in the country.

*China: Oil interests.* China's interests in the Sudan are almost exclusively oil-related. Oil exports require military security, and the military requires oil revenues, which China is willing to provide (Large 2007, p. 59). Indeed, above all else in the Sudan China prizes the stability that facilitates the production of oil (Large 2007, p. 72).

China has given loans to the NCP and, according to Dr. Metelits, is generally perceived as a supporter of the NCP rather than the peace agreement or the South. The possibility exists that China will influence CPA implementation and possibly any forthcoming elections to help the NCP remain in power. Some experts, including Metelits and Large (2007, p. 72), believe that a democratically elected government would likely bow to international pressure to have an open and competitive oil market, allowing in firms that bring development and jobs to the oil producing regions. Such a change could jeopardize Chinese companies currently working in the Sudan.

But China's support for the NCP, which is based entirely on access to oil, may be waning. As long as the NCP remains in power, China will likely support it. However, should that situation change, China's allegiances could as well. Recently, the GOSS met with Chinese officials. During this meeting, the GOSS made it clear to the Chinese officials that most of the oil lies in the South. Ambassador Duku has expressed the opinion that China will likely either try to prevent southern secession or will support the GOSS fully in its political aspirations to secure access to oil.

*Chad.* Chad benefits from war in the Sudan. Whenever there has been a strong and stable regime in Khartoum, there has been a regime change in Chad. As a result, Chad has a vested interest in either a continuation of conflict in the Sudan or the coming to power of a pro-Chadian regime. Another option could be a regime that is preoccupied with internal disputes and too busy to concern itself with Chad. Because CPA implementation will likely result in an end of NCP control in Khartoum, Chad will probably tacitly support implementation.

*Darfur.* Darfur has been central to an intricate game of domination and destabilization. Libya, Chadian opposition groups, and the Sudanese government have all used Darfur as a recruitment and training ground and as a staging base for attacking Chad (Rolandsen 2007, p. 155).

The conflict in Darfur is one of the main security threats facing the CPA. Not only is it being exploited for political gain by the SPLM/A, but it is spilling over into Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The conflict in Darfur has deepened because the North-South conflict has not been resolved (de Waal, 2007, p. 19). In Darfur the continuing tensions between the SPLM/A and the GOS are played out (ICG 2007a, p. 16)

The potential impact of the conflict in Darfur on CPA implementation is enormous. The war between the North and South was, to a large extent, a war between a central government, which controlled power, wealth, and development, and the periphery. That the war in Darfur can be described in much the same way is one of the reasons that the SPLM/A began supporting the rebels in Darfur. Darfur also poses a threat to the CPA because it is deflecting international attention away from the North-South agreement. Ambassador Duku expressed the belief that, without pressure from the international community, the NCP will likely avoid implementation.

*Oil: Revenue distribution and development.* Currently, there is every indication that the guidelines for oil revenue distribution set down in the CPA are not being followed; the South has repeatedly complained that the NCP is not sharing revenues fairly (ICG 2006a, p. 8). The main problems lie in how oil wealth is calculated and the determination of which oil fields lie in the South (ICG 2006a, pp. 7-9). Unfortunately, development in the South is entirely dependent on oil revenues, the South's only significant source of income. Without adequate funds, the South will remain severely underdeveloped during the entire CPA implementation process.

The only pipeline from Southern Sudan to the world market goes north, then northeast to the Red Sea through Port Sudan. Should the South separate after the referendum set out in the CPA, it is entirely possible that this pipeline will no longer be available, and getting the oil out will become a major problem.<sup>12</sup> Given the state of infrastructure in the South, this loss would directly threaten the viability of a separate Southern Sudan.

CPA implementation requires that development bring the areas most affected by the North-South war up to the standards of the North. Therefore, any future oil-sharing agreement should look at the intensity and spread of poverty, and should help to finance post-conflict reconstruction, with specific shares for oil-producing regions (Ali & Elbadawi 2005, p. 159).

### *Emerging security issues: Internal stability*

The CPA has ended decades of bloodshed and offers the opportunity to establish peace and security in the region. However, the structural conditions necessary to make peace work in the Sudan are similar to those for building an effective subregional peace and security order (de Waal 2004, p. 13). Lasting peace requires the development of legitimate power, law, and political order. Further, both human and economic security must be ensured.

Issues related to the two signatory groups—the NCP and the SPLM/SPLA—will affect implementation of the CPA. The SPLM/A, particularly since the death of John Garang, suffer from internal splits and may not be strong enough to survive the implementation process (Anderson 1999, p. 65), or to act as a counterweight to the NCP in the GONU. The NCP signed the CPA under duress, in an effort to deflect international pressure over Darfur (ICG 2005a, p. i). Full implementation of the CPA, in particular democratic elections, would likely see the NCP removed from power.

Since Garang's death, the SPLM/A has shown itself to be much less capable of making a major contribution to the resolution of the war and humanitarian disaster in Darfur, or of

solving the simmering problems of Eastern Sudan (ICG 2005b, p. 1). Further, the odds of secession have increased, since Garang was one of the only Southerners capable of selling a united Sudan to the South. The popular opinion in the South is that unity with the North is not a legitimate political option.<sup>13</sup> So, it seems extremely likely that the South will vote for secession during a referendum; such a result could easily lead to a resumption of conflict, particularly if the international community is not involved in the process and does not provide the support mechanisms for a peaceful transition.

In many ways, the war in the Sudan had reached a form of equilibrium. Those who suffered most were not part of the majority and had no say in ending the conflict (Morrison & de Waal 2005, p. 171). The war had gone on so long that a status quo survival method had been established by both parties, and the conflict was limited to specific geographic areas. As a result, not all Sudanese may possess the political will to implement the CPA.

In Kordofan, armed groups are unhappy with CPA implementation. There is a very real possibility that they may link up with insurgents in Darfur (ICG 2007a, p. i). The NCP has rejected the final and binding Abyei Boundary Commission report (ICG 2007a, p. 4). Further, the SAF are keeping large forces in the oil areas of Bentiu, Faloj, and Heglig (ICG 2007a, p. 5), contrary to CPA implementation guidelines. Negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM/A are stalled on the Abyei issue, and both sides are building up military forces on the borders of the region, making this issue one of the most threatening to the peace process (ICG 2007b).

In the East, the 2006 peace agreement has only begun to be implemented and could easily fall apart; in the North, the construction of dams has displaced and angered several communities (ICG 2007a, p. i). Although these dams are supposed to be a huge boost to national energy production, they have had destabilizing effects (ICG 2007a, p. 10). The Merowe dam poses significant environmental challenges, which could include riverbank erosion, reduced river valley groundwater recharge, the blockage of fish migrations, and damaged downstream agriculture (ICG 2007a, p. 10). The second project is further north, and threatens to submerge parts of the ancient Nubian homeland. It has received near unanimous opposition from Nubian communities, and there have already been several violent clashes between government forces and the community (ICG 2007a, p. 10). Without significant attention, these internal disputes threaten the long-term viability of the Sudanese state, and during this critical and volatile time, any return to violence between the North and the South could be accompanied by a variety of secessionist groups.

### *Policy Recommendations*

Full implementation of the CPA can ultimately reduce the likelihood of conflict in the Sudan and region. However, all parties involved in the CPA plus the international community must recognize that the CPA is not the end of negotiations but the beginning. There are many steps between signing the agreement, implementation, and lasting peace. The prerequisites for lasting peace include economic prosperity; stable, law-abiding governance; ethnic and religious tolerance; a framework for the peaceful settlement of differences; and strong institutions (de Waal 2004, p. 12). Further, human security must be assured for the residents

of the Sudan, and eventually for the entire region. The security interests of the Sudan's neighbours must also be taken into consideration during implementation.

### *Economic diversification, development and oil profit-sharing*

One of the biggest challenges to lasting peace in the Sudan is the unequal distribution of wealth and power, which has driven various groups in the Sudan to war. Sharing of oil resources must be transparent and fair, and the economy of the Sudan must be diversified.

To foster economic prosperity in the Sudan, development must occur in all productive sectors, not just oil. In the 1980s, the exploitation of oil seemed the great saviour for the Sudanese economy, which was near bankruptcy (Prunier 1989, p. 411). However, if the price of oil were to fall, as the price of cotton once did, all development projects tied to oil revenues would be curtailed. If both sections of the country were to have a diversified economy, oil would become a less critical factor, thus enabling a more positive framework for negotiations on oil revenues and potential secession by the South.

The best way to increase economic prosperity in the South is to rapidly develop strong institutions, fund social services such as health care and education, and develop the infrastructure required to diversify the economy. Further, effective management of resources and a schedule for re-examining wealth-sharing are essential to meet the shifting needs of the country over the next few decades.

Oil is a flashpoint for conflict between the North and South and, potentially, in the region. Creating transparency about the magnitude of oil revenues helps to reduce risk in conflict-sensitive areas because it makes exaggeration of the gains more difficult. Information independent of government is important for both sides to develop trust (Collier et al 2003, p. 130). An independent commission should be established to monitor the oil sector and make unbiased reports that both governments of the Sudan can trust. The international community and, in particular, IGAD must pressure the NCP and the GONU to implement the CPA.

### *Governance, religious, and ethnic tolerance and institutions*

The committees and groups outlined in the CPA must be created and given the appropriate powers to accomplish their tasks, including adequate funding. NGOs and funding agencies should select commissions at risk and provide sufficient external funding and resources to allow them to operate properly. In particular, the international community must continue to press for the establishment of a National Petroleum Commission, the acceptance of the ABC report, and a completion of the census (Sullivan 2006, p. 7). For a list of what needs to be implemented, see Appendix A.

The Government of Southern Sudan has been plagued by infighting and internal disagreements. The international community should support further South-South dialogue. The GOSS must also continue to press the NCP and GONU to implement the CPA fully. Without effective pressure from the GOSS, the NCP is unlikely to press for implementation,

and the result will be a stagnant situation which, according to the GOSS, will inevitably mean a return to war.<sup>14</sup>

Successful elections are crucial to stability in the Sudan. The Sudan has a long history of ethnic dominance and tribal wars. Balanced and fair elections will reduce the risks of ethnic dominance, thus reducing the likelihood of a resumption of conflict (Collier et al 2003, p. 139). The international community must exert urgent pressure on the GONU to conduct the census and elections, accept electoral observers, and ensure a smooth transition of power from the current GONU to a newly elected national government. Transparent elections will also ease the situation in Darfur, as better representation will address some of the key concerns of the rebels.

### *Address internal and regional sources of conflict*

The civil wars in the Sudan have transcended national borders and become regional wars. Any return to war between the North and South will also have regional components. The most effective way to prevent the return to conflict is in the above recommendations, but regional policies can also be implemented.

The issue of the Nile waters is significant for the region and will become more pressing if the South votes to secede. To prevent its becoming a flashpoint for conflict, a tentative water-sharing agreement should be drawn up between Egypt and the GONU, in consultation with the GOSS, which would be implemented in case of secession. The international community, in particular the UN, should exert pressure on IGAD to deal with the water issue and prepare for the possible secession of the South.

Another source of tension in the region is government support for opposition groups in neighbouring countries. GONU has frequently supported such groups to counter opposition groups at home. Free and fair elections will allow for better representation, thus reducing the likelihood that these groups will grow in the Sudan, as well as the need for the NCP to support opposition groups in neighbouring countries. The international community should examine the means by which small wars and insurgencies are funded in the region. To achieve regional stability, the international community must persuade governments in the region to stop dealing with rebel groups.

Some important regional states believe that they have more to gain from a weak Sudan than from a strong one (ICG 2002, p. 53). A weak Sudan is easier to negotiate with, will make more favourable trade deals, will be unable to export militant Islam, and will be unable to support opposition movements within neighbouring countries. But a weak Sudan also poses significant security challenges. A weak Sudan has porous borders that allow safe havens for criminal activity and guerrilla movements, and result in hundreds of thousands of refugees throughout the region.

One of the main problems in the Sudan is that “none of the warring parties share the same vision about what Sudan is, what it represents, or what it should be” (Nantulya 2003, p. 110). Indeed, the same could be said for much of the population. As a result, it is important to start developing ideas of what a united Sudan could look like, or what cooperation

between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan could look like. Either way, the Sudanese people must be prepared for the possibilities, and ready to approach them peacefully and cooperatively.

If a united Sudan is the goal, then solving the problems of nationality and religion are crucial (Johnson 2004, p. 128). Unity must be made attractive to the South through a variety of means, including development, and a recognition of the economic, political, and cultural differences between the North and the South. However, it must be recognized that a united Sudan is extremely unlikely in the medium-to-long term, and appropriate actions must be taken to ensure that secession will be a peaceful process.

Internally, the Darfur situation threatens to undermine CPA implementation. Darfur is distracting the international community and diverting important resources and pressure away from the North-South peace process. If the CPA is not fully implemented, there will be no possibility for peace in Darfur.

### *Conclusion*

The implementation of the CPA is an excellent starting point for peace in the Sudan. However, it does very little to address the possibility of conflict between regional and internal actors. As a result, these issues must be addressed through other policies, by the NCP, the GOSS, international actors, and NGOs. In particular, tribalism and resource-sharing issues have the potential to threaten peace in the Sudan and the region.

In the Horn, countries that share borders often become involved in each other's conflicts. One reason is that tribal and ethnic groups do not adhere to international boundaries and so their grievances often move between nations. To end this threat to regional security, political and economic bonds between countries need to be strengthened and the root causes of conflict must be addressed. Further, countries in the region must make a concerted effort to stop fostering rebellion in their neighbour's lands, since such behaviour breeds an incessant cycle of violence.

Internal civil wars tend to generate regional arms races. Responding to the risk of civil war, governments tend to increase military expenditures. However, neighbouring countries often see increased military expenditures as a direct threat, and therefore increase their own accordingly (Collier et al 2003, p. 34). Reducing the cycle of civil war expenditures and support for opposition groups will go a long way towards creating a sustainable peace.

The sharing of scarce resource is another potential flashpoint for conflict in the Horn, and must be addressed pre-emptively. Kerim Ousman believes that, in particular, robust sharing agreements related to the Nile waters should be developed for all contingencies. Should the South secede from the Sudan, allocations for its water supply should already be in place.

Lessons learned from the failure of the Addis Ababa agreement are important. The regional government based on the agreement failed because of conflict over resource development and benefits, dissatisfaction with the DDR process such as the reintegration of the guerrillas,

and growing confrontation between the regions in the south (Johnson 2004, p. 43). Southern leaders were criticized for accepting the agreement on those terms (Johnson 2004, p. 55).

General policy options have been developed to address both internal sources of conflict in the Sudan and regional ones as well. To prevent the return of war, the international community, NGOs, the NCP, and the GOSS should address these issues and implement the policy recommendations. Otherwise, Ousman believes, the rebellion that is so inherent to the Sudan has a very real possibility of causing the disintegration of the whole country. The CPA is a solid peace agreement, and has the potential to bring a real and lasting peace to the region if it is implemented in good faith.

## *Appendix A: Current CPA Implementation*

Implementation of ABC report: *The GOS has not implemented the recommendations of the ABC report, nor has it been published. The civilian administration mandated for Abyei has not been established.*

National Reconciliation and Healing Process: *Not started.*

North-South Border: *The Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee started work in January 2007; their final report is expected in the first quarter of 2008.*

Census: *The census is scheduled for 15-30 April 2008, but funding remains an issue. If the census is not completed by this time, delays to national elections are likely.*

Land Ownership and National Resources: *The CPA does not address issues of land ownership and national resources. The National Land Commission Bill, which is to deal with these concerns, has yet to be tabled in parliament.*

Oil: *The lack of transparency in the division of oil revenues continues to be a problem in implementing the CPA.*

### *Commissions not yet established*

National Human Rights Commission  
Electoral Commission  
Land Commission

### *Legislation not yet passed*

National Security Service  
National Police  
Elections  
Government Purchase Bill  
Armed Forces Bill (has been tabled, but not yet approved)

### *Opposition parties not participating in GONU*

Umma Party (Al-Mahdi), Popular National Congress (Al-Turabi)<sup>15</sup>

## *Notes*

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2. Comment by Ambassador John Andrugá Duku, Principal Liaison Officer, Nairobi GOSS Liaison Office at the Africa Peace Forum/Project Ploughshares roundtable, Kenya, December 4-5, 2007.
3. Telephone interview with Claire Metelits, November 16, 2007. Dr. Metelits is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Washington State University. Her research interests include insurgents, criminal organizations, contemporary state-building, conflict, and international security.
4. Comment by Ambassador John Andrugá Duku, December 4-5, 2007.
5. Countries in the region that are not described in this report include the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. These countries do not have a significant interest in Sudanese internal politics at this time. However, given the nature of politics in East Africa/Horn of Africa, this could change quickly.
6. Interview with Tag Elkhazin, October 12, 2007. Mr. Elkhazin is a Sudanese national and an expert in peacebuilding, political analysis, internally displaced persons, and security sector reform. He graduated from the University of Khartoum in engineering and currently runs a consulting business, SubSaharaCentre.ca.
7. Comment by Ambassador John Andrugá Duku, December 4-5, 2007.
8. Interview with Kerim Ousman, November 15, 2007, Kingston, Ontario. Dr. Ousman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada. His expertise lies in international relations theory and African politics.
9. In an interview, Elkhazin also made this point. At the December 2007 roundtable, Ambassador Duku said that the GoSS has assured the Egyptian government that they will not require more water, but the continuance of the status quo is regarded as highly unlikely in the event of secession.
10. This point was reinforced by Dr. Ibrahim Farah.
11. Interview with Elkhazin, 2007.
12. Interview with Elkhazin, 2007.
13. This opinion was expressed by several Southern Sudanese at the APFO/Project Ploughshares roundtable in December 2007.
14. Comment by Ambassador John Andrugá Duku, December 4-5, 2007.
15. Further details on the portions of the CPA that have been implemented can be found in UNMIS 2007.

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# Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Community Security in Southern Sudan: The Links between Gender Identity and Disarmament

By Judith McCallum and Alfred Okech

## *Executive Summary*

This paper seeks to clarify the links between gender identity, militarization, and disarmament in the Sudan, drawing from academic sources as well as documentation from various UN and humanitarian agencies operating in the region. It also draws from the experience of Pact Sudan's program staff.<sup>1</sup> The research reveals that gendered identities were not only shaped by the militarization of certain sectors of the society, but also by the displacement of populations. Some of this displacement was to the garrison towns held by the northern forces (i.e., Juba, Malakal, Aweil); others were displaced to the northern parts of the country (Khartoum, etc.), to neighbouring countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda), and to North America, Europe, and Australia. All the displacements shaped the diverse identities in Southern Sudan, and each type of displacement particularly shaped the attitudes towards women and men and their roles in society. In turn, these identities have an impact upon disarmament processes in the diverse communities of Southern Sudan.

## *Introduction*

A recent Pact Conflict and Threat Analysis (Pact Sudan 2007) highlighted the manipulation of identities as one of the key causes of the inter- and intra-communal conflict in Southern Sudan that threatens the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This research was shared with the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) and other Pact Sudan stakeholders. The research demonstrated that the manipulation of identities has indeed caused fractures within Southern Sudanese communities and that the legacy of this manipulation threatens the effective implementation of the CPA. It was widely agreed that the fractured nature of Sudanese identities was a factor that needs to be understood more clearly in conjunction with insecurity, inequity, injustice, and institutional weaknesses of the state, as they are all interrelated.

However, it is interesting to note that, although a wide diversity of identities were identified and discussed in the threat assessment, including ethnic differences, “northerner” versus “southerner,” “Arab” versus “African,” and even returnees and “stayees,” the one basic aspect of identity that was ignored was *gender*. In all areas where the research was undertaken, the impact of the war and the resulting displacements upon *gender identities*<sup>2</sup> was never mentioned or identified as a concern in Southern Sudan. While it is possible that gender was not seen as an indicator of threat to the implementation of the CPA, it is also true that the research was done primarily by men with men. It should not come as a surprise that the importance of gender in post-war and war contexts is often ignored—except perhaps to highlight women as victims of war. As Samuelson (2007, p. 833) states, “in the war zone,

women's bodies are simultaneously saturated with and stripped of meaning; in the process they are rendered invisible." However, research shows that the manipulation of gendered identities, both male (in particular their militarization) and female, is equally important when considering the implementation of the CPA and the disarmament of Sudanese communities.

Sudan is a vast country with many different cultural and socio-economic groups. These groups did not all experience the war in the same way. For one thing, the degree of militarization varied radically from location to location. And local norms influenced the ways in which militarization changed gender identities. In light of the range of experience, it is difficult to make broad generalizations about the impact of the war on gender identities in Southern Sudan.

However, this paper will seek to reveal some of the ways that these identities were manipulated during the war, particularly in the areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and will outline possible implications for the disarmament of Southern Sudanese communities. The scope of this paper has been limited to the southern region of Sudan because of the complex differences between this region and the North.

### *Research Methodology*

Drawing on field research and the experiences of the authors in their work for Pact Sudan's Enhancing People to People Indigenous Capacities (EPPIC) program, this paper seeks to analyze the ways that gender identities were manipulated during the North-South civil war in Sudan (1983-2005), either intentionally or as a product of militarization. In addition, the paper examines how these identities influence the implementation of the CPA and the disarmament of Southern Sudanese communities. In particular, the paper seeks to answer the following questions:

- How has the militarization of Southern Sudanese society affected gender identities?
- Have these identities in turn influenced the disarmament process?
- What are the gender considerations for arms control and reduction, and community security in Southern Sudan?

To provide answers to these questions, focus groups were formed in Juba and Aweil. Their tasks were to explore

- the role of women in arming their communities during the war;
- the impact that the presence of arms in the community has on women;
- the ways in which the war affected male and female behaviour in their communities;
- the process of disarmament in their communities; and
- the positive and negative roles that women play in the disarmament process.<sup>3</sup>

Interviews were also held with Pact Sudan staff and women leaders in the Sudanese government, including members of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) and the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Peace and Reconciliation.

Building on the secondary data that already exists, our research triangulates data to develop a comprehensive picture of the current status of the disarmament process in Southern Sudan, how it influences the stability of the region, and, in particular, the links between identity and disarmament and the role of women in the disarmament process.

## *Sudan: Context*

The colonial and post-colonial history of Sudan illustrates how the nation-state, constructed out of a very un-nation-like community of ethnicities and religions, has served to fracture society and cause conflict (Sharkey 2003). Before the Turko-Egyptian invasion of 1821, the Sudan consisted of kingdoms and tribal communities. Sudan in its present boundaries did not exist. Deng (2005, p. 41) asserts that previous and ongoing conflicts in Sudan are a result of “the crisis of statehood and national identity in Sudan,” which has its roots in “the British attempt to bring together diverse peoples with a history of hostility into a framework of one state, while also keeping them apart and entrenching inequalities by giving certain regions more access to state power, resources, services, and development opportunities than other regions.” The international and regional recognition and support for these borders since independence has done little to decrease the conflict or to provide the country with any sense of national unity and nationhood.

The modern nation-state of Sudan is a result of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium administration that ruled the country for 58 years until independence in 1956, although the roots of current political factions go back much further into history (Deng 2005). The British rule was not popular in either Northern or Southern Sudan and, in 1924, the British divided Sudan into North and South in an attempt to contain the Nilotic tribes that were resisting British rule. In the early 1920s, the British passed the Closed Districts Ordinances, which stipulated that passports were required for travel between the two zones and permits to conduct business in the other zone, and totally separate administrations.

With backing from Egypt, the northerners demanded that the North and South be united. Although by policy the British recognized the distinctiveness of Southern Sudan, they were still in favour of the integration of Southern Sudan with the north because “economics and geography combine (so far as can be seen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound to the Middle-Eastern and Arabized northern Sudan” (Deng 2005, p. 38).

Southern Sudanese were wary of being united with the North after independence, predicting (accurately) that in such a union they would be underdeveloped, recolonized, and enslaved by the northerner Sudanese. Many southerners felt betrayed by the British because they were largely excluded from the new government. The language of the new government was Arabic, but the bureaucrats and politicians from Southern Sudan had, for the most part, been trained in English. Of the 800 new governmental positions vacated by the British in 1953, only four were given to southerners (Machar 1995). In addition, the political structure in the South was not as organized as that in the North, so political groupings and parties from the South were not represented at the various conferences and talks that established the modern state of Sudan.

As a result, even before independence in 1956, civil war broke out between the Anyanya movement and the Government of Sudan (GOS), and lasted until 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed and the South became an autonomous region (Johnson 2006). For almost nine years, Sudan experienced relative peace, until 1983 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was withdrawn and President Jaafar Nimeiri (May 25, 1969–April 6, 1985) declared the introduction of Sharia (Islamic law), resulting in the resumption of civil war, this

time between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) under John Garang and the GOS. On April 6, 1985, a group of military officers, led by Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, overthrew Nimeiri, who took refuge in Egypt. Three days later, Dhahab authorized the creation of a 15-man Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule Sudan.

The second civil war lasted over 20 years, cost an estimated 1.5 million lives and displaced over four million people (Johnson 2006). The war not only had a huge toll in terms of numbers killed and displaced, but because of the GOS practice of waging war through local militia groups, it also fractured communities. During this war, arms flowed into Sudan to the many armed groups from different supporters.

Even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005 and the formation of the Government of National Unity (GONU) in September 2005, questions of identity continue to plague the country, especially in Southern Sudan. The coalition government faces the huge challenge of reintegrating a whole generation of Sudanese who have grown up displaced, including approximately 1.8 million in the capital city, Khartoum (Jacobsen, Lautze & Osman 2001).

In 2007, Sudan entered the third year of CPA implementation amidst concerns that the agreement was already facing serious challenges. Relations between the two parties of the agreement—the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP) of the North—continued to be strained, and relations within Southern Sudan were affected as many residents felt that the SPLM was not adequately asserting Southern concerns within the GONU. This message was reinforced by the First Vice-President of the Sudan, President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, in his address to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly on September 11, 2007, as reported by Reuters:

“I am alarmed, worried and deeply concerned about the status of CPA implementation,” he told the parliament in Juba, capital of south Sudan. “I am worried Mr. Speaker that it is likely that Sudan will revert again to war if we do not act now with our partner NCP.”

Southern Sudanese leaders are concerned about both the direct undermining of the CPA by the NCP and procrastination on its implementation. Serious breaches of the agreement over the past two years include:

- the continuing presence (and in some places redeployment) of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) troops in Southern Sudan past the July 9, 2007 deadline;
- the slow pace of the implementation of reforms (i.e., freedom of the press, freedom of speech and association) and formation of Commissions (Constitutional Review Commission), as stipulated in the CPA;
- the exclusion of the SPLM from major decisions made by the Government of National Unity (i.e., foreign policies, expulsion of foreign diplomats);
- the raiding of SPLM offices in Khartoum on September 11, 2007;
- the lack of transparency in the exploitation of oil resources and sharing of revenues, the unexplained reduction of monthly transfers from \$100-million to \$44-million, and the exclusion of southerners from the Ministry of Gas and Oil; and

- the lack of implementation of the Abyei Protocol and recommendations of the Abyei Boundary Commission report, the delay in the demarcation of the South-North border, the lack of funding for the Boundary Commission, and the resulting delays to the population census pilot.

All these issues came to a head on October 18, 2007 when the SPLM suspended its participation in the GONU. In response, the NCP blamed the SPLM for delaying the implementation of talks on the Petroleum Commission and the interim constitution. The NCP also accused the SPLM of violating the peace accord by continuing military expenditures and recruitment, as well as obstructing members of the SAF. Since the SPLM's withdrawal from the GONU, Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir has hinted that a return to war could be imminent if the CPA is not implemented properly.

Pact Sudan's *Conflict Threats and Peace Assessment* (2007) reveals that there are also significant threats to the CPA within Southern Sudan. The integration of other armed groups (OAG) into the various armed forces (SPLA, the police, wildlife, and the Joint Integrated Units) remains incomplete, and there is still no clear policy or mandate for the disarmament of civilians. As a result, guns remain in the hands of civilians, and there are frequent interethnic incidents that result in the call for the forced disarmament of specific groups (for example, the Murle), which has politicized the process.

Past attempts to disarm civilians lacked the coordination that would ensure that disarmed communities were not left vulnerable to their neighbours. Particularly for those along either the still undemarcated North-South border or borders with neighbouring countries, the desire for guns for protection remains strong. Politics, rather than a coordinated and well-thought out and integrated approach, seem to determine decisions on which communities should disarm and how they should be disarmed. The next section will examine small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Sudan and the current status of community disarmament.

### *Background Information on SALW and Disarmament*

Current wars and post-conflict dynamics are shaped by wider global influences. The wars fought on African soil are the products of specific history, with unique genealogies. According to A. Mama (2001), innovations of military forms in Africa emerged during the national liberation struggles, when the "all-male colonial armies of occupation gave rise to tactically astute guerrilla forces" that operated in accessible areas such as hills and forests. "For the popular forces of nationalism, violence was both necessary and justified. The *raison d'être* was not the greedy brutality of conquest, but rather the righteous cause of liberation from the contemptible atrocities of colonial rule" (Mama 2001). These guerrilla armies drew from the 'poorest of the poor' both for recruits and material support. And, in contrast to earlier militaries where female support existed but was less obvious, these armies included both women recruits, and relied even more explicitly upon the support of women in their communities (i.e., see McKay and Mazurana 2000).

The way in which these wars were waged changed dramatically with the introduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW).<sup>4</sup> They were supplied, at least in the initial context of the Cold War, by both the USA and USSR and their allies, who supported dissident groups,

brutal and dictatorial regimes, insurgency groups, and liberation movements in the proxy wars that served their strategic self-interests. Although much focus during this period was on the ‘arms race’, the more pernicious impact was the product of the wide distribution of small arms. In the post-Cold War context, the sale of SALW continues to be lucrative, resulting in a complex global distribution that is beyond the scope of this paper.

The popularity of light weapons in current and recently ended African conflicts reflects their low cost, efficiency at killing, ease of use and maintenance, and portability. While small arms and light weapons are designed for use by armed forces, they have unique characteristics that are also of particular advantage for irregular warfare or terrorist and criminal action (Renner 1997, pp. 11-12). SALW are easily affordable; accessible; less bulky than large weapons systems; and easily hidden, assembled, and disassembled. In Uganda, an AK-47 costs the same as a chicken and in northern Kenya, the same as a goat; in Mozambique and Angola, an AK-47 complete with a couple of clips of ammunition can be bought for less than \$15.00—the cost of a bag of maize (Smith & Vines 1997, p. 9).

As a result, SALW are not solely in the hands of irregular armies of rebels, but are also used to equip child soldiers, and by communities to provide protection as an intrinsic part of the cultural and socioeconomic fabric of these societies. In low intensity conflicts, such as intercommunal conflicts over cattle rustling and raids, SALW have been the sole tools of violence. This is particularly true in the Horn of Africa, where the world’s largest concentration of pastoralist populations often clash over access to water resources, thus increasing the justification to carry and use arms (Francis 2006). Guns in these communities have become a vital part of both the culture and livelihood strategies during both the war and the post-war period, especially when there are few economic options for youth.

For this reason, Babu Ayindo (2007) calls for an increase in the effectiveness and efficiency of small arms action. He argues that the involvement of civil society is critical and suggests that there is a need for governments to engage more with civil society on disarmament, particularly because civil society efforts are often more fluid, with less bureaucracy. In addition, government approaches have often focused on the “hardware” approach that emphasizes disarmament, collection, and destruction rather than the underlying social and economic reasons that people rely upon SALW. Ayindo’s study of the composition of national focal points indicates that only the Uganda National Focal Point included the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. He found that civil society involvement with the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) resulted in greater acknowledgement, sensitivity, and action on gender issues and the perspective of women.

In Southern Sudan, the proliferation of SALW was largely the result of the North-South war. The northern government provided weapons to their allies in the south—militia groups and communities that did not support the SPLA—to wage proxy battles and destabilize the south. The SPLA and communities that supported them were given SALW by the Ugandan, Ethiopian, and Eritrean governments (CIA 2007) and through the diaspora communities.

Southern Sudan livelihood patterns greatly affect SALW proliferation. Most residents are either pastoralists or agriculturalists. The nomadic tribes in Sudan have often fought over grazing and water points and have historically raided cattle from each other. Recently, the

Murle, Dinka, Nuer, Toposa, Mundare, and Didinga tribes have adopted guns as a means to exert dominance over their neighbours and carry out cattle raids. The culture of cattle ownership is so ingrained that groups like the Toposa believe that they are the sole owners of all cattle. This situation is further complicated because these communities often straddle the borders with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Communities on both sides cross these borders not only to purchase guns but also to raid cattle. The Pokot, Turkana of Kenya, and Karamojong of Uganda often raid cattle in Southern Sudan. The use of guns to raid cattle and control resource points of water and grazing land has created a risk for all the residents of the communities. Pastoral communities have also become vulnerable to manipulation by the SAF, which has provided SALW to some of these communities to counter the SPLA rebellion in the south and create general insecurity.

The settled agricultural communities often had no incentive to own guns and were relatively nonviolent. However, the war brought increased insecurity and a demand for small arms to protect homes and villages.

As a result, there are huge numbers of SALW in Southern Sudan, with most belonging to civilians. Small Arms Survey (2007 p. 2) estimates that there are between 1.9- and 3.2-million small arms in Sudan, with two-thirds of them held by civilians, 20 per cent by GOS, and the remainder shared between the official GOSS armed forces such as the SPLA and police and OAGs. However, the above statistics may not accurately represent the situation because the SPLA was a rebel movement before the signing of the CPA, making it difficult to distinguish between a civilian and a regular soldier.

SALW are more than just weapons of armies and criminals; they have become enmeshed in the very fabric of society. Not only are they a vital part of community protection and livelihood strategies (such as trade or cattle raiding), they are also wrapped up in cultural understanding and identities. The war in Sudan, which radically altered identities in Southern Sudan, has implications for the ways in which communities relate to one another, their perceptions of the arms in their midst, and their willingness to release them through disarmament processes.

The next section examines the phenomenon of identity and how it is created, maintained, and modified.

### *Identity and Armed Conflict*

In this paper it is understood that all identities, gendered or otherwise, are fluid and changing, not fixed or essential, not 'natural' or given, but "historically contingent and socially contested" (Hutchinson and Jok 2002, p. 91). According to Kwame A. Appiah (1992), all identities are complex and multiple; they emerge from historical responses to economic, political, and cultural forces within a particular society, as well as in opposition to other identities. While he asserts that all identities are rooted in "myths and lies" and not necessarily constructed on reason, they continue to flourish. Other scholars believe that identity is constructed by creating 'others' who are our opposites, and that our identity is based on continually interpreting and reinterpreting their differences from 'us'; AK Ramakrishnan (1999, p. 133) asserts that "each age and society recreates its 'others.'" In this

conception of identity, neither the self nor the other is static, but each is part of a “much worked over, historical, intellectual, political process—a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies.” Mineke Schipper (1999) likewise draws the connection between self and other in the development of identities, but emphasizes that identities gain increased significance when the group is threatened.

The Pact Conflict Threat Assessment found that “identity” was one of the key issues that threaten the implementation of the CPA in the areas that the program is operational. The identities that were highlighted were: the north/south identities—“Arab” and “southerner” or “black”; differing ethnic identities—Nuer or Dinka or Shilluk, etc.; as well as newer identities resulting from the war (returnees, ‘stayees’, etc.). These new identities are based around cultural changes between those who remained in the SPLA during the war, those who went to ‘the north’ and were influenced by ‘Arab culture’, and those who remained in the south but in the GOS held territories, especially the garrison towns (Juba, Malakal, Aweil).

For example, identities in Sudan that, during the war, had particular significance and importance (northern/southern, Arab/African, Muslim/Christian) now complicate the post-CPA environment. In Malakal, at a recent stakeholder event held by Pact Sudan (comprising 55 youth and 60 women), emerging hybrid identities were revealed that are potential sources of tension within this former garrison town. One main group is calling themselves “Malakiya,” while others are different types of ‘returnees’.

According to the participants, the Malakiya community (approximately 20 per cent of the population) emerged as a hybrid of Arab tribes and indigenous people over decades, which adopted Islam as their main faith. Although they associate more with Islamic cultures than their traditional African heritage, proudly perceiving the adopted Islamic and Arabic culture as modern and informed, they still consider themselves southerners. However, their neighbours consider the Malakiya allies of northern Sudan and not true southerners. In light of their strong group identity and social cohesion, leaders from the Malakiya community claim that they are a separate group that deserves rights of representation in public institutions, including legislative assemblies.

Local indigenous people (Collo, Dinka, and Nuer) resent their claims, calling them northern Arab sympathizers. These groups want the Malakiya to be subsumed by the existing southern tribes since most Malakiya have at least one parent from these groups. Participants in the discussions felt that this conflict was one of the threats to the full implementation of the CPA at the Malakal grassroots level.

The identities outlined above also have implications for gender because gender roles and identities, as expressed in dress, behaviour, and other social interaction, are quite different in the Islamic and southern contexts. For example, Salma Ahmed Nageeb (2004), in her study of the impact of Islamization upon women in Khartoum, examines how the restrictions imposed on women’s space, the “neo-harem,” control women and place them in the ideological and social space of Islamic nations, but also how women negotiate and construct this space. She demonstrates how they do this through *religiosity*, to both transcend the socio-cultural force of Islamization as well as activate it in their everyday lives and practices; and through strategies that expand their private space, stretching the traditional meaning of

women's private spaces to enhance their gender-specific power. Through these practices, group identity is formed, they are able to remain faithful to their religion, but they are also able to transcend the spaces that, because of their gender, have been defined and delineated. During the war, women in the government-controlled areas of southern Sudan also experienced the restrictions to their space, both of their personal bodies (adopting the hijab), as well as to their access to public space.

Interactions between returning communities and those who remained behind, as well as between returnees from different regions (northern Sudan, East Africa, or other, western countries) are intensifying, as the meeting at Malakal revealed. Returning youth feared that those who remained in Sudan during the war were imprisoned by static traditions with no mechanism for adjusting and no desire to change. Some of the women stated that returning youth were introducing "bad manners," especially in their dress, consumption of alcohol, and dancing styles, defying tradition and indigenous cultures. In response, the returnees argued that there should be freedom as stipulated in the CPA, and they criticized the Islamic way of dress and the call for abstinence from alcohol as a promotion of Islamic Sharia laws in Southern Sudan. In a post-conflict environment, where new institutions are being created, employment is low, and expectations are high, these lines of tension are potential flashpoints for conflict.

Again, the context has many implications for gender identity. Women returnees are often perceived as 'freer' in their interactions, dress, and behaviour than those women who have lived for many years in the northern-controlled parts of the country (both northern Sudan and the garrison towns in Southern Sudan), where their acceptance in the public sphere is often restricted. Those coming from the SPLA-controlled regions or other countries are less influenced by these restrictions and are, as a result, often more comfortable in the public sphere and less inclined to completely cover their bodies. So, what is considered proper behaviour, including women's participation in public office, is shaped by these gender identities—both those imposed by the dominant society and those assumed by the women themselves.

These emerging identities are shaped by the space created by the CPA but also in relationship to 'the other'. For example, the Malakiya created their identity in opposition to indigenous communities, while various factions of youth have created identities in opposition to those who either remained behind or were displaced elsewhere.

The next section will examine how gender identities are influenced by militarization, with a particular focus on the Sudanese context.

### *Gender Identity and Militarization*

While it is recognized that identities are often modified, changed, abandoned, and adopted, the identity conferred by gender, like ethnicity, is often seen as 'natural', given, and unchanging. However, recent scholarship reveals that gendered identities are as constructed and historically situated as other identities. In most societies, gendered identities take on the forms of masculinity and femininity, which are usually based on the sex of the individual and the sociological/cultural characteristics that are attributed to the two sexes in that particular

society. But visiting a different culture or talking to one's grandmother makes it easy to see that, except for some basic biologically based features, the characteristics attributed to one sex or the other are also culturally and historically conditioned.

Concepts of masculinity and femininity are further altered by the contexts of war and conflict, influencing the way in which guns are used and perceived, as well as cultural norms on acceptable levels of violence in the community. For example, militarization of a community can result in the loss of the taboos against violence to women and children, making these groups more vulnerable (Hutchinson & Jok 2002). It has been observed that the very process of militarization often draws upon how gender relations are constructed and in particular how masculinity and femininity are defined (Cock 1994, 2001; Enloe 1983; Hutchinson & Jok 2002; Mama 2001; Phillips 2001; Samuelson 2007).

According to Cock (1994, p. 153), "militarization is a society process that involves the mobilization of resources for war on political, economic and ideological levels." Women and men play a key role in this mobilization. Militarism has also been defined as the "pervasiveness in society of symbols, values and discourses validating military power and preparation for war" (Luckham 1998, p. 14). Again, the symbols, values, and discourses that validate military power are not only under the influence of men, but are accepted and promoted by both men and women in the context of war, often transforming society. As observed in the Southern Sudanese context, guns can take on a particular symbolic meaning related to masculinity.

Meg Samuelson (2007) suggests that within the configurations of war and conflict, masculine and feminine positions are delineated and exaggerated, with men taking on the roles of warriors and protectors, and women cast in the role of the protected, embodying hearth and home, but both inactive and passive. She states (p. 839), "Not only does the iconography of war present such bifurcated gendered figures, but it also appears to depend upon them." Likewise, Hutchinson and Jok (2002) assert that the intensification of gendered identities that occurs during the process of militarization happens regardless of the agenda of the warring parties, whether imperialist, nationalist, or ethno-nationalist. Like Samuelson, they suggest that militarization *cannot* work if men do not adopt specific norms of masculinity, and women prescribed norms of femininity. However, drawing from their research in Southern Sudan, they suggest that, as women adopt these roles, these essentializations are often turned back upon them, increasing their vulnerability in the face of the conflict. In addition, it is important to note that both men and women are affected by these processes, albeit in differing ways. The next section examines the impact of militarization upon masculine identities.

### *Militarization of masculinities*

While women are not challenged during conflict to prove their femininity, White (2007) suggests that historically wars have been symbolized as the "touchstone of 'manliness,'" in many movies and literature. She states that in war, combat is seen as the ultimate test of masculinity, and that military training often emphasizes masculine traits that both women and the enemy lack to foster male bonding and social cohesion within the army: "women

represent the weaker sex, home and hearth, and the need to be protected, while the enemy represents the weaker force to be dominated and conquered” (White 2007, p. 865).

Cynthia Enloe (1983) likewise argues that combat training inculcates an image of masculinity that is based on aggression and dominance, while asserting the male role of protector and defender. According to one ex-conscript in the South African Defense Force interviewed by Oliver Phillips (2001), “The army operates on a very male physical level. The male body is cherished and nurtured and you are encouraged to develop it in sport, in pushing yourself in terms of survival training and all sorts of things. And the fit virile male is the archetype in the army, who can take punishment and keep going.” The military thus becomes equated with men, and the army becomes the preserve of masculine values, as it seeks to both separate the ‘men from the women’ and make ‘men’ out of ‘boys’. Militarization is construed in terms of ‘masculine’ ideals of courage, virility, chivalry, and superiority.

This militarized masculinity, based on aggression, conquest, and structured violence, relies on an underlying rationalization of the need to protect women and children (Phillips 2001, Enloe 1983, White 2007). This concept therefore requires the ‘other’ of the feminine to complement it and justify its existence. However, according to White, this model of men as protector and women as protected is rarely lived out in real war situations. Women are often as much at risk of abuse from their compatriots as from their enemies, even in ‘liberation wars’ that espouse a commitment to gender equity. She states that often, in spite of the best intentions, legitimate causes for entering war, and the egalitarian slogans of most guerilla movements, the underlying contradictions lead many of the most visionary revolutionary leaders to duplicate the very aspects of the regimes that they overthrew: authoritarianism, elitism, and violence. So, while in the post-conflict environment of newly independent nations, women combatants are often expected to revert to their traditional roles as wives and mothers, the militarization of masculinity often persists and becomes entrenched.

Research has indicated that, during the second civil war (1983-2005), many aspects of Southern Sudanese society were militarized, making a huge impact upon not only gender relations but perceptions of ethnicity (Hutchinson 1996, 2000; Hutchinson & Jok 2002; Skedsmo, Danhier, & Luak 2003). Guns played a significant role in this process; in some areas the economy came to be based on a currency of guns. For example Skedsmo et al. (2003, p. 60) found that in Nuer society during the war, guns and other light weapons were increasingly used as an item in the payment of the bride price. According to their article, cattle and women traditionally have been central to Nuer culture and were the basis of reproductive exchange. Cattle collectively gained through the dowry or bride price in the exchange of daughters were called ‘cattle of girls’, and with the introduction of guns to these ‘spheres of exchange’, the concept of ‘cattle of the gun’ emerged, giving the gun a special status within Nuer culture similar to that of the spear. As with girls in the society who were attained through the exchange of cattle from the ancestral herd, guns were considered to be collectively owned—and therefore shared by brothers.

During the civil war in Sudan, both the ideological and material linkages between guns and masculinity developed swiftly, making guns and oxen “increasingly fused as complementary symbols of wealth, physical strength and, hence, marriage worthiness” and arms were used for masculine self-confirmation and to display male potency and strength. In addition, guns entered the metaphorical language of these groups, becoming central to rituals, songs, and

other aesthetic expressions. For example, in the eastern Nuer traditions potential grooms reportedly shoot guns over their intended's home at night (Skedsmo et al. 2003, p. 60).

Hutchinson & Jok (2002) documented the shift from the “spear to the gun” in Nuer and Dinka cultures, which “depersonalized” inter- and intra-ethnic homicide through the rationalized separation of the killer from the weapon, and removed spiritual and social responsibility for the death that had previously been acknowledged in the use of spears. “Unlike individually crafted spears, more-over, the source of a bullet lodged deep in someone’s body is more difficult to trace. Often a fighter did not know for certain whether or not he had killed someone” (p. 98). As a result, while guns could not attain the sacrificial significance of spears in these cultures, they became the primary markers of prosperity and central to masculine identity (Skedsmo et al, p. 60).

The role of guns in marriage negotiations is not unique to the Nuer and Dinka communities; there are similar practices among all the pastoralist communities in Southern Sudan. Pact staff members operating in Greater Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria confirm that among the Murle, Toposa and Mundare communities, weapons are not only a status symbol but also a vital tool in ‘restocking’ cattle through the raids on neighbouring communities that form an intrinsic part of marriage customs.

The SPLA also sought to capitalize on this link between guns and masculinity by instilling in its recruits a sense of hyper-masculinity that glorified the ‘raw power’ of the gun (Hutchinson & Jok 2002). New recruits were told that guns would bring the South its rightful heritage and that the lack of guns had denied them this success in the past. At the same time, the recruits’ relationships with their families, particularly women, were devalued. For example, Hutchinson heard the tragic story of a beautiful young girl who was carried off by ex-SPLA soldiers and became the source of conflict between the soldiers of the Dinka warlord Kerebino Kuanyin Bol. According to rumour, upon hearing of the conflict between his men, he pulled out a gun and shot the woman between the eyes, declaring that no woman would be allowed to cause dissention in his ranks; “the logic of the commander was clear: the girl’s life meant nothing in the context of group solidarity and discipline” (Hutchinson & Jok 2002, p. 101).

As the value of women decreased among the rebels, there was an enhanced sense of male entitlement to both the domestic as well as the sexual services of women. Hutchinson & Jok documented how this pressure to “keep up the reproductive front” shortened the weaning period from 18 months to nine months, creating a shorter time between pregnancies and increasing maternal deaths. However, while the military commanders encouraged this hyper-masculinity in recruits, it soon became accepted in the wider society—and women even reinforced this attitude themselves. As will be shown in the next section, in the context of a militarized society, women and perspectives of femininity also undergo transformation.

### *Femininities and war*

Although women and perceptions of femininity are often central to militarization, Jacklyn Cock (1994) suggests that both sexism and feminism have obscured the role of women in this process. According to her research on South Africa, sexism excludes women from the

military because of their perceived unsuitability for fighting; as the ‘weaker sex,’ they are physically inferior to men and need to be protected and defended. Feminism focuses on women’s “innate nurturing qualities, creativity and pacifism,” and the perceived monopolization of power by men, and concludes that war is predominantly a male affair (Cock 1994; also see Samuelson 2007). But militaries still need women in many ways, primarily as the feminine “other.” Women are perceived as both the conquered and the protected, and as both incapable and privileged (Philips 2001).

Our research in Sudan revealed that, as in other parts of Africa, women are more than just passive victims in the militarization process; indeed, they often actively reinforce the militarized mentality. Not only do they directly encourage their male relatives (husbands, brothers, and sons) to join the military, participate in communal cattle raiding, and seek revenge on neighbouring ethnic groups, but they also use such indirect methods as songs and comments to “shame” the men in their communities who did not participate. For example, in the Nuba Mountains, the Hakamas were women singers who were attached to fighting forces during the civil war. Their specific role was to motivate the men to fight by singing songs against cowardliness and retreat. In other parts of Sudan, particularly in Darfur, Hakamas have even been accused of inciting men to rape women from other groups. Similar stories have been told in other areas where women provided both material and psychological support to armed groups.

Often retaining traditional attitudes about gender roles and responsibilities, women were forced by the changing circumstances created by war to take on new roles—both at the basic livelihood level, with women taking on tasks usually done by men, as in agricultural production; and by actively participating in the SPLA and OAGs. Participation ranged from full membership in armed groups to supporting roles that provided food, security, and sexual services for the armies.

According to the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Peace and Reconciliation in the Government of Southern Sudan, during the early stages of the civil war, there was a battalion in Jonglei within the SPLA ranks known as Ketiba-banat, made up exclusively of girl volunteers and trained in Ethiopia. Although this battalion has been described as a formidable force, after their first battle in Njoko, the SPLA high command refused to put them in the front lines. A policy was established not to send women into the front line on the grounds that the civil war was forecasted to last for a long time, and exposing women on the front line meant potentially sacrificing many generations.

The Ketiba-banat battalion was assigned the tasks of supporting and supplying the front line with ammunition—tasks in some ways riskier than actually holding a gun—and treating wounded men in the battlefields. Women not only provided food for the front lines and other battlefields but were known to give the soldiers their food rations—food that was reportedly distributed by the UN-World Food Program and other humanitarian aid agencies. And, while some of these services were taken on voluntarily, many women were forced into these roles—even into marriage—at gunpoint.

It needs to be noted, however, that this process has taken different forms, depending on the local context. Recent discussions with Pact staff in Aweil town in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, a former garrison town under the SAF, revealed that, while gender identities and especially

perceptions of femininities changed during the war, the experience was radically different for those who remained in the rural areas under SPLA control. For example, very few women attended a recent workshop held in Aweil town, although they were specifically invited; and even the 'women's groups' were represented by men. We were informed, however, that had the workshop been held in a rural area, we would have had no problem getting women to attend; indeed, women would have dominated it.

According to the Pact staff person in Aweil, women in the rural areas of Northern Bahr El Ghazal are "freer" than those who remained in the former garrison town. Various reasons for the difference were suggested, including the influence of the 'Arab culture' brought in by the northerners, which places more restrictions on the movement of women. It was also suggested that, during the war, women in town were not encouraged to be active outside the home. It was generally felt that women were more at risk in the towns if they were in public. However, we were assured that the situation outside the town was radically different and that, in contrast, during the war women had assumed a more active role in civil society.

Mama (2001) asserts that the role of women and perceptions of femininity in militarized contexts often create fundamental contradictions, as militaries and rebel groups often involve women in nontraditional roles, but also rely upon specific ideologies of femininity and masculinity. As a result of these contradictions, male interests are pursued to the neglect, and often abuse, of women's interests. Women often suffer greatly in war because of the contradictory nature of militarization. The particular impact on women of the civil war and the presence of SALW in Sudanese communities will now be examined.

### *Impact of SALW upon women in Southern Sudan*

The prevalence of small arms affects men and women differently. Often women become more vulnerable to gender-based violence.<sup>5</sup> According to Cock (2001) gender-related violence is often a sign that the social fabric has disintegrated. Hutchinson & Jok (2002) have documented how the militarization of Dinka and Nuer culture led to an abandonment of ethical restraints and taboos against gender violence. They state that as a result of the militarization process, women came to be viewed not as "mobile assets" but "military targets."

Before the war women were considered less tied than men to one ethnic group and ethnic identity, and so they were more socially mobile between the ethnic groups. "Women's more ambiguous position at the crossroads of ethnic unities and distinctions afforded them considerable protection and social mobility at the start of this war" (Hutchinson & Jok 2002, p. 99). This ambiguous position has been observed in Pibor, where displaced Nuer women had so completely taken on Murle attire that the Pact staff person (a Nuer) was unable to distinguish them from the local community until they spoke Nuer to him.

This ability of women to move between ethnic groups is valuable for groups that often come into conflict over resources, because marriage offers important links that can diffuse potentially hostile relationships. At a recent workshop in Juba sponsored by Pact, 'cross-border marriages' were seriously proposed and discussed at length as a way to address interethnic conflict. Although the idea was eventually dropped, it did reveal the critical role that marriage, gender relations, and women can play in inter-communal relations.

However, Hutchinson & Jok (2002) found that, during the war, perceptions changed in the hyper-militarized Nuer and Dinka communities and women lost their special status as links, becoming instead important targets, particularly after the SPLA split along ethnic lines. Women were also often vulnerable to abuse by their own compatriots. In Ayod, when some women accompanied the youth in the cattle camps to the Toch—a small, swampy piece of land with rich grazing pastures, used especially during the dry season—the older women and girls left behind were often sexually harassed, battered, and sometimes even killed by small groups of armed nomads of the same tribe. Samuelson (2007, p. 842) states, “The war zone dramatizes what is true in civil society: that the boundary between coercive and consensual sexual intercourse is fundamentally blurred.” Further, women combatants are often unwilling to talk about the sexual violence of their fellow soldiers.

In the post-conflict environment, reintegration packages rarely address the needs of women. The Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan did recognize women both as members of armed groups, and as being associated with armed groups. Specific consideration was taken for a relatively small number (3,500 in Southern Sudan) of those who were associated with armed groups, recognizing the additional strain on ex-combatant and noncombatant women as they attempt to help their family members and themselves reintegrate.

Gains in status that women may have achieved during the conflict period are often fragile and not durable. Contrary to the perception that single mothers assumed more breadwinning roles during the war and should have been perceived as having more worth, there is no serious indication that traditional roles have changed. According to Pact’s Program Manager for Community Security, women did and continue to do most of the heavy labour in supporting family and community, whether the men are present or absent. However, there is no denying that the influx of small arms and light weapons has created more suspicion, not only between members of different communities, but also between husbands and wives.

As Cock (1994) asserts, while there is no link between demilitarization and gender equality, the link between militarism and masculinity is likely to remain intact in post-war contexts. As a result, women are often more vulnerable in the post-conflict environment than they were in the pre-conflict environment, particularly when the small arms remain in the hands of armed groups and community members.

A Pact Community Development Officer reported that, in a recent discussion in Juba, women stated that “when the SPLA was still in the bush, every night we were praying for their success—and when they came to Juba we were singing and dancing. But now this is not the case.... They are not the liberation we thought they were.” When the high expectations of the southern communities for security and development have not been met, at least at the level anticipated, disappointment and frustration have grown. Women in particular, feel this frustration.

According to the Control Arms campaign (2005), two factors underlie the link between guns and women’s lives: the worldwide proliferation of guns and the deep-seated global discrimination of women. Perpetrators of gun-related violence against women can be close intimate partners and family members; those in positions of power including employers and state officials (police, etc.); or criminals and members of armed groups. The use of guns in

gender-related violence has particular implications that the use of other weapons (knives, etc.) may not have. Women report feeling much more vulnerable when threatened with a gun, and they are more likely to be killed. Guns also reduce the capacity to resist abuse, the ability to escape, and the likelihood of intervention from others.

Women also bear the brunt of the impact of SALW in the community. When their partners are killed or injured by these weapons, women become the sole breadwinners, assuming total responsibility for children and injured husbands. Making a living by cultivation and grazing is made harder by the presence of landmines in Southern Sudan. Landmines exacerbate already difficult travel through vast territories and swamps that flood during the rainy season.

In all the focus group discussions and interviews, it was suggested that children and women are the most affected by war and the presence of arms in the community. Women are more often at risk when they are widowed and become single parents. Although the loss of loved ones affects men and women, the overwhelming view of the focus groups was that this loss had a greater impact on women, particularly because of their childbearing and rearing roles. One interviewee stated, “Women understand this better because they bear children. Men physiologically can’t understand this and are not that much attached to children.” Ayindo (2007) also suggests that it is easier for men than for women to maim and kill. Although some would contest the argument (for example, see Cock 1994), the perception is important. Women have played a key role in advocating restraint in militarized contexts and should be important participants in the disarmament process.

### *Disarmament and Gender*

Southern Sudan focus groups revealed that women played a role in arming communities during the civil war. Women sometimes purchased guns for their men, particularly their sons, and they were often the ‘custodians of the guns’. They smuggled guns across enemy lines and borders, sometimes even hiding them with their babies. In addition to actually being involved in the procurement of the guns, women provided psychological incentive for men to arm themselves and participate in conflict, as reported by Control Arms (2005, p. 4):

However, women’s attitudes can sometimes contribute to the powerful cultural conditioning that equates masculinity with owning and using a gun, and regards gun abuse by men as acceptable. Women sometimes overtly encourage men to fight, and, more subtly, support the attitudes and stereotypes promoting gun culture.

It has been reported that women still play the role of custodians of the guns in the post-conflict environment, particularly during the disarmament process. Because they are less likely to be questioned during a forced disarmament exercise, they are often the ones who hide the guns.

However, women have also played positive roles during the war and since. When listened to, they are a key voice for moderation, actively restraining intercommunal violence. Hutchinson & Jok (2002) cited the example of Elizabeth Nyawana Lam, who was instrumental in ending a confrontation between Bul and Leek Nuer by ordering all Bul and Leek Nuer women who went with their men to the battle to return home immediately. The researchers found that

even though many of the traditions related to gender roles and the protection of women had been lost during the war, Nuer and Dinka women were able to maintain their influence through their ability to 'shame' their husbands and sons.

This particular feminine influence was echoed in Lekwongole, Jonglei State where Murle women openly talked about their roles in both encouraging intercommunal conflict and encouraging peacebuilding and the youth to lay down their arms. These women emphasized the potentially central role that they could play in the disarmament process. They told us that women are the ones who buy the arms for their sons, encourage their youth to raid other groups, and provide the food for the raiding parties. In particular, the songs that women sing about their husbands encourage a type of masculinity that is centered upon providing cattle for their families and showing aggression and valor in raiding other groups. The women felt that their sons would give up their arms if so instructed by their mothers. If their sons refused to disarm, they said they would shame them by coming naked before them. They stated that, with education and encouragement, they could become influential in encouraging their sons and husbands to make peace. And they suggested bringing women from Nuer, Dinka, Murle, and other communities together to build relationships and learn how to build peace from each other.

According to Pact's Manager for the Community Security program, women are often the strongest campaigners for disarmament campaigns. Women most affected by guns often have the most creative ideas about incentives and strategies to remove weapons from the community, and play a vital role in building peace and trust between communities.

Pact's Community Security program has found that involving women in disarmament committees to raise awareness is effective because women are often the most active members of the communities in Southern Sudan. Women can also use their social and psychological influence to encourage the community to disarm. Older women in Pibor suggested that it was often the younger women who encouraged the young men to raid, and that it was critical for the older women to encourage their younger daughters to also be voices for peace. In the Nuba mountains, the influence of the Hakama singers has been recognized. These voices, which encouraged fighting during the civil war, are now being harnessed for peace, although there are accusations that they are still inciting violence in Darfur (*UN DDR Newsletter* 2006).

In Ayod county, Sudanese Women in Development and Peace is an indigenous women's nongovernmental organization that has managed a multitude of disarmament activities ranging from mobilization to training. SALW were having a big impact on their communities. The Chairperson of the NGO revealed, "In my own area, a brother was killing a brother; that is why we saw the need to carry out disarmament activities." With the support of the Swedish government, Pact Sudan, Catholic Relief Services, and UNDP, they were able to set up peace committees and councils and used the 'White Army' leaders to advocate for disarmament within some of the Nuer communities.

A conference of the Upper Nile Women's Association, all chiefs, and local government officials marked the beginning of an organized process toward peaceful civilian disarmament in greater Upper Nile.

While women can also be advocates for moderation and disarmament at the national and international levels, their voices might not be as readily acknowledged. If women are not heard at the higher levels of negotiation, critical perspectives are lost. The Government of Southern Sudan has guaranteed that a minimum of 25 per cent of leadership roles at all levels will be filled by women, but so far there are few women in key positions, particularly relating to peace and disarmament.

### *Sudan Peace Institutional Environment*

Many groups operating in Southern Sudan have a special interest in the disarmament process, including the DDR Commissions, the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC), the South Sudan Legislative Assembly's Committee of Peace and Reconciliation, various UN bodies, international NGOs, civil society organizations, and community peace committees. But the participation of Sudanese women remains limited. The SSPC has only one woman member and all the directors of the Commission are currently men. This is mirrored in many institutions in Southern Sudan.

While arguments are made that there are few qualified women with the technical skills and training needed for these specific roles, the reality is that leadership positions are often allocated for political reasons. The few women found in these bodies are often the most active members, who can become frustrated and burned out.

Disarmament work at all levels can be strengthened through both the equitable participation of women in decision-making processes and the integration of gender perspectives into disarmament debates, decision-making, and actions. For example, as noted in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, those involved in planning for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration must consider the different needs of female and male combatants.

In general terms, women often had greater representation in civil society before the CPA came into effect. Although usually in support roles, women also filled many significant civil society leadership positions. Since the CPA, many leaders of civil society organizations, particularly the significant women leaders, have been put into government roles. While this is a gain for the government and the country in general, it has severely handicapped civil society. In both Aweil and Juba, for example, there are few women representatives at the community level and, as observed earlier, even some women's organizations are headed by and represented by men. One common concern is for the shortage of qualified women and women's organizations with the capacity to participate in disarmament dialogues.

### *Conclusion and Recommendations*

Gender and gender identities have played key roles in the militarization of communities and in the arming and disarming of communities. However, while this truth is sometimes acknowledged by those in power, there are two major reasons that mechanisms have not been put in place to address the impact of militarization on communities and to harness the potential of women to play a key role in the disarmament process.

First, the disarmament process lacks a clear *mandate*. In particular, there do not seem to be definite guidelines on who has the responsibility to disarm communities. As a result, different institutions advocate different, often competing, approaches. This lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities makes it even more difficult for women, who are starting from a weaker political position, to engage in disarmament processes.

Second, there is no clear agreement on the *approach* to disarmament in Sudan. Should it be a community-based “software approach,” a military “hardware approach,” or a combination of the two? These processes are obviously related to the politics of Southern Sudan. For example, current calls for the forced disarmament of the Murle in Jonglei often ignore the marginalization of this community. Without adequate discussion with community leaders on how to address their specific concerns, forced disarmament could lead to a return to conflict.

As observed by Ayindo, community-based approaches tend to be more sensitive to the input of women and likelier to take gendered concerns into consideration. But all those involved in planning for DDR and civilian disarmament must consider the different needs of female and male combatants. Real opportunities for peace in Southern Sudan will not be fully realized if the particular roles and contributions of women are not considered.

Community-based approaches are also more likely to acknowledge that guns are a source of livelihood for youth with few options in these communities, and that offering legitimate and viable options for making a living would greatly increase the success of disarmament. Access to education, training in alternative livelihoods, and access to loans to start small businesses could all change the current culture of cattle raiding in some communities. Bringing youth into these discussions is one key way to ensure a deeper understanding of the problem. The involvement of women, who still have great influence over their sons and husbands, can provide vital support for such initiatives.

The following basic recommendations for addressing disarmament in Southern Sudan can be drawn from this research:

1. Women’s voices and perspectives need to be sought at all levels of the disarmament process. Women’s present efforts to raise awareness of proliferation and misuse should be identified and recognized when long-term disarmament processes are being planned.

Some ways to include women:

- Bring women from conflicting communities and communities not in conflict together to discuss strategies and alternatives for their communities;
- Consult and include women’s groups in peace negotiations;
- Train peacekeepers and peacebuilders to be aware of the special situation of women while promoting more women to senior DDR positions;
- Involve gender experts and expertise in the planning, assessment, and concept of the operational phases of the DDR process;
- Broaden policies to include all women and girls associated with armed groups, whether or not they possess weapons;

- Encourage the participation of existing women's groups in disarmament by appointing a significant number of women to decision-making positions in DDR commissions and relevant institutions;
- Hold regular consultation meetings with women ex-combatants and women's groups, in collaboration with community chiefs; and
- Include women in public information, training, and awareness, so that they understand their entitlements.

More action must be taken to achieve the 25 per cent participation of women at all levels of Sudanese government. Women's expertise has been underused in peace and security portfolios; women do not participate in sufficient numbers or in sufficiently influential positions in DDR decision-making processes. It is important to reach out to and educate gender equality activists, women's organizations, and individual women so that they are fully aware of disarmament issues and how the concerns of gender equality and global disarmament converge.

2. Roles must be clarified. Is civilian disarmament the responsibility of DDR Commissions or the military? What are the roles of other institutions, such as those responsible for peace and stability (i.e., the Southern Sudan Peace Commission, the Peace and Reconciliation Committee of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly)? How can these institutions work together for the peaceful disarmament of communities?

3. Disarmament needs an integrated approach from the military and the local communities. Communities must encourage their sons to give up arms voluntarily. At the same time, however, there must be an adequate rule of law in and among the communities to protect human rights.

4. There needs to be a strong push in Southern Sudan to replace guns with alternative livelihood strategies. Local and state governments should work together with national and international NGOs and civil society to provide education, technical training, and small loans to start up small businesses.

5. There needs to be a regional approach to disarmament and wider regional/international border issues need to be considered. Although resources are not sufficient to disarm the whole country at once, strategies need to be developed to ensure that communities are not made more vulnerable if they are disarmed before their neighbours. Establishing adequate rule-of-law institutions, such as police and judiciary, is one way to protect communities when their arms are removed.

6. In Southern Sudan, traditional chiefs and leaders are essential in promoting community involvement in collecting weapons. These leaders must be given training in disarmament processes and skills, with special attention paid to gender roles. Such training should include models from other locations that have used traditional authority in disarmament processes. Visits to such locations might also be useful. Involving women's groups in monitoring weapons collection and destruction, and as participants in destruction ceremonies can solidify community investment in the peace process.

## Notes

1. Through interviews with Pact's Enhancing People to People Indigenous Capacities (EPPIC) and Community Security program staff.
2. *Gender* refers to the socially ascribed characteristics of men or women, while *gender identity* refers to a person's internal sense of being a male or female, which is highly influenced by their familial, social, and cultural upbringing.
3. Focus groups were also commissioned in Kadugli, Malakal, and Abyei, but unfortunately their reports were not available for this paper.
4. UN Doc. A/54/258 defines SALW as follows: "Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. The category of small arms includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine-guns. Light weapons include heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibers of less than 100 mm. Ammunition and explosives form an integral part of small arms and light weapons used in conflicts, and include cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines, explosives, and mobile containers with missiles or shells or single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems."
5. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 2001) defines gender-based violence as any act of "violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life."

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### *Central Equatoria Women's Union, Hai Neem, Juba*

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### *Juba Workers Trade Union Federation, Women/Youth Training Center, Juba*

Elizabeth Sevena (Administrator), Miriam E. Kayang (Assistant Administrator and Teacher), Susy Zakaria (Teacher), Joyce Dimba (Teacher), Semira James (Teacher), Zienab Christine (Teacher).

### *Juba Workers Trade Union*

James Remijo Tongun (Chairman), Angelo Taban (Board Member), Daniel Taban (Board Member), Alexandria Kenyi (Board Member).

### *Aneil Town*

James Jok (Youth Chairperson), Athuot Bol (Women's Group Representative), Abuk Garang (SPLA-Wildlife), Garang Lual (Elder), Wieu Mabior (Sub-Chief), Samuel Mayuol (Youth Adviser), Tong Diing Akol (Executive Chief).

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC	Abyei Boundary Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CS	Community Security (Pact program)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DLF	Darfur Liberation Front
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
EIJ/EIJM	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPPIC	Enhancing People to People Indigenous Capacities (Pact program)
GONU	Government of National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NIF	National Islamic Front
OAG	Other armed groups
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
RECSA	Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SANU	Sudan African Nationalist Union
SLA/M	Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (Darfur)
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
SSLF/M	Southern Sudan Liberation Front/Movement
SSPC	Southern Sudan Peace Commission
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan

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