Overview

Germany will preside over the Council in September. A high-level meeting on the Council’s cooperation with the League of Arab States and ways to strengthen this relationship is planned to coincide with the start of the general debate of the General Assembly. In addition to German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who will preside, several other high level participants are expected.

An open debate on children and armed conflict is planned, with the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, and the head of UN peacekeeping, Hervé Ladsous, expected as briefers.

There is also a debate planned on Afghanistan during which the head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Jan Kubiš, is expected to brief.

The chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee (1737 Committee), Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), is due to provide his quarterly briefing to the Council.

Briefings, to be followed by consultations, are expected on:

- developments in Sierra Leone and the work of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) by its head and Executive Representative of the Secretary-General Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, and the chair of the Sierra Leone country-specific configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada);
- developments in Liberia and the work of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Karin Landgren, and the chair of the Liberia country-specific configuration of the PBC, Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden);
- developments and the latest Secretary-General’s report on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), by the Secretariat; and
- the Middle East, most likely by Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- issues of concern, under the “horizon scanning” format, by the head of the Department of Political Affairs, Jeffrey D. Feltman;
- Sudan and South Sudan (twice, in line with resolution 2046 requiring briefings every 15 days), most likely by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios;
- the work of the Sudan Sanctions Committee (1591 Committee) by its chair, Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia);
- developments in the Sahel region, with a particular focus on Mali, by the head of the Department of Political Affairs, Jeffrey D. Feltman;
- the situation in Yemen, by Special Advisor of the Secretary-General Jamal Benomar; and
- developments in and the latest Secretary-General’s report on Guinea-Bissau, by the head of the Department of Political Affairs, Jeffrey D. Feltman.

In addition, consultations are possible on:

- developments in Syria; and
- the political transition process in Somalia.

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions renewing the mandates of UNMIL and UNIPSIL.

It is also possible that, in line with Article 24(3) of the UN Charter, the Council will adopt its annual report to the General Assembly in September.
Status Update Since Our August Forecast

DRC
On 2 August, the Council released a press statement (SC/10736), condemning attacks by the M23 rebel group and calling for the cessation of all outside support to M23. The statement followed a 30 July briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Roger Meece, via video-teleconference. On 27 August, the Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, on the humanitarian effects of the fighting in eastern DRC. On 28 August, the DRC Sanctions Committee met with the Foreign Minister of Rwanda, Louise Mushikiwabo, concerning the report by the DRC Group of Experts on Rwanda’s support of the M23. On 29 August the Council held an informal interactive dialogue with the Foreign Minister and then with DRC representatives about the situation in the region.

UNRCCA (Central Asia)
On 7 August, Council members received a briefing in consultations from Miroslav Jenča, the head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). The members of the Council reportedly reaffirmed the importance of preventive diplomacy and early warning mechanisms in the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region. The importance of the role of UNRCCA in facilitating the assistance by Central Asian states to normalising the situation in Afghanistan, which affects the region more broadly, was also highlighted.

Lebanon
On 21 August, Council members met with UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troop-contributors in closed consultations. In a letter to the Security Council dated 14 August (S/2012/632), the Secretary-General recommended extending the mission’s mandate for 12 months. Council members met in further consultations to discuss the Secretary-General’s letter on 23 August. The Security Council adopted resolution 2064, extending UNIFIL for 12 months to 31 August 2013, on 30 August.

Kosovo
On 21 August, Farid Zarif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), briefed the Council on the latest UNMIK report and recent developments in Kosovo (S/PV.6822). Zarif emphasised the need for both Serbia and Kosovo to fully implement previously reached agreements and to resume the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Serbia’s new Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, said that resolving the final status of what Serbia calls “Kosovo and Metohija” was one of the government’s top priorities. He thanked the majority of member states “which respect Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi reaffirmed that Pristina was committed to the dialogue with Serbia, but that the “territorial integrity of Kosovo” would never be put into question, describing his state as a “political and juridical fact.” Several members urged for a quick resumption of delayed talks between the two sides.

DPRK (North Korea)
A regular quarterly briefing by the chair of the 1718 Sanctions Committee, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal), took place on 21 August in consultations. It was the first 90-day briefing since the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts, which assists the Committee, on 12 June. There was no outcome from the meeting.
Peace and Security in the Middle East

Expected Council Action
On 26 September, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle will preside over a high-level meeting of the Security Council on peace and security in the Middle East. The meeting will have a particular focus on the institutional relationship between the Security Council and the League of Arab States, with the UN and Arab League Secretaries-General expected to address the Council.

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Background
This meeting will be the key substantive event of Germany’s presidency of the Council in September. Its time on the Council has largely coincided with the Arab Spring and a period of unprecedented interactions between the Security Council and the Arab League, concerning both Libya and Syria. Germany hopes for this meeting to be a first step towards turning this experience into practical modalities for future cooperation.

In the case of Libya, the Arab League’s support was pivotal to the Council’s adoption of resolutions 1970 and 1973 on 26 February and 17 March 2011, respectively, and securing approval for concrete action against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi.

In the case of Syria, however, Arab League condemnation of the Bashar al-Assad regime no longer had the same impact. This was due—in addition to the fact that the Arab League itself was divided—to a more hardened constellation of positions in the Council vis-à-vis Syria compounded by the severe fallout over the Libya intervention.

Nevertheless, cooperation continued, and on 31 January 2012, Nabil al-Araby, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, addressed the Council for the first time, speaking about its efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis and urging the Council towards what in the Arab League’s view was effective action. (The briefing came in the lead-up to the 4 February veto of a Council draft resolution [S/2012/77] condemning the violence in Syria and supporting the 22 January Arab League decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition.)

The UN and Arab League have also cooperated by appointing Joint Special Envoy for Syria Kofi Annan (who was appointed on 23 February and resigned on 2 August) and more recently a Joint Special Representative for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether Council members see the cooperation with the Arab League as a promising tool for addressing challenges at hand.

Furthermore, given that political developments are in flux in the Arab world, a key issue for the Council would be how to strengthen existing cooperation to jointly emphasise conflict prevention and resolution in the region.

Underlying Problems
It is likely that divisive political issues will emerge, reflecting the disagreements over how the Council has handled the Libyan and Syrian situations. However, Germany is keen that the Security Council focus its attention and consider how strategic cooperation between the Security Council and the Arab League could positively affect ongoing political transitions in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen and help to staunch the spread of severe violence in Syria, which threatens regional security.

Options
One option for the Council is to simply hold the discussion.

Another option is for members to also explore Council practice regarding conflict prevention and mediation and their positions on developing a more robust Council role in the Middle East.

A further option is to establish a regular mechanism for contacts between the two bodies, perhaps along the lines of the practice the Council has forged with the AU’s Peace and Security Council of holding regular meetings in each other’s headquarters.

Syria

Expected Council Action
In the aftermath of the 19 August expiration of the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), at press time there was no Syria-related activity scheduled for the Security Council in September. However, it is highly probable that the Council will continue to follow the situation in Syria closely. There are several opportunities during the month for the Council to be apprised of the situation, including the regular Middle East briefing and consultations or the monthly “horizon scanning” briefing by the Department of Political Affairs. Although nothing had been announced, at press time it seemed possible that there might be a meeting of the core group of the “Friends of Syria” on the margins of the General Assembly in late September.

At press time the Council was expecting to have an interactive dialogue with Lakhdar Brahimi, the newly appointed UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria, and it is possible that it may request a more formal briefing on the Syrian situation from him in September.

Key Recent Developments
The overall level of violence in Syria has continued to escalate, with fighting in urban areas increasing, particularly in Aleppo. On 25 August, hundreds of civilians were massacred in Daraya. The Secretary-General has condemned the crime and called for an immediate investigation.

The UN estimates 17,000 people have been killed since the crisis began in March 2011, while other sources indicate figures as high as 23,000. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports more than 200,000 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. OCHA has reported that almost 2.5 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance.
Syria (con’t)

Human Rights-Related Developments

The 15 August Commission of Inquiry report on Syria will be considered on 17 September during the next session of the Human Rights Council. The Commission reports that the Syrian government has perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, extrajudicial killings and torture, gross violations of human rights and sexual violence. The report also notes that more brutal tactics and new military capabilities have been employed in recent months by both government forces and armed opposition groups. While opposition forces have committed war crimes, including murder and torture, the report finds that these violations are not of the same gravity, frequency and scale as those committed by government forces and its militia, the Shabiha. Regarding the 25 May el-Houl el attacks, the Commission’s report concluded that government forces and Shabiha militia were responsible.

Hervé Ladsous, the head of peacekeeping, briefed Council members in consultations on 2 August on the security situation in Syria and the implications for the future of UNSMIS. Also on 2 August, Kofi Annan, the joint UN-Arab League Special Envoy, resigned from his post.

On 3 August, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/66/253B) deploring the Security Council’s failure to act on Syria and calling for a political transition. The resolution was penned by the Arab Group, and 133 member states voted in favour, with 12 against and 31 abstentions.

Council members were briefed in consultations on 16 August by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet, who confirmed that the two conditions in resolution 2059 for a further renewal of UNSMIS—cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in violence by all sides—had not been achieved. (UNSMIS had been unable to exercise its key monitoring functions since 15 June.) These consultations took place against the backdrop of an increasing deterioration in the security situation in Syria. That same morning, Russia had circulated a draft press statement responding to 15 August bombing in Damascus near a hotel housing UNSMIS personnel and several military buildings. (Council members could not agree on the statement, and it was never issued.)

In remarks to the press following Mulet’s briefing, Ambassador Gérard Araud (France), as the President of the Council in August, expressed the Council’s agreement with the Secretary-General’s proposal to establish a political liaison office in Damascus. The Secretary-General had highlighted in a 10 August letter (S/2012/618) that such a flexible presence in Syria would allow the UN to continue to play a reporting role, facilitate the political track between stakeholders and provide support to mediation efforts. It seems the office will have approximately 20 to 30 staff with expertise in human rights and political and civil affairs and will include a small number of military advisers.

On 17 August, the Secretary-Generals of the UN and the Arab League announced the appointment of Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) as the Joint Special Representative for Syria. The same day the Security Council sent a letter (S/2012/654) to the Secretary-General reiterating support for his good offices and for the Joint Special Representative. On 21 August the Secretary-Generals of the UN and the Arab League announced the appointment of Nasser Al-Kidwa as the Deputy Joint Special Representative for Syria.

On 29 August, Council members had an informal meeting with Brahimi which allowed for an exchange of ideas on his role as Special Representative. (Brahimi’s first official statement as Special Representative is likely to be during the General Assembly meeting on Syria on 4 September.)

On 30 August, France organised a high-level meeting on the humanitarian situation in Syria. The meeting was chaired by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson briefed the Council together with the High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres. Foreign Ministers from Jordan and Turkey as well as ministers from Iraq and Lebanon also participated.

In other developments, Syrian Prime Minister Riyad Hijab defected on 6 August after only two months in office. From Jordan, Hijab claimed the regime of President Bashar al-Assad was collapsing and was in control of only 30 percent of Syrian territory.

On 9 August, an international meeting on Syria was held in Tehran with lower-level participants from nearly 30 countries, at which Iran proposed a Syrian national dialogue. There was no outcome from the meeting. In a statement delivered on behalf, the Secretary-General said Syria faces the grim possibility of long civil war with tragic implications for its people and regional stability.

Turkey and the US agreed on 11 August to set up a working group to plan a joint response to the crisis—in particular regarding support to Syrian opposition groups and contingency planning concerning any potential misuse of the stockpile of chemical weapons in Syria.

At an emergency meeting on 15 August, held in Mecca, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) suspended Syria. The Secretary-General of the OIC, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, said the decision sent a strong message from the Muslim world to the Syrian regime.

Key Issue

The key issue for the Council remains that Syria is in a state of civil war and has become militarised to such a degree that it seems there is little or no political space remaining to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis. Meanwhile, Council members, in particular the P5, have been unable to agree on an effective approach, leaving the Security Council in the position of watching the situation—which is a clear threat to international peace and security—unfold from the side-lines.

Options

Aside from following the Syrian situation through briefings, including possibly by Brahimi, Council options for September seem limited.

However, if Brahimi were to specifically request the Council to endorse a fresh approach to mediating the crisis in Syria, an option for the Council would be to issue a statement of support. (It seems his acceptance of the mediating role after Annan’s resignation was conditioned on having unified

UN DOCUMENTS Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2059 (20 July 2012) extended UNSMIS for a final period of 30 days. S/RES/2043 (21 April 2012) established UNSMIS and reaffirmed support for the six-point plan. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/8 (21 March 2012) supported the six-point plan for mediation of the Syrian crisis. Security Council Letters S/2012/654 (17 August 2012) was from the Secretary-General reiterating support for the Secretary-General’s good offices and for the Joint Special Representative for Syria. S/2012/618 (10 August 2012) was from the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2059 and confirmed the conditions for a further renewal of UNSMIS had not been achieved. S/2012/522 (5 July 2012) was the final communiqué of the 30 June meeting of the Action Group for Syria in Geneva. General Assembly Document A/RES/66/253B (13 August 2012) was a resolution deploring the Security Council’s failure to act on Syria and calling for a political transition. Human Rights Council Document A/HRC/21/55 (15 August 2012) was a report by the Commission of Inquiry on Syria.
Support from the Security Council.)

An additional option for the Council is to request a de-briefing from Annan and Gen. Robert Mood, the former head of UNSMIS, in order to allow for a better understanding of the challenges that had been faced in carrying out their respective mediation and observation tasks, as well as identifying possible “lessons learned” for future UN missions.

As the refugee situation continues to grow, the possibility of neighbouring countries closing their borders may mean that the Council may have to consider options to ensure the safety of the civilian population trapped within Syria.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council members remain deadlocked on an approach to the Syrian situation and, for the time being, any active management of the conflict has effectively passed from Council hands. However, Council members continue to be unanimous in their concern about the devastating level of violence in Syria, and there is strong consensus regarding the importance of maintaining a UN presence in Damascus and similarly strong support for the Secretary-General’s efforts in that regard.

It is as yet unclear how Council members might respond to Brahimi’s apparent reluctance to be bound by initiatives not of his own making, in particular the six-point plan, which the Council endorsed both in resolution 2043 and in a 21 March presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/6). In addition, it seems Brahimi is concerned about the stalemate in the Council over President al-Assad’s fate in any political transition and how this will affect mediation efforts on his part. It is possible that Brahimi may want a clear mandate from the Council to approach the issue of political transition without any preconditions. However, the P3 are keen to have this issue dealt with outside the Council. Russia and China, however, may be open to giving Brahimi Council support on this approach. Most Council members are of the view that the fundamental dynamics around the issue of regime change are unlikely to shift.

**Yemen**

**Expected Council Action**

In September, the Council is expecting to hold consultations on the situation in Yemen and to receive a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser and UN Envoy Jamal Benomar.

In addition, a donors’ conference on Yemen is expected to be held in Riyadh in early September, and the next Friends of Yemen ministerial-level meeting is expected to take place on the margins of the General Assembly in late September. (Saudi Arabia, the UK and Yemen jointly chair the Friends of Yemen, which includes key Persian Gulf countries, the G8 and intergovernmental organisations.)

No Council action is expected at this point.

**Key Recent Developments**

Benomar last briefed Council members on 17 July (under the terms of resolution 2014 the Council receives a briefing on Yemen every 60 days; these briefings have customarily been given in consultations). He noted that several political, humanitarian and security challenges continued to hamper the transition process and described interference from former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his kinsmen as a key obstacle to stability. Benomar also updated the Council on preparations for the national dialogue conference. (The outcome of the national dialogue conference will feed into the constitution-making process that is to conclude in late 2013, enabling presidential and parliamentary elections in February 2014.) On 16 July, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in a statement that “the national dialogue will be an opportunity for all actors in Yemen to collectively establish a new social contract and achieve national reconciliation.”

Yemen’s transition process moved one step further when, on 6 August, President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi issued decrees concerning the restructuring of the security sector. (The decrees transferred the command of some of the Republican Guard units to a newly created force called Presidential Protective Forces [PPF] and placed many other Republican Guard units under different regional commands. Other dissident army units have also either been incorporated into the PPF or placed under other regional commands. The Republican Guard, until recently, has been under the command of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, son of the former President.)

Benomar, in a statement issued on the next day, said that the issuance of the decrees marked an important step towards creating “the necessary conditions and take the necessary steps to integrate the armed forces under unified, national and professional leadership in the context of the rule of law.”

However, the ongoing interference from Saleh became apparent on 14 August when Republican Guard troops under the command of his son attacked the Defence Ministry in Sanaa, killing five people and wounding 17.
Yemen (con’t)

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 24 July the government of Yemen and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) signed an agreement to carry on a project aimed at strengthening human rights during the transition period in Yemen. The agreement commits the UNDP and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to help establish an independent national human rights body, develop civil society capacities in human rights and assist the Ministry of Human Rights to contribute effectively to the transitional process.

The overall security situation in the country has been precarious, with several troubling incidents occurring recently:

- a suicide bombing in a police academy in Sanaa killed at least six people and left several injured on 11 July;
- security forces discovered and defused a bomb at the entrance of an intelligence services building in Aden on 23 July;
- clashes between government forces and gunmen wearing police uniforms who were occupying the Interior Ministry in Sanaa left 15 dead and 43 injured on 31 July;
- five people were reported dead when Al-Qaeda-linked militants attacked a police station in Jaar on 1 August;
- at least six people were reported dead and ten injured after a grenade attack in a market in Taiz on 3 August;
- a suicide bombing allegedly carried out by Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants killed 45 people and left dozens injured in Jaar on 5 August;
- suspected Al-Qa’ida militants attacked the intelligence headquarters in Aden, killing 14 people on 18 August; and
- a gunman opened fire on a mosque in Aden during Eid prayers on 19 August, killing nine people and injuring 11.

Key Issues

The key challenge for the Council is to determine what further role it can play in assisting Yemen to foster a peaceful political transition that abides by the timetables of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and the accompanying Implementation Mechanism.

A related issue for the Council is dealing with the continuously precarious security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Yemen, which could undermine the new government’s position and the prospects for the political transition process.

Options

The Council’s options include:

- keeping abreast of the developments in Yemen and receiving regular briefings from Benomar and the Department of Political Affairs;
- adopting a clear message directed at spoilers, including former President Saleh, in order to give credence to its readiness to consider further measures, including under Article 41 of the Charter;
- visiting Yemen to send a strong signal about its support for a peaceful and successful transition; and
- requesting briefings regarding the human rights situation and the humanitarian crisis from the relevant UN actors, as well as international and regional organisations.

Council Dynamics

Council members seem to be in agreement that Yemen is a complicated situation, where the ongoing interference from Saleh and his relatives to undermine the transition process remains a key obstacle.

Most Council members appear concerned about the deteriorating security, human rights and humanitarian picture in Yemen. They consider the recent increase in terrorist activity as strongly signalling the urgency of political, military and security reforms. However, most Council members seem encouraged by the progress in Yemen, which albeit slow, seems promising in comparison to the situation in Syria.

The UK has the lead in the Council on Yemen. •

Somalia

Expected Council Action

The transition to permanent federal government institutions in Somalia that was underway at press time will be of primary concern for the Council in September, as Council members will be watching closely to see how events on the ground continue to develop. It is possible that the Council will request a briefing on the political situation in Somalia. A press statement or presidential statement welcoming the transition is also possible.

Also in September, the Council is due to receive the next 60-day report of the AU on the implementation of the AU Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) mandate. This report will not be considered until October, when the 31 October expiration of the mandate approaches.

A high-level mini-summit, involving representatives of the new Somali government, key regional actors and financial institutions, is planned for 26 September on the margins of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General will co-chair the event with the chairperson of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The meeting will focus on issues of transparency, stability and security, while also establishing medium-term goals for the new Somali administration. A communiqué following the meeting is likely.

Key Recent Developments

The period immediately preceding the scheduled deadline for transition to a provisional government, originally set for 20 August, was plagued by delays as well as incidents of...
violence and intimidation. On 1 August, the 825-member National Constituent Assembly approved a provisional constitution that will provide the legal framework for the new Somali federal government. The nine-day assembly session was the target of multiple assaults, including a mortar attack on 28 July and a suicide bombing on 1 August in which six security officers and the two bombers were killed.

According to news reports on 9 August, individuals dressed as Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces fired upon supporters of presidential candidate and former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, killing two people. In a 10 August press statement (SC/10740), Council members reiterated that those selecting new parliamentarians be able to do so “without fear of violence or intimidation.”

On 13 August, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga issued a statement condemning the killings of a journalist and a government official from the Ministry of Information. Invoking the killing of a Somali comedian two weeks earlier, Mahiga decried the culture of impunity prevailing in Somalia and called for the TFG to “strengthen its police investigative capacity.”

Press accounts on 17 August reported that the Technical Selection Committee had rejected more than 60 potential legislators on the basis of their involvement with groups accused of contributing to instability in Somalia. On 20 August a new parliament was inaugurated and 215 (out of 275) parliamentarians were sworn in, enough to constitute a quorum and allow the new body to convene. In a statement the Secretary-General described the inauguration as a “watershed moment.” The new parliament elected Mohamed Osman Jawari as its Speaker on 28 August. On 29 August, Jaylani Nur Ikar and Mahad Abadle Awd were elected first and second deputy speakers, respectively. The election of a new President is currently expected in early September.

On 27 August in Mombasa, Kenya, the extremist Islamic cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed was killed by unknown assailants. Aboud Rogo had been added to the Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee’s list of individuals subject to a travel ban, assets freeze and targeted arms embargo on 25 July. The report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (S/2012/544) identified Aboud Rogo as the ideological leader of Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre, and accused him of covertly funding the Islamist rebel group al-Shabab while advocating the violent overthrow of the Government of Kenya and the derailment of the Somali peace process. A close associate of Aboud Rogo also residing in Kenya, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, was added to the sanctions list on 23 August.

Three civilians (two boys aged 11 and 15, and a pregnant woman) were killed and four injured in the port city of Kismayo, stronghold of al-Shabab, following shelling of the town by Kenyan naval forces on 11 August. (Though Kenya provides troops and resources to AMISOM, Kenya operates outside of the mission’s mandate.) As a battle for control of the town appeared imminent, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Mark Bowden, expressed concern over the civilian casualties and reiterated his call for parties to the conflict to minimise its impact on civilians. Ultimately, a planned assault on the town by AMISOM was postponed following the crash of three Ugandan helicopters en route to Somalia to spearhead the assault on 12 August. A spokesperson for AMISOM reported that the mission had taken the port city of Merca, near Mogadishu, from al-Shabab forces on 27 August.

Security Council members have been keeping abreast of developments in Somalia. On 7 August, they heard a briefing by the Department of Political Affairs, in which the approval of the constitution and selection of parliamentarians were discussed.

On 28 August the Security Council was briefed in consultations by Mahiga (via videoconferencing from Mogadishu) on the political situation in Somalia and the Secretary-General’s most recent report on Somalia (S/2012/643). In his report, the Secretary-General asserted his intention to conduct an inter-agency review of the UN presence in Somalia and present recommendations to the Council by the end of 2012. In a press statement on 29 August, Council members welcomed “recent landmark events in Somalia,” condemned instances of intimidation and corruption and underlined that the parliament should “elect a President without further delays.”

Key Issues
The primary issue for the Council is seeing through the transition from the TFG to a new provisional government.

A key issue will be whether or not specific objectives agreed by signatories to the 6 September 2011 Roadmap to ending the transition and in subsequent meetings fall by the wayside, such as the mandate that women receive 30 percent of all seats in new federal institutions (as agreed in February as part of the Garowe II Principles). (According to the most recent report of the Secretary-General, only 15 percent of new parliamentarians as of 15 August were women.)

Allegations of corruption within the new Somali government are a major issue for Council members.

As the new government continues to take shape, an issue for Council members will be how closely it resembles the outgoing TFG.

A key concern in September will be to make clear to the new Somali administration that past Security Council pronouncements addressed to the TFG continue to apply to the new authorities.

A separate issue for the Council will be AMISOM’s attacks on civilians, in particular the likely impact of its forthcoming assault on Kismayo. The outcome of this battle may have consequences for the review of AMISOM’s mandate in October.

Options
The Council has several options for marking the end of the transition in Somalia. Following presidential elections expected by early September, the Council could:

• request a briefing from the Department of Political Affairs or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the political situation in Somalia;

• adopt a statement welcoming Somalia’s transition to a new government, expressing concern over the reports of bribery, intimidation and corruption that accompanied the transitional process and making clear that the conclusion of the transition represents the first step towards a permanent federal government; or

• adopt a resolution addressing similar issues, helping set out the parameters for the high-level mini-summit on the margins of the General Assembly and articulating new medium-term goals for Somalia.
Expected Council Action

In September, the Council expects to meet twice on Sudan and South Sudan, in accordance with resolution 2046, which asks the Secretary-General to inform the Council every two weeks about the status of compliance with the resolution. During one of these meetings the Council is likely to review the Secretary-General’s report, as requested by resolution 2046, which is expected to focus on the status of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, is expected to brief in these meetings.

Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), chair of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, is also expected to provide the quarterly report to the Council on the work of the Committee. The mandate of the Sanctions Committee expires on 17 February 2013.

Key Recent Developments

On 3 August, Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan and South Sudan, announced that Sudan and South Sudan had reached a deal on oil and other financial arrangements. (South Sudan shut down its oil production in January, after accusing Sudan of stealing its oil. Pipelines that lead to Sudan’s Port Sudan on the Red Sea are the only outlets to the outside world for South Sudan’s oil). According to the agreement, South Sudan would pay transport fees of $11 per barrel for oil from Unity state and $9.10 per barrel for oil from Upper Nile state. It would also pay an additional $3.028 billion to help Sudan weather the financial impact of losing South Sudan, which held 75 percent of Sudan’s oil deposits before its 9 July 2011 independence.

Details about how and when the agreement would be implemented remain unclear. On 4 August, Nafie Ali Nafie, the Vice-President of the ruling National Congress Party in Sudan, said that its implementation was contingent on the resolution of security issues separating the two countries. Also on 4 August, Pagan Amum, South Sudan’s lead negotiator in the talks, said that his country had been pressured into accepting the deal by certain states, including the US and the UK.

In early August, Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) signed separate memoranda of understanding with the AU, the UN and the Arab League agreeing to allow humanitarian access to civilians in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. However, in its memorandum, the SPLM-N expressed the reservation that the delivery of aid to these two states “is dependent on the consent of the Government of Sudan” on access to the SPLM/North controlled areas,” as Sudan has asserted the right to oversee the delivery of aid on its sovereign territory.

On 9 August, the Council held one of its bimonthly meetings on Sudan and South...
Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

Sudan. Mbeki and Menkerios participated in the meeting. Given the presence of Mbeki, a representative of a regional organisation, the meeting was held in the interactive dialogue format. Mbeki told Council members that the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone and Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism could still not be established because Sudan was reluctant to accept the map that the AU had proposed as the basis of negotiations on the border zone. (It seems that Sudan is concerned that using the map could prejudice future deliberations on border demarcation). He also noted that the two parties had established a Panel of Experts to craft non-binding recommendations regarding the status of five disputed areas along the Sudan-South Sudan border. Mbeki added that he expected the document outlining the agreement between the parties on oil and other financial arrangements to be signed by the parties in the near future.

As for next steps, Mbeki alluded to the 3 August communiqué in which the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) encourages further engagement of the AUHIP with the parties, requesting a comprehensive report from it by 22 September on the status of negotiations. He also noted that the AUHIP’s report would include proposals for resolving any outstanding matters between the parties.

During the meeting, Menkerios indicated that a recently formed tripartite committee (made up of the AU, the UN and the Arab League) would submit an action plan to Sudan for the provision of aid in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The Council met again in consultations on Sudan and South Sudan on 23 August, with a briefing by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet. He noted that the parties are now expected to make an effort to resolve outstanding issues by 22 September, in accordance with the AU’s decision to extend the original 3 August deadline.

On 24 August, the Sudan Sanctions Committee met in consultations to discuss the interim report of the Panel of Experts (PoE). The report, due in mid-May, was submitted to the Committee in late July; it had been delayed because the PoE was unable to secure in a timely fashion visas to conduct its investigations in Darfur. During the consultations, it appears that the Committee also discussed the timing of a visit by Ambassador Osorio and other Committee members to

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Disputed Areas along Sudan-South Sudan Border

Source: SCR map based on Bing Maps and International Crisis Group, “Sudan: Defining the North-South Border,” Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 75, 2 September 2010. The boundaries and names shown and the designations (black boxes) used on this map are for illustration purposes only. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of Abyei is likewise not yet determined.
Darfur. The trip has been tentatively planned for October.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, whose country has been hosting the peace talks between Sudan and South Sudan, died on 20 August. Zenawi had reportedly been following the negotiations closely, talking often with Mbeki. US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Princeton Lyman, said that Zenawi “played a very dramatic role in helping bring about stability in Sudan and South Sudan,” alluding in particular to the fact that Ethiopia provides peacekeepers to the UN mission in Abyei. (The resumption of talks between Sudan and South Sudan, originally planned for 26 August, was delayed until after the state funeral on 2 September. At press time, it appeared that the parties would reconvene in Addis Ababa on 4 September.)

On 24 August, a spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), expressed alarm at the health condition of 170,000 refugees from Sudan residing in camps and settlements in Unity and Upper Nile states in South Sudan. He noted that the rainy season and the cold weather have precipitated diarrhoea, malaria and respiratory tract ailments among refugees. The spokesperson also said that the dramatic increase in refugees in recent months has taxed the capacity of UNHCR and other agencies to address hygiene and sanitation concerns in the camps.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to calibrate an approach that recognises progress made in the negotiations but compels Sudan and South Sudan to continue to negotiate in good faith and resolve their remaining differences in a sustainable way.

Other important issues for the Council include:
• how to overcome the deadlock in establishing the border mechanisms that has been created in part by Sudan’s unwillingness to accept the AU map as a basis for negotiations;
• how to support the parties’ efforts to finalise and implement their agreement on oil and other financial arrangements;
• how to support negotiations on political issues between Sudan and the SPLM-N; and
• how to build on the progress made with the signing of the memorandum of understanding by Sudan and the SPLM-N on humanitarian access to civilian populations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• taking a low-key approach until it has time to study carefully the Secretary-General report on the status of negotiations (expected by 2 September) and also review the AUHIP report (expected by 22 September);
• dispatching a Council mission to the region to impress upon the parties the importance of resolving the remaining differences between them; and
• considering the imposition of measures under article 41 of the UN Charter (i.e. sanctions) if the parties fail to make significant progress in resolving remaining issues separating them by the AU-extended deadline of 22 September.

Council Dynamics
Several members are encouraged that Sudan and South Sudan have made some progress, particularly given that there has been a reduction of violence between them and that an agreement has been reached on oil and other financial arrangements. However, there is concern among some members that the agreement has yet to be signed and questions remain among some members about the commitment of the parties to its implementation. More broadly, there is also uneasiness among several Council members about the various other significant issues that remain to be resolved by the parties, such as establishing a buffer zone between the two countries, border demarcation, the final status of Abyei and the status of each country’s citizens living on the other side of the border.

It also appears that the negotiations on the presidential statement of 31 August at least mildly disturbed the delicate unity that had been building over the past few months in the Council on Sudan-South Sudan issues. One area of difference in negotiating the statement was how to characterise Sudan’s unwillingness to accept the AU map proposed as a basis for negotiations on the boundaries of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone. Some seemed to prefer to use language less critical of Sudan than others. Another area of difference was how the Council should characterise the 20 July aerial bombardment along the border that South Sudan says occurred in its Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, as was later verified by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Some members believed that this aspect of the statement needed to be more objective and condemn any support for armed rebel groups by the parties. (Sudan has contended that it was targeting an armed rebel group during the 20 July bombardment).

Several Council members seem encouraged that members of the Sanctions Committee will likely visit Darfur in the upcoming months. However, there is some difference of opinion on the Council about the degree of transparency that the Council should accord to the PoE’s work. Some members are concerned that last year’s final PoE report, which was circulated to Council members in late January, has not been publicly released. Others, however, believe that it is not the Council’s obligation to release the report, as they think that it contains inaccuracies. Different perspectives regarding whether or not to make public the report is relevant to Council sanctions regimes more generally; for example, the final reports of the PoEs for the 1718 Sanctions Committee (North Korea) and the 2010 final report of the 1737 Sanctions Committee (Iran) were not published.

The US is the lead country on Sudan-South Sudan issues.
In September, the Council expects a briefing on developments in Libya and the upcoming report of the Secretary-General providing the six-month review of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), requested by resolution 2040. In addition, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal), chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee, is also expected to provide a regular update to the Council on the Committee’s work, including an interim report by its Panel of Experts. UNSMIL’s mandate expires on 12 March 2013.

Key Recent Developments
On 2 July, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay briefed Council members in consultations on Libya. Pillay focused on the issue of civilian casualties resulting from NATO’s air campaign in 2011, as well as on the detainees currently being held by different revolutionary brigades. On 10 July, members of the Council issued a press statement (SC/10704) welcoming the 7 July elections for the new General National Congress (GNC). On 18 July, UNSMIL’s then head, Ian Martin, briefed the Council and said that the elections were an “extraordinary accomplishment” marred by some violent incidents, mostly in the east. Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libyan deputy permanent representative, also addressed the Council, stating that “according to all observers, the elections were free and fair and met all international standards.” The briefing was followed by consultations.

There were several notable electoral, political and constitutional developments. According to the official results of the 7 July election, former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril’s National Forces Alliance took 39 out of the 80 seats reserved for political parties. (The remaining 120 seats were reserved for independent candidates.) On 8 August, the National Transitional Council (NTC) ceased to exist when it handed power to the newly elected GNC. The GNC elected Mohammed Magarief as its President on 9 August with, among others, the task of appointing a new government. (The GNC must also decide on how to press ahead with the drafting of a new constitution. There remains speculation about how the 60-member constitutional committee will be formed. The GNC must also define the powers of the new President and vote for his deputies before full parliamentary elections can be held next year.)

In other developments, four staff members from the International Criminal Court (ICC) were released during a visit to Libya by ICC President Sang-Hyun Song on 2 July. (The four-person ICC defence team was detained in Zintan on 7 June following its visit to Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, son of deposed Col. Muammar Qaddafi. Defence counsel Melinda Taylor was accused of clandestinely passing Qaddafi a coded letter from a fugitive former aide, Mohammed Ismail.) On 6 July, Taylor said during a press conference that her actions in Libya were “consistent” with her legal obligations and that “these recent events have completely underscored that it will be impossible for Mr. Qaddafi to be tried in an independent and impartial manner in Libyan courts.”

On 31 July, according to a filing by his defence lawyers, Qaddafi asked to be tried at the ICC instead of in Libya. Ahmed al-Jehani, the Libyan representative to the ICC, said on 20 August that the trial would begin in Libya in September.

A number of security-related incidents continued to highlight various challenges. Foreigners were the target in several cases. On 31 July, seven Iranian relief workers were abducted by a group of armed men in Benghazi soon after they started a mission for the Libyan Red Crescent Association.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has suspended its operations in Misrata and Benghazi after unknown individuals attacked its office in Misrata on 5 August. (This was the fifth time in less than three months that the ICRC had been targeted in Misrata or Benghazi.)

UN DOCUMENTS

Security Council Resolutions

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS

Chair of the Sanctions Committee: José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal) Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts: Simon Dilloway, UK (finance) Theodore M. Murphy, US (regional) Giovanna Perri, Italy (finance) Salim Raad, Lebanon (heavy weapons) Savannah de Tessières, France (small arms and light weapons) Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL: Ian Martin (UK)

In an interview on 6 August with the UN News Service, Martin highlighted human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law as being among the key areas of work of UNSMIL. A major legacy of the past that had to be resolved was missing persons, he said. Martin added that another ongoing problem was the continued detention of those imprisoned at the end of the conflict, when capacity to screen those cases and deal with them properly within the law did not yet exist. Subject to the views of the new government, Martin anticipated that human rights would continue to be a prime focus for the work of UNSMIL.

A bomb exploded near the vehicle of an Egyptian diplomat in Benghazi on 20 August, but no one was hurt.

The military has been targeted repeatedly in bomb attacks. On 1 August, a bomb damaged the building housing the department of military intelligence in Benghazi. On 4 August, a car bomb exploded near the offices of the military police in Tripoli. On 19 August, twin car-bomb blasts detonated near the Military Academy and the Interior Ministry in Tripoli, killing two people.

Targeted killings of prominent figures also continued. On 10 August, Gen. Mohamed Hadia al-Feitouri, a senior defense ministry official, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Benghazi.

Key Issues
An overarching issue for the Council continues to be determining UNSMIL’s long-term role in Libya, in particular following the election of the GNC.

The Council’s role in the implementation of resolution 1970 with regard to its referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC and any referral-related trials is another important issue.

Preventing large-scale reprisals and killings in a post-conflict Libya, as well as concerns about human rights violations and the reported torture of detainees, are closely related issues for the Council.

Preventing heavy weaponry from
Libya (con't)

proliferating in Libya, as well as its continuing spillover in the Sahel region is an ongoing issue for Council members.

Underlying Problems
The pre-election divisions that existed within Libya's political and military elite are likely to remain a cause for concern in post-election Libya.

Instances of settling old disputes between anti and pro-Qaddafi forces, often accompanied by human rights violations, continue to pose serious challenges.

Options
An option for the Council could be to await the formation of the new government and then reconsider UNSMIL's long-term role according to the recommendations presented in the Secretary-General's report.

Another option for the Council could be to encourage, through a presidential statement, the GNC to recommit to long-term state-building and to re-emphasise the current mandate of UNSMIL.

Regarding human rights, rule of law and transitional justice in Libya, the Council could ask for regular briefings from UNSMIL and other relevant UN actors on issue-specific developments.

With regard to the ICC, the Council could ask for a briefing from the ICC Prosecutor to receive an update.

Council Dynamics
Council members appear to be in agreement in supporting the soon-to-be new government and are satisfied for UNSMIL to remain under the same mandate for the time being. They are mindful that any changes to UNSMIL's mandate would have to take into account the views of the new authorities and that any revision before then would be premature.

But differences over Libya have continued within the Council. During the preparation of the press statement welcoming the elections, Russia broke silence due to concerns with parts of the text, in particular the fact that the draft text was referring to the elections as "successful". Some other Council members also felt that this was not entirely appropriate as the voting process was not incident free. Moreover, Russia was uncomfortable with the inclusion of reference to the role of UNSMIL in the forthcoming constitutional process before the Council had held an in-depth discussion regarding UNSMIL's post-election role.

Some Council members are alarmed by the decision to commence the trial of Qaddafi in Libya. To them, it is a clear violation of Libya's obligations under international law and resolution 1970 that referred the situation in Libya to the ICC.

The UK is the lead country on Libya.

Mali

Expected Council Action
In September, the Council will likely be briefed in consultations by Jeffrey Feltman, the head of the Department for Political Affairs, on an integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues, as requested in resolution 2056. (On 26 September, at the margins of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General will host a high-level meeting on developments in the Sahel, including Mali.)

A Council press statement will be the likely outcome.

Key Recent Developments
On 8 August, the Council was briefed on developments in Mali since a military coup overthrew the democratically-elected government of the country on 22 March and on the ongoing strategic planning efforts following the request of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for a Security Council mandate authorising the deployment of an ECOWAS stabilisation force. The briefers included Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Salamatu Hussaini-Suleiman, Commissioner for Political Affairs for Peace and Security of ECOWAS. The Secretary-General's language was bleak: “a regional pillar of democracy has completely fallen away from the constitutional path, undermining years of progress.” He furthermore noted that “an already terrible food and nutrition emergency [has grown] even worse, exposing thousands more people to severe shortages of food, water and basic services. In areas where there was previously stability and peaceful coexistence, extremism, criminal activity and violations of human rights have gained ground”.

Limited progress has been made in restoring constitutional order in the country. “Mali’s socio-political forces remain divided over support for the transitional arrangements and, more broadly, over future prospects for the country,” he said. “The military junta reportedly maintains a strong influence over the transitional process. It has retained control over the security and defence forces and continues to violently repress fellow soldiers suspected of having supported the attempted counter-coup of 30 April.” He added: “I strongly encourage the government of Mali to develop an overarching political strategy to return the country to constitutional order and re-establish state authority in the north. The strategy should clearly spell out responses to genuine socio-economic and political grievances, the modalities for political dialogue and negotiations, and the aims of eventual military action against extremist forces in the north.”

UN DOCUMENTS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2056 (5 July 2012) was a resolution expressing the Council’s full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the transitional authorities in Mali in trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity. Press Statement SC/10741 (10 August 2012) was statements by the Secretary-General, representatives of ECOWAS and the AU, and by the Permanent Representative of Mali. Meeting Record S/PV.6820 (8 August 2012) was a meeting on Peace and security in Africa focusing on Mali. Letter S/2012/444 (13 June 2012) was from Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa) containing the joint communiqué issued after the sixth consultative meeting between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2012/910 (29 June 2012) was the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA). S/2012/42 (17 January 2012) was the UN interagency assessment mission report on the Sahel.
For her part, Hussaini-Suleiman noted that “terrorists and criminal networks” were trying to consolidate, and were committing “atrocious war crimes” in the north of the country. She said that the “objective of those terrorist groups and transnational organized criminals is clear, namely, to create a safe haven and a coordinating centre in the north of Mali for continental terrorist networks, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, MUJAO, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab.” If that objective is realised, she added, then “no country in Africa, or indeed outside the continent, will be safe.”

Prior to the briefing, Council members had received a note verbale from the Permanent Mission of Côte d’Ivoire—the current chair of ECOWAS—containing a detailed ECOWAS concept paper for deploying a stabilisation force in Mali. According to the note verbale, ECOWAS proposes to deploy a force of 3,245 troops—to which Nigeria (694), Togo (581), Niger (541) and Senegal (350) would be the biggest contributors—in three phases. The objectives of these phases would be, respectively, securing the transitional government in the capital, Bamako; restructuring and retraining the Malian army; and then launching an operation on radical Islamist forces in order to regain control of northern Mali. The note verbale stated that the overriding legal basis for the stabilisation force is the restoration of sovereignty and regaining territorial integrity in the north of Mali, where 10 percent of Mali’s population of 15 million live. The note verbale put the cost of the operation—which involves both military and humanitarian aspects—at about $410 million. (The note verbale is not exact about the mission’s duration, stating only that the humanitarian component will be tackled in six months, and the entire mission will transition “after an acceptable level of stability has been achieved.” By that time, ECOWAS will hand over responsibility to the AU and the UN.)

On 10 August, Council members issued a press statement (SC/10741) encouraging ECOWAS to prepare “detailed options for the objectives, means and modalities” of the proposed regional stabilisation force and indicating that the note verbale did not clarify crucial issues. The statement demanded that the members of the National Council for the Recovery of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE), the military junta that staged the 22 March coup, “cease their continuous interference in the political process.” The statement called on the transitional authorities of Mali to “ensure the full restoration and preservation of the constitutional order, including effective civilian control over the security and Armed Forces.” Members took note of the ECOWAS technical assessment mission that visited Mali from 6-18 July 2012, with the participation of the UN and the AU, and encouraged ECOWAS to have the transitional government “clarify its position.”

In this regard, a clear request from the government of Mali has been the key for Council support of the ECOWAS mission. This, however, was put in doubt during a 9-13 August meeting of ECOWAS military commanders and the government of Mali in Bamako. While transitional President Dioncounda Traoré is open to the idea and is making progress towards a new political consensus in the country, the military appears hostile. The transitional Defense Minister, Col. Yamoussa Camara, an ally of coup-leader Capt. Amadou Sanogo, told ECOWAS commanders that the stabilisation force should not be deployed in Bamako and should not take the lead over the Malian army in reconquering the north. (The ECOWAS note verbale described the army as having a “collapsed command and control system” and low morale. It is, according to the note, infiltrated by “extremist elements” and is crippled by “misplaced professional ego/pride.”)

The problems in the wider Sahel region—which spans some 8 million square kilometres between Mauritania and Libya in the north and Burkina Faso and Nigeria in the south—were examined by a UN inter-agency assessment mission from 7-23 December 2011. The mission’s report (S/2012/42), which described the impact of the return of about 420,000 migrant workers to Mali, Niger and Mauritania, predicted serious instability in the region also because weapons from Libya are finding their way into the hands of separatist and jihadist guerrillas.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is to devise an overarching strategy to tackle the multifaceted problems of the Sahel, in particular the growing spread of terrorist groups and terrorist activities in the region.

In this context, restoring constitutionality in Mali and re-establishing its territorial integrity is a particularly pressing issue.

Tackling the perennial humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region, as well as the massive human rights violations, especially against women and non-Muslims in the Islamist-controlled parts of Mali, are further key issues of concern.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:

- issuing a press statement after the briefing welcoming the Secretary-General’s initiative in organising the high-level meeting on the Sahel;
- issuing a presidential statement requesting the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Special Envoy for Mali as a first step towards forging a more effective approach to the complex issues facing the country.

**Council Dynamics**

Though there is consensus among Council members on the need for urgent action to tackle the multiple crises in the Sahel region, including re-establishing constitutional order in Mali and ensuring the re-establishment of the state’s authority over the northern half of the country, there is little agreement yet on practical action. ECOWAS proposed that its stabilisation force begin to deploy to Bamako and other towns in southern Mali in October or November, with the build-up of a strike force to be complete by January 2013 and the campaign to recover the north to be launched in February. Some Council members fear those four months could easily become extended, allowing the Islamists groups, **Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, Ansar Dine** and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, enough time to become entrenched in the difficult semi-arid terrain.

Other Council members fear that a premature offer of military aid to the regime in Bamako, in which the coup members appear to be influential, could be a retreat from the AU’s and the Security Council’s policy of zero tolerance for military coups.

Council members also want any military operation in Mali and the region to include non-ECOWAS neighbours, specifically...
Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco, who would have clear strategic interests in such an operation. France, which has taken the lead on Mali in the Council, has a long-established programme of support for African peace operations—the RECAMP initiative—with pre-positioned supplies at a base in Senegal, and is the most robust in advocating support for ECOwAS. It appears that both France and Morocco, though, would want to see a clear attempt at negotiation with some of the elements in the north, since outright military victory by ECOwAS in the north is doubtful.

Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
In September, the Council will likely be briefed in consultations by Jeffrey D. Feltman, the head of the Department for Political Affairs, on the latest Secretary-General’s report (S/2012/554) on the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS).

No outcome is expected from the briefing. The mandate of UNIOGBIS expires on 28 February 2013.

Key Recent Developments
On 21 July, the transitional government in Guinea-Bissau set up on 23 May as a result of a deal brokered by ECOwAS following the 12 April coup, elaborated a four-point program of action focusing on the following:

- preparing for and conducting presidential and legislative elections in April 2013;
- strengthening the rule of law, including combating impunity and reforming the justice sector;
- combating organised crime, corruption and drug trafficking; and
- embarking on security sector reform.

That same month, the country experienced a crippling strike by health workers protesting unpaid salaries.

On 23 August, the transitional government announced that it will renegotiate a deal with a mining company, Angola Bauxite, as the current agreement, signed by the ousted civilian government, is unfair. Angola Bauxite was jointly created in 2007 by the governments of Angola and Guinea-Bissau and various private investors to carry out mining operations and investments, including a $500 million plan to build a mine and deep-water port in Guinea-Bissau to handle bauxite. Coup leaders cited Angola’s military presence in the country, which they claimed was meant to protect former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Junior, as the key reason for the 12 April coup.

The transitional government, which includes two army officers, is led by Seriño Nhamadjo as President and Rui Duarte Barros as Prime Minister. The ECOwAS brokered deal which created the transitional government resulted in the military formally retreating to the barracks and the reinstatement of the elected Parliament, though there is no obvious role for it in the transition phase. ECOwAS has since deployed a 629-man police and army contingent, called the ECOwAS Mission in Bissau (ECOwIM). It replaced the Angolan military mission, MISSANG, which completed withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau on 9 June. ECOwIM is to assist in security-sector reform and help steer the country through the transition to civilian rule following the April 2013 elections.

On 23 August, the West African Economic and Monetary Union announced a loan of $28.5 million to Guinea-Bissau to be used for security sector reforms.

The Council last discussed Guinea-Bissau on 26 July when Joseph Mutaboba, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNIOGBIS, said that the humanitarian and economic situation in the country had deteriorated further. He cited the Guinea-Bissau Farmers’ Association as saying that the 2012 production of cashew nuts was forecast to drop to about 100,000 tonnes “as a result of the April 12 coup.” This, he said, “is particularly disturbing” considering that cashew production accounts for 90 percent of the national income and the sector employs almost 80 percent of the labour force.

Four days after the briefing, on 30 July, Council members, in a press statement (S/10734), called on all political and civil society actors in Guinea-Bissau to engage in a consensual, inclusive and “nationally owned” process to restore constitutional order in the country. The statement underlined the need for “concrete measures in key areas for long-term stability in Guinea-Bissau, among those the reform of the security sector, the fight against impunity and the fight against drug-trafficking.” Council members condemned the “continuing interference of the military in politics” and expressed concern about “reports of an increase in drug trafficking since the 12 April coup d’etat.” The statement stressed the importance of coordination of international efforts to address the crisis in Guinea-Bissau and called on the Secretary-General to consider “the convening of a […] high-level meeting, bringing together the UN, AU, ECOwAS, CPLP, EU and other international partners, as well as all relevant national stakeholders in order to produce a comprehensive and integrated strategy for the full restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, the promotion of democracy and rule of law.” On 13 June, the Council announced the appointment of Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco) as...
Sierra Leone

Human Rights-Related Developments
UNIOGBIS held a two-day colloquium on justice attended by 60 representatives of the country's criminal justice institutions (judges, prosecutors and police investigators). At the end of the 1 August event, Prosecutor-General Edmundo Mendes underlined the need for greater coordination among justice institutions in the delivery of justice and upholding basic human rights. The participants recommended, among other issues, that the government improve formal communication among the various institutions of justice and provide additional training for judges and justice officials.

Other issues include combating the stranglehold of drug-trafficking and organised-crime networks on the military and political elite, as well as undertaking a comprehensive security-sector reform process.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• issuing a press statement calling for the convening of a meeting of all international players on Guinea-Bissau and reiterating the call for clear steps towards constitutionality by the transitional government; or
• taking no action at this moment.

Council and Broader Dynamics
Though there is unanimous agreement about the need for restoring constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, the Council remains divided on some key approaches. Most Council members reject the idea of dealing directly with the transitional government, which is the product of a deal with an illegitimate military junta, and they have not recognised it. There is considerable anxiety within the Council around giving the impression of endorsing the 12 April coup or rewarding in any way the coup leaders, who—though retreated to the barracks—remain influential in the government, with two of their handpicked allies (military officers) being part of the transitional government.

Portugal, which has been playing a prominent role in the Council on this issue—it drafted the last statement, as well as resolution 2048—wants to see a greater role for the CPLP, which has been neutralised in Guinea-Bissau by ECOWAS. Togo, which leads on Guinea-Bissau in the Council, has stuck to the line adopted by ECOWAS, which is to allow the transitional government one year to conduct elections and to avoid any reference to the legitimacy of the elections of 18 March or that of front-runner Gomes Júnior.

There is, in other words, a stalemate on this issue, and this is unlikely to be broken in the foreseeable future. An indication of a new approach could be when, as envisaged, the authorities in Guinea-Bissau appoint a new Permanent Representative to the UN. If the credentials of the new representative are accepted by the Secretary-General, then it might send a signal to many countries that currently do not accept the legitimacy of the transitional regime—including members of the EU and some key members of the Security Council—that there is perhaps need for a new approach towards Guinea-Bissau.

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), which expires on 15 September. Jens Anders Toøenberg-Frandzen (Denmark), the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone and head of UNIPSIL, as well as Ambassador Guillermo Rischchynski (Canada), the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s configuration for Sierra Leone, will likely brief the Council. Joseph B. Dauda, Sierra Leone’s Foreign Minister, is representing the Secretary-General of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Commission’s configuration for Sierra Leone and head of UNIPSIL, which will likely brief the Council. Joseph B. Dauda, Sierra Leone’s Foreign Minister, is also expected to make a statement.

Key Recent Developments
On 23 May, Council members, led by Ambassador Sir Mark Lyall Grant (UK) and Baso Sangqu (South Africa), visited Sierra Leone as part of a three-country visit to West Africa. The Sierra Leone leg was intended to “encourage continued efforts to consolidate peace and neutral reconciliation.”

During the trip, Council members met with President Ernest Bai Koroma and other cabinet members, as well as with representatives from all registered political parties, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and members of civil society. Reporting on the trip to the Council on 31 May Ambassador Sangqu noted that the Council delegation got “a clear and welcome commitment to a free, fair and transparent [electoral] process” from President Koroma. He also felt reassured after discussions with all political parties and the NEC that “good progress was being made in preparing” for the elections on 17 November.

Sangqu mentioned, however, that the “political environment in the country continues to be dominated by intense rivalry and mistrust between the two major political parties”—the ruling All Peoples’
Sierra Leone (con't)

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

On 22 June, the chair of the PBC country-specific configuration on Sierra-Leone, Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), chaired an informal meeting of the PBC on Sierra Leone in New York to discuss preparations for the forthcoming elections. The NEC chair, Christiana Thorpe, attended the meeting. Toyberg-Frandzen and Sierra Leone government officials—including the Inspector-General of Police, the head of the Political Parties Registration Commission, and several representatives from civil society—participated in the meeting from Freetown via video link. Participants noted progress that had been made in the electoral process, including the completion of voter registration, and Rishchynski announced that the basket fund set up by the UN Development Programme has been fully subscribed. The Inspector-General of Police announced that 6,500 police officers would be trained in crowd control for the elections. Thorpe called attention to the logistical constraints of fully servicing 3,000 polling stations across the country, noting that the NEC needed more vehicles.

Rishchynski briefed the Security Council on 22 March (S/PV.6739) on his visit to Sierra Leone from 21-31 January. “There is a clear need to encourage more open dialogue, both among the political parties and with the national electoral institutions,” he told Council members. “As electoral campaigning begins in earnest, all parties must redouble their efforts to implement their commitments under the joint communiqué of 2009.” Resolution 2005 encouraged the PBC to “provide support to the government of Sierra Leone and UNIPSIL in preparation for the 2012 elections, including the potential to mobilise support from international partners, and in the implementation of the government’s Agenda for Change and the UN Joint Vision Strategy and in that regard to advise and keep the Council updated, including on progress made in meeting core peacebuilding objectives, as necessary.”

Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP)—though he felt “encouraged by the signing, by all the political parties, of a declaration agreeing to contest the elections fairly and not to resort to violence.” On the contentious issue of the purchase of weapons worth millions of dollars for the paramilitary police, which was raised in the Council by outgoing UNIPSIL head Michael von der Schellenburg on 22 March, Sangqu reported that President Koroma “reassured us that those weapons were transferred to the armed forces of Sierra Leone in the presence of international observers.”

The forthcoming elections in November remain the Council’s key interest in Sierra Leone. Council resolution 2005 had underlined the “importance of the government and the international community in continuing efforts to foster an environment that is conducive to the holding of peaceful, transparent, free and fair elections by strengthening the national electoral and democratic institutions, providing security, ensuring political access by the contestants to all regions of the country, making available forums for mediation and dialogue and assuring the credibility of the electoral process, and in doing so, contribute to the institutional development and continued stability of the country.”

The electoral process, however, remains contentious. On 31 July, the chair of the NEC, Christiana Thorpe, announced significant increases in nomination fees for presidential and parliamentary elections. The fee for presidential candidates was increased from 1 million leones (about $230) to 100 million leones (23,057.40) and for parliamentary candidates from 100,000 leones ($23) to 25 million leones (5,764.35). Thorpe argued that the increases were to constitute about 23.5 percent of the cost of the elections.

Eight opposition parties condemned the increases, which are far above the regional average, in a joint statement issued on 3 August. On 10 August, Thorpe announced that the fees for parliamentary candidates had been reduced to 10 million leones (about $2,300) but that those for presidential candidates will remain unchanged. On 14 August, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL) issued a statement condemning the increases, including the lowered figure for parliamentary candidates, noting that they constitute “a potential ground for discrimination against low income earners and vulnerable groups […] as only the rich and affluent will be able to contest.” HRCSL rejected Thorpe’s argument that candidates should contribute to meeting the overall cost of conducting the elections as “untenable” because funding elections is the constitutional responsibility of the government.

Earlier, on 29 March, the NEC announced voter registration figures. It used the biometric voter registration system to eliminate or minimise fraud. But the 2,701,299 voters it registered is only slightly higher than the figure for 2007 (2,621,313), and there was a decrease in voter numbers in the stronghold of the SLPP in southern and eastern Sierra Leone, prompting the opposition to assert that the NEC neglected some areas to give the governing party and President Koroma an undue advantage.

On the wider socioeconomic front, developments were largely positive. Two British companies—African Minerals (AML) and London Mining—began exporting iron ore from recently opened mines early in the year; one of these mines is believed to have one of the largest iron ore deposits in the world. This, coupled with reports of significant offshore oil finds, led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to project an extraordinary growth of 35.9 percent in gross domestic product in 2012. On 2 April, a Chinese company, Shandong Iron and Steel, announced it would invest $1.5 billion in AML’s Tonkolili mines.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is to ensure a smooth transition of UNIPSIL to a UN country team in 2013.

A closely related critical issue is to ensure that the November elections are conducted peacefully, and that the results are broadly accepted and seen as legitimate.

A further related issue is to ensure a reasonably even field during the electoral period, with the opposition being able to access the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC), which was jointly inaugurated by the Secretary-General and President Koroma in June 2010.

Another important issue is the setting up of an Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was recommended by the April 2009 Joint Communiqué, signed by the APC and the SLPP with the UN acting as moral guarantor.

Options

The Council could:

• renew the mandate of UNIPSIL for another year, without modifications;
• adopt a resolution extending the mandate of UNIPSIL by six months with a strong political message on the need for fair and free elections and a mandate to provide electoral...
Sierra Leone (con't)

assistance; or
  • adopt a resolution extending UNIPSIL's mandate by one year and making UNIPSIL transition to a UN country team contingent on the free and fair conduct of the November polls and overall peace and security after.

Liberia

Expected Council Action
In September, the Council will consider the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and will likely renew the mission’s mandate. Karin Landgren, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Liberia and head of UNMIL, and Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) country-specific configuration for Liberia, are expected to brief, to be followed by consultations.

UNMIL’s mandate expires on 30 September.

Key Recent Developments
The Secretary-General’s 24th progress report on UNMIL (S/2012/641) submitted to Council members on 15 August, added to two other recent reports on Liberia: the Secretary-General’s special report on UNMIL of 16 April 2012 (S/2012/230) and the 20 June mid-term report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the Liberia Sanctions Committee (S/2012/448). Both were discussed on 29 June, when Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding, Edmond Mulet, briefed the Council on the former report and Council members then held consultations also addressing the PoE report.

The three reports amplify a key anxiety: though UNMIL has been in operation since 2003, there are still critical gaps in Liberia’s governance and security apparatuses. The Secretary-General has determined, however, that none of the “current and projected threats facing Liberia” are of a military nature, and in the most recent report, reiterated the recommendation of his 16 April special report for the repatriation of 4,200 troops in three phases between August 2012 and July 2015, leaving the mission’s military strength at approximately 3,750 troops for the foreseeable future. (UNMIL’s total troop strength in April was 7,950.) The special report also recommended the addition of three formed police units to UNMIL’s police component over the same period (UNMIL police’s current strength is 498 advisers and 845 officers in seven formed units).

The special report was submitted to Council members before their visit to Liberia on 19-20 May, and its recommendation concerning UNMIL troop numbers was clearly on Council members’ minds during their meeting with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and members of the cabinet, as well as during their visit to the National Police Training Academy. Reporting the trip to the Council on 31 May, Ambassador Susan Rice (US), who led the delegation, said that members focused on security and rule-of-law institutions, reconciliation and positioning for the drawdown of UNMIL. Council members were particularly concerned at that point by the security challenges on the Liberian-Ivorian border, which they visited. Rice reported that President Sirleaf briefed the Council members on national priorities and called for greater international support for the Liberian National Police in line with an expected decrease in UN security personnel. Council members were aware of the “challenges to improving” internal security, with Rice noting that these involved “financial limitations, staffing and supporting remote security outposts, and the threat posed by international drug traffickers and organised criminals.”

Human Rights-Related Development
On 3 August, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern about draft legislation currently being considered by Liberia’s House of Representatives that would broadly criminalise homosexual behaviour. The legislation has already been passed by the Senate. OHCHR called on Liberia to implement the international human rights treaties that it has ratified, including the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, observing that laws criminalising homosexual acts between consenting adults violated individuals’ rights to privacy and to freedom from discrimination. OHCHR said that laws criminalising homosexuality can have a negative impact not only on gay and lesbian people but also on vulnerable populations such as people living with HIV who might be in need of treatment but will not come forward because of fear of prosecution, stigmatisation and discrimination.

The 15 August report of the Secretary-General highlights some of these challenges, noting that though the security situation in Liberia “remains generally stable” it is still fragile. It reported a 13 June incident in which police investigating an alleged rubber theft in Buchanan, in the interior of the country, came under fire, probably from ex-combatants operating in the area. It also reported the eruption of violence during a student protest march in Monrovia, the capital, on 18 July, and the more troubling developments at the border with Côte d’Ivoire in which seven UN peacekeepers and at least 27 civilians were killed on 8 June. The incidents, the report said, led to the closure of the Liberian border with Côte d’Ivoire on 9 July. The border remained closed at press time.

The report appears unusually sharply critical of the Liberian government’s shortcomings in the areas of governance and
reconciliation, both of which bear directly on security. Notwithstanding a commitment President Sirleaf reportedly made to the opposition last year to create “an inclusive administration”, the report said that by 1 August only 11 out of the 447 persons she had appointed to the cabinet and other government positions were not publicly affiliated to the governing party. Even members of the governing Unity Party have protested Sirleaf’s apparent nepotism, with her sons and other relatives appointed to top positions in the government. The report also states that although the Anti-Corruption Commission has investigated 25 high-profile cases since March 2009, and has submitted six to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution, “no prosecution has been completed and there have been no convictions.” In fact, the report said, the Sirleaf administration “remains unresponsive to audits of public institutions,” and so far “no action has been taken to implement the recommendations contained in 45 audit reports prepared over the past three years by the General Auditing Commission.”

Furthermore, the report says that despite a phenomenal growth in the country’s fiscal situation—the 2012/13 budget amounted to $649 million, representing an increase of about 25 percent over the previous year’s—the government has proposed reduction in funding for the police and immigration. This in spite of “an overall increase of $3 million for the security sector, mainly in support of the Armed Forces” of Liberia, the report said. On the critical issue of controlling the exploitation of natural resources—which was a key factor in the country’s civil war—the report notes the following: “Limited commitment to comply with the minimum standards of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds remains apparent. The Presidential Task Force on Diamonds has not met in a year, while its technical committee convened in early July for the first time in seven months. The Government’s capacity to control diamond mining and trade, a vital part of the certification scheme, continues to be weak, with the network of regional offices of the Government Diamond Office lacking basic capacity to monitor the movement of diamonds out of affected counties. The US Agency for International Development has indicated that it will discontinue funding for the property rights and artisanal diamond development programme established in 2010 to assist the Government to improve compliance, partially owing to insufficient commitment.”

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to carefully manage a smooth transition of UNMIL from a large peacekeeping mission to an eventual successor presence, probably a small political office similar to the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone.

Striking a balance between the need to wind down the mission and doing it when the gains from UNMIL’s work have taken root is a key related issue, particularly in view of the developments on the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border.

Underlying Problems
Financing is a critical problem. The Secretary-General’s 15 August report notes that as of 26 July 2012, the unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNMIL amounted to $142.6 million, and that the appropriation for the mission by the General Assembly on 21 June 2012 was $496.4 million, compared to $525.6 million for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• adopting a resolution renewing the mandate of UNMIL that incorporates the Secretary-General’s recommendation regarding the drawing down of UNMIL’s military component;
• adopting a resolution renewing the mandate but making the drawing down of the military component of the mission contingent on the security situation in the country, particularly on the border with Côte d’Ivoire; and
• in either case, including a strong message to the Liberian authorities regarding the acute need for institutional reforms is a further option.

Council Dynamics
While Council members are generally impressed by the performance of Liberia’s economy since 2006, there are growing concerns that critical governance and security areas in the country are being overlooked. While some fear that the timeline set by the Secretary-General for UNMIL’s military drawdown may be unrealistic, there is a feeling that a strong message ought to be sent to the Liberian authorities to make important political decisions, and to start taking over security responsibilities across the country.

The US leads on Liberia in the Council.

Afghanistan

Expected Council Action
The Council is scheduled to hold its quarterly debate on the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in September. Jan Kubiš, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNAMA, is expected to brief. At press time, no outcome to the meeting was anticipated. The mandate of UNAMA expires on 23 March 2013.

Key Recent Developments
A spate of violent incidents occurred throughout Afghanistan in July and August. On 9 July, a roadside bomb killed five Afghan police officers in Bamyan province in the centre of the country. On the same day, insurgents attacked several targets in Kandahar city in the south, including a bank and the police headquarters; media reported that three police officers and 14 insurgents were killed.
Afghanistan (con't)

in the fighting, while numerous others were also wounded. Also on 9 July, a motorcycle bomb was detonated near the base of a militia force supported by NATO in Helmand province, killing five people and wounding another 13.

Afghan security forces and NATO on 10 July launched a series of operations throughout the country that led to the death of 12 insurgents and the detention of 20 suspected insurgents.

A suicide bomber killed 23 people and wounded 60 others at the 14 July wedding of the daughter of Ahmad Khan Samangani, an Afghan parliamentarian from the Uzbek ethnic group who had fought against the Taliban in the 1990s, in northern Samangan province. Samangani was one of several prominent figures killed in the attack, which also led to the deaths of Saeed Ahmad Sameh, a prominent police official, and Muhammed Khan, the provincial head of the intelligence services.

The Taliban carried out coordinated attacks on 14 and 15 August. In Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz province in the southwest corner of the country, suicide bombers killed 30 people and wounded 60. (During the attacks, three additional suicide bombers were killed and four others captured before they could set off their explosives.) In northern Kunduz province, 10 civilians died and 30 were injured when an explosive device was remotely detonated. In a press statement issued on 17 August (SC/10745), the Council condemned the attacks “in the strongest terms”.

A series of so-called “green on blue” attacks have occurred in recent weeks and months in which Afghan security forces have shot their NATO trainers. More than 40 of these attacks have occurred thus far in 2012. After six NATO troops were killed in such “green on blue” violence in two separate incidents on 10 August in Helmand province, NATO instituted measures to enhance the protection of its trainers. NATO troops are now expected to have a loaded magazine in their guns at all times. Additionally, one or more NATO soldiers—whose identities will not be disclosed—are expected to watch closely the actions of Afghan trainees during joint activities. Nonetheless, in spite of these efforts, an Afghan soldier killed two US troops on 27 August in Helmand Province after an argument occurred in the midst of a joint US-Afghan patrol.

On 21 August, insurgents fired two rockets into the Bagram US airbase. Shrapnel from the rocket fire hit and damaged a cargo plane that had been carrying US General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was visiting the base at the time. A helicopter was also hit. It is unclear whether General Dempsey was the target of the attack.

Two other violent incidents occurred in Helmand on 26 August. Insurgents shot and killed 10 Afghan troops in Washir District at a check point. A spokesperson for the provincial governor said that the attack had been planned by insurgents who had infiltrated Afghan security forces. In a separate incident, 17 civilians were killed while holding a party in a Taliban stronghold. Media reports indicate that the victims, who either had their throats slit or were decapitated, may have been targeted because they worked for the local government.

The Council held its last debate on Afghanistan on 27 June. Briefing the Council, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous urged members to support the “Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees”, the outcome of the May International Conference on the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (with the support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan held this meeting in Geneva). The resulting strategy is designed to support the voluntary return and reintegration of Afghan refugees in a sustainable manner and, according to the joint communiqué issued at the conference, rests on three pillars: “continued support for voluntary repatriation, investment in sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan and assistance to host countries.” Ladsous also expressed concern about the rise in targeting of civilians, noting that insurgents were “responsible for up to 80 percent of civilian casualties.” He further cautioned that, given budgetary constraints, UNAMA’s 2013 budget “will reflect the overall need for cuts that have been requested by member states.”

Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, also addressed the Council during the debate. Fedotov noted that approximately 90 percent of the world’s opiates are produced in Afghanistan. He added that he had told Afghan President Hamid Karzai that addressing this problem needed to be a “national priority” and that Karzai concurred.

On 3 July, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apologised for the cross-border aerial bombardment in November 2011 in which US forces pursuing insurgents from Afghanistan into Pakistan accidentally killed 24 Pakistani troops. Following that incident, Pakistan closed two key NATO supply routes into Afghanistan, which it reopened only in the aftermath of Clinton’s statement. On 8 July, several thousand protestors in Islamabad and other Pakistani cities rallied against the reopening of the supply lines.

An international conference on Afghanistan was held in Tokyo on 8 July. Donors pledged more than $16 billion in civilian assistance to Afghanistan through 2015, as well as committed to provide support through 2017 at or close to levels of the past decade. Afghanistan and its international partners agreed to a “mutual accountability framework” through which Afghanistan affirmed its commitment to the rule of law, human rights, effective financial management and good governance while the international community promised to enhance the effectiveness of its aid delivery. (Improved aid effectiveness includes such measures as increasing the percentage of aid aligned with Afghan government-established priorities, as well as of contributions directly to the national budget.) The Council welcomed the conference in a press statement issued on 24 July (SC/10722).

On 22 July, the World Bank made a grant of $125 million to the government of Afghanistan to help improve roads and build bridges in rural areas of the country. The grant will support the Afghanistan Rural Access Project, which strives to make basic services more readily available to the population by increasing the number of Afghans residing within two kilometres of all-weather roads.
Human Rights-Related Developments

UNAMA released its mid-year report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on 8 August. Covering the first six months of 2012, the report documented 1,145 civilians killed and 1,954 injured in conflict-related violence. Of the 3,099 civilians killed or wounded, 925 were women or children. The report also recorded 34 attacks against schools and closures of schools, particularly those for girls. Commenting on the findings, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay stressed the importance of holding human rights violators accountable in efforts to bring down the number of civilian casualties. Pillay observed that impunity for human rights abuses only emboldened the perpetrators.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is how to address the extremely challenging security situation in Afghanistan, especially the targeting of civilians by insurgents. A related issue is how to curtail the recent attacks on international troops by Afghan security forces whom they are training. Another related issue is the need to reinvigorate reconciliation efforts between the government and the Taliban.

An additional key issue is how best to encourage international actors to stay engaged with rebuilding Afghanistan and to ensure that both Afghanistan and its international partners fulfil commitments made through the Tokyo conference’s mutual accountability framework.

An ongoing important issue is the need to address the national and regional implications to peace and security of the production and distribution of opiates within and outside Afghanistan.

A further key issue is how the Council can most effectively support the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees, building on the Geneva conference held in early May.

Options

Options for the Council include:
• listening to the briefing without taking action at the current time;
• inviting a representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to brief the Council on the implementation of the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees;
• inviting the High Commissioner for Human Rights to brief on protection of civilians issues; and
• requesting from the Secretary-General a strategic plan for UN support for reconciliation efforts.

Council Dynamics

There is widespread support within the Council for promoting good governance, human rights, reconciliation and development in Afghanistan, issues key to UNAMA’s mandate. Council members also broadly recognise that the meaningful long-term support of the international community will be necessary to help Afghanistan overcome its economic, political and security challenges in the years to come. In light of the needs of Afghanistan, Pakistan has expressed concern with potential budget cuts to UNAMA and the possible impact this could have on the mission’s effectiveness.

The difficult security environment, the drug trade and Afghan refugees are among key concerns of Council members. Several Council members, concerned with violence resulting from insurgent attacks, have emphasised the importance of strengthening the Afghan security forces, especially as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) draws down its military commitment. Russia has argued that inappropriate behaviour by foreign troops and accidental civilian deaths caused by airstrikes have fuelled instability in Afghanistan. It also notes that combatting the production and distribution of drugs should be a key priority of the government. Pakistan, which hosts approximately 1.7 million Afghan refugees, highlights the importance of the “Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees”.

Germany is the lead country in the Council on Afghanistan.

Afghanistan (con’t)

Expected Council Action

In September, the Council is due to receive a quarterly briefing from Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), the chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee (1737 Committee), on its work since the last briefing (12 June).

The Council does not usually take action following these regular briefings.

Key Recent Developments

On 7 June, the Council adopted resolution 2049, extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1737 Committee for thirteen months (until 9 July 2013). In the resolution the Council expressed its intention to review the PoE’s mandate at least one month before its expiry. The wording of the mandate renewal and the reporting requirement for the PoE is essentially identical to the previous year’s resolution: it requests a midterm report to the Council by 9 December and a final report to the Council following the completion of its mandate (after the report has first been discussed at the Committee level).

In a 6 July letter to the President of the Council (S/2012/521), the Secretary-General reappointed the eight members of the PoE. (The experts each have discrete expertise,
such as in “customs enforcement” and “missile technology.” All the P5 have a national on the PoE, the other three are from Germany, Japan, and Japan.)

On 9 July, Ambassador Osorio, as chair of the 1737 Committee, and Salomé Zourabichvili (France)—the coordinator of the PoE—briefed interested member states on the activities of both the Committee and the PoE. In remarks to the press afterwards, Osorio said that it had been important to reach out to the membership at large, as members’ strong support made the Committee’s work more effective and allowed the wider membership to better understand the provisions set out in Council resolutions.

Additionally, Osorio said that while he was encouraged that some states had submitted national implementation reports concerning sanctions on Iran (as required by Council resolutions), more needed to be done to improve the reporting rate. (For example, the Committee had received reports from only 80 member states under the most recent round of sanctions on Iran, resolution 1929.)

In political developments, discussions with Iran about its nuclear programme have been downgraded to the technical level since the high-level talks in Moscow on 18-19 June between the P5+1 (the permanent members and Germany) and Iran ended without a breakthrough. Iranian and EU officials met in Istanbul on 3 July and on 24 July.

On 2 August, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, who leads the P5+1 delegation, spoke for the first time since the Moscow talks with her counterpart, Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. In a statement following the telephone conversation, Ashton said that she impressed on Iran the need to address the issues raised “in order to build confidence,” and that the two agreed to talk again by the end of August.

Since negotiations recommenced this year in April in Istanbul, it seems the gap that separates the two sides in terms of their demands has not narrowed substantially. The P5+1’s request in the negotiations has essentially been three-fold, namely that Iran should:

- halt all 20 percent uranium enrichment;
- remove all stockpiles of 20-percent-enriched uranium in a swap agreement; and
- shut down the Fordow uranium-enrichment facility.

Iran on the other hand says it seeks recognition of its “inalienable rights” to peaceful nuclear energy and the right to enrich uranium. Tehran also seeks, inter alia, a lifting of sanctions against it. (Since 1 July, an EU oil ban against Iran has been in effect and— together with ever-tightening US sanctions—the current restrictions are the toughest that have ever been in place against Iran. In August, Standard Chartered Bank, which has its headquarters in London, agreed to pay a $340 million fine to New York State regulators following allegations that the bank had broken US sanctions on Iran. Several other European financial institutions are also reportedly being investigated by US authorities for possible illicit transactions with Iran.)

Following speculation this year as to whether Israel was considering unilateral strikes against Iran, President Shimon Peres said in a 16 August television interview in Israel that the country could not successfully undertake such a mission alone. The interview was reportedly broadcast hours after Defence Minister Ehud Barak told the Knesset that the risks of dealing with Iran today would be smaller and less costly than dealing with a nuclear Iran further down the track. While the presidential office is largely ceremonial, Peres’ remarks were interpreted as criticism of the conservative government’s rhetoric concerning a strike against Iran.

On 24 August, talks between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran in Vienna did not result in an agreement concerning access to Iran’s Parchin military site, nor did the two sides set another meeting date. Access to the site has been an ongoing priority for the IAEA as it believes Iran may have conducted tests there relevant to the development of nuclear weapons capability.

In late August, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attended the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran after much debate about his attendance. (Iran assumed the rotating presidency of the grouping for three years during the summit.)

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The Secretary-General’s report on “The Question of the Death Penalty,” which will be considered by the Human Right Council (HRC) in September, raises several serious concerns about Iran. It highlights the high number of executions and the new anti-narcotics law that came into force in 2011, expanding the application of the death penalty to new drug-related offences. (The HRC’s special rapporteur on human rights in Iran has reported that there were 670 executions in Iran in 2011, of which 81 percent were of drug offenders, including people believed to be under 18 at the time the offence was committed.) The report acknowledges that the new Islamic Penal Code, adopted by the parliament in January, states that juveniles below 18 years of age will not be sentenced to death if the court decides that the offender did not have adequate mental maturity and ability to reason. The report notes, however, that despite this limitation, the new code has retained the death penalty in almost all instances that were punishable under the previous measure and has expanded its scope in some cases.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for Council members is finding a diplomatic solution to the present impasse vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear programme.

Related issues for the Council are Iran’s inconsistent cooperation with the IAEA and ensuring that Iran fulfils its responsibilities as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

A further issue for the Council, particularly given that two elected members border Iran (Azerbaijan and Pakistan), is ensuring that tensions in the region do not escalate to the point where coercive measures are employed.

**Options**

Due to the dynamics among its permanent members, it is unlikely that the Council itself will take steps aimed at further pressuring Tehran to reach a negotiated settlement.

At the Committee level, however, members could follow up on the 11 recommendations in the PoE’s final report, including the designation of an Iranian cargo airline and Iran’s SAD Import-Export Company for engaging in prohibited arms exports activity with Iran.

Another recommendation by the PoE that the Committee could act upon is addressing the discrepancies between the lists of individuals originally designated under Council
resolutions (such as the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and those who currently hold those positions identified in the designations.

Furthermore, the Committee could work with the Secretariat to look into how the PoE could cooperate with other groups of experts assisting other sanctions committees.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Despite the fact that the P5+1 are represented as one group in the ongoing talks with Tehran, deep divisions exist among them on Iran. The increasingly stringent sanctions being imposed outside UN auspices by the US and EU, as part of a dual-track approach to both apply pressure and engage diplomatically, are not welcomed by some members. China in particular has publicly voiced concerns at recently introduced US sanctions that target foreign banks—including Chinese banks—that deal with blacklisted Iranian institutions. Russia, too, has warned of the “extraterritorial effect” of such sanctions. Several members, including China, consistently reiterate that sanctions ought not to be an end in themselves. Although others—including EU members—agree with that principle, they emphasise that sanctions are important in hastening a negotiated solution.

Several Council members emphasise the need for Iran to abide by earlier resolutions and for it to cooperate with the IAEA. Ensuring effective implementation of existing measures against Iran is likely to be a primary focus.

The US is the lead in the Council on Iran.

Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action

In September the Council is expected to hold an open debate on children and armed conflict. (Germany, the Council president for September, is also the chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.) The new Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous are expected to brief. It is also possible that a representative from civil society may speak.

The debate is expected to focus on the Secretary-General’s recent report on children and armed conflict (S/2012/261) with particular attention being given to the issue of accountability and persistent perpetrators of violations against children in armed conflict. Germany is planning to circulate a background note ahead of the debate. A presidential statement is a likely outcome.

(For a more detailed analysis of the Council’s recent work on protection of children both thematically and in country-specific situations, please refer to our 27 August Cross-Cutting Report on Children and Armed Conflict.)

Key Recent Developments

On 9 July, France and Germany co-chaired an “Arria formula” meeting to discuss ways of dealing with parties to conflicts that have been listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual reports on children and armed conflict for more than five years for committing grave violations against children, parties otherwise known as persistent perpetrators. The briefers at the “Arria formula” meeting were the then Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, Prof. Cecile Aptel from Tufts University and Dr. Bijaya Sainju from Partnerships to Protect Children in Armed Conflict (PPCC), an NGO network from Nepal.

The 11th Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict for the first time listed parties for attacks on schools and hospitals in its annexes in accordance with resolution 1998 adopted on 12 July 2011. It also removed three parties from and added five new parties to its annexes. Among the groups listed in the two annexes are nine government security forces (Afghanistan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) and 42 non-state armed groups. (Secretary-General’s reports contain two annexes: Annex I lists armed conflict situations that are on the Council’s agenda while Annex II consists of armed conflict situations not on the Council’s agenda but considered situations of concern for children.)

In the report, the Secretary-General encouraged the Council to put increasing pressure on persistent perpetrators and to consider applying targeted sanctions, expanding designation criteria for grave violations against children to all relevant Security Council sanctions committees and studying ways of imposing sanctions when there is no existing sanctions committee. He also suggested that greater cooperation between the Working Group and national and international courts may help address the problem of persistent perpetrators.

The Working Group has been deadlocked on the conclusions for the report on children and armed conflict in Sudan since the beginning of 2012. While the Working Group was able to come to an agreement on conclusions for South Sudan relatively easily, this was not the case for the Sudan conclusions. The main problem appears to be a lack of consensus on the issue of humanitarian access. At press time, discussions were continuing but no agreement had been reached. In the meantime, the Working Group has begun negotiating the conclusions for Colombia.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to address accountability, particularly in relation to persistent perpetrators. A related issue is whether there is a need...
to review the tools currently used to put pressure on the groups on the annexes to the Secretary-General’s reports.

A further issue is ensuring that more progress is made on adopting action plans concerning killing and maiming, sexual violence and attacks on schools and hospitals.

A longer-term issue is maintaining momentum on the progress in the work of the Working Group, in particular the adoption of its conclusions.

Options
The most likely option is a presidential statement addressing the issue of persistent perpetrators, reinforcing the need for accountability and requesting a report in 12 months.

As a follow-up to the debate, the Council’s options include:
- holding a meeting in the near future on the issue of persistent perpetrators;
- adding violations against children as criteria for imposition of sanctions to relevant sanctions regimes;
- ensuring relevant sanctions committees designate violators against children as targets for sanctions;
- considering ways of increasing interaction on the issue of children in armed conflict between the Council, the Secretariat, national courts and the International Criminal Court (ICC);
- requesting the Secretary-General to encourage governments to enforce national legislation to ensure there is no impunity for those accused of perpetrating violations against children; and
- requesting the Working Group to include a section with recommendations concerning persistent perpetrators in any conclusions it adopts.

Council Dynamics
Germany, which has been chair of the Working Group since January 2011, has worked with great efficiency, leading to the adoption of a record number of conclusions in the first half of 2011. However, the difficult negotiations leading to resolution 1998 were a warning sign of a more challenging time ahead for the children in armed conflict agenda. Over the last year, efforts made to close the time gap between the publication of the Secretary-General’s country-specific reports on children and armed conflict and the adoption of the corresponding conclusions by the Working Group have been considerably slowed down by the lack of consensus over the Sudan conclusions.

A number of the issues raised during the last debate, including “mandate creep” and the definition of “situations of concern” are likely to come up again. Given the current dynamics, most members do not have an appetite for any new decisions on this issue and do not appear to be looking for more than a reiteration of points made in previous Council decisions and a request for the next report.

There does, however, seem to be a degree of consensus that more needs to be done to put pressure on persistent perpetrators. Several Council members believe that the first step could be to ensure that all relevant sanctions regimes include violations of applicable international law involving children and armed conflict as grounds for designation for targeted measures. But there is likely to be disagreement over the idea of imposing sanctions on parties in Annex II, that is, on actors in situations that are not on the Council’s agenda. Most members also do not seem comfortable with the idea of a thematic sanctions regime or committee. The idea of involving the ICC and national courts may also meet with resistance from some members although no clear positions have emerged as yet.
### Notable Dates for September

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<tr>
<th>REPORT DUE</th>
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<tr>
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<td>SG report on Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>SG report UNSMIL (Libya)</td>
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<td>SG report on Mali and Integrated Sahel Strategy</td>
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### MANDATES EXPIRE

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<td>30 September</td>
<td>UNMIL (Liberia)</td>
<td>S/RES/2008</td>
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### OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

- **19 September** The Council is expected to hold an open debate on Children and Armed Conflict.
- **25 September** The General Assembly general debate will open.
- **26 September** The Council is expected to hold a high-level meeting on peace and security in the Middle East.
- **26 September** A high-level summit on Somalia is planned on the margins of the General Assembly.
- **26 September** The Secretary-General will host a high-level meeting on developments in the Sahel, including Mali, on the margins of the General Assembly.