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South Sudan: Prospects for Peace and Development

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Volume II

Additional written evidence

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The International Development Committee

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Written evidence

Written evidence submitted by Anglican International Development

SOUTH SUDAN: THE BIRTH OF A NATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Anglican International Development (“AID”) is a charity formed in September 2008. Its charitable objectives are as follows:

“The advancement of religion, namely to serve Jesus Christ in the church and in the world in a manner faithful to the Holy Scriptures and as his ambassadors in low income communities to bring solutions to poverty (financial, physical and spiritual) and to promote the relevance, truth and authority of the Holy Scriptures (in accordance with the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles of Religion) in a manner that leads others to trust and serve Jesus Christ in the church and in the world.”

1.2 Specifically, AID was created to respond to concerns surrounding the development of the global Anglican church and the communities in which churches are located. There were particular concerns expressed for the church in South Sudan, following the very divisive civil war and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that marked the end of hostilities in 2005. The established Anglican Church in South Sudan is the Episcopal Church of the Sudan (“ECS”), which operates in both the Republic of the Sudan and South Sudan.

2. HOW AID WORKS

2.1 At the time of AID’s formation, the situation in what was, at the time, the southern part of Sudan, as well as that of the ECS, was of acute concern. AID was therefore created as a different kind of development organisation; one that uses locally-based churches as enablers to reach effectively those most in need, whilst linking with the church at a national level to build capacity and enhance the ability to deal confidently with governments.

2.2 AID believes that working through churches in developing countries is one of the best ways to connect with individuals within local communities and within a support network that will help them improve their lives. AID therefore partners with local churches of all denominations, taking close account of their circumstances and opinions in order to ensure that effective support is delivered in the most appropriate way. AID also builds the capacity of churches to develop themselves effectively and to look after the needs of the communities in which they are based.

2.3 AID’s methodology can therefore be summarised as follows:

— aid agencies and donors are prepared to provide funds to support development;
— national and local governments have land on which to base projects and which they are often prepared to make available on preferential terms; and
— local churches have social capital, made up of local communities as well as access to a global network of specialist skills that are often available pro bono.

2.4 AID brings these elements together using its networks and knowledge of what is required in each situation.

2.5 The facilitation of the visit by the ICMDA (see below for more details) is a good example of this approach in action. In this case, the proposal is that the Government will allocate land to this clinical training college project, the World Bank will be approached to fund the construction of the buildings and running costs, local churches will identify trainees and the ICMDA will supply personnel pro-bono. Although this is a project that will be taken forward between the ICMDA and the Government of South Sudan (“GoSS”), AID investment succeeded in unlocking the potential that led to this combination, which represented a large multiplier effect of the investment made.

2.6 In order to ensure that projects are accountable to a body that is separate to discrete project oversight committees (or equivalent), AID operates a standalone auditing and monitoring function, called AID Cooperation, with the aim of monitoring project objectives, outcomes and cost-effectiveness, as well as carrying out reporting to trustees and donors and ensuring that good governance is maintained. Expenditure on projects, as well as key project stages and benchmarks will need to be agreed jointly between oversight boards and AID Cooperation.

3. AID’S EXPERIENCE AND WORK TO DATE IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 AID has a history of working in South Sudan that dates back over three years. Projects carried out to date within South Sudan include the following:

3.1.1 The launch of a microenterprise development (MED) programme, Manna Microfinance, in partnership with the ECS Diocese of Juba: This programme is run through local churches, from whose congregations self-help groups are made up. The programme aims to benefit 1,500...
people in Juba by the end of 2011, including 400 borrowers. In addition, AID is assisting an MED scheme run in partnership with the ECS Diocese of Yi and benefiting over 4,000 people, to achieve sustainability.

3.1.2 The provision of bicycles to pastors in the ECS Diocese of Rumbek: In 2009, bicycles were provided to 105 pastors in the ECS Diocese of Rumbek, enabling them to travel up to 1,000 miles a month, visiting their communities of over 5,000 people.

3.1.3 The funding and supporting of seminars for ECS pastors: AID contributed both financially and also by providing speakers to an ECS seminar in 2009 on the Church’s involvement in society ahead of the independence referendum, attended by 30 leaders from both church and government. Also, in mid-2011, AID supported a workshop for the pastors of the ECS’s Juba Diocese on “The role of the church in the independent Republic of South Sudan”, attended by 71 senior priests in the Diocese. AID provided speakers, joining those from the ECS, GoSS and other organisations. In addition, AID has sponsored the participation of the Chair of the anti-corruption commission at an international Human Rights seminar.

3.1.4 Support for graduate education for senior leaders: AID is supporting the studies of the Diocesan Secretary of Wau at St Paul’s University, Kenya, of a second Anglican priest at the same university and of the Bishop of Wau for a Masters Degree in HIV/AIDS Care and Counselling.

3.1.5 The facilitation of a visit to South Sudan by the International Christian Medical and Dental Association (“ICMDA”): In mid-2011, recognising that the shortage of trained clinical staff is one of South Sudan’s greatest needs, AID facilitated a visit by the ICMDA’s Chief Executive and a team of four senior medics and other experts. The ICMDA’s plan is to assist with a new college for clinical officers (equivalent to UK nurse practitioners) that could ultimately train 45 clinical officers annually, including five that will work in ECS clinics. A Memorandum of Understanding was agreed between the ICMDA and the GoSS Ministry of Health to gain funding and take the project forward. A follow up visit is due in early 2012.

4. The Rationale for Working through Churches at a Local and National Level

4.1 Whilst all acknowledge the good work of aid agencies, supranational NGOs and government-to-government aid, AID believes that, to create a real difference, inappropriate bureaucracies need to be bypassed and resources placed into the hands of people themselves.

4.2 This is not to say, however, that significant and lasting outcomes can be expected from aid that is distributed in a fragmented and piecemeal way. In order to connect with ordinary people so that they can be held accountable for using the resources given to them to improve their lives, a network must be used that is large enough to ensure national coverage, as well as being locally-based enough to value individual recipients themselves, treating them on a case-by-case basis.

4.3 Of the networks able to achieve this, churches are amongst the most effective and widely spread geographically. In most areas of the developing world, where the local communities are, there too are churches; indeed, churches are invariably the longest standing of community organisations and are far more trusted by poor people than governments or agencies.

4.4 According to the World Bank report, “Voices of the Poor” (carried out to inform the “World Development Report 2000-01 on Poverty and Development”), churches, as well as other faith-based organisations, were mentioned time and again as important and valued by the poor.1

4.5 In the last decade or so, the potential for churches in general to be key enabling partners in development has been widely acknowledged, including by Robert Calderisi, formerly World Bank Spokesman for Africa, who in a 2001 speech said:

“The Church is important in Africa, so it is important for the World Bank as well. You are close to the poor. You are rooted in local communities. You are normally truthful and neutral and detached from partisan politics. And you are able to serve the material—not just the spiritual—needs of the poor directly. You can challenge Governments and international institutions about their policies and actions and provide first-hand information on the needs and views of local communities.”2

4.6 South Sudan is in a position where there is a need to make the transition from being dependent upon humanitarian aid to having the capacity to carry out on its own the sort of development activity that will enable it to become a successful, sustainable and vibrant economy. In this “recovery” stage, churches represent a pre-existing, ready-made and on-going community of trust at grassroots level.

4.7 In South Sudan in particular, the churches worked with the population to relieve suffering throughout the period of the civil war, and are therefore trusted by ordinary people to bring help, succour and support

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where they are able to do so. However, there is a continuing need for monitoring and oversight; AID Cooperation therefore operates a similar concept to the European Recovery Plan (also known as the Marshall Plan) that, between 1947 and 1952, restored post-war Europe’s capacity to develop.

5. **The Extent of Humanitarian need in South Sudan, Particularly among Returning South Sudanese and those Displaced by Fighting and any Problems with Humanitarian Access**

5.1 Whilst it is self-evident that humanitarian needs remain great in South Sudan, the nature and extent of such needs differs significantly across the country. AID’s observation is that, particularly along the borders with Kenya and Uganda, the climate and the security environment is relatively benign. Civil War returnees from camps in these two countries have generally received a good standard of education and are in a position to make the most of such an environment. Areas such as Yei, Kajo-Keji and Torit also benefit from reasonable road connections to the markets of Kenya and Uganda and a good mobile telephone network. The needs in such areas are for high quality primary healthcare services, vocational training & investment in food security activities (such as agricultural smallholdings) and wealth creating activities (such as microenterprise development).

5.2 In contrast, the situation in the north of the new country is much less positive. For example, in Wau, capital of Western Bahr e-Ghazal state, communications are poor, as are links to the rest of the country. The price of raw materials is very high due the presence of a large number of aid agencies and commodities such as fuel can often be difficult to come by. Wau is also the final destination for many returnees whose presence is no longer welcome in Khartoum, as the colonial era railway line terminates there. Local services and capacity (such as exist) are being overwhelmed by trainloads of returning refugees. The needs in such areas are similar to the above, but there is a need for additional focus on improving communications networks, opening up markets and improving access to raw materials and drinking water.

5.3 Further north, the security situation along the new border remains dire. Although AID has not yet visited this location, our contacts in the ECS have allowed us to remain aware of the situation being faced in the area. On 14 June, the Archbishop of the Sudan issued a statement condemning the violence and bombardment of civilian settlements that had been taking place in Southern Kordofan (particularly the Nuba mountains) since 5 June and which had resulted in widespread suffering and destruction. He further stated that, from the time the initial fighting had begun, it had been reported that the number of civilians requiring immediate relief had increased to over 53,000 (and was set to rise further), 75,000 people had been displaced, bombing and looting had continued and houses and other buildings had been destroyed.

5.4 On 11 November, Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that an airstrike on a Unity State refugee camp on 10 November had been attributed to the northern Sudan Armed Forces by officials and witnesses, bolstering concerns that war with the truncated Sudan may reignite. This followed President Al-Bashir’s aggressive comments on 6 November indicating Khartoum’s readiness to engage in further warfare. The Yida refugee camp is home to about 20,000 refugees from the Nuba Mountains, who had fled from there to Yida as a result of the earlier violence.

5.5 It appears, therefore, that such violence is bound to continue along the new border, most likely flaring up from time-to-time, perhaps being driven by political events in Khartoum. This is in an area which is least able to deal with such relief requirements and the displacement of large numbers of people and, as such, there is a need for humanitarian interventions as well as political pressure on the Khartoum Government.

5.6 Whilst some aid agencies are present in these areas, the ECS in particular has an established presence and has declared itself ready to facilitate in the distribution of aid using its extensive network in Southern Kordofan and Abyei.

6. **The Provision of Basic Services and Essential Infrastructure**

6.1 Over the three years that AID has been working in South Sudan, our organisation has identified the need to bolster basic services in the following areas:

- Micro-Enterprise Development (“MED”);
- healthcare;
- agriculture;
- water/aanitation;
- education (including vocational education); and
- Church Capacity Building.

6.2 There is therefore a high degree of overlap with the DFID South Sudan Strategic Priorities to which funding is being allocated, which are as follows:³

- wealth creation;
- governance and security;
- education;

³ DFID South Sudan Operational Plan 2011–2015 (July 2011), page 7.
6.3 DFID has also stated that its key aims include the need to create wealth and sustainable growth.

6.4 To date, as mentioned above, AID’s activities have been focused on MED and church capacity building, with feasibility studies shortly to be initiated on healthcare and agriculture projects. AID’s aim is to fund and support projects in these areas, run in partnership with local churches but delivered by “technical partners” who have their own budget and discrete operations. Local churches are members of project oversight boards and provide advice and access to local facilities.

6.5 AID’s view is that, in pursuit of local relevance and effectiveness as well as transparency, working in partnership with local churches to put in place basic services and essential infrastructure represents one of the most effective ways to carry out such development. The following examples bear this out:

6.5.1 Manna Microfinance (“MM”), AID’s MED project in Juba but draws its clients from local parish churches in and around the capital city. It has received strong support from the hierarchy of the ECS, including from the Archbishop of the Sudan, and has also made good links with South Sudan’s central bank. Although the project has started only recently, repayment rates are currently running at significantly higher levels than other established operators, such as BRAC, SUMI and Finance Sudan Ltd. Also, due to its close links with the central bank (formally via the church) MM is in a good position to influence the development of GoSS policy on MED.

6.5.2 The ECS Martha Primary Healthcare Centre was a failing clinic located close to the Cathedral in the southern city of Yei. In 2006, John & Poppy Spens, ex-CEO of a UK housing association and UK-trained nurse practitioner respectively, travelled to Yei as Church Missionary Society Ireland mission associates to take over the management of the Martha Clinic. Over the past eight years, with the help of donors (including DFID), this has been transformed into a functional clinic providing excellent, affordable outpatient Primary Care (commensurate with GoSS policy) to all local residents with no discrimination of tribe, race or religion. The clinic is run in partnership with the ECS Diocese of Yei and is often held up as an exemplar within South Sudan.

6.6 The Bishop of Wau, the Rt. Rev. Moses Deng Bul, has already carried out planning for a similar clinic in Easternbank, a poor semi-urban community of around 50,000 internally displaced persons just outside the city of Wau. A clinic building is in place but is barely functioning. AID’s aim is to commence a feasibility study into this refurbishment and staffing project ahead of securing funding. AID’s ultimate aim is to replicate the success of the ECS Primary Healthcare Centre in Yei.

6.7 Although the overall picture of ECS healthcare provision is very mixed, the church is already a major provider of healthcare within South Sudan. Focussing on the need for value for money, there is often an infrastructure (such as a building) in place, as in the case of Wau that can be refurbished without the need for great outlay in terms of capital expenditure. However, there will still be a significant requirement for funding re. staffing, training and consumables.

6.8 Finally, AID recognises the need for a holistic approach to development. For example, via the educational component of MED projects, whereby borrower groups receive training and share best practice weekly, important messages on public health and other subjects can be communicated. This is established practice and provide advice and access to local facilities.

7. How DFID can help to improve governance, including at the county and local level.

7.1 Churches have a national voice, able to challenge governments and influence policy. This is (and will continue to be) particularly important in South Sudan, where the main political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (“SPLM”), is likely to dominate the political landscape for at least the next decade. Whilst there currently appears to be genuine commitment to democracy, there may not be an effective political opposition that emerges for some time.

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7.2 In the interim, in terms of effective opposition to the SPLM government, it is clear that some churches consider that they are currently performing this role to some degree. However, the on-going relationship may need judicious treatment going forward, as The Economist makes clear:

“Most powerful as a counterweight to the SPLM are the churches, both Catholic and Protestant. Priests, who are highly respected in South Sudan, co-operate with the government, though not unreservedly. As organisers they do so well that the government at times appears resentful.”

7.3 In any case, South Sudan remains a country where religion plays a key role. Many government ministers both attend church on a regular basis and are closely involved in a personal capacity. Therefore, there is a strong argument for developing the capacity of South Sudan’s churches. If churches are able to become effective advocates for their communities and challenge governments, then they can play a key role in improving governance nationally and locally.

7.4 In conclusion, the churches in South Sudan are able to hold the government to account in a way that no other organisation either can at present or will be able to do in the medium term.

8. The Role of the UNDP, Other Humanitarian Organisations and Other Donors

8.1 The UNDP, as well as other donors, are much in evidence in Juba, particularly in the form of vehicles and compounds. AID has carried out some liaison with the UNDP concerning its own projects but is not fully aware of the nature or extent of its work within South Sudan.

8.2 Anecdotal evidence continues to suggest, however, that the effectiveness of such supranational development agencies is in doubt. An FT article in March 2010 (referring to Southern Sudan, as it then was) suggested that:

“The region seems to embody two of aid’s recurring weaknesses—short-termism and a failure to recognise local circumstances”

8.3 Certainly, all agencies to which AID has spoken find South Sudan a difficult and fragile environment to operate in, not helped by potential fragmentation and possible tribal conflict.

9. The Security Situation and the Effectiveness of UNMISS

9.1 Churches are able to intervene and mediate in the political and tribal violence that will continue to be a feature of life in South Sudan. For example, in recent months, the ECS Archbishop of the Sudan, the Most Rev. Dr Daniel Deng Bul, has been made chair of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee and called upon to intervene personally to resolve numerous internal violent conflicts. Such conflicts often involve former high ranking members of the SPLM who now feel excluded.

9.2 Politicians often call for unity in the newly independent country, whilst acknowledging that tribal roots can make it difficult for people to feel a common sense of identity. Churches in general, and particularly the ECS, are pan-national bodies which can bring a sense of togetherness to those even in remote locations. As mentioned, even very remote areas host church congregations of some kind and such congregations form part of a national structure which is closely associated with the identity of the country itself.

10. The Implications of Potential Membership of the Commonwealth and the East African Community

10.1 In the specific case of the ECS, which is part of the global Anglican Communion, links to other Anglican churches worldwide (many of which are located in Commonwealth member countries) will compound the benefits of Commonwealth membership. Indeed, these will be far more than institutional links, being cemented by personal relationships developed by common experiences that reach across national borders.

10.2 Links can also be forged across at every level. As an example of this, AID’s work involves creating links across the ecclesiastical spectrum, between churches at a local level and also church organisations at a national level. This can bring a real sense of being part of a global family to those at all levels, but it is important that this sense of belonging is backed up by real effects on the ground. This will also be the case with Commonwealth and East African Community membership; institutional links without any tangible benefits will count for very little.

11. Conclusion

11.1 It is AID’s firm belief that, although the needs of South Sudan are very great, the potential that exists for prosperity in the new country is likewise very great. However, this is dependent upon better security, more effective and transparent government and locally relevant development.

5 The Economist, 5 February 2011.

11.2 In all these areas, the churches of South Sudan have a vital role to play in the future of the newly independent country. It is for this reason that AID advocates to the International Development Committee the case for working in partnership with South Sudan's churches in order to achieve its potential.

December 2011

Written evidence submitted by CAFOD

i. Introduction

i.i CAFOD welcomes the opportunity to feed into the International Development Committee’s inquiry into South Sudan.

i.ii CAFOD is the official relief and development agency of the Catholic Church in England and Wales, providing humanitarian and development assistance in 45 countries worldwide. CAFOD aims to strengthen communities’ and partners’ response to disasters and link its relief and development work. CAFOD prioritises work through local church organisations as they have a permanent presence in the country and a country-wide structure which is rooted in local communities. CAFOD is part of the Caritas International Federation.

i.iii CAFOD has been working in South Sudan for over 35 years, since the mid 1970s. CAFOD’s office in Juba was opened in 2006. The CAFOD programme focuses on Upper Nile, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria states, as part of the Caritas International response which covers the entire country implementing both humanitarian and development programmes CAFOD has been working in South Sudan since the early 1970’s implementing humanitarian and development relief programmes across the region through partnerships with national partners. CAFOD opened a country-office in Khartoum (2005) and a sub-office in Juba (2006).

CAFOD is currently mid way through implementing a three-year strategy in South Sudan. The development programmes focus on the promotion of peace and reconciliation; sustainable livelihoods; and HIV and AIDS. Furthermore, CAFOD responds to humanitarian needs in the country. This has included the distribution of food and non-food items and WASH services to households displaced by LRA attacks and inter-communal violence. Leading up to the Referendum and Independence CAFOD worked with other Caritas agencies on a country wide response focusing on emergency preparedness and early recovery needs. In both humanitarian and development activities, CAFOD emphasises the need to support Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees and returnees. Particular attention is given to the challenges facing women, children and youth, and People Living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA). All programmes include a commitment to partner capacity building. To maximise the impact of limited resources, to promote programme integration and link relief, recovery and development, CAFOD focuses its interventions in specific geographic locations, Upper Nile, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria. The 2011–12 Budget for CAFOD’s South Sudan Programme is approximately £ 4.5 million.

1. The extent of humanitarian need, especially among returning South Sudanese and those displaced by fighting in Abyei and South Kordofan; and any problems with humanitarian access

1.1 Humanitarian need is significant, and is likely to remain so for many years. The current situation needs to be addressed both through short-term provision of humanitarian relief as well as long term development planning.

1.2 The very poor planning for the reintegration of South Sudanese returning from Sudan and refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda has placed considerable strain on limited basic services and infrastructure. This in turn could exacerbate peace and reconciliation initiatives.

1.3 Over 342,000 South Sudanese have returned from Sudan since October 2010. Most of these people are concentrated in the border states of Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, often in communities without schools, health posts, or water facilities. More than 80% have no livelihoods or means of support. Schools in Unity State are strained with the influx of hundreds of children whilst health and hygiene facilities struggle to cope: in Jonglei and Warrap States each health post serves 30,000 people and the average number of people per water point is now over 2,000 in Unity State.

1.4 This situation will be further exacerbated by an additional 300,000 returnees that the government expects to arrive from the north before the end of 2011.

1.5 The highest returns being forecast are to North Bahr El Ghazal (around 87,000, forming 22% of the overall number), Unity (64,500, 16%), Upper Nile (52,500, 13%), Warrap (47,700, 12%) and CES (43,500, 11%). A very likely scenario is that a large part of the 400,000 returnees will be stuck in Renk (Diocese of Malakal—Administration Pastoral Region Kost) on their way to the final destination within South Sudan because the rainy season will make many roads all but impassable.

1.6 A Caritas assessment mission earlier this year found that facilities and support for the returnees were not in place, even for those who returned with government support. This has put an extreme burden on the
resources of the host communities, which they often share with the returnees thus impoverishing themselves, and has created a tension between the returnee and local population. The fact that many returnees are not coming back to their place of origin in rural areas but tend to settle around urban zones is adding to the complexity of the current situation. The additional number of returnees to South Sudan within the next few months will put even more pressure on the resources and services.

1.7 The Sudanese government has announced that as from 9 March 2012 all South Sudanese living in the North will be stripped of their rights as citizens and become “foreigners”. This will have a considerable impact on the church in both Sudan and South Sudan: South Sudanese who find themselves still in the north after the deadline are likely to turn to the church for help and support, if they find that their rights to employment and housing have indeed been eroded. The churches were the main source of humanitarian assistance to displaced southerners in the north, during the years of conflict and there is likely to be an expectation that this will continue. In South Sudan, where churches provide a very large part of the health and education services in the rural areas, an increased influx of returnees is going to add to demands on these services without necessarily any increase in resources. With employment opportunities virtually zero and returnees who are mainly coming from an urban environment in the cities in the north—and have most probably lost any farming skills they may have had—it is to be expected that there will be an increase in demands for humanitarian assistance.

1.8 During the long Sudanese conflict, churches in Sudan were key actors in the humanitarian sector, often being the only provider of assistance and health and education services to the population. For much of the last three decades the church has been the single institution with infrastructure on the ground amongst the people all over the south, and this has given it huge credibility. In addition, it has been actively involved in promoting and undertaking peace and conflict resolution activities. In the post-conflict period, the church, along with other actors that have been on the ground throughout the whole conflict, has had to go through a transition and find their new role, which also includes its part in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The church is well aware of the challenges ahead and is determined to play a leading role within Sudanese civil society in supporting the democratic process, promoting reconciliation and peace and offering humanitarian and development services to the most vulnerable people in both the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan.

1.9 The church has taken a proactive stance in looking for ways to improve its response to humanitarian needs and improving the capacities of the diocesan Development offices. The process of standardizing and improving national and diocesan structures (development offices) is underway with a focus on building transparent, effective and efficient management, communication and organizational structures and involving them in the program delivery. This will include creating a wide communication platform to discuss and achieve understanding of expectations, roles and responsibilities.

1.10 In addition to the continuous presence, the Catholic Church in Sudan has one more advantage that makes it ideally positioned to deliver humanitarian assistance: it reaches nearly every community and segment of population covering the whole of Sudan. Each diocese has a Caritas office responsible for the provision of humanitarian assistance and community development. Whenever in need, the population naturally turns to the church, informing them about the problems and needs in their communities and seeking assistance.

1.11 The transition of the SPLM/A from a guerrilla to a civil administration, weak physical and political infrastructure and large numbers of unemployed, unskilled ex-combatants means that both local and international humanitarian organisations are working in something of a political vacuum. The top-down, centralised approach of the new government acts as a further constraint. Nevertheless, despite these constraints the government is increasingly concerned to get the balance right between the role the state should play in service delivery and the existing and potential role of NGOs. CAFOD’s experience is that increased cooperation between NGOs and the government is being encouraged.

1.12 Insecurity arising from inter-ethnic conflict and armed militia who oppose the present government of South Sudan together with poor infrastructure are constraints on humanitarian access in numerous locations throughout the country

2. The provision of basic services, essential infrastructure and DFID’s efforts to reduce extreme poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods

2.1 This is essential and urgent. Unless people see that the government can successfully address their needs for basic services, (part of a peace dividend) they could become increasingly dissatisfied and this in turn could lead to growing insecurity.

2.2 The churches in South Sudan are major providers of basic services, but they are generally seen as being “private” service providers and as such receive little or no support from government (for example, the government does not pay salaries for teachers in church schools).

2.3 There is currently considerable discussion regarding how INGOs hand-over their services to government, but very little discussion on how indigenous civil society hands-over or gains support for its services.

2.4 Funding mechanisms are inappropriate for most national civil society organisations (including the church) to access.
3. How DFID can help to improve governance, including at the county and local level

3.1 Donors need to recognise that peace cannot be achieved through a top-down approach. Peace and reconciliation are essential building blocks for good governance, and peace-building is a long, slow process which must start at community level. Short-term funding mechanisms are wholly inadequate for this type of work because for the work to be effective it needs to be in place over a number of years and must be locally led. Appropriate funding mechanisms must recognise this and provide funding to local actors for meaningful peace building activities.

3.2 DFID and other major donors need to use their influence to ensure that there is a genuinely decentralised system of administration and that decision making is delegated to the lowest appropriate authority. Systems need to be in place to ensure transparency and accountability and that resources are not misused. Parallel to this, support must be given to civil society organisations, including the churches, who are building the capacity of communities to enable them to engage more fully in democratic processes, including holding local government to account.

3.3 DFID, together with the FCO and other international actors should support the government of South Sudan to ensure that it provides adequate protection and support for civilians caught up in ethnic conflicts in parts of the country. The British government should ensure that its funding addresses this issue.

3.4 Meeting on 28 October the South Sudan Bishops Conference noted: “Our people have displayed great strength, courage and fortitude in the face of war and hardship, but they have been traumatised and cycles of resentment and revenge have been created. Trauma healing is an immediate priority. The Church, by its nature and mission, is a sign of reconciliation, and South Sudanese have demonstrated a remarkable ability to reconcile, both through traditional mechanisms and in the Church-led “People to People Peace Process”. Reconciliation within South Sudan will be essential in building a new nation, addressing the grievances and pain of many individuals and ethnic groups who feel they have been mistreated even by the state or those who misuse the powers entrusted to them. However a number of necessary conditions must be in place for this to happen successfully. These include education, security, and a degree of stability and political maturity. Eventually, when the time is ripe, a truth and reconciliation process should be developed. It is to be hoped that, with time, reconciliation (as opposed to mere absence of conflict) will also be possible between the two Republics.”

3.5 Major support for developing human capacity via formal education and skills upgrading is needed. Sudan needs to invest in developing its own people to do the jobs currently being done by foreigners. Skills shortages are extreme, and donors need to work with the government to ensure that there is a clear strategy to address this which is both implemented by the government, and funded by donors. There will be no appreciable progress to achieve good governance without the trained and educated people to deliver this.

4. The role of the UN development and humanitarian organisations, the World Bank, other bilateral donors and the extent of leadership and coordination between them

4.1 Short-term funding is unhelpful. DFID should work with other international donors to establish long term funding mechanisms which enable actors to plan and execute development programmes which are sustainable.

4.2 Whilst encouraging long-term funding that is accessible to national organisations, the donor community must recognise that humanitarian needs will continue for years to come across South Sudan, so developmental funding mechanisms should not be at the expense of humanitarian funding mechanisms. Both are needed.

4.3 Funding mechanisms tend to exclude national organisations (time frames, grant size, accountability requirements, etc) are not helpful.

4.4 There is, unfortunately, within the international community inadequate recognition for the importance of grass roots institutions and organisations, particularly in the field of peace-building. There should be greater recognition amongst the major donors that the Government of South Sudan is a nascent government, emerging from more than 20 years of armed conflict. It was clear from very early on that there would be a shortage of trained and experienced personnel to run all facets of the work of the government. The major funding institutions need to adopt an approach that recognises this and allows designated funds to flow to Sudan, especially for building capacity, whilst establishing appropriate checks and balances to ensure the money is not diverted from its intended purpose.

5. The security situation including the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping force, UNMISS, and the prospects for a non-militarised border

5.1 UN peace-keeping efforts have in the main been disappointing in maintaining the peace and protecting civilians. It is perceived by many in South Sudan that the UN and the international community more widely have been much more sympathetic to the wishes of the government in Khartoum than to South Sudan. An example is in Abyei, where, although the UN stabilisation force has been almost completely deployed, the
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has made no attempt to withdraw, in line with the agreement, and there appears to be no political will to pressure them to do so.

5.2 “Too many agreements dishonoured” A clear example of this phrase, something of a talisman in South Sudan, is over the issue of border demarcation. The government in Khartoum rejected the findings of both the Boundaries Commission and the International Court of Arbitration, despite having previously signed up to be bound by both. No sanctions have been applied to them, only further pressure on the government in Juba to make more concessions.

5.3 The people of Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal and neighbouring countries continue to suffer due to the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). CAFOD and our church partners in South Sudan reject further militarisation of any of these conflicts, and call upon governments and the international community to work for negotiated settlements. We call for increased protection and humanitarian assistance for the affected populations. We believe the British government must work with the international community and particularly through its role on the UN Security Council to ensure both that the UNMISS mandate is adequate for the task that the force faces, and that it carries out its mission in accordance with its mandate. Furthermore, the British government should work with the governments of South Sudan as well as DRC, Central Africa Republic and Uganda and with international partners to ensure that civil defence units such as the so called “Arrow Boys”, ostensibly set up to defend the population against LRA attacks, are not provided with arms, something which will inevitably increase insecurity.

5.4. The Sudan Catholic Bishops recognise the threat to South Sudan of the on-going conflicts immediately to the north. In October 2011 they noted that “Civil war has broken out in the Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan State and in Blue Nile State, alongside the ongoing war in Darfur. We have consistently warned of the danger of a return to hostilities if the legitimate aspirations of the people of these areas were not met. Civilians are being terrorised by indiscriminate aerial bombardment. There is an urgent need to open humanitarian corridors to allow food and medicines to reach those in need. The dispute over the status of Abyei has been militarised. We urge the international community, and particularly our brothers and sisters in the African Union, to ensure that these conflicts are resolved peacefully through the full implementation of the remaining protocols of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for these three areas, and to assist with outstanding issues between the two nations including citizenship and demarcation of boundaries.”

November 2011

Written evidence submitted by the Development Initiatives

This submission from Development Initiatives is based on our experience in researching and promoting transparency of humanitarian and other resource flows for poverty reduction, through our Global Humanitarian Assistance programme, and through our support to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). 11

1. Aid investments in Sudan have been significant. Sudan has received US$14 billion in official development assistance (ODA) in the 10 years between 2000 and 2009. 12 The United Kingdom was the third largest donor during this period, providing 8.6% of the total. However, the historic aid investment in South Sudan is poorly documented and aid investments prior to independence can rarely be disaggregated between South Sudan and programmes in Darfur or elsewhere in Sudan, much less can they be tracked through to state and county level. This is a barrier to ensuring equity in resource allocation and to evaluating results and impact of aid investments. [see encl Global Humanitarian Assistance, Aid in transition: South Sudan].

2. Although South Sudan generates significant revenues from oil production [see encl. Global Humanitarian Assistance, Resource flows to Sudan: Aid to South Sudan, July 2011, pp 2], giving the Government of the Republic of South Sudan considerable scope to provide social protection their own citizens, in particular though cash transfers, it is likely that international aid will continue to underwrite the provision of basic services and social safety nets for the foreseeable future.

3. Transparency of aid resource flows is essential to achieve rational and equitable allocations of aid resources in line with the government’s priorities, and to facilitate accountability to both the intended beneficiaries of aid and to the tax-paying publics of donor countries.

4. Publicly available information on aid resources could both stimulate demand for open data on all resource flows for poverty reduction and provide a blueprint for transparency of other resources, including oil revenues.

5. A country-level aid information management system (AIMS) managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) is due to be launched this year. It is crucial that this data be publicly accessible, that it is IATI compliant, that donors report comprehensively and in a timely fashion and that the MoFEP has sufficient capacity and support to manage the system effectively.

10 Ibid.
11 IATI is a global transparency standard that makes information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand www.iatistandard.org. The UK government, working closely with Development Initiatives and UNDP, continues to play a leading role in the development and uptake of IATI.
12 The latest available data on ODA from the OECD is to 2009.
6. During the Interim Period, the international community and the Government of Southern Sudan missed opportunities to meet chronic needs, to address vulnerability and build resilience. A desire, shared by many donors and indeed the GoSS, in the early interim period to effect a rapid shift from humanitarian aid to development programming overlooked the huge and persistent burden of chronic needs, the continued risk of humanitarian crisis and was over-optimistic about the pace of development.

7. The artificial distinction between humanitarian and development financing streams left little space for predictable funding programmes meeting chronic needs and addressing the root causes of vulnerability. [See encl. Global Humanitarian Assistance, Southern Sudan: Funding according to need, Oct 2010].

8. In order to invest in resilience on South Sudan, government donors must consider a range of funding mechanisms—including but not limited to pooled funds—which permit flexible and predictable financing support. Pooled funds have proved useful in South Sudan, but have proliferated, blunting the potential boost to harmonisation. Pooled funds themselves may now require harmonisation in South Sudan, in which the UK government, involved in the establishment of funds including the Common Humanitarian Fund, should play a significant role.

9. Though improving, objective evidence on the scale and nature of vulnerability and humanitarian need in South Sudan is notoriously poor. This poor evidence base is a barrier to the effective and equitable allocation of resources. Donors should invest in the capacity to monitor and assess key humanitarian indicators and risk factors and also provide incentives for partners to use shared methodologies and participate in joint assessments to build a shared evidence base. In addition donors, including the UK, should more systematically incorporate objective evidence on risk, vulnerability and humanitarian needs, as well as evidence of a range of resource flows including aid and domestic government revenues, into their funding allocation process to facilitate better targeted and more equitable funding decisions. [See encl Global Humanitarian Assistance, Southern Sudan: Funding according to need, Oct 2010].

REFERENCES AND RESOURCES

Global Humanitarian Assistance, Southern Sudan: Funding according to need, Oct 2010.

Global Humanitarian Assistance, Resource flows to Sudan: Aid to South Sudan, July 2011.

Global Humanitarian Assistance, Aid in transition: South Sudan, Aug 2011.

Written evidence submitted by EU European External Action Service

THE SPECIAL FUND FOR SUDAN (ONLY THE PART ALLOCATED TO THE SOUTH)

South Sudan rural development programme (SORUDEV) €42,000,000
Strengthening democratic governance in the Republic of South Sudan €20,000,000
Improved management of education delivery (IMED), South Sudan €11,500,000
Better health for South Sudan (BHESS) €11,500,000
Total €85,000,000

PROPOSAL FOR USE OF THE €200 MILLION SPECIAL FUNDS FOR SOUTH SUDAN (SFSS) INCLUDING IN THE EU JOINT PROGRAMMING

JOINT PROGRAMMING SECTORS

Food security—rural development €80 Million
Health €50 Million
Education €30 Million
Security/rule of law €25 Million

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE

Technical Cooperation Facility €11 Million
Management Contribution (2%) €4 Million
Total 200 Million

January 2012
Written evidence submitted by Global Witness

SUMMARY

1. The purpose of the submission is to draw from our previous work on the management of natural resources in South Sudan, Sudan and elsewhere to address two of the issues highlighted in the inquiry announcement:
   — How DFID can help to improve governance, including at the county and local level.
   — The management of oil and oil revenues for development.

2. Based on the United Kingdom’s development priorities and the current opportunities and capacity gaps in the country, we recommend that the FCO and DFID take a much more active role in supporting transparent and accountable natural resource governance in South Sudan. In particular, the UK should be providing strong political and technical support for the institutions charged with overseeing the management of resources and revenues (eg the Audit Chamber and the National Legislative Assembly).

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

3. For 15 years, Global Witness has run pioneering campaigns against natural resource-related conflict, corruption, and associated environmental and human rights abuses. From Cambodia to Congo, Sierra Leone to Turkmenistan, we have worked to expose the brutality and injustice that results from the misuse of natural resource wealth.

4. Our previous work in Sudan and South Sudan has focused on how the opaque management of shared oil revenues by the Government of National Unity fuelled mistrust and risked a return to conflict. We have also spent the last year working with the relevant institutions in South Sudan to develop transparency and accountability mechanisms in the Transitional Constitution and forthcoming legislation.

5. Charmian Gooch is the co-founder and co-director of Global Witness. She jointly led Global Witness’ first campaign which investigated the trade in timber between the Khmer Rouge and Thai logging companies and their political and military backers. This campaign resulted in the cutting off of logging revenue to the Khmer Rouge and successfully put forestry reform at the centre of international donor policies. Charmian developed Global Witness’ second groundbreaking campaign, combating blood diamonds, which she launched in 1998 following detailed research and investigations. Global Witness was later nominated for the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize for its work on conflict diamonds. Charmian is a member of the World Economic Forum’s Young Global Leader group.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

6. According to South Sudan’s own Ministry of Finance, at current production levels, South Sudan’s oil industry is expected to last just eight more years. Oil revenues are expected to peak in the next year and at current spending levels, the Ministry anticipates a budget deficit as soon as 2021. Consequently, it is critical that South Sudan’s oil wealth is managed as responsibly and transparently as possible.

7. Since before independence, the Government of South Sudan has been developing the legal framework which will govern its petroleum sector for the foreseeable future. This effort includes the drafting of a Petroleum Policy, a Petroleum Bill, a Petroleum Revenue Management Bill, and subsequent regulations. Donor assistance is being provided by Norway and, to a lesser degree, the United States. The importance of this legal framework development process cannot be understated as it offers the Government a unique opportunity to establish robust transparency and accountability requirements in law from the start.

8. The most recent drafts of both the Petroleum Bill and the Petroleum Revenue Management Bill include many best practice provisions for ensuring transparency and accountability. However, some significant gaps remain regarding the disaggregation of data to be published and the frequency of reporting; gaps which risk undermining the transparency efforts of the legislation.

9. The Government of South Sudan recently announced it has sold 33.4 million barrels of oil, worth US$3.2 billion, for the period 9 July to 31 December. The only detail included in the announcement was a breakdown of sales by blend and a commitment to publish data on a quarterly basis. Information on the per barrel sale prices, the identity of the purchasers, and disaggregated production and revenue data (by month and by oil block) have not been published. Moreover, no information has been published on the fees paid to companies and the Sudanese government for use of the pipeline and marine terminal in Port Sudan (a charge separate from the transit fees now being negotiated) or on how much, if any, crude oil was sold to refineries in Sudan. This very limited disclosure of crucial data is very concerning, and is at odds with the Government’s previous calls for greater data transparency when sales of southern oil were managed by the government in Khartoum.

10. Oversight institutions in South Sudan, such as the Audit Chamber and the National Legislative Assembly, are largely overlooked by donors and struggle with a shortage of even basic facilities, limited technical knowledge and almost no research capacity. Focused assistance is desperately needed as these bodies represent the internal checks and balances which will be necessary to ensure the executive is held accountable in its management of natural resources and the revenues derived from them.
11. The UK is currently supporting capacity building in South Sudan’s Audit Chamber and the Public Accounts Committee of the Legislative Assembly via the Joint Donor Office in Juba. The UK government must take care to ensure that any arrangements it enters with other donors to provide indirect or shared funding of such programmes do not diminish its active political support of these institutions. It is also important that any shared funding mechanisms do not involve complicated joint approval processes that hold up much-needed technical training.

12. The UK, via consultants, has also been involved in the drafting of a Mining Bill in South Sudan. There has been little, if any, public consultation on the development of this critical legislation and it remains unclear if the draft to be presented to the parliament in the coming months will ensure greater transparency and accountability in this potentially very lucrative industry. Though the mineral sector is not expected to come on-stream for several years, gold and uranium exploration contracts have reportedly already been informally awarded. No information on existing contracts or exploration permits has been published by the Government since independence.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

13. Global Witness recommends that the United Kingdom take a direct and active lead on supporting the oversight role of the Audit Chamber and the National Legislative Assembly, in particular the Public Accounts and Energy Committees. The complexity of the petroleum sector requires that the institutions charged with monitoring its management be guaranteed the technical expertise, funding, and access necessary to properly oversee the sector and its revenues.

14. The United Kingdom should be putting pressure on the Government of South Sudan to include robust transparency and accountability requirements in the forthcoming Petroleum Bill and Petroleum Revenue Management Bill.

15. The United Kingdom should push for immediate transparency in the management of South Sudan’s petroleum sector. The information that must be published includes disaggregated production, sales, and revenue figures. This will bring South Sudan in line with international best practice.

16. The United Kingdom should push for comprehensive public consultation on the forthcoming Mining Bill and ensure that robust transparency and accountability requirements are included in the new law.

November 2011

Written evidence submitted by the Lakes State Government

INTRODUCTION

Lakes State Government received a notification about a visit of UK International Development Committee to South Sudan on 6–7 December 2011; the letter introduced the purpose of the visit as being an inquiry on South Sudan to look at the Birth of new Nation with a specific focus on the prospect of Peace and Development.

BACKGROUND

Lakes State warmly welcome the opportunity to make the submission to International Development Committee, but before we go into subject matter, Lakes State Government, on behalf of the entire community and my own behalf, wish to express a word of appreciation to UK Government for sending us the UK’s International Development Committee which is responsible for oversight of the Department for International Development (DFID).

LOCATION AND SIZE

Lakes State lies between longitudes 28° 53” east of the Meridian and latitudes 6° 46” North of the Equator. Has high land in Wulu South of the state and parts of Rumbek East, Yirol West County and low land north of the State. The State is composed of eight (8) Counties: Cueibet, Rumbek Central, Rumbek North, Rumbek East, Wulu, Yirol West, Yirol East and Aweirial.

The State is almost central in relation to the 10 States of South Sudan. It borders five States of The Republic of South Sudan namely: Warrap to the north-west, Unity State to the north, Upper Nile and Jonglei States to the east, Central Equatoria State to the south-east, western Equatoria state to the south-west. It occupies roughly an area of 49,325 km² and it is worth mentioning that the State derives its name from the number of Lakes scattered in the State. The State Capital is Rumbek.

CLIMATE

The State has a semi-tropical climate and normally receives between 900–1,200mm of rainfalls annually, although rain fall patterns have now changed a lot, mostly there are erratic rainfall usually from April to July and exceptionally, heavy rainfalls between August and September which cause flooding, rendering some of the rural areas inaccessible, impeding socio-economic activities. The long dry spells which starts from end of
October to mid April affects the availability of water sources and grazing ground become scarce, often resulting into sub-tribal clashes over resources.

Temperature ranges from 26°C–38°C with hottest months being from February to mid May. Relative humidity is high between September and October.

**LAND**

The state has abundant fertile land where a wide variety of crops can grow well with potential of producing surplus.

**AGRO-ECOLOGY SETTING**

Lakes state has a vast natural resources and favourable agro-ecological conditions including arable land, forests, and pastures, rivers, streams and lakes, wildlife and human resources, which if exploited well could make the State a fully food secured region leading to socio-economic development.

Its vast natural resources extend from fertile iron stone plateau to the South through central plain of savannah open woodland to the flood plains and toic (open plains) in the North of the State.

These three zones (Iron Stone Plateau Central plain and Flood plains) are rain- fed systems characterized by shifting cultivation and inter-cropping of traditional crop varieties, well adapted to local soil conditions, climate pests and diseases. They also provide opportunities for livestock, Forestry and Fisheries production to meet internal household food needs.

Similarly, agricultural production tools and implements for land preparation, weeding and harvesting have remained traditional and are suited for subsistence.

**ETHNICITY AND POPULATION**

The population of Lakes State is put to be 695,730 according to the rejected census results of 2009, but it is roughly around 1,000,000 of which 90% constitute ethnic groups of Dinka occupying seven counties out of eight state counties.

The other ethnic group of Jur (Beli) occupies Wulu county and southern parts of two counties of Cueibet and Rumbek East.

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES**

The Dinka ethnic groups, which constitute 90% of the total population, are predominantly agro-pastoralists and their wealth is seen mainly in number of cattle owned while Jur (Beli) are agriculturalist, whose wealth is measured in number of beehives owned and total area cultivated.

The state huge water resources consisting of lakes, big rivers (Nile and its tributaries) seasonal river valleys and swampland can support a potentially strong fish industry and commercial irrigation for a range of horticulture crops and water-loving crops like rice and sugar cane.

It is worth mentioning that the main source of livelihoods in the state is mainly:

(a) Agro-pastoralist mainly for Dinka ethnic groups.

(b) Farming/pure agriculturalist.

(c) Fishing along the river Nile–Shambe and nearby areas.

It is true that more than 90% of the State inhabitants depend on subsistence farming system. This is because about 40% of the total land surface is pure agricultural land while remaining 60% is marginal arable land, forests and wet lands.

Trade and commerce in the state is fairly in progress only that poor infrastructure is an obstacle as most of the goods are brought from either East Africa or Khartoum. There are three main business centres in the state namely: Rumbek market, Cueibet market and Yirol Market.

**AGRICULTURE**

Lakes State is faced with droughts and floods due to climatic changes. This situation needs the State to revise farming pattern by introducing and expanding cultivation of early maturing and drought resistant crops and water-loving crop varieties in arid and flood plains respectively, through adequate funding.

Pests and diseases, poor soil conservation and low soil fertility commonly cause crop failure, consequently agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and labour saving and cost-effective farm implements like ox-plough and mechanized technology would create positive impact on production and development.

Introduction of irrigation agriculture in arid zones would provide a market—oriented State economy as there will be surplus production.
Development of rural infrastructure including feeder roads, irrigation systems operated by households would also increase gross domestic production (GDP).

Production of cash crops of Simsim and groundnuts will make Yirol Simsim oil mill rehabilitation a necessity.

FORESTRY

The economic potential of forests is manifested by abundance of mahogany and ebony trees used for production of timbers, but ineffective due to lack of appropriate technology.

Some processes are underway, though insufficient due to lack of technology to rehabilitated Bhar-gel Saw-mill if funding is made available.

The other available and useful tree species with economic value include:

- Acacia wild tree spices for gum Arabic production that is useful in light industries such as shoes factories, wood and paper works.
- Lulu tree normally being consumed as wild fruit and locally processed to produce edible food oil.
- Palm tree eaten as wild fruit, construction of canoes, poles and leaves as fibres for mates and baskets making locally.
- Mahogany used for furniture's and building materials.

ANIMAL RESOURCES/LIVESTOCK

Livestock is a major contributor to the local economy and food security either directly through daily food subsistence or indirectly from sales of livestock and its products although under developed. The most commonly kept animals are cattle, goats, sheep and poultry. The livestock production is influenced by rain fall pattern distribution where pastoralist groups, follow movement of the flood waters looking for water and pastures. It is worth noting that, the dry season is the period when there is concentration of people in cattle camps in the lowland grazing grounds known as Toic. It is also period when tensions build up within and between herding communities, resulting to inter-tribal conflicts.

TYPES AND POPULATION OF ANIMAL RESOURCES

The total population of livestock is estimated to be above 2,000,000 of which cattle accounts for 90% and pigs 0.2% only in Rumbek and Yirol counties. Goats and sheep for 0.8%.

ANIMAL HEALTH

Although some animal diseases like rinderpest have been eradicated, still a number of animal diseases continue to pose challenges on livestock development in the state. However infectious diseases are threats to livestock development and production. Hence adequate attention, through the use of vaccination and treatment is essential to control the disease. Other interventions could be:

1. Build capacities of stock person staff in disease management and control.
2. Provision of drugs and vaccines.
3. Establishment of livestock market centres.
4. Bee keeping management through training and provision of equipment.
5. Improvement of stock by introducing cross breeding.

FISHERIES

Tilapia, Nile perch, cat fish, African long fish, carpulus fish and scale fish (nook in Arabic) are the major types of fish available in Lakes State, mainly from lakes, rivers, streams and swamps.

Major challenges, which need to be addressed for fish industry development, are:

- Establishment of policy and fishing act for control and management.
- Capacity building of human resources.
- Provision of fishing equipment/gears.
- Improve roads and lack of transport ie infrastructure.
- Training in methods of fish processing and storages.

WILDLIFE AND TOURISM

The 22 years of war and destruction of forests at an alarming rate forced the animals to run away and some randomly killed for food. However, some animals are returning. Types of animals are Rhino, Buffalo, Giraffe and Elephants; hippos; various types of antelopes and gazelles and did-dik. However, three game reserves exist
in the state namely: Southern National Park (Ngap and Kemer), Karier and Shambe. Also there are a number of birds. These resources could be developed; to make the state a potential area for tourism. The obstacle is lack of trained personnel and financial capacity.

HEALTH

Health sector in Lakes State has undergone a serious destruction and devastation as a result of 22 years war. Most of health facilities such as hospitals and health centres were destroyed. The few which remain are in bad conditions in terms of building and health equipment.

Based on primary health care policy we have one State hospital, one county hospital and four primary Health Care centres functioning. These facilities are lacking basic medical cadres and equipments. In the State no private sector hospital and health complexes.

Therefore, it is a high time to invest in this sector to reduce case referrals to Khartoum and other foreign countries where cost of treatment is high.

Health interventions constitute the following:
- Construction of State Counties, Hospitals and Health Facilities Centres.
- Provision of Medical Equipment.
- Provision of means of transport.
- Provision of drugs.
- Training of medical cadres.
- Provision of communications means.
- Electrification and water supplies.
- Environmental health and sanitation facilities.

EDUCATION

As there is high clamour for education in the State and the fact that Lakes State was among the completely devastated States during the 22 years civil strife, lot of challenges in developing education still remained mostly:
- Lack of trained teachers.
- Lack of learning materials, environment and learning spaces.

These challenges made some able persons take their children to the neighbouring East African Countries in search of better education.

At present, the student population attending formal education in neighbouring countries is more than 20,000 as such establishment of partnership to explore the situation so that a sustainable development in education and peace could be achieved.

Since the State just emerged from war, and is being faced with lot of problems in basic education provision and opening of private schools becomes a necessity.

INFRASTRUCTURE

It is to be recalled that the 22 years of civil war caused a lot of devastation and destruction of roads, public utilities, urban and rural water points, drainage systems and so many other simple infrastructures. Now the State Government is trying to provide basic needs mostly:
- Provision of safe drinking water to rural and urban areas.
- The State power station is under construction and hopefully will start functioning towards the end of the year 2010, although will not be sufficient to cover the whole Rumbek town, leave alone the Rural areas and therefore there is a need to explore other alternative sources of energy eg solar energy and wind-mill.
- Urban planning is also in process.
- Government of Southern Sudan has passed land policy, which will regulate usage and management of land for individual and commercial purposes.
- Road infrastructure is the most challenging structure in the State, as the State is a land lock and has negative impact on trade and business.
- Feeder roads are essential in connecting areas of production, consumption/markets and also help in maintenance of peace and State priorities, but only lack of funding is an obstacle.
- Rumbek airstrip is one of the ports internationally and therefore needs to be upgraded to meet the required standards. This also applies to Shambe port along the river Nile which gives access to North-South communication services and river transport.
— It is a State policy to encourage investment in real estate development, particularly for low income housing scheme.

**Major Strategic Issues for Development Intervention**

— Improvement of agriculture, livestock and fisheries production.
— Improvement of poor infrastructure.
— Project, regenerate, conserve soil fertile and natural Resources for sustainable management and utilization of natural resources.
— Develop training and skills programme for human resource s capacity building.
— Carry out rehabilitation of old projects that existed before the war destruction eg Barghel saw-mill and Yirol oil-mill.
— Agricultural appropriate inputs including credit facility at affordable cost.
— Encourage entrepreneurial skills training for small income generation and development.
— Provision land for businesses and investment.
— Development of water resources (dredging of rivers, digging of heifers and water catchments) for cattle and irrigation.
— Provision of clean water to urban centres and rural areas.

**Summary**

This submission outlines the following:

1. humanitarian needs among the returning South Sudanese;
2. the security situation in Lakes State;
3. efforts of the State in the provision of basic services and infrastructural development;
4. the need for DFID to help in improvement of Governance and sustainable Development;
5. the role of UN agencies and other NGOs partners in development;
6. the management of oil and oil revenues for development; and
7. what may be the implications of potential membership of the Commonwealth and the East African Community?

1. *The extent of humanitarian need, especially among returning South Sudanese and those displaced by fighting in Abyei and South Kordofan and any other problems with humanitarian access*

Lakes State unlike other States of South Sudan faces unique humanitarian challenges commensurate with its unique location. It shares no border with (North) Sudan and therefore doesn’t face any border crisis or violence. There has always been a long standing inter-communal violence within and with the inter-States Communities like Unity, Warrap and Western Equatoria. These incidences do not produce mass displacement. Only from November 2010 to November 2011, that Lakes State experienced an influx of returnees from the North, of the estimated 30,000 IDPs from Lakes State in the Northern States, only 7,027 have been received so far.

Problems faced and lesson learned.

IDPs repatriation required huge logistical arrangements. Number of helping NGOs were then involved, some of them adopted various inter-related options. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs was to arrange IDPs repatriation in collaboration with UN Agencies. The transport arrangements were to be by Air, Rail, River and Land. When transportation started, problems were encountered such as insecurity along the way for those travelling by land and train. Likewise, those who travelled by train and river got stranded at both ports, Kosti and Shambe. However, these are in addition to the initial problem of not being picked up sooner from their original bases. Even after they arrived to final destinations, still there was the question of feeding, accommodation, sanitation and water supplies, and how to meet their social and economic requirements. So far, some of them got integrated into the community with permanent land allocation, to the extent that some have done small farms around their simple homes.

But, even after they had settled down quietly and got integrated, they had continued to face multiple obstacles. One such obstacle was how their children were to get educated, as they were receiving their schooling in Arabic language in the Northern Sudan and now the language of instruction was to shift to English where they then were, which left some of the parents or guardians with options of either sending the children to other States where they will continue their studies in Arabic language like in Wau, in Western Bahr el Ghazal State or let them join English pattern where they are introduced to taking lessons in English. And this has in turn introduced its own problems of either the children standard drops or the children drop to lower classes coupled with the further problem either being taught under trees in overcrowded classrooms due shortage of classrooms spaces in some of the schools. Furthermore, there is lack of Arabic textbooks.
Nevertheless, other factors include socio-economic and healthcare. Most of the IDPs family were self-reliant ie they have jobs and some were doing their small businesses. This also applies to healthcare. The State was already suffering from lack of healthcare facilities, qualified personnel and drugs.

As for the flow of refugees from Abyei or South Kordofan to camps in the South Sudan borders Lakes State did its best by way of financial contribution and humanitarian agencies provided relief to the people in need.

2. The security situation including the effectiveness of the UN Peacekeeping Force

The Government of South Sudan’s ambitious Development Plan depends on a peace and security and Lakes State policy statement did put security its top priority which is yet to be achieved. Though insecurity remain a challenge, it has drastically dropped since the implementation of peaceful and voluntary disarmament of the civil population.

Lakes State being branch office/subsector of UMISS in South Sudan, we welcome UNMISS mandate for the protection of civilian under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 7,000 troops to be deployed across States of South Sudan, this will complement the national forces and the organized forces maintenance of security protection of our civil population.

The main causes of insecurity in Lakes State which was commonly experienced before recent disarmament is cattle raiding, disputes over grazing land, water points and revenge attacks. Currently security situation is calm. Even before the disarmament, Lakes State made efforts in line with its policy of maintaining security by conducting number of peace conferences within the Counties and with neighbouring States to promote peaceful coexistence, which to a large extent did work.

Challenges faced in security maintenance, due to low capacities of organized forces (police, prison, wildlife, fire brigade) coupled with low capacities of legal organs. This is an area where DFID and other International Partners provide their support to strengthen capacities to enable state maintain security and rule of law.

3. On the provision of basic services, essential infrastructure and DFID’s effort to reduce extreme poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods

The Lakes State government has listed basic service provision in its policy statement as a key priority, particularly education, healthcare, security, rule of law, and infrastructural development. Because we, like most of our fellow South Sudanese lack any access to healthcare, education, clean water or sanitation and these shortfalls in such essential services provisions create security risk. Recently, we experienced this situation in Lakes State with the influx of returning IDPs from the North at a time when such provisions were not in place. Overcrowding where services can be accessed placed an additional stress on our meagre resources and the social fabric and although no such thing is there at the moment, chances are that, this can still cause social unrest. Now, the State Government seeks those who will be willing to support the State developmental projects by incorporating their own development work with the State’s Plans.

Take education, for the last 21 years of civil war, educational infrastructure was completely destroyed. Even if the State Government has now put it as its top priority, yet there are no resources to turn the educational system around single handedly. It is a told order to construct schools, equip them with school materials and recruit qualified teachers to restore educational system that has been lost for over 21 years. We will need many good Samaritans such as what DFID has just begun and other international collaborators like UNDP to help us pass through these hard times. In short, we need support in the area of capacity building and resources for the provision of schools materials.

Healthcare, the State healthcare situation is dire due to lack of infrastructure, qualified personnel, medical facilities and drugs. There is only one referral hospital which is not well equip, so maternal and infant mortal rates is very high due lack of primary healthcare though some NGOs tried to intervene, there is still a lot to be done. Eg more qualified staff, PHCCs, PHCU, etc but we are thankful to CCM (An Italian Medical Care), WHO, MALTESER and others for their support during these periods.

Poor road network is another obstacle which terribly hinders the delivery of basic services all over the State leading to high cost of living in the State while Lakes State is the only link to the most States and therefore, need feeder roads to provide these linkages. Under Sudan Recovery Funds (SRF) two feeder roads turned into security roads are current under construction.

4. How DFID can help improve governance, including at the county and local level

The Republic of South Sudan has initiated some positive changes by introducing decentralization, and did establish a number of structures, like administrative chain of management, starting at the National, State, County, Payam and Bom (village) levels, the fiscal decentralization at Republic of South Sudan did not take place. Yet, it is the policy of Lakes State Government to fight corruption through transparency and accountability as the bases for good governance. We are fully committed to a corruption free society.

Despite the preceding efforts by our government, Lakes State concurs with Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS) view that: “there remains significant room for improvement in governance and there is a great deal that DFID and other international donors can do to promote this. Donors and their subsidiaries can work directly
with the government to rapidly improve human capacity in key ministries. They can also support the
development of civil society institutions that are essential for a functioning democracy, including a free media,
and freedom to participate in the democratic process, and an independent judiciary. Tackling corruption is
particularly important, as the country’s resources are already inadequate to the scale of development needs; if
unaddressed, rampant corruption could generate anti-government sentiment”.

Lakes State fully shares the prevalent concern widely expressed that areas pursued in governance usually
favour central government institutions, to the disadvantage of States which ran contrary to the decentralized
system envisioned by National Transitional Constitution rightly seen to be the best way towards achieving
peaceful development with great regional diversity in South Sudan. The surest way for DFID to improve
Governance is for International Development Committee to encourage Programmes delivered at the State and
County levels. Particularly, capacity building at various levels.

5. The role of UN agencies and other NGOs partners in development

Through the war years and after, in which international organization were involved in South Sudan, tangible
progress has been made by the donor community in providing the foundation for strong leadership and
coordination. Coordination mechanisms such as the cluster system of DFID’s core team, Sudan Recovery
Funds (SRF) and Basic Services Fund. The State is for the current coordination system because it helps avoid
duplication and manage gaps in service provision. But we would also encourage involvement of local NGOs
and CBOs to work hand in hand with international partners.

The State during its short live noted the significant worth of the Basic Services Fund in enabling civil society
to effectively deliver services. We sincerely appreciate the extension, as we have learned, of the BSF until the
end of 2012. But, worried by the news of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), the Basic Services Fund (BSF)
and Sudan Recovery Fund for South Sudan (SRF-SS) all drawing to a close within the coming year, to stop
gaps emerging in basic service provision, could the administrators of major funding mechanisms lead the
international community in establishing and charting out precisely what funding mechanisms will be in place
over the coming years to support peace-building, humanitarian relief and long term development work.

6. The implications of potential membership of the Commonwealth and EAC

At present, the Republic South Sudan has limited choice since the Republic of Sudan closed the border. It
is highly important for South Sudan to secure its position on the region and the world stage by building bilateral
trade, security and political relationships with its East Africa Countries. We, as State, would welcome the
decision by South Sudan joining the Commonwealth of Nations and the East African Countries and other
Nations.

7. The management of oil and oil revenues for development

Management of oil and oil revenues falls under the National Government. However, we were made aware
during the first Governors’ forum after Independence, that the Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning has
taken the lead working together with the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, of Justice, and the Bank of South
Sudan to draft the Petroleum Management Bill.

The Bill establishes the oil revenue stabilization accounts to act as buffer against volatility in oil prices and
future generation funds to enable the Government to set aside some funds for future generations.

The Bill is in line with Transitional Constitution of South Sudan which states that the ownership of petroleum
and gas shall be vested in the people of South Sudan and shall be develop and manage by the National
Government on behalf of, and for the benefit of the people.

The oil revenue management will be based on best International practice and principles for good governance,
transparency and accountability. Though Lakes State is currently a non oil producing State, we entirely agree
with the position taken by the above national bodies.

January 2012

Written evidence submitted by Minority Rights Group International

1. Introduction

2. Minority Rights Group International (MRG) firmly believes that South Sudan should be a priority for
HMG and DFID in particular. The development challenges in the country are enormous, as outlined in the
IDC’s call for submissions. In addition the country is affected by both internal and cross-border conflicts
which result in civilian deaths, destroy infrastructure, form a barrier to development initiatives, and result in a
disproportionate amount of government funding being allocated to security provision.

3. Among the most pressing concerns identified during MRG’s work in South Sudan are (a) the need for
effective decentralisation in order to assuage concerns of smaller ethnic communities about marginalisation
from decision-making, services and employment; (b) strengthening of grassroots structures for managing local-level conflicts; (c) protection of communities’ land rights; and (d) a consensus-based approach to security issues which sees local communities as partners for peace and not problems, and avoids the use of force.

4. MRG has been researching and publishing on Sudan/South Sudan since 1988. We currently have a programme, funded by the European Union and Ireland Aid, to provide research and early warning information on local-level conflicts over land, water and livestock in South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, and support local CBOs to resolve such conflicts.

5. Decentralisation

6. South Sudan is home to over 60 main ethnic groups and many more sub-groups. What has become known as “Tribalism” has become one of the most pressing concerns of people in South Sudan, particularly the fear that ethnic groups with access to power will marginalise the less powerful. People feel—with a certain amount of justification—that if their tribe is not represented in decision-making positions, they will not have access to resources, services and jobs. Smaller ethnic groups perceive the Dinka and to a lesser extent, the Nuer, as dominating power structures.

7. It will not be possible for all South Sudan’s ethnic groups—to least of all the sub-groups—to be represented in the Cabinet. Decentralization offers the possibility to bring decision-making powers closer to the people, at least for issues that are of relevance at the community level, such as basic services and jobs. South Sudan’s Transitional Constitution and Local Government Act allow, in theory, for considerable devolution of powers. However in practice, a number of barriers to this process have arisen, including a lack of infrastructure and sufficiently qualified people at the local level, and a failure by central government to prioritise decentralisation in the face of a myriad challenges in the post-independence context.

8. A number of internal conflicts, many of them with an ethnic aspect, are overwhelming the capacity of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to provide security to its own citizens. Decentralization may be the key to moving these tensions into the realm of democratic politics.

9. HMG should continue to work multilaterally with other donors to support governance programmes particularly with a view to strengthening governance structures at the state, county and payam level. Training should be provided to local officials and financial support provided for the necessary equipment and buildings. HMG should work to convince GoSS of the urgent need to show people that progress is being made towards bringing decision-making down to the local level, including through the use of innovative structures to give a voice to representatives of ethnic groups, such as the proposal for a House of Chiefs in each of the 10 states of South Sudan.

10. Managing Local-level Conflicts

11. Conflicts over land, water and livestock are proliferating in South Sudan. In some cases a never-ending cycle of revenge attacks begins. State security agents and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) struggle to cope, especially as the lack of paved roads makes access to affected communities difficult or impossible, especially in the rainy season.

12. In MRG’s experience, civil society groups and traditional tribal structures do excellent work in promoting mediation between feuding ethnic communities, but their capacity is extremely weak.

13. HMG should provide financial support and training for civil society groups and elders to work on conflict prevention and resolution.

14. Land Rights

15. Again, on paper, the legislative framework on land rights is promising. Collective ownership based on a history of residence and land-use is recognised. However the reality is less positive.

16. It is of grave concern that the Government of South Sudan has signed a lease of 16,800 square kilometres of land, comprising the entirety of Boma National Park in Jonglei State, to a United Arab Emirates company, Al Ain National Wildlife. The land, which could be used to grow food for local consumption, is to be used to build hotels and safari camps.

17. This vast tract of land is in an area which, like most of South Sudan, is inhabited by ethnic groups who, in many cases, exercise a collective, customary form of ownership of land, without formalised legal title. According to staff of a local non-governmental organisation which is a partner of MRG, members of the

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14 “Developments in Sudan and South Sudan”, event at Chatham House, 17 October 2011.
17 The New Frontier: A baseline survey of large-scale land-based investment in Southern Sudan, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2011.
community are unaware that they are likely to be shortly evicted from their land and do not understand the nature of the lease.\textsuperscript{18}

18. There are also worrying gaps in the structures and legislative frameworks to regulate land ownership. The National Land Commission for example lacks sufficient independence to regulate conflicts which are highly politically sensitive, in that all of its members are appointed directly by the President.

19. The draft Land Policy, intended to provide the framework for the implementation of the Land Act, has not yet been ratified by the government, and lacks necessary detail on conflict regulation. For example, it states the need for community consultations around any land use plans that affect them, but it does not propose any specific models or strategies through which these consultations should take place.\textsuperscript{19}

20. HMG should work with GoSS to stress the need for a conflict-sensitive handling of land ownership issues. As the permanent constitution of South Sudan is developed, HMG should raise awareness with GoSS of the need to establish a strengthened, independent and transparent process for nominating members of the Land Commission. The Land Policy should be strengthened by allowing for detailed and specific mechanisms for community consultations over land ownership, building in the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent\textsuperscript{20} in the case of proposed government exploitations or leases.

21. **Consensus-based Approach to Security**

22. South Sudan has known a number of forcible disarmament initiatives which have resulted in great loss of life. Many people are of the strong opinion that they need arms to survive in the face of external threats such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, or raids by pastoralist groups from neighbouring countries, or other South Sudanese ethnic groups which engage in cattle raiding.

23. People are suspicious of forcible disarmament because they believe that they may be disarmed while a neighbouring, hostile community is not, thus leaving them vulnerable. They also believe that guns can find their way back to the communities, usually to those that have friends in decision-making positions.\textsuperscript{21}

24. HMG should work with GoSS to develop alternatives to forcible disarmament, such as registration of all small arms, and consensus-based discussions around voluntary disarmament.

**October 2011**

Written evidence submitted by Peter Moszynski

THE WAR IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS: UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF THE CPA

Ever since it became clear that South Sudan was going to become independent a new wave of fighting and displacement has been spreading across the disputed border areas, as Khartoum appears determined to impose its rule across the remainder of the country by force.

Sudan’s peace deal, which expired on 9 July—along with the UN’s peacekeeping mandate in Northern Sudan—was called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement because it was supposed to find a solution to all of the country’s interlocking conflicts, not merely to end the war in the south.

As well as granting Southern Sudan’s people a vote on independence, there were special protocols dealing with the three “contested areas” that straddle the new border—Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

These are predominantly inhabited by pro-southern African tribes that supported the SPLA during the war. Abyei’s inhabitants were granted a referendum on joining the South, whilst the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile were offered an ill-defined process of “popular consultation” on their future status.

None of these aspects of the CPA were ever implemented.

In May Sudan armed forces invaded Abyei, displacing most of its Ngok Dinka population. UNMIS did nothing.

In June fighting spread to the Nuba Mountains area of South Kordofan, and again the UN failed to act—other than withdrawing peace-keepers from the disputed areas after their mandate expired in July.

Given the lack of international response, it is perhaps not surprising that by the start of this month fighting had spread to Blue Nile as well.

\textsuperscript{18} Phone interview with Paul Oleyo Longony, Boma Development Initiative, 22 July 2011.


\textsuperscript{20} http://www.forestpeoples.org/guiding-principles/free-prior-and-informed-consent-fpic

\textsuperscript{21} Security Promotion Seen from Below: Experiences from South Sudan, Working Group Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States, September 2011.
Although there is now supposedly a deal in place for UN mandated Ethiopian peacekeepers to supervise the
demilitarisation of Abyei, Khartoum has prohibited any outside involvement in either South Kordofan or
Blue Nile.

Before pulling out, UNMIS warned that the Sudan Armed Forces were committing atrocities against civilians
in the Nuba Mountains.

A leaked report said: “Instead of distinguishing between civilians and combatants and accordingly directing
their military operations only against military targets, the SAF and allied paramilitary forces have targeted
members and supporters of the SPLM, most of whom are Nubans and other dark skinned people.”

Reported human rights violations included: “aerial bombardments resulting in destruction of property, forced
displacement, significant loss of civilian lives, including of women, children and the elderly; abductions; house-
to-house searches; arbitrary arrests and detentions; targeted killings; summary executions; reports of mass
graves; systematic destruction of dwellings and attacks on churches.”

The UN also observed “a well known National Security agent wearing a Sudan Red Crescent reflective vest
intimidating internally displaced persons (IDPs).” When approached he said “he had received instructions from
state-level authorities to move out IDPs from the UNMIS protective perimeter.”

It is clear that hundreds of thousands of people are currently cut off from humanitarian aid and hundreds of
thousands more have been displaced.

The Nuba Mountains area that constitutes much of South Kordofan state is home to a diverse collection of
African tribes, collectively known as Nuba.

They speak a number of different dialects and languages and practise Christianity and traditional religions
in addition to Islam—which arrived in the area from West Africa so is much more relaxed than the version
currently espoused by the Islamist regime in Khartoum.

The mountains themselves are not very large—the remnants of a massive ancient range that has been worn
away to leave large groups of hills sticking out of a raised plateau—but as is the case with Jebel Marra in
Darfur—they are large enough to attract significant rainfall, making the area both fertile and virtually impassible
in the rainy season (between June and October).

The Nuba mountains have thus served as a refuge for various African tribes for centuries, since people first
fled the Arab occupation of northern Sudan and subsequent slave raids.

Their isolation meant that life went on fairly unchanged for people in the mountains pretty much up to the
1970s, when then president Jaafa Numeir began his Sudanisation policy of nation building in the wake of the
first civil war, a policy that increasingly defined Sudan as Arab and Islamic rather than multicultural, and
which—perhaps inevitably—led to the imposition of Sharia law and renewed civil war in 1983.

This time the Nuba joined in the revolt—believing in the SPLA’s original manifesto commitment to a united
secular new Sudan that would empower the marginalised people across the country and large parts of South
Kordofan stayed in SPLA hands throughout the civil war.

In January 1992 the government launched a Jihad against in the Nuba Mountains, declaring Moslem
supporters of the rebellion to be Apostates who had renounced Islam. Given that the crime of apostasy carries
a death sentence in Sudan, this effectively gave a green light to the Popular Defence Force militias to commit
massive atrocities, a tactic that was subsequently refined by the Janjaweed in Darfur.

The Nuba managed to survive a ten year blockade effectively cut off from the outside world until the siege
was finally ended by the January 2002 Swiss brokered Burkenstock Ceasefire Agreement for the Nuba
Mountains.

This was the first cessation of hostilities agreed in the conflict, and subsequently became a model for—as
well as subsumed by—the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Until the CPA, the Nuba made up a clear majority of South Kordofan’s population, but during the peace
talks the state of West Kordofan was abolished and partially incorporated into South Kordofan, with along
with its predominantly nomadic Arab population

South Kordofan is crucial to Khartoum: not only was it a key battleground in the last civil war, and is
adjacent to Abyei, Darfur and the border with South Sudan, it also contains almost all the oilfields still
remaining in North Sudan

During the CPA, the SPLA had around 40,000 troops north of the border, natives of South Kordofan and
Blue Nile. Following May’s occupation of Abyei, Khartoum gave an ultimatum that these forces had to be
transferred to the South before June. When this expired, the SAF began to move against them.

Trouble began following May’s disputed gubernatorial elections in South Kordofan, supposedly won by the
ruling National Congress Party’s Ahmed Mohammed Haroun—who had been indicted by the ICC for allegedly
masterminding the atrocities in Darfur
The SPLM refused to accept the result, claiming widespread fraud.

The process of Popular Consultation in the two Contested Areas was supposed to have been completed during the first half of the interim period of the CPA, well in advance of the southern referendum, but it was repeatedly delayed.

The late Dr John Garang told me during the CPA negotiations that the popular consultations agreed for South Kordofan and Blue Nile were “exactly the same as the self determination offered to the people of Abyei and the South, except it will be decided by their elected representatives rather than the people themselves.”

However, due to a disputed census, in which the authorities failed to enumerate most of the people living in the SPLA controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan’s elections were delayed until May, that is after the Southerners had already voted for independence, and the process of popular consultation never got off the ground.

Although they largely supported the SPLA in the war, the Nuba were amongst the most fervent supporters of keeping the country united, fearing for their future should the southerners vote to separate.

The CPA gave the southerners an opportunity to opt out should unity not prove to be attractive, but gave few guarantees to the population of the contested areas of the north.

Following Garang’s death in July 2005—right at the start of the six year interim period stipulated by the peace deal—it soon became clear that unity was no longer an option for the southerners, but little attention was given to the future of either the people or the SPLA forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile should the southerners vote to separate.

Last December, just before the referendum, Bashir said: “If south Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution, and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity … sharia and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language.”

Bashir appears to believe that the secession of the South meant that there was no need to implement the terms of the CPA in the rest of the country, and was confident that the international community would fail to react, as was the case in Darfur.

The military takeover of Abyei was relatively easy, but the rugged terrain of the Nuba Mountains has proved more difficult to occupy, particularity in the current rainy season, and the SPLA now actually controls more territory than it ever did during the war.

It’s worth remembering that the SPLA in the Nuba are indigenous fighters, experienced after many years of guerilla warfare on their home turf, ready to defend their homes against SAF aggression. Khartoum appears to be responding with exactly the same tactics it used in the last war—attempting to subdue the area by indiscriminate bombing and shelling and through denial of humanitarian aid.

President Omar al Bashir’s tendency for violent clampdowns of opponents has placed him at the top of the list of unreconstructed Arab military strongmen and already earned him the International Criminal Court’s first indictment against a sitting head of state, for crimes allegedly committed in Darfur by his fellow indictee Ahmed Mohamed Haroun.

Although most people now realise that Haroun is wanted by the ICC for the genocide in Darfur it is much less well known that he was also responsible for many of the atrocities committed in the Nuba Mountains in the last war.

It is easy to understand why the Nuba fear for their future. They saw their rights bargained away during the CPA and complain, with some justification, that their plight is now being ignored by the international community which appears to have been so keen to ensure that South Sudan had a peaceful transition to independence that it has failed to curtail Khartoum’s onslaught against the minorities left in the north.

The people of the contested areas are now being referred to as the janabeen jaded—the new southerners—reflecting their status as marginalised African peoples on the southern periphery of an integrated Arab-Islamist state. Precisely the same situation that led to the southerners voting for independence.

With rebellion still ongoing in Darfur and now unrest also re-emerging in the east there is now fighting along virtually the entire new north south border, but I should stress that this in not an interstate conflict.

The SPLA and the government in Juba appear to have been only too willing to surrender the interests of their former allies in the north in order to achieve their dreams of independence for South Sudan and don’t want to do anything that might jeopardise international support—so up to now they have been fairly muted in their criticism.

Although the problems in Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan all stem from the same failure to implement the relevant sections of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement prior to South Sudan’s independence in July, their positions are subtly different which has allowed the despatch of UN-mandated Ethiopian peacekeepers to Abyei—which is now an officially disputed region between two independent states—but not to the other contested areas.
However, now that the fighting has spread from the Nuba Mountains to Blue Nile and the border with Ethiopia, I think it will soon become apparent that there will be no possibility of peace in the region until all of Sudan’s various conflicts are properly resolved.

October 2011

Written evidence submitted by Oxfam

SOUTH SUDAN: THE BIRTH OF A NATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Oxfam has been working in what is now the Republic of South Sudan since 1983. Our programming is currently in 5 states (Upper Nile, Lakes, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria) and includes development and humanitarian programming. In September 2011, Oxfam was one of 38 operational agencies which presented its views on the future of assistance to the new country of South Sudan in a report “Getting It Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan”22 which addresses many of the themes of this IDSC inquiry.

HUMANITARIAN NEED AND ACCESS

2. Whilst the people of South Sudan and the international community look forward to a future of peace and development, there are and will continue to be significant humanitarian needs. In the first half of 2011, fighting in the disputed border areas, clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and militia groups, disputes over land and cattle, and attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, have forced over 304,000 people from their homes in South Sudan alone and left some 3000 dead.

3. A huge number of people are on the move, separated from homes, livelihoods and communities. They are a complex and overlapping mix of those displaced by conflicts within South Sudan, in Abeyi, South Kordofan and Blue Nile and South Sudanese returning from Sudan. Their vulnerabilities are compounded by chronic under-development within parts of South Sudan, food insecurity, recurrent droughts and floods as well as ongoing conflict. And they are often hosted by communities who are made vulnerable by these factors themselves, and now have to share scarce resources with the displaced. Many find themselves affected by multiple threats—for example, in early September 2011, many of those displaced by fighting in Abeyi found themselves hit by flooding in and around Agok.23

RISING FOOD INSECURITY IN THE BORDER STATES:

4. The estimated24 110,000 people displaced from Abeyi, the 12,500 from South Kordofan and 6,000 from Blue Nile tend to be concentrated in border states in South Sudan such as Warrap, Unity, and Upper Nile. These border areas are already coping with an influx of returnees as well as poor availability and rising prices of food, fuel, and other basic commodities. The closure of the border between the two new countries since May 2011 has escalated food insecurity within the southern border states. It is estimated that the price of some market staples and other food commodities prices have increased by as much as 50%.25 in border areas including Malakal. Prices have risen due to the cross-border trading block, the erratic and delayed start of the main cropping season; poor road conditions, and high fuel prices. Projections anticipate that cultivation will not return to normal levels after the rainy season and the food insecurity will be a problem in border areas into 2012. State Governors and other authorities are struggling to respond to the multiple challenges, Land allocation for returnees and the pressing need for food assistance or cash supplements for displaced, host communities and returnees need to be urgently addressed.

Returnees from Sudan:

5. Since October 2010, 343,403 people have returned to South Sudan. Some 800, 000 possible returnees remain in Sudan with aid agencies anticipating second and third rounds of concentrated returnee movements after the rainy season in South Sudan and towards the end of the naturalization period in Sudan. The vast majority of these people find themselves in border areas of the northern part of South Sudan where there are already food and fuel shortages due to trade blockades through border closures. This combined with the rainy season, and the large amount of household items with which returnees are travelling has meant there is insufficient transport to bring people to their destination points in South Sudan. With the transit point at Renk reaching full capacity, huge delays in onwards transportation of the returnees is causing anxiety and tension among returnees struggling to share finite resources and understand their options. Insufficient information has been given to the returnees on the ground—some of whom have now been there for up to three months. The strain is growing on the already overstretched resources for host populations too. Plans by responsible agencies to begin transportation are welcome. However they are not a comprehensive solution as the number of

22 “Getting It Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan”. September 2011.
23 OCHA weekly humanitarian bulletin 22 September 2011
24 Exact figures not available, estimates based on multiple sources at time of writing.
25 Oxfam GB assessments in July 2011 found that 1 litre of oil cost 15 SDG , as compared to 10SDG last year and a wholesale sack of potatoes had risen to 190SDG from 80SDG last year.
passengers planned represent only a small proportion of the returnees in need, and overall return intentions have yet to be fully investigated.

Conflict within South Sudan:

6. Humanitarian needs from conflicts within South Sudan are significant. For example the most recent large scale inter-communal attacks in Jonglei in mid-August have left over 21,000 people displaced with limited access to humanitarian assistance due to ongoing insecurity and poor road access. Further revenge attacks of significant scale are expected between the Murle, Nuer, and Dinka communities in Jonglei following ongoing inter-communal violence since 2009. Tensions remain with rebel militia group movements across the country responsible for tens of thousands of new displacements in 2011 in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity States. Clashes over the inevitably difficult disarmament campaigns of the Government of South Sudan can also be a source of insecurity, particularly in Lakes state.

Humanitarian access:

7. Insecurity, rains, fuel costs and poor infrastructure combine in South Sudan to pose enormous challenges to humanitarian access. From January to June 2011 there were 57 incidents against humanitarians recorded involving state security forces since January, with another 16 attributed to non-state actors. In April, two relief workers were killed in attacks on relief operations by the SPLA and armed actors. Areas of Unity affected by the violence between the SPLA and Peter Gadet’s forces were inaccessible for long periods. Furthermore, the rise in the use of landmines by armed actors has restricted movements and has resulted in fatalities. The result is that humanitarians can neither access areas in order to assess what help is needed, nor provide this assistance, and people cannot easily or safely move out to areas where aid can reach them. Armed actors associated with the SPLA have also been involved in the commandeering and looting of humanitarian stocks and assets (including food, cars and medicine) and the occupation of humanitarian premises, for example in Unity and Warrap. This has been in part due to decommissioned SPLA soldiers from Abyei moving southwards into Unity and Warrap with little support and resorting to looting of aid agencies assets and commandeering of vehicles as a survival means. The UN and donors are urged to use their influence with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to prioritise and make clear that the GoSS does not tolerate state security services involvement in the harassment, looting, and seizure of aid which pose a challenge to organisations and UN and that the GoSS will take serious steps to ensure appropriate conduct of its security services.

Humanitarian assistance:

8. Donors including DfID need to take account of the ongoing humanitarian needs outlined above and respond with continued, fast and flexible funding via a range of mechanisms that take into account the complexity of the situation in South Sudan. There are many lessons to be learned about how to facilitate rapid and effective humanitarian interventions many of which are outlined in further detail in the recent NGO paper “Getting it Right from the Start”26. These include:

— Channelling funds bilaterally to implementing agencies, which multiple evaluations have found to provide the most timely, effective response to affected populations.27
— Adequately resourcing a new Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) for South Sudan, addressing the problems that have arisen from delayed disbursement of funds, lack of synchronisation with the seasonal calendar and, short implementation periods.
— Supporting international humanitarian response institutions, including OCHA and the clusters
— Strengthening emergency preparedness and disaster management capacity of government institutions at the national, state and local levels.
— Exploring innovative mechanisms for enabling faster, more effective humanitarian response.
— Providing more substantial support for initiatives aimed at strengthening the ability of communities to prevent mitigate and recover from humanitarian crises.

THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE, UNMISS

9. The presence of UNMISS in South Sudan is a clear recognition that insecurity and threats to civilians continue within South Sudan, and that the international community is willing and able to address these. Whilst the primary responsibility for maintaining security lies with the Government of South Sudan, it is currently unable to meet these challenges alone. Command and control of the SPLA is still weak and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes are nascent. The DDR programme undertaken by the previous mission, UNMIS, has been widely critiqued as a failure with aspects of reintegration in need of much greater focus in the future.28

26 “Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan”. September 2011.
28 www.smallarms surveysudan.org/.../HSBA-SIB-17-Rethinking-DDR-in-South-Sudan.pdf
10. UNMISS is a very small force (mandated to have up to 7,000 military personnel and 900 civilian police personnel), with a strong and broad Chapter 7 mandate, covering a geographically vast and difficult terrain. In order to be effective the mission must:

**Be fully resourced**

11. including with full troop numbers as mandated in Resolution 1966. Any drawdown of peace-keeping personnel from 7,000 to 6,000 troops must be based on clear indications of a sustained improvement in the security situations. It must have the resources and willingness to undertake long distance patrols, use more frequently and effectively temporary operating bases or mobile operating bases, and to better target areas of tensions, in order to protect vulnerable and isolated communities from violence. This must form part of discussions with Troop Contributing Countries at all stages of deployment.

**Include sufficient civilian Protection of Civilians (PoC) expertise**

12. in the form of police forces, civil affairs, human rights officers, and peace-building experts. UNMISS must have senior staff dedicated to providing guidance on PoC co-located with all military bases, civil-military coordination capacity, and adequate numbers of community liaison officers and interpreters, as well as female staff and interpreters. It also requires a well-resourced Human Rights division and a strong early warning and conflict prevention and mitigation capacity.

**Effectively engage with local communities**

13. in order to protect civilians, without putting them at risk. Communities should be consulted to ensure that patrols target areas and times where people are at greatest risk. The mission will also need to develop public communications strategies to ensure that communities are aware of the mission’s role, activities, and limitations. This must extend beyond media which is extremely limited in reach in South Sudan. Community outreach/liaison officers, civil-affairs, and peace-building experts are need to engage with communities to understand threats, monitor any escalation of tensions with a view to early warning, and be prepared to engage with community leaders, elders and youth to prevent and mitigate attacks. In many ways UNMISS is operating in a new context in South Sudan vis-à-vis inter-communal clashes and cattle-raiding and needs support, resources, and time to ensure they are equipped to appropriately intervene in these situations.

**Clearly measure its effectiveness in regular reporting.**

14. Specific reporting on civilian protection actions and outcomes should continue in quarterly Secretary General’s reports to the Council. Reporting must be not only of activities and threats, but also of impact, measuring how security for civilians changes and why, as well as updates on the status of rollout of best practices in PoC and development and implementation of the mission-wide PoC strategy. Community perceptions of their own safety are a critical measure of the effectiveness of protection strategies.

**Have clear and realistic indicators for drawdown.**

15. Peacekeepers are never a permanent solution, and the Security Council needs to consider what the end of the mission should look like. The mission needs clear objectives with articulated benchmarks and indicators for when it will be appropriate for the mission to draw down. These should include a clear and sustained improvement in security for civilians, the capacity for the government to provide protection from these threats, and the establishment of effective and sustainable mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution and to address impunity. Government actors and affected communities should also be consulted in determining whether such objectives have been reached.

**Improving Governance, including at the County and Local Level**

16. The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan contains a commitment to the “decentralisation of decision-making in regard to development, service delivery and good governance,” and the Local Government Act 2009 devolves responsibility for the provision of basic services to “local government councils”. For most South Sudanese, their impressions of government are defined by their interaction with, and the quality of services provided by, county governments—and these interactions are thus fundamental to building the legitimacy of the new government. Despite this for much of the CPA interim period, efforts to build government capacity have focused on central government institutions. The NGO paper, “Getting it
Right from the Start sets out the challenges faced in building government capacity at the county level. It sets out a number of areas where donors including DfiD could support the GoSS in this task including in equitable distribution and clear accountability for state level budgets; addressing key staffing capacity gaps at the county level and indeed across the country.

THE ROLE AND COORDINATION OF DONORS

17. At this critical time in South Sudan’s development it is imperative that donors co-ordinate and align approaches to strengthen access to basic services. In this regard, the World Bank’s approach to the health sector has been a cause for deep concern. Despite a commitment to free health care enshrined in the constitution, a proposed World Bank programme included the re-introduction of user fees in two states and a radical and inappropriate reform of the health sector based on a poorly designed and researched performance-based financing model. The UK government as a major shareholder in the World Bank and the health sector lead in 6 states in South Sudan should send a strong and clear message that the World Bank must not proceed with any pilot based on these proposals. Instead it should return to consider and research what options would work in alignment with the government’s own health policy as well as the approaches taken by DFID and other donors including USAID.

18. In a context as complex as South Sudan where humanitarian and development actors face multiple, competing priorities, the need for effective donor responsiveness and coordination is paramount. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship and various other commitments to good practice, donors have explicitly recognised the importance of timely, predictable funding. This means that funding mechanisms must facilitate, not hinder, rapid intervention. But in South Sudan the converse has often been true, and the considerable delays encountered by agencies trying to access pooled funds, most problematically the MDTF, have been well documented.

19. Learning from the past, donors need to work together to ensure that future pooled funds are designed with a view to facilitating timely response. Management agents must be selected on the basis of clear criteria including past performance (noting that pooled funds managed by private contractors are widely regarded as having performed better than World Bank and UN-managed funds;) and whoever the management agent, governance arrangements must be designed so as to allow timely disbursement of funds.

20. Sustainability of programming and funding is reliant upon the ability and access of civil society to donor funding as well as intentional capacity building programmes by INGOS and donors. Traditionally civil society organisations have been subcontracted by INGOS with little direct access to donor funding. Not only is funding inaccessible but there is little influence on programme design by civil society organisations creating a governance deficit as design is done without appropriate citizen voice or accountability.

21. Donors also need to “Stay engaged long enough to give success a chance”. Addressing the development challenges in South Sudan will be a huge and complex task. Good development and even humanitarian assistance in protracted crises takes time. It takes time to assess the context and introduce a project to communities, time to facilitate community participation, time to build community capacity to maintain a project, and time to monitor to see if it’s working and take corrective action if it’s not.

October 2011

Written evidence submitted by Saferworld

1. Saferworld has prepared this submission of evidence based on our work to prevent violent conflict in Sudan/South Sudan since 2002. More information on Saferworld’s work in South Sudan is contained as an annex.

2. This submission focuses on how DFID can support the provision of security and justice as basic services and help to improve governance in South Sudan. It is organised in the following parts:

THE CONTEXT: INSECURITY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

3. Newly independent South Sudan faces many significant challenges—from establishing accountable, inclusive and responsive political/governance systems to providing security and peaceful development and building the economy needed for a viable state.

4. In this context, South Sudan’s security and development challenges cannot be disentangled; the two are intimately and intricately connected. Widespread insecurity has the very real potential to impede South Sudan’s progress.
broader economic development, whilst many of the country’s security challenges have their roots in its severe underdevelopment.

5. Communities in South Sudan experience a range of conflicts and types of insecurity—including armed cattle-raiding, abductions, domestic-, sexual- and gender-based violence, and disputes over access to resources like land, water and grazing. A complex multitude of factors contribute to this situation—some relating directly to a lack of security provision and wide spread availability of small arms, others to a lack of basic services or livelihood options.

6. At the same time, communities themselves make few “sectoral distinctions” in the way that donors, INGOs and development commentators usually do. When asked what makes them feel “insecure”, Saferworld has found that people will usually respond with a complex melange of issues including—inter alia—shortcomings in policing, attacks from armed groups and a lack of education or access to healthcare. If a peaceful and prosperous future for South Sudan relies, at least in part, on the new government’s ability to win the confidence of its people by meeting their expectations, then it will be first important to understand the way communities articulate their needs and what their expectations are for different national and international actors in meeting them.

7. To cut through this “Gordian knot” of insecurity and underdevelopment, national and international actors—including DFID—will need to take a large-scale and multi-sectoral approach that integrates programming across a number of different areas.

The “security gap”

8. This submission makes frequent reference to South Sudan’s “security gap” which is worth further illustrating.

9. South Sudan is an extremely large territory with difficult terrain and very little by way of physical infrastructure such as roads, power or communications. The formal state institutions normally charged with providing people with everyday security and justice services—the police, judiciary and penal services—are chronically under-capacitated, whilst the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is in need of serious reform. While DFID is to be congratulated for supporting several large-scale programmes to strengthen the capacity and professionalism of the security and justice sector, it will take a long time before these bear fruit and South Sudan’s security and justice services are able to serve the entire country effectively.

10. In Saferworld’s experience, these factors contribute to a vacuum of formal security and justice provision for many communities across the country: a situation in which the state just cannot be relied on to provide effective security and justice services.

11. To bridge this “security gap”, people in South Sudan turn to a number of different strategies. Small arms and light weapons (SALW—typified by the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle) are extremely common in South Sudan, and often held by civilians as a means of protection. South Sudan has a great many “non-state armed groups” with varying compositions and objectives—from community-based self-defence groups, to militias, armed criminal groups and cattle-raiding groups. Finally, a multitude of informal or “traditional” systems of dispute resolution, security provision and justice provision are used in many communities.

Jonglei and Warrap states—illustrating the security-development nexus

12. As part of an EU-funded project to look at ordinary people’s perspectives on peacebuilding across a number of conflict-affected and fragile countries, Saferworld has recently conducted research into how communities in Jonglei and Warrap states view their development and security challenges.

13. In both Jonglei and Warrap, respondents in focus group discussions and key informant interviews all cited cattle-raiding as their primary source of insecurity. Although cattle-raiding has a long history in South Sudan, in recent years it has increased in scale and intensity and now routinely results in large numbers of civilian casualties. In September this year, for instance, AFP reported that cattle-raiding in South Sudan had killed over 1,000 people since June and quoted the UN’s SGSR to South Sudan, Hilde Johnson, as describing civilian casualties. In September this year, for instance, AFP reported that cattle-raiding in South Sudan had killed over 1,000 people since June and quoted the UN’s SGSR to South Sudan, Hilde Johnson, as describing civilian casualties. In September this year, for instance, AFP reported that cattle-raiding in South Sudan had killed over 1,000 people since June and quoted the UN’s SGSR to South Sudan, Hilde Johnson, as describing civilian casualties.

14. In Warrap State, respondents also cited access to land and water as a key concern, although this issue is intimately linked to cattle-raiding as people compete for scarce grazing and water resources for their cattle—with raiding increasing when there is more pressure on the availability of pasture and water (for instance, during the dry season).

15. At the same time, respondents very often saw improvements in the provision of services by the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) as ideally being the primary means of addressing this insecurity (and, concomitantly, stressed the need to build more roads and communication infrastructure in order to facilitate the SSPS to deliver improved services).

41 See http://reliefweb.int/node/449552
16. This finding is important as it demonstrates that communities may currently see the solution to something that has its roots in developmental challenges (access to land and water resources/lack of alternative livelihoods) as being based in improved security provision. As security provision is often seen by communities in South Sudan as the responsibility of the state, whilst development responses are perceived to be largely the domain of the “international community”, this perception of SSPS service delivery being the key determinant of security has the potential to place unrealistic expectations on the state.

17. At the same time, in both states (and more generally across South Sudan), there is an extremely high prevalence of small arms. People typically keep guns for self-protection in the absence of other security provision. Such a proliferation of small arms amongst the civilian population means that security incidents have the potential to escalate rapidly and significantly increase the levels of violence associated with, for instance, cattle-raiding.

18. Even these limited examples begin to build a picture of the complex interplay between development and security challenges in South Sudan, with underdevelopment exacerbating insecurity in a context where a lack of formal or informal security provision and easy access to small arms mean that insecurity is intensified and itself undermines efforts to address developmental challenges.

19. Clearly, to address such a complex situation, efforts to address security challenges must be integrated with broader development efforts.

CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT

20. As indicated, civilian possession of SALW remains a significant obstacle to promoting security for communities in South Sudan. But, if poorly managed, efforts to disarm populations can potentially act as a catalyst for violence between communities or result in clashes between the military and the communities that are to be disarmed. Uneven disarmament can also cause disarmed communities to become vulnerable to attacks from still armed neighbours.

21. Since 2005, the GoS$ has implemented a number of disarmament campaigns none of which have so far achieved a widespread reduction in weapons possession but all of which have come at the price of short-term stability—and often at tragic human cost. For example, in 2006, forceful disarmament carried out by the SPLA in Jonglei left more than 1,000 people dead after inter-communal fighting when some saw opportunity in the “vulnerability” created within disarmed communities. In February 2010, in Cuibet County in Lakes State, members of a community who had been disarmed (and subsequently felt vulnerable to attack) attempted to break into storage areas to retrieve weapons that had been collected from them by the SPLA. This led to a confrontation with the SPLA which resulted in at least 30 deaths.

22. Despite the problems associated with disarmament, successfully reducing the number of small arms held by civilians will be a key step in reducing the potential for violence within South Sudan. However, as communities most often retain arms in response to real inter-communal violence, perceptions of threat from hostile neighbours and a lack of state capacity to provide security, it is important that disarmament is seen as only one component of integrated programming that seeks to provide security and address underlying causes of conflict between communities.

The current disarmament campaign in Lakes, Unity and Warrap states

23. In August 2011, a presidential decree was issued calling for the SPLA to begin a civilian disarmament campaign in Lakes, Unity and Warrap states—early indications suggest that this latest round of disarmament has learnt many of the lessons of previous disarmament campaigns.

24. The first step of the disarmament campaign in Lakes, for instance, was a community awareness programme undertaken by county commissioners and traditional authorities. Weapons were also registered in communities with lists then passed up the administrative chain to the executive chiefs, the “payam” administrators and county commissioners.

25. This first stage of civilian disarmament has been voluntary, with people handing over weapons firstly to the local chiefs and then the SPLA collecting the gathered weapons from the chiefs. However, the true test of whether this disarmament exercise has learnt from previous mistakes will be the next phase of the campaign, which will see the SPLA conducting “cordon and search” operations to seize weapons that were not relinquished voluntarily. Whether or not the SPLA is able to conduct these house-to-house searches peacefully and lawfully will be critical to stability and the potential for future rearmament.

Linking disarmament to wider security and development initiatives

26. The approach to disarmament currently being taken in Lakes State is, so far, a definite improvement on the past and so is to be welcomed. However, the really critical issue will be how the state will provide some form of security to those communities that have been disarmed and potentially left with a “security gap”. Currently the state’s limited capacity means it is unable to help communities successfully bridge this gap—which has the potential to contribute to conflict and insecurity as other communities attempt to exploit perceived advantage over disarmed communities, as happened in Jonglei in 2006 (paragraph 21).
27. In the immediate future, this means that GoSS—supported by international actors—needs to focus resources into improving the provision of security by the SPSS wherever possible. Where this is not possible, efforts need to be made to better understand the informal security providers that operate in the areas subject to disarmament campaigns and find ways to engage with them to limit the potential for conflict.

28. In the context of South Sudan’s enduring security gap, local communities often turn to a range of informal “service providers” for safety and security. These informal security providers take many different forms—for instance self-defence groups which operate under the authority of local politicians/chiefs or “monyomiji” groups, amongst others. International and more formal national actors have so far been uncertain about how best to engage with these groups since, whilst they may often fill a legitimate “security gap”, they may not always do so with legitimacy and may sometimes even contribute to insecurity and conflict. When these groups have links to particular political actors, that also creates additional challenges whether the groups are abusive or not.

29. However, if acting with legitimate authority and in an accountable and non-abusive manner, these groups have the potential to provide an additional resource for the state in providing security to its citizens. For this reason, Saferworld believes increased effort should be put into improving understanding about the variety of South Sudan’s informal security actors, their sources of legitimacy, and good and bad practices; strengthening links between informal security actors and state security actors; and ensuring that future security and justice policy takes into account the influence of informal security providers as part of the broader process of security sector reform.

Best practice for disarmament campaigns

30. Since 2007, Saferworld has supported the South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control. The Bureau has developed a number of points to guide civilian disarmament campaigns and Saferworld suggests these criteria provide a good model for the type of disarmament campaigns that should be implemented in South Sudan:

— Ensure that each state has an agreed security strategy and action plan in place before commencing disarmament (and the resources and the partners to implement it).
— Ensure that adequate security forces are trained and in place to avoid creating security vacuums after civil disarmament.
— Remove the guns from the hands of unauthorized civilians and ensure that they are properly inventoried and securely stored.
— Ensure that communities benefit from development to build confidence in peace processes and the government.

The committee should consider asking DFID:

—whether it sees its position as a key funder for police and military reform in South Sudan as providing an opportunity to push for greater coordination between actors working on different aspects of civilian disarmament and support civil society to raise awareness about voluntary disarmament based on the model outlined by the South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Disarmament (paragraph 30).

—what its plans are for promoting an improved understanding of the potential for legitimate and accountable informal security and justice providers to help bridge the “security gap” in South Sudan.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

31. As opposed to the civilian disarmament described above, “Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration” (DDR) programming looks at how to disarm and reintegrate back into society combatants and ex-combatants after a period of fighting has formally come to an end. In South Sudan, after a period integrating armed groups into the SPLA, DDR now focuses on currently serving members of the SPLA.

The background to South Sudan’s DDR

32. DDR has been taking place in South Sudan since 2005 as part of a broader defence reform programme aiming to create a more appropriate, affordable and accountable military and as a confidence building component of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)—90,000 soldiers each from the south and north were scheduled to complete DDR programmes. Supported by UNMIS and the UNDP, the programme was led by the national government, as stipulated by the CPA. The actual number of ex-combatants to go through the DDR process in South Sudan has been substantially less than envisaged—the figure reported by the South Sudan DDR Commission was 12,525 as of 12 August 2011.44

42 “Monyomiji” groups are an example of a “traditional” governance institution widespread in the Eastern and Central Equatoria states of South Sudan. Male community members of a certain age group collectively assume responsibility for community affairs for a set number of years before handing over power to a new generation recruited from younger age groups. See for instance http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50048
44 See www.ssddrc.org/ (as accessed 12 October 2011)
33. The DDR process in South Sudan has suffered from many problems, notably logistical planning that did not take into consideration the operational realities of South Sudan. In the period leading up to South Sudan’s referendum and independence, there was also uncertainty in the south about the potential threat from the north. The SPLA was consequently hesitant to reduce the number of its soldiers, instead using the DDR process as a means to provide for so-called “special needs groups”—including the war-wounded, retired soldiers, women and children.

34. And in South Sudan’s extremely underdeveloped economy, there were in any case extremely limited economic opportunities open to those leaving the SPLA—something that will be critical to address if South Sudan’s future DDR efforts are to succeed.

A new opportunity for consultation

35. With the end of the CPA, and so an end to CPA mandated programmes, South Sudan’s DDR Commission (along with other national and international stakeholders) is currently using the opportunity to design a new DDR strategy. Although there have already been discussions on the new DDR strategy within government, the SPLA and with international partners, there has been very limited consultation with civil society actors (national or international) or the private sector.

36. Saferworld believes DFID could highlight the need for broader consultation, sensitisation and awareness-raising on the DDR strategy. For instance, further work is required to identify the range of employment options and skills packages required to enable more voluntary participation in the DDR process—something that the private sector and civil society may have valuable perspectives on.

Integrating DDR with livelihoods and economic development

37. Without ensuring there are adequate economic opportunities for those being reintegrated then there will be a significant risk of future DDR merely sowing the seeds for renewed instability. The SPLA may be a bloated institution that soaks up a disproportionate amount of South Sudan’s budget, but pushing for the rapid downsizing of the SPLA before there are viable livelihoods options available for all the soldiers this would release from military service would likely have a severely destabilising effect on security in the country.

38. At the same time, many male soldiers live on bases with their wives and children who have established economic activities there and would suffer a disruption to their livelihoods if they had to move—supporting them to find alternative economic opportunities will also be important.

39. So it is essential that DDR programming does not take place in isolation but is, instead, approached as a long-term process which is fully integrated with broader livelihood and economic development plans.

Ensuring DDR programmes respond to community needs

40. It will also be important for the UK to champion a DDR programme that is responsive to the needs of communities as well as the SPLA.

41. DDR programmes cannot be designed only with the needs of ex-combatants in mind, but also need to take into account the communities into which these ex-combatants are reintegrating. International experience has shown that failing to do so tends to generate discontent and resentment between ex-combatants and their communities.

42. Instead, DDR programmes need to ensure disarmament and demobilisation efforts are part of a larger package of measures to ensure that both ex-combatants and other community members all have improved economic and livelihoods prospects.

43. Given the close and complex relationship between development and security in South Sudan, there is a pressing need for donors and other international actors, including INGOS, to take an approach that integrates development with people-centred security responses.

Estimates place spending on security and the military (largely going towards the payroll) at over one third of the GoSS budget (around $1.5–$2 billion per year in 2010)—see www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4980.pdf. Issues connected to the military payroll have caused violence since the CPA in Wau, Juba and Malakal. This is serious cause for concern because South Sudan’s main source of revenue, oil, is extremely volatile and, even at present, the army is not always receiving salaries. Although the reasoning for keeping soldiers on the payroll is clear, resources absorbed by security sector salaries cannot be redirected to support infrastructure and service delivery and so achieving the right balance and, over the long-term, drawing down the defence budget will be crucial.
The international policy context

44. South Sudan’s independence comes at a time of ever increasing recognition that previous approaches to development simply have not worked in the poorest conflict-affected and fragile states.

45. Around 1.5 billion people live in countries that could be described as “conflict-affected or fragile” but, as the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development\(^\text{46}\) makes clear, not one “low-income fragile or conflict-affected country” has yet achieved a single MDG and few, if any, are on track to do so despite around 30% of OECD DAC Members’ ODA being directed to these countries.\(^\text{47}\)

46. The World Development Report was explicit in not only highlighting that existing development paradigms have failed in conflict-affected countries, but also in proposing the outline of a new model for development in these contexts—one that prioritises building citizen confidence, stresses the importance of informal and formal “institutions” and recommends initial efforts be directed towards security, justice and jobs in order to lay the foundations for broader development.

47. Similarly, since 2009, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding\(^\text{48}\)—a partnership of donors, international civil society and the governments of some fragile states (including South Sudan)—has met to discuss detailed ideas on how to make aid delivery more effective in addressing the challenges of conflict and fragility. These plans are due to be presented as a “new deal for international engagement in fragile situations” at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in November this year. Key to this new deal is likely to be the idea of working towards a set of “peacebuilding and statebuilding goals” in fragile countries as an interim step before concentrating on the MDG targets. These PSGs, as defined in the “Monrovia Roadmap”,\(^\text{49}\) include developing a more inclusive political system, ensuring people’s security and access to justice, creating jobs and economic opportunity for all, and establishing the provision of equitable basic services.

48. Finally, in the UK, July saw HMG publish its Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)—a combined DFID, FCO and MOD strategy to guide the UK’s efforts to promote overseas stability.\(^\text{50}\) The BSOS definition of stability emphasises “… political systems which are representative and legitimate… and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development open to all.” Such a progressive vision of “stability” is extremely welcome and implies a substantial role for the UK’s international development efforts, in close coordination with defence and diplomacy.

49. Such internationally-driven processes are welcome and have the potential to significantly improve international engagement in fragile situations. Whilst there are obvious dangers in the rapid influx of international actors operational in the country, the fact that many in the international community are currently developing or rethinking their engagements in South Sudan provides an opportunity to put some of these good ideas into practice.

From rhetoric to reality

50. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’s recognition that fragile states most often need to concentrate on a more immediate set of priorities as foundations for achieving the MDGs is welcome. This will be a major shift in direction for international aid policy if the Monrovia Roadmap’s peacbuilding and statebuilding goals are adopted by the international community at Busan. The immediate practical implication of this recognition would be to open up space for developing countries and development partners to concentrate on addressing the issues that underlie fragility, as articulated by the peacbuilding and statebuilding goals, in order to lay the foundation for broader development as articulated by the MDGs.

51. National and international actors will then need to make sure that they are placing “conflict sensitivity” at the heart of their approach in fragile states. This goes far beyond the minimalist idea of “do no harm” (ensuring that development interventions do not inadvertently do anything to exacerbate conflict dynamics) and will require all development actors to ensure their interventions are having the maximum possible positive impact on conflict dynamics.

52. This in turn will mean international actors monitoring their interventions not only against purely development indicators but also a consideration of the impact their interventions are having on peace and conflict dynamics. Properly conceived, most development interventions can play a contributory role to peacbuilding and statebuilding efforts—but the objectives and indicators used for this work will need to be framed in the right way to ensure they do so. When evaluating value for money, DFID should consider requiring its contractors to demonstrate a positive impact on peace and conflict dynamics as well as delivering basic service or other development outcomes.

53. To ensure monitoring of programmes is able to assess the impact development, peacbuilding and security programmes have on each other, it should be based on a shared, and frequently updated, context


\(^{47}\) [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/6/48699002.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/6/48699002.pdf)

\(^{48}\) [www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_43407692_1_1_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_43407692_1_1_1_1_1,00.html)


analysis that defines a country’s security and development challenges and which is used as a key reference point in framing donor programming. Like donors, INGOs operational in South Sudan should likewise ensure they are developing such a shared analysis of the context.

54. The “new deal” which will be proposed at Busan (paragraph 47) is likely to set out a plan for putting such an approach into action. It is based on the idea of conducting “fragility assessments” for fragile countries that would determine the scale and nature of conflict and insecurity in that country; the development of shared visions for a country’s transition from fragility to lasting peace and shared plans for how to get there; and “compacts” between development partners and developing countries to shape the international support provided to put these plans into action. South Sudan would be a strong contender to be one of the first countries where such an approach was first applied if the new deal is agreed at Busan.

55. Such a practical approach would be welcome, if certain important provisions can be met. To make this approach really work in terms of building peaceful states and societies, an emphasis must be put on ensuring that a broad range of stakeholders are given the chance to fully participate in the entire process. “Inclusivity” is not merely a catchword beloved of INGOs—exclusionary political processes that shut out key stakeholders are well known to be a core element of many countries conflict dynamics.

56. For instance, although a desire for increased country ownership is understandable, it will be important that “fragility assessments” are an independently facilitated multi-stakeholder process rather than conducted only by the national government—otherwise they risk missing key issues or facing up to uncomfortable, yet pressing, realities.

57. Similarly, if a “shared vision” for a country’s transition to peace is not actually shared across all stakeholders in a country then it is likely only to inflame conflict and insecurity rather than providing a realistic and credible map out of fragility—Somalia’s transition provides only too real an example of this.51

58. And any new compacts agreed to guide the nature of international engagement in fragile states should ensure they do not risk becoming exclusionary compacts between national governments and international partners. Instead, these compacts should also be between the national government and the people of the country and should be strengthened by a full role for CSOs and the public in monitoring their success.

The committee should consider asking DFID what its plans are for ensuring that all of its development programmes make a contribution to addressing conflict and security dynamics in South Sudan; working with FCO and MOD to implement HMG BSOS commitments in South Sudan; ensuring that the inclusion and participation of a broad range of stakeholders is protected in the proposed new deal for international engagement in fragile situations; and how it would envisage taking forward the new deal for international engagement in fragile situations if agreed at Busan.

Delivering security and justice programming

59. Delivering on any new approach will also require finding the right ways to actually implement policy. With regards to sensitive security and justice programming, it is worth looking at what lessons have been learnt so far.

60. In South Sudan, DFID has been right to prioritise the investment in state capacity to provide security and justice and should continue to support GoSS efforts to bridge the “security gap”.

61. DFID has supported much Sudanese civil society work through the South Sudan Peace Fund but this is coming to an end in March/April next year and, while there are new priorities in the DFID operational plan for South Sudan, it is not yet clear how exactly money will be allocated. Whatever DFID’s final funding allocations look like, it will be important that it continues to support community-focused engagement on security provision, access to justice and peacebuilding.

62. And at the same time, as Saferworld has highlighted in previous submissions to the Committee, the continued push to deliver an increasing aid budget whilst reducing administrative costs52 has led to more and more programmes being outsourced to external contractors (including INGOs, the private sector and academic institutions).

63. Whilst there are undoubtedly benefits of using external contractors—they allow HMG to draw on specialised capacities which it does not have in house, for instance—for recognition must be given to the risks of outsourcing security and justice programming; work which is inherently political, challenging and sensitive. In particular, HMG must recognise that while it can outsource a considerable degree of implementation to external contractors, it cannot ultimately outsource risk. If a security and justice programme goes seriously off-track, it is unlikely to be a problem for the contractor alone—there are also likely to be substantial reputational, operational and conflict risks for HMG too.

51 See, for instance: www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Back%20to%20Basics%20briefing%20July%202011.pdf
52 We deliberately use the phrase “reducing administrative costs” as opposed to “increasing efficiency”. Reducing staff overheads may look like efficiency as it takes many of the transaction costs off HMG’s balance sheet but, of course, the transaction costs are still there—they have just been transferred into ODA spending by paying consultants to manage programmes. At the same time, if the purpose of ODA spending is to have a positive impact on development and conflict outcomes then “efficiency” cannot be seen in purely narrow terms of moving money from one budget to another without some serious thinking about the impact it is achieving and / or any potential negative impacts on the context.
64. Thus, even when implemented by external contractors, HMG still needs to invest appropriate human resources, time and political capital into security and justice programmes. In particular, this means that:

— Security and justice programming requires “political back-up” of the sort most able to be provided by diplomatic staff working in conjunction with other HMG colleagues. Thus, even if programme delivery is outsourced, HMG needs to retain some level of strategic engagement.

— HMG needs to retain a minimum level of managerial oversight to security and justice programmes in order to ensure they are properly integrated into a coordinated framework of engagement in South Sudan for the UK and other international actors.

— In volatile and dynamic contexts such as conflict-affected and fragile states, changes in the context can require—sometimes fundamental—changes in programmes. DFID’s programme contracts need to be able to reflect this reality and be flexible to allow for such changes where needed.

65. The preceding paragraphs are not intended to imply that the use of external contractors is always inappropriate. On the contrary, contractors can make a vital contribution to delivering HMG priorities. However, there is certainly a need to ensure that HMG is designing, contracting, managing and evaluating its outsourced security and justice programmes as appropriately and effectively as possible. As such, this area would benefit from more serious investigation and lessons learning.

The committee should consider asking DFID for detailed feedback on the performance of security and justice programming currently outsourced to consortia in South Sudan and the other countries this inquiry has focused on (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda); and any lessons that can be learned from these experiences to date, particularly in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of different delivery and partnership models used.

Annex

ABOUT SAFERWORLD AND OUR WORK IN SOUTH SUDAN

Saferworld is an independent, international NGO that works to prevent violent conflict and promote cooperative approaches to security. We believe everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives free from insecurity and armed violence.

We aim to understand what causes violence by talking to the people it affects and then bringing together communities, governments, civil society and the international community to develop solutions. Using this experience, we also work with the UK, EU, UN and others to develop ways of supporting societies address conflict and insecurity.

We have around 90 staff based in London and abroad and our funding for 2010–11 was approximately £6.8 million—mainly in the form of government grants from Canada, Denmark, the EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK.

Saferworld has been working in Sudan since 2002 and established an office in Juba in 2007. Initially our work focused on facilitating Sudanese civil society input into international conflict prevention policies affecting Sudan. After the signing of the CPA, Saferworld developed an in-depth programme of work in South Sudan, based on the recognition that intra-South conflicts needed to be resolved for the CPA to succeed. During this time, Saferworld focused on:

— Strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to respond to community security concerns.

— Strengthening the capacity of South Sudanese civil society to influence security and SALW policy.

— Promoting community-level approaches to SALW control that contribute to peacebuilding.

— Supporting the Government of South Sudan and international agencies to integrate SALW control and community security into broader security and justice/peacebuilding policies.

— Supporting work to address cross-border SALW and security issues.

Since South Sudan’s independence, Saferworld has focused its approach on contributing to building the foundations for a responsive and accountable South Sudan state with an active, inclusive society, jointly capable of preventing conflicts, ensuring effective security and justice, and generating a durable environment for equitable economic development.

October 2011
Written evidence submitted by St Mary’s Hospital, Isle of Wight—Juba Teaching Hospital Link

1. The St Mary’s Hospital, Isle of Wight—Juba Teaching Hospital Link

1.1 The St Mary’s Hospital, Isle of Wight—Juba Teaching Hospital Link (subsequently called The Juba Link) was started in November 2007 by a group of healthcare professionals at St Mary’s Hospital, Isle of Wight. The overall objective of the Juba Link is:

“To promote understanding of the needs and to support the Government of South Sudan in order to improve clinical services through the development of education and training.”

1.2 Although this was focused at Juba Teaching hospital the aim is to support training of healthcare professionals who are fit for purpose and can subsequently provide community focused care both at primary and secondary level and throughout South Sudan.

1.3 The Juba Link has undertaken a number of visits by senior healthcare professionals from the UK and provided training in a number of aspects of medicine, surgery, mental health, anaesthetics, nursing and midwifery. We have also supported a number of attachments in Juba for UK medical students and junior doctors and for South Sudanese trainees in the UK. We were instrumental in initiating the reopening of the School of Nursing and Midwifery in Juba and through our good relationship with the Ministry of Health of the Government of South Sudan (MoH GoSS) were asked to write a five year strategy for their secondary care services. Part of this strategy has been developed into a proposed programme for Postgraduate Medical Education and this has been approved by, and has received considerable support within the Ministry of Health. The proposal has been accepted in principle and a UK consultant (Dr Peter Newman) appointed as Honorary Director of Medical Education whose role is to pull together and develop all programmes for postgraduate medical training, not only those within the Juba Link. As a consequence of our activities we believe that we have acquired considerable experience of healthcare, especially hospital care, in South Sudan.

1.4 The Juba Link is entirely a charitable organisation and totally dependent upon fundraising. There are a large number of healthcare professionals in the UK who are willing to support the objectives. The biggest difficulty is the relative paucity and high cost of accommodation in Juba. The Juba Link is currently in the process of building a six bedded hostel to house visiting trainers in the grounds of the doctors’ mess at Juba Teaching Hospital. Building is well underway but there is still a shortfall of approximately £50,000. Completion of this building will hugely increase the availability of trainers many of whom are willing to pay their own airfares and undertake voluntary work in annual leave.

1.5 Interest in supporting healthcare training in South Sudan is also developing in a number of other hospitals, especially in the Wessex Region. Poole Hospital have developed a link with Wau Teaching Hospital and Winchester Hospital have developed a link with Yei Hospital. We are aware that the Norfolk & Norwich Trust are also considering a link.

2. Healthcare Challenges in South Sudan

2.1 It is recognised that health care in South Sudan is in a parlous state and that health care indicators are amongst the worst in the World. The figures in respect of this are well documented and do not need reiterating. The problems span both primary and secondary health care. In primary care the problems are predominantly infections/infestations with poor nutrition and often a lack of access to health care. Many of these can be dealt with by health care workers with limited training. There are however many conditions that require or should have hospital treatment. These include not only the whole range of conditions seen in Western hospitals such as heart disease and stroke but also the severe forms of infections/infestations and malnutrition found at the community level, complications of pregnancy, Caesarian section and surgical conditions such as strangulated hernia, acute abdomen, vesico-vaginal fistula, cleft lip/palate and trauma. Trauma is particularly common in South Sudan especially from gunshot wounds and road traffic accidents and is likely to increase. It is estimated that injury accounts for 12% for the world’s burden of disease and that by 2020 more than 1 in 10 people will die from injuries.1 There are currently upwards of 1,000 trauma admissions per year to Juba Teaching Hospital with a mortality of approximately 12%.2 More extensive lists of medical, surgical and obstetric conditions which are common in countries such as South Sudan and would commonly be treated in first referral hospitals have been documented by WHO.3

2.2 The Vice-president of South Sudan has indicated that his Government may currently be spending several million US dollars per year on sending patients abroad because of the lack of confidence in the hospital service/personal communication). This may seem profligate but how many foreign workers would choose to be treated or for their families to be treated in South Sudan if requiring hospital care?

2.3 So far health aid has concentrated on primary care and there are well over 100 NGOs in this field in South Sudan. Secondary care has received little attention and although official figures indicate that there are around 30 “hospitals” they are hardly hospitals as we know them. On the medical side most are staffed by one or at most two doctors plus some clinical officers, they have no running water, do not have any facilities for x-ray nor any but the most basic investigations. Areas such as the wards and operating theatres are Spartan in the extreme with little, if any, equipment. The skills and training of nurses and midwives is also haphazard and weak. Few if any district hospitals include any nurse or midwife at the registered level. The low population density in some regions and very poor roads makes access to hospital for many patients a further problem.
2.4 These problems of access to hospitals, poor equipment but above all the lack of skilled doctors and nurses in sufficient numbers has led to a secondary care service which should be unacceptable to a humane society and to the international community.

3. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCES OF THE JUBA LINK

3.1 The Juba Link firmly believes that healthcare in South Sudan should be supported in two main areas:

(a) Improving immediate frontline primary care in the villages and districts. Much of this care is at the moment provided by NGO’s but there have been some questions about effectiveness.

(b) Assistance in the development of a structure of healthcare, both primary and secondary, which enables the training of South Sudanese professionals who are skilled to work at the district level but also able to provide leadership, able to train others and can produce long term sustainability. This requires a structured programme of education and training across the spectrum of healthcare disciplines and medical leadership.

3.2 In terms of immediate service need priority has quite correctly concentrated on primary care in the community but the disease burden and importance of secondary care has not been fully recognised. Furthermore unless there is an integrated training structure for all the key healthcare professionals which equips them to deliver care across the board then the development of an appropriate and comprehensive health service will not occur and South Sudan will remain aid dependent. This training must incorporate both primary and secondary care and much of the training is likely to be hospital based.

3.3. At an international conference held in Karachi in 1981 on the role of Hospitals in Primary Care Dr Halfdan Mahler, the highly respected Director General of WHO, stated: 4

“A health system based on primary health care cannot, and I repeat, cannot be realized, cannot be developed, cannot function, and simply cannot exist without a network of hospitals functioning in a manner I have tried to describe. But Hospitals have to change their ways so that they become one of the main flag bearers of the most daring yet the most promising health movement in the history of humanity, the movement for “Health for all by the year 2000.”

How true his comments have proved to be in South Sudan

3.4 At the request of the Ministry of Health (MoH GoSS) the Juba Link has produced a draft proposal for the development of a Postgraduate Medical Education and Training Programme (enclosed). It must be emphasised that this is only a starting point, is subject to ongoing refinement and should be but one component of an integrated training programme for all healthcare professionals. The other main components would be undergraduate medical training, nurse training, midwifery training, the training of allied health professionals including the clinical officers/medical assistants and training in hospital management. In our view this would form the backbone of the future health service for South Sudan. Without it long term development of a health service will almost certainly not occur.

3.5 We believe that DFID are focussing too much on primary care, albeit very important, but at the expense of raising standards across the board, both in primary and secondary care. We would urge DFID to support the Postgraduate Medical Training Programme above and to consider support for comparable training programmes for the other healthcare disciplines.

4. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That the UK Government/DFID should support primary care through the NGO’s. This must be in line with MOH(GOSS) policies.

(b) There is an urgent need to develop structured healthcare education and training across the disciplines. This should be largely hospital based and would lead to the training of doctors, nurses, midwives and other healthcare professionals. It would primarily equip them to work at a district/community level but would also produce major advances in the provision of secondary care and would not entirely exclude tertiary care.

REFERENCES

1 Advanced Trauma Life Support for Doctors, 8th edn. American College of Surgeons; 2008.


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ENCLOSURE

The Development of Postgraduate Medical Education and Training in the Republic of South Sudan (not printed here).

November 2011

Written evidence submitted by Pieter Tesch

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE SUDAN CULTURAL SOCIETY OF BRITAIN & IRELAND (SCSBI)

The author is an Indonesian born Dutch national based in London working as an independent historian and freelance journalist, including as the Chief Executive of the SCSBI, specialising in the wider Sahara-Sahel region with a particular interest in Sudan and Mauritania; after graduating from the University of Amsterdam and a Master’s degree following post graduate research at Trinity College Dublin (TCD) worked as a journalist in Ireland, including covering the “Troubles” in (Northern) Ireland; in London worked amongst other as media advisor for the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. Is a member amongst other of the Sudan Studies Society of the United Kingdom (SSSUK), the Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS) and the Royal African Society’ African Studies Association of the UK (RAS/ASAUK). As the “historian” he accompanied the Sudan APG on its field trip to Sudan in September 2007 and made a written submission to the hearings of the Sudan APG on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Unity in Diversity Or A plague on both your houses in October 2009; was an election observer based in Wau (Northern Bahr al Ghazal State) with the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis (CFPA) during the April 2010 general elections. (www.cffpa.com/pdf/finalreport.pdf)

Remarks to Qualify the Submission:

(1) The submission reflects the personal views, comments and observations of the author and they don’t reflect necessarily the position of the SCSBI.

(2) The submission also reflects the situation in Sudan, and in particular that of South Sudan by the end of October 2011 as observed from the UK, and the author as a historian who does not do predictions or prophecies can only reflect on the implications of such issues such as the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum on the secession of South Sudan, resulting in the partition of Sudan, as they stand by the time of writing by the end of October 2011.

(3) The SCSBI is a non (party) political or partisan think tank based in London by formed by Sudanese and non Sudanese individuals who seek, based in the UK and Ireland, to promote the culture of Sudan and all its peoples to assist them in reaching a common and inclusive identity that accepts that such a identity should recognise the diverse historical and cultural traditions and heritage of the people of the historical (Nilotic) Sudan that were citizens of the Republic of Sudan (RoS) that became independent on 1 January 1956 and who are now the citizens of a partitioned Sudan of respectively the RoS and Republic of South Sudan (RoSS).

Summary:

(A) The submission will address in particular the points in the IDSC’s invitation for submissions on the “Security Situation” and the questions of the implications of membership for RoSS of potential membership of the Commonwealth and the East Africa Community (EAC) as they will reflect on what the SCSBI regards as the negative the implications of the secession of South Sudan and resulting partition of Sudan for the peoples of respectively the RoS and RoSS and the wider Sahara-Sahel region on the one hand and the Horn of Africa and Rift Valley regions on the other.

(B) The SCSBI does not subscribe to the apparent new orthodoxy that the secession of South Sudan and the partition of modern Sudan was an inevitable historical development but on the contrary that it is the result from outside pressures intervening into grievances of sections of the people of Sudan not to the benefit of the peoples of Sudan but for the benefit of foreign interests.

Introduction

(1) Two years ago the author made a submission (Unity in Diversity) to the All Party Group on Sudan to support the unity of modern Sudan based on Sudan’s own history of what historians call the Middle Nile or the region along the Nile between modern Egypt and modern Uganda and to allow the CPA run its course to assist in creating a reformed, open, inclusive and democratic Sudan instead of partitioning the country into two parts which are autocratic and seem to seek narrow defined national identities reflecting those in the majority and in power.

(2) On the eve of the referendum on secession in South Sudan the author celebrated Sudan last independence day as an united country in Port Sudan seeing the whole diversity of Sudan’s people celebrating together, Beja and Rashaida from the east, Nubians and other people from the Nile valley, from the west (Kordofan and Darfur), and from the south, those who consider themselves Arab and those who don’t, Muslim and Christians (Copts, Protestants etc). However the apparent immovable force of secession of South Sudan had become invincible through a combination of forces from inside South Sudan and their supporters outside in what the author regards as the breach of the original spirit of the CPA.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

(3) The author’s comments and observations are based on his experiences as a journalist, working often in countries where there are, unfortunately more often than not violent, conflicts over (national) identities, involving issues of ethnicity, religion, and historical background, such as in Ireland, in his own mother country of Indonesia, or in such modern countries of the Sahara-Sahel region as Mauritania and Sudan, countries often also on the sharp end of the fault line between the Arab world and (Tropical) Africa and which are often accused of favouring their “Arab” identity over its “African” identity.

(4) (Note: “Tropical” Africa refers to that part of its continent south of the Tropic of Cancer, north of which Africa shares many geographical and cultural traits with the Mediterranean and the Near East. The term “Black” is purely based on colour and with its implicit implications of race and culture not satisfactory.

The term “Sub-Saharan” is a more neutral geographical term, but it is useless as to describe where the “sub” of “sub Saharan” starts in relation to the history of such African peoples and their cultures such as the Nubians of northern Sudan or the Zaghawa of western Sudan (Darfur), Chad and southern Libya, straddling the Tropic of Cancer, while the home of so called “Sub Saharan” oldest civilisations such as Nubia and ancient Ghana are historically situated in respectively the Middle Nile and southern modern Mauritania and the Middle Niger regions; see for instance Graham Connah, African Civilisations, Cambridge 2001)

(5) The author arrived at his interest in the Middle Nile Valley region of the eastern Sahara-Sahel because of his own classical background in Ancient History and his interest in African History; it is the logical outcome of combining these two interests. One can find references to this ancient land not only in the Holy Koran and Holy Bible, but also in Homer, Herodotus and Plutarch to mention a few ancient authors.

(6) Modern Sudan derives its name as the eastern or Nilotic part of the historical region that Arabic Mediaeval geographers called the Bilad al Sudan or the “land of the black peoples”, which began, culturally somewhere in the southern Sahara around the Tropic of Cancer, stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and southwards through the Sahel and beyond into the dry and wet savannah zones.

(7) The archaeologists and historians of Kush and Nubia have come to recognise the Middle Nile Valley from the First Cataract in the Nile Valley at Aswan, just north of the Tropic of Cancer, were different, culturally and otherwise, from those to the north; the Egyptians referred to this area as Kush, the Greeks and Romans called it Aethopia or “land of the people with burnt faces” before it became known in Mediaeval times as Nubia.

(8) The peoples, historical civilisations and kingdoms of the Middle Nile had historical, cultural and linguistic links with the peoples to the west of Kordofan, Darfur and beyond and to the south such as the Shilluk and beyond and traded and interacted with the peoples to the east, with the historical civilisations and kingdoms of modern Ethiopia and naturally to the north with Egypt from times immemorial until our own times. As a result cultures and civilisations changed, not in the least through the arrival first of Christianity in Late Antiquity and that of Islam in the later Middle Ages.

(9) Arabs did arrive in the Middle Nile in the 7th century but the northern Christian Nubian kingdom of Makuria twice repelled an Arab invasion coming down from Egypt resulting in the Buqt or peace and trade treaty that lasted until the 14th century. By then the then Turkish rulers of Egypt through a combination of military intervention and pushing troublesome Arab Bedouin tribes southward had so much undermined Makuria that it broke up and gradually disappeared while to the south the Nubian kingdom of Alwa with its capital at Soba near modern Khartoum fell to an alliance of northern Arabised tribes and peoples to the south probably related to the Shilluk resulting in the first Muslim state on the Middle Nile of the Funj Sultana al Zurqa.

(10) Islam had already spread mainly peacefully through from the north as well as the west, followed by various degrees of Arabisation. This result as Dr David Edwards has suggested (The Nubian Past: An archaeology of the Sudan. London-New York 2004; but see also Timothy Insoll, The Archaeology of Islam in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Cambridge 2003) in blurring the modern distinctions of “North” and “South” in modern Sudan as we may discover a past in which all of modern Sudan was the “South”.

(11) Modern Sudan was as so many other modern African and Asian countries the result of colonial conquest and its border were like so many other borders on the political map of modern Africa drawn up at the Berlin conference that carved up Africa between the competing and aggressive imperialist powers in Europe and the weakening Ottoman empire, initiating the scramble of Africa in the later 19th century without any consideration for the historical, political and cultural heritage and traditions of the peoples affected who found themselves by the turn of the 19th into the 20th century as subjects of far away colonial masters.

(12) These only adjusted the Berlin maps to take cognizance of topographical features such as rivers and mountain ranges rather than again historical, cultural and ethnic considerations. Peoples and cultures with long standing historical links were split up and others with no links or even worse with historical anamities were thrown together and when independence came from on the second half of the 1950s they were expected to be the citizens of new “nations” and behave accordingly like modern nation states. This was enshrined in the legal principle of uti posseditis juri and endorsed by the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU).

(13) It was the argument of the OAU as Africa decolonised against secessionist movements and attempts at partition such as in the former Belgian Congo with Katanga, in Nigeria (Biafra) in an often failed attempt to prevent civil and regional wars. It often resulted in one dominant cultural tradition in the new nation becoming political dominant, such as Islam and Arabic language and culture for instance in modern Sudan.

(14) This was not something perverse as some commentators and analysts, especially those supporting the South Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), have been arguing, and not something uniquely for modern Sudan, but it can be found among many modern independence movements and new independent nations.

(15) The European colonial powers with Britain in the lead supported the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Middle Nile and hence to the west into Darfur, to the south of the Nile and in the east of the Red Sea Hills pushing into Ethiopia. When the Mahdist revolt of 1885 successfully challenged Turco-Egyptian rule of modern (northern) Sudan, it was only defeated in 1898 eventually by British intervention changing the rule over modern Sudan as the Anglo-Egyptian condominium as one territorial unit or country. To stem the influence of nationalism against colonial rule, in particular of the “Arab Awakening” since WWI through Egypt, the British removed virtually all Egyptian influence in Sudan in 1924 and introduced the so called “Closed Districts” ordinance for southern Sudan, which remained otherwise ruled from Khartoum without any attempt to integrate South Sudan into British East Africa and which ordinance was subsequently lifted post WWII in the run up to Sudanese independence on 1 January 1956.

(16) It can be argued that the northern Sudanese independence leaders as Muslims and culturally Arabic ignored and dismissed the cultural traditions of the southern Sudanese, but in the 1950s their political and cultural affinity was the Arab nationalism of Nasser and others. Naturally the munity of the southern military units in 1955 that lead to the first southern rebellion should have acted as a warning, but although this could be considered as a bad omen for the future of an independent Sudan it should not be taken as a historical proof that the secession of South Sudan was a historical inevitability as there were other models available such as the Republic of Indonesia, which is the world’s nation with the largest Muslim majority but which secular constitution guarantees equality to the cultural and religious traditions of the non Muslim minorities of Hindus, Christians and adherents of traditional beliefs in the face of various secessionist insurges in parts of the archipelago even during its armed fight for independence and immediately post independence from Dutch rule.

INDEPENDENCE, CIVIL WAR, CPA, SOUTHERN SECESSION AND PARTITION OF SUDAN

(17) The civil war in southern Sudan raged from 1956 until 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed that granted autonomy to South Sudan and which eventually collapsed due to unrest in northern Sudan against the Nimeiri regime that eventually fell in 1985, but the rebellion of the newly formed SPLM/A continued, eventually coming to an end through the internationally negotiated and supported 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Though a clause for s referendum in South Sudan for a secession was inserted in the CPA, it was understood that all parties ranging from the Government in Khartoum to the UN, AU, Western powers, including the US, UK and EU, and the SPLM/A under its then leader Dr John Garang would be in favour of unity and the CPA was regarded as an agreement for reform and democratisation of the whole of modern Sudan.

(18) However, for reasons best known to themselves the SPLM/A changed its position following the untimely death of John Garang in July 2005 supporting secession instead of unity, becoming apparent in Garang’s successor Salva Kiir not running for the presidency in the April 2010 elections, followed by the withdrawal of the SPLM’s northern leader Yasir Arman of the presidential election shortly before the April 2010 election again for reasons best known to the SPLM. While the emphasis had been on allegations of vote rigging in northern Sudan, similar allegations against vote rigging in southern Sudan were ignored. Kiir was elected President of South Sudan with supposedly a 93% share of the vote, not unlike the recent election results of neighbouring presidents in the Rift region such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, and Paul Kagame and whose elections have been criticised for lack of transparency. The democratic deficit of the
new South Sudan was sealed with supposedly 98.83% share of the vote, slightly less than the vote of 99.73% for the Anschluss of Austria with the Nazi Third Reich in March 1938.

(19) But Salva Kiir, the SPLM etc seem to enjoy the same benefit of the doubt that has been bestowed by the West upon the regimes of Messrs Zenawi, Museveni and Kagame. Is it because they act like a spear in the back of the crescent of Islam in Africa from the Swahili corridor in East Africa over the Horn of Africa into the Sahara/Sahel region from the Red Sea to the Atlantic in the west in the “War on Terror”?

(20) The rise of Jihadism in Africa, not only in the Horn of Africa (Somalia) with neighbouring majority non Muslim countries in the region such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi and Uganda, to where now reportedly US troops are being sent to assist supposedly in the counter insurgency against the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA) that now basically operates in the DRC, Central African Republic and occasionally in South Sudan’s Equatoria as to relief Ugandan troops that are part of the AU mission in Somalia (Amisom), and deploying US troops here would not have happened if Sudan had remain united, but also in the wider Sahara/ Sahel region to the west of Sudan and into which weapons are now leaching from Libya which had under Gaddafi already form of supplying arms to regional insurgent groups from the Tuareg of Mali to Chad and Sudan (Darfur), will make the two Sudans on the crossroads of the Sahel, the Horn and the Rift even more vulnerable than an united Sudan was previously.

(21) The RoSS has been already since its birth on 11 July 2011 been designated as a “fragile” state that needs the support of the so called G7 plus to exist on top of all its other international multi donor schemes, becoming another “NGO republic” and another attempt by the UN in nation building without much success, while the RoS remains excluded from similar assistance and has been refused debt relief.

(22) But the RoSS is equally vulnerable to internal threats as when the SPLM had decided on its secessionist course as confirmed on the eve of the April 2010 elections it has clearly failed to bring on board large sections of people in South Sudan who don’t share the SPLM’s view for political reasons and/or who fear not without justification the ethnic (“tribal”) dominance of one particular ethnic group despite the SPLM’s large victories in the 2011 elections and 2011 secession referendum and as witnessed by various ongoing mutinies in its army, the SPLA, and local insurgencies, which cannot all of the time blamed on “Khartoum” as the SPLM and its foreign supporters would like to do.

(23) In fact “Juba” itself appears not be adverse in meddling in local insurgencies north of its new border, not only in the so called “Three Areas”, Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, but also in Darfur as well as getting politically involved with northern Sudanese opposition parties.

(24) While avowedly claiming to be partitionist to build South Sudan as new nation, “Juba” and the SPLM appear to follow not only on the one hand an irredentist (from the Italian irredento or unredeemed, meaning annexation of territories administered by another state on grounds of common ethnicity and/or prior historical possession) line towards the “Three Areas”, of which only Abyei had been given a choice under the CPA of a referendum to choose between North or South, something the SPLM/A never made it very clear to its supporters and in the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan or in Blue Nile that there were to remain part of the RoS, but also on the other hand has made construction to operate in the RoS as a political party, the SPLM North, with a paramilitary wing, the SPLA North, not unlike the all Ireland republican Sinn Fein party and its paramilitary wing the IRA following the partition of Ireland in 1921 as the larger part of the island seceded from the United Kingdom first as the Irish Free State becoming an independent republic later, with the apparent aim to remain involved in the politics of the RoS after its own secession and begging the question whether “Juba” and the SPLM with their foreign backers appear to be more interested to be part of a scheme for regime change in “Khartoum” rather than in solving its border issues and wanting to become good new neighbours.

25) This conundrum was clearly expressed in the way the SPLM and “Juba” dealt with the Abyei question in the run up to the January referendum and July secession as they consistently refused those Baqqara cattle pastoralists groups which for centuries annually migrate southward from South Kordofan to Abyei and beyond into North Bahr al Ghazal during the dry season the vote to participate in the referendum on the status of Abyei supposedly because there are nomadic, though living traditionally for at least half a year in Abyei, but in reality as the author argued in one of his contributions to the “Making Sense of Sudan” Blog, renamed African Arguments, (http://africanarguments.org/2010/08/16/new-borders-leave-the-pastoralist-a-stranger-in-his-own-land/) because the SPLM regards the Baqqara as Arabic speaking and Muslim as non indigenous and therefore as not fitting its perception of what the new nation of South Sudan should look like, certainly non Muslim and non Arabic, as much as previous Sudanese governments stressed that it was Muslim and Arabic in reverse.

(26) As a result “Juba” appears to be more interested in imposing a very narrow version of a new South Sudanese national identity turning its back on its own history as part of the wider “Middle Nile” as well as being more interested in following a political and military line towards its new northerly neighbour and wishing to become a supposedly “good ally” in the “War on Terror”, leaving the softer parts of nation building such as economic development, provision of health and education etc to the international donors and international agencies (UN, NGOs etc) that have been pouring in money without apparently bothering “Juba” too much about good governance, corruption and democracy etc.
(27) Regionally speaking, naturally it makes sense for the new South Sudan to seek cooperation and integration with the EAC but not without its neglecting developing its traditional and historical links with North Sudan as otherwise South Sudan will just replace the northern traders or Jallaba with businessmen from Uganda and Kenya who are commercially much more stronger to benefit from the economic opportunities and potential that South Sudan offers than the southern Sudanese themselves due to “Juba’s” apparent lack to regard economic development other than an opportunity to extract revenue for the benefit who holds the lever of power in the administration.

Conclusions:

(28) South Sudan was born already as a fragile state, not helped by the apparent lack of “Juba” in proper nation and state building but rather in pursuing a vendetta with “Khartoum”, leaving public services to international donors and regarding economic development solely as a revenue extraction vehicle. Joining the EAC on this basis will be a calamity for South Sudan.

(29) The SPLM has been wrong in turning its back on the historical links much older than the modern colonial conquest by Turkey followed by Britain between North and South Sudan. To deny its own history will mean not being able to achieve a common inclusive national identity and as such will be a calamity for South Sudan.

(30) Last but not least as a result suffering from internal divisions South Sudan will be even more vulnerable to the repercussions of the regional instability coming from surrounding wider Sahara/Sahel, Horn and Rift regions and as such can be very calamitous for South Sudan.

October 2011

Written evidence submitted by VSO

1. VSO is an international development agency with over 50 years of experience working in poor countries around the world. We take a unique approach to tackling global poverty, by placing committed volunteers with carefully selected partners—from grassroots groups to government ministries. Our 1,600 volunteers use their skills to improve the impact of aid efforts for poor and marginalised people. By working closely over time with partner organisations, they provide the right support to help ensure that local development efforts deliver greatest impact and value for money.

2. VSO is currently establishing its programme in South Sudan, with support from DFID. This followed a realignment of our country portfolio and the decision to refocus our work on least developed and fragile states. The establishment of the new state of South Sudan gave us the opportunity to establish a programme early in the life of the new country as institutions are established.

3. VSO’s presence in South Sudan currently consists of one member of staff and four short term volunteers who are responsible for the identification of possible partner organisations. In January, we plan to begin sending highly skilled long term volunteers on two year placements to work alongside partners in the health and education sectors. A small number of volunteers will also be sent to work alongside community based organisations and support the development of a strong civil society in the country. In total, by December 2012, we plan to have 75 long term volunteers in country. As one of the first international NGOs working exclusively on development in South Sudan, and working in partnership with DFID, we are in a unique position to comment on the emerging situation in the country.

VSO South Sudan and DFID

4. In July, VSO received a grant of £59,704 from DFID to fund an initial scoping exercise in country to establish the feasibility of operating an education, health and civil society focussed programme in South Sudan. This initial grant covered the costs of basic set-up costs, undertaking security and medical risk assessments and beginning the work of programme design and partner identification. This grant has covered VSO’s costs in country since July. Having now completed the process of partner identification with the assistance of four short term volunteers, we are continuing discussions with DFID regarding future support to take the programme forward. We hope that this will be concluded soon.

This Submission

5. Our short submission will focus on three aspects of the inquiry:

— The provision of basic services, essential infrastructure and DFID’s efforts to reduce extreme poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods.
— How DFID can help to improve governance, including at the county and local level.
— The role of the UN development and humanitarian organisations, the World Bank, other bilateral donors and the extent of leadership and coordination between them.
6. VSO believes that underpinning the success of South Sudan will be the establishment of a strong, legitimate and accountable state. In order for this to happen, democratic institutions are essential. This will only be achieved if institutions can respond to the needs of local populations and, in turn, design and build the basic services they need. This is important not just for central government but also for local government who, in the context of the Government’s decentralisation agenda, will be relied on to provide many basic services.

The provision of basic services, essential infrastructure and DFID’s efforts to reduce extreme poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods

Health

7. Health outcomes in South Sudan are critical. 80% of households have no access to toilet facilities, only 55% have access to improved water supplies, and only 17% of children are fully immunised. The maternal mortality rate is 2,054 per 100,000 which is among the worst in the world.\(^{53}\) Contributory factors include the low percentage of births that are attended by a skilled attendant (10%),\(^{54}\) poorly equipped primary and secondary health care facilities, cultural preferences for home deliveries, and challenges getting to centres as a result of poor roads (the 2010 Statistical Yearbook cites that only 66%\(^ {55}\) of rural communities have access to some health facilities). Further, there is a profound shortage of qualified or even partially-skilled health care staff across the board. An extensive report on health professional training undertaken by the Liverpool Associates in Tropical Hygiene identified that in all GOSS facilities the majority qualifying with a certificate level qualification (plus a substantial minority of those with diplomas) would probably be unsafe practitioners, and at state level a full 50% of diploma graduates would be unsafe practitioners.\(^ {56}\)

8. There is currently great need to enhance availability of basic health services in South Sudan. One consequence of the civil war was the destruction of much of the country’s health care system. At present, it is estimated that only 25%–30% of the population have access to healthcare and there is potential for the situation to deteriorate if NGOs supporting health facilities withdraw funds from these programmes.\(^ {57}\) The country is currently very reliant on health care provided by NGOs. 119 health NGOs are currently operating in South Sudan and about 63 are providing primary health care. With close to 60% of doctors in some states working for NGOs, there is a need to invest in the country’s health system so as to prevent a severe deterioration in access if NGOs were to withdraw in future. VSO would recommend that in addition to continuing to fund NGO-led health services, DFID looks to invest significantly in building and expanding sustainably the country’s health system.

9. There is also a great need to increase the number of trained health workers and the capacity of training institutions. As noted above, the extensive survey recently undertaken by Liverpool Associates in Tropical Health revealed the possible extent of unsafe practice across South Sudan. Taken together with the severe shortage of health workers, it is clear that there is a need to invest in adequate training facilities for health workers across the country. Juba College of Nursing and Midwifery—one of the country’s largest and most advanced training facilities—trained only 28 midwives and 21 nurses in their first cohort in 2010. They are also the only institution in the country that currently allows students to undertake the three year diploma course in nursing.

10. Capacity issues are exacerbated by the significant lack of tutors across the country. In recent visits to training institutions across the South of the country, VSO volunteers encountered facilities with only a handful of tutors. At the Yei National Health Training Institute, there are only four full time tutors who are expected to teach courses across a range of subjects including community midwifery, nursing and skills for laboratory technicians. It has no clinical tutors, and no named mentors for the students on the wards. At the Rumbek School of Nursing, there are two Ugandan tutors supported by a UNMIS doctor who provides part time support. Finally, in Juba, the College of nursing and midwifery has only two tutors: one for midwifery (who is also the principle) and one for nursing. If it is not addressed, the lack of capacity in training facilities means that the country will continue to struggle to produce qualified health workers. While meeting emergency humanitarian needs, DFID should not lose sight of the long term objective of creating a quality and well resourced South Sudanese health system. This should include clear commitments to investing in building the capacity of training institutions across the country.

11. The management and design of health institutions is also incredibly complex. For example, the Juba College of Nursing and Midwifery has only recently opened. The design and organisation of the college demonstrates the complexity of healthcare provision in South Sudan. A consortium of NGOs led by the UNFPA supports the management of the college, United Nations Volunteer tutors support teaching, demonstrating equipment was supplied by UNFPA and the purpose built premises were built with the support of international NGOs. There is a need to ensure that a plan is in place which sees the long term objective as transfer of the


\(^{54}\) Figure from Action Africa Help retrieved from http://www.actionafricahelp.org/news.php?id=56


\(^{57}\) Health Performance Mapping: State Ministries of Health Southern Sudan, Liverpool Associates in Tropical Health.
management of facilities such as Juba College of Nursing and Midwifery from the NGO sector wholly into the public health system.

Education

12. Education indicators in South Sudan are extremely poor. The population is exceptionally young (51% are under 18 and 72% are under 30), only 27% of the population over 15 years old is literate (40% male, 16% female) and only 37% of the population over 6 have ever attended school.\(^{58}\) Class sizes are excessive,\(^{59}\) teacher pupil ratios are worsening and are likely to grow as the number of returning refugees continues to outpace education provision, and many classes are conducted without shelter or in tent classrooms. Of particular concern is the urgent need to improve both the quality of teacher training as well as the percentage of teachers (notably women) who are properly trained. At only 13% overall, this is particularly needed in states receiving returnee children.\(^{60}\) An additional challenge in the Northern States relates to the introduction of the English Language Curriculum and new teaching requirements which have completely de-skilled teachers who speak only Arabic or local languages. Finally, this already challenging situation is compounded by the poor capacity of staff working in the State and County level Departments of Education and the general low levels of education management throughout the system.

13. DFID’s programme spend on education facilities and training will amount to over £37 million by 2015. DFID are to be commended for moving ahead with an education programme in South Sudan, despite the high risk of the project not achieving its goals. As in the health sector in South Sudan, there are many challenges to be overcome, not least in the provision of quality training to teachers across the country. Any significant increase in enrolment must be supported by a corresponding increase in the number of trained teachers. Recent visits by VSO education advisers in September and October 2011 have indicated the limited capacity that exists to train teachers and to assess and monitor the quality of teaching with many government teacher training institutions remaining closed.\(^{61}\) As part of DFID’s education programme for South Sudan, headline results should be set for the training of teachers and for supporting the Government of South Sudan to effectively monitor and report on quality of teaching.

14. VSO welcomes the emphasis being placed by DFID on bringing girls into the education system. Providing girls with a good quality education is the first step in tackling the extreme disadvantages faced by girls and women in South Sudan. In order to increase enrolment of girls in primary education, VSO believes that a greater emphasis must be placed on expanding the opportunities available to women to become teachers. Research conducted by VSO across Sub-Saharan Africa has consistently demonstrated the link between increasing enrolment of girls in primary schools and the presence of female teachers. In South Sudan two challenges exist. Firstly, encouraging women to train to be teachers and, secondly, ensuring that they reach the rural areas where the gender disparity in enrolment is most stark. For example, in North Bahr-El-Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes and Unity states—boys are more than twice as likely to enrol in school as girls.\(^{62}\) DFID should ensure that its emphasis on women and girls in education in South Sudan is carried over into the recruitment of teachers to ensure that positive female role models are recruited and reach the areas with the greatest gender disparity. Consideration should be given by the Government of South Sudan to introducing measures to incentivise female teachers to move to rural areas with the greatest need of addressing gender disparities.

How DFID can help to improve governance, including at the county and local level

15. VSO recognises the significant challenges faced by the Government of South Sudan as it works to establish new institutions and to provide stability across the country. VSO believes that one of the best ways to create robust and legitimate democratic institutions is for governments to embrace pluralism and create space for healthy political dialogue. The transitional constitution adopted by the Government of South Sudan commits the country to “establish a decentralised democratic multi-party system of governance”. This is a positive step and the Government of South Sudan should encourage the establishment and growth of opposition parties. DFID should work closely with the Government of South Sudan to share expertise and ensure that the Government’s work to decentralise power is a success.

16. The decentralisation of power to country and local levels provides an opportunity for state and local government to consult widely with populations on decisions that affect their lives. This is particularly important as the Government establishes more basic services; local people should be included in the design of these systems so as to ensure that basic services meet the needs of their communities. In order to set the precedent of community involvement, DFID should require as a condition of funding projects that communities should be able to participate in the design of services.

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17. There are currently around 200 national NGOs registered in South Sudan, according to the NGO Forum. Very few of these are well functioning and only some have a grass roots mandate. The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–13, produced by the Government of South Sudan commits the Government to supporting civil society. It is in the interests of the Government of South Sudan, the people of South Sudan and the international donor community that a well equipped civil society sector emerges in the country. DFID should work to assist the Government of South Sudan to fulfil their commitment to establish a robust civil society, capable of holding local government, national government and international donors to account. In particular, they should work closely with the government to ensure that the proposed NGO law provides a supportive legal environment for the sector and does not inhibit the growth of a healthy civil society.

18. The inclusion of women in national and local decision making in South Sudan will be an important step to establishing the legitimacy of institutions and to ensuring that they are truly representative of the communities that they seek to serve. The introduction of a 25% quota for female members of the legislative assembly is to be welcomed. However, for this to be meaningful, the Government of South Sudan and both female and male members of the legislative assembly should be engaging constructively with grassroots organisations that represent the views of women. DFID has a role to play in supporting the growing number of women’s civil society organisations and strengthening them so that they are able to advocate effectively on behalf of the communities they represent. DFID, together with these organisations, should also work to encourage a new generation of female leaders from across South Sudan to expand on the current level of representation in the legislative assembly.

19. VSO supports the analysis and recommendations of the Joint Briefing Paper “Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan”. This briefing paper was produced and adopted by a number of international NGOs operating in South Sudan and outlines the challenges of working with international donors.

20. VSO would emphasise the need to find the correct balance between humanitarian aid and development. While there will be a need to address significant humanitarian needs for years to come (a situation possibly exacerbated by the volatile security situation and the continuing return of refugees), it is important that the development needs, such as the establishment of a system of basic services in health and education as discussed above, are not lost. Donors and NGOs together with the Government of South Sudan must be forward looking and continue to emphasise development alongside humanitarian assistance.

October 2011

Written evidence submitted by Patrick Wakely, Emeritus Professor of Urban Development, London University Tom Carter, Urban Development Consultant

Summary

We wish to emphasise the crucial role that efficient and effective urban centres have to play in the development of South Sudan. Promoting progressive urban development through investment in urban services and infrastructure, and simultaneous support for effective urban governance will be immensely important for strengthening the role of local government in the new nation. We therefore strongly urge the UK Government to provide increased support to the urban sector.

Why invest in urban centres?

The vast majority of the population of South Sudan lives in rural areas—so why invest in urban centres? There is universal recognition that towns are the engines of national and regional development, even in predominantly rural economies. Towns are the centres of government at national, state and county levels. They are the principal source of economic services—markets, trade and commerce; banking, insurance and credit; communications; technical support and agricultural and rural extension services. They are the centres of national and regional social infrastructure—hospitals and other health referral facilities; secondary and higher education, and technical/vocational training establishments and their extension to the hinterland; welfare facilities for the disabled, infirm and aged. They are also the principal drivers of cultural change, modernisation, economic and social development—and thus the source of political development. If the towns do not function efficiently, the rural areas that they support and that support them will not develop effectively.

The towns must provide an attractive and efficient environment to encourage both public and private sectors:— Government operations and services must be delivered efficiently; and this will encourage good administrators to work in the civil service.

Owing to a delay in VSO’s registration with the Government of South Sudan, we were unable to add our name to the briefing in September 2011.
Entrepreneurial activity must be stimulated so as to generate trade, create jobs and provide cash incomes, and creates the potential to retain the educated and innovative young—the human capital that will be crucial to long-term development.

In addition, there are thousands of qualified South Sudanese living in the diaspora who can be attracted back by the prospect of contributing to nation-building. They have skills that are relevant to the institutions and economies of urban areas; and they will expect the quality of life that developed towns can offer. It is simply unrealistic to expect returnees to move back to poorly-serviced urban centres or to rural areas from which they or their parents originated, a point that is well recognised by GoSS.

In brief, if the towns don’t work, then South Sudan will not develop.

BACKGROUND

Following the CPA, the SPLM embarked in 2005 on an ambitious initiative for investment in urban centres. This was driven by three concerns:

— Degraded physical conditions in the State capitals and other main towns would severely constrain the establishment and effective functioning of Government services—for government to work, the main towns had to work.
— The ability to cope with the expected large scale influx of IDPs (internally displaced persons) returning to the South.
— The need to stimulate economic development, and create a wide range of local job opportunities.

Technical support was provided by the UN (through UNDP and UN-Habitat), and funding support for investment in urban infrastructure was provided through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (administered by the World Bank) and USAID, with significant counterpart funding provided from the GoSS budget.

What’s gone wrong

In spite of admirable and well-intentioned efforts by the local administrations, most of whose staff lack the necessary technical skills and experience to meet the exceptionally demanding challenges, these ambitious plans have foundered. The GoSS budget has collapsed due to the falling worldwide price of oil, and budget funds have been largely consumed by recurrent costs (especially SPLA and public service salaries), with little available for capital investment.

International contractors brought in to implement major infrastructure works have faced enormous difficulties with mobilisation of large equipment, supply of materials and lack of skilled labour. As a result, tender costs have been exceptionally high.

In addition, investment has been badly skewed. Firstly, a large proportion of funds has been soaked up by Juba, the capital of the South—so the other nine State capitals have received very little. And, secondly, investment has tended to focus on the needs of political and administrative elites rather than the general public.

And meanwhile, the scale and pace of urban growth—most notably in Juba—has far outstripped these modest attempts to deliver basic urban services.

The risk of failing urban development

The credibility of GoSS will be seriously weakened by its apparent inability to meet even the most basic needs of urban populations: access to safe water and sanitation, reliable power supply, and transparent land management procedures. Indeed there is sound evidence that this is already happening.

Many of the basic principles of good urban governance—are being by-passed. The result is widespread disillusionment among the urban population, and an increasingly cynical attitude towards the machinery of government and those that run it. These factors have surely contributed to the social disorder that has occurred in Juba and some other towns, both before and after independence. The growth of disaffected urban communities represents a real threat to the stability of the new Government—at national, state and municipal levels.

Yet the solutions to urban development problems are fairly well understood: there is extensive knowledge and experience of what works—and what doesn’t—based on almost 50 years of progressive urban development initiatives that have been tested in Africa and throughout the developing world, supported by the international community.

It is imperative, in our view, that the international community addresses these urban development issues in South Sudan with a similar urgency that is brought to hunger, health and education.

Restoring UK support to the urban sector

We note that the promotion of urban development is not currently a particularly fashionable position, and has a low priority for many development agencies, including DFID. Since 2003, DFID has reduced its support to technical assistance for urban infrastructure and development.
International Development Committee: Evidence

British development planners—both academics and consultants—have been at the forefront of major thinking and practice in Third World urban development over many decades. In the past, the British Government has given support to many countries (including Southern Sudan in the 1970s and 80s) to strengthen the capability of local urban planning and development institutions. British urban professionals continue to play an important role, but working almost exclusively through and for other multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies funded by other countries, and not by the UK.

We therefore wish to urge the Government to resume strong support for urban sector activities, in order to harness:

— the crucial contribution of towns to ensure successful development of the new country; and
— the excellent reputation of British urban sector professionals.

October 2011

Written evidence submitted by WAGING PEACE

1. Summary

This submission contends that the fledgling Republic of South Sudan’s (RoSS) economic, social and political success is dependent on resolving outstanding tensions with its northern neighbour, the government of Sudan, and specifically, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). South Sudan’s security will be perpetually undermined unless the outstanding issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and political differences with Khartoum are tackled, preferably in an international or regional forum. There is an important role for the UK in facilitating and advising such a forum, ensuring all parties fulfil their promises.

The success of the CPA thus far has been immense, however, with so many destabilising issues left unresolved it is far from comprehensive. Continuing large scale human rights abuses in the border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states will sooner or later draw RoSS into open or proxy conflict with Khartoum. On the basis of views expressed to us by military, political and civil leaders, Waging Peace fears that RoSS may become involved in defending its “cousins” across the border. Even in the absence of open conflict, RoSS will be under constant pressure to divert resources to defence and security; resources that would otherwise be used to create the infrastructure critical to development.

Both parties need to be held accountable to their CPA promises. There resolution is essential in ensuring a demilitarised border and long term and sustainable peace. Key areas which require resolution and we will provide comment upon are:

1. The location of the new border.
2. The rights of ethnic and religious minorities within Sudan.
3. The right of ethnic and religious minorities to belong to civil and political organisations.
4. The economic relationship between the two nations including the fees charged by Sudan to tranship South Sudan’s oil to Port Sudan.

2. The UK’s role

The UK deserves immense credit for its role as conscientious midwife in the birth of the RoSS. It was due to the sustained efforts of UK diplomats, officials and politicians that all parties to Sudan’s bloody and long-running war eventually came to the negotiating table, and that the CPA resulted. UK ministers and officials have been closely involved in ensuring the January 2011 referendum and independence in July occurred in such a peaceful environment. Their central contribution should be recognised.

For this reason the UK is ideally placed to ensure that those issues left unresolved by the CPA receive immediate attention. Failure to do so will exacerbate the already volatile and violent environment along the new border. At the end of this submission, we outline the UK’s points of possible leverage.

3. The border

The precise location of the border between north and south was so contentious that the details were not resolved before secession. The CPA promised a referendum in Abyei, and consultation exercises in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which would allow people living in states situated on the north side of the proposed border to have a say about which country they lived in. Since many residents of these states self-identify as non-Arab and non-Muslim and fought against Khartoum in the civil war, they feel aligned to RoSS.

Sudan has blocked the promised referendum in Abyei and the consultation in South Kordofan and has delayed the consultation exercise in Blue Nile. All three areas are now subsumed in violence, with thousands dead, injured, missing or displaced and with allegations of ethnic cleansing of non-Arabs coming from all quarters including the UN. Latent tensions caused by years of persecution and marginalisation by Khartoum have been reignited and the resentment, distrust and tensions on both sides of the border that are unlikely to go away without intervention.
4. The presence of millions of Non-Arab, Non-Muslim Sudanese in Sudan

Millions of non-Arab and non-Muslim people remain north of the border in Sudan. During the decades of war between the north and south, many southerners migrated north to find safety and better economic prospects. For years families who hail from the south have lived in squalid camps around Khartoum. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) believes as many as five million people of southern extraction still live in the Khartoum area. They did not return to RoSS at the birth of the new nation because of the lack of economic opportunities there, and because they feared losing the homes and businesses they had built up while living in the north. Parents were reluctant to remove their children from school while RoSS offered so little in comparison. Although southerners have experienced routine discrimination and intimidation in the north, economic circumstances made life in Khartoum a more attractive option. Issues of citizenship have been left unresolved by the CPA, and there is a fear that persecution of “Southerners” living in the North will only intensify once the nine month transitional period of citizenship has expired.

The other reason why Sudan contains so many people who self-identify as southerners is a legacy from the CPA. When the border was drawn, sizeable numbers of people in South Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile states found themselves on the “wrong”, northern side. The Nuba, Dinka, Nuer Beja, Funji and Uduk ethnic groups define themselves as non-Arab Africans. Many of whom are Christian or animist and not Muslim, and have resisted the imposition of Sharia for years. Many of these people fought on the side of the SPLM during the war and now consider themselves the new persecuted “Southerners” of Sudan.

There follows a more detailed examination of recent events in each disputed state along the border. It is essential to understand why the SPLM and Ross may feel the need to devote troops and resources to the area, and why unresolved tensions are so inflammatory.

5. Abyei

Until 1905 Abyei was in the southern region under colonial administration, and consequently many of its residents retain emotional and cultural ties with the south. Although the CPA stipulated that there would be a referendum on self-determination, it failed to reach agreement on who was entitled to vote. Khartoum insisted that nomadic ethnic groups who self-identify as Arabs must be allowed a vote in the referendum, thereby making it likely that the year-round residents of Abyei (non-Arab and non-Muslim) would be outnumbered. Juba, however, disagreed.

In May Sudanese armed forces took control of Abyei arresting anyone associated with the SPLM, and looting and destroying the homes of non-Arab and non-Muslim residents. This precipitated a flood of non-Arab and non-Muslim refugees across the border to relative safety in RoSS. The UN estimates 110,000 have been displaced, and they are unlikely to return in the current hostile environment.

An unpublished UN report in May described the government of Sudan’s actions in Abyei as “tantamount to ethnic cleansing”. After pressure from Khartoum this was changed to “actions that could lead to ethnic cleansing”.

President Bashir promised his troops would withdraw from Abyei by 24 May. Having pacified the international community with this pledge, Bashir then announced on 15 June that Sudanese troops would remain. Regional players brokered a deal whereby Ethiopia would provide peacekeepers, but as of 11 October, Khartoum says it will stay until all the Ethiopian peacekeepers are deployed. A senior SPLM official, Luka Biong, has suggested Khartoum’s aim is to continue its occupation and make it unattractive for non-Arab citizens to return, thereby ethnically cleansing those who would vote against unity with the northern entity.

6. South Kordofan

The underlying tensions described in Abyei, above, also apply in South Kordofan, home to 2.5 million Nuba people. When Winston Churchill visited the Nuba mountains in the 1900s, he was shocked to see ethnic Arab troops from Khartoum using the Nuba people for target practice. The Nuba would argue little has changed in the intervening century. The Nuba self-identify as non-Arab and non-Muslim, and they feel kinship ties with the Africa Christians and animists living in RoSS. It is a matter of deep regret to the Nuba that they find themselves living to the north of the new border.

The Nuba people believe they have experienced prejudice, discrimination, violence and ethnic cleansing at the hands of Khartoum’s ruling ethnic groups for decades. This pattern of abuse has been documented by human rights groups, faith groups and the United Nations over the years.

In January 1992 Khartoum declared jihad against the Nuba: thousands were killed, and hundreds of thousands were forced into camps. The government of Sudan used access to food as a weapon of war, restricting all humanitarian access to starving the Nuba.

On 5 June 2011 the Sudanese armed forces began operations in South Kordofan to “disarm” Nuba fighters who should have been absorbed into the SAF under the CPA but were not due to the lack of a viable consultation process. SAF describes these Nuba fighters as “mutineers”, following a “foreign scheme that aims to change the regime”.

The presence of millions of Non-Arab, Non-Muslim Sudanese in Sudan
The UN report on the events that followed states: “Human rights abuses are commonplace and part of the strategy”. The report described door to door searches targeting African ethnic groups, looting humanitarian offices and warehouses. It described seeing, “cattle trucks filled with blind-folded young men, their hands tied, sitting on the floor, sentries guarding them”. They were driven out to the edge of town where mass graves were later revealed by satellite images.

A Catholic news agency reported that local people who had been prominent in voter education and in civil society were the first to be executed. So were medical personnel, political rivals and individuals involved in the local authorities.

An aid worker interviewed on 5 June described witnessing a planned campaign of ethnic cleansing. Supposed sympathisers were executed on the spot and Sudanese troops explained they had orders to “clear” the area, and to “sweep away the rubbish”. Helicopter gunships pursued and killed Nuba as if they were animals,” according to the Sudan Council of Churches.

It is reported that 50 Nuba towns have been bombed during the conflict thus far. It is of note that the state governor, Ahmad Haroun, is wanted by the ICC for 40 charges including war crimes in Darfur. The humanitarian agencies, who have been excluded from South Kordofan by Khartoum, say aid is once more being used as a tactic. It was made clear to UNMIS that if it attempted to land a helicopter it would be shot down. The main runway has been repeatedly bombed in order to prevent arrivals of humanitarian supplies. Very little access has been granted to International aid agencies, and where it has been allowed they are only able to operate through national staff. Many of these staff are unable to work as conditions are too dangerous, often because they are taken to be supporters of the SPLM-N due to their Nuba ethnicity and are therefore targets for government attacks.

On 10 June the Sudan Ecumenical Forum warned, “A humanitarian crisis on an enormous scale is unfolding in South Kordofan”. The All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Archbishop of Sudan, Rev Dr Daniel Deng Bul Yak both describe what is happening as an “ethnic cleansing policy”.

A Nuba eyewitness who escaped to a refugee camp in Kenya said Sudanese soldiers were deliberately targeting those they believe to be ethnically African: “People who are “black black” are sought out and killed. Dead bodies are along the roads”. Aid workers fleeing South Kordofan told reporter Alan Boswell that Nuba were being gunned down in the street.

Satellite images (www.satsentinel.org) reveal several fresh mass graves, giving credence to many eyewitness reports of the ethnic cleansing and murder of non-Arab Sudanese. Respected international human rights groups have also documented and corroborated eyewitness accounts.

In September Baroness Valerie Amos, head of the UN humanitarian agency, released an uncharacteristically blunt summary of the outlook for the Nuba people: “Unless there is an immediate stop to the fighting, and humanitarian organizations are granted immediate and unhindered independent access throughout South Kordofan, people in many parts of the state face potentially catastrophic levels of malnutrition and mortality”.

At least 73,000 people were displaced as a result of the fighting and the aerial bombardments in the initial stages of the conflict. To date approximately 12,000 people been displaced to Unity State in RoSS with an average of 270 people arriving there per day.

On 1 July Bashir ordered his troops to “continue operations in South Kordofan until they clean the state of rebels”. He blamed “the Jews” who “run the media and the humanitarian groups” for tarnishing Sudan’s reputation.

At the time of writing, Sudanese armed forces remain in place. In September President Bashir repudiated a cease-fire agreement negotiated by his government and the SPLM-North, and broke his own self-declared truce of aerial bombing.

7. Blue Nile state

Blue Nile was an SPLA stronghold during the war and many of its citizens remain aligned with the south to this day. On 1 September Sudanese armed forces attacked the residence of the recently elected governor of Blue Nile state, Malik Agar. The governor fled and was replaced with a nominee from the Regime.

The UN’s OCHA agency estimates that 135,000 people were forced from their homes by the initial conflict and approximately 50,000 remain displaced today. The agency reports that 27,500 have gone across the border to Ethiopia which has necessitated the opening of a new refugee camp there. Residents of the main town, Damazin, headed south to RoSS to escape the attack, leaving their possessions behind. At the time of writing, the Satellite Sentinel project reports a build-up of at least 3,000 Sudan armed forces troops on the outskirts of another strategic population centre, al-Kurmuk.

8. The need for explicit and enforceable rights for religious and ethnic minorities in Sudan

Sudan has signed various international and regional treaties guaranteeing minority rights and assuring its citizens freedom of speech and assembly. Its interim constitution also offers similar statutory protection. However, in practice Sudan is consistently categorised as one of the least free nations in the world. Freedom
House has rated Sudan as one of the world’s most repressive regimes, on a par with North Korea. Transparency International ranks Sudan’s corruption as so serious that it is 172nd out of 178 nations. Reporters Without Borders ranks Sudan as among the 10 worst countries on earth.

In the absence of any meaningful legal safeguards there is no reason to believe the persecution of the non-Arab and non-Muslim citizens of Sudan will not continue. Leading members of the ruling National Congress Party (formerly the National Islamic Front) have been forthright about the intention to make Sudan an exclusively Arab and Muslim country.

On 19 December 2010 President Bashir made an important speech in which he described the character of the new post-Southern secession Sudan. He said:

“If South Sudan secedes, we will change the Constitution, and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicit … Sharia and Islam will be the main source for the Constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language”.

Defining Islam and Sharia, Bashir said it “has always stipulated that one must whip, cut or kill”.

The Christians and animists in Sudan may not relish this prospect. Mistrust and fear will remain in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states until there is a credible and enforceable bill of rights protecting minorities, accompanied by impartial and accessible legal redress through both the police and the courts. The Khartoum authorities have a track record of violating the international and national rights treaties they have signed. Hence it is not enough for the international community to accept Khartoum’s word that minority rights will be respected. There must be a transparent constitution created in consultation with civil society groups monitored by a regional or international body, to ensure existing national Sudanese laws are enforced and enforceable.

9. The need for enforceable rights for ethnic and religious minorities to form and belong to political and civil groups

Even before RoSS’s independence in July 2011, it was clear that the security services in Sudan intended to crack down on any expression of political plurality. Since Abyei was taken in May, human rights and faith groups have documented the violent suppression of churches and political parties throughout Sudan. Individuals who are believed to be involved in the church, or the SPLM-N have been targeted, dragged from their homes, executed in the streets, and “disappeared”. The ruling NCP recently reversed its previous position and refused to recognise the SPLM-N. It has closed down numerous newspapers and radio stations, harassing and arresting journalists.

Khartoum frames their actions in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile as cracking down on a “rebellion”. However, church wardens and civilians unaligned to any political movement have been among those targeted. Khartoum is cracking down on all political dissent, or perceived dissent, on the part of all non-Arabs in the region.

The ruling NCP regards all non-Arab Sudanese as a threat to its hegemony. This concern is exacerbated by increasing tensions within the ruling party, the NCP. Julie Flint and other commentators have reported a recent shift in power from the leading civilian figures in the NCP to military representatives. Sudan watchers believe the military wing of the NCP blames the civilians for allowing the secession of RoSS. They fear that restive and marginalised regions like Darfur, the East and those states along the border (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) will engender further secessionist movements. They are unwilling to countenance the further dismemberment of what was previously Africa’s biggest country. Hence influential military figures are insisting on a crack down on political opposition and civil society, further restricting what little free speech exists and President Bashir, increasingly reliant upon military support, believes his own political position and the unity of the nation will be well served by war with an internal enemy.

10. Fees charged by Sudan to tranship Southern oil to Port Sudan

The CPA resulted in 75% of Sudan’s oil being allocated to RoSS. The South produces 385,000 barrels a day, and it transships north and east through an existing pipeline to Port Sudan. Using a Sudanese pipeline is clearly not ideal, given the tensions between the two nations. However, ROSS’s reserves are not significant enough to justify the expense, estimated at between $1.5 and $3 billion, of building a pipeline across less hostile territory to a Kenyan port.

RoSS’s northern neighbour fully grasps the leverage this gives Khartoum over what it can charge to use its pipeline. Regrettably transshipping fees were one of the issues left unresolved at the time of secession.

Sudan is charging RoSS $33 a barrel to transship oil. Neighbouring Chad pays $0.4 a barrel. The highest known transshipping rate elsewhere is $2 a barrel. Clearly, Khartoum’s excessive charges will lead to further tensions between the two countries, especially in the oil-rich border regions.
11. Will RoSS become involved in conflicts north of the border?

A cursory glance at RoSS’s press illustrates the scale of public outrage at human rights abuses Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Southern politicians and religious leaders have also been vocal in expressing their disgust at Khartoum’s actions.

However, the new nation has much to lose by being drawn into open or proxy confrontation with its former rulers in Khartoum. Any conflict with its northern neighbour would take a huge economic and military toll.

It is also true that RoSS resisted being drawn into the war in Darfur, where Sudanese who also define themselves as African, have endured Khartoum’s campaign of ethnic cleansing since 2003. One factor contributing to the SPLM’s apparent indifference to the fate of Darfur is that historically Darfur supplied many of the soldiers who terrorised the south during the decades of war. The other factor was that from the start of large scale human rights abuses in Darfur, the SPLM has been engaged in negotiations with Khartoum to end the war in the south, and it was reluctant to be side-lined by Darfur. The international community has also feared that peace talks with Khartoum would be derailed, and were careful to prevent any linkage between what Khartoum was doing in Darfur and what it had been doing for decades in the south.

In summary, there are much stronger kinship bonds between RoSS and the people of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile state, than there are with fellow non-Arabs from Darfur. An important factor in this is shared religious and cultural values and traditions, and geographical proximity.

It is significant that the SPLM-N has recently forged alliances with Northern opposition including Darfurian rebel groups, giving rise to concerns that war could erupt along the entire border between north and south, from Darfur in the west to Ethiopia in the east. There are also fears that other regional players might be dragged in, supplying weaponry to RoSS.

12. The historical precedent for intervention by RoSS

It is not difficult to predict what will happen when a nation splits in two in less than amicable circumstances: there are unpromising precedents in recent history (Korea, Vietnam, and Germany).

In the case of Sudan, the CPA has left a substantial population of non-Arab and non-Muslim citizens living on the northern side of the new border. Political and civil society leaders in RoSS have been vocal in expressing their concerns about the fate of their northern co-religionists, and those with whom they share an ethnic (non-Arab) identity. Just as West German foreign policy, and its citizens, remained acutely concerned by the plight of their cousins living in both East Berlin and the GDR, so RoSS will most likely shape its foreign and defence policy according to the fate of its non-Arab, non-Muslim cousins. It is unrealistic to believe RoSS will be unmoved by human rights abuses being suffered by people with whom it shares such a history and strong sense of identity. It is also unlikely that either side will turn the other cheek to the allegations of the funding of proxy militias inside their borders.

13. Points of leverage

Sudan is keen to normalise relations with the USA and Europe. It also has a sinking economy with its citizens recently taking part in another spate of riots. This presents several points of leverage:

1. Khartoum resents its presence on the US State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism.
2. It wants access to the IMF and World Bank.
3. It is keen to negotiate away its estimated $38 billion of debt.
4. The NCP wishes the outstanding ICC arrest warrants for President Bashir and other NCP figures to be suspended.
5. Sudan’s oil industry, and other aspects of its economy, need western technology, and thus the regime wants existing sanctions to be scrapped.

14. The need for urgent action

Waging Peace strongly urges the International Development Select Committee to press HMG to take the following action.

In the short term, it is vital that Khartoum stops the aerial bombardment of its own citizens in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. If this requires the threat of the imposition of a no-fly zone, then the UK should work with its international partners to make the likelihood of such a threat credible. Appeasing Khartoum has not worked in the past, whereas concerted action does bring the desired results. Immediate unimpeded access to affected civilians by humanitarian agencies and the UN is also essential, and should not be the subject of negotiation.

In the longer term, Sudan must be made to abide by the international and regional treaties it has signed, thereby guaranteeing rights to its religious and ethnic minorities. If Sudan violates its own international and regional obligations, its membership of international bodies should be suspended. Sudan must also be obliged to fulfil its commitments under the CPA. Using the points of leverage mentioned above, the outstanding
contentious issues (the border, citizenship and rights, and oil transhipping) must be resolved if there is to be any prospect that RoSS and its northern neighbours can peacefully co-exist.  

October 2011

Written evidence submitted by World Vision UK

World Vision is a child focused Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, their families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. We are the world’s biggest local charity, working in nearly 100 countries to improve the lives of about 100 million people worldwide. World Vision has been working in South Sudan since 1989, delivering basic services, aiding the recovery of people’s livelihoods and improving their prospects for long-term development. Currently, World Vision has programmes in seven of the 10 states in South Sudan and is providing health services to an estimated 1.2 million people; providing access to clean water and improved hygiene and sanitation; providing over 70% of World Food Programme food to highly food insecure communities; strengthening communities’ coping mechanisms and supporting re-integration efforts; supporting local peace building initiatives and protection of children and vulnerable people; and promoting agriculture, food security and livelihoods activities.

We welcome the opportunity to provide written evidence to the Committee on this enquiry. We very much welcome the support the UK has given to South Sudan. DFID, as in many other countries, is a progressive and effective donor, listening to the needs of the people of South Sudan and achieving significant results. Our evidence includes detailed comments on DFID’s priorities and future work. In general we welcome the publication of the DFID Operational Plan for South Sudan 2011–15, however, while the sectoral methodology of the plan is to be commended, we believe that it misses out on a more integrated, holistic approach to community development. DFID have adopted a service delivery approach, which includes minimal dialogue with communities around wider development plans, civil society strengthening and beneficiary accountability.

1. We recommend that DFID have a greater balance in their funding, increasing support for community engagement and civil society strengthening.

1.2 We recommend that the UK supports and encourages the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to invest in more equitable and sustainable rehabilitation and development through increased allocation of the national budget for the extension of basic services, livelihoods opportunities, economic diversification and strengthening of justice systems. Taking a longer-term, more holistic approach to statebuilding.

2. Humanitarian Need

2.1 The Government of South Sudan (GOSS) has drafted its South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013 and post-independence, donors are looking to make a shift from humanitarian to development assistance. While we welcome a focus on more sustainable programming, the complexity and dynamic nature of the South Sudan context is such that it doesn’t neatly fit into such paradigms. Consequently, aid instruments and aid programs can be out of sync with what is known about processes of stabilisation and the time frame required to establish a fully post-conflict political environment.

2.2 Distinctions between “humanitarian” and “development” funding are not easily drawn in the complex, dynamic context of South Sudan. South Sudan requires years of response, donor commitment and investment, and the short term nature of many of the available donor funds can undermine potential progress. In order to ensure a longer term approach, that addresses the interconnected developmental issues, we believe there needs to be much stronger coordination between donors, for example between ECHO and EU DevCo.

2.3 Instability and the impact this has on humanitarian need in South Sudan is increasing. So far this year, over 310,000 people have been displaced due to conflict, compared to 220,000 in 2010.62 Whilst instability is also likely to continue in the short-term, if not increase with the end of the rainy season, World Vision also expects that droughts and floods will continue to force people from their land.

2.4 World Vision has been responding to those displaced, including from the conflict in Abyei. The immediate and most pressing needs are for Non Food Items (NFIs)—shelter, mosquito nets, cooking pots, etc), health care, and clean water and sanitation. Our recent Rapid Needs Assessment reported that access to safe, clean water in Warrap, Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states is very limited.

2.5 Further, insecurity undoubtedly affects our ability to programme. Over recent weeks we have had to suspend our project implementation in specific parts of Upper Nile (Kaka) and Warrap (Tonj East) as a result of heightened insecurity.

2.6 DFID and the other donors must recognise that there will be significant humanitarian need in South Sudan for years to come and sufficient funding must be made available for this. Funding must be fast and flexible to allow effective humanitarian response. This will be best achieved through humanitarian funding channelled bilaterally, together with an adequately resources Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) for South Sudan. For more information, see section 5.
2.7 The design of the new CHF for South Sudan must take into account lessons learnt during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation period. Specifically, the delayed disbursement of funds, short implementation periods and lack of synchronisation with the seasonal calendar must be addressed. This could be achieved by extending the duration of CHF projects (and the humanitarian work-plan) from one to two years, but with multiple openings during each period (two to three openings annually); and aligning the CHF funding schedule with the seasonal calendar. Donors should where possible make multi-year commitments so that the allocations process is not held up due to uncertainties over available funds, and should ensure that funds are committed well before the start of the project year. Donors should also work with OCHA and the UNDP to streamline the allocations process so as to ensure that funds are disbursed before, not after, projects are due to commence.64

2.8 More support is needed to strengthen the ability of government and communities to prevent, mitigate and recover from humanitarian crises. This should be framed within established community structures, for example supporting community leaders to develop contingency plans, while ensuring the participation of women, children and vulnerable groups. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management has recently highlighted the importance of strengthening national and state disaster management strategies, so DFID and other donors should aim to support them in these efforts.

2.9 DFID and the other donors must continue to support initiatives aimed at improving security and protection, reducing a key driver of displacement. This should include local peacebuilding initiatives (implemented through established community structures), continued support for the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform to increase command and control among the armed forces, and programmes to promote good governance, community-oriented policing and access to both formal and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.

3. Returnees

3.1 The reintegration of returnees is a significant challenge, with the high numbers (almost 350,000 by the start of October),65 the already limited basic services and livelihood opportunities in South Sudan, and ongoing insecurity. We expect returnees to continue arriving into South Sudan over the coming months given the nine-month transitional period agreed by the two governments which lasts until March 2012.

3.2 Reintegration is made more difficult in urban areas where access to land is constrained. GOSS promised returnees land and according to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, this land is available in the rural areas. However, many returnees have come from Khartoum and intend to return to urban/peri-urban areas of South Sudan where land is under much greater pressure and the surveying and allocation of it is a lengthy process.

3.3 The educational needs of returnee children is also an issue to be addressed, given that they will have previously been taught in Arabic, and now have to transition over to English, as do the teachers that have returned.

3.4 Efforts to promote access to and ownership of land for returnees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups must be supported. This should include the establishment of offices of the South Sudan Land Commission in each state; the development of county land authorities and payam land councils; and the establishment (or enhancement) of community-based dispute resolution initiatives.66

3.5 The returnees’ skills and assets must be recognised and harnessed to ensure better-targeted livelihood opportunities, successful reintegration, the scaling-up of basic service provision and the development of South Sudan. The distribution of seeds and tools is not an appropriate response to all returnees.

4. Food Security

4.1 As a result of the increase in violence and the belated distribution of seeds and tools, most Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and returnees have not cultivated for the 2011 June to September cropping season. In addition to this, in some states, such as Warrap, the rains have been delayed and erratic.

4.2 The Sudan/South Sudan border blockade is significantly affecting market activities in the border states. With restricted availability, the price of food, fuel and other commodities has risen substantially, exacerbating food insecurity in these areas. World Vision has offices in Kuajok, Bentiu and Malakal, capitals of Warrap, Unity and Upper Nile respectively, and has witnessed these shortages and rising prices. Rising prices are also impacting on programme implementation. In Malakal, a drum (210 litres) of fuel used to cost around 500 SSP (£120) before independence and now it costs 5,700 SSP (£1,350).

64 Rebecca Barber on behalf of 37 NGOs, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan, (Oxfam International), 2011
65 UN OCHA South Sudan
66 Rebecca Barber on behalf of 37 NGOs, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan, (Oxfam International), 2011
4.3 Out of a population of 8.2 million, the FAO estimates 1.2 million people will be “severely food-insecure” in 2012.67 Vulnerable households are adopting reliance on less preferred or cheaper food, limiting portion size, reducing number of meals and restricting adults’ consumption to enable children eat as coping strategies to adjust to food insecurity.68 This reduction in food intake has particularly affected the female population.

4.4 A pre-harvest nutrition survey recently conducted by World Vision in five counties of Warrap state has shown that gross malnutrition is 22% amongst children under-five, a doubling since the same period last year. It must be noted, however, that while increased malnutrition rates have been recorded in Warrap, Upper Nile and Lakes states, malnutrition rates have declined in most states.

4.5 Livelihoods profiles and coping strategies must be properly understood and then supported. This entails ensuring that there is sufficient time and funding given to undertaking rigorous context analysis. The information must be geographically disaggregated to take account of the variation between and within states, counties and communities.

5. BASIC SERVICES FUND AND OTHER FUNDING MECHANISMS/ISSUES INCLUDING DONOR COORDINATION

5.1 The DFID-led Basic Services Fund (BSF) is widely regarded as one of the most successful pooled funding mechanisms in South Sudan, and World Vision has found it to be efficient, timely, responsive and user-friendly. The Juba-based management agent Mott MacDonald has enabled good working relationships between the BSF and NGOs, with technical support and frequent project visits. A comparison between BSF and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund—South Sudan (MDTF—SS), which experienced huge delays in disbursing funds, shows that the management of pooled funds by private management agents, such as the BSF, are widely assessed to have performed better.

5.1.1 For example, the BSF enabled World Vision in Western Equatoria to build the systemic change needed to treat over 36,000 children, train 30 teachers and 42 education managers, drill five boreholes and rehabilitate 15 and train 20 water committees to manage their villages’ water supply. For the funding we received, this project represented excellent value for money.

5.2 The BSF is flexible, transparent and is well designed to meet the needs of implementing NGOs. We welcome the extension of this fund until September 2012, as the new DFID-led health pooled fund is developed. However, given that BSF covers health, education and water, sanitation, we would welcome clarification on what DFID funding mechanisms will fill the gap left by BSF in the latter two sectors.

5.3 Post-independence, with many of the funding mechanisms that were trialed in South Sudan during the CPA Interim period coming to an end and new funding mechanisms being developed, it is crucial that lessons are learnt, good and bad, to increase impact on the ground for the people of South Sudan.

5.4 At present, the UN’s cluster system enables strengthened communication and coordination between humanitarian actors (UN agencies, NGOs and donors); however dialogue with development donors is less easy. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning’s Aid Strategy details coordination mechanisms; DFID and other donors must work closely with the government to enact and strengthen these.

5.5 Integrated programming across sectors will be key to making substantive progress; a single sector approach is often limited. For example, the effort to address malnutrition has primarily focused on treatment. Yet malnutrition has multiple causes that all need to be addressed to be successful, such as poor water, sanitation and hygiene, feeding practices, culture, and lack of access to dietary diversity and primary health care. These in turn are linked to education and livelihoods. In South Sudan, the prevalence rates of acute malnutrition have remained persistently high because of the interconnected nature of the development and humanitarian problems.

5.6 The new funding mechanisms must learn the lessons, good and bad, of the previous funding mechanisms. A range of mechanisms both bilateral and pooled are needed for flexibility, but there are some common characteristics they should share to increase impact on the ground for the people of South Sudan, notably timely, predictable funding through an efficient management agent.

5.7 For basic service delivery, longer-term funding is also advantageous to strengthen capacity-building of the local government and community. This requires sufficient time, “good development cannot be rushed”.

5.8 While these new mechanisms are being developed, DFID and other donors must ensure a there’s no gap in funding and thus service delivery in 2012 and hence we welcome the extension of BSF into 2012.

5.9 There must be strengthened communication and coordination between donors operating in different sectors to enable integrated programming. DFID and the other donors must support the government to provide strong leadership, communication and coordination amongst all stakeholders (civil society included) in this.

5.10 Increased dialogue between “humanitarian” and “development” donors is also needed to ensure progress on the ground is not being lost in the relief-rehabilitation-development continuum.


68 Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, World Food Programme
6. MATERNAL, NEWBORN AND CHILD HEALTH

6.1 World Vision welcomes the UK Government’s commitment to achieving progress on MDGs 4 and 5, and particularly the personal commitments made by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for International Development. In South Sudan, the maternal and child health statistics are alarming and significant progress needs to be made. According to the most recent data available, maternal mortality is 2,054 per 100,000 live births, making it the highest rate in the world.69

6.2 Working to improve maternal and child health has been shown to result in substantial dividends, including reducing the burden of health costs and generating economic growth. The World Health Organization’s Commission on Macroeconomic Growth and Health found that “that investments in global health will save eight million lives a year by 2010 and generate at least a $360 billion annual gain during the period 2015–20, several times the costs of scaling up the health interventions themselves, counting both the donor and recipient country efforts.”70 Further, given the ongoing insecurity in South Sudan, investment in health is crucial in building confidence in the statebuilding project, and this is reflected in the UK Government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy, which states, “The fabric that holds society together is strengthened if people see that their taxes are used effectively, for example to provide health care”.71

6.3 World Vision recommends that there should be a balanced allocation of aid between the supply side (infrastructure such as health facilities and drugs) and the demand side (community engagement) of health services. The BSF’s peer review noted that performance was assessed primarily on the supply side.72

6.3.1 For example, apart from food availability, World Vision has found cultural dietary taboos and preferences to be determinant in influencing nutritional status of children among communities in South Sudan.73 There is also a gender dimension, as women and girls tend to eat last, enjoying the least diet diversity. Working with and gaining the understanding and cooperation of community leaders is essential to adjust these behavioural practices and reduce malnutrition.

6.4 There also needs to be better data and statistical evidence to enable targeted programming. For example, the most recent maternal mortality rate for South Sudan comes from the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey, since the maternal mortality rate was not measured in the 2009 survey. Furthermore, the 2006 figure is actually based on older data. Accurate and timely data is crucial for understanding how to target health interventions in order to meet the greatest need.

6.5 DFID should broaden its approach to basic services to include demand side considerations. Community engagement is crucial for sustainability, an understanding of the socio-cultural issues is also necessary for effective programming.

6.6 DFID needs to invest in much more data collection into maternal and child mortality.

7. LIVELIHOODS

7.1 World Vision, along with 37 other agencies, produced a report Getting it Right from the Start looking at the priorities for action by donors in the new Republic of South Sudan. We believe that it is essential that there is a focus on increased livelihood opportunities.74 This will be crucial for increasing economic growth, reducing instability and aiding development in South Sudan.

7.2 With 78% of households in South Sudan depending on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary source of livelihood,75 there is an increased need for progress in these areas. South Sudan has a rich natural resource base yet just 4% of arable land is cultivated, the production of livestock and fish is just a fraction of the potential, and interstate trade and international exports are minimal.76 Furthermore, many believe that Western Equatoria State could be the “bread basket of South Sudan”, yet it has the highest number of displaced of all the 10 states due to attacks by the Lords Resistance Army and those that remain on the land struggle with lack of access to credit and markets, hindering their ability to scale-up production and profit.

7.3 Particular challenges are posed by: low education levels; very limited infrastructure and access to credit; almost a complete absence of value-adding technology; the high number of returnees; and ongoing insecurity. Furthermore, there is a challenge is to ensure resources are exploited in a manner that leads to an improved reduction in poverty.

7.4 DFID and other donors must increase their support for sustained efforts to improve local agricultural and pastoral production to levels that promote viable livelihood opportunities. These efforts must include foci

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69 Sudan Household Health Survey, 2006
70 http://www.who.int/macrohealth/background/en/
71 UK Government Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 2.14
73 Groves, V (2010) Childhood Malnutrition and the Dinka Children of Southern Sudan, An Exploration into the Cultural and Social Determinants of Malnutrition in Children Under the Age of Five Years in Torng South County
74 Rebecca Barber on behalf of 37 NGOs, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan, (Oxfam International), 2011
75 National Baseline Household Survey (2009)
76 Rebecca Barber on behalf of 37 NGOs, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan, (Oxfam International), 2011
on provision of quality seeds of improved varieties; training in improved farming, fishing and animal husbandry techniques; agricultural extension services; processing and packaging inputs and technology; and access to credit. Improvement of infrastructure is also vital.

7.5 The strengthening of the private sector will be important. All British companies operating in South Sudan must do so in a transparent and accountable manner, demonstrating a long-term commitment to the country. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should advise on this.

8. CIVIL SOCIETY

8.1 Given the displacement and disruption to communities caused by the war, civil society is weak in South Sudan. It needs protecting and strengthening as a priority to both increase the sustainability of development work and to improve good governance. Involvement of communities in projects can often be limited given short funding cycles and the rainy season and poor infrastructure restricting NGOs’ access. Longer-term funding would enable greater community involvement, ownership and thus sustainability.

8.2 At present, NGOs are providing an estimated 80% of the basic services in South Sudan, so communities look to NGOs rather than to their government for improvement access to and quality of these services. While recognising that NGOs will play a key role in basic service delivery for the coming years, all stakeholders must begin preparing for the gradual transition over to government provision. Civil society will key important in this, by holding government to account and engaging with the relevant government authorities. At the same time we must recognise the need to scale up basic service provision, as it’s estimated that only 20% of the population currently have access to basic services.

8.2.1 World Vision currently uses funds from our DFID Partnership Programme Agreement for a social accountability project in Western Equatoria state. This project will provide civic education for communities, educating them on the roles and responsibilities of government, and in turn enabling them to engage in dialogue with their local government authorities with the aim of improving access to and quality of basic service provision.

8.3 National NGOs are also weak and struggle to access funds. Often they do not hear about funding opportunities, do not meet the necessary financial reporting requirements, or are unable to cost-share and handle the size of the grant. Access to funding for National NGOs needs to be increased, as strengthening them is an important part of strengthening civil society.

8.4 DFID must promote greater community engagement in programming through the provision of longer-term, flexible funding to NGOs.

8.5 Civic education programming must also be supported to strengthen civil society and its voice. This includes youth and women’s groups and Faith-Based Organisations. The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–13 contains a commitment to training civil society on good governance, and GOSS should be supported to fulfill this commitment.

8.6 The new funding mechanisms that are being developed must strengthen national NGOs’ ability to access funding, DFID and other donors must support to these National NGOs to meet the financial reporting mechanisms. Promoting partnering and mentoring with INGOs would be a way to do this.

8.7 As a donor with a long-term commitment to South Sudan and one that adherence to the principles of good development practice, DFID should have a voice at the table with government to press for improved good governance as well as for increased GOSS budget allocation for basic service provision, including for mother and child health.

9. LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING

9.1 Between 2005 and 2011, donors predominantly focused their capacity building efforts and technical assistance at the national level, in the capital, Juba. Until recently, little investment was made in capacity building at the state and county levels. Yet with the government’s decentralisation policy, it is the local government that is responsible for service delivery.

9.2 Capacity building must address both human and material resources. Many counties lack IT and communications equipment and transportation. Given such limitations, attracting and keeping well-qualified staff at the county level is very difficult. The scarcity of qualified staff across the country due to the legacy of the war is also problematic.

9.3 DFID should increasingly focus capacity building at the state and particularly county levels through the provision of technical assistants and through grants that provide office infrastructure and staff trainings. However, this alone will not be successful, to ensure that well-qualified staff are attracted to and remain at county levels, government salaries must be of a sufficient level and paid on time. Providing decent staff

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77 Rebecca Barber on behalf of 37 NGOs, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan, (Oxfam International), 2011

78 Rebecca Barber on behalf of 37 NGOs, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan, (Oxfam International), 2011
accommodation could also act as an incentive. To overcome the shortage of qualified staff in South Sudan, attracting back the Diaspora will be important.

9.4 Given that DFID is significantly increasing its representation in Juba we hope this presents the opportunity for more staff field visits to strengthen understanding of the context and the realities on the ground outside of the capital.

10. CROSS GOVERNMENT WORKING

10.1 The establishment of the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit was very welcome, and enables a coordinated approach to Sudan. World Vision feels that this has proven to be a great success, and allowed the UK to play a significant role in both diplomatic and development efforts to help Sudan recover from decades of civil war and poverty. We support the continuation of a UK Special Representative to Sudan and feel that this role has reflected the importance of Sudan to the UK Government and given the UK Government significant influence in international support for the CPA. The UK’s role as member of the Troika has furthered this influence and we welcome the continuation of this important group.

10.2 In our experience, the Sudan Unit has been open and welcoming of engagement from NGOs, civil society groups and the Diaspora. Our impression of working with DFID in Juba is similar. We welcome this level of consistent commitment from the UK Government to working with non-governmental groups.

10.3 World Vision also welcomes the level of ministerial engagement, in this and the previous Government, on issues relating to both South Sudan and Sudan. We believe that the visits and statements of UK ministers and secretaries of state have been important in ensuring continued international attention on the referendum and independence processes, as well as supporting the people of South Sudan and the statebuilding project.

10.4 We also welcome the UK Government’s new Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This is intended to ensure that all UK Government interventions in fragile states account for and address the underlying causes of instability, such as lack of political inclusion, ineffective security and justice services and little or no public confidence in legitimate national and local government institutions. We welcome the Government’s willingness to engage NGOs on how BSOS can effectively be implemented in states such as South Sudan, and hope that this level of engagement and cooperation will continue.

10.5 We recommend that the level of UK engagement in South Sudan should continue to be high. Although South Sudan has become independent, there remain significant challenges in post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues, development and security. This is, therefore, a crucial time for South Sudan and it is critical that international engagement is prioritised and maintained.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The UK Government should continue to have a high level of engagement with South Sudan.

2. DFID should increasingly focus on building capacity at the state and county levels.

3. DFID should promote greater community engagement and sustainability through the provision of longer-term, flexible funding.

4. DFID should press for greater transparency and accountability in the Government of South Sudan budget.

5. DFID and other donors must increase their support for sustained efforts to improve local agricultural and pastoral production to levels that promote viable livelihood opportunities.

6. We recommend that DFID have a greater balance in their funding, increasing support for community engagement and civil society strengthening.

7. DFID needs to invest in much more data collection into maternal and child mortality.

8. Efforts to promote reintegration of returnees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups must be supported.

9. DFID and the other donors must recognise that there will be significant humanitarian need for years to come and sufficient, timely funding must be made available for this.

October 2011
Written evidence submitted by International HIV/AIDS Alliance

The Committee’s visit to South Sudan comes at a critical moment in the global HIV response that will have a direct impact on South Sudan’s ability to bring a halt to the spread of AIDS.

This is of great concern to the Alliance since we have been supporting community based responses to HIV in South Sudan since 2005, helping to build up community based civil society organizations that work closely with regional and the national HIV council. The Alliance South Sudan now supports almost 100 community based organizations across South Sudan doing impressive work at a community level to prevent and care for people affected by HIV.

1. The decades of conflict in South Sudan, and the subsequent lack of movement of people have resulted in South Sudan having a relatively low HIV prevalence rate when compared to the region. With stability there is now a significant influx of people from neighboring states with high HIV prevalence rates which poses a key threat to South Sudan if a comprehensive HIV prevention, treatment, care and support plan is not fully integrate into the social, economic and infrastructure development plans in South Sudan.

2. Whilst G8 leaders committed to supporting low and middle income countries in reaching universal access to HIV treatment, prevention and care, and the UK has promised that “no costed national HIV plan should go unfunded” we find that South Sudan’s national AIDS response remains unfunded—despite DFID’s increased investment in health.

3. A number of donors including the UK and USA have been supporting South Sudan’s country coordinating mechanism (CCM) to prepare a comprehensive funding application to the Global Fund. The cancelation of Round 11 by the Global Fund Board will have a devastating impact on the planned financing of S Sudan’s national AIDS response that requires the urgent attention and commitment of DFID.

4. In September Alliance South Sudan met with DFID representatives and the FCO Sudan Unit and presented the case of HIV in the Republic of South Sudan at the Joint APPG on HIV and AIDS and APG Sudan event you attended. At the meetings in London and follow up meetings with DFID in S Sudan we learnt that whilst financing health is a priority for DFID and the FCO no specific funding for the national HIV plan is planned by DFID. With the cancelation of R11 we would ask the IDC to urge DFID to reassess this position.

5. The International HIV/AIDS Alliance, as a PPA recipient, would welcome your to visit the Alliance South Sudan to share with you the work that we are doing on the ground as well as the impact of the funding crisis has on people living with HIV and those that are most vulnerable to HIV.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN: A HEALTH AND HIV FUNDING CRISIS

With the cancellation of Round 11 of funding by the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Malaria and TB (Global Fund), essential HIV prevention and treatment services in the Republic of South Sudan will not be providing.

Between now and 2014, at least 11,000 people living with HIV and AIDS in need of Antiretroviral treatment in South Sudan will not have access to it and might die unless additional funding is found. At present, the UK does not provide any funding to the National AIDS Commission and to directly support the HIV response in South Sudan.

If the UK Government is going honour its commitments towards universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support, it has to support the HIV response in South Sudan. There is currently zero funding allocated for HIV/AIDS within DFID’s Operational Plan 2011–15 for the Republic of South Sudan.

BACKGROUND

Having recently emerged from 45 years of civil war and gained independence in 2011, the Republic of South Sudan has weak health systems and limited human, organisational and technical capacity to respond to HIV.

Conditions for HIV to spread among the general population have increased since the civil war ended in 2005. According to UNAIDS, it is estimated that there are 116,000 PLHIV, which constitutes a 1.4% prevalence rate.79

Surveys across the country indicate that HIV prevalence rates in the Republic of South Sudan can vary from 10% in areas bordering Uganda to less than 1% in central parts, with a rate of 6% in the capital city Juba.80 This pattern is linked to the return of refugees and internally displaced people, combined with increased cross border travel. Returnees are coming from Uganda, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya, which all have high HIV prevalence rates. Populations most at risk of HIV infection include refugees, internally displaced people, soldiers, truckers, sex workers and tea sellers, as well as women and young girls more generally.

80 Ibid.
The Republic of South Sudan has made significant steps towards providing comprehensive HIV services including voluntary counselling and testing, prevention of mother-to-child transmission services and antiretroviral treatment. The government’s health policy (2007–12) provides a good framework for partnership with civil society, but it needs to receive adequate funding within the national budget. It also needs to be rolled out so that health and community workers are trained on HIV, sexual and reproductive health and other related policies.

**IMPACT ON THE HIV/AIDS RESPONSE**

The Republic of South Sudan was depending on the Global Fund Round 11 funding to be able to fill a significant funding gap within its health response. Although there is a fully costed National AIDS Plan, there is a funding gap of 80%.

Without Global Fund Round 11 funding there is no additional funding in country for HIV and AIDS. The current Global Fund Round 4 funding has come to an end and has managed to get 2,000 people living with HIV on ART.

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan has recently got approval for a Continuation Channel for funding from the Global Fund that will enable the people currently on treatment with GF support for a further. There are still many people needing life saving HIV treatment who currently cannot be initiated onto treatment because of the lack of resources. Whilst USAID/CDC have agreed to provide some of the paediatric treatment needed in the country there is currently no additional funding from the UK or any other funder for ARV procurement.

It is estimated that there are approximately 45,500 people living with HIV in need of ART in South Sudan (poor monitoring systems and low HIV-testing outside of maternal health services make it difficult to have accurate prevalence data). Less than 10% (3,700) of those in need will be on ART, receiving the medication they need to return to health and to prevent further infections, by the end of 2011.81 With the absence of Global Fund many people who are living with HIV and become eligible for treatment between now and when the 2014 funds are disbursed will not be able to receive help during this time.

Urgent financial support is needed for the provision of antiretroviral treatment, voluntary counselling and testing, and prevention of mother-to-child transmission across the country.

The government of South Sudan needs support to provide at least a basic package of community based HIV testing, counselling, HIV medicines, prophylactic treatments, care and support. With the pressing priorities of a new State there basic services are being overlooked, particularly by the key donors.

**THE ROLE OF ALLIANCE SOUTH SUDAN**

Established in 1993, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance (“the Alliance”) is a global partnership of nationally-based linking organisations working in over 40 countries, to support community action on AIDS in developing countries. The Alliance opened a Country Office in South Sudan (“Alliance South Sudan”) in 2005. Alliance South Sudan currently supports 92 community-based organisations across 23 counties in eight of South Sudan’s 10 states. Building capacity for an integrated HIV response is at its heart. Given the very limited and fragile government and civil society structures that existed immediately after the signing of the peace agreement, this work is an excellent example of the Alliance’s approach to community systems strengthening. This work has focused on civil society, as well as local and central government structures including the support of six County HIV/AIDS Commissions and two State HIV/AIDS Commissions.

Through its partners, it provides services such as HIV prevention, condom distribution, referral for voluntary counselling and testing and care and support. Alliance South Sudan strengthens emerging civil society organisations through grants and organisational and programmatic support, and has a memorandum of understanding with the government to be the lead agency to strengthen the capacity of civil society in the HIV response. Also, it builds the capacity of County AIDS Committees to strengthen coordination and service provision to adults and children in the Equatoria states, and it played a key role in the development of the Government of South Sudan HIV and AIDS strategy.

**A CALL ON THE UK**

DFID in country has indicated that HIV and AIDS related activities within the DFID health portfolio will be included within the Basic Health Package. The Basic Health Package is a primary health care based response to HIV and AIDS, which will also include outreach at the primary health care level. Although this is welcomed, there are critical activities within the HIV response that sit outside of the clinical setting and need a specific allocation of funds such as prevention, care and support and working with children affected by AIDS.

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If the UK Government is going honour its commitments towards universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support, it has to support the HIV response in South Sudan. There is currently zero funding allocated for HIV/AIDS within DFID’s Operational Plan 2011–15 for the Republic of South Sudan.

DFID is very interested in the demobilisation and integration of military personnel back into the community but there is no mention of HIV within these activities. As compared to the general public, armed personnel have a higher HIV prevalence rate (~4.4% compared to ~3%). Additionally, there is significant funding for Education but no integration of HIV and AIDS into the education curriculum. Due to low levels of literacy and education there are high levels of stigma and discrimination toward people living with HIV in South Sudan. Young people need more life skills and HIV awareness to prevent them from getting HIV and prevent them from getting into situations that would make them more vulnerable to HIV.

The Sudan Unit within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office indicated that £150 million will be allocated for Sudan each year, £90 million going to the Republic of South Sudan. A small portion of the £90 million spent on HIV/AIDS can have a huge impact to both fill gaps in the current funding crisis as well as contribute to increasing access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support. Investing in the Basic programme activities (ie PMTCT, condom promotion and distribution, key populations, behaviour change programmes) and Critical enablers (ie community mobilisation, stigma reduction, political commitment and advocacy) as indicated by the Investment Framework for HIV/AIDS\(^2\) will result in greater impact on HIV and AIDS as well as broader health.

February 2012