Linking DDR and SSR in post conflict peace-building in Africa: An overview

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This paper is an overview of the linkage between the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR). It makes the case for developing an integrated approach in trying to understand the complementary relationship between DDR and SSR by drawing on a number of peace building experiences on the African continent. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations for improving both DDR and SSR processes and argues that a properly structured and governed security sector is necessary for ensuring the success of post-conflict peace building and for making sure that countries that have undergone DDR programmes do not relapse into violent conflict.

Key words: Demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation, post conflict, peacebuilding, security sector reform, Africa, United Nations, African Union.

INTRODUCTION

Peacebuilding “has emerged as one of the most critically important, albeit vexing, aspects of international involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations.” The persistence of conflicts in many places where peacebuilding has been tried is an illustration both of the overwhelming need for and significant difficulties in establishing conditions for sustainable peace. (Keating and Knight, 2004, p. xxxi) As Africa emerges out of its post-Cold War period, characterised by intra-state conflicts and political instability, the continent has also become a prime theatre for various post-conflict peace-building interventions. A plethora of actors is involved in such interventions -- ranging from sub-regional and regional organisations to the United Nations. The goal of these institutions is not only to stem the upsurge in civil conflicts but also to prevent relapse when those conflicts are over (Steadman et al., 2002).

Primarily, the challenge for these peacebuilding intervention measures is to find a way to dismantle conflict-nurturing institutions and replace them with institutions that are capable of sustaining peace. Some conflict-nurturing elements have dissipated with the cessation of hostilities and the demobilisation of fighters. But others have persisted, requiring sustained military and diplomatic engagement. For instance, the remnants of wartime military and security apparatuses in some countries in Africa continue to pose great risks to internal security: inflated armies with little or no civilian control; irregular and paramilitary forces; an overabundance of arms and ammunition in private and government hands; weak internal security forces; and a lack of trust in and legitimacy of governments’ control over police and military forces (Newman and Schnabel, 2002, p. 1-6). Interventions have therefore gone beyond the initial peace processes to restore physical security and stability to include long-term peacebuilding initiatives that aim to usher in socio-economic progress and reform of political institutions in post-conflict societies. At their inception stages, these interventions encourage warring factions to buy-into peace agreements that form the basis for the disarmament and demobilisation of their fighters. This is usually followed by the long-term process of reintegation that includes the reform of the security sector to meet post-war security challenges and to create an enabling environment for sustainable peace and development. These two interventionary processes – Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) -- have become buzzwords of the post-conflict peacebuilding vocabulary, but there have been few attempts to establish the analytical and practi-
The DDR/SSR nexus

The conceptualisation and implementation of peacebuilding initiatives have reflected, more often than not, a lack of coherence, co-ordination and awareness of the linkages between the various elements of peacebuilding. I argue here that for peacebuilding interventions to be sustainable there needs to be a growing awareness among policy makers, interveners, academics and practitioners of the links between DDR and SSR. This of course presupposes the need for comprehensiveness and clarity at the conceptual as well as the practical levels. The article makes the case for an integrated approach that seeks to understand the complementary relationship between DDR and SSR by drawing from peacebuilding experiences on the African continent.

Maximising the potential synergies between linked post-conflict peacebuilding processes, such as DDR and SSR, is critical if peace, stability and development are to be achieved in fragile states (Bryden, 2007, p.3). To accomplish this objective, the article begins with an examination of the evolution of post-conflict peacebuilding as theory and praxis and with a conceptualization of the processes of DDR and SSR. It is noted that these two peacebuilding initiatives have distinct and separate conceptual and intellectual origins. The DDR process owes its genesis to former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's bold attempt to draw the link between the reform of the development functions of the UN system – something that was further elaborated on by Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi Annan. The concept of SSR, on the other hand, can be traced to British Foreign Secretary, Clare Short's bold attempt to draw the link between the reform of the security sector and poverty reduction in Britain's overseas development policy (Short, 1999). The government of the UK, particularly under former Prime Minister Tony Blair, championed SSR on the African continent. The UN has also acknowledged SSR as an essential element in any post-conflict stabilisation process. For instance, the Annual Report of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that was adopted in February 2006 endorsed the significance of SSR in peacekeeping (DCAF, 2007).

The article then goes on to identify some of the key actors involved in DDR and SSR programmes – those within the broader UN system, as well as those outside, such as the European Union (EU), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and regional organisations. This is followed by the establishment of theoretical linkages between the two interventions and then by a cursory but reflective look at seven cases in which DDR and SSR interventions have been tried on the African continent (Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan). From these cases one can learn some valuable lessons about the challenges that are encountered in both processes and how these processes can be improved.

THE EVOLUTION OF POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

‘Peacebuilding’ first became part of the official discourse at the UN in 1992 when former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali utilized the term in his An Agenda for Peace. For Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding was an activity to be undertaken immediately after the cessation of violence. In his own words, peacebuilding was “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p.11).

What Boutros-Ghali had identified as ‘peacebuilding’ was not new. Similar post-conflict strategies, or interventions, were applied in the past. For instance, at the end of World War II the United States, through its Marshall Plan, played a major role in the reconstruction of war-torn Europe and Japan. But what was novel in Boutros-Ghali’s reformulation of the concept was the realization that the demise of the Cold War had in fact opened up new possibilities for the UN system to play a major interventionist role in bringing both short-term and long-term resolution to outstanding conflicts. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali was the first to suggest that contemporary peacebuilding ought to be integrally linked to other more traditional UN peace-support activities, such as preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) In so doing, according to the former UN Secretary-General, the UN would be able to establish a comprehensive and rather seamless strategy for dealing with violent conflicts (something that was impossible during the Cold War era). Subsequent UN policy chiefs have not deviated from this post-Cold War policy. If any thing, they have consolidated this concept by building upon the foundation laid by the former UN Secretary-General.

In a 1998 report titled “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,” Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Kofi Annan, had this to say:

Experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that
integrated peacebuilding effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict. Peacebuilding may involve the creation and strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. Peacebuilding does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. (United Nations, 1998, para.63)

By 2001, an emerging concept – the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) – was gaining momentum within the international community as a normative framework for legitimizing humanitarian interventions. (ICISS, 2001) This normative development in some ways helped to shore up the UN’s post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. An important element of the R2P norm is the premise that the international community has a responsibility to protect innocent lives in countries where governments are either unable or unwilling to provide that protection.

The humanitarian intervention envisaged by the authors of that norm places a high premium on the importance of rebuilding societies torn apart by conflict. The norm envisions a continuum of protection that links prevention, reaction and rebuilding activities. It underscores the relevance, and priority, of preventing the deterioration of conditions that create the need for intervention in the first place. But also crucial to the peacebuilding idea, the R2P norm implies a rebuilding agenda that promotes security for all, good governance, and sustained social and economic development so that future military interventions would not be necessary (Nindorera and Powell, 2006). The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) states that “the responsibility to protect implies the responsibility not just to prevent and react, but to follow through and rebuild. This means that if military intervention action is taken…there should be a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promote good governance and sustainable peacebuilding” (ICISS, 2001, Chapter 1, p.13) The responsibility to protect norm entails the ultimate requirement eventually to devolve authority and capacity to national governments to ensure the well-being of all citizens. (Baranyi and Mepham, 2006) In that sense, R2P is linked conceptually and pragmatically with DDR and SSR. Like DDR, security sector reform is conceived as an important element as outside actors, like the UN, hand over the responsibilities of peacebuilding to post-conflict state governments. Those governments have to indicate a strong commitment to respect their democratic obligations and provide their citizens with the protection that comes from reforms to the security sector.

**CONCEPTUALIZING DDR & SSR**

The world is now grappling with one of its most pressing global public policy problems – that is, how can countries coming out of a state of internal conflict build the required foundation for sustainable peace and avoid a return to violence? Such countries are generally faced with enormously, highly complex, and intricately interconnected problems. But perhaps the most immediate challenge for these states is to decide what to do with the large numbers of ex-combatants, usually still heavily armed, who need to be disarmed, demobilized and then re-integrated into societies that, for obvious reasons, may be reluctant to embrace them. Since “ex-combatants have a potent ability to ‘spoil’ the peace process and undermine progress towards security and development, it is largely accepted that they need special attention” (Bell and Watson, 2006, 3). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes and programmes are designed precisely to address this challenge. To understand the character of DDR programmes, it is important to begin with a brief backgrounder that explains the need for such programmes and then to provide definitions of the three elements that make up these post-conflict interventions. To do the latter, we will draw on Kofi Annan. (United Nations General Assembly Document A/60/705, 8)

**Why the need for DDR programmes**

Conflicts in Africa, particularly civil wars, usually result in the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers and irregular rebel militia. Many of these recruits include women and children. (de Watteville, 2002; Verhey, 2001). Once a conflict comes to an end, either through a peace agreement or as a result of military victory, the war-torn country needs to address the issue of surplus troops who may be discharged from military and rebel forces, which for security purposes, are being disbanded.

The nature of the conflicts in Africa has also included the proliferation of lethal weapons, mostly small arms and light weapons (SALW). This problem has become more acute and less controllable since the end of the Cold War in 1989 (Krause, 2004). The manufacture and trade in small arms is a lucrative business, mostly controlled by mercenaries and private companies. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa reports that Africa alone has suffered close to six million fatalities over the past 50 years or so due primarily to SALW. Estimates of The number of small arms and light weapons in circulation
range from 100 to 500 million, with 50-80 million being AK-47 assault rifles. An increasing number of countries are becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms and related ammunition either through indigenous or licensed production. (Fact Sheet, 2001) Most of these weapons have found their way into the various conflict zones in Africa. A substantial amount has been traded through black market channels and through a growing network of semi-official and secret pipelines (Berdal, 1996, 19). The aftermath of conflicts in Africa has also meant tackling the difficulty task of dismantling persistent old loyalties and command structures of fighting forces.

Having a large number of ex-combatants who are still in possession of weapons can pose a threat to the security of a state and its civilian population (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003). The situation may also be considered threatening for countries bordering on the state in question. So DDR programmes are generally put in place to dissipate threats to the security of a post-conflict society, and a particular region, by helping ex-combatants disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into communities of their choice. These programs should ultimately provide ex-combatants with the kind of skills necessary for them to become productive members in a peaceful society. DDR programmes, combined with security sector reform (SSR) are designed, ideally, to forestall any return to violence, (Schnabel and Hans-George 2006; MDRP position paper, 2003) and to this end they consist of three prince-pal components, or a three-stage process that involves weapon surrender, discharge of active combatants, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into their society.

The objective of the DDR process, according to UN’s DDR Resource Centre, is “to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin.” This entire process, linked to broader national recovery, is a complex one, “with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions.” One of the other major aims of DDR is to address the post-conflict security problems that arise when the glut of ex-combatants is left without livelihood or support networks (other than dependence on former comrades) during the transition from conflict to peace. By relieving combatants of weapons and by taking these individuals out of their military structures and routines, the DDR process can then facilitate integration of the ex-combatants into society and help them become active participants in the peace process. (United Nations, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre, 2009)

**DDR Defined**

Disarmament refers to the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and, often, of groups within the civilian population in a conflict zone. As well, it involves the establishment and initiation of arms management programmes (e.g. programmes for safe storage and/or destruction of weapons) as well as of de-mining. When conflict ends through a negotiated settlement ex-combatants are generally induced to give up their weapons voluntarily. When conflict ends via a clear military victory, the victor will more often than not coerce the vanquished to surrender their weapons. Where UN peacekeepers are involved in the disarmament phase of DDR, they are generally charged with the collection, safe storage, and sometimes the destruction of weapons. In theory, by taking weapons out of circulation, a more secure environment is created in which the peace process can coalesce.

Demobilization is a process by which conflicting armed groups are induced to disband their military organization and structure and shift from ‘combatant’ to ‘civilian’ status. This phase of the DDR process involves, inter alia: the registration and processing of individual ex-combatants in temporary centres; the massing of troops/rebel forces in cantonment sites, encampments, barracks or other assembly areas, for the above purpose; inducements for ex-combatants to give up their weapons (e.g. the exchange of weapons for money); the provision of transitional support/assistance packages to help them and their families meet their immediate basic needs, such as food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term remedial education, training, employment and tools (this element of the demobilisation phase is usually referred to as reinsertion); discharge; and, transportation for ex-combatants to get to their home community. In most cases, the dividing line between reinsertion and reintegration is not always all that clear. But, given the political and security objectives of DDR, it is perhaps useful to view the reinsertion phase as a bridge between demobilization and reintegration. (Ball and van de Goor, 2006)

Reintegration is a longer-term social and economic phase in the DDR process, with an open time frame designed to facilitate the assimilation of ex-combatants in a way that allows them and their families to adapt to civilian life in communities that may not necessarily be ready to accept them. In most cases, this phase of the DDR process involves: provision of cash or some form of compensation package in exchange for the commitment of ex-combatant not to return to conflict; providing ex-combatants with longer-term job or career training; initiating sustainable income-generation projects; repatriating refugees and displaced persons; and establishing a forum and process for truth and reconciliation. This stage of the DDR process is usually accompanied by efforts at rehabilitation of war affected individuals, including children, and reconstruction of national infrastructure damaged as a result of the violence (Knight, 2008, pp. 24-52).
In some cases, surplus militia and other ex-combatants may be encouraged to merge with a new national military force as part of security sector reform during this phase of DDR. This is a critical factor in successful post-conflict peacebuilding agendas since no peace can be assured unless order is maintained—and, often, the best method of ensuring order in a formerly divided society may be to have a unified national army. In any event, reintegrations are sustained when indigenous capacity is enhanced, when ex-combatants and other war-affected individuals become productive members of their communities, and when post-conflict societies begin to learn how to address conflicts in non-violent ways.

There is some debate as to whether or not the ‘R’ stage of DDR should entail a focus on (or an enhancement of) longer-term reintegration. The position taken by some scholars is that “longer-term reintegration is not part of the DDR process.” The rationale used by those who hold this position is that a conceptual line needs to be drawn between “an individual’s status as ex-combatant and his/her status as civilian.” (Ball and van de Goor, 2006, 3) However, this “line” seems particularly artificial. If in fact the main purpose of DDR is to contribute towards building sustainable peace it would seem to make sense to include longer-term reintegration as part of DDR. As previously noted, this need has been recognized by the UN and, subsequently, the organization has placed a greater emphasis on long-term re-integration and uses the term “reinsertion” to refer to the short-term process between demobilisation and re-integration. (United Nations, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre, 2009, 2)

Clearly, the entire DDR process is multidimensional and exceedingly complex, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. Its primary goal is to address the post-conflict security challenge that stems from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks once wars come to an end and during the critical transition period from conflict to peace. DDR programmes seek to support ex-combatants’ economic and social reintegration, so they can become stake-holders in peace and productive members of their communities.

There are serious concerns among some observers that some ex-combatants receive disproportionate benefits during the post-conflict phase. However, one can argue that such disproportionate benefits may be a small price to pay for the establishment of security in war-torn societies, particularly if obstacles and blockages to broader recovery efforts can be eliminated and a return to violence forestalled. (UN Nepal Information Platform, 2008).

Understanding SSR

There is a growing awareness that the problem of insecurity in transitional states in Africa has been compounded by some of the very institutions meant to mitigate them. A number of factors account for this. National militaries and other security sector actors have been implicated in many cases in the support of autocratic rule and in the prosecution of civil wars. In periods of autocratic rule, the military establishment in some African countries has not only been accused of propping up unpopular civilian regimes but also of illegally taken centre stage in the political processes. This has led, characteristically, to a legacy of entrenched politisation and professional erosion of security sector institutions, to the lost of confidence and trust in their capacity and very existence, and to appalling civil-military relations. States emerging from autocratic rule and civil conflicts must necessarily restructure and transform the security sector not only to bolster its capacity to address post-war security challenges, but also to support the tenets of democratic governance so necessary for building sustained peace. The universally acceptable formula for accomplishing the above has been dubbed “Security Sector Reform”.

Security governance issues including the reform of the security sector and reinforcing the rule of law are now increasingly recognised as priority peacebuilding tasks. The UN for instance, is now considering effective SSR as part of a comprehensive and sustainable peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategy in post-conflict states. (UN Security Council Report, 2007) Within the context of UN post-conflict peace-building interventions, SSR has been deemed imperative not only for avoiding a situation of security vacuum after the withdrawal of peacekeepers but also for removing immediate threats to the process of democratic good governance.

Despite its widespread usage, there is very little consensus on the definition and scope of Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a post-conflict peacebuilding concept. But generally, SSR is viewed as an agenda that conceives in a holistic manner (that is, taking into consideration both state and human security) the role of security agencies in the wider processes of governance, democratisation and conflict prevention (Karkoszka, 2003, pp.9-15). SSR involves a process of trying to improve the governance over service delivery in the security sector. This sector comprises organisations authorised to use force in the protection of the state and its population, as well as civil management and oversight bodies. The EU has broadly accepted SSR to mean the reform processes applied in those countries whose development is hampered by structural weaknesses in their security and justice sectors and are often exacerbated by lack of democratic oversight (Helly, 2006).

Actually, in the post Cold War period SSR has taken on a different meaning from the one used during the Cold War. (Williams, 2005, p.45) Today the concept of SSR is being used within the broader context of post conflict peacebuilding, and from a development perspective. The British Department for International Development (DFID),
for example, views SSR as a central conflict prevention and poverty reduction mechanism. In its development policy review statement in 1999, DFID noted that unprofessional or poorly regulated security forces often tend to compound, rather than mitigate, security problems. It went on to state that excessive security spending can have a tendency of absorbing a country’s scarce public resources which could be better utilized in other socio-economic sectors and contribute to poverty alleviation. Because security sector problems tend to be a symptom of broader social, political and economic challenges facing poorer societies, there is a strong argument for adopting a more holistic approach to development that incorporates security sector concerns (DFID, 2008).

Besides this donor and development policy change, a normative and conceptual shift is also evident when it comes to SSR. Unlike the Cold War connotations, SSR in the current usage constitutes four related conceptual dimensions that target the security-development nexus. They include:

1) Political- involves capacity building for civil and executive oversight institutions; the strengthening of civil society structures, including parliament and government monitoring mechanisms; the reform of control bodies, such as those responsible for planning and budgetary issues; providing support to NGOs and the press; and seeking to ensure the principle of effective civilian oversight and civil supremacy over the military and security apparatuses.

2) Social- entails the cultural transformation in security sector institutions including leadership, management and administrative ethos and traditions; the strengthening of public security; training in the preparation of security reviews and assessment of citizen security needs; the proper control of arms transfer, especially measures to curtail the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

3) Economic/Development- constitutes measures to consolidate disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters; the civil utilisation of resources formerly used for military purposes; the demilitarisation of post-conflict states.

4) Institutional- includes organisational restructuring that focuses on the professionalization of security forces; pairing back of the size of security forces; training of armed forces in the application of international norms and laws; improving organisational and management processes to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the security area.

SSR thus seeks to restructure demoralised security apparatuses of the state as well as their management and oversight mechanisms to meet post-war security challenges. It has focused on strengthening the peacetime capacity of security forces to meet immediate security challenges that threaten sustainable peacebuilding processes and post-war development. Post-Cold War SSR has meant a fundamental restructuring of security institutions so that these institutions perform human security as well as state security functions and operate within a framework of democratic and transparent governance. Training within this context puts a premium on respect for human rights, adherence to the laws of armed conflicts and to international conventions that govern the operations of security forces, and to the rule of law. It has also meant downsizing armed forces, many of which became bloated during war-time, while at the same time increasing the size of police forces to deal with the high propensity of occurrences of low-intensity violence and criminalisation in post-war settings. Some SSR processes have included justice sector reforms, which improve the peacetime capacity of the judicial and penal systems and to ensure professional and independent dispensation of justice.

The following have been identified as key tasks for internal and external actors engaged in reforming the security sector of post conflict societies: (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006)

i) Strengthening the peacetime capacity of military forces to arrest any external threat to the peace process.

ii) Strengthening the peacetime capacity of police forces to arrest any threat to the peace process at the community level.

iii) Strengthening the peacetime capacity of the judicial and penal systems for the effective and impartial administration of justice.

iv) Governance reform and institutional capacity building to ensure effectiveness in civilian management and control of security related institutions including defence, justice and internal affairs ministries.

v) Entrenchment of the principles of transparency and respect for the tenets of democracy and the rule of law in the operations of security sector institutions.

vi) Capacity building for effective civil and legislative oversight of the security sector.

vii) Prioritisation of the long-term process of reintegrating ex-combatants, including child soldiers, by providing security insurance.

viii) Restoration of confidence and trust in security institutions, especially the promotion of cordial civil-military relations.

Security sector institutions

The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) identifies and groups security sector institutions in a post-conflict setting into four: core security actors; management and oversight bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions; and non-statutory security forces (OECD/DAC, 2005, pp.20-21).
i) Core security institutions - armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services; coast guards; border guards; custom authorities; civil defence forces; national guards; militias.

ii) Management and oversight bodies - the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; custom authorities; financial management bodies (financial ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society institutions.

iii) Justice and law enforcement institution - judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

iv) Non-statutory security forces - liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body guard units; private security companies; and political party militias.

Reform in these institutions is considered necessary if enduring peace is to become a reality in post-conflict settings.

**DDR AND SSR IN AFRICA: FORUMS AND ACTORS**

The importance attached to post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa is reflected not least in the number of forums that have been convened to facilitate frank dialogue, sharing and sober retrospection. However, most of these forums have addressed post-conflict peacebuilding issues like DDR and SSR in isolation. Few attempts have been made, even at the conceptual and theoretical levels, to link critically these two post-conflict peacebuilding interventions. The instances cited below have reflected either on issues related to DDR or SSR but hardly both. At a conference in August 2006, a number of scholars, practitioners and observers of DDR programmes in Africa came together at the Kofi Annan International peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana to discuss, compare and assess demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes in Africa in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. This multi-country assessment is the subject of a forthcoming book on DDR and should make an important contribution to cross-country comparative studies evaluating critically DDR programmes. Other relevant forums that have addressed DDR include:

i) The Stockholm initiative on DDR (SIDDR), held in November 2005, which focused on opportunities and limitations of DDR within the broader peace negotiations framework as well as the political and funding aspects of DDR programmes.

ii) The Freetown Initiative — stemming from a major international conference on DDR that was jointly organized by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations (held on 21-23 July 2005 in Freetown). The objective of that meeting was to facilitate frank exchange of views and experiences among African DDR stakeholders and practitioners and their international partners on the implementation of DDR programmes in the region and to use the lessons learned to formulate practical recommendations for improving the implementation of future DDR programmes. The full report from this conference can be found at www.un.org/africa/osaa/ (accessed 20 May 2009).

iii) An Overview of African Development conducted in December 2005 by the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), which examined conflicts in Africa and the role of DDR in post-conflict reconstruction.

iv) A UNIFEM panel at the Ten Year Review conference of the Beijing Platform for Action (9 March 2005) on Women Building Peace through DDR.

v) The second regional meeting on the Harmonization of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Ex-Combatants in West Africa sponsored by the UN Office for West Africa held in Dakar, Senegal from 5-6 August 2004.

vi) A Regional workshop on Promoting SSR in the Horn of Africa organised by the centre for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), held on the 13-14 July 2006, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.


The involvement of a multiplicity of actors in DDR and SSR programmes explains recent concerns with the consolidation, coordination and integration of the various peace keeping and peacebuilding activities of these actors. But who are the primary actors involved in these interventions?

**The UN’s role in DDR AND SSR**

Peace-building (and its DDR/SSR elements) is a complex undertaking that requires multiple and diverse players and encompasses a variety of tasks. Perhaps the most important actor in DDR and SSR is the United Nations system and its various agencies and bodies. There are several reasons why the UN has been so actively engaged in DDR and SSR and in peacebuilding more generally. The UN, because of its universality and global
The UN system, with its many agencies and affiliated bodies, is well placed to offer up multiple players (specialized agencies, departments, funds, and associated bodies), and to perform the variety of tasks needed for DDR and SSR processes to be successful. Furthermore, the world body is constitutionally set up to be a linchpin that connects with other DDR/SSR players such as regional organizations, sub-regional organizations, the Bretton Woods’ institutions, national governments and civil society organizations.

One should note that because Boutros-Ghali’s conception of peacebuilding was premised on the construction of lasting peace, the UN Secretary General was acutely aware that this concept had to involve more than just the cessation of violence. It had to include strategies for economic development, the protection and promotion of human rights, the solidification of the rule of law, the establishment of democratic and accountable structures and processes, social equity, environmental sustainability and the meting out of justice balanced with the encouragement of reconciliation between ex-combatants and other members of the target society. In a word, we have come to expect DDR and SSR processes to tackle the security-development nexus in efforts to address broad national recovery efforts and human security needs.

The continued commitment of the UN to peacebuilding was demonstrated in 2004 when the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. (United Nations, 2004) That proposal was endorsed, along with the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm, at the 2005 UN World Summit in New York. Subsequently, both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly adopted concurrent resolutions to establish this new organ (UN Security Council resolution 1645 (20 December 2005) and UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/180 (30 December 2005). This Peacebuilding Commission is intended to bridge the institutional gap between peacekeeping and development activities, thus furthering the UN’s ability to deliver on both DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict peacebuilding operations. It also adds a measure of coordination to peacebuilding activities that are conceived all across the UN system while promoting the principle of local ownership in DDR processes (Wiharta, 2006, pp.140-41).

The UN system, with its many agencies and affiliated bodies, is in a pivotal position to perform the complex job of coordinating the multiple tasks and diverse players involved in the DDR processes. But, in the end, nationally organized DDR programmes may be more effective and may produce more long-lasting results. Nevertheless, a new comprehensive set of policies, guidelines and procedures labelled the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) is expected to provide the UN system with a consolidated policy framework that will usher in a more integrated approach to the planning, management and implementation of DDR programmes. The IDDRS draw on the experience of all UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes that are involved in DDR in order to produce the most complete repository of best practices in this area, to date, and to ensure future coordination of UN and non-UN DDR programmes. (http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/index.php, accessed on February 10, 2007)

Why the concern with DDR effectiveness? Knight and Ozerdem have demonstrated that the success or failure of DDR directly affects the prospects for long-term peacebuilding in post conflict countries. (Knight and Ozerdem, 2004). This acknowledgement of the need for better coordination of inter-agency activities has also been expressed in the Integrated DDR Standards developed by the UN. In addition to building a more effective lateral framework across the UN system, the IDDRS also seek to provide better coordination with various actors on the ground. Lastly, the IDDRS recognize that the ‘R’ in DDR can represent many long-term processes, including, rehabilitation, reintegration, repatriation, reconstruction, reconciliation, etc., and thus should not be limited to short-term reinsetion of ex-combatants into their communities.

Essentially, the UN has come to realize that DDR is a political and socio-economic process with long-term development implications. It is not just a short-term military activity that focuses primarily on establishing stability and security in a post-conflict setting. As shall be shown below, the ultimate objective of any DDR programme must be “the sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants.” (Bell and Watson, 2006, p.1). That can only come about as a result of broader national recovery efforts.

**DDR and UN peace support missions**

The UN has assumed a broad peace support mandate that goes beyond peacekeeping. Peace support operations (PSOs) are established to foster and reinforce conditions for sustainable peace. They are intended to facilitate peace negotiations and agreements, the monitoring of ceasefires, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and particularly the peacebuilding elements of DDR. PSOs provide a more holistic approach for addressing conflicts on the African continent and this has made the UN “an indispensable partner in the search for durable peace in Africa.” (United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2005: p.15.).

The UN, including its specialized agencies, departments, programmes and funds, intervenes at various points in the DDR process. It provides humanitarian assistance particularly during the disarmament and demobilization phases of that process. It offers financial assistance to help with the transitional support packages
needed during the demobilization and early part of the reintegration phases. It provides technical assistance and other forms of help for reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and for recovery operations. It also provides personnel and funds to help ex-combatants with their reintegration and to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their local communities.

At centre stage in the early phases of the DDR process is the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is the UN body responsible for arranging peace negotiations between warring factions. This department works in collaboration with other UN departments, specialized agencies, programmes and funds to design DDR programmes. Some of the other UN players operating in the DDR process include the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the UN World Food Programme (WFP).

All of these bodies lend considerable support in the form of personnel, financial and other material assistance to countries coming out of conflict. The UN system is also involved in coordinating efforts in the DDR process of other agencies from outside the UN framework. Actors such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are, or have been, involved multilaterally and bilaterally in some elements of DDR programming. For example, the DDR of former combatants has been central to the EU’s security strategy of post conflict peacebuilding in Africa. It should be noted as well that the UN has some involvement in DDR programmes in countries where UN peacekeepers are not currently deployed – for instance in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Indonesia (Aceh), the Niger, the Congo, Somalia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka and Uganda.

The UN and SSR

Unlike its consolidated role in DDR, UN interventions in SSR have been on a piecemeal basis in recent years. The Security Council has, however, been engaged in conceptualising SSR and in developing the principles on which an appropriate role for the UN in SSR should be based. Supporting the reform of national security institutions, and the civilian control, oversight and governance of the security sector, is recognised as part of the overall equation in helping to restore peace and security in post conflict theatres (United Nations Security Council Update Report, 2007). In recent years, the UN has begun utilising SSR as an organising term for those activities. This parallels the evolution of thought on peacekeeping and peacebuilding that can be found in the 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations; the 2004 Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; the Secretary General’s 2005 In Larger Freedom Report; the 2005 World Summit Outcome and the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions creating the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). SSR-related issues were also implicitly addressed in UN Security Council resolutions on specific country matters, e.g. those establishing the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). References are also made to SSR in the following UN mandates renewal and confirmations: the United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (MONUC) mandate renewal in October 2004 and reaffirmation in June 2006; the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire’s (UNOCI) mandate renewals of November 2006 and January 2007; and the mandates for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

This expansion in thinking about SSR as an integrated concept is also related to the growing recognition of the security/development nexus. While the recognition of the importance of SSR is growing, the evolution of a UN SSR framework continues to face a number of challenges. Security policies - both internal and external -- are at the centre of power relations as noted in the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report. The challenge of establishing and maintaining a national consensus on a reform road map is therefore enormous. Establishing a national consensus on SSR requires a policy setting and consultation environment dominated by local ownership. The UN General Assembly has affirmed the primacy of local authorities over the process of priority-setting and in developing strategies of post-conflict peace-building, with a view to ensuring national ownership when the PBC was established in December 2005. In the initial phases of a peace operation, however, the good intentions of local ownership may be thwarted not only by the difficulty in attaining consensus but also due to the lack of national capacity and legitimate leadership to implement reforms. The very presence of UN peacekeepers in post-conflict settings is usually a signal of a breakdown in national institutions, trust, national capacity and good governance processes (United Nations Security Council Update Report, 2007).

Value added by EU’s DDR contributions

The European Union’s involvement in both short term and long-term DDR programmes has been quite extensive. The EU has supported about 20 such programmes in Africa since the early 1990s, (Knight, 2008: pp.24-52)
Forces of Liberia (AFL) and for the reintegration of ex-security sector reform in development co-operation. earmarked for the process of demobilizing the Armed enterprise development. The third instalment was training, apprenticeship, and job placement and small processes by bringing together "a wide range of instruments combatants into their communities. The EU is also by the emerging international debate on the broad theme (MDGs) (Helly, 2006). This strategy has been stimulated the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals for security, stability, development, democratic heavily involved in the overall planning of in-country DDR assistance. The system can be adjusted to tackle the issues that are keys to DDR success (that is, security, delivery of political, economic, and development processes in Africa. It has an elaborate system for the demobilization, the establishment of a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), and the National Commission on DDR and reintegration activities. The second instalment went towards reintegration activities, including provision of formal education, development of agricultural and other income generation activities, the provision of vocational training, apprenticeship, and job placement and small enterprise development. The third instalment was earmarked for the process of demobilizing the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and for the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities. The EU is also heavily involved in the overall planning of in-country DDR programmes.

Certainly, the EU adds value to the UN's DDR processes by bringing together "a wide range of instruments for security, stability, development, democratic governance and the promotion of human rights." (http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU_Joint_concept_DDR.pdf, accessed on 11 September, 2009) Apart from the UN, the EU is the biggest players in supporting peace processes in Africa. It has an elaborate system for the delivery of political, economic, and development assistance. The system can be adjusted to tackle the issues that are keys to DDR success (that is, security, governance, economic and social progress, justice and reconciliation). At the same time, both the EU and the UN collaborate with the African Union (AU) and various continental sub-regional bodies in implementing DDR programmes (Bell and Watson, 2006).

An EU strategy for SSR

Security sector reform is a relatively new policy area for the EU. However, as a global actor, the EU has begun to develop an effective SSR strategy that would enable it to address some of the current security challenges inhibiting the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Helly, 2006). This strategy has been stimulated by the emerging international debate on the broad theme of security sector reform in development co-operation.

The adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 committed the EU to making a significant contribution to security and stability in the world. Subsequently, numerous Council and Commission policy statements have identified SSR as a priority means for achieving objectives at the security-development nexus. For example, the June 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP highlighted the need for European Security and Defence Policy missions to have expertise in SSR. Security sector Reform as well as DDR were then emphasised as key elements of the November 2004 EU Action Plan for ESDP 'Support to Peace and Security in Africa' (ISIS Europe, 2006) Despite these numerous referencing of SSR in EU political documents, the European Union still lacks a comprehensive SSR policy framework to guide its external action. The EU is yet to develop policy guidelines for the mainstreaming of SSR into its external relations policy, planning and programming. The biggest challenge is the lack of coherence and co-ordination, aggravated by competing interest amongst EU institutions and member states.

The UK and SSR

Of all the bilateral and multilateral donor organisations and countries, the British government (under the administration of Tony Blair) most clearly placed security sector reform at the heart of its development policy (Herbert, 2004). In addition to the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as previously sole actors addressing international security sector reform issues, the Blair government included the Department for International Development (DFID) in a general security-policy review. In an overview of DFID’s strategy in Africa, the Africa Plenary Session on SSR in 2007 notes that the UK government has played a crucial role in championing Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) on the continent. SJSR activities have been carried out in around 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000 (DCAF, 2007). The African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) is the main funding outlet for UK interventions in this issue area. The present status and future outlook of the programme were evaluated at a symposium held in London in mid-February 2000 (Short 2000).

Other actors

Concerns with DDR and SSR in post conflict states have also been expressed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the past decade, the World Bank has been involved in debates concerning the security-development nexus, through its analyses of the appropriateness of military expenditure in certain
African countries. In 1997, a Post-Conflict Unit was established at the World Bank, institutionalising the treatment of themes such as demobilisation and security sector reform. The IMF and various regional bodies also addressed specific aspects of the broader issue of security. How these themes are identified and addressed, however, remains a matter of organisational policy and mandate. Bilateral support from individual countries has also been crucial in demobilisation programmes, arms control, demining and other interventions involving SSR.

LINKING POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES

In Boutros-Ghali’s conceptualization of peacebuilding one can easily discern the early outlines of what later became known as the DDR and the SSR processes. (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) The former UN Secretary General envisioned, for instance, that some of the elements involved in peacebuilding would be linked directly to preventing the recurrence of violent conflict. These elements include: disarming warring factions, restoring law and order, decommissioning and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, reintegration internally displaced persons into their communities, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, improving police and judicial systems, monitoring elections, de-mining and other forms of demilitarization, providing technical assistance to fledgling states coming out of conflict, advancing efforts to protect human rights, repatriating refugees, reforming and strengthening institutions of governance, promoting formal and informal participation in the political process, and facilitating social and economic development.

From the mid-1990s on, the UN embraced the DDR process as an essential element of its multidimensional post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction function (An Agenda for Development, 1994). Indeed, DDR programmes have become commonplace in UN peacekeeping and other peace operations, (UN General Assembly document, A/60/705, p.2) and their intent has been to build security structures by reconstructing the social fabric of and developing human capacity in, countries coming out of conflict so that a sustained, long-term peace can be established in those target countries once UN missions are terminated. As Neclâ Tschirgi puts it, “post-conflict peacebuilding has become an international growth industry” (Tschirgi, 2004: p.1). This development is reflected to a large extent in the recent exponential growth in the peacebuilding literature. But it is certainly a result of responses to a UN blue ribbon panel report, at the turn of this century, which called on the world body to expand its global peace support role.

Responding to the Brahimi report

When the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report) was released in August 2000, the link between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and socio-economic development was fully acknowledged. The Panel recommended a number of peacebuilding tools and strategies that could become part of any peace support operation. These include the adoption of quick impact projects (QIPs), the establishment of a fund for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the adoption of a ‘doctrinal shift’ away from civilian policing to ‘rule of law’ teams, the creation of a pilot Peacebuilding Unit, and regularized funding of the Electoral Affairs Division at UN Headquarters in New York (United Nations, 2000). In effect, the Brahimi report made the link, albeit implicitly, between DDR and SSR.

Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, wrote in his Report to the sixtyeth session of the UN General Assembly that, since 11 February 2000, six UN peacekeeping operations have included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as part of their mandates. Those six peacekeeping operations were: the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The DDR tasks involved in those operations included, inter alia: broad provision of security; collecting, securing and destroying light and heavy weapons; de-mining; demobilizing ex-combatants; dismantling militia groups; enhancing regional security to stem the spill-over of conflicts across borders; identifying and resettling foreign ex-combatants, including children and women; supporting national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes; promoting sensitization programmes within communities; and, meeting specific needs of women, children and the disabled ex-combatants.

Here again we see an effort to link DDR and SSR. The challenge has been to achieve synergies between the two intervention processes. In Africa, the linkages between DDR and SSR are particularly important “because both concern the military, the security sector and other groups responsible for its management and oversight.” Africa specifically, “merits special attention because it has suffered disproportionately from conflict and has been the major theatre of post-conflict peacebuilding activities” (Bryden, 2007). But developing the synergies between DDR and SSR has not been easy in African post-conflict societies. Bryden identifies five levels at which synergies between the two interventionary measures need to be established:

i) At the strategic policy level to ensure coherence of actors within the UN system (or within a donor government/multilateral organisation).
ii) In the interface between headquarters and field operations to provide adequate support to the latter.
iii) Across the range of external actors operating in a
given theatre to ensure effective mechanisms for
effective policy and operational coordination.
iv) Between different strands of a UN field mission (or
different parts of a donor government/multilateral
organisation) to ensure coherence across its post-conflict
peacebuilding commitments in a given theatre.
v) At the points of interaction between external actors and
national authorities to develop meaningful political and
operational coordination (Bryden, 2007: pp.5-6).

Why link DDR and SSR

Despite the potential for synergies between DDR and
SSR, few attempts have been made to link explicitly the
two interventionary measures at the conceptual and policy
levels in the African context. A rare exception is the Multi-
Country Demobilisation and Reintegration (MDRP)
symposium that examined the appropriate links between
DDR programmes and Security Sector Reform. This
effort kicked off in the Central African Republic (CAR)
where experts from the World Bank and MDRP con-
cluded a mapping of an SSR strategy in that country. The
mapping also resulted in the development of preliminary
recommendations on how the MDRP could better support
security sector reform through its programs, and how the
World Bank and MDRP partners could support SSR
outside of the MDRP framework. It was noted at that
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to be inextricably linked to broader security sector reform.

1. Both DDR and SSR programmes share the same
objective of contributing to nationwide, as well as
regional, peace and stability processes and creating the
enabling environment for post-conflict development. They
are recognised as key elements of post conflict peace-
building. DDR processes have the immediate objective of
restoring physical security and stability which is required
in order to put governance structures back in place and to
resume a state of normalcy in the post-conflict setting.

SSR, on the other hand, guarantees long term security
for the consolidation of peace and development
processes.

2. They have major impacts on each other in the
peacebuilding process. DDR has a direct impact on the
prospects for SSR since disarmament and demobilisation
— often conducted before SSR is addressed — set the
terrain for future reform efforts by establishing the
conditions of the security sector. Decisions on the man-
date, structure and composition of security services can
impact on the numbers of personnel that will need to be
demobilised and reintegrated into society (Brzoska, 2005:
pp.95-113). DDR processes have been directly linked
with SSR in terms of downsizing militaries in the
aftermath of war. As already noted, wars in Africa have
left states with bloated armies which they can hardly
afford. Reducing the size of armies, which is a funda-
mental element of SSR, has meant disarming and
reintegrating former military men into communities — both
stages in the DDR process. DDR processes therefore
become channels through which excess military
personnel can be discharged safely into the civilian
society. Inversely, DDR processes feed into SSR
through military reintegration programmes. In such cases,
army.

Disarmed and demobilised combatants from various
factions are incorporated into a new unified national

3. DDR processes require a secure environment. In the
first place, disarming and demobilising combatants is a
delicate process requiring security guarantees. At the
start of the process, where a vacuum exists and mistrust
is rife, the deployment of external peacekeepers has been
critical. In the long run, however, it is important to
enhance the capacity of national forces to protect the
DDR process, especially the stage that has to do with the
long-term reintegration of former fighters into civilian life.
In any case, disarming and demobilising fighters of
warring factions can be a potentially explosive situation.
Whenever the process backfires, conflict can be re-
The majority of these conflicts were really about power ignited with a higher destabilising potential. Combatants from conflicting factions need to be guaranteed their security when they surrender their weapons – once the source of their protection.

4. Moreover, the discharge of large numbers ex-combatants upon a civilian war weary population is certainly, accompanied by a serious internal security challenge that takes to task a robust internal force and an effective judicial system. Failed reintegration processes have put significant strain on SSR by increasing the pressure on police, courts and prisons as propensity for violence to erupt is always rife. The management and control of this impeding situation to avoid a relapse into a full-scale violence is essential not only in the consolidation of DDR processes but also for illuminating the prospect for post-war recovery.

5. Both processes have as their target combatants involved in concluding wars. The gap between DDR and SSR in some countries has been directly bridged with a Military Reintegration Programme. This is part of the restructuring process of the security sector but involves drawing manpower for a new national army from the various warring factions. Bringing former military antagonists together can also be explosive, if not done according to clear criteria. It can fuel insecurity as individuals with obscure backgrounds and inadequate training are simply re-deployed within the security sector (Bryden and Hänggi, 2005). But where it has worked, it becomes an important leverage not only for military reconciliation after divisive wars but also for forging a sense of national unity within a military. If former soldiers are employed in other parts of the security sector as a reintegration measure, DDR will also contribute directly to SSR.

THE PRACTICE OF DDR AND SSR IN AFRICA

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been one of the primary arenas for major armed conflict; especially intra-state conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2006, p. 109). There were 19 conflicts fought on the continent since 1990, with only one of them being an interstate conflict (that is, between Eritrea and Ethiopia). These conflicts were in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Eritrea), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Morocco (Western Sahara), Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Sudan(Southern Sudan) and Uganda.

The majority of these conflicts were really about power struggles over the control of government. Since 2004, the UN has deployed nine multidimensional peace support missions on the continent. This is the highest number of such missions in Africa since 1991 and the highest for any region in the world. In fact, by 2005, 75% of UN peace-keeping resources (budget and personnel) were devoted to dealing with African conflicts. That number was even higher in subsequent years because of the deployment of the UN/AU hybrid force in Darfur. This section of the article examines the practice of DDR chronologically in the following seven African countries: Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Sudan.

Angola

Angola suffered major conflict for about 40 years before the Bicesse Accords were negotiated between the Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in May 1991. Those Accords contained provisions for a DDR process that envisioned the disarmament of combatants from the warring factions -- the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), an arm of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government, and the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAL) -- an arm of the opposition UNITA. The DDR programme stemming from the Bicesse Accords made provision as well for the creation of an integrated national army that would have 20,000 members each from the FAPLA and FAL, and the demobilization of close to 200,000 troops.

This particular DDR process in Angola failed because UNITA refused to accept the outcome of the elections held in 1992. However, one outcome of this process that structures for the demobilization of combatants were created for the reintegrating of ex-combatants into civilian life.

After the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement in 1993, there was another attempt at implementing a DDR process. But despite the establishment of a government of national unity and reconciliation, and the integration of some of UNITA’s fighting forces into the national army, this DDR process failed because UNITA refused to adhere fully to it. Conflict resumed in Angola in 1998, but came to an end in 2002 when UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, was gunned down by government forces in Moxico Province. Savimbi was clearly a major obstacle to peace in Angola. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos used the occasion of the rebel leader’s death to announce a ceasefire, which included a Peace Agenda that offered general amnesty to UNITA soldiers and provided a way for them to lay down their arms without losing face (Cauvin, 2002, p.10).

A joint commission was established to oversee the implementation of this new DDR effort in Angola. Quartering Areas were established across the country for the demobilization of UNITA forces, and Reception Areas were set up for family members and dependents of UNITA soldiers. During this period, 91,127 UNITA soldiers
were registered along with 288,756 of their family members and dependents. (Figures can be found at [http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR%20Sierra%20Leone%20March%202006.pdf](http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR%20Sierra%20Leone%20March%202006.pdf), accessed on May 17, 2009).

The reintegration programme for ex-combatants were demobilized began in September 2003 and was implemented through the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration for Ex-Combatants (IRSEM). This second stage of the DDR process focused specifically on vocational training, apprenticeships, community works, micro-businesses, providing access to tool kits, advisory services and micro-credit. By 2005, more than 20,000 ex-combatants had taken advantage of the reintegration support, which was delivered primarily by national and international NGOs.

In spite of the recent successes, the DDR process in Angola has been subject to a number of challenges, including: the lack of international financial support; the absence of trust at the beginning stages of the DDR process; the recycling of ex-combatants who disarmed and were demobilized in previous DDR programmes; the large number of disabled war veterans; logistical difficulties; the paucity of support to ex-rebels’ families; the lack of experience in reintegrating ex-combatants in urban areas; and the obvious absence of proper planning for the “R” phase.

DRC

Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has faced many challenges. There have been numerous conflicts among several armed groups and two Presidents have been deposed by force. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was killed in 1961 and President Joseph Kasavubu took control of the country. Then, in 1965, Colonel Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko headed a coup which took control of the government. Mobutu enforced one party rule and crushed all dissent in the DRC.

During the Cold War, western nations saw him as an ally against communism in Africa. He amassed a huge personal fortune while the majority of the people of the country remained in abject poverty. With the assistance of Moroccan and Belgian troops, as well as American and French military aid, Mobutu suppressed rebellions in 1977 and 1978. He changed the country’s name to Zaire in 1971 and continued his rule until May of 1997 when he was deposed by Laurent Kabila. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, was elected president of the DRC in 2006. Since Sese Seko was toppled from power, the DRC has continued to struggle to find a way to end the violence and rebuild the country.

Complicating the situation is the geographical location of the country in central Africa and the fact that over the years many of its neighbours (e.g. Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda) have been, themselves, embroiled in conflicts (Muggah, 2004). This has led to multiple complicating factors including the cross-border migration of refugees and incursions of various fighting factions into the DRC, particularly in the north-eastern part of the country. For example, after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, many Hutus fled to the DRC. They used the DRC as a base from which to launch attacks in Rwanda. As a result of these incursions, Rwanda backed Kabila, at the time a DRC rebel leader. In 1997, when Kabila took control of Kinshasa and ousted President Mobutu, one of his first decisions was to change the country’s name back to DRC from Zaire. However, shortly after Kabila took power he began to remove Rwandan Tutsis from positions of power. Once again Rwandan Tutsis interfered; although this time they tried to topple Kabila. Several countries stepped in to support Kabila, sparking what some have called “Africa’s first world war.”

In response to this war, the UN established in 1999 a Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). MONUC continued to operate in the DRC, and expanded its presence after a separate conflict broke out, in 2002-03, in the Ituri region. The Ituri conflict remains one of the key roadblocks to peace in the DRC. Current president Joseph Kabila has little effective control in much of the country, particularly in the north-eastern Ituri region.

When MONUC was established following the ceasefire of 1999, its mandate was to keep the peace, disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants, and return foreign insurgents to their native lands (http://www.un DDR. org/countryprogrammes.php?c=25, accessed on May 17, 2009). However, this UN force was thinly spread and its mandate was unrealistic given the continuing political instability of the transitional regime. Further complicating matters was the slow development of a proper unified Congolese national army that could lead the DDR efforts and co-ordinate activities. Nonetheless, the UN claims that over 20,000 people have been disarmed in the DDR process in the DRC.

DDR has provided an entry point for SSR in this country. The first multi-partner talks on the restructuring of the armed forces took place within the context of DDR. Also, the initial documents on SSR in the DRC were drafted with DDR serving as a starting point (the Comité Technique de Planification et Co-ordination) (Bryden, 2007). A combination of continued human rights abuses on all sides, a weak regime beset with chronic political and economic crises, lack of political will to enforce the mandate, and shortages in funding for DDR has resulted in very limited success. This has impacted directly the implementation of a SSR programme for the DRC. The adoption of an effective SSR hinges on the success of the process of demobilising combatants. While accurate numbers are difficult to obtain, out of an estimated
300,000-330,000 fighters in the DRC, (http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR620012007, accessed on May 17, 2009) only about 13,000 Rwandan soldiers have been demobilized by MONUC and the goal of demobilizing and reintegrating 150,000 ex-combatants is still fairly far off. (http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR%20Sierra%20Leone%20March%202006.pdf, accessed on May 17, 2009)

Due to lack of trust between the various warring parties, disarmament has not proceeded as planned. But as of June 2005, 10,000 ex-combatants, including 2,700 child soldiers, were demobilized and 18 months of wages were paid to those ex-combatants in three equal instalments. Child ex-combatants were placed under the care of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and women and the disabled were placed in a special reintegration programme. It should be noted that the Burundi DDR programme was linked strategically with the broader Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) developed for Burundi. Along with the mistrust that remains between some of the conflicting parties, and the continuation of low-level conflict, some of the combatants simply refused to disarm before entering the demobilization centres and some rebel groups reported inaccurate information on the number of their armed forces. These problems have posed serious challenges for the DDR process in Burundi.

The DDR process in Burundi, following the ceasefire agreement of 15 November 2003, is comparable to the Liberian experience in that a national commission was established to oversee and implement the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants with the UN-mandated force, in this case the ONUB, facilitating and assisting the process. This programme is considered a success with 21,379 former combatants demobilized, including 3,015 women and 494 children. In addition to the above numbers, according to the UN, “... a further 5,412 ex-combatants have benefited from targeted economic support, 3,300 of whom are now engaged in income-generating activities across Burundi. It is expected that over 8,000 will receive similar support in the coming months and many of the demobilized child soldiers have returned to school and are participating in vocational training (http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=17, accessed on December 20, 2008).

A key element of the programme was the implementation of security sector reform and the design of a comprehensive social re-integration package. The security sector institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. Thus, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), includes important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of post-conflict security forces that are expected to act professionally and politically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians

Burundi

Burundi’s political and ethnic conflict dates back to the early 1960s, prior to its independence from Belgium. But in 1972 this conflict really intensified when Hutus, living in Tanzania, invaded Burundi and slaughtered hundreds of Tutsis. The conflict took another turn for the worse in 1993 when the first elected Hutu President was assassinated and Tutsis were again systematically targeted for extermination. Since 1993, more than 300,000 people have been killed in that intra-state conflict, a large portion of the population has been displaced, infrastructure has been destroyed and economic activity disrupted. The Organization of African Union (OAU) – now the African Union (AU) – took the lead in facilitating a negotiated end to the conflict between 1997 and 1999, resulting in the Arusha Agreement, signed in 2000. That year a transitional government was formed and a general ceasefire came into effect in 2003.

Apart from granting partial amnesty to the rebels, the Arusha Peace Agreement spelled out specific arrangements for the establishment of a national army and for the implementation of a DDR process. The UN joined the OAU in implementing that process. However, since not all warring parties signed on to the peace agreement, it was difficult for the OAU and UN peacekeeping forces to create the needed security environment for the DDR process to be implemented properly. Nevertheless, in 2003 the external interveners did manage to create a National Programme for DDR (PNDDR) which ultimately was placed under the auspices of the National Commission for DDR (CNDDR), chaired by the President of the country. A Joint Operation Plan (JOP) was developed to facilitate implementation of the various DDR phases.

The JOP’s objectives were to: disarm and demobilize 55,000 ex-combatants, including some 8,000 child soldiers of the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB); assist in disarming 20,000 members of the government militia and 10,000 members of the Parties of Armed Political Movements (PMPA); and, dismantle the chain of command of the rebel groups. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) of the World Bank provided a framework for all of the partners that supported the DDR process in Burundi (http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR%20Sierra%20Leone%20March%202006.pdf, accessed on May 17, 2009).
The Arusha Accords make provision specifically for the joint representation of Burundi’s two main antagonistic ethnic groups (Hutus and Tutsis) in the defence and security forces, as well as for the establishment of a new national police force, and the deployment of international troops to oversee the entire process. Specifically, the defence and security reform process calls for the:

i) Integration of various rebel movements and the Forces armées burundaises (FAB) into a single national defence force;
ii) Formation of a new national police force to replace the gendarmerie – formerly part of the regular army;
iii) Demobilization of tens of thousands of former combatants from all former rebel movements as well as the FAB.

The Accords also stipulate that security forces shall be trained at all levels to respect international humanitarian law and the supremacy of the constitution. Also, these forces are to be subjected to technical, moral and civic training – training that includes understanding the culture of peace, the conduct of democratic processes, and human rights and humanitarian conventions.

**Liberia**

When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Liberia, in August 2003, all former warring factions, including the government troops, embarked on a post-conflict process of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR). On 19 September 2003, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with UN Security Council resolution 1509. Its mandate was to support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NGTL) was put in place, with Monrovian businessman Charles Gyude Bryant as chairman. Multi-party elections were held in October 2005 and a constitutionally-mandated two-candidate runoff occurred a month later. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected on 16 January 2006, becoming the first female African head of state. Ever since then, Liberia has been undergoing a process of reconciliation and reconstruction. Gun violence has been almost non-existent since the completion of the Disarmament and Demobilization phase (LNP, 2006).

Following the peace agreement signed in Accra, Ghana on 18 August 2004, Liberia established the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (NCDDDR), which was tasked with overseeing the DDRR process in that country. This commission was comprised of representatives from former warring factions, the transitional government, the ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). To facilitate the implementation of the DDR process, NCDDRR, UNMIL, and the UNDP joined forces to create a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) which facilitated the planning of the program and the oversight and monitoring of its day-to-day operations. Through the three phases of Liberia’s DDR programme, 101,495 ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilized including 22,370 women, 8,523 boys, and 2,440 girls. In all, 28,314 weapons, 33,604 heavy munitions, and 6,486,136 rounds of ammunition were turned in for disposal (http://www.undr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52, accessed on May 17, 2009).

This accomplishment was however followed by the difficult task of restructuring Liberia’s security sector. The challenge has been restructuring the sector in a way accommodates all groups in a largely heterogeneous society. Effort should be made to re-professionalise the military, subject them to consistent training and attuning them to the task of protecting the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from external aggression and internal insurrection. Additionally, other security agencies such as the Police, Immigration, Customs, Secret Service and Intelligence units need to be re-professionalised. All these tasks need to be done within a framework of the transformation of the entire society (Shola, 2006). The CPA makes provision for reform of the security sector but was unclear about changes to oversight institutions and about how a coherent national vision of security that will allow for effective governance of the security sector would be developed (Bryden, 2007).

UNMIL’s responsibility for SSR has been centred on police reform. Article VII of the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) gave a leading role to the United States for reforming the Liberian armed forces. However, the US Government decided to outsource this role to a private company, Dyncorp International. There is clearly limited involvement of civil society and the Liberian parliament in the security sector reform process, and this raises questions about the weakness of institutional oversight over the entire SSR process. There is a Governance Reform Commission (GRC) headed by former Liberian President Amos Sawyer, created under the CPA with the mandate to promote good governance in the public sector. The GRC seeks to inject local transparency and accountability into the SSR process to ensure, as far as possible, that any decisions made about the reform of the security sector, its management and oversight, are actually grounded in Liberian authority and realities. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of approaches by different actors, coupled with lack of transparency and the paucity of democratic control that are direct results of the outsourcing process, pose significant challenges to the legitimacy and sustainability of current SSR efforts in that country (Peas, 2005). Addressing these deficits is essential, if the Liberian security sector is to be trans-
formed and shake off its historical legacy as a tool of repression and win the trust of the communities and individuals it is mandated to protect (Bryden, 2007).

**Côte D’Ivoire**

To put DDR in proper context when it comes to Côte D’Ivoire, it is important to recount briefly the series of peace initiatives that followed the Ivorian conflict. Once considered one of the most stable countries in Africa, Côte D’Ivoire descended into major conflict on 19 September 2002 after a failed attempt to overthrow the government of President Laurent Gbagbo. That failed coup quickly turned into a rebellion that literally divided the country in half, with the government controlling the South and the rebel Forces Nouvelles taking control of the North.

Ten days after the onset of that crisis a summit was convened in Accra, Ghana under the auspices of Senegalese President and ECOWAS chairman, Abdoulaye Wade. Emerging from that summit was the Accra I Accord which called on all armed groups in the country to cease fighting and engage in a dialogue to bring a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The Accord condemned the illegitimate use of force and human rights violations that were occurring in the country. An agreement was signed on 9 July 2005, between the Ivorian government and Forces Nouvelles, to initiate a DDR program.

One of the key issues facing the peace process in Côte D’Ivoire has been the citizenship status of more than 3.5 million people in the predominantly Muslim north who migrated across the border from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, but who played a major role in building the nation of Côte D’Ivoire after independence in 1960. The proper status of these individuals and their children is an issue that has implications for the democratic process in that country and, in fact, sparked the flare-up of the initial conflict. While there has been agreement on the implementation of an identification process, and while the pre-cantonment of combatants began in June of 2006, the de facto state of seething tension and insecurity in Côte D’Ivoire prevents any meaningful progress in the DDR programme.

In such a fragile socio-political context, persistent violations of human rights and humanitarian law, inter-community tensions and widespread impunity continue to aggravate the social fracture. These abuses and the impunity that fuels them raise serious concerns about the potential for sudden violence whenever the peace process is stalled. The protection of displaced populations and host families, especially in Government-controlled areas in the West and in the Zone of Confidence, remains one of the most urgent humanitarian challenges, as well as that of children associated with armed forces and children victims of violence and sexual abuse, or deprived of access to education (Humanitarian Appeal, 2007)

The DDR process in Côte D’Ivoire has not quite reached the implementation phase, as the peace process itself is still not a reality. Despite the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in South Africa on 6 April 2005, and the Ouagadougou peace accord on 4 March 2007, the country remains embroiled in a low-intensity conflict, although the Presidential elections now scheduled for early 2010 may help to resolve some elements of this conflict.

**Sierra Leone**

The decade-long civil conflict in Sierra Leone was declared officially over in January 2002 after a tenuous path of negotiated settlement. Central to the various peace agreements signed between the warring factions was the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. The peace accords of November 1996 and July 1999 signed in Abidjan and Lome respectively between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) made provision for the establishment of a viable Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRP). The overall goal of DDRP was to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatant in order to consolidate short-term security as well as lay the ground work for a sustained peace in that country. The specific objectives of the DDRP were to:

1. Collect, register, disable and destroy all conventional weapons and munitions retrieved from combatants during the disarmament period.
2. Demobilise approximately 45,000 ex-combatants of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).
3. Prepare and support ex-combatants for reinsertion and socio-economic reintegration upon discharge from demobilisation centres.

According to provisions of the Abidjan Peace Accord, a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR) was established to manage the DDRP process. The commission was comprised of representation from the various parties to the conflict, as well as some external actors. The latter included the UN, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and donors. The activities of the NCDDR were largely supported financially by the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). During the period 1997 to 2002, about US$31.5million were committed to the MDTF (World Bank Report, 2002).

The Sierra Leone DDR programme unfolded through three problematic phases that were associated with draw-
backs from initial non-compliance with peace agreements, coups d’état, mistrust and programme restructuring. Phase I dates back to the signing of the Abidjan Accord in 1997. It witnessed the surrender to ECOMOG of combatants of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone. According to NCDDR, only 1,414 adult combatants were demobilized in phase 1 of the programme (NCDDR, 2002). The process was suspended after the violation of the cease-fire agreed upon in Abidjan and the resumption of hostilities in December 1998. It was revived in Phase II under the Lomé Accord that was signed in 1999. The supervision of the process in this second phase was designated to the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). But this process was again stalled with the resumption of hostilities; this time involving the hostage-taking of 500 UN observers by the rebels in May 2000. Phase III of the programme was initiated in May 2001. This followed the signing of the Abuj a cease-fire agreement in November 2000, which culminated in the cessation of hostilities. The third phase also witnessed a change in the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping mission and an increase in its troop strength to 17,500 (the largest ever UN Mission, up until that time). Over the period of the above three phases, 72,500 combatants were disarmed by UNAMSIL. This included 24,000 from the RUF, 37,000 from the CDF, and 11,500 from the SLA. Of this number, 69,000 (95%) went through the demobilisation process; 56,751 (81%) registered for training under the reintegration programme; and 54,000 (80%) received a Transitional Subsistent Allowance (TSA). Another batch of 2,600 combatants was incorporated into the new national army through the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP). It included 1,173 RUF, 535 CDF, and 55 AFRC. The total arms cache registered included 46,435 weapons and 1 million pieces of munitions. In Sierra Leone, the link between DDR and the latter processes of SSR, supported largely by DFID, is apparent. In the first place, a number of former fighters from the warring factions were incorporated into a new national army through going through screening and examination processes at demobilization sites. A comprehensive restructuring process of the security forces ensued through the Sierra Leone Security Sector Project (SILSEP). DFID, in collaboration with the UK’s Ministry of Defence, poured an initial estimated £21 million into this project between 2000 and 2002. (Bryden, N’Diaye and Olonisakin, 2005, p.9) SILSEP is a medium term programme aimed at restructuring and equipping the security institutions of Sierra Leone to perform their role in modern state building both constitutionally and adequately. Underscoring this goal is the creation of the institutional and legal framework for the formulation of acceptable national security and defence policies which enshrine principles of civilian control, accountability and transparency with respect to the various elements of the country’s security forces.

Strengthening the constitutional and legal framework helps in establishing roles and mandates for the security forces and imposing a hierarchy of authority that places the legislature and executive in control of these forces. Specific institutional and legal mandates therefore act as a check against overlapping jurisdictions of police, paramilitary and military operations. The internal security roles that the military can play during peace-time and when there are states of civil emergencies or natural disasters, is also spelled out, as well as the extent and nature of the military’s non-security roles in public life (DFID, 2002).

**Sudan**

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan, signed on 9 January 2005, contains a section on DDR. As stipulated in that CPA, “the overarching objective of the DDR process is to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilisation across Sudan, particularly war affected areas”. (Safer Africa, 2005, para 23.1) This goal is to be achieved through voluntary and comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and special groups and through the promotion of community security and arms control. The agreement makes provision for the establishment of three institutions that are responsible for managing the process. They include the:

i) National Council for DDR Co-ordination (NCDDRC).

ii) North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC).

iii) South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC).

The NCDDRC is a joint body charged with the responsibility of overall policy formulation, oversight, coordination, evaluation and review of the DDR process. The two commissions are regional political bodies with civil society representation and support from the international community, especially the UN system. They are in charge of the DDR process design, implementation and management. According to Article 24.4 of the CPA, no DDR planning, management or implementation activity is supposed to take place outside the framework of the interim and permanent DDR institutions.

The total number of combatants to be disarmed in Sudan is unknown, at the time of writing. These individuals will, however, be drawn mainly from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Alliance Force (SAF). This DDR programme draws funds from a number of sources, including the UN Assessed Budget for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion -- through the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS); donors who contribute through the UNDP; and internal
Gaps in DDR processes:

The objective of the IDDRP is to establish and develop the capacity of DDR institutions and civil society, while at the same time initiating basic DDR processes for selected target (special needs) groups. Its successful implementation will lay the groundwork for the development and future implementation of a multi-year DDR programme, which will complete the DDR process. The special needs groups include: Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAFG); Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFG); and Disabled Former Combatants. The strategy in this case is to target specific groups for demobilization and to get the relevant parties to ratify the IDDRP process.

To date, while the Government of National Unity has endorsed this process, a national commission has yet to be inaugurated. As part of its mandate, UNMIS “…shall assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction.” (IDDRS, 2005) Given the current uncertain situation in Sudan, the DDR process in that country is still very much at the planning stages.

CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN DDR AND SSR PROGRAMMES

Despite the relative successes noted above, linking the processes of DDR and SSR in the African context has been stymied with a number of difficulties. The challenges are mostly country specific – depending on the nature of the conflict, actors involved, level of support as well as the mode programme interventions, planning and implementation. That said, it is however possible to categorise these difficulties into broader themes that reflect the general characteristics of post conflict peace-building problems on the continent. It is against this backdrop, that this final section groups the challenges that confront not only the individual DDR and SSR activities but also attempts at linking them. The problems identified are as follows: gaps in DDR processes, mistrust and mutual suspicion between national actors, poor coordination and networking, limited national institutional capacity, lack of sustain funding support; and sub-regional instability.

Gaps in DDR processes: The process of DDR is more often than not the forerunner to other post conflict peace-building initiatives, such as SSR. Conversely, the prospect of embarking on a successful reform of the security sector is most likely contingent on the viability of DDR. Yet, experiences in the conduct of DDR in Africa have pointed to fundamental gaps which have far reaching ramifications for forging a link with SSR. The intersection between DDR and SSR at the practical level should be apparent at some stage in the process of demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants, but for two ominous challenges.

Insensitivity to the plight of vulnerable groups of combatants: Of particular concern for those engaged in the DDR process is the plight of war affected children. Children (both boys and girls) are the primary victims of armed conflict. They are its targets and, increasingly, its instruments. Their suffering bears many faces, in the midst of armed conflict and in its aftermath.

Children are killed or maimed, made orphans, abducted, deprived of education and health care, and left with deep emotional scars and trauma as a result of their exposure to war and violent conflict. They are recruited and used as child soldiers and forced to give expression to the hatred of adults. Uprooted from their homes, displaced children become exceedingly vulnerable. Girls face additional risks in conflict and immediate post-conflict situations, particularly the possibility of sexual violence and exploitation. All children -- whether they are child soldiers, sex slaves, girl mothers, cooks, spies, or concubines -- are victims of armed conflict; all of them deserve the attention and protection of the international community and therefore ought to be considered whenever any DDR process is contemplated.

Special attention also ought to be paid to the plight of women in the DDR process. According to one World Bank report, DDR tends to focus on “young men with guns”. There is a tendency to ignore the needs of female ex-combatants during the design and implementation of DDR programmes. But female supporters, and females associated with armed forces and groups, require entry into DDR at the Demobilization stage because, even if they are not considered as much of a security risk as male combatants, the DDR process, by its very definition, will serve to dismantle their social support systems by demobilizing those on whom they have relied to make a living. If the objective of DDR programmes is to promote broad-based community security, then it would be foolhardy to create insecurity for this group of women by not paying attention to their special needs.

Even if one makes the argument that women associated with armed forces and rebel groups should be incorporated into more broadly coordinated reintegration and recovery frameworks, it is important to realize that these women will miss out on targeted support that will help them make the transition from military to civilian lifestyles. In addition, many of the programmes aimed at
DDR programming. This is reflected not least in the reintegration phase:

Skewed reintegration phase: The reintegration aspect of DDR has proven to be most worrisome. This is due in part to the fact that the disarmament and demobilization components dry up existing funds and, partly because the "R" segment of DDR falls within the long-term processes of reconciliation, reconstruction, governance reforms and poverty reduction. The momentum of support for DDR processes is usually never sustained into the reintegration phase. This lack of sustained support to DDR has had the most adverse consequences for the reintegration process considering the sequential nature of DDR programming. This is reflected not least in the re-insertion package available to combatant. In Sierra Leone, criticisms are rife regarding the inappropriateness and inadequacy of job-training support given to ex-combatants that would enable them to begin the process of reintegrating into their communities. Many criticize the training as being too brief and not necessarily reflecting the needs and opportunities available on the local job market. Instances in which ex-combatants -- after realizing the frustration of the unemployment situation -- simply sold their start-up kits are quite common place. Although the reintegration process is long-term, the inability of the DDR process in Sierra Leone to give ex-combatants the capacity to continue with the process is testament of the weakness of this portion of the DDR programme.

In short, this challenge relates to the narrow focus on the short-term security goals of disarmament at the expense of the longer term goals related to reintegration, reconciliation, rebuilding and healing. An example of such a short-term focus is the exclusive focus on the collection of arms without providing the necessary support to ex-combatants for their reintegration in civilian life. This narrowing of the focus of DDR has often led to the exclusion of certain target groups from DDR programmes. Women combatants, supporters and dependents usually fall between the cracks of DDR programmes because of the focus on short-term security goals (Barth, 2002). A skewed reintegration phase also implies a false start for SSR.

Mistrust and mutual suspicion between warring factions: The implementation of peace processes relating to DDR and SSR has also been stifled by a high degree of mistrust and mutual suspicion between warring factions. This is so because demobilizing fighters and restructuring the security sector involve sensitive political and power relations issues. It has been difficult for obvious reasons to have conflicting parties buy into DDR and SSR peace processes or to link the two processes together. This has been reflected in unwillingness of warring parties to conform to the provisions of peace plans, for instance. There is generally a lack of the political will among belligerents to lay down their arms, to disengage the military option, and to surrender their fighting forces and weapons. Warring factions, especially rebel movements, often worry about their security without the gun. One can hardly vouch for the sincerity of rebel groups when they sign peace treaties. Thus it is not surprising when we witness numerous ceasefire violations, accusations and counter-accusations, prolonged hostilities -- all of which threaten to collapse the DDR process and scuttle SSR.

In Sierra Leone, the delay in the implementation of the DDR process could to a large extent be attributed to the intransigence and untrustworthiness of the RUF. The process was constantly being reversed with the resump-
tion of hostilities which targeted even the UN Peace Mission. In Sudan, the process is yet to get off the ground effectively partly because of the lack of a comprehensive ceasefire and the continuation of hostilities in the region of Darfur. In the DRC, the inability to ensure the cessation of hostilities in the Ituri regions has become one of the greatest impediments to the effective implementation of DDR. When DDR processes get stalled by non-compliance from parties, the adoption of long-term security restructuring becomes inconceivable.

Poor co-ordination and networking among programme interveners: Post-conflict peacebuilding processes in Africa have witnessed the intervention and involvement of various actors both from within and without. These include regional actors like ECOMOG in West Africa, OAU now AU, the UN, EU, NGOs, bilateral donors and civil society. Some have been instrumental in devising and implementing either DDR or SSR initiatives or both. What, however, has been severely lacking is a proper mechanism for effective coordination and information flow among various actors in these processes; resulting in functional overlap, duplication, waste, and role conflicts.

Many of the interventions from the NGO sector especially have been competitive instead of complementary. During DDR processes, this has left combatants, vulnerable group such as women, children and the disabled, in a state of quandary -- moving from one form of assistance to another. Worse still is the fact that at times some of these actors provide conflicting information about the DDR or SSR process, which could be frustrating to combatants. Difficulty in accessing information has also meant that women and child combatants have depended heavily on their commanders in order to understand the process. Some commanders take advantage of this situation and pass on misleading or deliberately distorted information to these individual, which deprives these most vulnerable groups from the full benefits of the programme. The problem is further compounded by the absence of a clear procedure for registration and redress.

There is also clear lack of a parallel process, in most cases, that focuses on the needs of non-combatant victims in post-war settings. Many of these individuals perceive the TSA to be a ‘cash for arms’ scheme which compensates only the people who may have in fact committed atrocities during the conflict – that is, the combatants (Willibald, 2006). This has a worrying effect on the subsequent processes of reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants. It has also meant that the more vulnerable groups among the ex-combatants, viz., women and children, at times remain dependent on their former commanders, thus reinforcing loyalties and sometimes preventing their return to local communities.

It should be noted that as the complexity of the DDR process evolved, the UN approach to DDR did not keep pace. As a result, DDR programmes originating in the UN has tended to be rather disjointed and fractured. A recent inventory of UN peacebuilding capacities identifies that coordination between UN entities and external actors in DDR is often lacking or is carried out in an ad hoc manner. (United Nations, 2006, p.28) Kofi Annan put the problem this way:

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have often been conducted in a fractured way, resulting in poor coordination and sometimes competition between and among peacekeeping operations, agencies, funds and programmes, which have often worked independently from one another. At best, this has resulted in disjointed programmes with large gaps between the various components. At worse, it has led to disillusioned ex-combatants returning to arms, as was the case in Sierra Leone and Haiti. (United Nations General Assembly, 2006)

A major challenge has been to develop integrated mechanisms to coordinate efforts between the UN agencies that are involved in the DDR process as well as between UN agencies and other actors that would be responsible for the design and implementation of DDR. An example could be a better coordination between the UN Department of Political Affairs that negotiates the peace agreement and UNICEF that designs programs for the reintegration of child soldiers. This raises the question of sufficient political will and required capacity to coordinate both at the intra and inter-agency levels. However, it should be pointed out that with the implementation of an integrated DDR system in the UN, this issue is now being addressed.

Limited national institutional capacity: The complex nature of post-conflict peacebuilding processes, especially when external actors may be uncoordinated in their interventions, underscores the real need for a robust national capacity to ensure effective implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. It is also essential, for sustainability purposes, to advocate for national ownership of these processes and active local participation in them. This has, however, remained a fundamental challenge for post conflict transitional states in Africa because these states emerge from conflicts with very weak institutional capacities which make them unable, in most cases, to develop policies, programmes, strategies and implementation modalities. DDR programmes for instance, have increasingly suffered from this institutional gap in both the conceptualization and implementation stages. This is reflected not least in the exclusion of comprehensive prior assessments to adequately reflect the specific needs of the various groups of combatants.

The formulation processes of DDR and SSR pro-
programmes are rarely informed by reliable data and research. In implementation phases, DDR institutions have most often been constrained by limited logistics and human resource capacity to monitor and evaluate programme implementation. Most times there is an absence of an effective coordination strategy that identifies gaps and provides redress mechanism for vulnerable groups of combatants. Security sectors in these countries are usually poorly coordinated and operate with sparse and inadequate guidelines.

Most post-conflict peace processes disburse huge sums of money. The effective management of these funds to ensure judicious utilization and a check against corrupt practices and mis-use remains a crucial problem. Challenges in terms of the weakness or absence of financial structures in war-ravaged environments are quite evident. The NCDDR in Sierra Leone, for example, had to grapple with this problem as noted by its Commissioner. There can be no denying that efforts to provide cash payments in Sierra Leone faced a number of challenges common to post-conflict environments, including “the absence of banks in a large part of the country, movement of [a] huge quantity of cash across the country, security for the process and co-ordination of various agencies involved within a tight timeframe” (Sierra Leone Web, 2002).

Inadequate funding support: The lack of adequate funding support to peacebuilding interventions poses another major challenge for establishing a comprehensive and integrated framework for both DDR and SSR. The disjointed nature of interventions has often reflected the piecemeal manner in which funding is sometimes made available. Also, different funding streams have been used to fund various components in peacebuilding. The UN Secretary-General’s 2006 report on DDR recognizes the problems posed by “the absence of adequate, timely and sustained funding.” The Secretary-General at the time noted that “this has frequently resulted in a gap between disarmament and demobilization activities on the one hand, which are relatively easy to fund, plan and implement, and reintegration on the other, which is dependant on voluntary contributions and on expertise and conditions that are not always present in a timely manner in a post-conflict environment” (United Nations, 2006).

DDR and SSR programmes are conceived at a time when target countries do not have the resource base to meet the financial, logistical and technical requirements for a successful implementation of these programmes. These countries emerge out of conflicts with very low national income mobilization capacity. Against this background, the funding provided by the international community has been critical. What is at issue however, is the adequacy, sustainability, and timeliness of such funds.

Donors do not always honour their pledges to DDR funds and those that meet such commitments usually do not always do so in a timely and sustainable fashion. This has the potential of not only derailing trust in DDR programmes but also of undermining the entire peace process, including attempts at SSR. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the entire DDR programme was estimated to cost some US$50 million. Yet, only US$31.5 million was committed to the World Bank’s MDTF, meaning that there was in fact a funding shortfall for the DDR programme in the amount of US$18.5 million. Additionally, the total number of combatants disarmed in that case exceeded the 45,000 that was originally anticipated. There was an excess of approximately 27,500 ex-combatants, which posed considerable pressure on the limited funds that were made available. As early as 1999 UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, warned that unless donors commit additional resources, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) will run out of money before the completion of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone. At the time, committed resources to the Fund amounted to only US$5.6 million. (United Nations, Secretary General, 1999)

Sub-regional instability: Most of the conflicts in Africa have regional dimensions partly as a result of the porous nature of borders and the intricate networks between warlords on the continent. Weapons and combatants are easily traded between armed groups across borders in volatile regions. Unfortunately, however, most post-conflict peacebuilding programmes have not been designed to reflect this reality. For instance, there was no sub-regional approach to the DDR and SSR processes in Sierra Leone even though the war was, to some extent, construed as a spill-over conflict from neighbouring Liberia, and as part of the instability problem in a volatile sub-region.

The process of disarmament and demobilization in Sierra Leone was being implemented at the time when the security situation in the Mano River countries was extremely volatile. Some combatants slipped through the porous borders into the conflict zones of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, only serving to exacerbate an already unstable situation in the sub-region. The gravity of the problem has been put this way by other observers:

In a continent where interstate borders are highly porous and where many intrastate conflicts exhibit some regional dimensions, arms buyback or exchange programmes do stimulate illicit regional arms trade and weapons proliferation. In West Africa, for example, while the reward for surrendering weapons is $900 or more per combatant in Côte d’Ivoire, it is as low as $300 in neighbouring Liberia. This has led to fears and suggestions that armed elements in Liberia are crossing over to Côte d’Ivoire to triple the financial value of their weapons (Isima, 2004: p.4).
Conclusions

This paper examined lessons learned from the experience of those who have been working in DDR and SSR programmes in Africa over the years. In conclusion, I will make some recommendations addressing a number of the major lessons learned from post-conflict peacebuilding interventions in Africa.

In the first place, it should be made abundantly clear that, at both the policy and practical levels, the DDR process cannot be implemented in isolation of broader processes of post-conflict peacebuilding and nation-state recovery, reconciliation and rebuilding. It is very important for those designing and implementing DDR programmes to link those programmes to the wider sustainable peace efforts, including reforms in the security sector and development of the socio-economic frameworks that the targeted national government and its society can use to forestall any relapse into conflict. The DDR process should therefore contribute to the broader security sector reforms that create an enabling environment for the advancement of formal education, the development of agriculture, the establishment of small enterprise development such as micro-businesses and other income generating activities, the initiation of vocational training and apprenticeship programmes, job placements, the promotion of human rights and justice, the integration of fighting forces into national armies, the facilitation of reconciliation and the building of national unity.

National actors, especially those with a stake in the peace process, should declare their commitment to the post-conflict peacebuilding interventions. Mutual trust between warring parties is essential, not only for building confidence in the DDR and SSR programmes but also, for encouraging active participation in the overall post-conflict peacebuilding process. It was noted earlier that the success of both DDR and SSR programmes will depend heavily on the level of political will which conflicting parties demonstrate. All parties to the conflict will have to respect the terms of the peace settlement and the commitments they made as signatories to any peace agreement. Moreover, there ought to be a plan in the design of DDR programmes for national governments and their civil societies eventually to take over key elements of the DDR and SSR processes once external parties begin to move out of the country, or draw down their intervention mission. This requires post-conflict governments to make a serious commitment to enhance their national capabilities and to corral their societal expertise in order to assume the management of DDR and SSR programmes.

Kofi Annan once wisely suggested that the UN ought to assist in developing national capacities so that the transition from conflict to sustainable post-conflict peace would be smooth and uneventful. In his Report to the sixty-sixth UN General Assembly, the former Secretary-General wrote that the UN now recognizes the importance of “genuine, effective, and broad national ownership of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process” for the sustainability of peace in post conflict societies. One can also make the argument that in certain cases there ought to be a regional approach to the implementation of DDR processes. For example, in volatile regions such as the Mano River basin in West Africa and the Great Lake region, a regional rather than a strictly national implementation of DDR could reduce the incentive for trading combatants and weapons across borders.

Second, it is important to incorporate DDR and SSR at the inception stage of peace processes, especially in the case of politically negotiated settlements. All conflicting parties need to buy into the DDR and SSR programmes. Sometimes it takes a neutral third party to step in during the early stages of peace negotiations in order to allay suspicions, build trust, and emphasize the importance of DDR to sustained peace. In other cases, it might take the international community’s public demonstration of commitment and financial support to the DDR process for warring parties to have confidence in post-conflict peacebuilding process. Pledges made must be honoured by the members of the international community, and payments should be made on time and in full.

Third, fragmented approaches to DDR can undermine the success of peace processes, with adverse ramifications for SSR. This is why integrated planning and programming is vital for ensuring the kind of synergy that can make the DDR process a success. However, an integrated approach is difficult to achieve because of the multiple players involved in DDR. In the case of the UN system, integrated planning and programming requires the creation of integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration units. However, such a plan would mean a major change in the organizational culture of the UN, which is generally characterized by the fierce guarding of fiefdoms, poor inter-agency coordination, and reflexive adaptation (Knight, 2000). The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the IDDRS are hopeful signs that the political will now exists to address, at least, the lack of inter-agency coordination in this particular issue area. Also, there needs to be clarity on the roles and capabilities of different actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding. Other bilateral and multilateral players that are engaged in peacebuilding interventions in Africa should better integrate their approaches in order to provide more coherent and coordinated support to national actors.

Fourth, there should also be a long-term commitment by multilateral and regional bodies (both state and non-state) to support peace-building programmes in Africa. Premature withdrawal of support, for instance, can have the effect of reversing the democratic and peace-building gains in fragile states. Sustained donor support over the
long haul is therefore critical for most post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. However, it should always be borne in mind that such external support must be geared towards enhancing the national capacity of post conflict states eventually to take over the peace-building process. Donor funding should be tied to those conditions that enhance the target nation’s ability to manage local resources in a transparent and effective manner. However, any exit strategy must be designed to avoid creating a security vacuum and straining national capacity.

Fifth, DDR and SSR processes should incorporate serious efforts at the reform of the rule of law mechanisms and oversight bodies in security sectors. DDR processes would also be enhanced if national governments and regional bodies agreed on measures to reduce or eliminate the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) on the African continent and to fight against impunity (Muggah, 2005). Efforts to reintegrate former fighters into their communities and to reconcile former warring factions should not preclude deterrence and justice processes if peace is to be sustainable. In other words, DDR and SSR processes should benefit from wider arms control and arms reduction measures as well as from transitional justice processes undertaken at the regional and/or global level.

Sixth, the insensitivity of some DDR processes to the plight of vulnerable former combatant groups should be addressed if there is to be a smooth ‘roll out’ of these processes. It is extremely important, during the early phase of DDR, to get children extracted early from the clutches of armed groups, and to strip them of their weapons. Ensuring the early release of children from the clutches of the more seasoned fighters can actually have a positive impact on broader security issues. This was one of the lessons learned in Burundi. It was found that the rapid demobilization of children ahead of the demobilization of adults from armed forces contributed greatly to building confidence, which in turn helped to move the peace process forward.

Seventh, it has been found that those DDR programmes which provide large benefits to ex-combatants during the demobilization phase can cause major resentment among the civilian population. In a sense, these large payments are viewed by civilians (non-combatants) as rewarding those who may have committed atrocities during the violent conflict. This not only can affect the process of reintegration and reconciliation but it can also pose a serious security challenge to both the DDR and SSR processes. The manner in which DDR is conducted is a concern for SSR. The lesson learned here is that it is probably better to utilize in-kind assistance or other forms of material support that would also have benefits for the community at large and not just for ex-combatants. When monetary incentives are considered necessary, they should be made in small payments over a longer period to assure peaceful resettlement. Although the idea of swapping weapons for cash seems to work in some places, this demilitarization strategy may not work as well in other places where the possession of arms and their use is an accepted cultural value.

While lump sum inducement payments to ex-combatants can help to stimulate the local economy, they can also have a reverse inflationary effect. The utilization of cash payments by organizations involved in DDR programmes have sometimes led to fraud, mismanagement of funds, and divergence of assistance funds from targeted beneficiaries, as well as extortion. To avoid some of those problems, non-liquid incentives such as supermarket vouchers can be handed out during the weapons collection phase of DDR. Others have recommended “weapons-for-development” schemes and the strengthening of cultural norms against the possession and use of weapons as an answer to this problem (Isima, 2004). Furthermore, it might be a good idea to institute post disarmament and demobilisation arms collection and control programmes in order to track SALW that are not handed over during the disarmament phase of DDR programmes. Communities should be made aware of the importance of small arms collection and control following the end of formal disarmament programmes. The UNDP Arms for Development programme in Sierra Leone is a case in point.

Finally, when those responsible for the design of DDR programmes are flexible, they can usually produce positive adjustments at various stages of these programmes. Take, for instance, the situation in Liberia. A change in the criteria of who was eligible for DDR assistance allowed women associated with fighting forces to meet those criteria. As a result, for the first time, there has been greater accessibility to DDR programmes for women. Also, reintegration benefits ought to be tailored to age, gender, educational qualifications and physical abilities of the recipient. Women, in particular, shoulder an enormous burden in post conflict societies. Not only do many of them have babies—the outcome of rape and forced marriages, several of them are involved in providing care for demobilized ex-combatants, for disabled ex-combatants and those who are chronically ill (Carpenter, 2007). This work ought to be compensated and it usually never was.

In conclusion, DDR processes will be vacuous unless they are articulated within broader national recovery efforts aimed at the reconstruction of battered states and the building of sustainable peace (Ali & Matthews, 2004). Thus, DDR processes and outcomes ought to be linked more seriously with an effective security sector reform programme in a post-conflict environment. Ex-combatants have to have a sense of security as they handover weapons which they regard as sources of protection. As DDR processes unfold, a properly structured and governed security sector must be put in place.
not only to ensure the security of demobilised combatants but also to nip in the bud any security threat that could lead to a relapse into full scale violence.

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