The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community.

CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict, insecurity and scarcity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict.
### Table of Contents

**Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations: The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic, 2006-2010**  
Alexandra Novosseloff and Richard Gowan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Introduction</strong></td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. The Pre-Deployment Phase: 2006-2007</strong></td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.i Background and initial Council engagement</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.ii The quest for a UN mission</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. The Deployment Phase: 2007-2009</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.i France turns to the EU</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.ii EU-UN coordination in the planning phase</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.iii The plan comes together</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.iv The operations: hitting the ground stumbling</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.v The EU and UN in action</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.vi Thinking beyond EUFOR</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.vii The debate over MINURCAT’s future</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. The Withdrawal Phase: 2009-2010</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.i Post-transitional problems</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.ii The Chadian withdrawal of consent and the end of MINURCAT</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of working methods: 2009-2010</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Conclusions and Recommendations</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afterword: the Security Council and peace operations</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

This paper, the second in a series on Security Council working methods and the performance of peace operations, addresses the Council's engagement in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) from early 2006 to the end of 2010. While the Council explored options for deploying some sort of UN peacekeeping presence to these countries from mid-2006 onwards, these discussions were secondary to much higher-profile debates about the possibility of a large-scale force in Darfur. After Chad had stated its initial opposition to a UN military deployment, France initiated proposals for the deployments of an EU military mission linked to a UN police presence to Chad and CAR in mid-2007.

After lengthy negotiations, the two organizations deployed in early 2008, and operated in parallel until March 2009. The EU mission then closed, following a pre-arranged schedule, while the UN mission (MINURCAT) deployed a military presence. However, Chad put a growing number of obstacles in MINURCAT's way, and eventually withdrew its consent altogether. MINURCAT ended its operations in December 2010.

The goal of this paper is to show how the Security Council's working methods affected its dealings with Chad and CAR prior to the launch of MINURCAT and the parallel EU mission (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and its oversight of the two operations from 2008 to 2010. While the two missions' performance was shaped by multiple contextual factors (and in EUFOR's case, European politics) it offers lessons about the relevance of working methods to an operation's effectiveness. This is particularly true because MINURCAT was subject to almost constant political pressure from the government of Chad, and the Council's working methods inevitably shaped elements of its response to this pressure.

The paper finds that, in the pre-deployment phase, most Security Council members largely saw Chad and CAR as side-issues to Darfur. The exception was France, which argued for a regional approach, and led a Council mission to Chad in June 2006. When the Council mandated a UN force in Darfur in August 2006, it included the possibility of a multidimensional presence in Chad. However, Sudan objected to a solely UN mission to Darfur, DPKO raised doubts about deploying to Chad and the Chadian government itself tried to place limits on the proposed mission. Lessons for working methods include:

1. The absence of a friends group or contact group focused solely on Chad and CAR reduced the amount of attention they received relative to Sudan and Darfur.

2. The Security Council mission to Chad was put on the Council's agenda but did not significantly increase most Council members' focus on the situation there.

3. A lack of open debates on Chad and CAR also reduced the number of opportunities to devise more effective UN strategies for the two countries.

4. While interactions with the AU on Chad (as opposed to Darfur) were limited, UNHCR and humanitarian officials had notable influence over the Council.

The deployment phase began in May and June 2007, when France persuaded Chad to accept a “multidimensional presence” in the form of a parallel EU-UN deployment. However, neither organization was able to deploy significant numbers of personnel until early 2008. The Security Council as a whole had a relatively limited role in this period, as France was in the lead and many significant debates took place in the EU. Once EUFOR and MINURCAT were deployed the Council became more active, as it debated what to do once EUFOR concluded its one-year mission. Lessons include:

1. France's bilateral diplomacy was necessary to secure a deployment, but ambiguity over the mission's goals and mandate alienated members of both the
Security Council and the EU. This was one factor in difficulties in finding enough contingents to deploy.

2. DPKO helped manage EU-UN relations, but a lack of political communication between the Security Council and the EU Council, as well as some degree of misunderstanding between the two secretariats hampered the mission.

3. Open Council debates on MINURCAT’s future played an important role in 2008, as CAR and its allies on the Council used them to make the case for a UN military presence in north-eastern CAR, in spite of some members’ skepticism.

4. The Council’s overall approach to the crisis was limited by Chad’s insistence that MINURCAT should not have a political role, a position supported by regional powers including Libya. This reduced the mission’s credibility, and contradicted the principles for successful peacekeeping outlined in the Brahimi report and the Capstone doctrine.

The **withdrawal phase** began when MINURCAT took over military duties from EUFOR in March 2009, but it always struggled to be effective. As the mission came under increased pressure, the Council increasingly debated its future in private, including through a series of informal interactive dialogues involving officials from Chad. While diplomats involved in this process argue that it had positive benefits, Chad withdrew its consent to the mission and the Council agreed to end MINURCAT’s operations by the end of 2010 after negotiations with Chad. There are fewer lessons for working methods from this period but it raises significant questions about whether the Council gains leverage from informal meetings.

In conclusion, the paper draws a series of recommendations for future missions:

1. Where the Council faces controversial questions about launching, sustaining or closing missions, open meetings may give it additional leverage.

2. The Council should explore ways to enhance the role of Council missions in developing a strategic consensus, and to use friends groups and contact groups as mechanisms for addressing multiple dimensions of regional crises.

3. The Council should explore methods to avoid prolonged mandate-making processes creating opportunities to weaken new missions in advance.

4. The Council should explore options for developing political channels of communication with the EU comparable to those it now has with the AU.

5. Where individual Council members negotiate missions with host countries, mechanisms are required to ensure the confidence of other Council members.
Acknowledgements

This project was made possible by a grant from the Government of Switzerland.

The authors wish to thank Emily O’Brien for her extensive research and editorial assistance. They also thank Emily Anne West and Francisca Aas for their support, and to a number of current and former UN officials and diplomats who have commented on the paper or given advice at various stages. Ambassador Paul Seger and Counsellor Pascale Baeriswyl of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN deserve particular thanks for their faith in the project and advice to the authors.

Alexandra Novosseloff and Richard Gowan

Alexandra Novosseloff is a Research Associate at the Centre Thucydide (Research on International Relations) at the University of Paris 2.

Richard Gowan is Associate Director at the Center on International Cooperation in New York.

This article is in part based on a series of interviews with UN, EU, French and US officials.
The Security Council, Chad and the Central African Republic, 2006-10

Introduction

This paper is the second in the Center on International Cooperation’s series of studies on the relationship between Security Council working methods and the performance of peace operations. The first paper in this series reviewed the case of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) from 2000 to 2008. This sequel focuses on a mission that was launched just as UNMEE was finally winding down: the UN Mission to Chad and the Central African Republic (known by its French acronym, MINURCAT). We have chosen this mission because it generated an unusual range of problems for the Council.

Context

For much of the last decade, both Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) have been affected by internal instability and disorder in the neighboring Sudanese region of Darfur. The number of Darfuri refugees in Chad was estimated to be over 250,000. While a huge amount of international attention was focused on Darfur after its descent into civil war, the situation in Chad was treated as (at best) a secondary concern by many observers. CAR has received even less external attention, although there have been a series of small UN peace operations and political missions deployed in the country since the late 1990s.

As this paper shows, the Security Council began to focus on Chad and CAR in greater detail in 2006 when raids by rebel groups from Sudan exacerbated the instability in both countries. The Council’s priority remained Darfur, which had been patrolled by troops from the African Union (AU) since 2003. The AU Mission in Sudan was proving increasingly unequal to the challenges it faced, and by mid-2006 Western members of the Council (most notably the United Kingdom and United States) were pressing hard for a UN mission to take over. Although a resolution mandating a UN force was passed in August 2006, it proved impossible to implement because of objections from Sudan. In late 2006 and much of 2007, the Council worked on an alternative: the creation of a hybrid UN-AU force, which Sudan eventually accepted. This process, monitored closely by the global media and non-governmental organizations, provided the context for Security Council diplomacy over Chad and CAR.

What follows is, therefore, the story of a sideshow. Only one member of the Council – France – persistently made the case for treating Chad and CAR as parts of the regional dimension of the Darfur conflict. As we will see repeatedly, the two countries were often only mentioned in passing in UN debates on Sudan. Nonetheless, from mid-2006 onwards there was general acceptance that some sort of UN presence in Chad and CAR should be launched as part of the response to Darfur. This idea was also promoted by humanitarian officials concerned by insecurity in refugee and IDP camps in eastern Chad.

The paper that follows breaks down the story of this sideshow into three parts. The first covers discussions of creating a UN mission in Chad and CAR as part of a larger regional response to the Darfur conflict in 2006 and the first months of 2007. Security Council Resolution 1706, which gave the initial mandate for a UN mission in Darfur, included provisions for a “multidimensional presence” in Chad and CAR. But Sudan’s objections to the resolution and the Chadian government’s own efforts to control the shape and goals of any UN mission on its territory severely obstructed this initiative.

The second phase of the story begins in May 2007, when the French government tried to break this impasse by proposing that the European Union (EU) should deploy an initial military mission to provide the framework and security umbrella for a UN police and civilian mission. The paper shows how this proposal required significant negotiations not only with Chad (CAR was always more amenable) but between the UN and EU, at both the political and operational level. Nonetheless, in September 2007 the Security Council mandated both MINURCAT and the accompanying EU Mission (EUFOR Tchad/RCA). Due to many operational setbacks the two missions that were meant to operate together were deployed in a sequence between early 2008 and May 2009.
The third part of this story begins with the departure of EUFOR. While MINURCAT was mandated to deploy troops to replace the European force (and some EU members put their personnel under UN command to ease the transition), the Chadian authorities were consistently negative towards the UN mission and eventually withdrew their consent altogether. MINURCAT never reached full strength and closed down at the end of 2010.

The Security Council and its working methods

Both MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA have already been the subject of detailed operational studies, while Chad and CAR have also been touched on in studies of Darfur. This paper does not attempt to replicate these previous studies. Instead, its focus is the role that the Security Council played in shaping, supervising and winding up the mission and – more specifically – how Security Council working methods affected this process.

In our previous study of UNMEE, we noted that many experts on peacekeeping see little connection between the technicalities of the Council’s working methods and the effectiveness of peace operations. Nonetheless, in that case we were able to show that – while not decisive to UNMEE's fate – the Council’s working methods did affect the mission's composition and ability to function effectively. Examples of this included:

- **Open Security Council debates on UNMEE** helped incentivize European troop contributors to deploy troops early in the mission, facilitating a rapid entry.²

- The chairman of the Security Council’s **Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations** played a useful role in protecting the mission from political pressures.³

- **The Council’s cooperation with the inter-governmental Friends of UNMEE** (a group led by the Netherlands and Norway) also created an important mechanism for supporting UNMEE during periods of tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁴

These examples and others suggest that, if members of the Council utilize its working methods effectively, they may be able to enhance the effectiveness of a mission. Most obviously, the Council’s working methods can be used to create political leverage that complements the operational efforts of peacekeepers on the ground. This was of particular importance in the case of UNMEE, a relatively small mission (with no more than 3,500 troops at any time) with a limited Chapter VI mandate to monitor border areas. UNMEE needed all the political help it could get from New York. The way that the Council utilized its working methods affected the quality of political support it could offer at different times to UNMEE.

We have turned to MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA because these two missions (even when operating simultaneously in 2008-9) faced a number of similar problems. They were relatively small operations, at least in comparison to the very large AU-UN hybrid force that deployed to Darfur, and they also had a limited operational mandate, which centered on creating security around refugee and IDP camps in Chad. From 2006 onwards, UN officials had argued that this should be tied to a mandate to assist political dialogue between the various Chadian factions, but Chad's government refused to accept this, viewing an international presence as a threat to its very existence. From the very first phase of planning, the Security Council played a complex political role vis-à-vis Chad's government as it attempted to sustain its consent for MINURCAT.

Within the Council, France typically set the agenda on Chad, its former colony. In 2007 and 2008 in particular, getting a mission to Chad became a French priority.⁵ But Paris did not have complete freedom of maneuver. It faced three dilemmas. The first was Chad's skeptical attitude towards any international deployment on its territory. The second was that many members of the Security Council were also unconvinced that a mission was worthwhile, especially if it had to operate on the terms set by Chad. The third dilemma was that, when France turned to the EU for military support, a significant number of European governments were also distinctly unenthusiastic.
France thus had to both sustain Chadian support for a mission and satisfy its counterparts at the UN and in the EU. At times, when Chad’s demands became particularly pressing, this balancing act was nearly impossible. Questions were raised over how the Security Council should address events in Chad and CAR: should it debate events in public or attempt to smooth over problems through informal discussions? The fact that it was necessary to link discussions in the Security Council and EU Council created further diplomatic headaches. At times in the process, coordination with the African Union also proved to be a challenge.

In this context, the paper sets out to ask three main questions about the ways in which the Security Council’s working methods affected MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA:

- How far did the Council’s working methods assist or impede its efforts to maintain the consent of Chad for both missions, especially in periods in which Council members had different perceptions and priorities to satisfy?
- Did the Council’s working methods complicate or facilitate cooperation with the EU, and to a lesser extent with the AU, in devising and running MINURCAT and EUFOR?
- Given the complexity of the Council’s relations with Chad, CAR and its partner organizations, did its working methods create a sufficient degree of transparency around the processes involved, and did this affect other governments’ views?

MINURCAT’s deployment overlapped with a series of debates about the Council’s mechanisms for coordination with the African Union. One diplomat from a Council member noted that he always saw the Chadian problem and the generic issue of relations with the AU as inter-related. It also coincided with discussions of how to make Council decision-making on peace operations more transparent to troop contributing countries. There are thus especially good reasons to address the story of MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, as it is directly pertinent to more general debates on working methods as well as lessons learned on shaping peacekeeping operations.

Before going further, however, it is also worth highlighting the limits of what a study of working methods can tell us. As we noted in our previous study of UNMEE, contextual factors are always likely to shape peace operations’ performance more fundamentally than working methods. The narrative that follows certainly affirms this point. One of the most influential actors in shaping Chad’s relations with Sudan was, for example, Libya. The government in Tripoli often appeared to be motivated by a desire to exclude the UN from events in Chad to the greatest extent possible. The Council’s working methods were unlikely to have much influence in periods in which it was cut off from events. The situation was also shaped by changes in the relationship between Chad and Sudan.

Nonetheless, the paper that follows again suggests that the Council’s working methods did affect the performance of MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA – and that the Council could have utilized its working methods better on a number of occasions.

**The shape of the paper**

As noted above, this paper is divided into three parts, reflecting the three main phases of the Security Council’s engagement with Chad and CAR during the Darfur crisis (this paper does not cover the Council’s longer history of engagement with CAR). These are:

- The ‘pre-deployment’ phase of planning for a UN mission from April 2006 to April 2007;
- The deployment of the ‘multidimensional phase’ from the first discussions of a joint EU-UN mission in May 2007 to EUFOR’s closure in March 2009;
- The ‘withdrawal’ phase from March 2009 to December 2010.
Each phase is covered in one chapter, and each chapter is divided into two parts. The first part provides a narrative of the Council’s behavior in the period, while the second provides a brief evaluation of the way Council working methods affected events. The paper concludes with an overall evaluation of the role of working methods in this story.

2. The Pre-Deployment Phase: 2006-2007

2.i Background and initial Council engagement

The conflict in Darfur worsened in 2005-2006, and increasingly affected the bordering states Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Relations between Chad and Sudan were strained. Sudan sought to influence Chadian internal affairs beginning in the 1960s; Chadian authorities consistently argued that the Sudanese regime funded rebel groups. This discord between the two governments worsened in December 2005 when Chad declared a state of war with Sudan, after a rebel attack on Adré. The governments of Chad and Sudan signed the Tripoli Agreement in February 2006, under the Libyan regime’s auspices. This formed the framework for the resolution of the border conflict between the two countries, each of which had argued that the other sought to back rebel groups to overthrow its government. This was one in a series of non-aggression agreements between the two governments. Though Libya took a lead role in mediation between Chad and Sudan, it did not have the influence to ensure agreements between the two countries were carried out, and mistrust between the two governments persisted.

In contrast, relations between the governments of Chad and CAR were less difficult, as the two governments had common interests – particularly concern about the violence spilling over from Sudan and the attitude of the Sudanese regime. Chad aided the weak CAR government, and even maintained a military presence in northern CAR. But it was forced to move its military contingent at the end of 2005 in the context of the increasing threat posed by rebel groups to N’Djamena, and ongoing turmoil in Sudan. Meanwhile, the UN maintained a political mission in CAR, the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which had replaced an earlier peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). Although charged with security sector reform activities, BONUCA’s ability to affect the political and security dynamics of CAR appeared distinctly limited.

The regional unrest triggered greater international attention to the situation in Chad. In March 2006, the UNHCR alerted the “international community” to the growing need to protect refugee camps. Then in April, on the eve of presidential elections, Chadian rebels based in Darfur launched raids across the border and there was an attempted coup in the capital. On 18 April Secretary-General Kofi Annan briefed the Council on Sudan in a closed session and underlined the risk that the Darfur crisis could spill over into Chad and CAR. On the same day Salim A. Salim, the African Union’s envoy to Sudan, raised concerns about the regional dimension of the conflict in a public statement to the Council. On 21 April, Annan transmitted a letter from Chad’s foreign minister to the Council that declared that the “Khartoum regime persists in its determination to destabilize Chad.” A few days later the Council issued a presidential statement noting its “concern” about “persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect (...) the region including the security in Chad.”

It did not take long for the prospect of an international presence to gain traction, however. But the initial impetus did not come from within the Council. On 18 May, a letter from the Chadian Ministry for Land Administration to the UNHCR representative in Chad asked for the strengthening of Chadian forces present in the camps. It raised the alternative of a deployment of UN or EU forces between the camps and the Sudanese border. Chad and the UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the deployment of 235 Chadian gendarmes in the 12 refugee camps in the east of Chad. Then on 19 May, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, addressed the Security Council in a public meeting and asked that it take action “urgently to prevent a scenario in which more and more civilians are attacked and displaced.”
In June, the UNHCR launched initial talks with the French authorities on how to secure the camps. The urgency of the situation was underlined by the murder of a number of humanitarian workers. The Security Council, meanwhile, increasingly saw the situation in Chad as part and parcel of the Darfur crisis. From 4-10 June, Council ambassadors visited Darfur and Chad (with a side-trip to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa) in part to lay the groundwork for an AU-UN transition in Darfur. The mission’s stated goals largely related to Darfur and Sudan, but included “evaluating the situation of the refugees from the Sudan and from the Central African Republic, as well as of the internally displaced persons in Chad.”

The Security Council mission was led by Emyr Jones Parry, the British Permanent Representative to the UN, but the Chad leg was co-led by his French counterpart Jean-Marc de la Sablière. The Council members squeezed in their visit to Chad at the end of their trip, going to both N’Djamena and Goz Beida, one of the main refugee camps in the east of the country. They managed an extended meeting with Chadian President Idriss Déby, who requested international protection for humanitarian workers. At a public briefing to the Council on 15 June, de la Sablière noted that it would be “appropriate for the Secretary-General to consider the question of international protection for the camps and to make recommendations to us.” On 17 June, President Déby officially requested the help of the UN to secure its border with Sudan. At a further public meeting on 29 June, de la Sablière went a little further, noting that it would be “good” if UN planners also addressed the border control issue.

Nonetheless, the Council’s public discussions (which did not involve a full-scale open debate on either occasion in June) were largely focused on Darfur. UN officials noted the Council’s interest in Chad, and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno talked about a strengthened liaison mechanism with Chadian authorities. But DPKO, already concerned by the scale of its future tasks in Sudan, was reluctant to take on an additional presence in Chad. UN officials indicated that the AU or EU could provide such a presence instead. France suggested the option of an AU Gendarme-type force (Force de gendarmerie Africaine). But such a force would have taken quite some time to deploy and President Déby was opposed to the involvement of the AU (where he was quite isolated), citing the difficulties plaguing AMIS.

After the Security Council mission to Sudan and Chad, the AU and UN conducted a joint mission to Darfur to prepare for a transfer from AMIS to a UN force. When Kofi Annan delivered his report summarizing the conclusion of the mission to the Council at the end of July, he again noted the regional dimension of the conflict. He proposed that the new UN mission in Darfur could monitor the border from the Sudanese side. He also suggested that a possible liaison “presence” from the existing UN mission in South Sudan (UNMIS) could be set up in Eastern Chad and CAR to monitor the situation in the refugee and IDP camps.

On the basis of Annan’s report, the United States and the United Kingdom prepared a draft resolution that first simply asked the Secretary-General “to report to the Council on the protection of civilians in IDP camps in Chad.” A second draft mentioned the possibility that the UN operation in Darfur could monitor crossborder activities. It also mentioned the possible establishment of a UN multidimensional presence in Chad and, if necessary, in CAR. A third draft included all these possibilities. The changes from the first draft reflected French pressure to include serious proposals for stabilizing Chad and CAR rather than treating them as secondary to the Darfur situation. This pressure had been applied in private: the Council held no meetings on either Sudan or its neighbors until 28 August, when it convened a closed meeting that featured an intervention by Jan Egeland on the humanitarian situation.

Three days later the Council met for a public meeting on Resolution 1706, which not only mandated a new UN force in Darfur but called for the “establishment of a multidimensional presence consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police liaison officers in key locations in Chad, including in internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and if necessary, in the Central African Republic,” as well “to monitor transborder activities of armed groups along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African Republic in particular through
regular ground and aerial reconnaissance activities.”

This meeting was tense: China, Russia and Qatar all abstained on the resolution. Chad was only mentioned twice in the whole debate (once by France and once by Qatar); CAR was mentioned once (by France). Although France had secured agreement for a regional approach to the Darfur crisis, debate continued to be dominated by the political obstacles to a new UN force in Sudan.

Ironically, the government of Sudan shifted attention back to Chad and CAR with its persistent refusal to cooperate on the implementation of Resolution 1706. Unable to get its personnel into Darfur, DPKO gave greater attention to the prospects of a “multidimensional presence” in Chad. The idea of deploying the UN mission outlined in Resolution 1706 to Chad first was discussed. On 30 October 2006 the Security Council held a closed meeting on CAR, with the country’s Prime Minister, Élie Doté, in attendance. DPKO briefed the Council and laid out two broad options: a UN liaison/monitoring mission or a multidimensional UN peacekeeping presence in eastern Chad and the northeast of CAR. On 18-22 November, DPKO led a Multidisciplinary Technical Assessment Mission to Chad and CAR to plan for operations along the Sudanese border. CAR had already given its agreement without any serious caveats, but Chad’s position was lukewarm. It wanted to limit the UN presence to a civilian and police force to secure the camps.

On 5 December the Council held informal consultations on the regional situation, but most Council members showed little interest in the security situation in Chad. They were still largely focused on the idea of a “hybrid” AU-UN mission in Darfur, which looked more politically palatable to Khartoum than a purely UN presence. On 15 December 2006 the Security Council issued a presidential statement of concern about the increase of activity among armed groups in eastern Chad. In the statement the Council reiterated that it looked forward to proposals from the Secretary-General for “improving security conditions on the Chad side of the border with the Sudan and the monitoring of trans-border activities between Chad, the Sudan and the [CAR]” (emphasis added).

The multidimensional presence in Chad and CAR had thus originally been envisaged as an offshoot of UN operations in Sudan, therefore, a clear distinction had begun to emerge between the two missions. A number of Security Council members reportedly preferred to keep decisions on Chad and the CAR separate from discussions on the shape of the hybrid Darfur operation. It was, perhaps, clear that predicking a mission on the consent of all three of the governments of CAR, Chad and Sudan was not viable.

The concept of a stand-alone UN mission in Chad and CAR was thus the product of three main factors. The first was the desire of the governments of both countries to see some sort of mission deployed (even if Chad’s desire was far from unconditional). The second was France’s interest in addressing these concerns as part of the overall response to the Darfur crisis, which many other governments treated in isolation. The third factor was Sudan’s refusal to support the deployment of UN forces as part of a regional framework – which pushed the Council and DPKO to treat Chad and CAR separately. As we have seen, the question of what could be done in these two countries was consistently treated as an add-on to debates about Darfur. There was only limited meaningful debate about how best to address Chad and CAR among Council members.

A fourth significant, though not decisive, factor was pressure from UNHCR and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland for some sort of international presence in eastern Chad. This created some public pressure on the Council to consider the option, and UNHCR acted as an interlocutor for Chad early in 2006. While humanitarian officials started from concerns about camp security, they contributed to the argument for a border-monitoring presence as well as a stronger security presence in and around the camps. By December 2006, however, it was still not clear that the UN (or any other organization) would deploy to Chad and CAR.

2.i The quest for a UN mission

On 22 December outgoing Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a report on the potential for a UN peacekeeping
operation in Chad and the CAR, pursuant to Resolution 1706. He described how “the situation in the border areas ... is now a serious threat to peace and security in the whole region. The devastating conflict in Darfur has clearly spilled over into Chad, and the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic appear to be increasingly interlinked.” However, the report revealed major concerns for the Secretariat raised by the recent assessment mission in Chad. It advised against any deployment until hostilities came to an end in Chad, a political dialogue was underway and all parties consented to a deployment. The report highlighted the lack of a robust political process and concluded that the necessary conditions for the deployment of a force “do not, therefore, seem to be in place.” This conclusion reflected a flaw in the Council's discussions to date: while the Council had accepted the case for a mission, it had given Chad's internal politics only limited thought.

Nonetheless, the report offered two deployment options: (i) a monitoring mission (with the mandate to observe the situation in the border areas), and (ii) a monitoring and protection mission (that would in addition contribute to security in the border region and protect civilians under imminent threat). It expressed a preference for the latter. While the Chadian government had prioritized policing and the Council border monitoring, the Secretary-General's report concluded that “under both options, the mission would need to include a political and civil affairs component.” Cautiously, the report advised that the Council send an advance information-gathering mission.

Symbolizing this caution, the Secretariat had argued that a monitoring mission would require 4,000 troops, while a monitoring and protection mandate would necessitate 10,000 or 11,000. The Council members suspected that these relatively high figures – tabled in parallel with plans for an expensive and sizeable mission in Darfur – had been devised by DPKO specifically to complicate the case for a mission in Chad and CAR. After the consultations, the Council issued a presidential statement (drafted by France) advising the Secretariat to submit revised recommendations by mid-February after another technical assessment mission to review the situation. It also requested the deployment of an “advance mission” at the earliest possible date to “accelerate preparations for an early decision on the possible deployment of a multidimensional UN presence.”

Having failed to persuade the Council to drop the mission idea, the Secretariat requested France's help in dealing with the Chadian authorities on the issue of consent for a UN mission. DPKO started the force generation for the advance mission, (Mission des Nations Unies au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine – MiNUTAC), which was intended to involve eighty military and police personnel. In parallel to the UN effort, a 12 February 2007 communiqué the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) encouraged political dialogue in Chad, and opted to send a mission to gauge the implementation of the February 2006 Tripoli Agreement. Libya played host to a Sudan-Chad-CAR summit on 22 February, but the political situation remained troubling.

The Secretary-General's revised report on Chad and the Central African Republic was put out on 23 February 2007. Still cautious in tone, it discussed the potential for deploying...
a peacekeeping force in eastern Chad on the basis of the two options for deployment in the earlier report. It reaffirmed the Secretariat’s preference for the second, larger deployment that called for 10,900 troops. The report proposed that the mission be mandated to ensure the security and protection of civilians, undertake good offices, carry out human rights work and train 800 Chadian police officers and gendarmes paid for by the UN. These personnel would provide security within the refugee camps. The training plan replicated UNHCR’s approach to camp security, rather than DPKO’s practices.

While the UN now had a better-developed plan, the Chadian authorities remained skeptical. The Secretary-General’s report noted that President Déby stressed that Chad had asked the Security Council in November 2006 to deploy a “civilian force” to the camps in eastern Chad, not a deployment of a military force. The President also underlined the concerns that the international community was considering the deployment of a force in Chad because Sudan had refused to accept the deployment of an operation in Darfur. He demanded additional details about the operation in writing. UN officials duly provided Chadian authorities with an aide-mémoire laying out its recommendations on the mandate, size and structure of the proposed multidimensional presence.

On 27 February, the Security Council held closed consultations on Chad. All P5 countries supported a multidimensional presence, as did Ghana and Peru. The Congo expressed concerns over the position of Chadian authorities while South Africa, Panama and Italy raised questions over the conditions of deploying the UN mission. Qatar was even more skeptical. In spite of these divisions, France started to prepare a resolution in close coordination with the African members of the Council. The French draft authorized the deployment of a Chapter VII UN Operation in CAR and Chad (ONURCAT – Opération des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad) in order “to protect civilians in the Chadian and Central African bordering regions with Sudan and to reduce tensions along the borders of these three countries.”

Echoing earlier debates, it emphasized the necessity of coordination between ONURCAT, BONUCA and UNMIS. In consultation with its African partners, France decided to circulate the elements to the other members of the Council. But both the Council and the Secretariat were waiting for an answer from the Chadian authorities to move forward. In closed Council consultations on 8 March, DPKO informed the member states that the Chadian Permanent Representative had asked for the deployment of MiNUTAC to be deferred. After this setback, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad, Ahmad Allam-Mi, was invited to further informal Council consultations on 23 March. He argued that the security situation was under domestic military control and questioned the relevance of the deployment of a military component of the UN mission, reiterating that the Chadian request was for the deployment of a “civilian international presence” in the East. The Chadians opposed the deployment of MiNUTAC. Chad made a “counter-proposal”: the deployment of 2,500 military police to ensure the security in the refugee camps. However, the Chadian Foreign Minister indicated that Chad was open to negotiations on the mission’s size and makeup, as long as the final result was closer to Chad’s starting position than DPKO’s proposals.

Chad’s reluctance temporarily froze the efforts to deploy a UN mission to the country. Déby’s position was now distinctly stronger than in early 2006. Talks with Sudan were slowly resuming, and the countries signed a new deal in Saudi Arabia on 2 May that committed them to implement the Tripoli Agreement and assist the AU’s attempts to bring peace to Darfur. Libyan and Eritrean observers were now posted on the Chad/Sudan border. Inside Chad, the government had made progress in containing rebel groups, and while persistent insecurity continued in the east of the country, the situation in the camps had improved.

Yet the case for a peacekeeping operation remained valid. In early April, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes (Jan Egeland’s successor) returned from the region and highlighted the instability in northeastern CAR. He emphasized that camps in Chad were still worse than those in Darfur. France continued to press President Déby to accept a UN mission, but there was no real progress until May.

Although Chad and CAR gained increasing attention from the Security Council through 2006, they were still relatively peripheral to the main debate about Darfur. If France had not insisted that Chad be included in any regional response to Darfur, other Council members would probably have given it relatively little attention. Chad wanted a mission but insisted that it should have a limited mandate without a political dimension. This was a source of debate among Council members and in the Secretariat.

A missing friends group?

The Council’s engagement with Chad and CAR in 2006-2007 thus raises important questions about how effectively it is able to respond to regional crises of this type. While conflict analysts have underlined the significance of “regional conflict formations” stretching across borders, the Council often struggles to address all aspects of these situations. In this case, the problems inherent in deploying a UN force to Darfur often overwhelmed discussions of the situation in Chad. In late 2006 there was a new drive to deploy in Chad primarily because of Sudan’s obstructionism over Darfur – but this in turn alienated the Chadian government, which objected to being treated as a “sub-set” of Darfur.

The Council’s ability to improve its response to regional conflict formations is primarily a question of political and strategic prioritization rather than working methods. However, it is arguable that in the case of Chad and CAR, the Council might have been able to mount a more effective early response had a friends group formed to address issues affecting Darfur’s neighbors.

In the case of UNMEE, we noted that the “Friends of UNMEE” played an important role in sustaining political attention to the mission even when Ethiopia and Eritrea were a relatively low priority for most Council members.

In the case of Chad and CAR, we have seen that the Friends of Darfur briefly played a role in persuading Chad to accept a mission – in the next section, we will note that Libya formed a regional contact group to address renewed tensions between Chad and Sudan. France and other members of the Council could have helped the Council by forming a friends group earlier in the crisis.

As it was, the Council responded to events in Chad in an ad hoc fashion, and under the pressure of one Member State that knew the country particularly well. In so doing it raised a series of questions about the utility of the Council’s working methods.

The Council mission to Chad and the absence of open debates

It is striking that the Security Council ambassadors’ visit to Chad and Darfur helped put the Chadian situation on the map and (with French pressure) opened the way to an eventual peace operation there. The pressure from the “humanitarian community” was also key in that regard. Had the ambassadors not visited Chad – and President Déby not made his request for UN assistance to them in person – it might have been harder for France to sustain the argument that events there were part of a regional crisis.

The importance of the Council mission should not be overestimated, however: it did not persuade any countries other than France to champion a mission. As we have noted, the initial UK-US draft resolution on Darfur did not contain any suggestion of a UN presence in Chad. This was only inserted later at France’s insistence. Indeed, it may have actually strengthened the view of many Council members that Chad was a “French issue.”

In this context, it is also striking that, while the French permanent representative briefed the Council in public on Chad, there was almost no open debate on the country in 2006. In open debates on Darfur, Chad and CAR were only referred to in passing, if at all. This arguably reduced the
level of attention to both countries, as Security Council members did not have to analyze or justify positions for or against intervention publicly.

**A phased but flawed mandating process**

By default, the Security Council discussed the potential of a presence in Chad and CAR in a phased process. Since the Brahimi report in 2000, UN officials have argued that the Council should take a phased approach to mandating new missions to ensure that there are sufficient personnel and resources available to sustain new deployments. Although the Council has resisted making this normal practice, there are a number of cases in which it has taken a de facto phased approach – we noted that in the case of UNMEE, it provided an initial mandate for a planning presence to prepare for the larger mission.38

In the case of Chad and CAR, the initial mandate for a multidimensional presence in Chad as part of Resolution 1706 acted as the basis for phased discussions of what that present should look like. In this case, however, the process was distorted by factors including Sudan’s opposition to Resolution 1706, DPKO’s evident doubts about a mission in Chad and Chad’s own concerns and change of policy.39 These factors combined to ensure that the mandating process gradually turned into a “race to the bottom,” as France and the other Council members lowered their ambitions as they attempted to secure Chadian consent.

This process was exacerbated by the Chadian foreign minister’s own appearance at the Council, which he used as an opportunity to set new parameters for an acceptable mission. While this was a necessary step towards legitimizing the mission – and stimulated the African members of the Council to try to persuade Chad to cooperate with the Council – it also pushed the Council away from focusing on operational effectiveness. Instead, the priority became adapting the proposed mission to meet Chad’s preferences.

The Chadian government was unusually but not uniquely forthright in demanding to shape the mission on its territory (Sudan proved equally demanding over UNAMID). In this context, more open debates might have improved this process, as it would have required Chad to make its case for a limited deployment under greater public scrutiny.

**Relations with the AU and UNHCR**

While the African Union was closely engaged with the UN over Darfur in this period, this cooperation did not extend to deep collaboration over Chad. The AU’s own priority was to make progress in Sudan, especially so as to relieve the pressure on AMIS. While it did acknowledge the crisis in Chad, and offer to help resolve it, its role was limited. This was in spite of the fact that members of the Council, especially France, were lobbying for an AU police mission in Chad in 2006. However, Chad itself was opposed to any greater African Union involvement.

By contrast, it is worth noting that UNHCR and OCHA (through the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarians Affairs) did have some influence over Council decision-making. In contact with the Chadian authorities, UNHCR pressed for an international intervention in Chad that DPKO was actively opposed to, and its program of supporting Chadian security personnel in the refugee camps created part of the template for the Secretary-General’s proposals for a new mission in Chad. When asked for planning such intervention, DPKO took a broader view of the political and regional context than OCHA. Although this is not primarily a matter of working methods, it raises the question of how the Council interacts with (and prioritizes the views of) different parts of the UN system, which will often differ over peacekeeping.

In this first phase, UN-EU relations were not a significant concern. This, however, would change dramatically in the summer of 2007 thanks to a new initiative from Paris.

3.i France turns to the European Union

In May 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner gave new impetus to French diplomacy towards Darfur and Chad. Faced with the persistent refusal of President Déby to accept any deployment of the UN on the border with Sudan, French officials concluded that it was necessary to focus on the humanitarian dimensions of the problem (the United Kingdom and United States supported this approach.). The French decided that the EU should play a major role to facilitate a UN deployment and overcome DPKO's initial reluctance to take on another operation in parallel with its difficult deployment in Darfur. They therefore engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" aimed at convincing the UN, the EU and their Member States of the need for such an operation.

Due to its "special links" with Chad (a military presence ‘Operation Epervier’, since 1986), France was inevitably a leader on that issue, but Paris was sensitive to the potential complications of acting alone in its former colony. France thus took the initiative in the European Council to ask for EU planning for an operation in Chad to secure refugee and IDP camps and to facilitate a UN deployment. It set three conditions for any EU mission: a clear time-limit (a mandate of 3 to 6 months); geographical focus (meaning the EU would deal with insecure zones around the most important camps); and a guaranteed transfer to a UN mission at the end of the operational timeframe. This proposal launched a new round of negotiations between France, the EU and the UN over how to deploy a joint mission.

On 8 June, the EU Council Secretariat circulated a first paper of “the possible actions of the EU in Darfur and neighboring countries.” The next day, Foreign Minister Kouchner arrived in Chad and secured Chad’s acceptance of an EU mission in principle. After this decision, France continued discussions on the format of the mission with the Chadian authorities through a working group led by the special adviser of the French Foreign Affairs Minister and President Déby’s diplomatic adviser. A French non-paper on “an international presence in Chad and CAR” became the basis for more detailed operational discussions.

DPKO set out a series of clear conditions for its part in the mission. It wanted a military presence wherever the UN police would be deployed, and argued that the EU forces should operate for a full year rather than 3-6 months. It also insisted that the UN presence should have some sort of political mandate. More technically, DPKO still planned to train and pay for Chadian police officers but insisted that they should not wear blue berets to avoid any confusion with the international officers.

On 26 June, the international contact group on Darfur (a group of 17 countries including all P5 members) met in Paris. The UK and US led talks on Darfur, while France led those on Chad. A French spokesman noted that as "an agreement of the Chadian authorities is emerging in favor of international intervention, we are continuing to work with Chad, the UN and the EU on the preparation of an operation to secure the areas of Chad most affected by the Darfur crisis.” The contact group also endorsed CAR’s calls for assistance. On 28 June, Idriss Déby agreed on the UN concept of operations.

3.ii EU-UN coordination in the planning phase

Although France had secured Chad’s consent for an EU mission, there were doubts within the EU itself about the proposal. Some European governments were concerned about the operational challenges – especially ensuring that the mission had a clear end-date – but some also questioned whether the EU should prioritize Africa. The EU Council’s Political and Security Committee approved the mission in principle on 18 June, but members were not expected to pledge forces before reviewing a concept of operations.

On 5 July, DPKO and OCHA held consultations with EU member states at the EU Liaison Office in New York. DPKO underlined that it was keen to have a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Chad in order to clarify all parties’ responsibilities. It underlined the need for regular meetings with the EU on finalizing the mandate and division of labor for the joint operation. France circulated a new non-paper on the situation in Chad and CAR and the proposed mission to other EU members, hoping to identify troop contributors.
Nonetheless, intra-European discussions remained difficult. While the EU states on the Security Council (Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom) supported France’s initiative, most other members of the European Union remained cautious. Their concerns included not only the EU’s exit strategy, and the need for a comprehensive approach, but also the potential effects of developments in Darfur on any mission in Chad and the question of how many troops France itself would contribute. The fact that most EU member states had very little knowledge of Chad and CAR contributed to this general lack of support for the project. The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) met on 10 July and there were discussions of deploying as early as October 2007. It was agreed that proposals for the force should be put before ministers at a meeting on 23 July. But Germany and Sweden blocked the preparation of a “crisis management concept,” the next stage in the EU planning process.

The technicalities of coordinating between New York and Brussels were also problematic. On 13 July, Under Secretary-General Guéhenno briefed the Security Council on potential peacekeeping operations in Chad and CAR, noting that he was in discussions with the EU in Brussels. On 17 July, he went to Brussels to brief the PSC in an effort to address some of the EU members’ concerns. To reinforce EU-UN cooperation, the secretariats of the two organizations launched weekly video conferences.

In New York, the main focus remained on the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur. The United Kingdom was in the lead in preparing the mandate for the force, working closely with the United States, France and the African members of the Council. US officials were supportive of the EU operation in principle but expressed concern about the possibility that the Chad deployment would be much faster than that to Darfur, and argued that the two should be simultaneous. DPKO’s Police Division sent a new technical assessment mission to Chad on 21 July to clarify the role of the police component of the proposed mission. As before, the main goal was the creation of a Chadian Police Service for Humanitarian Protection (Service de police tchadien de protection humanitaire) of 800 to 1,000 police officers to help secure the camps. This process was expected to require 200 to 300 international police trainers. DPKO was also planning to send 7 formed police units (around 1,000 personnel) to assist the Chadian Police Service in case of severe troubles.

The EU’s planning process gained momentum on 23 July, when foreign ministers met in Brussels and agreed to request a crisis management concept for the mission. An agreement was also reached to send a joint EU-UN assessment mission to Chad in late July with General David Leakey, head of the EU Military Staff, in the lead. With the EU and UN secretariats working increasingly closely, it was time to take the issue back to the Security Council.

3.iii The plan comes together

On 10 August Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued an updated set of recommendations on peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR on 10 August laying out proposals for a joint EU-UN mission. On 21 August, the Security Council held informal consultations on the Secretary-General’s August report, and the majority of the Council members supported his plans. The Congo and Qatar underlined that the UN and the EU should be in contact with the AU and sub-regional organizations. Many member states stressed the need for an internal political process to stabilize Chad. The senior UN official present, Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi, explained that President Déby was opposed. The Council adopted a presidential statement on 27 August indicating its readiness to mandate a mission, taking into account the views of the CAR and Chad. France began drafting a resolution mandating the joint mission, which was first distributed to the other members of the P3, and then to the other Europeans and the Africans of the Council, as well as DPKO.

At the end of August, General Leakey led another joint EU-UN assessment mission to Chad. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon then visited Chad in early September. On 7 September, the Chadian government signed a joint communiqué indicating its intention to deepen internal political dialogue, work with Sudan to normalize regional relations, and facilitate the rapid deployment of an
international presence in Eastern Chad and CAR. Chad reconfirmed its consent for UN and EU peacekeeping deployments in an 11 September letter to the Security Council. (The CAR government did the same in a letter dated 18 September.)

Also on 11 September, the EU reached agreement on a crisis management concept for Chad. The EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and Ban Ki-moon exchanged letters confirming the basic outline of the mission. The EU expressed its willingness to move forward with operations in a 13 September letter requesting formal Security Council authorization of the EU force including a legal basis for the mission. But talks in the Council proved complicated.

Some of these complications concerned how the training of Chadian police should be financed. The United States objected to this program being funded on assessed contributions as it would create a potentially costly precedent for other missions. DPKO was also concerned about the timelines for the EU and UN deployments – it wanted to ensure that the EU Force reached its “initial operating capability” before deploying civilian UN personnel. During the negotiations, the European members of the Council paid special attention to the wording on the deployment of the EU operation, the Americans continued to concentrate on funding. By contrast, Qatar, China, Indonesia and Russia focused on ensuring that the UN mandate contained language indicating the consent of the host country to the deployment of the two operations. The African members of the Council, having previously been consulted on the draft mandate, did not raise many substantial concerns.

A compromise was found to meet the Americans’ financial concerns: the training and equipping of the Chadian police would be supported through a Trust Fund, which the European Commission made a significant contribution to. On 25 September 2007, during the ministerial week of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1778 establishing MINURCAT and mandating a complementary EU force. The aim was to “help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favorable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas.” The EU operation was initially conceived as a military element “to establish a safe and secure environment” of the broader “multidimensional presence” constituted by MINURCAT.

### 3.iv The operations: hitting the ground stumbling

The deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR suffered from the troubled security situation from attacks by rebels on N’Djamena from the very beginning of the operation in January 2008. MINURCAT also faced continued reluctance on the part of the Chadian government to welcome the presence of the UN, in part because the UN had claimed the necessity of establishing a component watching over the political process in the country. That situation prevented the civilian/police component of MINURCAT from deploying at the same time as the military deployment of EUFOR. The idea of deploying EUFOR in the last quarter of 2007 fell victim to a shortage of offers of essential helicopters. There was even some talk of cancelling the mission altogether due to the helicopter gap, which was eventually plugged by an offer of aircraft from Russia. Nonetheless, the slow progress in deploying reflected a lingering mistrust of the mission in the EU.

Highlighting this mistrust, some EU members made a point of insisting that EUFOR must be impartial rather than a pro-Chadian force. Those making this argument included Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, and Poland – all states with UN experience. A number of EU members also took a cautious approach because of their lack of direct interest in Chad, such as Finland and Sweden. By contrast Germany and the UK were more concerned by the common costs associated with the mission. Nonetheless France eventually provided 57% of the EUFOR personnel, or roughly 2,000 troops of the overall force of 3,500 assigned to the mission.
MINURCAT got personnel on the ground ahead of EUFOR, although its deployment soon slowed down drastically. On 17 December 2007, the Secretary-General issued his first three-month report on MINURCAT. It was discussed by the Council on 3 January during informal consultations. By this time, 110 persons had been deployed. Training of a first pool of 220 Chadian police officers was scheduled to begin in mid-January. A new technical assessment mission (TAM) was sent thereafter. On 28 January the Secretary-General appointed Victor Angelo as his Special Representative in Chad, the head of MINURCAT.

On the night of 30 January, the crisis in Chad escalated yet again, with rebel attacks on N’Djamena. The EU Operations Commander took the decision to defer the deployment of EUFOR and then suspended EUFOR provisionally, but EU member states still expressed their support for the operation, and reiterated their belief in its necessity. Meanwhile DPKO started the evacuation of MINURCAT personnel. Under Secretary-General John Holmes voiced his concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Chad, and the increasing number of displaced persons.

The African Union issued a statement reiterating that “no authority that comes to power by force will be recognized by the AU,” and authorizing Libya and the Republic of Congo to take on a mediation role. Chad sent three verbal notices to the Council between 30 and 31 January on the crisis. France, with the African members of the Security Council, requested urgent Council consultations on 3 February, and a Secretariat briefing on the situation in Chad – done by Dmitry Titov, the DPKO Africa Director. France put forward a draft presidential statement on international military aid for Chad’s besieged government. Council members including Russia and Vietnam expressed concern about the draft statement absent a formal request by Chad for military aid and on the wording “all necessary means” in support to Chad.

In the course of the meeting, Chad sent a letter to the president of the Security Council requesting assistance. France amended its original text, to get a consensus on requesting Member States “to provide support as requested by the Government of Chad.” But the Russian Federation indicated it could not approve the text, and was supported by South Africa, Vietnam, Indonesia, and China. Contacts between capitals, however, allowed the adoption of a presidential statement on 4 February that condemned the attacks and urged member states to “provide support, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, as requested by the Government of Chad.”

The Security Council issued a 4 February 2008 presidential statement that voiced support for the 2 February AU denunciation of the attacks, and embraced the AU decision to authorize Libya and Congo to begin mediation efforts. The statement also pushed the region’s states to respect one another’s borders, in keeping with previous agreements. The presidential statement also appeared to legitimize possible French military support to Chadian forces. In the end, President Déby did not formally request any help from the French government. The situation in Chad was also discussed in informal consultations with the Secretary-General on 5 February.

The breakdown of relations between Chad and Sudan, and the related destabilizing violence, pushed the AU to take on a greater role as mediator in the regional conflict. While hostilities seemed to have diminished by early February, and Sudan appeared to be working with mediators from Libya and Congo, Chadian-Sudanese tensions remained. Mandated by the AU, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade negotiated an agreement between Chad and Sudan in March 2008 that outlined steps to normalize relations. The Dakar Agreement reiterated the two states’ commitments to their previous agreements on border issues.

The Dakar Agreement also took the step of establishing a Contact Group to oversee the agreement’s execution. Libya and the Republic of Congo took lead roles in the Group, which also included among others Senegal, Gabon, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, MINURCAT and the AU. The agreement additionally designated France, the United States and the United Kingdom as part of the “group of friends of the Dakar Agreements” giving them the right to participate in the Contact Group’s meetings. The Contact Group...
was also mandated to establish a border monitoring force between Chad and Sudan.67

After a short interruption from 29 January to 12 February, the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR resumed. The ongoing instability of the humanitarian situation obligated member states to deploy as fast as possible. The Chadian authorities continued their efforts to negotiate a special status for the Humanitarian Chadian Police for Protection. On 13 February, the Security Council held informal consultations on the conflict in an effort to address outstanding issues. Edmond Mulet discussed the progress of the MINURCAT deployment and confirmed that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) would arrive at the end of February. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Chad, Ahmad Allam-Mi, addressed the Council on 26 February in an informal meeting, and presented an “aide-mémoire” on the regional dimension of the crisis in Chad, reiterating that the Chadian government had been the victim of aggression from the regime in Khartoum.

3.v The EU and UN in action

The Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) of EUFOR was declared on 15 March, even if the required assets and personnel were barely sufficient to begin to fulfill the mission.68 This established a timeline, with the start of the UN-EU assessment occurring at the six-month mark and the EU-UN handover after a year. At this point, EUFOR had deployed around 1,700 military personnel. A Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA) was signed between MINURCAT and the Chadian authorities on 21 March. A compromise was also found on the Chadian Police for Humanitarian Protection (PTPH) becoming a “Département intégré de sécurité” (DIS), and 11 of 50 liaison officers were deployed between the two organizations.

The Council held informal consultations on CAR and Chad on 9 April, which included a progress report by Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet on the deployment of MINURCAT.69 In a subsequent press statement, Council members voiced their concern over the ongoing unrest in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR.70 The unrest, logistical difficulties and delays in the construction of infrastructure in eastern Chad, held up MINURCAT from completing its deployment. EUFOR was similarly delayed. On the other side of the border, in Darfur, the Sudanese government slowed UNAMID’s deployment and one year after the adoption of Resolution 1769, only 9,500 soldiers had been deployed.

Following an attack by a Darfur rebel group on Khartoum on 10 May, the Sudanese government severed diplomatic ties with Chad, asserting that it had a role in the attacks. This forced MINURCAT to plan a possible evacuation of its personnel located in N’Djamena; in Abéché, only seven essential persons remained with EUFOR. On 13 May the Council issued a statement denouncing the attack, but counseled against retaliation.71 In June, rebel attacks against the Chadian government prompted it to assert that Sudan was complicit in the attacks, which underlined the need for a regional strategy.72 On 16 June, after informal consultations, the Council put out a presidential statement, drafted by France, condemning the rebel attacks and calling upon the region’s countries to implement the Dakar Agreement.73

At the beginning of June, MINURCAT had completed the training of 71 Chadian police commanders, and commenced the training of 200 police and gendarme officers out of the 850 mandated to be deployed in the camps. The slow pace was in part due to Chad’s insistence on prioritizing material and financial support to the police force, which distracted from immediate training tasks.

On a special mission to Africa, the 15 ambassadors of the Council made a stop in Chad on 6 June, to take meetings with the Chadian authorities, to visit refugees and IDPs camps near Goz Beida and to meet with humanitarian workers. The French Permanent Representative, Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert led that section of the mission.74 However, President Déby chose not to meet the ambassadors, which they interpreted as a snub. The Security Council reaffirmed its support for EUFOR and MINURCAT and to the role of these operations in the protection of refugees and IDPs. The mission recommended that the Security Council “encourage the Secretary-General to deploy MINURCAT as quickly as possible.”
3.vi Thinking beyond EUFOR

A EU-UN midterm assessment mission visited the region between 18 and 26 June to assess security needs in the region and give recommendations on the shape of an international military presence after the expiration of the EUFOR mandate in March 2009. The terms of reference of the mission were developed jointly by both organizations. The potential for a security vacuum after the mandate expired was cause for concern. The Secretariat and the EU explored various peacekeeping options, taking into account the Chadian government’s ongoing refusal to sanction a border-monitoring mission, and its concerns about interference in Chad’s domestic affairs. The SRSG expressed a preference for a stronger political and rule of law mandate for the follow-on mission.

DPKO was reluctant to take over the EUFOR mission, even though the terms laid out in Resolution 1778 presented no alternatives. DPKO also favored a stronger political mandate; the Capstone Doctrine, which following the recommendations of the Brahimi report, was adopted a few months prior and clearly stated that a peacekeeping operation should be deployed in support of a political process. France expressed strong opposition to that outlook, as it knew it was a red line for the Chadians that would prevent any handover from EUFOR to MINURCAT. France also reiterated that a regional perspective on the unrest underpinned the creation of EUFOR and MINURCAT.

The Secretary-General’s 8 July report on MINURCAT warned: “EUFOR and MINURCAT are not in a position to directly address the problem of cross-border movement by armed groups. Furthermore, the mandates of MINURCAT and EUFOR limit the role of the two missions to addressing only the consequences and not the issues underlying the conflict in Chad. Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, and in the absence of a viable dialogue between the Government and all opposition groups, the resources invested by the international community in Chad risk being wasted.”

France circulated a draft resolution to its partners in the Council and to other European missions for their feedback. The French insisted on mentioning the exact date of the proposed handover, as its EU partners were unwilling to extend EUFOR’s mandate. The UN Secretariat was frustrated by the strict timeline for the EUFOR mission – and the firm end date in particular – and felt pressured by the lack of flexibility on the part of EU member states. The EU member states, it was thought, lacked understanding of UN constraints, while seeking a straightforward exit strategy for themselves.

3.vii The debate over MINURCAT’s future

On 19 September 2009, in a public meeting, the SRSG presented the Secretary-General’s July report. In the same meeting, the CAR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dieudonné Kombo Yaya, addressed the Council to request the maintenance of the UN mission in Birao, the major town in north-eastern CAR. Birao had been the center of fighting in 2006 and 2007, and remained a potential flash-point (there would indeed be new violence there in mid-2010). The Chadian Permanent Representative confirmed President Déby’s consent to the EU handover to MINURCAT, but also argued that Chadian concerns had not been sufficiently taken into account in the SG’s report. During the meeting, the United Kingdom declared itself opposed (mainly for financial reasons) to maintaining the UN segment in Birao.

France drafted a resolution for renewing the mandate of MINURCAT in late August. By early September however, DPKO had not decided on the force format it would prefer to succeed EUFOR. The SRSG expressed a preference for a police force (with FPUs) to address law and order issues. A rather cautious 12 September report by the Secretary-General recommended an expanded mandate for MINURCAT post-EUFOR, including a military force of 6,000 troops with, if possible, a reserve force “over-the-horizon.” The report stressed that for the military dimension of the mission to be successful it was necessary to tackle the underlying sources of insecurity in the region. It also advised that the “new” mission should have a good offices mandate. It recommended that the UN presence in CAR should be even more limited.

A new public meeting was organized on 24 September and the French, Burkinabese and Belgium Foreign
Ministers attended it as well as Javier Solana, who presented the midterm review of EUFOR. At the end of a 24 September meeting, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1834, which was co-sponsored by Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, the United States and Libya, extending the MINURCAT mandate until 15 March and indicating an intention to deploy a military dimension of the mission upon the expiration of the EUFOR mandate. At this stage, the UN remained nevertheless “uncommitted as to the demand for a follow-on-force.” The key outstanding issues in the handover between EUFOR and MINURCAT, including the rehatting of European troops, the volume of the military component of MINURCAT, questions about the logistics of the transfer and the issue of a reserve force over the horizon, remained unresolved. Mid-October, DPKO sent EUFOR contributing nations a request for rehatting a portion of their troops in MINURCAT for a period of up to one year. During this negotiation, Chad’s position remained uncertain. Indeed, Chad wrote to the president of the Council on 28 October expressing unhappiness with proposals to expand the UN military force and questioning its impartiality. Chad’s government was reported to prefer a military force half the size (3,000) of that proposed in the Secretary-General’s report in September and to double the personnel of DIS. Chad’s objections left the Secretariat reassessing its options.

The newly appointed head of DPKO Alain Le Roy visited Chad on 14-15 October and the military adviser of DPKO, General Obiakor, visited the country in mid-November. Yet opposition by the Chadian authorities persisted to the deployment of more than 3,500 UN blue helmets. This unresolved issue delayed the publication of the next planned Secretary-General’s report. On 11 November France organized a political-military meeting of the Security Council at the experts level to discuss MINURCAT’s volume of forces. Political-military meetings of this type were a relative novelty at this time, and participants from smaller countries on the Council reportedly found them very useful.

The Security Council met in a public meeting on CAR on 2 December and the SRSG, François Fall, and members of the Council including France, the United States, Belgium and Croatia declared themselves in favor of the maintenance of a segment of MINURCAT near Birao. On 4 December, the Secretary-General released its report on MINURCAT. It recommended the deployment of a military component of 4,900 soldiers in Eastern Chad and of as many as 500 soldiers in northern CAR. The number of trained police at this point was 418 out of the 850 planned. The Secretary General’s report expressed the requirements, in DPKO’s view, for a successful handover, which included: rehatting most of the European contingents, agreement with the Chadian government on the transfer of infrastructure from EUFOR to MINURCAT and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). By this measure, the full operational capacity of MINURCAT would however not be reached before October 2009.

On the basis of the Secretary General’s report, France drafted a new resolution for MINURCAT similar to that proposed by the Secretary-General. Britain continued to oppose a deployment in CAR of more than about 15 soldiers. This delayed negotiations in reaching a concept for a “new” MINURCAT. There were also continuing questions over MINURCAT’s role in addressing Chad’s internal political problems. On 12 December, the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica took the unusual step of intervening after a public briefing on the situation in Chad from the SRSG to argue that MINURCAT should have a role in reconciliation within the country. Normally Council members would have raised such issues in private consultations, but Costa Rica’s public maneuver created pressure on other Council members to take the issue seriously – and it was included in MINURCAT’s mandate.

France’s draft resolution was circulated to the Council membership on 15 December. However, the Chadian authorities expressed a preference for further discussion of the modalities of the handover. They took issue with the EU’s plan to hand over infrastructure in Chad to the UN, rather than to the Chadian government, and requested that the UN continue the process of infrastructure building in-country. The position of the Chadian government directly impacted DPKO’s planning: the issue was seen by DPKO as crucial, as it conditioned the timeline of the EU’s handover. Moreover, the Chadian government indicated...
to DPKO that it opposed the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT.

To address Chad's caveats, DPKO asked France to intervene as a mediator. Meanwhile, Chad's reluctance to sign on to the new mandate plan led DPKO to ask the Security Council to "endorse" the concept of operations it had proposed. On 9 January, the Security Council reached a written agreement on the deployment of the military component of MINURCAT. A compromise was also reached on the number of military personnel to be deployed to northern CAR. Resolution 1861 unanimously authorized the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT to replace EUFOR with 5,200 (4,900 in Chad and 300 in CAR) personnel on 14 January. MINURCAT's mandate was also renewed through 15 March 2010, with the possibility of renewal for another year thereafter.85 Resolution 1861 established benchmarks for MINURCAT's exit strategy upon expiration of its mandate in March 2011.86

A troop contributing countries meeting was organized on 9 February, five weeks before the transfer of authority. Six countries taking part in the EUFOR mission – France, Finland, Albania, Austria, Ireland, and the Russian Federation – had confirmed the rehatting of their troops. Although they accounted for 80% of EUFOR's strength, DPKO feared that a gap in both security and capabilities competencies had opened between EUFOR and MINURCAT. In the Security Council, informal consultations were held on 13 February, and Alain Le Roy briefed the Council on the preparation for the transfer of authority. These consultations were held at the request of DPKO in an effort to put pressure on the Chadian authorities, who had not yet signed the memorandum of understanding. An hour before the Council was set to meet, the Chadian government finally endorsed the MoU.

On 17 February, the SRSG briefed the EU Political and Security Committee on the deployment of MINURCAT and the training of DIS, and assured the EU ambassadors that there would be no security gap created as a result of the 15 March handover. This meeting also served as an opportunity for the EU member states choosing to rehat a portion of their troops under the UN flag to confirm their participation.

France's decision to push bilaterally and directly for an EU-UN mission in Chad and CAR significantly reduced the role of the Security Council in mid-2007. Indeed, it was arguably overshadowed by the EU Council, where European governments were able to question France's position more effectively than in New York. The Council took a more central role once the mission was deployed, in part because the relatively short life-span of EUFOR meant that follow-on arrangements had to be discussed from an early stage.

France's choice: effectiveness versus inclusivity?

France's direct contacts with Chad were essential for any deployment to take place. Had President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner not pursued bilateral diplomacy, it is unlikely that MINURCAT or EUFOR Tchad/RCA would ever have come into existence. French officials argued that this bilateral approach was also justified by the Council's previous level of agreement on the need for some sort of mission in Chad, and that Paris was enacting the Council's will.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the French approach created mistrust within both the Council and the EU. This mistrust was captured by those Security Council members who questioned the credibility of President Déby's consent to the mission in informal consultations. It was also underlined by those skeptical EU members who temporarily held up the development of a crisis management concept for EUFOR in mid-2007. In a way, France's work to convince its partners over the need for such operation was not well served by Chadian fundamental reluctance over that project.

It is arguable that the main problem resulting from this lack of confidence was the difficulty raising sufficient personnel for both MINURCAT and EUFOR. Although there were a number of contributory factors (not least the fact that many potential contributors were heavily committed to other operations) doubts about the goals

---

**Evaluation of working methods: 2007-2009**

France's decision to push bilaterally and directly for an EU-UN mission in Chad and CAR significantly reduced the role of the Security Council in mid-2007. Indeed, it was arguably overshadowed by the EU Council, where European governments were able to question France's position more effectively than in New York. The Council took a more central role once the mission was deployed, in part because the relatively short life-span of EUFOR meant that follow-on arrangements had to be discussed from an early stage.

France's choice: effectiveness versus inclusivity?

France's direct contacts with Chad were essential for any deployment to take place. Had President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner not pursued bilateral diplomacy, it is unlikely that MINURCAT or EUFOR Tchad/RCA would ever have come into existence. French officials argued that this bilateral approach was also justified by the Council's previous level of agreement on the need for some sort of mission in Chad, and that Paris was enacting the Council's will.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the French approach created mistrust within both the Council and the EU. This mistrust was captured by those Security Council members who questioned the credibility of President Déby's consent to the mission in informal consultations. It was also underlined by those skeptical EU members who temporarily held up the development of a crisis management concept for EUFOR in mid-2007. In a way, France's work to convince its partners over the need for such operation was not well served by Chadian fundamental reluctance over that project.

It is arguable that the main problem resulting from this lack of confidence was the difficulty raising sufficient personnel for both MINURCAT and EUFOR. Although there were a number of contributory factors (not least the fact that many potential contributors were heavily committed to other operations) doubts about the goals

---

**The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic**

---

continued on page 24
of the mission and reality of Chad’s consent to the deployment were certainly part of this problem.

This raises the question of whether – both in the Security Council and in Brussels – France could have done anything more to remove ambiguities about the emerging mission. France clearly became aware of the need for increased communications as the planning process evolved and mission got underway. The mandating of the mission during the ministerial week of the General Assembly was one good example. While it is arguable that greater transparency earlier in 2007 might have increased confidence in MINURCAT and EUFOR, it is open to question whether this would have been achieved through open Council meetings on force generation. In the case of UNMEE, open meetings of the Council highlighting the role of troop contributors were a useful incentive to those providing contingents. But in the case of Chad, there were real doubts about the mission that needed addressing, which many countries might have refused to raise in open meetings.

DPKO’s role in the EU-UN relationship

The EU’s entry raised immediate questions about how to structure EU-UN relations in this case. The two organizations launched a ‘bridging operation’ without agreeing on their general principles or detailed and binding terms of reference. The lynchpin of the relationship was clearly France as the primary force behind both UN and EU preparations. However, there was not a straightforward relationship between the Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee – the two entities never held a common session for a debate on the joint mission for example. Instead, much of the relationship was managed through secretariat-to-secretariat collaboration on practical issues. In this process, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno played a significant role in reassuring the EU Political and Security Committee about the mission. Prior to his first briefing to the Political and Security Committee on Chad, Guéhenno made a point of briefing the Security Council on his intentions. Nonetheless, it is arguable that the lack of a better-structured mechanism for political communications between the Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee created problems in the development of the mission. Security Council members consistently questioned the EU’s intentions while European states raised concerns about the UN’s readiness and willingness to take on security duties from EUFOR in 2009. In the run-up to EUFOR’s deployment, DPKO appeared at times to be trapped in a process of negotiations with France and the EU rather than following a lead from the Council.

It should be noted that DPKO’s close coordination with its partners in the EU did not guarantee smooth cooperation at the field level, though coordination was reasonably effective while EUFOR was operational. However, it frayed significantly during the transition from EUFOR in 2009, in part because of weaknesses in information-sharing (a problem noted in other cases of EU-UN cooperation, including Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Many of the technical details were at a level that the Security Council and EU Political and Security Committee could not have been expected to engage with, let alone resolve. However, it is worth noting that the Council cannot always devolve operational issues to DPKO (or other parts of the UN Secretariat) on the assumption that all will go smoothly.

Open discussions on MINURCAT’s evolution

As we have noted, however, events in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 shifted attention back to the Council. Whereas MINURCAT and EUFOR had emerged through confidential negotiations, CAR used public meetings of the Council to make the case that MINURCAT should retain a military presence on its territory after EUFOR’s departure. Members of the Council including France and the United States also used public meetings to make this case in later 2008, in spite of Britain’s misgivings. This was arguably a case in
which the use of open meetings had a significant effect on the shaping of a mission, as CAR’s public pleas made it harder to refuse its request for assistance.

This episode in EUFOR’s history has important ramifications for balancing the Council’s use of open and closed meetings. As noted above, open meetings are not always a suitable venue for discussions of sensitive operational aspects of missions. They can, however, provide a useful platform for countries to present the basic humanitarian and political arguments for sustaining missions, even when doing so is a controversial issue.

While Chadian officials also attended public meetings, Chad used other channels to communicate its concerns over the continuation of MINURCAT and lay down the conditions for its continuation. The caveats that Chad put in place on MINURCAT after EUFOR’s departure would slowly erode the mission’s ability to operate before Chad at last withdrew its consent completely.

The Security Council’s marginal role in Chadian politics

It is finally worth noting that, throughout the period immediately before and during EUFOR and MINURCAT’s co-deployment, the Security Council maintained only a peripheral role in Chadian politics and Chad-Sudan relations. The Dakar Agreements, forged outside the UN framework, consolidated this situation. The presence of MINURCAT in the contact group launched by Libya after Dakar – and of France, the United Kingdom and the United States as observers – only partially offset this disadvantage. Although DPKO officials persistently warned the Council of political problems in Chad, and Chad’s Foreign Minister raised them directly in consultations on one occasion, the Council largely focused on how to sustain MINURCAT as an operational entity, not Chad’s own politics. France actively promoted this approach in the face of DPKO’s doubts. Although beyond the issue of working methods, this clearly created doubts about the mission’s real utility.

continued from page 22

continued from page 22

contribution. Reflecting the Chadian authorities’ wish to have a Francophone African lead the military component of MINURCAT, Major General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji of Senegal (a former DPKO deputy military adviser) was appointed MINURCAT Force Commander at the end of February, ahead of the 15 March transfer of authority. On that date, the handover from EUFOR went smoothly, defying pessimists’ predictions.

4. The Withdrawal Phase: 2009-2010

4.i Post-transitional problems

In spite of the relatively smooth transition from EUFOR, MINURCAT did not get off to an easy start. Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet briefed the Security Council in a public meeting on 24 April on the Secretary-General’s 14 April MINURCAT report, and described how deficits in equipment had undermined MINURCAT’s ability to implement its mandate. The mission continued to face logistical challenges, and struggled to meet the force generation requirements outlined in its mandate. MINURCAT had deployed 2,400 soldiers; among those, 1,800 were rehatted from EUFOR. The fact that EUFOR handed the security of the camps directly over to the Chadian government rather than MINURCAT created difficulties, and was a weak point of departure for the UN in later negotiations with Chad. One month after the transfer of authority, MINURCAT had only half of its mandated military forces. Before the rainy season, the force totaled only 3,000 soldiers. MINURCAT, as EUFOR before it, was also short of promised helicopters. 850 DIS personnel were trained, and two-thirds of them were deployed in eastern Chad. Finally, as EUFOR had to handover most of its equipment and infrastructure (such as the airport aprons of Abéché and Ndjamena) to the host nation, that further delayed the deployment of the military component of MINURCAT and undermined its operational effectiveness.

Once again, the security situation had deteriorated, especially at the border between Chad and CAR and between Chad and Sudan. Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov urged the Council in an open meeting to
encourage potential troop contributing countries to supply MINURCAT with much-needed capacities. The mission remained stalled at half its authorized troop levels. Chadian and Sudanese representatives exchanged pointed words over the Chadian government’s ongoing skirmishes with rebels in eastern Chad. That meeting was followed by closed informal consultations, including discussion of a draft presidential statement presented by France. The next day, the Council agreed on a presidential statement that condemned military attacks in eastern Chad by “Chadian armed groups, coming from outside.” The statement was initially opposed by a number of delegations, including China and Libya, though the Russian Presidency of the Council facilitated a consensus.

On 13 July, a political-military meeting of the Security Council at the expert level was convened for a briefing by the Secretariat on the state of the MINURCAT deployment. The Office of Military Affairs presented the concept of operations and the rules of engagement for the mission. Delayed deployments of some battalions as a result of a lack of preparation, equipment deficiencies and deployment capabilities shortcomings continued to frustrate the mission’s progress towards its objectives. On 28 July, MINURCAT’s head Victor Angelo briefed the Security Council on the most recent Secretary General’s report. Issues under discussion included MINURCAT’s efforts to support security in eastern Chad and parts of CAR, the status of IDPs and the frayed relations between Chad and Sudan. Angelo also requested that member states furnish assistance to facilitate MINURCAT’s deployment, arguing that “if we are fully deployed, we will make a difference.”

A new Secretary-General’s report on MINURCAT was issued on 14 October, and Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet briefed the Council on 22 October 2009 in a public meeting. Both painted a mixed picture of some political progress in Chad, and a more stable situation in northeast CAR, coupled with MINURCAT’s slow progress in achieving a series of benchmarks, including improving coordination with police and assisting refugees and IDPs to return to their places of origin, among other challenges. The report highlighted the lack of progress toward a comprehensive solution, particularly with armed groups in eastern Chad, and little to show in the way of progress in governance reforms. This report was the last written under the command of Victor Angelo who, after two years, came to the end of his term. He was replaced by Youssef Mahmoud in March 2010, who’s main task was then to close down the mission.

Negotiations commenced in December between the UN and Chad on the renewal of MINURCAT’s mandate, presenting the Chadian authorities with an opportunity to express once again their great reluctance for the UN mission. The Chadian government repeated its position that MINURCAT was not executing its mandate in a satisfactory fashion. In January, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Chad told the SRSG that President Déby opposed any renewal of the mandate, asserting that the Chadian government was in a position to furnish a security guarantee without any outside assistance.

The Chadian government requested that MINURCAT be recalled from Chad in a 19 January letter to the UN Secretary-General, an unexpected demand that raised concerns among humanitarian groups. The Security Council delegations did not favor a hasty withdrawal, fearing that it would result in the rollback of limited improvements in the security environment there. In response to Chad’s position, France and DPKO sought to “arrange” the Chadian request into a more constructive set of steps. Rather than MINURCAT’s immediate withdrawal, the parties argued for the mission’s progressive withdrawal over the course of 2010.

Political-military meetings of the Council were organized by the French mission before and after DPKO arranged a technical assessment mission to Chad led by DPKO’s former military advisor, General Patrick Cammaert. For DPKO, the withdrawal of the military component of MINURCAT was necessarily linked to the departure of the other components of the mission. This raised concerns that in the absence of MINURCAT, DIS could not sustain itself. Meanwhile, the Chadian authorities thought that the technical assessment mission had been sent to negotiate the modalities of MINURCAT’s withdrawal, when in fact the
technical mission had a much more limited mandate to observe and assess the situation on the ground. The Chadian authorities initially expressed a preference for the mission to withdraw by 30 April. It then altered its proposal, outlining a plan for the mission’s withdrawal to begin on 15 March for the civilian component and on 31 May for the military component, with the complete withdrawal set for 31 July. DPKO opposed the timeline outlined by the Chadian government, but the regime insisted on MINURCAT’s withdrawal. The deadlock over negotiations led DPKO to block further deployment of MINURCAT forces, and the mission remained short of full deployment.

France once again took on the role of mediator in discussions between Chad and DPKO. The French convened a P5 meeting with Ban Ki-moon and Alain Le Roy, as well as a political-military meeting of the full Security Council, in an effort to forge an agreement on MINURCAT’s gradual withdrawal, rather than a sudden drawdown. Concerned parties agreed that the mission’s sudden departure could have grave humanitarian consequences and contribute to the collapse of DIS. But for the Security Council, there was also a great concern to avoid “an UNMEE scenario.” In order to allow negotiations to continue, a technical roll over of the mission was planned.

The Security Council members were briefed by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes and Alain Le Roy in informal consultations on 17 February about the precarious status of MINURCAT’s mission. Holmes described the mission as a vital one, particularly its protection of civilians component in light of the ongoing insecurity of the 500,000 refugees and IDPs. He concluded his briefing by noting that none of the benchmarks corresponding to Resolution 1861 had been achieved.

Le Roy outlined the mission’s options moving forward in the context of the Chadian request for MINURCAT’s full withdrawal: (i) the Security Council could choose to renew the mission’s mandate through March 2011 in case of the Chadian authorities reversed course; (ii) MINURCAT could be withdrawn immediately; or (iii) the mission’s area of responsibility and personnel could be reduced. The Security Council reiterated its support for Le Roy in his negotiations with the Chadian authorities.

Both at the UN, and in Chad, efforts to reach a mutually agreeable solution continued. Alain Le Roy traveled to N’Djamena from 24 February to 1 March and met with President Déby in an effort to ease tensions with Chad. Meanwhile, the French permanent representative, in his capacity as President of the Security Council, was tasked by his colleagues to demarche the Chadian permanent representative on the options for a way forward. In March, the French mission drafted a technical resolution to allow discussions on MINURCAT’s future to continue, as agreed between Alain Le Roy and President Déby. In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Chadian authorities agreed to a two-month extension of MINURCAT. The Security Council approved Resolution 1913 on 12 March, which extended MINURCAT’s mandate through 15 May so that discussion on the mission’s fate could continue. The resolution was co-sponsored by 10 members of the Council, including Nigeria and Gabon.

4.ii The Chadian withdrawal of consent and the end of MINURCAT

Two sets of informal consultations were held by the Council, as well as a political-military meeting at the expert level. DPKO was unprepared to reconfigure MINURCAT below a minimum of 3,600 troops, and its position was considered as “no-go” for the Chadian authorities who mostly wanted to get rid of the military component, but not necessarily of the entire mission. But from the beginning DPKO did not want to leave civilian staff or police in Chad without a security and military umbrella. The Council held an informal discussion with Chad and CAR’s permanent representatives on 22 March, in which Council members agreed on the gradual departure of MINURCAT after a transfer of power to local authorities.

Chad’s President Idriss Déby met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on 8 April and discussed MINURCAT’s future. Under Secretary-General Alain Le Roy briefed the Council on 9 April, relaying the Chadian government’s
position that it was prepared to assume protection responsibilities and that it proposed a reduction in MINURCAT’s size to 1,900 troops. Reports of the meeting indicated that President Déby agreed to an extension of the mission’s mandate through October.\footnote{106} On 10 April the Irish government announced its decision to withdraw its 400 peacekeepers, citing continued uncertainty about the mission’s future.\footnote{107} Finland went the way of Ireland shortly thereafter, to the Council’s frustration.

The Security Council held a flurry of meetings as it moved haltingly toward a decision to end the MINURCAT mandate. It held another set of informal consultations on 23 April after President Déby agreed on the aide-mémoire negotiated between his government and the DPKO team led by Mahmoud. Then on 30 April, the Secretary-General’s report on MINURCAT was released.\footnote{108} On this basis, France drafted a resolution that it first submitted to its P3 partners due to the initial reluctance of the United States and the United Kingdom to end the MINURCAT mandate, and to fulfil its financial and logistical commitments. An informal meeting was also organized with Chad and CAR’s permanent representatives on 6 May. Additionally, informal consultations were held on 8 May with SRSG Youssef Mahmoud during which recommendations of the next Secretary General’s report on the future mandate of MINURCAT were presented.

Because of a lack of consensus within the Council, and the time taken by the United States to accept a draft resolution that required Congressional approval, the Council decided on 13 May in Resolution 1922 to another technical rollover of the mission for 15 days. The rollover was necessary, as the mission’s mandate was due to expire on 15 May.

By the end of the month, a resolution outlining MINURCAT’s withdrawal was imminent. On 19 May, the American delegation submitted additional elements to be included in the French draft resolution. On 21 May, an informal meeting of the Council was held with representatives of the Chadian authorities. On 26 May the Council unanimously passed Resolution 1923, which called for a reduction of the military component of MINURCAT in July and the complete withdrawal of the mission by 31 December 2010.\footnote{109}

The resolution was a compromise between Chad, which preferred MINURCAT withdraw in March 2010, and Council members that wanted to preserve the Mission to avoid an embarrassing and potentially destabilizing sudden withdrawal of blue helmets. Concerning CAR, Resolution 1923 asked the Secretary-General to submit a report in July with options after the withdrawal of the 300 remaining blue helmets there.

The 30 July Secretary-General’s report on MINURCAT laid out plans for minimizing the impact of MINURCAT’s withdrawal, particularly in CAR.\footnote{110} One option that met with support from CAR’s government was a capacity building operation to assist the CAR authorities in maintaining security.\footnote{111} It also underlined the efforts made by Chad to gradually take over MINURCAT’s activities. The head of MINURCAT Youssef Mahmoud briefed the Council on 10 August on MINURCAT’s drawdown in an informal meeting, which the Foreign Affairs Minister of CAR and Chad’s permanent representative attended. The government of Chad outlined its plan for strengthening DIS following MINURCAT’s withdrawal in a letter to the Council on 7 September.\footnote{112}

The Secretary-General released his report on MINURCAT on 14 October.\footnote{113} On 15 October Chad presented an updated version of its plans for the DIS, and its expanded role post-MINURCAT.\footnote{114} In contrast, concerns about the impending security vacuum in the CAR persisted, as MINURCAT completed its withdrawal in northern CAR by the end of October.\footnote{115} Informal consultations were held on 20 October, and the SRSG briefed the Council and the Foreign Affairs Minister of CAR presented his plan for CAR’s government to take over MINURCAT.\footnote{116} The following day, an informal debate was organized with Chad’s permanent representative where he presented the Chadian government’s plan to maintain and strengthen DIS (1,000). At that point, MINURCAT military personnel had ceased all operational activity.\footnote{117}

In December, the Secretary-General released his last report on Chad and CAR, as the mandate expired on 31 December.\footnote{118} The report also presented lessons learned from the handover with EUFOR in March 2010. At a public
Evaluation of working methods: 2009-2010

The informal interactive dialogues

The primary feature of the Council’s applications of its working methods during MINURCAT’s final phase was its use of informal interactive dialogues as a mechanism to engage with Chad in early 2010. Diplomats involved in this process insist that the dialogues played an important role in persuading Chad not to expel MINURCAT even more hastily than it did. While this may be the case, it is hard to quantify the dialogues’ impact, as a number of contextual factors surely shaped Chad’s decision-making. First, France applied considerable direct pressure for a compromise. There was also a relatively high level of scrutiny of the process from NGOs and the media in the West, creating incentives for Chad to move gradually.

Nonetheless, the use of dialogues was significant in that this mechanism had only been devised very recently to allow the Council to interact with Sri Lanka during its offensive against the Tamil Tigers in 2009. The MINURCAT case was thus the first time that such dialogues were applied to a peace operation under strain.

It must be noted that the dialogues had only succeeded (at best) in persuading Sri Lanka to modify its use of force slightly during the 2009 crisis. Again, the 2010 dialogues can at best be argued to have persuaded Chad to reduce its pressure on MINURCAT temporarily. So far, it is clear that these dialogues are a useful procedural device for the Council, but not a political tool capable of decisive results.

The continued role of humanitarians

One further aspect of the Council’s approach to MINURCAT’s last year worth noting is the continued role of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in shaping the Council’s view of the mission. The fact that John Holmes made a persuasive briefing meeting, Youssef Mahmoud briefed the Council on the lessons learned from MINURCAT on 14 December. He underlined that the humanitarian situation in Chad and the security situation in CAR were still fragile. The Council adopted a presidential statement presented by France on 21 December. MINURCAT completed its withdrawal on 31 December, and the transfer of all its activities to the UNDP Country Team. The withdrawal of MINURCAT did not lead to any instability due to the work of DIS and of the Joint Force at the border with Sudan.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

MINURCAT and EUFOR remain controversial in both UN and EU circles. Some of those involved with the UN mission argue that it has achieved the unstated goal of preserving the governments of Chad and CAR. But the alternative might have been much greater regional instability. In the introduction, we identified three basic questions we wished to answer about the influence of the Security Council’s working methods on MINURCAT and EUFOR. In this conclusion we offer our answers to those questions, as well as a few lessons learned on peacekeeping, and make recommendations.

Lessons Learned on Peacekeeping Operations

In August 2000, the Brahimi report advised that “the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation.” In designing joint operations between MINURCAT and EUFOR, challenges to implementation were minimized. This approach had negative long-term effects.
The ‘multidimensional presence’ was ill-conceived from the beginning. All the actors involved in its design placed constraints on it, limiting its effectiveness. The operation’s mission was unclear. Was it intended to address the regional dimension of the conflict in Darfur? Did it represent a way of intervening in Darfur? Should the mission address Chad’s domestic problems that fueled conflict with Sudan? The operation was mandated to secure refugee and IDP camps, train local police and build up permanent infrastructure for the police force, facilitate the return of IDPs, observe Chadian internal affairs and secure northeastern CAR. Political constraints and challenging regional dynamics made this mandate difficult to carry out, and the Security Council also lacked a clear and realistic exit strategy for the operation.

Both EUFOR and MINURCAT failed to get political support from their respective memberships and constituencies, something that the Brahimi report highlighted as a key element for success in peacekeeping. Both force generation processes were thus longer than usual. Moreover, the debate over the nature of the mandate and its interpretation continued as both operations were deploying, reinforcing the lack of consensus about the purpose of the multidimensional presence. This undercut any leverage the mission had with the local authorities. Divisions in the Council at the end of MINURCAT’s mandate also contributed to strained relations with the Chadian government.

Both operations were established in challenging security environments with weak central governments. Insecure conditions around humanitarian camps were particular cause for concern. This led the humanitarian community to push strongly for a mission to Chad and CAR, in addition to its advocacy on Darfur. This created a sense of urgency in the Security Council, but put strain on DPKO at a time when it was dealing with a challenging deployment in Darfur. The Security Council also focused on deploying peacekeeping tools, rather than potentially more relevant or politically attuned policy options.

**Lessons Learned on Working Methods**

The first overarching question was whether the Council’s working methods assisted or impeded its efforts to maintain the consent of Chad for both missions. Ultimately, our analysis suggests that Chad’s consent to the missions was unrelated to the dynamics of the Council. However, it is clear that in 2006-7, Chad was able to exploit the prolonged mandate-making process at the Council to introduce curbs on any UN mission’s options. Moreover, a lack of open debates in both 2006 and 2007 meant that Chad was not required to justify its position publically, reducing the UN’s leverage.

By contrast, it is striking that in 2008, a series of open meetings allowed CAR and its allies on the Council to make a case for a military component of MINURCAT that might otherwise have been ignored. Conversely, the Council’s efforts to dissuade Chad from withdrawing its consent for MINURCAT through informal interactive dialogues in 2010 eventually proved fruitless. On balance, it can be argued that the Council’s preference for confidential meetings – although essential when discussing sensitive political and military issues – may actually reduce its overall political leverage.

Our second introductory question was whether the Council’s working methods complicated or facilitated cooperation with the AU and EU in devising and running MINURCAT and EUFOR. As we noted previously, interactions with the EU were extensive but complicated by the lack of direct political communication between the Security Council and the EU PSC as well as the lack of organizational procedures to launch a bridging operation. Instead, many communications were channeled through DPKO and its counterparts in the EU institutions. This was also true in other cases of EU-UN cooperation, such as the 2003 EU deployment in support of MONUC, and has not been a major problem. In the case of Chad, however, it did create a degree of uncertainty among
states in both forums about the intentions and reliability of the other.

Whereas the Security Council has recently enhanced its political dialogue with the AU Peace and Security Council, the focus in EU-UN relations has largely been on technical discussions of peacekeeping, rather than any new political contacts. Some significant members of the EU are known to oppose any such initiative. However, it is clear that a mechanism for better EU-UN communications at the political level would be useful at least where immediate crises and joint mission planning processes are involved. Our final question was whether the Council’s working methods create a sufficient degree of transparency around the processes involved, and whether this affected the decision-making of states outside the Council. Here the answer is mixed. It is arguable that the way in which France negotiated MINURCAT and EUFOR with Chad in 2007 did create a degree of uncertainty among other states (inside and outside the Security Council and EU) about the bases and goals of these missions. This may well have contributed to the difficulty in finding sufficient personnel and assets for both missions, although it would have been hard to do so anyway, given the overall demand for peacekeepers and low salience of Chad and CAR to many governments. However, a degree of confidentiality was almost certainly essential.

Conversely, the open meetings of the Council in 2008 did contribute to a degree of transparency that appears to have strengthened the case for continuing MINURCAT. Ultimately, the degree of transparency surrounding MINURCAT was not influential in shaping Chad’s attitude to the mission, which proved to be decisive to its continuation.

**Recommendations**

1. **Where the Council faces controversial questions about launching, sustaining or closing missions, open meetings may give it additional leverage.**

There is little evidence from the story of Chad and CAR that closed Security Council discussions have a serious strategic effect on how missions evolve. There is evidence that (both in 2007 and 2010) closed and informal discussions had tactical utility, as they allowed Council members to voice serious concerns. Overall, however, the evidence suggests that greater use of open meetings might increase the Council’s political leverage in certain cases – closed meetings have mixed results.

2. **The Council should explore ways to enhance the role of Council missions in developing a strategic consensus, and to use friends groups and contact groups as mechanisms for addressing multiple dimensions of regional crises.**

The pre-EUFOR phase demonstrated that the Council often finds it hard to focus seriously on multiple dimensions of regional crises. The Council mission to Chad in 2006, although a rushed add-on to its visit to Darfur, helped focus some attention on the country’s problems. But it was neither long nor extensive enough to give most Council members a full sense of Chad’s problems. A fuller visit might have had greater impact. Similarly, the creation of a UN-based friends group to discuss the Chadian dimension of the crisis might have supported efforts in the Council to address it. Both Council missions and friends groups can be used more effectively in future crises.

3. **The Council should explore methods to avoid prolonged mandate-making processes creating opportunities to weaken new missions in advance.**

Throughout 2006 and 2007 Chad was able to take advantage of the UN’s extended mandating process to pick holes in DPKO’s (admittedly flawed) plans. To some extent this was inevitable given the importance of Chad’s consent to any mission. Nonetheless, the Council should ensure that it schedules and manages discussions of future mandates in such a way that they do not become “races to the bottom,” with the Council constantly lowering its ambitions for the sake of (any) deployment.
4. The Council should explore options for developing political channels of communication with the EU comparable to those it now has with the AU. While our analysis suggests that the Council’s contacts with the AU were deficient in 2006-2007, this was understandable given the focus on Darfur. Furthermore, AU-UN political contacts have been upgraded. There is now an argument, as noted above, for upgrading political contacts between the UN and EU (in addition to pre-existing operational links) in those cases where the two organizations co-deploy.

5. Where individual Council members negotiate missions with host countries mechanisms are required to ensure the confidence of other Council members and troop or police contributors.

France’s importance in facilitating the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA cannot be underestimated. But the negative consequences of its resort to strong bilateral pressure should also be noted: potential UN and EU personnel contributors asked difficult questions about the nature of the mission. While the quality of Council interactions with troop contributing countries has improved in recent years, there is an argument for mechanisms for individual Council members to reassure other Council members and force contributors about new mission ideas.
Afterword: the Security Council and peace operations

The Center on International Cooperation’s work on the Security Council’s decision-making processes over peacekeeping in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and the Central African Republic has shown how difficult it is for the Council to follow hard and fast rules of procedure. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Council’s initial role was to approve a peacekeeping force envisaged in a peace agreement forged by African and American mediators in Algiers. When it came to Chad and the Central African Republic, the Council was engaged in discussions of a force for some time. But it eventually signed off on a proposal for a complex operation that was largely devised by France to meet the demands of Chad’s government.

To some extent, both studies demonstrate the limits on the Council in guiding and shaping peace operations. It is a diplomatic forum not an operational “command post”.122 In almost any crisis, the fifteen members of the Council have extremely varied access to information about the country or countries involved. Council members are inevitably inclined to see trade-offs between missions and their ability to address each crisis in depth is inevitably limited. In recent years, the Council has found itself overseeing roughly thirty UN peace operations, political missions and peacebuilding offices at any one time – in addition to addressing the many urgent issues which do not involve any UN mission.

Given all these constraints, the Council will always struggle to provide rational and well-informed guidance to all missions under its purview. Equally, Council members – and especially the Permanent 5 – are inevitably wary of any steps that reduce their prerogatives. Nonetheless, the Council has recognized the need to spread the burden of overseeing missions through steps including: (i) accepting the utility of Friends Groups in cases such as Ethiopia and Eritrea; (ii) increasing interactions with troop and police-contributing countries; (iii) establishing formal relations with the African Union’s Peace and Security Council; and (iv) developing a better working relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission. The Council has also moved towards developing informal meetings of the Military Staff Committee, opening it up to all members and utilized political-military meetings in drafting and reviewing mandates.

Nonetheless, such structural improvements are sometimes of limited relevance to the immediate problems of launching a new mission in crisis conditions – or negotiating the exact terms of a mandate. Although the recently-enhanced Council consultations with troop and police contributing countries have been positive for inclusiveness and transparency, the discussions are reportedly often insubstantial.

In going step-by-step through the Council’s dealings with Ethiopia/Eritrea and Chad/CAR, we have tried to show how the Council’s working methods relate to actual decision-making (with the proviso that the substance of many of the discussions involved remains confidential). This has led us to reflect more generally on how the Council could better calibrate its working methods to respond to future crises. This afterword lays out three sets of proposals about how the Council should behave at different stages.

1. In launching a mission, gather and share knowledge more effectively

Our case-studies underline that many Council members and troop/police contributors have limited information about the circumstances surrounding possible new missions. While some can rely on national resources, many only learn about crises and possible response from the UN Secretariat. The Secretariat has a good deal of experience in running assessment missions prior to operations, but its reports can also be complicated by differences between departments over potential new deployments. Lack of information can create mistrust among members of the Council, and doubts among force contributors about a mission’s political and strategic goals. Possible solutions to this problem include:

• Sending Council missions – probably at the expert level – to countries where a mission may be deployed before it is mandated to gain a fuller understanding of
the situation and risks, and to allow an early discussion on the needs of such mission;

- Attaching a small number of experts (including military advisers) from Council members to Secretariat assessment missions as observers, to gain a better grasp of the resulting proposals;

- Requesting Council members’ diplomatic missions (where they exist) in a country affected by conflict to offer a joint estimate of needs and options for a mission alongside the Secretariat’s;

- Holding at least one Arria formula meeting during each new mandating process to allow independent experts to offer the Council their views on a mission’s needs and challenges;

- Holding political “pledging conferences”: open debates at which troop and police contributors can present their commitments to a new mission and discuss the political situation involved.

In some cases (as over Ethiopia and Eritrea) a multi-stage mandating process may allow for better information-sharing, but the case of Chad shows that prolonged mandating processes can also confuse matters. The mix of diplomatic options for assessing and reporting a new mission’s options will in part depend on the urgency of a new deployment, and the security conditions in the deployment areas.

It is also important that Council members reacquaint themselves with mission conditions periodically, and that countries coming onto the Council are brought up to speed on the state of pre-existing operations. In this context, it may be possible to invite experts from countries joining the Council to visit a number of missions together before their term begins. Furthermore, it is important that Council missions, at whatever level, are designed to maximize information-gathering. We have noted that the Council’s initial visit to Chad was very brief. It should be possible for Council members to schedule and implement missions more effectively, to ensure that participants get a full picture of a situation.

2. Sharing responsibilities inside and outside the Council

However good information-sharing may be within and beyond the Council, debates about new and ongoing missions can be complicated by the perception that specific powers interests are driving decisions. In the Chad case, many Council members believed that France was making instrumental use of the UN – but French officials were concerned that Britain and the US were focusing on Darfur for their own reason while ignoring Chad’s part in a regional conflict. In some cases (as over Ethiopia and Eritrea) many Council members accept that one power is in the lead and detach themselves from debates. In time, this can negatively impact on a mission’s performance, as problems are not scrutinized enough.

What steps can be taken to avoid these challenges? One option would be for Permanent Members of the Council to share responsibility for drafting mandates (“pen-holding”) with other Council members. At present, the P5 typically hold the pen in peacekeeping mandate-making processes – although there are exceptions, with Japan taking the role for Timor-Leste. It has been suggested that this be reversed, so that the elected members take the lead in drafting – then again, elected members of the Council may have national interests of their own at stake in a given mission or simply lack in expertise.

A third option would be for permanent and non-permanent members to “twin” and share responsibilities for pen-holding in drafting new mandates. The U.S. and Uruguay previously teamed up in this way on Haiti. The combination of a permanent and non-permanent member of the Council leading each mandating process could raise transparency and trust (it is also good practice for pen holders to share draft mandates with Council members from a relevant region, as France did with African countries on Chad).

In practical terms, it is also important for Council members to make best use of the support offered by Groups of Friends and other inter-governmental contact groups. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the existence of a Group
of Friends dedicated to the UN mission helped both get the operation going and sustain political dialogues over its future in difficult periods. This was, in part, because of the proactive role of the Netherlands and later Norway in leading the Group. Not all Groups of Friends are so successful (the Friends of Georgia was long notorious for its internal divisions, for example) but the Council should actively encourage the creation of such contact groups to support missions. Where a Friends Group or other contact group already exists prior to a mission’s deployment, the Council should work with its members – involving them in Council debates as necessary – to help make a mission work.

It is also necessary to structure relations with regional organizations more effectively. In recent years, the Council has created new mechanisms for dealing with the African Peace and Security Council, as noted above, but relations with other organizations tend to be channeled through secretariats or managed at the field level. This is often the most efficient approach but it may be possible to improve cooperation with other organizations on specific missions. Opportunities for doing so could involve;

- Building on current dialogues, the Council could send missions (not necessarily involving all members at once) to hold dialogues on operations with regional organizations, especially in cases where a mandate is up for renewal and there are options to build stronger partnerships. Such an approach could have resolved confusions with the EU Council over Chad in 2007-2008;

- Leaders of co-deployed missions (such as EUFOR Chad/RCA and MINURCAT) could give joint video briefings to the Security Council and other political bodies (such as the EU Council or AU PSC) simultaneously, to consolidate common understandings of the problems involved. Such briefings could be kept separate from debates to avoid complications over actual prerogatives;

- The Council should encourage regional organizations to have representatives on Groups of Friends involved with peace operations, as the EU has been involved in some Friends in the past.

3. Exit strategies, peacebuilding and lessons learned

Peace operations often suffer particular problems during their drawdown phases – and the Council has particular problems addressing these. We have noted that the final stages of UN operations in both Ethiopia/Eritrea and Chad/CAR, the withdrawal of consent by host governments undercut the peacekeepers. In both cases, the Council reacted by holding more and more informal consultations and fewer public meetings. This approach failed to save either mission, in spite of concerted diplomacy. However, in both cases, the Council held no follow-on debates on the situations in the affected areas – implying that once the mission had closed, the Council conducted no after action review of its role.

The Council has also recently been criticized for failing to grasp the full complexity of peacebuilding challenges – which inevitably involve developmental and economic tools beyond the Council’s control. Colin Keating, a former Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the UN and the founder of Security Council Report, a think-tank, has emphasized this problem. He suggests that the Council has made incremental steps towards improving ties with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), for example inviting the chairs of PBC country-specific configurations to attend informal interactive dialogues and formal meetings on the country they cover. However, these representatives of the PBC are not involved in the Council’s private consultations, which means that they are still excluded from important talks.

Ambassador Keating argues that the Council could go further, developing informal mechanisms for addressing specific country issues through informal “partnership configurations” with the UN Development Program and other parts of the UN: “the tool box for the partnership configurations could include regular visits by the relevant chairperson to the region, demarches, reinforcement of SRSG and Secretariat ‘good offices’, interaction with

The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic
regional or sub regional parties, coordination of bilateral demarches by member states with influence, closed or open meetings and creation of integrative effect by exercising oversight – including on the contribution of the UN country team.” But this bold reappraisal of the Security Council’s status vis-à-vis other parts of the UN might create many tensions.

However, the Council can at least take some steps to demonstrate the importance it places on effective peacebuilding activities both while an operation is deployed and (in particular) after it has withdrawn:

- As a matter of course, the Council should request chairs of the PBC’s country-specific configurations to participate in consultations on the countries in question;

- When it appears probable that a mission is entering its final phase, the Council should convene at least one Arria formula meeting at which civil society representatives from the affected country or countries can express their views and concerns about possible future developments;

- In closing a mission, the Council should agree that it will hold one or more debates on the situation in the area where the peacekeepers deployed – even if there is no specific Peacebuilding Office or UN political mission left behind – to monitor post-peacekeeping events.

In addition to monitoring events in the post-peacekeeping environment, the Council should actively attempt to learn lessons from a closed mission. One option would be for the Council’s Informal Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to conduct a lessons learned exercise in each case, in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ own experts and outside scholars.

No one innovation in working methods can overcome the obstacles to effective oversight of peace operations by the Security Council. But some of the options set out here would at least clarify debates over how operations are run, improve Council relations with other actors and increase the quality of the political support that the Council can offer missions – and the countries and peoples that they assist.
Annex

MINURCAT Personnel

Number of Personnel

- UNVs
- Int'l Staff
- Military Observers
- Nat'l Staff
- Police
- Troops

The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic
EUFOR Tchad/RCA military personnel contributions, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3715</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Anne-Claire Marangoni. ‘Le financement de opérations militaires de l’UE : des choix nationaux pour une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense?’, *EU Diplomacy Paper* no. 6, College of Europe, November 2008. (Estimates gathered on the basis of working documents from the French military staff).
### MINURCAT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributing Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>2,940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

**The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic**
### MINURCAT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributing Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,130</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,281</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.
2008, six non-aggression pacts were concluded between Chad and
the Darfur conflict. See Roland Marchal, “Understanding French Policy
the Darfur insurgents from Chadian territory, often by his own relatives. ‘
reluctant Idriss Déby to turn a blind eye to the support channelled to
and ammunition, an internal Zaghawa reconciliation, which pushed a
were heavily involved in supplying the Darfur insurgents with weapons
the continuing normalisation of relations with Tripoli, while the Libyans
consolidation of Idriss Déby’s grip on power, through a constitutional
International Cooperation, January 2011, p. 5.
3Many factors contributed to that state of affairs: the fact that
‘N’Djamena was handling different agendas at the same time: the
consolidation of Idriss Déby’s grip on power, through a constitutional change that authorised an unlimited number of presidential mandates, the continuing normalisation of relations with Tripoli, while the Libyans were heavily involved in supplying the Darfur insurgents with weapons and ammunition, an internal Zaghawa reconciliation, which pushed a reluctant Idriss Déby to turn a blind eye to the support channelled to the Darfur insurgents from Chadian territory, often by his own relatives.’
4In addition, France tried to push Chad to play a role of mediator in the Darfur conflict. See Roland Marchal, “Understanding French Policy Toward Chad/Sudan? A Difficult Task (3)”, Africa Arguments, 6 June 2009.
Papier_--_Peacekeeping_2_--_2.pdf
9Many factors contributed to that state of affairs: the fact that
‘N’Djamena was handling different agendas at the same time: the
consolidation of Idriss Déby’s grip on power, through a constitutional change that authorised an unlimited number of presidential mandates, the continuing normalisation of relations with Tripoli, while the Libyans were heavily involved in supplying the Darfur insurgents with weapons and ammunition, an internal Zaghawa reconciliation, which pushed a reluctant Idriss Déby to turn a blind eye to the support channelled to the Darfur insurgents from Chadian territory, often by his own relatives.’
10In addition, France tried to push Chad to play a role of mediator in the Darfur conflict. See Roland Marchal, “Understanding French Policy Toward Chad/Sudan? A Difficult Task (3)”, Africa Arguments, 6 June 2009.
11Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework”, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 144, 24 September 2008; between 2003 and 2008, six non-aggression pacts were concluded between Chad and Sudan.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14S/PV.5414, 18 April 2006.
15Ibid.
fr/lesoirdalgerie/40556.
23S/2006/591, 28 July 2006, “Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur”, para. 123. Thereafter, the negotiations were focused on the format of the UN operation taking over AMIS, and on persuading the Sudanese President to agree on the deployment of the operation.
26S/PV. 5558, 30 October 2006.
27Interview with senior UN official.
29Ibid
30Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic, 22 December 2006.
31Ibid, para. 81.
32Ibid.
33Ibid, para. 88.
34On the contrary, Qatar, Indonesia and Italy said that the requirements put forward by DPKO should be taken into consideration. The Russian Federation asked for more information. See S/PV.5621, 16 January 2007.
35S/PRST/2007/2, The SC Report of Dec 2007 suggested that the mandate of this advance mission could be the following: “Such an advance team would collect more information on the situation in the border areas and further explore the possibilities for a political agreement between the Governments concerned in the region, and between the Governments and their respective opposition groups. It would also conduct further detailed planning and logistic preparations, so as to enable me to submit more comprehensive recommendations to the Security Council in due course” (Para.88).
36In parallel to the UN effort, a 12 February 2007 communiqué the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) encouraged political dialogue in Chad. The PSC also opted to send a mission to gauge the implementation of the February 2006 Tripoli Agreement. Libya played host to a Sudan-Chad-CAR summit on 22 February, but the political situation remained troubling.
37Interviews with French officials.
40DPKO in fact never believed that the situation in Chad required the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. according to a Secretariat’s official, “in the UN tool box, there is no instrument for humanitarian intervention”.
41According to Roland Marchal, “Kouchner, who had become a good friend of the Sudan Liberation Movement’s leader, Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, wanted to focus on Darfur. On his first day in office, he organized a meeting with various NGOs interested in Darfur. The outcome was his proposal to organise ‘humanitarian corridors’ to provide food and assistance to the Darfuri population. The NGOs working in Darfur, the experts, and eventually the UN strongly disagreed: Darfur was not Bosnia, and this proposal was not solving any current difficulties faced by humanitarian workers. While visiting Khartoum a few weeks later, Bernard Kouchner organised a meeting in Darfur with the NGOs present. He left the room in anger when their representatives told him that what they needed first was a political solution in Darfur, not corridors. (!) Again, he needed to take the initiative by proposing a new idea. This is how the concept of EUFOR/ MINURCAT came into being. (!) Paris wanted to promote the idea because it integrated different goals into one policy. Moreover, it allowed Paris, which was going to chair the European Union, to show its leadership at the European level and also to get the EU to share the financial burden of such an operation in Chad for the whole year of 2008. Among French diplomats and the military there was also a minority group that pushed the project as the best way to close the Epervier (Sparrowhawk) Operation5, to save some money and get these French troops out of a country with such a debatable record”.
Kouchner visited N'Djamena in May and then again on 9-11 June. The EUFOR/MINURCAT French initiative is at the convergence of three different logics. First, while Khartoum had endorsed the idea of a new international force in Darfur in June 2007, it had made it clear that no Western countries would be allowed to contribute troops. There was no way French politicians could claim any role in that acceptance and in its implementation. The second logic was the urgency to show that the newly elected government in France could deliver. French politicians were looking for an alternative way to show their commitment to Darfur supporters in France. The third trend was the policy pursued by Paris concerning the deployment of U.N. troops at the border of Chad and Sudan. The DPKO was not enthusiastic about that concept. It had already too many operations ongoing, with too few troops, and such an operation had a taste of France using the U.N. to achieve its own political agenda. See Roland Marchal, op.cit., p. 22.

France’s sold an ‘international security presence’ to President Deby, a wording that was vague enough as the Chadian President remained reluctant to accept any U.N. involvement. See Ministerial meeting on Darfur in Paris, available at: http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/article1872.html.

The fact that most EU members states had very little knowledge of Chad and CAR contributed to this general lack of support to that project. The interview with EU official, 2011.

Security Council Report, August 2007, Chad/CAR.


Ibid.

S/RES/1778 (2007). The Foreign Minister of Chad was invited to participate in the meeting. S/PV.5748, 25 September 2007.

Ibid.


France, in parallel, informed its EU partners in an urgent meeting of the PSC.


Ibid.


Interview with an EU official, 2011.


Interview with a UN official, January 2012.

S/2008/444, 4 July 2008. To facilitate the discussions, on 7-8 August, the Head of MINURCAT Victor Ângelo held a two-day workshop in Sweden, which included representatives from the Chadian government, the UN, the EU, the AU, the OFI, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Council’s permanent members and Libya, to assess the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR, as well as the political and humanitarian situations prior to Council deliberations on the topic in September.


“This Libyan co-sponsoring was a surprise as this country had previously pressured Chadian authorities to oppose the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

As stated by Gerald Aherne (Minurcat’s former Deputy force Commander), “while the UN remained uncommitted as to the demand for a Follow-on-Force, the EU saw things differently. It saw the EUFOR Operation solely as a bridging operation with the defined one-year timeline, and unambiguously stated this in its Concept of Operations.” in Gerald Hainzl and Walter Feichtinger, EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited, Austrian Ministry of Defense, 2011, p. 140.

Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands refused to reheat their troops. France agreed to reheat their troops for 3 months and to keep some logistical and engineering capacities until December 2009.


“This meeting was initiated in the framework of the French-UK initiative on “Effective Strategic Oversight”.


For the Secretariat, it cannot be considered a completely new mission, as it only concerns the deployment of the military component of the mission and does not put into question the SOFA and SOMA already signed with the Chadian authorities. In other words, DPKO did not want this handover to be an opportunity for the Chadian authorities to question all the legal texts so far negotiated.

S/RES/1861 (2009). The resolution renewed MINURCAT’s mandate and authorized the deployment of a military component within it to replace EUFOR.

According to paragraph 25 of Resolution 1861, these benchmarks are the following: (a) Voluntary return and resettlement in secure and sustainable conditions of a critical mass of internally displaced persons; (b) Demilitarization of refugee and internally displaced person camps as evidenced by a decrease in arms, violence and human rights abuses; (c) Improvement in the capacity of Chadian authorities in eastern Chad, including national law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and the prison system to provide the necessary security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers with respect for international human rights standards.

Some of the main organizational obstacles were the following: coherence between both planning processes for deployment and logistics, transition between the EU use of logistics and UN procurement, incompatible command and control structures, absence of contingency planning in the UN for the transition phase before January 2009. See Alexandra Novosseloff, “EU–UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping”.

The command group of MINURCAT Force, namely the Force Commander (FC) and the Deputy Force Commander (DFC), were appointed very late. As a result, neither could influence the formulation of CONOPS15 of the Force or the required pre-planning for the critical C2 process by Force Headquarters (FHQ). In the complex and harsh environment of eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic this was a critical enabler not allowed to the Command Group (CG), neither prior to nor during TOA. The FC arrived in the AoO on the day of TOA, while the DFC arrived on 2 March 2009. See Gerald Aherne, op.cit., p.143.


Ibid; S/PV.6121 and S/PV.6122, 8 May 2009 were verbatim records of the Council meetings to discuss renewed cross-border rebel activity in Chad.


On the European side, the EU political and Security Committee looked...
to wrap-up the EUFOR mission. On 18 May, the final report of the SG/HR on EUFOR Tchad/RCA was adopted by the GAERC, after being presented to the PSC on 5 May. By 15 May, EUFOR had completed its withdrawal. The EU Presidency presented the end of mission report on EUFOR, reiterating the importance of UN-EU cooperation to ensure a timely handover.  


According to the International Crisis Group: “Eufor and Minurcat have served as symbolic handrail against a possible overthrow of Déby’s regime by armed groups supported by Khartoum. Now that Déby has reorganized his army and has signed a truce with Sudan in the context of their respective electoral processes in 2010-2011, he thinks he can do without Minurcat”, in “Le maintien de la mission de l’ONU est contesté par N’Djamena”, Le Monde, 9 février 2010.  

Ibid. 

Most members of the Council indeed advocated for a “progressive drawdown” or a “phased withdrawal” of MINURCAT. They called for multilateral and bilateral demarches on both governments. Some members stated that any withdrawal and transfer of responsibility should be conditioned to the Government of Chad’s ability to carry out the Mission’s present military mandate. At the end of these consultations, the Council could not provide a definitive view on a force less than 3,600 (considered by DPKO as a minimum to ensure the protection of civilians’ mandate it was delivered).  

Ibid. 


Turkey and Germany have also held the pen on Afghanistan.  

Colin Keating, Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security Council (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2011), p. 3.  

Ibid., p. 4.
Related Publications from the
Center on International Cooperation

Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations: The Case of UNMEE
Richard Gowan with Teresa Whitfield

Review of Political Missions 2011

The Role of the United Nations in Middle East Conflict Prevention
Elizabeth Sellwood

ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: The Triple Threats
Alhaji M.S. Bah and Kwesi Aning

Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of
Changing U.S. Security Policy
Bruce Jones, Shepard Forman, Richard Gowan, eds.

Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012

Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational threats
Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual and Stephen John Stedman

and Beyond
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI)

Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific
Elsina Wainwright

More information about these and other recent publications can be found at www.cic.nyu.edu.