European Interagency Security Forum

The European Interagency Security Forum is an independent platform for Security Focal Points from European humanitarian agencies operating overseas. EISF members are committed to improving the safety and security of relief operations and staff in a way that allows greater access to and impact for crisis-affected populations.

The Forum was created to establish a more prominent role for security management in international humanitarian operations. It provides a space for NGOs to collectively improve security management practice, and facilitates exchange between members and other bodies such as the UN, institutional donors, research institutions, training providers and a broad range of international NGOs.

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About the Author

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As a NGO security professional with more than 20 years of experience I consider it important and essential for the humanitarian and development community to include gender considerations in every aspect of risk analysis, policy and programme implementation.

Men tend to occupy work positions within the NGO sector where their level of exposure to certain threats, often violent, puts them at a high level of security risk. They face immeasurable pressure to assert their masculinity in almost all operating situations. Because of this tendency and through undertaking their day-to-day work responsibilities, they can be inherently more vulnerable. Meanwhile, women working in development and emergency response are too often confronted with organisational programme requirements, which - when combined with the cultural aspects of the environment in developing countries - restricts or diminishes their role and limits their effectiveness to do their job. In addition, women coming from outside the local community frequently find themselves vulnerable in a number of ways – within the structure of the NGO itself, culturally within the local community, and as a result of a misguided perception that women are more vulnerable because of a lack of physical strength. Additionally, female national staff often find themselves at risk because of their association with a ‘Western’ organisation.

This important briefing paper by the EISF recognises the different risks that male and female NGO staff might be exposed to when working in the field. It highlights how gender is about both men and women. Therefore men and women must be considered as equally instrumental in the understanding, promotion and operationalisation of gender considerations throughout both humanitarian and development programming and security.

I personally have noticed the under-representation of women within the ranks of NGO security professionals. Few women work as full-time NGO security specialists or security focal points due to cultural issues and the environment in which NGOs are engaged. As a result, women continue to be forced to take a back seat. Consequently, the people who make up the majority of staff within the NGO community are required to work within an environment which can severely limit their contributions and very often places them at more risk. I believe that it is of utmost important to try to diversify the profile of security professionals and reach greater gender balance within the NGO security sector. As highlighted throughout the EISF paper, a more diversified work team, where every staff member (irrespective of gender, nationality, work experience) feels included and heard will only contribute to a more effective workforce and ultimately better implementation of programmes.

I hope the reader will enjoy this paper as much as I did when first reading it. Part 1 of the paper provides interesting insight into the complexities surrounding gender and security, particularly clarifying confusion around the concept and the interrelation between gender, security, programming and staffing issues. For those readers with less time to spare I can recommend going straight into Part 2 where useful and comprehensive tools are provided which can help to mainstream gender in your organisations’ security risk management practices. Good luck with this important endeavour, as to quote this paper: ‘gender-sensitive security considerations continue to be developed, so [that] good and holistic security risk management practices will continue to evolve.’

Robert MacPherson
13 August 2012

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The consideration of gender in security risk management is very important, given the reality that men and women face varying levels of exposure to specific situational threats (e.g. male staff are statistically more affected by violent crimes, while female staff are more affected by sexual offences, theft and burglary). The differences in gendered behaviour, bias, and learning have a direct impact on the security of the individual and the agency team. Specifically, the way in which staff perceive, understand, internalise and accept security informs how they can become exposed and how they may react in various situations. We should also acknowledge from the outset the impact of external factors (cultural, political, historical, overall level of security, etc.) on levels of risk faced by individuals and agencies.

This research has found that there are widely differing levels of comprehension of what gender means in security practices and within the wider sphere of humanitarian/development assistance and operating environments. This indicates the need to broaden current thinking on gender and how this should be integrated in security management thinking and approaches. The issue of gender (and often by immediate association gender-based violence (GBV)) is an emotional and divisive subject that triggers deeper perceptions, internalised fears, repression, insecurities, experiences, embarrassment and injustices. Aversion and deficiencies related to addressing gender are mostly rooted in the misunderstanding of its true meaning and applicability across all spectrums of society, including humanitarian assistance and organisational culture/practices.

The complexity of gender considerations in security goes beyond the common understanding that it is simply a relative vulnerability. ‘A gendered security risk management framework considers what it socially and personally means to be a man, what it means to be a woman, transgendered or inter-sexed’. It is about gaining perspective on the priorities of female and male staff, national and international, as they conduct humanitarian and development activities as safely and securely as possible, in a particular social and cultural context.

A gendered approach to security includes reconciling the internal and external contexts of an individual: how are internal systems of beliefs, identification, and values tested against the external environment of operational culture, colleagues and context?

Organisational culture, leadership and policy are vital in clarifying and promoting how gender informs all aspects of programming and staff safety and security. Gender-sensitive approaches must be strategically adapted, not muted, within each specific context. Our ability to better deal with threats comes from having a supportive and effective management culture that promotes open communication, equality, and collective and inclusive problem solving and from having an enabling, accessible and transparent reporting and response system.

The significant efforts made over the last decade toward the development of NGO security risk management culture and methodologies are commendable. However, in the course of this research many concerns were raised by survey and interview participants about how the existing security risk management framework, terminology and approach are often still predicated on a military model, which is inherently patriarchal. This highlights the need to continue building on the notion of a gendered approach to security risk management, which may in fact propose a paradigm shift in thinking and practices.

This shift requires that our current security methodology should consider gendered security practices that are inclusive of a more holistic gender-influenced assessment and approach that ensures that the integrity of the agency and individual is not compromised. A gendered security management approach is inclusive of men, women, transgendered and inter-sexed people and is informed by their needs, perspectives and solutions. It builds upon their strengths and experiences and delves deeper into the behavioural tendencies of agency staff and the people they work with, which are often contributing factors exacerbating gender-related risk.

Executive summary

The consideration of gender in security risk management is very important, given the reality that men and women face varying levels of exposure to specific situational threats (e.g. male staff are statistically more affected by violent crimes, while female staff are more affected by sexual offences, theft and burglary). The differences in gendered behaviour, bias, and learning have a direct impact on the security of the individual and the agency team. Specifically, the way in which staff perceive, understand, internalise and accept security informs how they can become exposed and how they may react in various situations. We should also acknowledge from the outset the impact of external factors (cultural, political, historical, overall level of security, etc.) on levels of risk faced by individuals and agencies.

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1 Based on data from UNICEF 2011 and Wilie & Feld 2011
2 Excerpt from interview with Jane Barry
Previous research has shown that gender has been inconsistently incorporated into security analysis, threat and vulnerability assessment and consequent mitigation strategies within humanitarian and development organisations (Gaul et al. 2006; Speers Mears 2009). Gender-specific risk considerations are about both women and men. ‘Gender neutrality’ as a concept aims to erase social differences between gender groups by moving away from stereotypes, stereotypical attitudes, behaviour and habits. Some agencies prefer gender-neutral policies and procedures. However, in reality and in practice, this is very difficult to achieve given the multitude of operational and human resource (HR) variables. This research by the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) proposes complementary NGO guidelines for mainstreaming gender into security risk management, filling a gap in the existing literature, and providing vital guidance at the operational level.

The paper’s objectives are to:

1. Raise general awareness about gender and how it relates to security risk management, describing:
   - How gender is a relative vulnerability, to be examined alongside other risk factors such as nationality, ethnicity etc;
   - The complex relationship of gender with contextual realities including social norms and mores, religious beliefs and practices and culture;
   - How gender is a cross-cutting issue that informs current methodologies relating to all aspects of humanitarian/development operations and security/HR management;
2. Provide gender-specific considerations and guidance for both headquarter and country/field level that can be integrated into and/or complement the existing security risk management framework.

The gender-specific considerations presented in this document relate to people of all gender identities (women, men, transgendered and inter-sexed people) and sexual orientation (heterosexual, lesbian, gay and bisexual).

Outline

The paper is divided into two parts, related to the paper’s objectives:

Part 1 is a comprehensive overview of conceptual and theoretical considerations relevant to creating more awareness and a common understanding of gender considerations in security.

Part 2 provides several practical tools and guidance (checklists, frameworks etc.) that can be integrated into existing security practices.

Part 1 Conceptual and theoretical considerations in gender and security

Section 1: This section gives a conceptual overview of the importance of gender within security risk management approaches and practices. It touches on key gender-related security considerations and provides an overview of aid worker perceptions of gender-related risk both context-specific and globally. Finally, the relationship between gender equality and security management is elaborated upon.

Section 2: This section touches on the complexities of gender and security when considering the intersection of agency, operating culture and the individual. Although it is challenging to reconcile all three dimensions, it is not impossible.

Section 3: This section delves into concrete ways to integrate additional gender considerations during context and risk assessments. It also provides insight into the accuracy of assessments and subsequent measures for reducing risk.

Section 4: This final section is about the implementation of gender-sensitive security mechanisms such as training, security procedures, incident reporting and recovery.
Part 2 Guidance tools
A. Looking through the gender lens: general profiles of agency personnel
B. Guidance for gender-sensitive security risk assessment
C. Gendered risk analysis
D. Gender-specific considerations in security risk mitigation
E. Gender-based violence – assessing, preventing and case management
F. Good practice in gender-sensitive incident reporting and complaints mechanisms for reporting SEA
G. Gendered training considerations – sample modules

Throughout the briefing paper, quotes are inserted to highlight practical issues, examples and experiences. These are derived from responses to the questionnaires, key informant interviews and document reviews.

Methodology

Background research
Documents reviewed included several published reports on gender and security related issues, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidance and principles documents (on gender, gender-based violence etc.). The security policies of several agencies, guidance and procedure documents and a multitude of websites were consulted in the course of this research. All materials (except for internal organisational policies) are referenced at the end of the document.

Online survey and questionnaires
Three survey/questionnaires were distributed globally and made available online in order to capture a cross-section of humanitarian and development workers and agencies. The main survey (made available in both English and French) targeted all agency field staff. The second was adapted for country office management and security officers/local points (SFPs), while the third questionnaire was directed to various agency headquarters (incl. EISF Members).

Field staff (all positions including programming, gender specialists etc.)
A total of 95 individuals (42 men, 51 women, 2 respondents of unknown gender) responded to the research survey. Of this total, 11 were national staff, 25 were local staff and 46 international staff. 12 respondents did not identify with a staff group title. 48% of the field respondents had six or more years of working experience. A total of 27 organisations were represented in the survey of which 42% were agencies that were multi-missioned (conducting both humanitarian and development work).

Country office management and security staff
A total of 31 respondents (10 women, 20 men and 1 of unknown gender) from country offices that represented over 10 different agencies completed the questionnaire. Of the 31 respondents, eight were local staff, three national staff and 17 international staff of which 58% had six or more years of experience. Respondents varied in positions from head of mission, security officers to HR personnel etc. 45% of the respondents identified their agency as multi-missioned.

Agency headquarters (incl. EISF members)
28 headquarter staff representing 16 different organisations (75% multi-missioned) completed the survey of which 50% were women and 50% were men. Respondents (of which 79% have six or more years of experience) varied from global security directors (or SFPs) to programme managers, gender and protection advisors, knowledge management personnel etc.

Fig 1: Geographic distribution of country office and field staff respondents (HQ responses not included)

3 Several EISF members shared their policies and procedures to inform this research and we are very grateful for their willingness to be open and transparent. The organisation’s policies and procedures consulted included those of Carei, Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Oxfam GB, Care International, World Vision and Christian Aid.
4 Personnel that are nationals from the country they are working in, but that are stationed in an office/area away from their identified home.
5 Staff that are working in the area of home origin.
Key informant interviews
Over 26 individuals (45% men and 55% women in both HQ and field positions) were interviewed over Skype, in person and by phone. They represented a diverse cross-section of security, research, emergency, psychosocial, human rights and gender specialists, with close links to humanitarian and development assistance.

Focus group discussions – Pakistan and Afghanistan
Four focus group discussions were facilitated in Pakistan and Afghanistan based on a detailed facilitation script. Staff participating comprised national and local personnel. Each group was segregated by sex and all measures were taken during focus group discussions to assure safety, confidentiality and respect.

Data limitations
The data collected in the course of the research via questionnaires and interviews largely comprises anecdotal evidence. Although no hard conclusions can be drawn given the variables, time and geographic constraints, an important diversity (geographic, organisational, gender, job positions etc.) was captured that adequately supports the main findings and overall issues on gender in security risk management.
Part 1

Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations in Gender and Security
Effective humanitarian and development programming requires the consideration of gender. Given that security and programming are closely interrelated and interdependent, security equally requires a robust gendered approach and attention to gender-specific vulnerabilities. A gendered approach to security risk management would lead to improved practices in assessing, implementing and reaching compliance to safety and security guidelines and policy. A gendered approach is a human-centred approach, considering that men and women face specific risks that may or may not, depending on situation-specific factors, influence or exacerbate the extent of violence toward the individual.

Gendered security approaches benefit NGO security risk management discourse, since they cover the spectrum from knowledge and tools to facilitating working with and managing people. It therefore includes access to information, consultation, accurate risk assessment, more effective training and compliance. Gender is an important vulnerability and therefore directing specific attention to gender-specific vulnerabilities provides an opportunity to better analyse contributing factors, so that gender-related risk can be more effectively reduced.

1.1 Key gender considerations in NGO security risk management

The gap in basic comprehension and importance of gender is influenced by various factors, including:

- culture and nationality
- religion/beliefs
- level of education
- influence by dominating gender groups in a society.

Gender cannot be separated from culture, class, ethnicity, age, religion, conditioned expectations of physical appearances (hair, dress, stance, mannerisms), behavioural tendencies, etc.

What is gender?

The IASC 2006 report defines gender as follows: “The term gender refers to the social differences between female and males (including Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Inter-sexed – LGBTI) throughout the life cycle that are learned, and though deeply rooted in every culture, are changeable over time and have wide variations between cultures. “Gender” determines the roles, power and resources for females and males (LGBTI in any culture’ (IASC 2006a: 1).

Gender does not only relate to women

Gender is commonly perceived as an issue relating only to women and so can evoke emotion and bias. Respondents to the HQ questionnaire also showed a tendency to view gender as a woman’s issue when asked about gender and security. Generally, more male than female respondents thought that gender and security related only to women’s risks. Confusion about terminology, and the common perception that addressing gender issues goes against the norm in certain societies, has contributed to the gap in the integration of gender within humanitarian and development assistance.

Gender considerations allow us to identify the vulnerabilities of both women and men. Although historical and existing gradients of gender inequality and vulnerability have most affected women, agencies are increasingly aware of the specific needs and vulnerabilities of men. This is particularly relevant when considering the current safety and security risk management framework and tendencies in security approaches for NGOs. Insecurity Insight’s latest research provides some first, tentative findings indicating a need for more comprehensive gender analysis in incident reporting. According to the research ‘a higher proportion of men face specific vulnerabilities that proportionally fewer women experience and vice versa’ (Wille & Fast 2011). Additional research has also brought to light the specific security threats that each gender group faces, thereby stressing that gender is relevant to both men and women (Gaul et al. 2006; Speers Mears 2009; UNICEF 2011).
Gender in relation to other factors

Gender is an important vulnerability in any risk assessment. However, to categorise gender as just a ‘risk factor’ reduces the larger dimension that gender is inherently intertwined with all aspects of the operating context, as well as the agency culture and programming. It is also at the core of a person’s identity, physiological tendencies, internalised beliefs and understanding (not acceptance) of imposed societal status and related gender roles. The perception others may hold about an individual’s gender and the gender attributed to individual staff members represents one of many factors that increases exposure to security events, the level of physical and psychological impact and ways of dealing with them.

Donor attention to gender

Many donors are increasingly asking for the integration of gender equality and gendered risk assessment into programme design. This is particularly true for agencies that focus on gender-based programming (e.g. food security for female-headed households, education for girls, human rights, GBV programming) as they may face resistance from extremely conservative actors in specific operating environments. The security risk management framework most commonly used by agencies (GPR8 2010), must continue to promote this interrelation between security and programming, and how security can be better mainstreamed within programmes. This is particularly relevant when carried out in conjunction with programme risk assessment.

Definition of gender-sensitive security risk management

Gender-sensitive security risk management thus reflects that gender considerations should be an integral part of decision-making in policy development, application of approaches and use of resources that frame organisational security management. This framework recognises the different, specific security needs, experiences, issues and priorities of all individuals. Acting on this awareness, the agency aims to adequately reduce the level of risk and achieve equitable levels of security and safety for all personnel, including all gender groups.

1.2 Perceptions of gender-specific security risks

Field survey perceptions

According to the field staff survey, slightly more men than women think that national staff and international staff are equally at risk in their current operating situation. Generally, around 50% of the respondents felt that both international staff and national staff are equally at risk. Local staff respondents had the highest proportion (72%) that mentioned that national and international staff are equally at risk.

The following graph illustrates the ‘perception’ of which gender group is seen as most at risk in the operating environment. Overall, female staff in all categories are seen as more at risk. Women perceive female international staff as most at risk. Men perceived female local staff to be at higher risk. High numbers of both male and female respondents saw no differences between international female/male staff. A high number in each respondent group (national, local, and international) indicated that they believe there are no big differences between men and women within their own group. National staff tended to hold that female international staff were most at risk (64%).

Fig 2: Perception of field staff
Which gender group is most at risk?
Overall, the majority (>75%) of field staff survey respondents feel exposed to security risks. The top five security threats to which staff feel exposed are:
1. theft/burglary,
2. armed robbery,
3. kidnapping/abduction,
4. verbal threats/harassment and
5. collateral damage.

Field survey respondents felt that being a woman or man increased their exposure to specific threats. Women were seen as more vulnerable to harassment, gender-based violence and sexual harassment. Also, they were seen as slightly more at risk for verbal threats and theft/burglary, while men were perceived as slightly more at risk for death threats. Field staff felt that women and men face similar risks of kidnapping/abduction, collateral damage, armed robbery, extortion/bribery and physical assault.

Country office management and security staff perceptions

Fig 3: Country office perception
Which gender group is most exposed to security threats?

Survey results indicated that HQ and country office management/security staff rate the following as the most prevalent threats that they and/or their colleagues were exposed to:
- traffic accidents
- gender-based violence (inclusive of sexual harassment)
- theft
- kidnapping/abduction
- collateral damage

Perceptions about women as opposed to men

Case Study 1 – Pakistan
Summary from in-country focus group discussions

In some situations, men are more at risk (e.g. to targeted crimes motivated by tribal feuds, ethnic or political reactions, or even kidnapping). However, due to cultural and social sensitivities, women are at risk of harassment, mental stress, pressure to perform better than men (as they feel they are constantly being judged), personal image and reputation related to social stereotyping, health issues, family concerns, increased vulnerability and lack of training in dealing with security threats.

Women are also more vulnerable to crime because of their gender. Criminals and offenders consider them to be an easier target due to their physiology and, in most cases, their lack of ability to fight back, escape or to overpower the threatening element. Moreover, in the case of women, criminals are motivated by not one but two motives – criminal and power motives (often sexual violence) – which increase the probability of crimes against women (e.g. in many cases mugging would be coupled with sexual assault, or abduction would be coupled with sexual assault and rape).

Women also don’t talk about their concerns and threats very openly for the fear of being stigmatised, or considered ‘less professional’ than their male counterparts.

The correlation between the perceptions of the aid workers surveyed and interviewed and the context-specific status of women cannot be ignored. Although gender considerations relate to women, men and LGBTI, the perception that women were more vulnerable (and thus vulnerable to GBV) was overwhelming. Overall, agencies need to actively work on increasing awareness that gender is equally relevant to women, men and other identities.
Box 1 – Gender-based violence (GBV), harassment, and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)

**Gender-based violence** (inclusive of sexual violence) is an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between females and males (or LGBTI identity). The nature and extent of specific types of GBV vary across cultures, countries and regions. Examples include sexual violence, including sexual exploitation/abuse and forced prostitution; domestic violence; trafficking; forced/early marriage; harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation; honour killings; and widow inheritance. Other forms of GBV include forced recruitment of men, women, and children (IASC 2006b).

GBV is at the forefront of many humanitarian workers’ concerns. Women are especially vulnerable but it can, and often does, occur to men (for example within the prison system, or in forced recruitment etc.). Incidents of GBV are often traumatic and are one of the most feared types of security incident. GBV is a major assault on the person’s physical, psychological and emotional integrity.

GBV considerations are twofold. First, GBV prevention and response should be integrated into all sectors – the assessment, design, delivery and monitoring of programmes – to prevent further harm and the exposure of beneficiaries to GBV. The second consideration is the level of exposure to GBV of agency staff members when carrying out their work or within the workplace, often within established relationships, and by extension, the domestic occurrence that may be related to the individual’s work or association to the organisation. For GBV within the workplace, stringent awareness, prevention and reporting mechanisms must be instituted. The existence of GBV in both programming and in the exposure of staff members must be assumed. The lack of quantitative data should not serve to ignore this life-threatening issue (See Part 2: Guidance Tool E for additional guidance on assessment, prevention and response to GBV).

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) are forms of gender-based violence that have been widely reported in humanitarian situations (IASC 2006a). While SEA can be perpetuated by anyone, the term SEA has been used in reference to sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by both civilian and uniformed peacekeeping personnel of non-UN and UN organisations.

SEA occurs when a position of power (such as being a staff member of an NGO) is used for sexual purposes against a beneficiary or vulnerable member of the community. Sexual harassment occurs when differences in power between staff members are abused (verbally, through touch, use of inappropriate images, etc.). However, sexual harassment is prevalent within the wider community and low levels of harassment are often shrugged off because of self-doubt, fear of reporting and burdening, and because it is not well explained and understood.

Accountability on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) stems from the IASC Guidelines (derived from the UN Secretary General’s bulletin on PSEA) and Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) Standards (UN 2003 & HAP International 2010). Compliance to PSEA is currently also being requested from several donors. Reporting mechanisms, both community-based and internal, are being instituted, intersecting with security risk management. Complaints mechanisms must be established at field level and must be accessible, confidential, transparent and safe (see Guidance Tool F in Part 2 for how to implement an SEA complaints mechanism). The transfer of knowledge and understanding of codes of conduct concerning PSEA and, by extension harassment, could be improved through good leadership, training and clear messaging from all levels of the agency.

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8 See also: http://www.pseataskforce.org/
1.3 Reconciling gender equality with gender-specific security considerations

Gender equality is not a luxury or a privilege. It is grounded in international legal frameworks that include: international human rights law, women’s human rights (e.g. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325), children’s human rights, international humanitarian law etc.

Gender equality or equality between women and men refers to the equal enjoyment by females and males of all ages and regardless of sexual orientation of rights, socially valued goods, opportunities, resources and rewards. Gender equality does not mean that women and men are the same, but that their enjoyment of rights, opportunities, and life chances are not governed or limited by whether they were born female, male (IA SC 2006a: 1) or LGBTI. Protection is at the core of gender equality.

When looking at gender equality within security management and the operating context there could be a risk that the imposition of stringent security measures because of gender could be misunderstood as undermining gender equality. Gender equality in security management should be about ensuring that security and safety considerations are assessed and implemented in a way that enables the security of women, men and other identities while taking into account an analysis of their specific vulnerability, needs, and capacity.

The implementation of gender-specific security measures (or procedures) should not compromise gender equality. Perhaps this is where there are the most obvious gaps in reconciling an individual’s nationality/culture, the agency culture and the operating context. Reconciling does not imply submission or gross compromise of values and beliefs. It means that the individual can still retain their dignity and accept that they must modify their behaviour, dress or social interactions, for the benefit of demonstrating respect in order to gain acceptance and legitimacy with actors in the operating context. All in all, security measures should be informed by sound risk analysis and be instituted with the security of all agency personnel, assets, operations and beneficiaries in mind. Ultimately, these measures are put into place to ensure uninterrupted continuation of aid delivery.

There are situations where it is not acceptable to compromise: harassment, discrimination, measures not founded in accurate risk analysis (prompting further review of their legitimacy), and situations where the personal security threshold has been crossed.

Gender equality includes having a voice, ability to input and participate in decision-making. Although some security situations necessitate an autocratic approach (e.g. during crisis management), they still must be informed by gender-specific considerations. Consultations with a comprehensive cross-section of key personnel, beneficiaries, authorities and local population that reflect all gender groups is the key to both gaining understanding about where we work and how to work.

Case Study 2 – Iraq

There was some concern over the procedure that female international staff would be greeted at the airport in Iraq with an Abayah, veil and headscarf. Although they were uncomfortable with this at first, international female staff had been clearly made aware of this through pre-departure information. They were also given an outlet to comment and inquire if this was indeed critical for security, if there were other reasons for doing this, or if it was just easy to do. In the end, the security measure proved to be legitimate, given that international female staff (especially women from the United States) were the prime target for abduction.

Key informant interview

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9 A long black cloak worn over a dress and covering the wearer from head to foot – traditional in Iraq.
According to HQ and country office management/security respondents, the most significant complexities surrounding gender and security are (in order of importance):

1. Environments that are conservative or that subjugate women;
2. Pre-existing attitudes and bias of agency personnel, communities, beneficiaries etc.;
3. Lack of internal buy-in to gender sensitivity and agency gender principles;
4. Male dominance of security management;
5. Gender being considered to relate only to women; and,

This section examines all of these dimensions within a broader theme that includes the operating context, the agency culture and the individual.

2.1 Gender in the operational context

The context of operation is a key consideration when looking at how gender, gender issues and relations inform culture, religion and society. It may seem difficult to reconcile the agency culture and programmes with the operating culture.

Both state and non-state actors are increasingly using culture to ‘justify’ carrying out violence against women. When these acts are given legitimacy, whether at the international or regional levels, it promotes the idea that there is an inherent cultural right to execute violence amongst certain communities. This is patently unacceptable and must be rejected.

Excerpt from key messages of Violence is Not our Culture 10

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Fig 4. Interrelation between individual and organisational profiles with the operating context

### Operating context
- National laws, societal values, religions, ethnic groups
- Status of women/men, prevalence of GBV

### Organisation
- Policies, principles, codes of conduct, attention to gender equality and equity
- Programming (humanitarian, development, medical, sector-specific, human rights, gender equality integration)
- Security risk management practices

### Individual
- Sex
- Gender
- Nationality
- Beliefs
- Ethnicity
- Age
- Sexuality

10 Online global campaign to stop violence against women in the name of culture. See: [http://www.violenceisnotourculture.org/](http://www.violenceisnotourculture.org/)
A perfect balance will rarely be achieved. In reality there will be a constant rhythm, back and forth. When balancing organisational principles against the operating context it is important to be strategic and ethical and ensure that the integrity of the agency and personnel is maintained for the protection and needs of beneficiaries.

Programming and gender considerations: protection of beneficiaries and staff

With all these operating dimensions, the prevalence of neutrality is a must for our organisation, while keeping in mind that neutrality doesn’t mean to allow conduct that breaches our principles.

Country office respondent

You first have to understand their way of thinking and accept that you can only make progress with small steps. Your organisation/staff has to give the good example; you should start by making national staff fully aware of gender issues. You can work with people from the local community who can be examples. People have to understand why gender is important.

Field office respondent

It has been a big challenge to work in a society where talking about gender equality is highly sensitive. GBV is very common in the local communities. Our local volunteers, who are active citizens, play a gender role model in their own communities. They work and live with local communities and share good practices.

Field office respondent

The interrelation of security and programming is one of the most important considerations. An agency’s programmatic decisions and presence will influence power dynamics in a particular context. Gender-related programming can be especially contentious in contexts where rights of women and girls are not respected and where fundamentalist or conservative beliefs dominate society. Gendered programming often requires female staff to be able to talk to women beneficiaries – changing perception and therefore risk, particularly as women’s empowerment programmes can be seen as disempowering men. Programming that may face opposition and thus cause security concerns requires strategic considerations based on gaining important levels of acceptance with the local community. On the other hand, any reluctance on the part of NGO staff to challenge obvious women’s rights/gender equality issues and violations (for example by taking the view that ‘it’s their culture’) can compromise the agency’s integrity.

In the course of this research, some key informants expressed apprehension about programming for the prevention of GBV, as in some contexts and communities this might not be appreciated and can pose direct security risks. GBV is, however, life threatening. Organisations often establish thresholds of acceptable risk, balancing an agency’s capacities and the nature of the programmes it runs (life-saving vs. non-life saving). GBV prevention should be seen as life-saving work, potentially raising the threshold. This type of programming would require additional effort and investment of resources in acceptance, in particular as a security strategy, informed also by a sound programme analysis (see Part 2 Guidance Tool: B).
2.2 Agency culture

As a humanitarian organisation, gender has been seriously prioritised in our organisation. There is a clear gender policy and strategy for implementation and a clear policy linked on gender and security management.

[The policy is] not only concerned with gender imbalances and roles and needs, but also looks into how to make equal power relations between female and male staff, e.g. increasing numbers of men and women who are in decision-making positions; set up a gender task force group that works with the security focal point.

Country office respondent

Each humanitarian and development organisation has its own cultural profile and priorities that can potentially come into conflict with the operating context. Presence and programming will affect the surrounding environment and vice versa. In addition to the institutional culture and philosophy of the NGO, donors are increasingly demanding greater attention to gender equality in humanitarian and development programming, providing another reason to consider gender-sensitive security risk management.

An organisation’s policies, principles and strategic planning (either specifically for security, or for health and wellness, HR, programming etc.) can benefit from the inclusion of gender and how it informs humanitarian and development practice and agency culture. Naturally, the extent of this inclusion depends on how far gender equality is a priority for the organisation.

2.2.1 Policy, practices and codes of conduct

In general, less than half of the organisations interviewed had gender built into their security policies. 59% indicated that the integration of gender and gender equality would be considered in future policy revisions at HQ level. Almost all organisations had a code of conduct in which protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) was integrated.

The following are suggestions for examining the level of integration of gender into the agency’s security policies or related policies:

1. **Gender equality in programming:** the agency’s attention to prioritising the traditionally excluded gender groups, mainly women, achieving results relating to men and women’s empowerment and/or equality between women and men in the countries or communities where it works.

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**Case Study 3 & 4**

**Pakistan – excerpt from focus group discussion**

We are working largely with rural communities where women and men have unequal social status. Women have restricted mobility; they don’t have access to food and economic resources. They can’t get an education or engage in paid employment. Women generally stay home or participate in unpaid labour. In the majority of places, women are uneducated, face domestic violence, don’t have access to healthcare, do not have a right over their bodies, are considered inferior and are discriminated against. Early marriage, honour killing and lack of opportunities are other issues facing women in most rural settings. Women’s participation in social and political spheres is very limited and they have little or no say in decision-making (at a social or domestic level).

Men in rural communities are generally poor. They are oppressed at the hands of the flawed governance systems; they face harassment by the powerful feudal leaders and have to deal with social stigmas, usually attributed to their wives, daughters and sisters (cultural and social stigmas usually associated with women’s gender roles). In the household, they enjoy a superior position, and are the decision-makers. In rural settings, women and men both face torture, violence and unfair treatment, but men still have a superior position within the household. They enjoy benefits over women, due to cultural and social sanctions.

**Banda Aceh, Indonesia**

Banda Aceh had been a closed area before the tsunami, and so some of the local men had pre-conceived ideas of what Western women were like. During the later phases of emergency response and reconstruction, with an influx of foreigners, there was an increasing number of incidents of harassment, assault and rape against international female staff and national female staff originating from Jakarta (the number of incidents may have been under-reported). Sharia law was also increasingly exercised (in response to exposure to Western culture). This led to an alarming increase of incidents of GBV against local female staff working for INGOs. This is a very specific example of the impact of presence and of the gender-specific risks that exist and need to be anticipated.

*Findings from a security assessment produced by a multi-missioned agency in 2008*
2. **Supportive institutional policy framework:** Is there evidence that gender equality is a cross-cutting theme and/or one of the ‘lenses’ that the organisation uses?

3. **Institutional enabling environment:** This element looks at the internal process and procedures that the organisation has developed to implement its policies that may be informed by a gender equality policy (investments in tools, training, expertise, partnerships, mechanisms to implement, accountability structures etc.)

4. **Gender balance/employment equity:** whether or not there has been a commitment to (and progress toward) gender balance in staffing throughout the organisation, especially at key decision-making positions. It is important to keep employment equity issues separate from gender equality policies, even though progress on one issue is often linked to progress on the other.

5. **Principle of non-discrimination:** Gender, sex (including discrimination due to pregnancy or being of child bearing age), sexual preferences, religion, ethnicity and nationality should not be used to discriminate against the recruitment and hiring of the most appropriate and qualified individuals able to fulfil a job requirement. Unless an accurate situation-specific risk analysis identifies one group as more at risk, the agency should consider other enabling options (additional information, consent, procedures, input etc.).

### 2.2.2 Personnel and staff composition

**Being a man has an impact on my security as I will be forced to go to risky places that can threaten my life.**

*Male field survey respondent*

**A woman is more vulnerable to physical assault when being robbed. Local male staff are being arrested more, but this may be due to the fact they are drivers and guards and are more exposed than others.**

*Male field survey respondent*

**Being a woman means you are more vulnerable to gender-based violence as the culture somehow treats gender-based violence as normal.**

*Female field survey respondent*

**Women are under-represented in professional occupations and the majority of national staff, especially field staff, are male. The country has an ongoing history of rape and sexual assault as an instrument of war and day-to-day subjugation of women. The risks therefore seem elevated for women as opposed to men.**

*Female field survey respondent*

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11 Several EISF members shared their policies and procedures to inform this research. These agencies had incorporated gender in their security policy or paid strong attention to issues around sexual violence and PSEA. We are very grateful to have had the opportunity to learn from these existing practices and these have been incorporated in the remainder of this section, as well as in the tools in Part 2. Organisations that shared their policies are referred to in the methodology section.

### Differences between female and male personnel (national and international)

Gender roles vary from one culture to another, from one ethnic group to the next and from one social class to another. All cultures have gender roles and they all have certain expectations for the way women and men should dress, behave and look.

Particularly in a humanitarian situation, the staff teams of agencies may be comprised of international staff that represent several nationalities and national staff that may come from diverse parts of the same country. Having a diverse team composition is a security strategy used by agencies to gain acceptance. It also means having varying internal bias, cultural and gender dynamics.

When all personnel have different understandings of what gender means or what constitutes gender-based violence, this could contribute to harassment and other gender-based victimisation such as derogatory comments, stereotyping and inequity. Hence there is the opportunity and need for an agency to clearly articulate its policies and codes of conduct. Every sub-group of a team has its own behavioural tendencies and security considerations (See Guidance Tool A for general considerations regarding profiles of agency personnel).

Respondents to the survey and questionnaires noted that teams within their organisation saw a proportionally higher number of male staff, particularly in more remote areas and that there are often more women working at the agency headquarters. Anecdotal references from surveys, questionnaires and interviews identified that there was a lack of women in positions of leadership, thus decision-making, and that security positions are mostly male-dominated. There were, however, a few examples of women-led security management structures that, in the respondents view, supported inclusion of women in decision-making and influencing the overall security policies and culture towards a more ‘inclusive model’.

Field respondents were consistent in expressing the view that men and women tend to hold specific jobs in NGOs.

**Women’s jobs tend to be:**
- Human resources or administration
- Cooking, cleaning
- Nursing, midwives

**Men tend to be:**
- Top managers
- Security, logistics, finance
- Guards, drivers, or engineers
This division correlates with the increase of exposure to security threats as men tend to have riskier occupations, while women’s social status in most countries exposes them to other risks or keeps them away from working for NGOs.

A recent research and toolkit on acceptance stresses that gender is critical for good programming, negotiating relationships and measuring relative vulnerability (Fast et al. 2011a/b). Whenever possible, gender balance at all levels of the agency (HQ to field), creates more strategic possibilities for discussing and addressing policies (both on programme and security). Moreover, diversity in staff composition improves access to beneficiaries. For example, in some situations, a female staff member will be better equipped than her male counterpart to obtain the views and priorities of women in the community.

**Practical ways to have a gender balanced team that promotes security**

- Depending on the specific location, seek a wider distribution of vacancies – attract a diverse pool of applicants for both gender and ethnicity.
- When women or men are under-represented, encourage them to apply.
- Identify, understand and address obstacles to employing women. Consider the following ideas, depending on the feasibility in the setting (IASC 2006b):
  - Meet with community leaders to discuss the importance of having women work for the organisation.
  - Establish day-care or cooperatives among mothers to share day-care.
  - Establish job sharing arrangements.
  - Allow women to travel with a male relative who is not staff, if a risk assessment recognises that the security of women may be increased by this practice.
- Include experienced and non-biased women and men on interview panels.
- Evaluate all candidates against the same criteria.
- Do not assume that some jobs are too difficult or dangerous for women or inappropriate for men.
- Consider alternative working arrangements to overcome cultural limitations to women’s employment (e.g. husband/wife, brother/sister teams to manage outside perceptions depending on how conservative the operating environment is).
- Provide training on gender and cultural diversity to all staff, and/or build gender into security training.
- Offer separate facilities (toilets, sleeping quarters) for men and women.
- Keep all staffing and incident data disaggregated by sex for easy monitoring.
- Recognise that in some locations and for some job positions, gender is an issue and affects the ability to do the job.

**Security personnel: composition**

It is understood that organisations have mainstreamed security risk management responsibilities in many different configurations. This includes:

- the use of security focal points;
- the mainstreaming and/or sharing of security responsibilities across existing positions;
- use of security officers or advisors; and/or,
- use of Private Security Providers (PSPs).

Comments from key informants and survey participants overwhelmingly indicated a concern about the fact that a large majority of security officers are male, often coming from a military or police background. HQ and country office respondents indicated how complexities of gender and security are strongly interrelated with power balance issues, due to imbalance between male and female staff in security positions and the ‘macho culture’ present in some contexts (overwhelmingly more female than male respondents highlighted this as an issue). Respondents specifically noted the lack of female security staff, and in particular the consideration of national female staff for security positions.

The field staff survey gave the following responses regarding gender balance among security responsible positions in the field (see table on the next page). The overwhelming majority of the SFPs and security advisors were male. The advantage of having both women and men (national and international) in security positions is that diverse gender perspectives can be accessed and captured and measures and solutions proposed will have been informed by all staff members and their experience. This will only result in increased awareness and acceptance of security measures by the staff team.

Since security management for NGOs began being formalised in the 1990s, there has been a slight increase in women holding security positions at HQ levels and as advisors. But given the current reality that the majority of security practitioners are men, usually networking with...
other men in similar positions, an accurate picture of the security situation cannot be attained if 50% of the population has not been consulted. Some agencies have actively sought to have a balance of women and men in security positions. This approach has facilitated access and consultative approaches with other team members, community members and beneficiaries.

**Recruiting security personnel**

*Headquarter positions are limited, and people working in the field may experience difficulties settling into the mundane, and hence accept one posting after another in very difficult situations. What does this mean to the community? Security management may be relegated to experienced, yet burnt out security professionals or less experienced individuals in over their heads.*

**Psychosocial specialist**

We need further dialogue within our organisations when it comes to the recruitment of security professionals. What professional profiles and career trajectories are desirable? What awareness of the organisation’s mission and how it engages with the operating context do security professionals need to have if they are to operate with sensitivity and effectiveness?

The relevance of these concerns within the larger discourse of NGO security risk management should not be ignored. Theoretically, depending on the operating context, it should be an individual’s experience, ability, personality, commitment, sensitivity to operating context and programming, and ability to work with others that should prevail. Security personnel (excluding local security guards) that have not transitioned from a military mindset and demeanour or that do not accept NGO culture may alienate themselves from team members, compromising the entire safety and security of the agency even though their analysis or procedures may be appropriate. For example, in the military if an officer instructs someone to do something it will be done, whereas in an NGO if someone is told what to do, with no opportunity to input, they may deliberately not do it. In the military, women and men have specific roles they are allowed to fulfil, and this experience might unintentionally be reflected within the NGO operating environment. For example, several key informants mentioned that women are less often considered for positions in extreme insecure environments.

This highlights a need to:

- Consider a shift in perception of the profile of a security officer, which includes considering additional qualities and experience to complement existing job descriptions for safety and security personnel (irrespective of if they come from the military or police);
- Rethink which personality/gender/nationality profile would be most appropriate for your specific NGO culture, programmes and operating context, without assuming that one gender should be automatically preferred;
- Analyse presence and activities, access and acceptance accurately;
- Look into ways of encouraging and mentoring women (both national and international) to become security officers, advisors and focal points;
- Focus on potential women and men coming from programming and management backgrounds in conflict situations or complex emergencies and consider individuals with an understanding of the wider humanitarian system, laws, principles and values and of gender considerations;
- Consider individuals who recognise the importance of investing in diverse relationships and in innovative approaches including acceptance as a priority strategy (context dependent);
- Consider individuals who understand the importance of training and communicating in various ways through several channels so that the message is transmitted and understood; and,

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| Does your organisation have these positions in place regarding security? |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                            | Men | Women | None  |
| Country Director           | 45% | 47%   | 8%    |
| Full time Security Focal Point (HQ) | 52% | 12%   | 34%   |
| Part-time Security Focal Point (HQ) | 26% | 10%   | 64%   |
| Regional Security Advisor  | 32% | 6%    | 62%   |
| Security Officer (in country) | 48% | 10%   | 42%   |
| Security Focal Point (in country) | 49% | 20%   | 31%   |

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Gender and Security
• Have someone who understands that travel to the field is crucial to interact with beneficiaries and who can observe the quality and acceptance of programmes and presence.

Additional challenges to gender balance

For agencies that have security built into line management, there is still a challenge of ensuring that male and female managers are compassionate about gender security considerations and that their decisions are not undermined because of stereotypical perceptions of being too ‘cautious and scared’, ‘patronising’ or ‘cavalier’.

Female staff lack a voice in a male dominated management culture and environment, they are rarely seen to ‘speak up’ or speak out about issues of security for them. In some country contexts, there is denial about the prevalence of GBV, and violence against women may be relatively invisible (e.g. low level of reporting, denied as a political problem).

Country office respondent

Women tend to face additional challenges and choices when wanting careers as a humanitarian worker, manager and security staff. A security career invariably impacts relationships and leads to complexities in choosing between having children, assuming non-traditional parenting roles and/or sacrificing their personal life, for both women and men. Although people can construct full and meaningful lives in whatever choice they make, women tend to have fewer support options available and be judged more harshly for any absences from parenting, given universal gender roles, while men can mostly get away with being absent.

In addition to this, we have to recognise that other external security stakeholders are usually men (e.g. UN security, government, military, police and PSPs staff). Being isolated, ignored or second-guessed are only a few of the possible challenges female security staff (and in particular national female staff) could face, making it more difficult to stay in the sector because of stress, discouragement, discrimination and loss of confidence. This second-guessing can come from both male and female colleagues.

Finally and importantly, what does it mean to be a LGBTI security professional, or the security officer for LGBTI staff in political and cultural situations where same-sex relationships may be illegal? The complexity of this is important but an organisation could apply a strategy managing the spectrum of visible and invisible personal dimensions, accordingly to situational specifics (see figure 6 under paragraph 2.3).

2.3 The individual staff member

Gender, image and acceptance

Behaviour and respect have everything to do with acceptance. There are many aspects of an individual that cannot be entirely controlled and that are visible to the outside world. Other parts can be kept hidden. Depending on where we are and the nature and severity of security implications, we may need to keep some things invisible for both our own and our colleagues’ safety and security, without again, compromising our dignity or core values.

Figure 1 illustrates some of the components of an individual’s identity, from what is immediately perceived to what may be kept more hidden from the outside world. The sex/gender and ethnicity of a person are usually the first attributes to be appraised.

Fig 6. Persaud-Reilly spectrum of individual identity – from mostly visible to mostly invisible
General profiles of women and men

The socially defined gender context is both powerful and subtle. Often it is difficult for a woman to articulate her concerns about safety and security. Often it is difficult for men to understand and take the increased risk exposure of women seriously. There are several ways in which organisations increase the risk for women through direct or indirect communication of cultural norms. One common example is when risk-taking is admired. Another is the message that self-care is not valued. When the leaders of an organisation are uncomfortable with topics related to sex and violence they increase the likelihood that problems will go unrecognised or unreported. An organisation that does not treat men and women equally in regard to power and authority also sets up a system that increases the risk for GBV.

Wagener 2012: 1

Over the past 20 years there has been much research and discussion about gender-related issues; from studies about the difference between male and female brains to examining the effects of societal barriers, stereotypes and imprinting assumptions. There is still much to research, understand and ultimately change. The complexity of this subject goes beyond this research, however, we must understand that gender is such a profound identification marker that it affects us in our attitudes, bias, assumptions, behaviour, internal and external beliefs, self-perception, fears etc.

The following is a very brief overview of what may be generally perceived as female and male gender stereotypes, reinforced by class, religion and culture (see also Part 2: Guidance Tool A).

Profile women

Women working in the male dominated field of security tend to feel that they must prove something, keep up, feel included and be respected. Biologically and physiologically, they are perceived as weaker and in need of protection. Women may also face other factors such as pregnancy, breastfeeding and levels of physical abilities which may lead to discrimination.

International women working for agencies are often perceived as being gender ambiguous or as being another gender altogether (referred to as the 3rd sex).15 In some situations, international women are allowed into situations not necessarily open to national women, i.e. talking to male village elders. This can be an advantage in terms of achieving work goals, but could affect the levels of ‘protection/respect’ accorded to the international woman. At the same time, often:

International female staff must contend with widespread perceptions and beliefs that ‘all international women are prostitutes/promiscuous’ because the only knowledge of them, prior to aid agencies arriving, came from movies/music videos showing women with virtually no clothes on.

Key informant

Profile men

Men can also be victims of gender-based violence during conflict, albeit in different and complex ways. […] Men are also the victims of sexual violence, including rape and sexual torture, during war. In addition, men are victimised when they are forced to rape or watch their loved ones being raped.

Sigsworth, 2008

Men have a tendency to feel that they must be in charge, braver, more physical and often assume a protector role. When masculinity is challenged, men tend to react quite strongly. They may misunderstand the physiological link between fear and anger when faced with danger. This could put them at further risk in specific situations where they are already perceived as more aggressive, confounding their fear, which then escalates to anger. They may feel the need to prove themselves, compete and assert their gender. Men are typically socialised to keep their fears, worries and concerns to themselves, which in turn can contribute to internalised stress and trauma.

All of these factors provide insight in how specific staff members are likely to react in specific situations. For example, behaviour at a checkpoint may have several outcomes depending on the behaviour informed by personality traits and gender.

15 This notion of a third sex (applying to international female staff) comes from anecdotal references – surveys, questionnaires and interviews, in particular from international female staff respondents.
Reaction measures are all informed by situation-specific pattern analysis. The following comment illustrates perceptions about how women and men can respond to violence.

*When considering analysis of acts of crime over the past 10 years of assault data, trends indicated that if men resisted an attack, violence would escalate. If women resisted, there was a possibility that they could de-escalate the attack. Assailants anticipate and are prepared for the possibility that men may react aggressively when faced with danger. Conversely, women are expected to submit or freeze. Therefore, when women resist, aggressors are usually taken by surprise and need to re-calculate their attack which in turn re-directs the rhythm of their attack.*

*Michael O’Neill, Safety and Security Director of Save the Children USA*

This comment is not included here to suggest that active resistance is recommended in all situations when faced with aggression, unless there is certainty that the victim can overpower or escape from the assailant.

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**Case Study 5 – Sri Lanka 2006**

Female programme staff of an agency with a sub-office in Trincomalee were facing high levels of harassment and assault every time they crossed a Sri Lankan army checkpoint. This was mostly prevalent when they were travelling by motorbike. Meanwhile male staff, who sometimes faced intimidation when crossing checkpoints, admitted that they often responded in anger, which in turn escalated aggression.

Alternative transportation arrangements for women were negotiated in addition to establishing better incident reporting mechanisms, as well as offering psychosocial/medical support outlets. Defusing anger/interpersonal communication awareness and strategies were provided to all staff to equip them with the ability to recognise and manage their own reactions in order to steer situations toward a better outcome.

*2006 Organisational Security Assessment Finding*

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**Gender risk thresholds**

Depending on the individual profile and the work someone is doing, a personal risk threshold is a variable that must be considered in relation to the institutional risk threshold. Both the individual and/or the agency can make decisions regarding the acceptable level of exposure to risk. It is important that the decision is based on an accurate risk analysis and that other options are explored, so that gender-balanced teams and better programming can be attained. In addition, some agencies give their personnel a choice to say no and withdraw from a particular task if the associated risk is beyond the individual’s personal risk threshold.
3.1 Specific gender considerations in security risk assessments

Although organisations often apply a gender lens to communities and beneficiaries for programme purposes, they often do not apply the same lens to internal practices such as security assessments. Country office and headquarter respondents overwhelmingly agreed on the importance of gender considerations during a risk assessment process. For additional guidance on doing a gender-sensitive security risk assessment, see Part 2: Guidance Tool B.

Sound contextual assessments demand a comprehensive understanding of gender relations (going beyond assumptions) in the community where the organisation is working, as well as where the office is situated, where staff live and travel and of the broader community of the area. Detailed nuances in these relations can be both indicators of risk factors, and the key to negotiating security. While doing a gendered risk assessment the organisation should consider the security and safety related needs, experiences, issues, and priorities of women, girls, boys and men with reference to historical and existing context, such as specific threats, vulnerabilities and the overall risks examined.

People often make assumptions on how men and women are positioned and what relations are in place. If you don’t have a good understanding of this you risk reinforcing existing discriminatory, hierarchical structures. One should keep in mind that as an external party, what you do will always have an effect on existing power dynamics. Often women and men have different roles and thus should be targeted differently.

Gender specialist

Being sensitive to gender in situational assessments will ultimately inform the risk assessment and help to identify cultural and behavioural norms well in advance for the purposes of demonstrating respect and for better programme delivery.

3.1 Specific gender considerations in security risk assessments

Security focal points and security committees

Consulting several SFPs and establishing security committees provides opportunities to best capture the diversity of staff, their concerns, perspectives and grievances.

Good practice would recommend that a gender mixed team should be involved in conducting a risk assessment to ensure that all perspectives are captured and gender barriers overcome. A mix of nationalities (or ethnicities at country/field level) can be effective. Joint security-gender assessments or the implementation of a gender working group that is consulted throughout the assessment could also be considered. 44% of the field respondents stated they had not been consulted on security issues (50% women, 34% men). Meanwhile, 40% of male and 60% of female respondents from HQ/Country Office, feel that there is a lack of consultation of gender groups in security management.16

In our organisation, we encourage and ensure that female staff participate in risk assessments, and that their specific concerns and suggestions are incorporated in the security plans and policies. Periodic review meetings are also held with female staff allowing a safe space for open sharing, questioning and feedback. In my experience this has been a positive experience that has helped us ‘genderise’ our security practices and policies over time. It is an ongoing learning exercise for the organisation.

Key informant

Working with gender and GBV specialists

Gender and GBV specialists should be included in any security focal point’s network of key informants since they have valuable information and insight. They can also be consulted for vetting findings and for contributing to solutions for reducing gender-related risk. Gender and GBV specialists have typically conducted an assessment on the historic and current status of women, girls, boys

16 When planning it is important to be aware that local female staff in particular, may not be willing to discuss harassment and other gender-based issues in front of men, particularly if male staff are part of the problem, whether deliberately or unwittingly. International and national women may not want to admit to being affected by harassment for fear of being seen as weak.
and men and/or the prevalence and profile of GBV. They have the technical expertise and sensitivity to conduct interviews and have knowledge or access to individuals, the community at large, local networks and organisations engaged in gender issues. They can also be included or consulted for the development of a wider security policy or procedural documents and often to facilitate essential gendered training. Many agencies may not have their own gender or GBV specialists depending on their mandate and programming. However, gender and GBV specialists can be easily accessed through other NGOs, the UN, civil society groups and local grassroots organisations.

The security committee or security management team model at national level is quite effective as it brings together various expertise and skills for security management and decisions. Key for such a team is an equal representation of all genders and inclusion of gender/women’s rights officers. This also acts as strategic support and oversight for the SFP at the national or sub-national level.

Capturing information

Several mechanisms, often used for programming purposes, have been employed to capture gender-related security and context information. Focus group discussions (with the community or agency personnel) have proved to be a preferred method in collecting information about perceived and real security risks, information about the communities and their cultural nuances, attitudes, norms, behaviours and codes, and about specific security-related issues staff may be facing in programme delivery. A specific process that is used to take into account gender in such a discussion is also referred to as gender synchronisation:

1. First, talk with women and men separately;
2. Second, bring them together (stepping stones approach); or,
3. Use community/staff conversations to discuss issues around gender (e.g. domestic violence, traditional gender roles, etc.).

If well facilitated in safety and confidentiality and according to situation-specific parameters, focus group discussions alleviate perceptions of pre-existing gender stereotypes, prejudice and assumptions. Depending on the context and staff cohesion, it may or may not be appropriate to further separate national and international staff. Direct observation during programme activities is an under-utilised tool, as are informal social opportunities (e.g. Saturday sewing groups, cricket game) that are safe spaces for active and respectful listening.

Some agencies also use quotas. This means that when implementing programmes, they often use community selection boards that influence who benefits in the community etc. In these situations, effort is made to ensure equal representation in decision-making, for example with regard to gender. These types of approaches can lead to attitude and behavioural changes towards gender stereotypes, however, they can also have adverse effects and create more tension (within the community or between the community and the organisation).

Gender specialist

Comprehensive incident pattern analysis

Pattern analysis assists in determining which relative vulnerabilities increase risk to a security threat. Gender obviously arises under the heading of ‘who’ is targeted and may affect the what, where, when and how. However, additional important considerations would be included in further stages of an incident, for example if an escalation of aggression during an incident may put men and/or women at further risk (e.g. in a context-specific situation of armed robbery, are men at additional risk of being physically assaulted, are women usually left alone or not?).

Actor mapping

Actor mapping (stakeholder analysis) is usually considered in risk assessment processes. For situations where the agency’s programming may be perceived as controversial (e.g. girls’ education, women’s rights or GBV prevention and response), a detailed actor mapping is an essential tool in identifying who (state actors, police, military, non-state actors, religious groups, neighbours, etc.) may be opposed to the programme and may have the intent and capacity to cause harm. The actor mapping also enables NGOs to identify opportunities to strategically cultivate relationships and convey transparency with the aim of gaining active acceptance.

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17 Gender synchronisation is an approach that intersects gender transformative efforts of men, women, girls, boys, all sexual orientations and gender identities by engaging people to challenge harmful and restrictive constructions of masculinity and femininity that drive gender-related vulnerabilities and hinder security (Greene & Levack 2010).
19 A useful actor analysis methodology can be found in GRPR (2010) on p.33.
3.2 Gender-sensitive security risk analysis

Threat, vulnerability and risk analysis

Attention to gender in security should not overshadow other context-specific vulnerabilities. A gender-specific risk means that the likelihood of a threat to cause harm to a specific gender group impacts women and men differently.

A risk assessment process that is gender-informed may consider a more detailed analysis of violence and crime and if there are patterns of additional violence toward one specific gender group. The physical and psychological impact on the individual may be quite catastrophic, but for the agency it could be moderate.

Despite efforts to objectify the risk assessment processes, victimology/incident patterns contend with important variables that can skew analysis depending on the person analysing and the tools utilised. Therefore findings may be unknowingly inaccurate (see also Part 2 Tool C, for guidance).

Security analyses are not ‘fact’, they are ‘perception’, and those perceptions can be skewed. If they are accepted as fact, and are misrepresented and/or missing information, it is the analysis itself that causes the risk to staff.

Jane Barry – interview

Therefore, if more people of different gender, ethnicity, age and job position participate in the security analysis, chances are less that perceptions of an individual or single group can skew the results.

Devising appropriate strategies for analysing and mitigating gender-specific risks

A gender-responsive mitigation strategy aims to create an enabling working environment and conditions through gender-sensitive assessments (situational analysis and risk, threat, vulnerability analysis) that inform standard operating procedures and contingency planning. This is done through consideration of gender-sensitive security strategies, staff selection, codes of conduct, programme development and policy.

Within NGOs, gender-specific guidelines or procedures have been considered to varying degrees. Most respondents agree that if it is justified and needed, special considerations and guidelines should be integrated into standard operating procedures for female and male staff.
What should be kept in mind is that existing security policies may be applied differently to men and women, even when written without gender-specific considerations. This often depends on the perspective of the security responsible person on the ground.

**Case Study 7 – Liberia**

Male staff – especially international staff, were at a high risk of extortion by being falsely accused of sexual violence (all of this exacerbated by existing high levels of prostitution and a history of sexual exploitation and abuse). Special measures needed to be instituted that would assist in avoiding situations where men could be vulnerable to accusations. e.g. being alone with a woman, and the avoidance of certain hotspots.

*Key informant interview*
The five main processes that HQ and Country Office respondents identified for implementation of security policy and guidance were:

1. Training and briefings
2. Use of standardised documents (policy and operational procedures)
3. Updated security plans
4. Thorough dissemination of documents and plans
5. Recurrent policy revisions

4.1 Safety and security measures and responses

46% of HQ respondents and 55% of country office staff indicated that gender is specifically addressed in their organisation’s security procedures. 58% of field staff respondents indicated that their organisation’s security procedures mention security challenges that are specific to men and women. 31% do not mention gender-specific security challenges with the remaining 11% not known. Of these security guidelines, 28% include separate procedures for men and women, while 59% do not mention any gender-specific procedures. The gender-specific procedures mentioned in these plans relate primarily to:

1. Travel restrictions (area/locations) (63%)
2. Dress (55%)
3. Travelling alone prohibited (38%)
4. Curfew and lodging (32%)

Organisational policies provided by EISF member organisations (Cesvi, ACF, Oxfam GB, Care International, World Vision and Christian Aid) also demonstrate that gender-specific procedures mainly involve information regarding the points mentioned above. Gender-specific security challenges that were included mainly related to instances of sexual harassment/violence. Several policies highlighted the importance of sex-disaggregated incident data, attention to gender-specific risks when doing a vulnerability/risk analysis and attention to risks for LGBTI staff.

Only 53% of field staff respondents felt that their current safety and security procedures are adequate in keeping them safer (with 26% mentioning that the current procedures keep them partially safe). Main comments focused on the need for better implementation of guidelines and policies, better individual follow-up of procedures and the need for more training.

Effort must be made in analysing the relevance of gender-specific security guidance. This could be achieved by deconstructing a gender-specific procedure to determine if in reality, the control factors are gender-related. For example, a procedure stating that women should not travel alone in isolated areas of the town at night, begs the question if in reality the true security variables or control factors are not necessarily the relative vulnerability of women, but in fact that any exposure at night, alone, in an isolated area, increases vulnerability of all personnel, irrespective of gender.

While visiting an NGO in Afghanistan I was provided with a set of security guidelines specifically written for women. Of the 30 or so rules all but one of them related to behaviour and respect. More importantly they were all applicable to both men and women, except for one rule regarding the wearing of a headscarf that was applicable to women only.

In the eyes of a perpetrator, men and women are not equal. The uniqueness of gender and nationality requires a complex understanding of relative vulnerability. See Guidance Tool D in Part 2 for additional guidance on gender considerations in security policies and procedures.

4.2 Training, inductions, orientations, and briefings

Training

Responses from the questionnaires were quite consistent in regard to training. Approximately 68% of field respondents had experienced some gender-specific guidance built into general security training, and this was well received and appreciated (equally by men and women). Those who had not experienced gender-specific guidance during security training, expressed that they would be very receptive to it (especially local and national staff). Training teams were 57% all-male, 4% all-female and 39% mixed.
Some agencies, the UN included, have developed and implemented gender-specific training programmes specifically addressed to women. There are definite advantages to this such as creating safe spaces for women to be less inhibited in asking specific questions and in discussing very personal and sensitive issues and experiences. It may also be more technical, such as self-defence courses which can of course benefit both men and women as they are not about strength, but about self-awareness and precision in the unlikely event that one must fight back. At the same time, there needs to be reflection on the implicit or deeper messages gender-segregated training may transmit. Does this reinforce the notion that women are more vulnerable? Would this negatively affect recruitment of women? How would this contribute to a common, collective understanding among female and male staff of gender-specific vulnerabilities? Despite these concerns of perception, gender-segregated training must be considered as a legitimate and key approach, particularly crucial in some specific situations determined by location, culture and religion (e.g. extremely repressive environments) and the agency’s own culture, programming and composition of staff.

In a context like Pakistan, Afghanistan or Chechnya women staff can simply never speak of threats of GBV attacks on their ‘honour’, their reputation…… in front of male colleagues, as this openness could ultimately pose a huge security risk in itself (i.e., they could subsequently be targeted for what they said in a training). If the space will end up with only a superficial discussion of ‘common’ threats. To a certain extent, men will also be less likely in front of women to show ‘weakness’ in a security training (although, conversely, I have also seen male colleagues, as this openness could ultimately pose a huge security risk in itself (i.e., they could subsequently be targeted for what they said in a training). If the space will end up with only a superficial discussion of ‘common’ threats. To a certain extent, men will also be less likely in front of women to show ‘weakness’ in a security training (although, conversely, I have also seen female and male staff of gender-specific vulnerabilities). Despite these concerns of perception, gender-segregated training must be considered as a legitimate and key approach, particularly crucial in some specific situations determined by location, culture and religion (e.g. extremely repressive environments) and the agency’s own culture, programming and composition of staff.

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The gender balance and background of trainers must be carefully considered for improved facilitation, balanced representation and approachability. For example, security trainers with military or law enforcement backgrounds can bring a very specific and sometimes inappropriate security perspective – regardless of gender.

Deciding which training modality would best fit individual, team and agency needs and culture depends on many factors (Part 2 Guidance Tool G provides more details on possible trainings and topics). Whatever training approach is chosen, it can only promote more awareness and platforms for discussion and understanding. Different configurations and combinations of training (gender training with security training) should be considered and, as mentioned previously, adapted to the specific needs of personnel in a specific location.

Induction, orientation & briefings

Induction and orientation are critical in setting the tone for a contract or period of employment. Transparency about the real risks, clarity about codes of conduct, policy, procedures, expected behaviour and disciplinary measures must be instituted from the beginning. There should be no ambiguity in addressing and creating awareness about difficult subjects such as GBV and harassment through frank and clear discussion with all staff. It is also important to repeat briefings when people move to different countries/localities as the context, and therefore the gendered risks, will be different.

A security culture can only be cultivated over time, through the consideration of a longer-term vision and planning of security trainings, discussions and mentoring relationships.

20 Anecdotal reference from interviews, questionnaires, focus group discussions and direct observation and discussions in various training settings.
21 Mentoring/coaching support to individuals can allow safe, one-on-one spaces for staff to talk through their concerns and build coherent individual and organisational strategies over time.
4.3 Incident reporting

Gendered data in incident reporting

Insecurity Insight’s recent publication on gender and incident data (Wille & Fast 2011) reveals major gaps in sex-disaggregated incident reporting, which severely hinders accurate incident analysis. Most agencies do not yet disaggregate data according to sex or even nationality. Only 22% of field survey respondents indicated that the incident reporting forms/mechanisms ask for the sex of the person reporting/involved (with 38% responding they do not know). This percentage is 33% for country office respondents (20% do not know) and 8% for HQ respondents (20% do not know).

Insecurity Insight’s research presents some limited due to incomplete data interesting findings that challenge our assumptions about which gender group is more vulnerable to which specific security threats. It perhaps also confirms some of them, such as the probable lack of (or under-) reporting and prompts further questions. Do men report less? Do women not report for different reasons? Do women and men not report GBV because of internalised reasons? Are some specific types of incident reported more often because they are linked with insurance claims? Does this correlate with typical gender distributions in specific jobs?

Overall, responses from the survey and questionnaires indicate that agencies are seriously considering changing their incident reporting format to include sex-disaggregated data. 74% of HQ respondents and 79% of country office respondents answered that they would consider modifying their incident reporting formats to include sex-disaggregated data.

Tool F in part 2 provides more specific guidance on good practice in gender-sensitive incident reporting and complaints mechanisms for reporting sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).

Under-reporting

There are many factors that may inhibit the reporting of an incident, particularly one that may be intensely personal and sensitive. Fundamentally it is a management responsibility, supported by the agency culture, to allow for a safe, confidential, and open reporting environment. Often, it may be more difficult for men and women to report incidents of sexual violence, as this is incredibly sensitive and mired in self-blame, shame, fear of being stigmatised and denial. Unfortunately most cases of sexual harassment/violence happen within existing relationships, which in turn precipitates fear of reprisals from a colleague. This can be exacerbated in a security sensitive environment. Staff might also believe that a particular incident may not be worthwhile sharing for personal reasons, such as not wanting to make a fuss or out of fear that the incident may not be taken seriously by the focal point.

In some countries, local laws might not allow for incidents to be reported outside the immediate office management (such as on central online incident reporting systems), particularly when the case is of a criminal nature and under investigation by the local police.

The top five (taken from HQ and country office perceptions) of under-reported incidents include:

1. Sexual harassment and GBV
2. Bullying and intimidation (arising from internal power dynamics in the agency)
3. Near misses
4. Theft (including petty theft)
5. Accidents without injuries

HQ respondents indicated that the sex of incident reporting officers shows slightly more men (44%) than woman (32%). For country office respondents this was reversed, with 38% being female and 31% male.

Overcoming barriers to reporting

As mentioned before, many security threats can be posed by staff members themselves, against other staff members or through perpetrating violence against the beneficiaries/local population. This can take the form of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) – both a serious human rights violation, as well as posing a significant security risk to staff. In addition to more traditional approaches to incident reporting, including online systems, several mechanisms could alleviate the fear, shame and lack of awareness in reporting incidents and facilitate the criticality of reporting.22 A ‘whistleblower’ policy and procedure should be standard for all agencies as one of many incident reporting channels. A whistleblowing (accessible) hotline can be used for reporting sensitive incidents, breaches of the code of conduct, or incidents of SEA. In all of these cases, the option for confidential reporting can also encourage staff to report incidents involving colleagues.23

Other solutions include having both male and female focal points to facilitate incident reporting. This could be taken a little further in the sense that focal points for incident reporting could be selected to represent all categories of staff, such as national male, national

22 For more on overcoming barriers to reporting, see the report by Van Brabant 2012.
23 According to the IASC, witnesses to incidents of SEA have a duty to report. In cases of sexual violence between co-workers (internal or involving other agency workers) it is highly encouraged that reporting should be done by the victim or at least with full support and consent, since reporting on the victim would be disempowering.
female, international male, international female. Access, confidentiality and safety are the core principles to reporting any sensitive incident. Focal points must be extremely well selected based on position, character, level of confidentiality, objectivity and not just their position. Clarity about procedures and follow-up are important. Some factors to consider in establishing safe, accessible and transparent incident reporting mechanisms include:

- Establish a confidential reporting system/structure and alternate channels.
- Clarify options for reporting such as where to go and who to report to (well selected and trained national, international staff member, female, male, manager, peer, hotlines).
- Encourage reporting in a meaningful and respectful manner (taking it seriously).
- Clarify what is expected to be reported and be inclusive of situations that may be less obvious but correlate to the agency’s code of conduct (e.g. low-level harassment).
- Respect an individual’s wish not to report (except in situations of SEA since ‘duty to report’ is a guiding principle, see Guidance Tool F).
- Be clear about follow-up: who will process the information, who will investigate the matter, who will take the decision and what will be the process.

**Box 2 – Sensitive incident reporting considerations**

Harassment (overt and low level), as well as GBV, is perceived to be largely under-reported. Responses from all questionnaires and focus group discussions with groups of national staff in Afghanistan overwhelmingly confirmed this view. Under-reporting is common even in Western countries as feelings of guilt, shame, self-blame, fear of reprisals, a lack of trust in the medical, police or legal systems or deeper internalised reasons prevent a survivor from seeking support. GBV was not publicly addressed in more liberal countries until about the 1970s (Herman 1997). Reporting GBV, SEA and harassment requires very structured reporting mechanisms that will precipitate investigation and disciplinary procedures. Annex F gives an overview of good practice in procedures for complaints of SEA and harassment.

**4.4 Gendered dimension of recovery**

In the army, many women were raped by peers or superiors, but were told to back off. If you’re treated in such a way this might hamper your ability to cope with security in your work (e.g. because you can suffer from anxiety attacks, be more aggressive or in urgent need of stress management).

*Key informant*

**Psychosocial recovery**

Psychosocial considerations and support are critical in situations of cumulative stress and after major traumatic events. The gendered dimension of how we perceive and respond to insecurity and traumatic events is often based on individual profile, gender and ability to cope. All these factors play a role in better recovery from physical or psychological harm or may precipitate further deterioration. What is critical to assert here is that psychosocial reactions to and effects of insecurity and trauma are not a gender issue, they are a security issue and must be fully integrated into our concept of ‘security’. Otherwise we risk reinforcing the idea that ‘psychosocial’ is ‘soft’, ‘separate’ and ultimately ‘feminine’. As we continue to focus only on physical risks, more attention needs to be given to psychosocial risks and by extension, to individual behaviour and response. Also, it should be further explored how gender considerations seem to influence the way that psychosocial aspects of security management tend to be sidelined and siloed.

Psychological risk factors must be considered in parallel with physical security threats – both pre- and post-incident. Most mental health professionals are actually women, yet gender and cultural barriers often inhibit people seeking support. Some barriers include the individual not knowing what they need, lack of familiarity with systems or stress, feeling embarrassed, fear of losing control, fear of judgement, doubtful of the effectiveness of support, not wanting to burden others or avoidance of the occurrence of the event (NCTSN 2006).

*Equally as powerful as the desire to deny atrocities is the conviction that denial doesn’t work. Remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are pre-requisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims.*

*Herman 1997*
Many agencies are increasingly recognising the use and benefits of Psychological First Aid. Psychosocial support should consider access to external and internal mechanisms such as professional counsellors, traditional/religious/respected community leaders and elders or a peer support system. Matching the most appropriate support person with the survivor could be determined by their level of experience, credentials, training and (often) gender.

**Physical recovery**

In facilitating physical recovery, an agency must ensure (with full consent of the victim) quality access to medical support. In case of physical or sexual assault this should include access to: PEP kits, rape kits, medications, access to emergency contraception (morning after pill) etc. These treatments must be administered within a set timeframe. For example, rape kits must be used immediately and PEP has to be administered within 72 hours of exposure to HIV. The tendency to hide sexual assault can mean that by the time a case is reported, many potentially effective emergency response measures have been rendered useless.

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24 PEP kit: Post Exposure Prophylaxis – very early administration of this combination of medication, reduces the probability to developing HIV/AIDS. PEP kits must be administered and monitored by qualified medical personnel.
Gendered security approaches are about more than the do's and don'ts. They are about conditioning high levels of self-, team and environmental awareness when conducting humanitarian and development operations. A gendered security approach is predominantly about dialogue, understanding, attitudes, perceptions, reporting procedures and support networks. Although good security management does require rules, complementary gendered considerations are about improving the personal ability of staff to better appraise situations, the impact of their presence and making the best decisions for their individual, team and organisation’s security and safety. The important aspect of this understanding is that it should be shared, and collectively agreed upon by all individual staff, women, men and all gender identities and sexual preference, in a particular context.

Part 1 of this paper has looked into how gender-specific considerations can be integrated into security risk management frameworks. Part 2 provides specific guidance to bring this into practice. The following are some useful principles of gender-sensitive security risk management:

- Gendered security management is an approach that is relevant to all gender groups. Therefore it is about absolute inclusivity – security for all agency personnel.
- The whole of an individual is comprised of several dimensions that are linked to their ascribed or prescribed gender identity. These dimensions include age, physical attributes, behaviour, experience, religion/beliefs, ethnicity, nationality and sexuality etc.
- Gender balance is considered, informed by security and reflected whenever possible in staff team compositions. This includes promoting equal participation and consultation of women and men in security/agency management and decision-making.
- Training can take many forms but can be gendered to raise awareness of gender, GBV, behavioural impact, psychosocial, situational and risk awareness. It should focus on active prevention and empowerment to make good decisions for the safety and security of one’s self, team, agency and ultimately beneficiaries. It should also emphasise that gendered analysis and specific mitigation measures do not equate with suggesting that men and women are not capable of doing some jobs.
- Leadership and management are the principal drivers in developing gender-sensitive policies, awareness, acceptance and compliance.
- Security incident analysis should include sex-disaggregated data in addition to other information such as nationality, and job position.
- Any discrimination against agency staff, for reasons that are unjustified and for which risk reduction solutions are not explored, is unacceptable and goes against IASC gender equality guidance that promotes gender balanced teams.
- Staff deemed most at risk, after a thorough and valid risk analysis has been undertaken, have the benefit of being fully informed and of participating, if possible, in decision-making about their appropriateness for the assignment. Seeking input from them and their teams, ascertaining both individual and institutional risk thresholds and presenting solutions will lead to greater acceptance of additional procedures and risk mitigating measures.

Security risk management is not only about dealing with threats, vulnerabilities and risk. It is a comprehensive process. Consulting and working with people, training and supporting them and ensuring their comprehension and adherence to staying safe and secure is at the heart of good security risk management. Having gender diverse teams means working with them in identifying opportunities and meeting their needs. The more specific we are at addressing vulnerabilities, the better we can be at reducing the risk.

Gender is an important cross-cutting consideration and a dimension of human rights, as it informs all aspects of society and culture. It is up to each organisation, depending where they work, how they work and what they work on, to decide if gender remains a compartmentalised vulnerability to be systematically assessed or if they are ready to operationalise a broader understanding of gender within their humanitarian and development assistance practices, and security risk management framework. Whichever path is chosen, as gender-sensitive security considerations continue to be developed, so good and holistic security risk management practices will continue to evolve.
Part 2

Practical Tools and Guidance for Gendered Security Risk Management
There are four basic kinds of gender stereotypes: 25

- **Personality traits**: e.g. women are often expected to be passive and submissive, while men are usually expected to be self-confident and aggressive.

- **Domestic behaviour**: e.g. caring for children is often considered as best done by women, while men do household repairs.

- **Occupations**: e.g. until recently most nurses and secretaries were usually women, and most doctors and construction workers were usually men.

- **Physical appearance**: e.g. women are expected to be small and graceful, while men are expected to be tall and broad-shouldered.

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# Guidance Tool A: Looking through the gender lens: general profiles of agency personnel

## ASSUMPTIONS

**LOCAL STAFF**

- **Woman**
  - May face criticism from community and family for working and being associated with an NGO.
  - Most likely has an opportunity to work for NGO because they are not yet married.
  - If married and/or have dependents, there is additional stress from having to deal with work and running a household.
  - May face threats inside and outside of work (both within the community and from family members).
  - May have a higher or lower risk threshold than other staff members.
  - MAY or MAY NOT be willing to discuss harassment and other gender based issues in front of men, particularly if male staff are part of the problem, whether deliberately or unwittingly.

**NATIONAL STAFF**

- **Woman**
  - May face criticism from community and family for working for NGO.
  - May enjoy certain privileges and freedom coming from urban setting or other community.
  - May feel they can take additional liberties since they are in their home country.
  - May not be well accepted and still perceived as a foreigner in project/office location away from home.
  - May or may not be single.

## HR/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

- Perception by immediate local community – possible threats due to association.
- Hours of work.
- Transportation to/from office.
- May be limited in their employment due to pregnancy or other home responsibilities.
- Impact of team members’ bad behaviour or agency poor programming will affect their reputation and so security.
- Security threats may come from own family and community.
- MUST STAY. Bound to community in times of high insecurity and must live with consequences of poor agency acceptance.

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25 A stereotype is a widely accepted judgment or bias regarding a person or group — even though it is overly simplified. Stereotypes about gender can cause unequal and unfair treatment because of a person’s gender. This is called sexism.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>LOCAL STAFF</th>
<th>ASSUMPTIONS</th>
<th>HR/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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| Man | - May face criticism from community and family for working and being associated with a NGO.  
- May face threats inside and outside of work.  
- May have a higher or lower risk threshold than other staff members.  
- Most likely has a job position with a higher level of exposure – driver, guard, community mobiliser etc. | - Perception and security threats due to association with NGO may be seen as a spy etc.  
- May be at risk of being recruited by armed groups.  
- Would benefit from specific technical training and interpersonal training (managing anger/communication).  
- May be exposed to local tribal and ethnic feuds.  
- May think that discriminating behaviour to local women is acceptable (culture) and local woman may feel unable to report it.  
- MUST STAY. Bound to community in times of high insecurity and must live with consequences of poor agency acceptance. |

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<th>ASSUMPTIONS</th>
<th>HR/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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| Man | - May enjoy/practice certain privileges and freedom coming from urban setting or other community.  
- May feel they can take additional liberties since they are in their home country.  
- May not be well accepted and still perceived as a foreigner in project/office location away from home.  
- May have habits, or sense of power that are not appropriate.  
- May feel they can take additional liberties since they are in their home country.  
- May not be well accepted and still perceived as a foreigner in project/office location away from home.  
- May have habits, or sense of power that are not appropriate. | - MUST STAY. Bound to community in times of high insecurity and must live with consequences of poor agency acceptance.  
- May enjoy different level of gender equality in home country.  
- Gender is often perceived as ambiguous (3rd sex)  
- May be victim to being perceived according to stereotypes perpetuated by media and entertainment industry.  
- Possibly perceived as a wealthy, easy target.  
- May be perceived as representing values that clash directly with the ideas/values/beliefs of fundamentalists and patriarchal conservatives.  
- Lifestyle, health and social interactions may differ from normal behaviour at home (e.g. smoking).  
- May not want to admit to being affected by harassment out of fear of being seen as ‘weak’.  
- Possible long term self-worth issue if in a culture where you are pitied for being single/not having children – possibly leading to self justification.  |

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<th>INTERNATIONAL STAFF</th>
<th>ASSUMPTIONS</th>
<th>HR/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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| Woman | - Privileged.  
- May enjoy different level of gender equality in home country.  
- Gender is often perceived as ambiguous (3rd sex)  
- May be victim to being perceived according to stereotypes perpetuated by media and entertainment industry.  
- Possibly perceived as a wealthy, easy target.  
- May be perceived as representing values that clash directly with the ideas/values/beliefs of fundamentalists and patriarchal conservatives.  
- Lifestyle, health and social interactions may differ from normal behaviour at home (e.g. smoking).  
- May not want to admit to being affected by harassment out of fear of being seen as ‘weak’.  
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- Possibly perceived as a wealthy, easy target.  
- May be perceived as representing values that clash directly with the ideas/values/beliefs of fundamentalists and patriarchal conservatives.  
- Lifestyle, health and social interactions may differ from normal behaviour at home (e.g. smoking).  
- May not want to admit to being affected by harassment out of fear of being seen as ‘weak’.  
- Possible long term self-worth issue if in a culture where you are pitied for being single/not having children – possibly leading to self justification.  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL STAFF</th>
<th>ASSUMPTIONS</th>
<th>HR/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Man | - Privileged.  
- Age and maturity levels may make them more likely to take more security risks.  
- Gender and maturity levels may make them more likely to take more security risks.  
- Lifestyle, health and social interactions may differ from normal behaviour at home (e.g. alcohol consumption).  
- May have habits or sense of power that is not acceptable (e.g. perception that they have more power/authority).  
- Security risk threshold may be higher than other staff members. | - Very clear guidance on behaviour, physical appearances, dress and RESPECT. This includes guidance on social interactions with the opposite sex – national and international.  
- Security guidelines during social hours.  
- Interpersonal skills and gender sensitive training recommended.  
- May think discriminating behaviour to local women is acceptable (culture) and local woman may feel unable to report it.  
- CAN LEAVE. May not experience the impact of presence and consequences of bad decisions, behaviour and poor programming.  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALL AGENCY PERSONNEL INCLUSIVELY</th>
<th>ASSUMPTIONS</th>
<th>HR/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - By association with the agency and its programmes, depending on the level of acceptance, may or may not be at further security risk.  
- Locations of work, site projects and overall adequate procedures and adherence to these may vary from one individual to the next, but the impact on the whole team is relevant. | - Safety and security.  
- Benefit from gendered safety and security training – inclusive of all staff or segregated if deemed appropriate or requested.  
- Must be aware of an accessible, safe, confidential incident reporting mechanism for all incidents, including sensitive ones.  
- Must be aware of safe and confidential access to psychosocial support. |
Guidance for gender-sensitive security risk assessment

**General context analysis**
- Historical perspective on status and rights of women, men, LGBTI.
- Current status and rights of women, men and LGBTI and persons living with mental and physical disabilities.
- Have gender roles shifted during/after an emergency (natural disaster, conflict and complex humanitarian situations)?
- National laws.
- Profile of crime: pattern analysis – is gender a motive? Does it escalate or defuse aggression?
- Social struggle between groups or regions – their stance on gender issues.
- Identity groups (profile and beliefs) – their gender codes and norms.
- Religious, social, political ideology: key beliefs and practices in relation to gender.
- Traditional social structures used to uphold gender norms, level of functionality.
- Social norms and codes governing public behaviour, dress and the interaction between men and women.
- Class system and its relationship to gender.
- Incidence and prevalence of GBV.
- Access to GBV support mechanisms: medical/psychosocial/legal.
- Gender-specific health issues.

**Detailed situational analysis**

1. **Analyse the history of aid agencies (including ones that have similar values and programmes related to gender equality or GBV):**
   - What were the security threats they faced, how did they deal with them, level of acceptance and success of programmes?
   - What are the perceptions of the local community, national authorities, beneficiaries, etc. regarding assistance and specifically the programmes of the agency?
   - If one gender group of staff were at higher risk, how was their exposure reduced?

2. **Detailed conflict and violence analysis**
   - Is rape used as a weapon of war? Other widespread violence?
   - Detailed profile of crime. Are men more at risk of elevated aggression? Are women more targeted? Is sexual violence occurring during other incidents of aggression, captivity or situations of abduction or kidnapping? Which gender group is targeted?

**Tools**
- Open source publications, internet, NGO/UN Reports, country profile abstracts, in-person interviews and visits to health facilities, local civil society groups, police station, other NGOs, UN (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA etc.) authorities, gender specialists.
- Key informant Interviews with: Other NGOs/UN Agencies, staff members, beneficiaries, local population, local and national authorities.
- Participatory approaches and Focus Group Discussions with: Local community, beneficiaries, staff members, civil society groups, gender and GBV specialists, medical/psychosocial staff etc.
### Gender sensitive security assessment – Considerations to integrate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor mapping, violence mapping, specific threat pattern analysis and detailed profile of crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Actor mapping – gender-related
Map all actors that may be against gender-related programming by the agency, with particular emphasis on those that have capacity and intent to cause harm. Also identify any civil society gender/rights activists or grassroots organisations that deal with gender.

#### 4. Consultation and participation – external actors
Consult with a large cross section of local population, national organisations, beneficiaries and other international agencies that are involved in similar gender work and are like-minded. Look to them to identify gender-specific considerations: real and probable threats, if there are any patterns and what their security coping mechanisms may be.

#### 5. Consultation and participation – internal actors
Consult with cross sections of staff and gender advisors to get a detailed analysis in relation to gender issues of the country profile and internal gender-related dynamics within the staff team:
- Dynamics between women and men, staff, communities, etc.
- Gender-related and other risk factors while at work or when undertaking programme activities, ascertain perceptions and concerns about personal security.
- Level of risk due to association with the agency.
- Solutions to improving working conditions (e.g. working hours).
- Perspectives on security risk effectiveness of existing security measures and internal mechanisms such as incident reporting etc.
- Which job positions do men and women generally hold?
- High risk areas (inside and outside of agency facilities and programme sites)

#### 6. Detailed GBV Assessment (see Guidance Tool E)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify necessary resources needed to mitigate security risks and include them in project proposals and budgets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify all of the agency’s operations that may be affected by threats; determine locations and activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify how and why particular threats could affect programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify threats that are present and are less likely to affect the agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct comprehensive picture of programme activities and how security information can be integrated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Identify ‘programme criticality’.
  - Negative consequences of not implementing the programme or cancelling an existing programme. |
  - Extent to which other NGO activities are dependent on the agency’s continued implementation of its programme. |
| Identify and locate the agency team. |

---

26 Based on InterAction Security Unit (2010)
Gendered risk analysis

This flowchart can be adapted for analysing any relative vulnerability/risk.

GENDER-SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT PROCESS

FILTERS
Assumptions, biases, gender/culture/nationality/experience, tools

THREAT IDENTIFICATION
Gender specific threats (GBV, harassment etc)

RELATIVE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Gender is the motivating factor for causing harm. Exposure to threats due to gender tendencies in specific job positions

RISK ANALYSIS
Is there an escalation of aggression toward a specific gender group in other threat situations. Likelihood, impact (physical and psychological risk) on the individual. Impact on agency.

RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
Significant investment in acceptance strategies Consultation with agency personnel to validate and implement measures

ANALYSIS OF APPROPRIATENESS OF MEASURES
Are the measures in place for other reasons than security? Are they in place because it is easy to do? Is gender a control factor? Are the security measures legitimate?
Gender-specific considerations in security risk mitigation

The proposed measures should be informed by a context-specific analysis that accurately captures the level of risk. These are only considerations for security planning.

Gender-specific considerations in risk mitigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHAT</th>
<th>MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PERSONAL CONDUCT | ● Expected behaviour: respect, dress, formalities, different interactions with various interlocutors – applicable to both sexes.  
● Compliance with national laws (all staff including LGBTI).  
● Cultural and social issues to be sensitive that relate to gender and GBV.  
● Personal security – specific gender considerations: avoidance, strength in numbers, curfews, no-go zones, gender-specific threats, etc. This must be validated by an accurate risk analysis.  
● Protection of valuables.  
● GBV/harassment protocol. |
| ACCEPTANCE | ● Strategic and respectful cultivation and maintenance of context-specific relationships.  
● Respectful interactions with various interlocutors.  
● Ongoing dialogue and transparency about programme and presence with local communities, beneficiaries, authorities etc.  
● Staff and community participation in programme design.  
● Constant monitoring and evaluation of programme quality.  
● Strategic programme assessment, design and implementation that incrementally negotiates toward objectives.  
● Agency staff well trained in interpersonal communications/ interacting with local community etc. |
| AGENCY STAFF MANAGEMENT | ● Staff members (process-driven dialogue with gender diverse security committee, focus group, representative cross-section etc.) are consulted in risk assessment and in design of security measures.  
● Culture of openness, reporting, etc.  
● Taking people’s welfare and security seriously. |
| VISITOR PROCEDURES | ● Pre-arrival and on-arrival briefings.  
● Accommodation safest possible, with attention to single travellers’ vulnerability. |
| HR | ● Safety and security induction/orientation.  
● Inequity complaint mechanism.  
● Bullying/harassment policy and procedures.  
● Staff selection.  
● Support, identifying opportunities, meeting people’s needs. |
| TRAVEL/MOVEMENT PROCEDURES | ● Authorised means of travel and carriers: do any modes of travel increase gender vulnerability?  
● Travel restrictions (gender-specific), no travel outside town perimeter, policy on overnight stays, curfew, etc.  
● Authorisation procedures. |

Continues over the page…
## Gender-specific considerations in risk mitigation

### WHAT

#### USE OF LAND VEHICLES
- Vehicles safety equipment (first aid boxes supplied with feminine hygiene products).
- Driver and passenger conduct.
- Context-specific procedures and gender considerations such as sitting position inside car, who members of staff can/cannot travel with.
- Others (e.g. motorcycles) appropriate for gender group/not appropriate – cultural and/or security reasons.

#### FACILITIES
- Access procedures (female guards for body checks on female visitors).
- Minimum building safety and security equipment & supplies.
- Building evacuation procedures and assembly point – take into consideration mobility of staff (physical and other).
- Fire safety instructions. Fire extinguishers all staff can/know how to use.

#### INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
- Disclosure/confidentiality policy.
- Incident reporting.

#### HEALTH
- Individual responsibility/behaviour.
- Key health risks – any gender-specific risks.
- Context-specific preventative measures.
- Procedure for medical treatments (gender-specific).
- Vaccinations.
- Gender-specific equipment, supplies that may be needed, pre-positioned or identified for further access: PEP kit, rape kit, post rape medications, first aid kits that are supplied with gender-specific items such as feminine products, etc.

#### WELLNESS
- Stress prevention measures.
- Psychosocial support appropriate for gender preference.

#### FACILITIES APPROVAL
- Location security (office, hotels, residences, warehouses, field offices).
- Safety of buildings.
- Gender and cultural considerations in deciding location, co-habitation, guarded/not guarded/ community perceptions, etc.

#### INTERNAL COMPLAINTS MECHANISM/HELPLINE FOR STAFF SUPPORT
- Focal points for women and men, national and international staff.
- Procedure is well communicated and understood by all staff. It is accessible, confidential, transparent and safe.

#### CRITICAL INCIDENTS
- Gender sensitivities.
- Additional gender-specific risks such as sexual violence during captivity. Agency to pre-position needed support (psychosocial, medical and legal).
Gender-based violence – assessing, preventing and case management

Introduction

The importance of considering GBV has become more formalised over the past decade. Various initiatives and the development of important tools and guidance in recent years has led to better implementation of prevention, coordination and response measures for GBV in humanitarian response. Nonetheless, there remain further opportunities to raise awareness and integrate good practice for the mainstreaming of GBV considerations into safety and security practices of agencies, as personnel are increasingly facing additional threats.

With all types of GBV, there are serious and potentially life-threatening health implications (physical, emotional and psychosocial) that can have a profound negative effect in terms of morbidity and mortality on the lives of both victims and their families. Social and economic consequences, if not addressed, can have long-term and negative implications at the individual, family and community levels (Wagener 2012).

At risk staff

Anyone can be a victim of GBV, although women tend to be more vulnerable. Agency personnel are most at risk in the following situations:

- When travelling, working, or living alone
- Working in cultures of gender inequality
- Lone female heads of households
- When under the influence of alcohol or drugs
- Individuals in an abusive, intimate or dependent relationship
- Individuals in war or armed conflict situations

Definitions (based on IASC 2006a/b)

Gender-based violence (inclusive of sexual violence) is an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between females and males. The nature and extent of specific types of GBV vary across cultures, countries and regions. Examples include sexual violence, including sexual exploitation/abuse and forced prostitution; domestic violence; trafficking; forced/early marriage; harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation; honour killings; and widow inheritance. Other forms of GBV include forced recruitment of men, women, and children.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) are forms of gender-based violence that have been widely reported in humanitarian situations. While SEA can be perpetrated by anyone, the term SEA has been used in reference to sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by both civilian and uniformed peacekeeping personnel of non-UN and UN organisations.

Conducting a detailed GBV situational analysis

These are some of the topics and questions that need to be considered when analysing a particular situation.

General Information and GBV basics

- Demographics (disaggregation by age, ethnicity and sex is important)
- Types of gender-based violence
- Extent of gender-based violence
- Contributing factors
- Survivor profiles
- Perpetrator profiles
- Survivor needs
Community profile

- Community knowledge, attitudes and practices about gender issues and GBV
- Traditional/religious beliefs and practices
- Level of women’s participation in decision-making
- Status of women
- Community strengths
- Community perceptions and common stereotypes

Programming considerations

- Accessibility and safety of location where programme is implemented (e.g. camps, villages)
- Services and facilities: locations, organisations, security
- Inclusion or exclusion of women in planning and decision-making
- Emergency outlets, security
- Sensitivity and awareness of staff and volunteers

Security measures

- Types, sex and number of police and security staff/volunteers in and around the setting
- Methods used for identifying security threats and risks
- Involvement of community

Reporting and referral

- Survivor options for making reports
- Referral mechanisms
- Confidentiality and information sharing
- Involvement of community in reporting and referrals
- Involvement of other agencies active in protection

Response services

Availability and accessibility:

- Health care: which clinics have protocols, PEP kits, rape kits with emergency contraception (morning after pill), STD medication, forensic evidence collection kits, equipment, trained staff (women and men)? What is their data on cases? What is the prevalence of GBV?
- Psychosocial care: are counselling services available? What does counselling mean in this setting? Who are the counsellors, and what is their training, their role?
- Legal/justice system: does impunity prevail or are there options to access legal support? How many cases of GBV were submitted in the past year? How many perpetrators were tried, convicted and sentenced? How many found not guilty? What are the host country laws and policies related to various forms of GBV?
- How is the victim treated? Blame etc.
- Security and safety: how many reports to police? What capacity and resources do they have, including procedures for conducting investigations, arresting, private interview space, female officers?
- Traditional practitioners and community based groups
- Services provided by other NGOs, UN, and host government institutions
- Involvement of beneficiaries/community in response action
- Previous case studies of successful GBV case handling

Mostly agencies have very few or no success stories of effectively handling such cases, if there are any, they should be highlighted to give confidence to victims to report. I was told by a staff of an aid agency that the reason why she would never report any sexual violence case is because in her experience, both victim and perpetrator are penalised by organisational procedures.

Key informant – Pakistan

GBV prevention

Women tend to be more vulnerable to GBV, which in turn is usually perpetrated by men. Because of this, men play an important role in the prevention of GBV. Usually, the perpetrator is known by the victim/survivor. It should be noted that GBV is assumed to be severely under-reported by men.

GBV response

There are short- and long-term physical, emotional and psychological consequences for the individual and their overall wellness. GBV is often under-reported because of fear of reprisals, social stigma, shame, and self-blame.

Women may experience it as a mark of disgrace, find it difficult to discuss something so personal in a work context, or worry that drawing attention to the situation will make their life or job situation worse. In many cases women may feel that reporting the incident will bring more harm than good, due to the lack of health or legal services.

Key informant
Good practice: agency response to incident of GBV of staff member

**Fig 7. Principles of referral process**

**GBV Referral Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No action should be taken without the express permission of the survivor, if and when appropriate. Creation of a safe space for the survivor.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explain the role of the primary contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform survivor of importance of accessing health care within 72 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If chosen, refer and accompany survivor to medical clinic or facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access psychological support – informed of available services, benefits and consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If chosen, refer to specific and appropriate psychosocial specialist, support centre or other programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to legal and justice if possible – informed of benefits and consequences of pursuing legal action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain benefits of making an incident report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Sensitive incidents reporting cycle

Good practice in gender-sensitive incident reporting and complaints mechanisms for reporting sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)

- Safe, accessible, confidential reporting mechanism(s) (options/internal/external)
- Analysis and/or investigation with full consent
- Disciplinary and legal action
- Referral to health care and psychosocial support
- Positive encouragement to report incident
- Policy and code of conduct. Knowledge, awareness, acceptance
- Policy and code of conduct. Knowledge, awareness, acceptance
Good practice in gender-sensitive incident reporting

Policy
Policy is at the foundation of good incident reporting and may include a whistleblowing clause. Special emphasis should be placed on promoting incident reporting. Mandatory reporting for specific incidents, except situations where it is an option for an individual such as incidents of harassment and GBV (SEA falls under a different code of conduct and policy). Staff members have a duty to report incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse or possibly face disciplinary measures. See below for more information on SEA).

Awareness
Staff should be aware of what constitutes an incident with particular emphasis on the less talked about situations such as harassment, GBV, near misses, or smaller incidents. Awareness can be raised while creating comfort and trust in encouraging incident reporting during induction, orientations, trainings, at meetings, etc. Staff must know their rights and options.

Incident reporting options/procedures
Several channels should be established for incident reporting. This offers additional options for personnel depending on their comfort level or need for confidentiality. Options include (but are not limited to): on-line reporting through agency intranet, phone hotline (reverse charges or toll-free), focal points, channels that bypass some levels of management (in cases where they are being reported on), etc.

Use of focal points
Focal points must be carefully selected and trained based on their personal profile, capability, ability to maintain confidentiality and objectivity. Having international and national, male and female focal points could increase comfort and access to reporting.

Analysis/investigations
Follow up on incidents will subsequently inform risk analysis, risk reduction measures or levels of staff awareness. Some level of internal investigation, conducted by extremely well trained individuals may be necessary (breach of internal policies). This will then warrant notifying the local authorities/police for external investigation in case of a confirmed breach of local laws.

Disciplinary procedures
Should there be misconduct of a staff member, depending on the severity of the incident, local laws including labour laws, disciplinary measures should be taken and must be applied consistently across local/national/international/male/female staff members.

Institutional memory
Avoid hiring any person with a history of perpetrating any type of serious incident including corruption, sexual harassment, or sexual violence, including sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and domestic violence. This may seem obvious, but there is a long history of anecdotal evidence about perpetrators being re-hired in a different country office – sometimes even the same agency. If relevant laws governing employers and employees permit, coordinate with other agencies to establish a system for sharing information about employees terminated for engaging in harassment, sexual violence and/or SEA. Careful hiring practices that include reference checks and vetting are imperative.

SEA Framework

IASC SEA Principles
- Sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers constitute acts of gross misconduct and are therefore grounds for termination of employment;
- Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or age of consent locally. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence;
- Exchange of money, employment, goods, or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading, or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any form of assistance that is due to beneficiaries;
- Sexual relationships between humanitarian workers and beneficiaries are strongly discouraged since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics. Such relationships undermine the credibility and integrity of humanitarian aid work;
- Where a humanitarian worker develops concerns or suspicions regarding sexual abuse or exploitation by a fellow worker, whether in the same agency or not, s/he must report such concerns via established agency reporting mechanisms;
- Humanitarian workers are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse and promotes the implementation of their code of conduct. Managers at all levels have particular responsibilities to support and develop systems that maintain this environment.
Fig 9. Reporting cycle SEA

Start anywhere in the continuum!

- Code of Conduct
- Agency Policy & Procedures
- Investigation of Allegation
- Response to Findings
- Complain ts Handling/Mechanism

Implications for staff & consequences

Beneficiary

Staff

Assistant to victim

Report to complainant

Education about the process

Source: InterAction SEA Learning Modules and Guidance
Many of the considerations below are already included in most personal security/security management training courses. They should be seen as additions that can enhance existing training and mainstream gender throughout security training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUGGESTED # OF DAYS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>TARGETED STAFF / TYPE OF TRAINING</th>
<th>IDEAL FACILITATOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1-2 days            | Self-awareness and team cohesion in relation to security risk        | • Exercises to identify strengths, weaknesses  
• Working through scenarios  
• Awareness of team members  
• Security framework adapted to personal security  
• Interpersonal communication/defusing anger  
• Knowing how others will react due to gender stereotypes | All staff (personal security)                                                                                                                   | Mixed or gender-specific                             |
| 1 day               | Gender                                                               | • Define gender  
• Describe the importance of understanding the concept of gender  
• Demonstrate understanding of their own gender roles and gender in their community  
• Describe how issues of gender can put women, girls, boys and men at risk, in programming and in programme delivery  
• Describe the concept of gender in their mother tongue, without using the word ‘gender’ | All staff (personal security)                                                                                                                   | Gender specialist, mixed gender facilitators, nationalities |
| ½-1 day             | Concepts of power and abuse of power, vulnerability and lack of choice, different types of violence | • Looking at community and power distribution  
• Examination of existing types of violence | All staff (personal security)                                                                                                                   | Gender specialist mixed gender facilitators, nationalities |
| 1 day               | Gender-based violence and harassment                                 | • Overview of agency policies/code of conduct  
• Define gender-based violence  
• Identify the causes and contributing factors of GBV  
• Discuss the role of power in gender-based violence  
• Identify human rights violated by acts of GBV  
• Identify types of GBV  
• Discuss the physical, psychological and social consequences survivors of GBV might face  
• Look at agency/context specific prevention and response measures  
• Clarity about incident reporting mechanism | All staff (personal security/security management)                                                                                                 | GBV/Gender specialist, agency management |

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<th>IDEAL FACILITATOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 day               | Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse| ● Overview of agency code of conduct and PSEA policy  
● Discuss the role of power in exploitation  
● Identify two psychological after-effects and describe survivor needs in relation to them  
● Identify two health outcomes and describe survivor needs  
● Describe the agency-specific Code of Conduct and other staff performance guidelines in the setting  
● Describe the procedure for reporting sexual exploitation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | All staff (personal security/security management)                    | Agency management                              |
| 2 days              | Internal case management                   | ● Describe and apply the steps in a case management model when working with survivors  
● Understand the different needs of survivors and be able to undertake more holistic assessment, taking into account different needs  
● Identify core knowledge and skills required to work with survivors  
● Define all terms used on the Intake and Assessment Form  
● Demonstrate ability to complete all case management forms correctly  
● Demonstrate ability to explain the Consent Form to the survivor  
● Describe the procedure for emergency response and reporting a GBV incident – during the day, at night  
● Identify five stakeholders who will need to be included in the GBV coordination team at project site level  
● Describe the difference between giving information and giving advice  
● Explain empowerment & confidentiality as key concepts in assisting victims of GBV  
● Accessing legal services and justice                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Focal points (security management)                                | Mixed specialist and agency management          |
| 2 days              | Stress management and psychosocial response| ● Signs and symptoms of stress  
● Managing stress  
● Active listening and advising  
● Emotional support  
● Seeking support  
● Critical incident management  
● Debriefing  
● Team cohesion and processes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | All staff (personal security and security management)                | Mixed or psychosocial focal point/ specialist |
| 1-2 days            | Personal security                          | ● Context-specific risks  
● Gender and behaviour  
● Gender-specific risks  
● Special considerations  
● Open discussions  
● Case studies/scenarios  
● Self-defence  
● Defusing anger                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Security and management (security management)                      | Gender-specific groups (optional)             |
| 2 days              | Gendered security risk management          | ● Overview of gender and GBV considerations  
● Overview of gender transformative and synchronisation approaches  
● Introduction of assessment methodologies for gender-based risk analysis  
● Devising gender appropriate measures  
● Analysis of gendered procedures  
● Gendered approaches to implementation – training                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | All staff (personal security and security management)                | Gender-specific groups (optional)             |
The author and EISF are grateful to all the individuals that have contributed to this research, either through interviews, document reviews or by filling out the survey. The list below is not exhaustive and provides an overview of those contributors that have granted permission for their details to be included in this report.

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Leah Sherman  Assistance with data analysis from Surveys, and on-line questionnaires  
Christina Wille  Director Insecurity Insight  
Bjorg Mide  Global Security Coordinator, Norwegian Church Aid  
Larissa Fast  Kroc Institute and Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame  
Michael O’Neill  Director Global Safety and Security, Save the Children International  
Robert MacPherson  President and CEO, Cosantóir Group  
Lynne Cripe  Member, The KonTerra Group  
Randel Bareham  Independent Security Consultant and Trainer  
Noemi Munoz Zamora  Head of Safety and Security Unit, Handicap International Federation  
Rebekka Meissner  Security Advisor, Medair  
Nadja Dolata  Gender and Diversity Adviser, Save the Children UK  
Alyson Eynon  Senior Humanitarian Child Protection Advisor, Save the Children UK  
Katharine Williamson  Humanitarian Child Protection Advisor, Save the Children UK  
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Norman Sheehan  Security Director, Chemonics  
Pascal Daudin  Policy, ICRC  
Diego Guerrero Oris  Intermón Oxfam  
David Clamp  VSO  
Shaun Bickley  Tricky Locations  
Madeleine Kingston  Monitoring and Evaluation/Programme Development Manager, Save the Children (South Africa Programme)
1. Definitions relating to gender & security

The definitions refer to proposed new terminology and concepts relating to considerations regarding gender & security. The definitions were developed by the author, with feedback from EISF and the Gender & Security Working Group.

**Gender-sensitive security risk management:** within this framework gender considerations are an integral part of decision-making throughout the overarching philosophy, application of approaches and use of resources that frame organisational security management. The framework recognises the different inequalities, specific security needs, experiences, issues and priorities of women, men (and LGBTI). Acting on this awareness, the agency aims to adequately reduce the level of risk and achieve equitable levels of security for their male and female personnel.

**Gender responsive mitigation strategy:** creating an enabling working environment and conditions through gender sensitive assessments (situational analysis and risk, threat and vulnerability analysis) that inform standard operating procedures and contingency planning by considering gender-sensitive security strategies, staff selection, codes of conduct, programme development and policy. The mitigation strategy will thereby be aimed at reducing the level of risk for the particular safety and security of their female and male staff, in a specific context.

**Gender-related data:** the quantitative and qualitative information that is connected by the shared characteristic of gender.

**Gendered security policies and procedures:** policies and procedures that distinguish between, are specific to, or biased to either women, men, girls or boys.

**Gender-sensitive security assessment:** to ensure that while doing an assessment you consider the security and safety related needs, experiences, issues, and priorities of women and men with reference to historical and existing context, such as specific threats, vulnerabilities, status, stereotypes and the overall risks examined.

**Gender-specific risk:** likelihood and potential impact of a threat that is specific to women, men, boys and girls, by virtue of their gender.

**Gender-specific vulnerability:** a vulnerability whereby the determining factor, level and exposure to a threat is directly attributed to gender.

**Gendered security mainstreaming** consists of strategically assessing and including gender-specific considerations to make women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of security policies, guidelines and procedures, as well as incorporating these considerations in the safe implementation of programmes in the existing operational context.

2. Gender terms (adapted from the IASC Handbook)

**Gender** refers to the social differences between females and males throughout the life cycle that are learned, and though deeply rooted in every culture, are changeable over time, and have wide variations both within and between cultures. Gender, along with class and race, determines the roles, power and resources for females and males in any culture.

**Gender analysis** examines the relationships between females and males and their access to and control of resources, their roles and the constraints they face relative to each other. A gender analysis should be integrated into the humanitarian needs assessment and in all sector assessments or situational analyses to ensure that gender-based injustices and inequalities are not exacerbated by humanitarian interventions and that where possible greater equality and justice in gender relations are promoted.

Gender balance is a human resource issue. It is about the equal participation of women, and men in all areas of work (international and national staff at all levels, including at senior positions) and in programmes that agencies initiate and support (e.g. food distribution programmes).
Gender-based violence (inclusive of sexual violence) is an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between females and males. The nature and extent of specific types of GBV vary across cultures, countries and regions. Examples include sexual violence, including sexual exploitation/abuse and forced prostitution; domestic violence; trafficking, forced/early marriage; harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation; honour killings; and widow inheritance. Other forms of GBV include forced recruitment of men, women, children.

Gender equality, or equality between women and men, refers to the equal enjoyment by women, girls, boys and men of rights, opportunities, resources and rewards. Equality does not mean that women and men are the same but that their enjoyment of rights, opportunities and life chances are not governed or limited by whether they were born female or male.

Gender mainstreaming is a globally recognised strategy for achieving gender equality. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations defined gender mainstreaming as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.

LGBTI: Refers to the acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual transgendered and inter-sexed. Lesbian and gay are individuals that are sexually attracted to members of their own sex. Bisexual are attracted to both sexes. Transgendered individuals identify with another gender than the physiological characteristics they were born with. Inter-sexed individuals are born with both male and female physiological characteristics.

Protection: encompasses all activities aimed at securing full respect for the rights of individuals – women, girls, boys and men – in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) are forms of gender-based violence that have been widely reported in humanitarian situations. While SEA can be perpetrated by anyone, the term SEA has been used in reference to sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by both civilian, uniformed peacekeeping personnel of non-UN and UN organisations.

3. Security terms

These definitions come from the Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments (GPR8 2010).

Danger habituation: a usually unconscious adjustment of one’s threshold of acceptable risk resulting from constant exposure to danger; the result is a reduction of one’s objective assessment of risk, possibly leading to increased risk-taking behaviour.

Risk: the likelihood and potential impact of encountering a threat.

Risk assessment/analysis: an attempt to consider risk more systematically in terms of the threats in the environment, particular vulnerabilities and security measures to reduce threat or reduce your vulnerability.

Security: freedom from risk or harm resulting from violence or other intentional acts.

Security strategy: the overarching philosophy, application of approaches and use of resources that frame organisational security management.

Standard operating procedures: formally established procedures for carrying out particular operations or dealing with particular situations, specifically regarding how to prevent an incident happening, survive an incident or follow up on an incident as part of the agency’s crisis management planning.

Threat: a danger in the operating context to the individual, organisation or property.

Threshold of acceptable risk: the point beyond which the risk is considered too high to continue operating; influenced by the probability that an incident will occur, and the seriousness of the impact if it occurs.

Vulnerability: the level of exposure to a particular threat.

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30 Sexual Exploitation is any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to: profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.

Sexual Abuse is the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.
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