Assessing State Fragility: A Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report

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Executive Summary

This CIFP report provides a global fragility ranking for 2011 for a total of 197 countries. The global rankings indicate that Somalia tops the list of most fragile countries followed closely by Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, and Central African Republic. Sudan, Eritrea, Pakistan and Côte d’Ivoire round out our top 10. The majority of the top 20 most fragile states are located in sub-Saharan Africa, a finding that is consistent with our historical data (www.carleton.ca/cifp). The balance of countries are located in the Middle East and North Africa: Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen and Central and South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar. A year-over-year comparison with CIFP’s previous rankings shows that Afghanistan, Chad, DRC and Somalia rank consistently among the top poor performers and usually within the top five. On the other side of the ledger, Haiti and Iran have moved out of the top 20, suggesting modest improvements in their performance in the last several years. This report also provides a composite analysis of fragility using the Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity (ALC) cluster scores. The ALC assessment enables us to evaluate the different characteristics of stateness, namely in terms of identifying the sources and extent of both weaknesses and strengths; it also assists policymakers in their decisions on where and how to engage by providing additional nuance to the question of fragility. Myanmar now tops the list of authority-challenged fragile states, a result that is indicative of the political uncertainties that have taken place in that country. Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan round out the top five in the authority category. For the legitimacy rankings, Somalia, Myanmar and Iran top the list, with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also showing up in the top 10. Other countries of concern include Saudi Arabia Belarus, Libya, Yemen and Syria. In the capacity rankings, this category is still dominated by sub-Saharan African countries; most of those in the top 20 are from that region. The balance of the report examines correlates of fragility with respect to ALC components and areas of interest to donors as well as regional breakdowns. Our examination of the evolution of fragility over the period 1980-2010 identifies three groups of countries: those that are stuck in a fragility trap, those that have moved in and out of fragility and those that have successfully exited in the last decade or so. The report concludes with policy recommendations and directions for future work on the sequencing of state breakdown and the associated timing of donor interventions.
1. Introduction

In its latest report on resource flows to fragile states, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) shows that approximately US$ 47 billion in official development assistance (ODA) went to fragile states in 2009, which represented 37% of ODA for that particular year.¹ And yet, the group of countries classified by numerous organizations as fragile is continuing to fall behind and will likely not meet any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.² The current financial crisis, demographic pressures and climate change are but some of the factors that are likely to exacerbate the problem of (or create new situations of) conflict and fragility in these states.

Although CIDA has made a number of crucial investments in the development and strengthening of monitoring tools and capacity building, some gaps and unmet challenges within the donor community persist. This includes the lack of a systematic effort to understand why countries that have transitioned out of the conflict-fragility trap have been able to build resilience, while others remain mired in conflict or are unstable. This challenge speaks to the need to build more effective linkages between analysis, monitoring and warning, on the one hand, and support to donor decision-making on the other.

Thus the objective of this report is to provide an updated account of fragility rankings using the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Fragility Index (FI) (www.carleton.ca/cifp) and its different sub-components. While much of the report focuses on the most recent state of fragility across countries (and regions), it also considers the long-term evolution of fragility and discusses the policy implications of the findings. A major challenge in compiling this report was to ensure that all available data sources are included and that the overall FI and its sub-components had enough indicators in order to be representative of the actual situation in each country and over time.

Fragile states are by definition characterized by weak policy environments, which make engagement in them a long term challenge. Furthermore, their level of structural complexity also makes policy entry difficult. Our view is that a reasonable starting point for early warning models is to use structural data to profile countries along several dimensions, a task which we accomplish here. More complex models, which are beyond the scope of the current report, would ideally combine different levels of data, both quantitative and qualitative (see Appendix 1), and conduct more thorough statistical analysis for both retrospective and predictive assessments (Tikuisis et al., 2012).³

Building on our previous work in this area, we argue that fragility is a measure of the extent to which the actual practices and capacities of states differ from its idealized image. (Carment et al. 2009b). It is a matter of degree not kind. It is intended to be a general term, one within which related, though more specific terms, including, statebuilding, weakness, failure, conflict and collapse may be located. Fragility is a measure of the extent to which the actual institutions, functions and political processes of a state accord with the strong image of sovereign state, the one reified in both theory and international law.


² As the 2011 World Development Report highlights, providing effective assistance to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States is difficult, mired with setbacks, and a long-term enterprise. Not one low income FCAS is presently on track to achieve any of the MDGs by 2015.

³ The current report focuses on structural data only; however, CIFP’s methodology considers different levels of analysis, namely structural data, events-based data, and expert and field surveys (see www.carleton.ca/cifp).
our definition, all states are to some extent fragile; this is, we believe, a closer representation of reality than an arbitrary line, however drawn, between weak and strong or resilient and vulnerable. However, only some are mired in deep rooted conflict and violent transitions. Some are fragile states with “undergoverned” spaces that have just enough linkages to the world (roads, phones, etc.) to allow terrorists, drug lords, etc. to operate, but don’t have enough governance to purge these threats from the country. Others are states described as MIFFs (Middle Income but Failed or Fragile) (www.economist.com/node/18986470) combining reasonable economic performance with poor governance. Both types are states that we consider to be caught in a “fragility trap” or are “unstable” by which we mean they fluctuate in and out of extreme fragility experiencing conflict at different stages.

Fragility is generally a result of the interrelated aspects of poverty, conflict and stability. State fragility is the product or convergence of three interconnected (and sometimes contradictory) policy-inspired research streams: development-oriented, conflict-oriented, and stability-oriented. The development-oriented stream has drawn support from the World Bank, DfID and the OECD, largely motivated by the poor track-record of structural adjustment and market-friendly reforms conducted in several countries, earning the latter the label of ‘difficult partners’ or ‘difficult environments’ and ‘LICUS’. The second stream is the conflict-oriented stream, which is a result of the development of early warning and conflict prevention tools in the 1990s as the world shifted from interstate to intrastate conflicts in the final years of the Cold War and continuing throughout the 1990s with the terrible experiences of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia to name a few. Finally, the stability-oriented stream relates to threats that weak and failed states pose to their neighbours and the international system (for example support of Al Qaeda by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan before 9/11).

As mentioned above, we use the FI developed by CIFP in this report. According to CIFP’s conceptualization, the state is the primary unit of analysis and needs to exhibit the three fundamental properties of authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) to function properly (or to use the World Bank's language – security, justice and jobs). Fragility measures the extent to which the actual characteristics of a state differ from their ideal situation; states are constrained by both internal and external forces that are constantly changing over time. Consequently, all states are, to some extent, fragile; weaknesses in one or more of the ALC dimensions will negatively impact the fragility of a particular country. In that sense, we need to consider not only the extreme cases of failing, failed and collapsed states but also the ones that have the potential to fail.

According to CIFP’s conceptualization of the term and its measurement, authority captures the extent to which a state possesses the ability to enact binding legislation over its population, to exercise coercive force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. Since the end of the Cold War, fragile states have overwhelmingly been the locus of much of the world’s violence, both conflict-related and otherwise. Today, however, politically motivated civil conflict is not the only source of violence and instability in fragile states; fear of criminal and drug-related violence has come to dominate these states and their neighbors, surpassing concerns regarding terrorism, civil war, and international conflict.

Legitimacy describes the extent to which a particular government commands public loyalty to the governing regime, and to generate domestic support for that government’s legislation and policy. When it comes to practicing effective governance, many fragile states lack the legitimacy to be effective and responsive policy makers. To be sure, while there are still some deeply entrenched and often predatory

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4 See Carment et al. (2009b) for a detailed account as well as the Concept Report available from the CIFP website.
regimes among those states we call fragile, many simply reflect a disengaged population weary of governments incapable of providing basic services and a legal system that makes contractual relationships, property rights and respect for human rights unsustainable. Fragile states need an institutional architecture for consolidated and sustainable political competition that ensures elites are answerable to the people they serve.

Capacity refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends. States lacking in capacity may prove unable to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, food shortages, or refugee flows. Populations living in fragile states are further from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) than any others on the planet. Among all developing nations, though they comprise roughly one-sixth of the world population, fragile states by various definitions account for over 30% of the absolute poor, over 40% of the children that do not receive a primary education, 50% of the children that die before their 5th birthday, nearly 40% of maternal deaths, over 40% of those living with HIV/AIDS, and 35% of those lacking safe drinking water.

This ALC approach is in effect a synthesis of different theoretical foundations and the three overarching streams described above: development (as measured through indicators of capacity), conflict (as measured through indicators of authority) and security (as measured by indicators of legitimacy), each of which are covered in greater detail elsewhere (Carment et al., 2006, 2009a).

In order to arrive at a composite index for authority, legitimacy and capacity for a particular country, different indicators are converted to a nine-point score based on the performance of that country relative to a global sample of countries. In general, a higher score is an indication that a country is performing poorly relative to other countries. In order to avoid wide fluctuations in yearly data for country performance, averages over a five-year time frame are calculated for global rank scores. Typical measures found under authority include the level of corruption and contract regulation. Legitimacy includes measures such as regime type and human rights. Capacity includes measures such as GDP per capita and foreign aid as a percentage of national income since many of the most fragile countries are credit constrained and heavily dependent on aid. In addition to the FI and ALC indicators, cluster scores along several dimensions (governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, environment) are provided to provide further nuance to the profiling of countries.

The rest of the report proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present and discuss our latest fragility ranking along several dimensions, with a particular focus on countries of concern. Section 3 presents and discusses the correlates of fragility, as key variables of interest to policy makers. Section 4 focuses on the time series evidence regarding fragility, highlighting three types of countries: those caught in a fragility trap, those who have moved in and out of fragility, and those who have exited fragility. Section 5 concludes with some general recommendations.

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5 In addition to the ALC components we use six clusters of state performance. Both the ALC components and the six clusters can be used to monitor the Five Objectives on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding specified at the Busan Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011: 1. Legitimate politics: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution 2. Security: Establish and strengthen people’s security 3. Justice: Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice 4. Economic foundations: Generate employment and improve livelihoods 5. Revenues and services: Manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social service delivery.
2. Country Rankings

Table 1 below shows our global fragility ranking for 2011 for a total of 197 countries. The rankings indicate that Somalia tops the list of most fragile countries followed closely by Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, and Central African Republic. Sudan, Eritrea, Pakistan and Côte d’Ivoire round out our top 10. Overall fragility scores above 6.5 are considered serious. Of those most fragile states scoring 6.5 and above, there are 14 in total. Only Somalia scores at or above 7.5, which we consider very serious and approximating a failed, collapsed or failing state; Afghanistan at 7.4 is certainly not far behind despite numerous efforts to stabilize the country since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fragility Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>17.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>17.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>16.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yemen, Rep.</td>
<td>15.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>14.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>14.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>14.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of the top 20 most fragile states are located in sub-Saharan Africa, a finding that is consistent with our historical data (www.carleton.ca/cifp). The rest are in the Middle East and North Africa: Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen and Central and South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar. A year-over-year comparison with CIFP’s previous rankings (see Table 2 below) shows that Afghanistan, Chad, DRC and Somalia rank consistently among the top poor performers and usually within the top five. On the other side of the ledger, Haiti and Iran have moved out of the top 20, suggesting modest improvements in their performance over the last several years. Many of CIDA’s countries of focus, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Pakistan and Sudan, are in the top 40 fragile countries in Table 1 above. Some such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan also show up among the most fragile countries in the past three years (see Table 2 below).

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6 As is common practice with structural data reporting, the data for this 2011 ranking is from 2010 data.
In addition to fragility rankings (as seen in Tables 1 and 2 above), CIFP provides a composite analysis of fragility using the ALC cluster scores, as defined in the previous section. The ALC assessment enables us to evaluate the different characteristics of stateness, namely in terms of identifying the sources and extent of both weaknesses and strengths; it also assists policymakers in their decisions on where and how to engage by providing additional nuance to the question of fragility. Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide a ranking of the top 20 poorest performers in each category.

Myanmar now tops the list of authority-challenged fragile states, a result that is indicative of the political uncertainties that have taken place in that country. The opening up of Myanmar to political transformation, as well as ongoing clashes with separatist groups, are primary drivers of its high ranking. Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan round out the top five. Each of these countries faces serious and ongoing conflict and tumultuous relations with its neighbours. It is also interesting to note that Kenya and Ethiopia now rank fairly highly in the authority cluster. Their high authority scores are a key reason for their overall high fragility scores. Historically countries performing poorly in this category are

### Table 2: Highest Fragility Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yemen, Rep.</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ALC Analysis**

Myanmar now tops the list of authority-challenged fragile states, a result that is indicative of the political uncertainties that have taken place in that country. The opening up of Myanmar to political transformation, as well as ongoing clashes with separatist groups, are primary drivers of its high ranking. Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan round out the top five. Each of these countries faces serious and ongoing conflict and tumultuous relations with its neighbours. It is also interesting to note that Kenya and Ethiopia now rank fairly highly in the authority cluster. Their high authority scores are a key reason for their overall high fragility scores. Historically countries performing poorly in this category are
drawn from a variety of regions beset by conflict, territorial disputes and regime change but this year’s authority rankings suggest that sub-Saharan Africa is the key locus for these kinds of problems, thus suggesting that overall performance in the region may be deteriorating.

Turning now to our legitimacy rankings, historically this category has been dominated by autocratic regimes from the Middle East and North Africa along with North Korea but some significant changes have taken place in this category with Somalia, Myanmar and Iran topping our list. Central Asia has three countries scoring poorly here, including Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These poor scores are typically indicative of a deteriorating human rights record and a decline in state-society relations including gender equality, freedom of the press and civilian oversight in political structures. Other countries for which there should be cause for concern include Saudi Arabia, and Belarus. Libya, Yemen and Syria also show up as the reporting period coincides with the onset of the Arab Spring; the sources and causes of which we have traced elsewhere to poor legitimacy performance (Carment et al., 2009a).

Finally, in our capacity rankings we can see that this category is still dominated by sub-Saharan African countries; most of those in the top 20 are from that region. This finding has positive and negative connotations in that while some countries may be recovering from the effects of the economic recession, the chronically poor performers in this category including Somalia and DRC appear on this list year after year. It is to be noted that many of these countries are also aid dependent, again a sign of their weak capacity to mobilize resources domestically. Among the non-African countries ranking highly in this cluster, Timor-Leste has entered our top 20 while Afghanistan, Haiti and Yemen remain firmly stuck among the poorest performers.

Indeed of the fragile states that appear on all three lists Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, DRC and Chad might all be characterized as either failed or collapsed. Those that can be found on two lists are more numerous, accounting for half of the total and include: Myanmar, Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, Ethiopia, CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mauritania and Eritrea. Whether any of these countries are mired in fragility or on a path to recovery is a question we answer in section 4 below.
Regional and Country-Level Analysis

Figures 4 and 5, show respectively, regional averages organized by fragility and ALC clusters, and by six cluster areas, which include governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography and the environment. These cluster areas are discussed further below at the country level. Gender is included as a cross-cutting theme (drawing on specific indicators from each of the six clusters). A full description of the component indicators of the six clusters and the rationale for creating them can be found on the cifp website at www.carleton.ca/cifp.

Each figure reveals some interesting, and in some cases, counterintuitive results. For example, figure 4 provides a relative ranking based on fragility scores moving from left to right (represented by the red and far-right column in each bloc). Although sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the highest average fragility score followed closely by South Asia, it is exceeded by South Asia’s poorer performance in both authority and legitimacy and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in legitimacy. Indeed, were it not for the consistently poor capacity scores in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia would be the most fragile region in the world. As it stands, the two regions are in a virtual tie for overall poor performance. Although the MENA’s legitimacy score is the worst among all regions, its capacity and authority scores are fairly similar to those of East Asia and Latin America respectively. Central Asia’s averages on the other hand would be even lower were it not for the fact that we have clustered it with Eastern and Central Europe for ease of comparison (Western Europe and North America are excluded from these regional comparisons).
The poor performance of sub-Saharan Africa is further illustrated in figure 5, which provides a regional breakdown by cluster areas. Sub-Saharan Africa fares the poorest in economics, human development, governance and demography while South Asia is the poorest performer in security and crime, and the environment; the MENA has the poorest average score on gender (which relates back to its poor legitimacy scores). Although the remaining three regions do not have the highest scores in any one cluster, we can see where the poorest performance lay. In the case of East Asia and Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia, governance is the biggest contributor to fragility; for Latin America and the Caribbean, it is its environmental performance.

**Figure 6: Poorest Performing Countries/2011**

**South Asia - Clusters**

These figures reveal that many of the fragile states experiencing governance, and security and crime problems, are those with ongoing internal insurgency and political upheaval. Somalia, which is the most fragile state, also tops the list in these crucial areas and ranks among the top 20 in two others. A critical ranking, in this regard, is a country’s governance cluster, which is a measure of the ability of a regime to effectively manage its human and natural resources and to allocate them efficiently and fairly. The economic development cluster correlates strongly with countries that have poor trading conditions, little industrialization and little or no diversity in their manufacturing sectors. The security and crime cluster covers a range of measures that tap into the presence of low intensity violence and threats to
human security as well as the occurrence of terrorism and organized crime. Some countries appearing high on the security and crime list do not always rank highly in other clusters (for example, Russia and Israel), where in other cases, a poor standing here correlates with overall poor performance in authority and legitimacy standings (for example, Pakistan, DRC and Somalia).

The human development rankings are indicative of the overall performance of sub-Saharan Africa’s particularly poor track record on the MDGs, since the MDGs track closely with the component parts of the human development cluster. The demography cluster is a measure of key attributes of population growth and distribution. It also includes the youth bulge index. Sub-Saharan Africa is once again the key locus of concern for demography with the important exception of Afghanistan also ranking highly in this category. The environment cluster taps into land degradation in terms of arable land available for agriculture, as well as the quality of air and water measured in absolute and per capita terms. Not surprisingly, Haiti is near the top of the list and several Latin American countries appear here as well.
3. Correlates of Fragility

Having compared fragility rankings across regions and by cluster, we now examine some key relationships between CIFP fragility rankings and specific indicators which tap into our measures of authority, legitimacy and capacity, as well as Canadian foreign policy priorities. Figures 12-18 below, tell us how fragile states perform relative to all other countries in aggregate and are suggestive of priority areas of concern for policy makers.

For example, in figure 12 we can see that higher fragility scores correlate strongly with poor physical integrity rights, which is an index constructed from torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance indicators and ranges from 0 (no respect) to 8 (full government respect). Pakistan performs among the worst in this category. Afghanistan and Canada are provided for comparison.
Historically, our data tends to support the overall trend shown here, though some of the lowest human rights scores are to be found among the middle range performers.

Figure 13 indicates improving fragility scores are associated with increasing female representation in parliaments. There are some interesting outliers here (as shown by Rwanda’s extreme performance in this category) whereas Canada is in the middle of the pack and Haiti performs poorly.

Figure 14 regarding freedom of the press indicates that increasing freedoms are associated with lower overall fragility scores. For comparison we provide Canada which ranks well, Haiti which performs in the middle of the press freedoms index and Somalia which ranks among the worst performers on both indices.
Figure 15 provides a distribution of per capita in US dollars. The majority of countries are clustered around low aid per capita scores suggesting that fragility is not a determinant of aid spending on a per capita basis, though aid “darlings” such as Afghanistan and Haiti perform better in this category. The poorest performers tend to be neglected because of poor policy environments and a poor policy environment is a measure of state’s authority and legitimacy.

In figure 16, we observe that GDP per capita, a basic measure of poverty, is negatively correlated with the CIFP fragility index: poor countries are more fragile than rich countries. This finding makes intuitive sense since capacity, a key facet of the CIFP index, is a driver of overall fragility for most states.

A similar relationship is displayed in figure 17, which shows the relationship between fragility and infant mortality. Sudan and Ukraine are identified for comparison purposes.
Figure 18 focuses on the relationship between levels of democracy and fragility in the form of an inverted-U. The most fragile states are typically not those with the lowest democracy scores. The curvilinear relationship indicates that states that are more fragile are more likely to be “anocracies” and unconsolidated democracies. In Figure 19, we show the relationship between gender empowerment (a measure from the UNDP which shows the extent of gender inequality across countries – taking into account economic and political participation of women, and their command over resources). Countries that score well on gender empowerment tend to be less fragile. For illustrative purposes we indicate the relative positions of Yemen, Bolivia and Canada.

4. Fragility Over Time

Given the persistence and long-term nature of fragility, it is important to examine how fragile situations occur and evolve over time. Many cross-country indicators of fragility do not have long-enough time series data for proper analysis. The CIFP dataset, on the other hand, reaches back to 1980 (further on some data points). This panel structure gives us a thirty-year window to examine three types of countries: those that have been stuck in a fragility/failure trap (Type 1), those that have exited fragility and are now stabilized (Type 2), and those that have moved in and out of fragility (Type 3).
For Type 1 countries, we proceeded to rank all the countries in our dataset according to their fragility scores for each year of data and then considered the number of times they showed up in the top 20. While this is an extremely high threshold, especially given that the consensus is that there are more than 20 fragile states at any given time, it ensured that we were choosing those that are clearly stuck in a trap. Besides Afghanistan which, was always ranked in the top 20, other candidates that showed up more than two times out of three in the top 20 included Pakistan, Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi. These are also countries that rank among the worst performers over the whole period when we calculate their average fragility scores. For Type 2 countries, we used our yearly country rankings to identify those that were fragile in earlier periods and were able to exit the top 40 rankings for the last ten years or more. Countries in this category that really stood out include Algeria, Cambodia, Guatemala, Malawi and Mozambique. Finally, for Type 3 countries, we considered those that moved in and out of the top 40 ranked countries in terms of fragility and possible candidates included Guinea Bissau, Iran, Laos, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal7. Table 3 above provides a full list of all countries under each category.

Figures 20-22 show how fragility has evolved for some of the countries in table 3. There is a clear upward trend in figure 20, a downward trend in the last 10-15 years in figure 21, and a relatively flat trend in figure 22, confirming the classification of these countries under one of the three typologies of table 3. Our argument is that successful transitions from fragility can be understood as a process of

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7 Interestingly, the recent military coup in Mali in March of this year has created a very volatile situation.
improvement in the proper sequence of authority, legitimacy and capacity, through, among other things, compliance with the law and incorporation of peoples into a functional economy.

For countries stuck in a fragility trap, for example Pakistan, increasing fragility appears to begin with deterioration in authority structures that are negatively reinforced by internal and external forces. Similarly, in a case such as the DRC, the country is stuck because small gains in capacity are not matched by improvements in authority, and to some extent legitimacy. Countries thus remain stuck in a fragility trap as a result of challenges to and degradations in authority. One could thus argue that the sequencing of positive changes in such countries would be one that focuses on addressing authority structures and then legitimacy to buttress that authority and finally capacity.

Countries that have exited fragility and are now stabilized are the mirror image of those that are stuck in a trap. For example, both Guatemala and Mozambique have emerged from conflict and improved their fragility scores when positive gains are made on authority structures. Although these countries face their own challenges (Guatemala faces increased violence and insecurity related to the drugs trade; Mozambique is plagued by bad governance and corruption), these have not been severe enough to send them back among the most severe cases of fragility. The third group of countries that have moved in and out of fragility presents a more complex picture. For example, Iran is a country with authority and legitimacy challenges that even strong economic performance over the period 2000-2007 could not reverse. On the other hand, a country such as Senegal faces mostly capacity issues, like much of sub-
Saharan Africa; its overall fragility tends to be further exacerbated as a result of volatility in authority and legitimacy scores.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

These findings on fragile states can provide policy makers with a structured framework that can be used to identify entry points for targeted engagement whether that is at the early stages of fragility or later. In this report we have spoken to some of the key determinants of fragility. Using a cluster-based and ALC approach we have highlighted the sectors of countries and regions that are particularly weak.

Needless to say, there are numerous challenges to statebuilding that arise in the modern context including risks of ethnic conflict, challenges to economic development and regional instability. First, leaders must ensure they have institutions to provide adequate services to the population. Second, leaders must find ways to properly channel ethnic, social and ideological competition that will otherwise erode the effectiveness of weak institutions even more. Finally, leaders must find a way to overcome the cumulative effects of poverty, over-population, rural flight and rapid urbanization, as well as environmental degradation that can otherwise overwhelm a vulnerable state’s capability to function.

Consider Pakistan, which faces difficult and constant challenges to authority. With respect to theory, much of the literature focusing on fragility would suggest that states like Pakistan fail under conditions associated with challenges to their authority and so it might be expected that authority is the first set of risk factors rather than the last to succumb. By using our ALC methodology we would suggest that compliance with the law in Pakistan has degenerated because state institutions are losing legitimacy in the eyes of large segments of the population resulting in lost economic productivity.

Our related research also shows that resilience can emerge from economic development and greater connectivity with state-provided services and in turn support for effective and responsible government (both of which improve legitimacy). Consider our regional analysis of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) using data preceding the Arab Spring. It shows legitimacy, followed by authority as important structural factors contributing to fragility in several MENA countries, which together with more recent economic (capacity-related) events, led to the political crises. It would be far too simplistic, in our view, to think of the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt as being only about economics or just authority problems. Rather, it is the longstanding frustration with the types of political regimes in place, human rights violations, lack of good governance and corruption that are causally linked. http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1379.pdf

Canada can contribute to supporting and facilitating political and institutional processes in order to strengthen the basis for resilience. This might include political settlements, by working to underpin the responsiveness of the state to effectively fulfill its core functions in providing key services, and by supporting legitimate forms of societal political pressures that will determine how a state should function. By identifying weaknesses along the different dimensions examined here, we can find areas in which we have a comparative advantage in order to intervene. Furthermore, from a donor perspective particular attention must be paid to strategic dilemmas confronting them in terms of weighting, prioritizing and sequencing aid instruments at various junctures in the state building process and the degree to which specific initiatives may have contributed to improved outcomes across the three core ALC pillars.
Of particular relevance are the implicit trade-offs between measures taken to achieve short-term stabilization and longer-term institutional development objectives. This has implications for long-term strategic planning for humanitarian purposes and short-term emergency response. At its core, effective state building involves the fundamental transformation of a broad spectrum of state-society relationships as evidence in our A, L and C framework.\(^8\) For example, some of our previous research shows that states that rank highly in terms of authority challenges, are also suffering from a lack of legitimacy, (for example, Afghanistan and Iraq) and also experience conflict.\(^9\) However, when we examine those states which rank highly (in terms of weakness) in either of the capacity or legitimacy scores, a different picture emerges in which large scale conflict does not appear to be a key determinant (for example, Saudi Arabia and North Korea for legitimacy, and Burundi and Sierra Leone for capacity). Not surprisingly perhaps, the states with the weakest capacity scores are in Africa while low legitimacy and authority states represent a more geographically diverse group (Carment et. al. 2006).

The implications for Canada are clear and are specified in Appendix 2. Briefly, challenges to and degradations in authority and to legitimacy appear to be key reasons why countries remain stuck in a fragility trap. Two general observations can be made. Changes in legitimacy and authority over time typically mirror prior changes in authority. A second general observation is that changes in capacity appear to be independent of the more “political” processes embedded in authority and legitimacy. In some cases, we know that extreme but even less extreme capacity scores appear to have little relationship with changes in legitimacy and authority performance; in others, improving capacity moves in a direction opposite to legitimacy and authority as in Iran. Intuitively this would suggest that shifts out of fragility are not obtained through economic transformation alone.

For CIDA, there is a need to understand the sequencing of fragile state transitions and the timing of associated interventions that seek to strengthen those transitions. For example, when we examine CIDA’s twenty countries of focus, they include those that are very fragile in several dimensions, such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Pakistan and Sudan, as well as several other African countries such as Ethiopia, Mali and Tanzania that are weak in human development and face capacity-related issues. Less obvious, however, are those such as in the Caribbean regional program that are small islands with environmental challenges that are most likely to be exacerbated with climate change, or a country such as Colombia which ranks 87\(^{th}\) globally (see Table 1) and yet is among the 20 poorest performers when it comes to security and crime.

Ultimately the need for specificity at the policy level promotes a disaggregated analysis of the relationship between conflict and fragility. Using our disaggregated cluster based methodology, we need to know why some countries that were once considered fragile have successfully recovered and become resilient, functional and effective while others have been less successful and remain fragile and mostly in conflict for long periods of time. By examining and clarifying these differences, we can develop early warning capabilities to identify states that may be weakening or failing.

At the heart of this analysis is the assumption that effective policies on fragile states will arise from long-term investment in the early warning, monitoring and evaluation of inter-related processes coupled with

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\(^8\) The theoretical implication of our argument is simple. Much of research in this field has almost exclusively focused on defining the dependent variable in terms of failure and there is a heavy bias in selecting causal factors on the dependent variable. As a result, research programs tend to conceptualize failure as an “end state” associated with either or both armed conflict or low capacity. By focusing on “end states” and in particular those brought about by violent events or low capacity, our ability to anticipate earlier turning points and stages where a fragile state might or might not fail is held back.
integrated and targeted resource allocation. Our goal is to identify and understand the sequence of changes leading to conflict in fragile states and to match those to the timing of effective interventions. For example, when we examine one of the most severe cases of fragility namely the DRC, we find that rapid changes in authority structures in the face of chronically poor capacity scores were key drivers of instability. The independence between changes in authority and legitimacy on the one hand and capacity on the other also indicates a need for specific instruments targeting individual weaknesses, as opposed to, say, focusing on security and hoping that development will follow (and vice versa).

However, for second-tier countries such as a MIFF like Pakistan, where fragility is not as extreme, where service delivery is to some extent in place, and there is some level of effective policy making, we suggest that the strategic timing of aid could work by targeting a particular area, which may then create positive feedbacks for other weak areas. More generally, aid needs to be context specific and timed properly and strategically, and it must be tied directly to indigenous capabilities that demonstrate long term effectiveness.

Even though a successful transition out of fragility is primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, the role of international actors, while limited is still very important. This argument is buttressed by two cases that have emerged from fragility and have become more resilient (Mozambique and Guatemala). In addition to aid, Canada can contribute to supporting and facilitating political and institutional processes in order to strengthen the basis for resilience. This might include political settlements, by working to underpin the responsiveness of the state to effectively fulfill its principal functions in providing key services, and by supporting legitimate forms of societal political pressures that will determine how a state should function. Key, however, is the identification of where the investment will yield the “biggest bang for the buck”.

In brief, our cluster based approach on determinants using structural data (as described in the current report) and events data can provide policy makers with specific entry points for targeted engagement. There is a commensurate need to combine an understanding of root causes with a systematic understanding of the dynamic and agency-driven processes and exogenous shocks that often constitute the immediate triggers for deepening crisis, failure, and state collapse – hence the need for a focus on both qualitative case studies as well as macro level comparisons.

In regards to the role of Civil Society Organisations(CSOs), early warning and fragile states analysis and response are still characterised as “extractive” practices through the lens of an interventionist paradigm. There remains a need for the inclusion of Southern perspectives into Northern decision-making processes. In this regard, CIFP’s partnerships and collaborations have positioned the project to address this challenge. However, success in overcoming this obstacle requires long-term resources commitments. The current methodology used here can also be applied to the extractive industries (see http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/cra_corporate.php for work in this area).

In addition, failed and fragile state policies are often not informed by regular situation analyses. Where such analyses are factored into programming, it is often a “one-off” exercise or an external analysis that does not reflect local perspectives. Given the dynamic and complex nature of conflict, systematic monitoring and analysis in combination with structural risk assessments are prerequisites for appropriate and sustainable action. CSOs can contribute to this ongoing analytical process.

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10 Pakistan and the DRC are, of course, both stuck in a fragility trap but the DRC is clearly characterized by more extreme fragility given its overall ranking.
Finally, the impact of prevention activities is often reduced because of a lack of co-ordination and strategy. Frequently, key actors (NGOs, governments, multilateral organisations, civil society groups, etc.) operate in isolation or do not co-ordinate activities across sectors. This often results from a lack of common analysis and the lack of multi-agency planning forums for the development of joint prevention strategies. A common framework can assist analysts to support decision making processes (see for example Appendix 2).

Future Research

Future Research using the CIFP ALC framework should examine following four questions:

How can CIDA take advantage of the CIFP project to provide timely identification of states that are entering into fragility and into potential long term conflict associated with failure and collapse?

What lessons can be gleaned from states that have successfully transitioned from fragility to effectiveness and resilience?

In what ways can donors capitalize on identity, culture, and other indigenous institutional strengths, such as gender, to support transitions towards resilience?

How can existing CIFP tools and frameworks be enhanced to help CIDA better understand fragile state processes (see appendix 1).

Recommendations

With these research questions in mind, CIDA should consider the following three recommendations:

• Implement a regularized CIFP ALC framework report to evaluate country performance;

• Rankings by country and region should be incorporated into decision making to evaluate CIDA’s intervention and programming effectiveness and priorities;

• Complementary risk assessment and aid evaluation methodologies discussed in Carment et al (2009a) and noted in Appendix 1 should be incorporated into structural data reports for monitoring purposes.
References


About CIFP

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy is an independent research organisation based at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada, focusing on fragile state, democracy and governance aid monitoring, conflict risk analysis, early warning and mainstreaming aid effectiveness. The project has over 17 years experience in developing methodologies, training and working with local, national and regional organizations and governments. Funders, supporters and users include the United Nations Development Program, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of Defence, Defence Research and Development Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Conflict Prevention Network, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the World Food Program, Criminal intelligence Services of Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency, The International Development Research Centre, the OECD’s INCAF and private sector firms including extractive industries.

David Carment (PhD) has over 18 years experience in policy relevant research on fragile states, conflict prevention, mainstreaming risk analysis and aid allocation. He led a CIDA funded initiative on mainstreaming research on failed and fragile states into policy making over the 2005-2008 period. He also served DAC-OECD’s working group on fragile states. He has developed risk analysis training workshops for NGOs in Africa, Asia and Europe. He is the editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal.
Yiagadeesen (Teddy) Samy (PhD), a development economist has numerous publications on aid and development including a recently co-authored volume on fragile states. His quantitative expertise on Small Island Developing States, aid allocation and other development issues provides the research team with a strong empirical footing. He and Carment have presented their work at Center for Global Development, World Institute for Development Economics Research and the International Studies Association.

Alejandro Pachon is a doctoral candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His current research is focused on democratization, international assistance, and Security Sector Reform. Alejandro has significant working experience as a researcher and policy analyst in both, governmental and non-governmental environments.
Appendix 1

As part of a broader effort to enable more effective international engagement in failed and fragile states, a team from Carleton’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP - www.carleton.ca/cifp) has been working with the Canadian government in a multi-year initiative that has three objectives. First, we have developed a number of wide-ranging tools that encompass, among other things, the monitoring, forecasting, and evaluation of failed and fragile states, as well as the assessment of supporting policies intended to address the development, security, and economic challenges they represent. The following diagram outlines the full extent of the CIFP analytical framework - known as the CIFP Net Assessment (CNA) - identifying the various modules involved in the analysis.

Second, the project presents a methodology for evaluating individual country performance. This drill-down capability provides guidance to programming officers at CIDA and other government departments working in complex and fragile environments. It enables them to focus efforts and resources on the root structural causes of fragility rather than the outward symptoms of the problem, while simultaneously identifying areas of comparative strength within the state that may provide valuable points of entry for international development efforts. At the same time, it allows them to avoid decisions likely to further destabilize the country through otherwise unforeseen consequences of programming activities.

Third, the project engages in statistical and theoretical research, regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables. The findings provide some insight into the varied causes of state fragility. Several important avenues requiring further study have been extensively covered in publication form. Such research is particularly relevant, given that the now broadly
acknowledged lack of progress toward global attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to a certain extent explained through the poor performance of the world’s fragile and failed states.

**Innovations in Research Design and Methodologies for Risk Analysis, Country Monitoring and Impact Assessment**

Effective policy in fragile states requires a solid analytic base that:

- Is sufficiently nuanced to allow the observer to understand differentiated performance in different areas of fragility, rather than presenting processes and performance in an oversimplified manner;
- Identifies both positive and negative sectors in each state’s performance, thereby highlighting potential points of entry for external actors;
- Combines real time dynamic event and actor analysis with long-term structural information to counter time lags between developments on the ground and their reflection in statistical indicators and resulting programming priorities and timelines;
- Provides policy relevant diagnosis by matching the analysis to the end user’s operational capacity; and
- Provides an evaluative framework with which to assess policy impact both before and after programs are implemented.

The relationship between these objectives and the policy cycle are shown here:

**Development Policy Cycle**

In order to address these policy objectives, the CIFP Fragile States Project has developed a three tiered multi-source, multi method policy relevant tool kit. Our argument has been that if they are to have any significant impact, fragile state policies require a multifaceted but focused analysis based on an
Appreciation of the relative risks that exist within and between states and, more importantly, the development of effective policy-relevant tools for international engagement. One of the key innovations has been the construction of a web-based country monitoring tool, shown here:

First, structural data, such as GDP per capita, political indices and human rights measures, provide a sturdy platform on which to build country analysis. Structural data are compiled by recognised organizations, sometimes in partnership with host nations. Structural data allows the end user to rank countries for quick assessments of performance within sub-sectors. Country level structural data also enable comparative analysis. For example, one may compare the voting rates among women in Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire using data collected by the UNDP or the World Bank. Using the same indicators and econometric analysis it is possible to determine in what way women’s voting rates in Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire are influenced by education levels, rural and urban environments, and formal employment.

Second, the systematic collection and evaluation of dynamic data also known as events-based information analysis, is highly relevant to fragile states programming and processes. Dynamic data analysis whether it draws on information from media sources or country experts, is useful for identifying up-to-date trends in popular perceptions, preferences and stakeholder behaviours. Dynamic data analysis can add considerable value through regularized and standardised reporting. It can deepen understanding of trends found in structural data, and can highlight trend reversals. For example, a statistical study may show a steady decline in violent events over a series of years, but current events may evidence a sudden surge in violent demonstrations, one that will show up in structural data only until after the fact. Events-based information can also provide a window into stakeholder perceptions, how they are reacting to real-time changes and why they are doing so.

The figure below shows patterns of decline in governance performance approximately a year prior to the declared state of emergency in Pakistan in 2007. The red regression line in the graph represents the overall trend in events. Clearly, in the case of Pakistan, there was considerable evidence of an approaching crisis. Such evidence, if properly understood, can allow policymakers to respond in a timely fashion to impending problems, rather than simply responding after the fact.
Third, the project employs qualitative information, as a valuable complement to the systematic collection of statistical data, as it uncovers details and nuance. Put simply, when correctly structured, expert opinion can provide the "why" behind the "what" revealed through structural and dynamic data analysis. Expert opinions can provide detailed insight into specific issue areas, as well as offer ideas about what areas deserve the most attention going forward, either because they are functioning well and can be used to propagate positive reform in other parts of the governance system, or because they are weakening and threaten to undermine stability and development in other sectors. For example, CIFP’s expert survey on Ghana highlights the problem of low popular expectations of government as an obstacle to improving governance performance. Ghanaians have become so accustomed to limited government capacity that they have ceased to seriously challenge the government on its service delivery.
Appendix 2

Cluster Impact Assessment Questions for Desk Officers, Field Officers, Analysts and Project Managers

Does the engagement:

Security:
Deter the outbreak or perpetration of specific possibly imminent acts of violence?
Prevent actual low-level eruptions of occasional violence from escalating?
Protect vulnerable groups from likely attacks of violence?
Relieve the sense of threat, fear and anxieties expressed by various groups toward one another?
Contribute to security sector reform, especially the professionalization and modernization of armed forces?
Enable effective civilian oversight of the armed forces?
Reduce the state’s dependence on foreign military presence?
Promote regional stability?

Crime:
Strengthen criminal justice systems, including police, judiciary, and prisons?
Assist the state in modernizing its criminal code, particularly with respect to its treatment of vulnerable sections of the population, including women, children, minorities, and indigenous groups?
Contribute to the rule of law?
Provide useful strategies to prevent and/or respond to crimes against humanity, war crimes, rape, and other particularly destabilizing forms of criminality?
Support measures to reduce venal corruption?
Limit key destabilizing criminal activities, including drug production and trafficking in small arms, humans, drugs, kidnapping, and extortion?
Provide replacement opportunities for economic activity in the licit economy whenever attempting to limit or extinguish black market activity?

Governance:
Engage opposed top-level political actors in new contacts and communications?
Enter new substantive ideas and options into debate and dialogue that are seriously considered or adopted as compromise solutions of outstanding disputes?
Help the parties’ leaders reach specific agreements on disputes and public policy issues?
Change the perceptions and attitudes that the leadership groups held toward one another?
Soften the stridency and tone of public debate and statements?

Set up or strengthen formal institutions and procedures that encompass broad segments of the population in more democratic or consultative forms of decision-making?

Create new informal venues and channels through which disputes and issues can be addressed by the protagonists?

Help build autonomous spheres of social power that are active outside the official organisations of both government and opposition political parties and organisations (civil society), which can counteract the divisive and antagonistic tendencies of political leaders?

Enable meaningful participation of marginalized groups in mainstream political discussions?

Support a professional and politically independent civil service?

Protect the freedom of the press?

**Economy**

Support professional and transparent government budgetary practices?

Encourage long-term job creation?

Reduce aid dependency?

Reduce external debt?

Enhance tax collection efficiency?

Provide some protection against external economic shocks?

Enable economic diversification?

Provide microeconomic incentives to reduce dependency on black market economies and increase participation in the licit economy?

Reinforce contract enforcement?

Encourage sustainable, long-term FDI?

Increase the overall standard of living?

Encourage female participation in the workforce?

Support development of state capacity and infrastructure?

**Human Development**

Stimulate active, salient efforts to address structural disparities among the main groups at odds, by achieving more equitable distributions among them of basic material and economic needs, such as income, educational opportunities, housing, health services?
Upgrade the skills and understanding of those significant organised groups who are promoting conflict prevention and reconciliation processes, so they can be more effective advocates or implementers of these goals?

Cause, or threaten to cause, such a rapid redistribution of resources from “haves” to “have-nots” that the insecurity of the former is increased, thus inviting violent backlash, or the “have-nots” are enticed to use violence to obtain more redistribution?

Provide necessary medical services?

Provide emergency treatment for HIV/AIDS?

Enable the growth of a local medical capacity?

**Environment**

Support land reform that addresses systemic inequities in a manner that fairly reimburses those displaced during the process?

Provide sustainable access to potable water?

Limit pollution and other factors responsible for environmental degradation?

Limit or halt rates of deforestation, while providing viable and reasonable alternate sources of income for those currently involved in the industry?

Institute dispute resolution systems to address current or potential disputes over the allocation of limited resources

**Population and Demography**

Support strategies designed to moderate excessive population growth?

Address the problems created by excessive regional population density?

Support efforts to reduce inter-ethno-religious tensions?

Support voices of moderation and mutual acceptance against radical politico-religious movements?

Address issues created by any youth bulge?

Help the state to cope with pressures created by urban growth rates and rural-urban migration?
## CIFP Potential Impact Assessment: Horizontal/Cluster Impact Analysis cont’d

CIFP analyses potential impact of Canadian engagement by indicator cluster, giving some indication of the extent to which the proposed engagement policy will actually affect the underlying causes of fragility. Key impacts include:

### Economy
- Supporting professional, transparent budgetary practices
- Encouraging long-term job creation
- Reducing aid dependency and external debt
- Encouraging female participation in the workforce
- Support development of state capacity and infrastructure

### Human Development
- Addressing intercommunal structural disparities
- Reducing maternal and infant mortality
- Enhancing educational opportunities both in absolute and gender-specific terms
- Improving standard of living

### Crime
- Professionalizing the police, judiciary, and prisons
- Improving the state’s legal protection for women, children, minorities, and indigenous groups
- Supporting measures to reduce venal corruption
- Limiting drug production, trafficking in small arms, humans, and drugs; kidnapping, and extortion

## CIFP Potential Impact Assessment: Horizontal/Cluster Impact Analysis cont’d

CIFP analyses potential impact of Canadian engagement by indicator cluster, giving some indication of the extent to which the proposed engagement policy will actually affect the underlying causes of fragility. Key impacts include:

### Population and Demography
- Supporting efforts to moderate excessive population growth
- Addressing problems created by excessive regional population density
- Supporting efforts to reduce intercommunal tensions
- Supporting voices of moderation and mutual acceptance against radical politico-religious movements
- Addressing issues created by the youth bulge
- Helping the state to cope with urban growth rates

### Environment
- Supporting land reform that addresses systemic inequities
- Providing sustainable access to potable water
- Limiting pollution and other factors responsible for environmental degradation
- Limiting or reversing rates of deforestation, while providing viable and reasonable alternate sources of income for those currently involved in the industry
CIFP Potential Impact Assessment:
Horizontal/Cluster Impact Analysis

CIFP analyses potential impact of Canadian engagement by indicator cluster, giving some indication of the extent to which the proposed engagement policy will actually affect the underlying causes of fragility. Key impacts include:

**Security**
- Deterring violence
- Protecting vulnerable groups
- Enhancing general perceptions of safety
- Protecting vital infrastructure
- Participating Security Sector Reform
- Enabling effective civilian oversight of the armed forces
- Reducing state dependence on foreign military presence

**Governance**
- Engaging actors on all sides of the dispute(s)
- Encouraging problem-solving approaches
- Enhancing intercommunal trust
- Strengthening domestic decision-making apparatuses
- Enabling the meaningful political participation of marginalized groups
- Supporting a professional and politically independent civil service