Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity

A CIVCAP Network Joint Research Project

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Authors and Acknowledgements

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Executive Summary

In 2010, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General appointed a senior advisory group to conduct an independent review of how civilian capacity is provided in the aftermath of conflict. The advisory group’s report on civilian capacity (CIVCAP) resulted in the UN and its member states embarking on a global effort to reshape the way that civilian expertise is mobilized in crisis and post-conflict settings.

CIVCAP seeks to enlist a broader set of partners in the provision of this civilian assistance, and in particular to work with the Global South as important providers. The UN CIVCAP approach rests on the assumptions that Global South partners are willing and able to bring expertise from their own development and transition experiences, that there will be resources available to enable this, and that the multilateral machinery for post-conflict international assistance will be able to re-engineer itself to better absorb that support.

The CIVCAP initiative has emerged against the backdrop of a much broader and longer-term dynamic wherein major actors of the Global South have continued to grow significantly as providers of bilateral assistance. Long-standing South–South cooperation programmes have expanded in line with the growing economic interests and foreign policy aspirations of these countries. National policy frameworks, systems and institutions are evolving to manage the growth in scale and complexity of these technical cooperation programmes, a trajectory which seems likely to continue in the coming years.

The CIVCAP Network countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey) have been tracking the CIVCAP process and have been actively engaged in consultations at the UN and regional levels. Each of these countries approaches CIVCAP from a slightly different perspective and each has varying interests and ambitions. In general, the principles and broad approach of CIVCAP—such as its focus on greater inclusion and recognition of the importance of South–South knowledge transfer and its advocacy of nationally-led approaches over supply-side dominance—are welcomed by the countries. There is an interest in finding ways to ensure that their national expertise and civilian experts can be harnessed for CIVCAP.

On the other hand, these countries also face a range of challenges and constraints in their engagement with CIVCAP. Several of them have had limited experience in providing civilian specialists in crisis settings. For others, there is more experience, but they are grappling with how to strengthen their systems for deploying personnel or for upscaling their civilian assistance activities. There are domestic challenges in some countries, ranging from incentives structures, resources and legislation, to pre-deployment training or coordination. There is also a continuing lack of clarity about how their national capacities will engage with multilateral actors. There are questions about what sorts of specific civilian expertise the
UN and others are seeking in practice. How will requests be made to governments? Under what terms and conditions and status will their personnel work? Some partners are seeking further discussions on what resources or funding mechanisms might be available to support CIVCAP contributions and how this may work.

The partner countries recognize that CIVCAP is a work in progress and that much remains to be elaborated. However, many of them may not be in a position to further clarify or develop their capabilities and systems for supporting multilateral CIVCAP deployments (e.g. putting in place training, policies, rostering) until that clarity begins to emerge. There is a high likelihood that, in the short to medium term, most of the partner countries will provide civilian experts in crisis and post-conflict settings primarily through bilateral arrangements. In the meantime, more can be done on the domestic level to raise awareness of CIVCAP among national stakeholders, in government and beyond, and to work on eliminating potential obstacles or bottlenecks to CIVCAP deployments, whether through multilateral or bilateral channels.

For most of the countries studied, a far wider set of activities (including trainings, study tours, workshops etc.) serve as important mechanisms for supporting civilian capacity development in both development settings and in post-conflict and crisis settings. The narrow concept of CIVCAP – with its primary focus on the problem of in-country technical assistance – is seen as limited, and as failing to recognize the wider contributions being made in supporting civilian capacity under existing bilateral cooperation programmes.

Chapter Six of this synthesis report presents ten general findings or observations drawn from the country case studies. These observations can perhaps feed into discussions among CIVCAP Network countries about key issues that they could monitor, or engage with as the Network continues its work in cooperation with governments and the UN in support of the CIVCAP initiative. The baseline observations from this study are as follows:

1. There is a good level of general support for CIVCAP among the partners.
2. CIVCAP needs to move quickly from the theoretical to the practical.
3. The UN CIVCAP concept is not sufficiently broad to capture the CIVCAP-related activities of the countries studied.
4. Countries are likely to prefer an ‘on request’ model to engaging with the UN CIVCAP initiative, until mechanisms for government-provided personnel have been clearly articulated.
5. Bilateral assistance is likely to remain the predominant approach.
6. The CIVCAP community is small, and strong formal as well as informal networks are needed, internationally and domestically.
7. The need for strengthened coordination and deployment support systems is recognized, but technocratic tools for managing larger scales of civilian capacity deployment are not yet a high priority.
8. New funding for encouraging CIVCAP through multilateral institutions could generate support from smaller countries with limited financial resources, but not from the larger players.
9. Trilateral cooperation arrangements are potentially important mechanisms for building CIVCAP relationships, but are ad hoc.
10. Regional organizations are not yet playing a significant role in CIVCAP, although the African Union has already embarked on a process to make greater use of CIVCAP in future.
1. Introduction

During crisis and in the aftermath of conflict, deploying the right civilian capacities can be essential to building peace, to facilitating fragile social and economic transitions and to reinforcing national and local institutions. The Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict (CIVCAP) process, launched in 2010, is an international effort to strengthen the thinking around, and the machinery for, providing effective civilian assistance in crisis and post-conflict settings.

The CIVCAP Network

In support of the CIVCAP process, a new network of research partners has been formed and is working to find opportunities for strengthening and supporting CIVCAP. The Civilian Capacity Network is a research partnership centred on prominent countries of the Global South. It brings together national institutes with expertise in peacebuilding research. The aim is for these research partners to work cooperatively alongside governments, the UN and other partners to realize common interests on the CIVCAP agenda. The CIVCAP Network currently consists of analytical and research institutes in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, and is supported by Norway.

CIVCAP Network Partners (2012)

- African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (South Africa)
- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)
- Igarapé Institute (Brazil)
- Institute of Contemporary International Studies (Russia)
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (China)
- Istanbul Policy Centre, Sabanci University (Turkey)
- Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (Norway)
- United Service Institution of India (India)

The Baseline Study

In June 2012, CIVCAP Network partners agreed to produce a joint ‘baseline’ (or starting-point) study on the state of play with CIVCAP among the partner countries. To contribute to the present report, national case studies were produced for Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.1 This synthesis report draws extensively on the indivi-

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1. In addition to those mentioned, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP) contributed a case study of a Francophone country, namely Burkina Faso.
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dual case studies as inputs to the baseline. All partners have been encouraged to publish their country case studies.2 This report and the case studies are the CIVCAP Network’s first formal contribution to the dialogue on the role of the Global South in providing civilian expertise in crisis and post-conflict settings. The case studies also present valuable research about national experiences with providing civilian assistance beyond crisis and post-conflict settings.

This report will inform a first substantive discussion among all CIVCAP Network partners and their governmental counterparts at a seminar in Brasilia on 28–29 November 2012. At that meeting, CIVCAP Network members will help validate the observations and findings from the study. To this end, the present report presents a synthesis of the 2012 ‘baseline’ understanding of national approaches to CIVCAP. The report introduces the CIVCAP agenda and the perceptions of CIVCAP by the Network partners. It outlines national motivations and interests in CIVCAP, as well as the national frameworks that underpin engagement with CIVCAP. The study presents findings on the civilian assistance activities of each of the countries, and the national policies, systems and resources for administering these. Thereby the study seeks to explore partners’ current approaches to CIVCAP and to identify issues for the CIVCAP Network to continue to engage with in future.

Defining CIVCAP

The CIVCAP agenda builds on familiar concepts in international cooperation, but the CIVCAP construct itself is a relatively new one in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding parlance. Although governments have for decades deployed civilian personnel abroad through technical cooperation and other programmes, the 2011 Senior Advisory Group’s Report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict3 focused attention on the particular challenges of deploying civilian expertise in crisis-affected countries and in support of post-conflict peacebuilding.

For the purposes of this study, the following working definition for ‘CIVCAP’ was agreed at the outset of the research:

**CIVCAP Working Definition**

The term ‘civilian capacity’ (CIVCAP) refers to non-uniformed civilian individuals or groups deployed overseas to crisis or post-conflict settings by (or coordinated through) their respective governments. The term includes personnel deployed through bilateral cooperation programmes as well as those deployed through the United Nations, regional organizations or other intergovernmental organizations. It includes civilian capacity deployed from the public sector or private sectors, including academia and civil society organizations that is in some way ‘coordinated’ under government auspices.

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2. As appropriate, the individual studies will also be published online with the joint study on the CIVCAP Network website: http://www.nupi.no/Virksomheten/Forskningsprogram/Civilian-Capacity.

3. The original report can be found at: http://www.civcapreview.org (The report was transmitted in full to the UN General Assembly in February 2011 under UN document symbol A/65/747-S/2011/85).
The key features of the CIVCAP definition are:

- non-uniformed, civilian personnel\(^4\)
- deployed by, or otherwise coordinated under the auspices of, governments
- deployed to crisis or post-conflict settings

The term ‘civilian assistance’ (rather than CIVCAP) is used in this report to denote provision of civilian capacities in countries not affected by crisis. In order to assess the potential for CIVCAP provision in future, and to understand the underlying national approaches, this study has drawn extensively on wider experiences of civilian assistance in non-CIVCAP settings.

The above definition of ‘CIVCAP’ does not preclude the possibility that the CIVCAP Network may decide to use a broader interpretation in future. This may well be necessary as the CIVCAP concept, in its current usage, refers primarily to a problem analysis seen from the viewpoint of the United Nations – in particular, the twin challenges the UN faces in finding sufficient national civilian capacity in host countries and the right international civilian specialists for timely deployment in conflict and crisis settings.

As discussed in this study, several countries take a broader view of what CIVCAP might entail, in terms of the types of assistance provided, and the need to look at civilian capacity developments beyond the confines of the aftermath of armed conflict.

\(^4\) This definition follows the UN approach and defines civilian personnel as distinct from military and police personnel. An interesting alternative approach is that of the European Union (EU), which distinguishes between military and civilian crisis management, and where the police are regarded as part of civilian crisis management.
2. A New Approach to Civilian Capacity

The CIVCAP Problem Statement

Released in early 2011, the independent report of the Senior Advisory Group on *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* set in motion an international effort to tackle systemic challenges in civilian capacity mobilization. Existing approaches to mobilizing specialized technical expertise had repeatedly been found wanting in post-conflict settings.

A central feature of the CIVCAP agenda has been the frank recognition that in the aftermath of armed conflict, or in other crises, traditional civilian technical assistance programmes and international peace operations have struggled to identify and deploy enough appropriately experienced and skilled civilian specialists. Technical assistance programmes have been slow to mobilize the level of highly specialized capacities required, and have struggled to respond quickly in the absence of clearly stated demands from countries in conflict and governments in crisis. Large international peace missions deployed by the UN and other international institutions often carry high vacancy rates and also have been unable to source sufficient numbers of specialist personnel in key peacebuilding sectors, particularly in core governance and institution-building fields.

The 2011 CIVCAP Report identified several important challenges faced by the UN and its partners in providing CIVCAP in the aftermath of conflict:

- identifying and engaging appropriate *national expertise* for peacebuilding from within the crisis-affected state and from its diaspora
- *rebalancing supply-driven CIVCAP approaches* in favour of clearly articulated and genuine national demand from recipients
- identifying and *quickly mobilizing the right international expertise*, and in particular from the Global South.
- opening up long-standing institutional practices in mobilizing civilian personnel so as to embrace a *faster and more flexible approach to mobilizing civilian specialists* for work in crisis and post-conflict settings.

There was also an important recognition that specialized capacities, particularly in areas such as governance, public policy and government institution/systems support, exist primarily within national government structures and not in international organizations.
The approach to date

With approval from the UN General Assembly\(^5\) in May 2012, the UN and its partners launched a broad programme of consultation and analysis to develop CIVCAP systems for the future. Although coordination of this international effort is centred on the UN Secretariat, CIVCAP is being pursued as a global partnership with UN member states, as well as UN and intergovernmental organizations and non-government actors.

The UN and its partners are working to identify CIVCAP improvements along three main lines:\(^6\)

- **national ownership**: strengthening host country ownership and leadership of transition processes and supporting new methods for mobilizing the host country’s own national capacities in support of peacebuilding;
- **partnerships and expertise**: building stronger partnerships for timely supply of high-quality CIVCAP experts, in particular encouraging greater Global South engagement in providing CIVCAP expertise in key peacebuilding sectors;
- **greater institutional flexibility within the UN system**: improvements within the UN system to make it more flexible and responsive to national requests for CIVCAP specialists and to foster greater openness to new methods of deploying individual experts and groups of experts offered by member states and other partners.\(^7\)

The UN Secretariat has limited resources for CIVCAP implementation and is actively looking to its partners, including the CIVCAP Network, to help identify new approaches in the above areas. Through this study, the CIVCAP Network is focusing on the CIVCAP partnership agenda and in particular the issues around mobilizing CIVCAP from the Global South.

Assumptions

The UN’s CIVCAP partnership agenda\(^8\) hinges on several important assumptions about the future dynamics of CIVCAP supply and demand. These assumptions are either explicitly stated in the Independent Report and subsequent reports of the Secretary-General, or can be implied from those documents. Important CIVCAP assumptions include:

1. that major actors of the Global South, as well as smaller developing countries, are genuinely interested in, committed to, and have available for deployment the specialist expertise required in crisis and post-conflict settings;

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\(^6\) The Report of the Secretary-General on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, 15 August 2012 (A/67/312-S/2012/645) laid out three main headings for the CIVCAP work plan.

\(^7\) For example, the UN is looking at revising ‘onboarding’ arrangements to facilitate the deployment of personnel deployed by governments, intergovernmental or quasi government channels in support of specific and specialized UN mandate tasks for limited durations. This includes: (i) secondment of individuals from governments to UN posts or as UN Volunteers; (ii) mobilizing civilian capabilities (particularly teams) sourced from member states under ‘letters of assist’ or memorandum-of-understanding arrangements, and; (iii) an expansion of the ‘experts on mission’ system currently used for ‘uniformed civilians’ (police, corrections personnel) to a broader set of categories of ‘Government-Provided Personnel’ sourced from member states.

\(^8\) See sections III and V of the 2012 Report of the Secretary-General for an articulation of the partnership approach being implemented by the UN Secretariat (A/67/312-S/2012/645).
2. that CIVCAP partners have important domestic transitional and peacebuilding experiences, as well as specialist civilian personnel that they are willing and able to provide to help transfer that knowledge;
3. that CIVCAP partners are in fact interested in deploying their capacities either through, or in close coordination with, multilateral institutions like the UN, rather than focusing on bilateral cooperation arrangements;
4. that greater CIVCAP cooperation between the UN and the Global South is a way to forge closer relationships and mutual understanding, and thereby more deeply involve these member states in the work of the UN;
5. that resources will be available and can be mobilized in support of enhanced CIVCAP participation, whether bilaterally or through forms of triangular cooperation;
6. that the UN, regional organizations and other intergovernmental bodies are able and willing to open their institutional practices to support new ways of mobilizing and deploying specialists in, through or alongside UN operations.

These assumptions reveal much about the expectations, aspirations and interests of the UN with respect to the CIVCAP partnership agenda. Through an analysis of how key emerging actors in the Global South are engaging with CIVCAP, this study explores the validity of some of these assumptions.
3. Network Partner Views of CIVCAP

Nations of the Global South are already engaged in UN peace operations at significant levels, as well as providing civilian assistance bilaterally. More than 60 per cent of the total international civilian staff in UN peace missions come from Global South countries. More than 80 per cent of the CIVCAP-type positions requested from governments to fill specialized justice and corrections functions have been provided by the Global South, in particular by smaller developing countries. The next chapters explore the perspectives and experiences of some major actors in the Global South – Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey – and review their national experiences and aspirations for raising their level of civilian capacity provision in crisis and post-conflict settings, through bilateral and multilateral channels.

The term ‘CIVCAP’ (as used by the Senior Advisory Group report and by the UN) is a relatively new one in the international discourse on peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Yet, the concept is not entirely unfamiliar to partner governments. The CIVCAP agenda builds upon long-standing experience in providing international technical assistance, including through extensive South–South cooperation activities. National understanding of CIVCAP is informed by each country’s experiences with technical cooperation, as well as their international peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission experiences and broader foreign policy interests and ambitions.

The process of domestic and international familiarization with the CIVCAP concept has been underway since 2010. At the UN General Assembly, the issue has been advanced slowly and deliberately, so that countries can become more familiar with the concept before significant changes are proposed. The General Assembly has requested the UN Secretary-General to undertake extensive consultations on CIVCAP prior to submitting specific proposals.

Both the Senior Advisory Group’s review of civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict and the subsequent regional consultations on CIVCAP and CAPMATCH have contributed to raising awareness on the issue. Since the UN regional meetings held in Indonesia (March 2012), South Africa (July 2012) and Morocco (September 2012), there has been a significant interest in CIVCAP from a range of countries beyond the CIVCAP Network itself. Egypt, for example, is keenly engaging in CIVCAP and has identified available expertise on CAPMATCH. Many other countries outside the CIVCAP Network, among them Burkina Faso and Bangladesh, have taken an active interest in CIVCAP as a potential ave-

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9. See for example Annex One
10. CAPMATCH was launched by the United Nations in September 2012 as a service established to facilitate the matching of requests for assistance with suppliers of civilian capacity. Its web portal is at https://capmatch.dfs.un.org/Capmatch/
11. A valuable study of Burkina Faso and its engagement with CIVCAP was produced by Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP) as an adjunct to the CIVCAP Network’s baseline study; it clearly reveals the interest of a small, internationalist developing country in the CIVCAP agenda. For more on ROP see: http://www.operationspaix.net.
nue for deploying personnel in international missions, building on their experiences with deploying uniformed civilian personnel like police or corrections officers.

In this context, the CIVCAP concept continues to undergo a ‘socialization’ process in the national and international contexts. Several partner countries are still finding their positions on the CIVCAP agenda introduced in the UN. Other countries, however, have been quick to engage in the issue and to begin to shape the CIVCAP agenda. For most countries, a common challenge has been finding ways to communicate the CIVCAP agenda to the broad range of relevant national stakeholders (beyond the ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) or other peak coordinating bodies), most of which are as yet largely unaware of the concept and the global processes underway.

CIVCAP appears to be viewed by most of the countries studied in this report primarily through the prism of development cooperation, and as an extension of their bilateral technical cooperation activities, which have long provided civilian assistance overseas. The starting point for those looking at CIVCAP from the perspective of bilateral cooperation can be quite distinct from those viewing the same concept from, for example, the position of delivering improved UN peacebuilding efforts.

CIVCAP is not only seen from a technical cooperation perspective but also is informed by each country’s experience with international peace operations. Each of the countries examined here has been a significant actor in international peace operations through the UN and/or regional entities for more than a decade, in some cases for more than 50 years. This engagement has primarily been within the UN peacekeeping framework and through contributions of military and police personnel. Table 1 shows current contributions to UN peace operations (peacekeeping operations and special political missions) by CIVCAP Network members as of September 2012. Annex 1 provides additional information on civilian personnel to UN field missions as staff and as government-provided experts on mission. Annex 2 shows the deployment levels of all categories of personnel (military, police and civilians) for all CIVCAP Network partners from 2010 to 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2191</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1834</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>2041</td>
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<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Personnel deployed in UN field missions, by category, as of 31 August 2012

*Figures for uniformed personnel (troops, military experts on mission, and police) contributions are taken from the DPKO Website. Figures for international civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping missions and special political missions have been provided by the Department of Field Support. UN civilian staffing figures show that while CIVCAP Network personnel numbers are overall relatively small, that there is a very large number of countries participating. Well over 60% of the personnel currently in UN missions are from the Global South, as are 80% of government-provided ‘experts on mission’.*
CIVCAP is also viewed through the broader prism of the foreign policy interests and ambitions of the partner countries. For countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, CIVCAP is also seen in terms of their foreign policies and their growing soft power, and their roles as influential global players in an increasingly multipolar world. CIVCAP also has the potential to bolster their roles and reputations as major regional actors by responding to potential CIVCAP needs regionally.

There is no single ‘Global South position’ or CIVCAP Network position on CIVCAP. Each country comes to CIVCAP from a different starting point, with different national experiences and differing ambitions. For example, in the case of India, CIVCAP engagement is enmeshed within a more fundamental debate within the Indian decision-making community about the country’s future participation in UN peace operations and how to strengthen international peacekeeping capacities. This is a debate taking place within the context of a wider discussion about India’s foreign and security policy. Turkey views CIVCAP within its wider development cooperation framework and solidarity with countries in crisis, as well as an additional option for soft-power influence. In the case of Indonesia, the broader civilian dimension is a less politically sensitive entry point for dealing with conflict management in its region. For South Africa and Brazil, regional considerations weigh as heavily as the global ones as these countries look into new initiatives such as CIVCAP.

An interesting point to emerge across several case studies and interviews is that the growing interest in the CIVCAP agenda is due in part to the increasing demand or requests from the UN Secretariat to the partner countries to contribute civilian experts to UN peace operations, and more recently to the CAPMATCH tool. The majority of the studied countries have provided information about generic civilian expertise in one or more of the five prioritized areas – basic safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality, and economic revitalization – for the CAPMATCH database.

All countries have noted that demand for their capacities is on the rise. Most of them indicated that they are receiving growing number of bilateral requests for assistance from neighbouring countries or other countries of the Global South. There is also greater recognition domestically that the civilian capacities which each of the countries has to offer is increasingly valuable on the global stage. Many of these capacities are built upon successful domestic policies, programmes and experiences and there is an interest in sharing these with others. A further factor contributing to increased interest in the CIVCAP agenda is membership on the Peacebuilding Commission. Bangladesh is one such example, where interest in CIVCAP has grown since the launch of the 2011 Report on CIVCAP. Most recently, the government has expressed interest in identifying relevant training courses for potential civilian experts to be deployed to peace operations.

The partner countries have also expressed some lack of clarity as to the purpose of the UN’s CIVCAP agenda, particularly with regard to CAPMATCH. It is not clear to some whether the process is more about actually facilitating and strengthening national efforts to deploy
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civilian experts, or if it is simply about getting countries to deposit information on the CAP-
MATCH platform. A recurring point made by the partner countries is the need for the UN
Secretariat to play a more proactive role in ensuring that CAPMATCH can lead to real
‘matches’, whereas the UN Secretariat has been at pains to explain that it does not have the
resources to play such a role. Almost all of the case studies noted that greater clarity in the
articulation of needed civilian expertise would be helpful, as would the development of clearer
frameworks for deploying government-provided personnel with specialized expertise or other
civilian capacities to UN operations. For some of the countries, the availability of sources of
funding for these multilateral contributions is also seen as important to future success.

Notwithstanding the overall positive and supportive positions towards the CIVCAP agenda,
interest and ambitions vary among the partner countries. The following is a brief analysis of
the views and positioning of each of the studied countries on the CIVCAP to date:

Brazil

Brazil is supportive of the CIVCAP agenda, and has recent experience in deploying civilian
experts in post-conflict/peacebuilding contexts. In 2012, Brazil became a co-sponsor of the
CIVCAP Resolution in the UN General Assembly, and the Foreign Minister has several
times mentioned Brazil’s interest in providing Brazilian CIVCAP to UN peace missions.
These reflect a deeper interest in Brazilian foreign policy concerning the interdependence
between security and development. The new interest in CIVCAP support to the multilat-
eral system has been due in part to requests from the UN for Brazil to participate in CIV-
CAP, as well as Brazil’s experience as a lead actor in Haiti and the growing role of the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a civilian peacebuilding effort.

India

India has been a supporter of the CIVCAP agenda in the UN General Assembly and Secu-
rity Council. Through its extensive peacekeeping engagement, India is familiar with the
underlying rationale for the CIVCAP agenda, and has seen CIVCAP as an avenue for
improving the capability of peacekeeping missions. India has sought to ensure greater rec-
ognition of the linkages between peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and to ensure that the
contributions of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders is recognized and not diminished.
India has noted that national ownership should be at the core of a demand- (and not sup-
ply-) driven CIVCAP agenda. India is committed to considering requests for government-
provided personnel from the UN. Yet, it also expects the UN to develop transparent and
clearly defined frameworks for utilizing member-state capacities, which should include a
greater focus on secondment of government officials and more formalized mechanisms for
soliciting requests for assistance.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a firm supporter of CIVCAP at the global and regional levels. This has included
strong leadership on the issue through its Permanent Mission in New York. Together with
Canada, it serves as co-chair of the Consultative Group for the Civilian Capacity Review.
In March 2012, Indonesia hosted a regional consultation on CIVCAP in Bali. It co-spon-
sored the General Assembly resolution and hosted a CAPMATCH consultation of the
international civilian training and rostering community at its Permanent Mission in New York on 14 June 2012. Indonesia sees CIVCAP as resonating well with its own views on peacebuilding and crisis management, and consonant with the ASEAN preference for non-confrontational forms of peace operations. It views CIVCAP as an opportunity to export Indonesia’s positive domestic experiences in support of others.

Russia
Russia has been generally supportive of CIVCAP. As a relatively new donor, Russia is interested in ensuring that taxpayer resources are spent effectively, and for the best possible results. However, international aid and assistance programmes have not always been effective enough. Russia looks for at least indirect political benefits from the assistance it provides. Russia is seeking access to new markets and other business opportunities for its national companies. From a broader perspective, Russia has less interest in funding those international assistance programmes that are seen as pursuing highly ‘Western’ approaches and agendas. Russia is interested in the greater organized involvement of its citizens in international assistance activities, and is working to identify opportunities to do so.

South Africa
South Africa is supportive of CIVCAP and, by hosting an African regional conference in Pretoria on 19–20 July 2012, has positioned itself as somewhat of an advocate in the region. In the peace operations context, South Africa has been actively engaged in the development of the civilian component of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Arrangement and the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF). CIVCAP is viewed as an avenue for mobilizing and deploying civilian expertise from South Africa and for complementing its bilateral cooperation programme under the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) and the recently established South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). South Africa, like Brazil, is a strong example of how the epistemic community plays a vital role in advancing concepts onto domestic policy agendas.

Turkey
Turkey has provided low-profile support for the CIVCAP agenda. Turkey views its civilian assistance activities as part of its ‘global diplomacy efforts’ and ‘development cooperation efforts’. It sees strong inter-linkages between its civilian capacities efforts and its foreign policy goals. As a primarily bilateral actor, Turkey has not indicated any short-term plans for providing substantial CIVCAP assistance through the UN, but it has deployed civilian capacities with NATO in Afghanistan and the EU in the Balkans.

4. Review of National Experiences

This section explores the experiences of CIVCAP Network partners. It draws extensively on the six case studies conducted on Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. These case studies explored the normative and policy frameworks that underpin national approaches to CIVCAP, and reviewed national experiences in providing civilian assistance and future aspirations of these countries as regards CIVCAP.

Several common experiences emerged across the case studies:

1. The term ‘civilian capacity’ as used by the case-study countries refers to a wider set of activities than merely deploying technical experts abroad. It includes capacity-development activities such as short-term missions, trainings, scholarships, and study tours, etc.

2. Each of the countries has substantial experience providing civilian assistance to other countries. Although the bulk of this experience has been in stable development settings, support is increasingly being provided also to countries in crisis or in the aftermath of conflict. Such support has been provided primarily through bilateral South–South cooperation programmes.

3. All of the countries subscribe explicitly to South–South cooperation principles\(^\text{14}\) as paramount considerations in their overseas cooperation activities. The general approach of CIVCAP appears to resonate with these as well as with the foreign-policy priorities and international cooperation principles for each of the countries.

4. All of the countries appear interested in expanding their CIVCAP provision in peace-building/peacekeeping contexts through either bilateral and/or multilateral channels. Currently, most appear to prioritize bilateral cooperation modalities over regional and multilateral options.

5. All of the countries have some form of policy and/or institutional change process underway that is designed to strengthen their national policies, institutions and capacities for technical cooperation, including providing civilian assistance.

6. In each of the countries, there are very few institutions and personnel familiar with the CIVCAP agenda and the processes of overseas deployments, rarely extending beyond one or two coordinating agencies.

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14. Although principles are not officially codified or enumerated, several guiding approaches are frequently invoked, including: respect for sovereignty and national ownership, demand-driven engagement with another country as equals, transfer of knowledge, based on solidarity and/or mutual benefit between countries, with a view to strengthening local capacity and developing national resources.
Otherwise, each country has different approaches to CIVCAP. These national approaches are deeply rooted in the national policy and institutional contexts, as well as the current and historical experience with international cooperation programmes and specific experiences in providing civilian expertise. The remainder of this chapter provides a synopsis of the niche national capacities of each country as well as a review of the foreign policy, international cooperation and peacekeeping firmaments on which CIVCAP engagement is being built.

**Niche civilian capacities**

**Brazil**

Brazil’s primary fields of technical cooperation interest have included tropical agriculture and tropical health, vocational training, energy, environment and to a lesser extent public security and education. These sectors draw heavily on Brazil’s own good practices in national development. For future support to UN missions, possible niche areas for Brazil might include corrections, wider policing and community-violence reduction.15

**India**

India has a potentially vast reservoir of civilian capacity across a broad spectrum of civilian tasks. In the fields of democratization and electoral support, Indian experts have worked abroad with electoral bodies, including in support of UN entities and the Commonwealth Secretariat. India has an enormous national technical-vocational training capacity, with a network of more than 1,000 industrial training institutes. The country has a considerable national disaster relief capacity, with an interest in overseas engagement operationally16 as well as through advisory services.17 There is significant potential to draw on policing capacity (uniformed and non-uniformed) to provide technical assistance abroad, including in post-conflict settings. India can draw on a large private-sector capacity, some of which is already being tapped through initiatives such as Consultancy Development Centre.

**Indonesia**

Indonesia’s interests in providing CIVCAP appear limited at present to government-related capacities and there has not yet been a canvassing of the non-governmental sector. Although Indonesia’s short-term capacity to provide civilian expertise is limited, there is genuine ambition for the medium term. Indonesia has commenced a policy effort to better define its technical cooperation priorities, wherein seven ‘flagship’ programmes have been proposed to government for approval. Of these, several of these priorities are of real relevance to CIVCAP, including: capacity building for democracy; disaster risk reduction; capacity building for good governance; and also a programme of targeted capacity building for Palestinian development with a focus on the viability of the future Palestinian state.

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15. Since 2005, the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio has provided capacities to advise on and help deliver community-violence reduction programmes in Haiti. Brazil has also provided a small number of police experts to MINUSTAH.

16. For example, India maintains 10 battalions on standby for disaster response, and 180 Search and Rescue (SAR) teams (14 of which on 30 minute-notice standby agreements); and an Indian SAR team was sent to Fukushima, Japan, for rescue and recovery operations in 2011.

17. India maintains state- and central-level centres of excellence in disaster risk management.
Russia

Russia has so far focused mostly on providing funds for international aid and assistance, with less focus on international deployment (beyond humanitarian and emergency responses such as through EMERCOM). Russia has focused on health, food security and education. It has been donating funds bilaterally and multilaterally, and providing training in recipient countries as well as in Russia, but has not been active in providing significant numbers of personnel for international missions. Russia has the potential for providing civilian capacity in security-related fields, education and medicine. Russia has enough experienced experts to assist administrative and economic reforms abroad.

South Africa

South Africa has provided civilian capacities such as observer and electoral support missions, mediation and policing support. It has also focused on democracy promotion, anti-corruption and truth and reconciliation processes. There is also a considerable capacity both within and outside government on human rights, rule-of-law and transitional justice issues, including prominent advocacy and legal expertise. A challenge for South Africa’s new development partnership office will be to reach out to the many untapped sources of expertise in government, in civil society organizations and the private sector. South Africa is also aware that its national capacity reserves are limited and often cannot be spared from domestic priorities for extended periods.

Turkey

Turkey’s main focus to date has been on providing bilateral civilian expertise in the basic services cluster such as construction, infrastructure and agriculture as well as cultural activities. However, in Afghanistan and to some extent Somalia, Turkish support has broadened. Turkey has become a significant provider of assistance in Somalia, and is increasingly coordinating its efforts with the international community as others deploy into Somalia. In Somalia, as elsewhere, Turkey has used a blend of Turkish NGOs, official government assistance, security sector actors and religious groups, as well as private business interests.

Foreign policy and international cooperation underpinnings

This section explores some the foreign policy, international cooperation experiences that are foundations on which emerging national approaches to CIVCAP are being built. Each of the case-study countries has pursued some form of international cooperation effort for many years, albeit varying considerably in scope and scale. Table 2 provides a summary of those cooperation programmes.

To varying degrees and in different ways, each of the countries has some experience of deploying civilian capacity abroad in technical assistance roles. Bilateral cooperation programmes have been the main instruments for this. Most of the countries studied have deployed limited numbers of civilian experts and/or other forms of civilian support in post-conflict, peacebuilding or transition settings. For example, some have deployed civil service or quasi-governmental experts abroad, as in the case of Indian and Turkish support in Afghanistan, and South African electoral expertise in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as truth and reconciliation advisers in Nepal. In other cases, non-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>International Cooperation Activities (year of commencement)</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Priority sectors/services</th>
<th>Priority regions</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Technical Cooperation projects and activities (1950s)</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief, Tropical agriculture and tropical health, vocational training, energy, environment and to a lesser extent public security and education</td>
<td>Latin America, Caribbean, Africa</td>
<td>$1.6 billion in cooperation for international development for 2005–2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>India Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme (1964) and Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme</td>
<td>MEA (and new Development Partnership Administration, DPA)</td>
<td>Training for partners in India; project services in recipient countries; deputation of Indian experts; study tours; donations of in-kind equipment/assistance; disaster relief</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>$15 billion for 2012–2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation programme (1981) (with an inter-ministerial task force)</td>
<td>MFA, Ministry of State Secretariat</td>
<td>Basic services, community empowerment, capacity building on democracy, disaster risk reduction, capacity building for good governance</td>
<td>Southeast Asia, Palestinian territories</td>
<td>$7 million for 2010–2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>MFA, and Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief, basic services</td>
<td>Caucasus and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance programme (1985)</td>
<td>MFA and TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency)</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief, construction, infrastructure, agriculture and cultural</td>
<td>Middle East, Caucasus, South and Central Asia, Africa</td>
<td>$8.5 billion (in ODA) for 2007–2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. For each country, other activities or capacities exist outside of those flagship programmes that are implemented directly by the foreign or technical cooperation ministries. For example, India also maintains technical assistance capacities in its Electoral Commission, National Institute of Disaster Management, Consultancy Development Centre, etc.
governmental national capacity has been leveraged as well (for example, Brazilian NGO expertise in community-violence reduction in Haiti) although largely outside of governmental frameworks.

These civilian deployment experiences have not been stand-alone activities. Civilian capacity efforts appear to be deeply embedded in the foreign policy and international cooperation objectives of these countries.

Brazil

Brazil is a long-standing proponent of multilateralism and balances this with its national aspirations of leveraging its regional-power status into a greater global role. Brazil’s international cooperation effort supports these foreign policy interests. Its foreign policy principles are enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitution, with explicit references to peaceful settlement of disputes and cooperation among peoples, sovereign equality, self-determination and non-intervention. Brazil is asserting a stronger role in international groupings and institutions, including the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the UN, the Group of Twenty (G20), the trilateral India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) forum and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping. In the UN General Assembly, Brazil has become an active player in peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues. Brazil’s term as an elected member of the Council from 2010 to 2011 coincided with that of Turkey (2009–10), and of South Africa and India (2011–12). This period saw sustained Council engagement on questions of post-conflict peacebuilding and the launch of the CIVCAP process.

Brazil’s international cooperation efforts began in the 1950s and increased markedly in the 1970s and 1980s. A second surge in international cooperation commenced from 2003. Between 2005 and 2009, Brazil contributed USD 1.6 billion in international cooperation activities, and the number of its country partners increased from 21 to 56. In this period, the programme began to tilt away from its strong regional focus, with a new emphasis on Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. In 2010, for the first time Africa overtook Latin America and Caribbean as the largest recipient region of Brazilian technical cooperation assistance. Today, Brazil provides assistance to 23 countries deemed Fragile States under either World Bank and/or OECD definitions.

The type of cooperation programming by Brazil has gradually become more ambitious. There have been tentative steps toward longer-term, more integrated technical assistance projects, although these remain the exception. There has also been a significant move away from multilateral channels: more than 90 per cent of its technical cooperation projects are now bilateral. Brazil’s civilian experts working with technical cooperation (referred to as ‘technicians’) typically deploy on short-term missions only, and are sent bilaterally. Haiti, Guinea Bissau and Timor Leste are the main post-conflict peacebuilding settings that have seen the deployment of Brazilian technical experts. The Brazilian government has not deployed civilian personnel in post-conflict settings through UN or regional organizations.

18. Recently, ‘structuring projects’ have been utilized: these integrate multiple activities within larger-scale, longer-term projects, and have required the deployment of project management teams.

19. Although short-term civilian missions have been sent to Afghanistan, DRC, Lebanon, Liberia and Sudan.
Brazilian individuals (e.g. UN staff members) are recruited/deployed without direct government coordination or facilitation.\textsuperscript{20}

\section*{India}

India maintains a robust bilateral cooperation agenda alongside its strong foreign policy positions in multilateral arenas. At the UN, India has been active in many policy spheres, including as a major player in shaping policy within the Non-aligned Movement in the General Assembly as well as in UN field operations, the latter primarily through its large peacekeeping commitments.\textsuperscript{21} India has also been a high-profile member of the Peacebuilding Commission and has worked to engineer better linkages between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding dialogues in the UN. This year, India completes its term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2011–12, during which time it has promoted peacekeeping and peacebuilding linkages and has engaged in the UN CIVCAP process. India has long maintained an active international cooperation programme as one component of a comprehensive foreign policy agenda. India has long adhered to the principles of South–South cooperation in its multilateral and bilateral activities. It has traditionally focused on providing bilateral assistance and ensuring that its international cooperation provides mutual benefits to India and the partner countries in the spirit of South–South cooperation.

Since 1964, India has implemented its flagship international cooperation programme known as the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. Managed by the Ministry of External Affairs, ITEC has grown considerably over the past ten years. ITEC has six components: training in India;\textsuperscript{1} project services in recipient countries; deputation of Indian experts; study tours (usually visits of two to three weeks); donations of in-kind equipment/assistance; disaster relief assistance. ITEC has remained a predominantly bilateral cooperation programme but has occasionally been used to support intergovernmental cooperation programmes.\textsuperscript{22} ITEC and other Indian programmes such as the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme now provide assistance to more than 150 countries.

Alongside ITEC, India also maintains technical assistance capacities in its Electoral Commission, National Institute of Disaster Management, Consultancy Development Centre etc., as well as through the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme. With the emergence of India’s new institution for managing its development cooperation programme, the Development Partnership Agency, further strengthening of its international cooperation programme is anticipated, which will help to integrate the multiple sources of overseas assistance provided by India.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20} For most countries, however, there is government support and lobbying for senior-level UN appointments, including in senior field positions on civilian contracts.

\textsuperscript{21} India is currently the third largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping and has had more than 150,000 peacekeepers serving in operations since the 1950s.

\textsuperscript{22} ITEC has provided assistance through or in support of several inter-governmental initiatives, including Commonwealth Secretariat, UNIDO, G77 and G15 initiatives.

\textsuperscript{23} See for example http://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm
Indonesia

Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions have grown steadily as the country has moved towards middle-income status. Indonesia is increasingly keen to draw on its successful domestic development and transition experiences in support of others abroad, primarily in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has a strong vision of itself as an exporter of important development experiences, including in managing political transitions, democracy promotion, security sector reform, as well as in national and subnational peacebuilding, as in its experience with Aceh. Indonesia would like to be in a position to respond to the increasing requests for civilian capacity, and to concretely engage with CIVCAP.

Indonesia frames its civilian capacity activities as an element of its technical cooperation and South–South cooperation. Over the last two years, the government has worked on articulating a policy document – ‘Grand Design and Blueprint on South–South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation’ – which, among other things, would serve as the national guidelines for deploying civilian capacities. This draft policy document is currently awaiting executive approval to be passed into law. Indonesia’s international cooperation programme has focused largely on training and workshops within Southeast Asia. The country wants to begin exporting its own technical knowledge rather than being viewed as a recipient of assistance. Its technical cooperation (kerjasama teknik) programme was established in 1981 to share Indonesian experiences and knowledge with fellow developing countries. Indonesia has consistently provided modest amounts of technical assistance to a small number of partners, primarily in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is still in the process of developing a comprehensive international cooperation policy. As part of this effort, seven flagship programmes for technical assistance are under development, several of which may be of real relevance to CIVCAP.24

Russia

In the last decade, Russia has transitioned from being an aid recipient to becoming a donor. In 2006, a draft policy, Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance, was approved by the government, and was endorsed by the president in 2007.25 The focus is on fulfilling Russia’s wider foreign policy and economic interests: strengthening Russia’s international position and credibility; stabilizing socioeconomic and political conditions in partner countries; establishing a belt of good-neighbourliness; preventing the emergence of potential focal points of tension and conflict, primarily in the regions neighbouring Russia; and creating a favourable external environment for the country’s own development. Economic interests have been stronger influencing factors than political or foreign policy agendas. According to Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Storcak, ‘development of poor countries favours an increase of the consumption of goods produced in the donor countries’.

24. Several of these future flagship programmes may be of direct relevance to CIVCAP: community empowerment, capacity building for democracy, disaster risk reduction, capacity building for good governance, and capacity building for Palestinian development with focus on viability of the future Palestinian state. The selection of these flagship programmes has been based on the following criteria: best practices and wide implementation in Indonesia, successful adoption in other developing countries, significant impact and contribution for developing South–South cooperation.

Since it became a donor in 2005, Russia has steadily increased its overseas contributions from USD 100 million to an estimated 500 million in 2012. While initially channelling its contributions primarily through multilateral frameworks, Russia has increasingly expressed a preference for bilateral channels, on the grounds that the international organizations do not reflect Russian perspectives, but instead reflect Western-centric concepts and views. Russia’s priority aid recipients are its neighbours and countries that belong to its former sphere of influence. Sub-Saharan Africa is an emerging region of interest.

South Africa

The promotion of peace and stability is a core tenet of South Africa’s foreign policy, with a particular focus on promoting stability within the African continent. In multilateral forums (including as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2007–08 and again in 2011–12) South Africa has sought to represent African interests on the global stage. South Africa has been a proud exporter of its domestic experiences in political, security sector and other reforms since the end of Apartheid, as well as its well-known experience with truth and reconciliation and transitional justice.

South Africa has maintained international cooperation programmes since the late 1960s. In the post-Apartheid era, the programme underwent a major overhaul, guided in large part by government commitment to its African Renaissance policy, which emphasizes African solutions for African challenges, and the pursuit of a stable, just and equitable continent. South Africa’s foreign policy and international cooperation approach is anchored on this commitment to the African region and its sub-regions.

Since 2001, South Africa’s primary instrument for supporting overseas cooperation has been the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). The ARF is a means to implement South Africa’s international cooperation priorities, which include the promotion of democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, peace and stability as well as humanitarian assistance, capacity development and longer-term development. The ARF is more of a multilateral and less of a loan/credit-focused mechanism than the country’s previous international cooperation financing instruments. This enables South Africa to support more than just bilateral government-to-government cooperation. Accordingly, the ARF has been used to support regional and international programmes as well as bilateral activities and as a mechanism for not only South African support to partners but also to enable third-country ‘triangular cooperation’.26 A broader development cooperation management entity – the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) – has been established in 2012.

Turkey

Over the past two decades, Turkey has steadily built a comprehensive and proactive foreign policy that balances political and economic strategic interests with humanitarian motivations. Its foreign policy pursues a commitment to international peace and security, particularly with its neighbours but also much more broadly. Turkey has promoted a vision of

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26. For example, ARF is used for South African funding to third countries, such as Cuban doctors to Sierra Leone, but the ARF can also serve as a modality for receiving donor funding to support South African activities abroad.
itself as a successful, moderate and secular Islamic state and as a bridge between East and West. Like the other case-study countries, Turkey has utilized both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to expand its global profile and has been active in the UN Security Council (2009–10), the G20 and in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Turkey’s international cooperation is guided by six foreign-affairs objectives: a balance between security and freedom, ‘zero problems’ with neighbouring countries, proactive peace diplomacy, strong global relations, active involvement in international issues, and cooperation with international organizations. Its assistance to partner countries, particularly those in crisis, is often described as part of a solidarity approach. Turkey commenced its official development assistance programme in 1985. In the past two decades, but particularly since 2003, Turkey has steadily expanded its assistance to countries beyond the traditional focus on its immediate region and countries with which it has ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious bonds. Turkey’s assistance programmes have remained very bilateral in focus, but have expanded significantly in geographical scope and scale. Turkey quite fluidly draws on its capacities in the public as well as the private sectors (including NGOs, religious organizations, business community).

National systems and structures for technical cooperation / civilian assistance

This section examines how national systems, organizational structures and policy frameworks are evolving and influencing the ways the countries studied look at CIVCAP.

From the available data, most of the countries studied have tended to deploy civilian experts under bilateral technical assistance agreements, and generally on short-term deployments. The number of nationals deployed to UN field missions has been relatively small, ad hoc and has not been through proactive efforts of government. To date, most countries have therefore not needed a centralized coordinating structure or the other tools that might be required to service a significantly upscale demand for civilian expertise (rosters, standardized training, etc.). However, the case studies also show that because the range of civilian expertise deployed is quite broad, and is ‘offered’ by various government ministries, agencies and at times civil society organizations or the private sector, the absence of a centralized structure has made it difficult to maintain a comprehensive catalogue of civilian deployments or to build up a repository of learning from technical assistance experiences.

Several partner countries are looking into deploying greater numbers of civilian experts in post-conflict settings in a more predictable and coordinated fashion. Although some of these processes appear to be organic and nationally-driven, others indicate a more ‘reactive’ process: global developments like the UN’s CIVCAP and related CAPMATCH processes,

27. From an early focus in the mid-1980s on a small number of partners in the Sahel and its immediate region, Turkey refocused in the 1990s to early 2000s on the Balkans, on emerging CIS countries with historical and ethnic/cultural ties to Turkey and on greater engagement with regional countries. Since 2002, in Afghanistan, Turkish assistance has been channelled through its provincial reconstruction teams (in support of ISAF) and its bilateral cooperation programme. In 2005, Turkey launched its ‘opening up to Africa’ policy, which expanded its development cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa.

28. The Somalia famine in 2011 brought a major humanitarian response from the Turkish government, businesses, charities and individuals.
including regional consultations where the UN has asked countries to take-stock and present their national civilian capacities, appear to have kick-started national discussions and reviews of how they have engaged and how they might engage. Moreover, all of the Network partner countries have contributed to the pilot phase of the UN’s CAPMATCH tool; their role in CAPMATCH is likely to impact or necessitate a re-evaluation of the need for some kind of centralized structure or mechanism.

As the level of technical cooperation has increased, a majority of the countries find that problems in terms of programme implementation, coordination, budgets and evaluation processes arise. Several countries are either in the process of establishing dedicated development agencies, which would have relative funding autonomy and would serve as focal points on civilian capacity issues; or they are planning to do so.

**Policies and Institutional Frameworks for CIVCAP**

This section outlines the institutional arrangements in place or emerging for managing technical assistance in the countries studied. Table 3 presents an overview of some of the policies and institutional arrangements in place.

**Table 3. Summary of policy and organizational arrangements related to civilian assistance/ CIVCAP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign or technical cooperation underpinnings</th>
<th>Specific CIVCAP policies</th>
<th>Institutional Arrangements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Foreign policy, Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td>MFA is main focal point: general coordination of International Action to Fight against Hunger (CG-Fome) for humanitarian assistance issues, and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) for technical cooperation issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Technical cooperation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>MEA is main focal point: Development Partnership Administration (DPA) was set up in 2012. Ministry of Home Affairs is domestic focal point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Grand Design and Blueprint on South–South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation</td>
<td>Possible guidelines drawing from Grand Design Policy</td>
<td>Desire to establish dedicated coordinating body: bureau within MFA or a stand-alone agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Development Assistance Concept Note</td>
<td></td>
<td>MFA proposal to establish Russian Agency for International Development (RAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Ubuntu White Paper on Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Under development by NOCPM by DIRCO</td>
<td>South Africa Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Foreign and development policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office, with support from relevant ministries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The partner countries do not yet have in place policies explicitly related to CIVCAP, but the contours are emerging in formal statements including at the UN. The policy instruments that guide the governments’ decision-making processes for CIVCAP are nested in their broader development cooperation and foreign policy frameworks, described above. For instance, several of the partners align their technical cooperation principles with the general principles of South–South cooperation as a demand-driven engagement with another country through the transfer of knowledge, based on solidarity, to strengthen local capacity and developing national resources. In terms of these principles, the provision of civilian assistance is often viewed as a transfer of knowledge.

A common element in the decision-making systems of all partner countries is the relatively limited number of actors involved. All indicated that their MFAs are the focal points for civilian capacities, and most of the coordinating bodies sit in that ministry, even if a majority of the stakeholders may be outside the diplomatic corps. However, given the likelihood that the specialist capabilities required for CIVCAP are likely to come from line ministries rather than coordinating agencies, it appears increasingly important for a wider set of actors in partner countries to be aware of the CIVCAP process and its parameters as these become clearer.

Brazil

Brazil deploys civilian experts in the context of its humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation activities, both of which are coordinated by the MFA, albeit through separate offices. In cases where there perhaps might be greater national interest, the Office of the President steps in. The General Coordination of International Action to Fight against Hunger (CG-Fome) is the lead entity within the MFA on humanitarian assistance issues, while the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) is the lead on technical cooperation issues. These two bodies are the only entities within the MFA that have some discretionary power and lines of funding. Despite the existence of CG-Fome and ABC, and their explicit coordination mandates, a significant portion of the country’s technical cooperation and humanitarian activities are carried out by NGOs, municipalities and other domestic actors, bypassing the coordination mechanisms. As Brazil’s engagement in CIVCAP continues to grow, efforts are underway to assess what systems might be needed to improve civilian deployment, such as providing pre-deployment training for deployed civilian personnel, especially from the federal level.

India

In 2012, India set up its Development Partnership Administration (DPA), which is headed by an Additional Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and aims to bring together all the relevant stakeholders involved in foreign aid and development activities within the MEA. It has a total budget of USD 15 billion over the next five years. It will administer both the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and the Special Commonwealth African Assistance (SCAAP) programmes: these have expanded in terms of scope of activities and in geographic spread, which are the mainstay avenues for India’s bilateral civilian-capacity initiatives.
Indonesia

Despite its clear ambitions and articulations for stepping up the deployment of civilian capacities, Indonesia has not yet established a permanent central policy coordinating body to oversee the implementation of technical cooperation initiatives. Two options are currently being discussed. The one is to establish a bureau under one of the key ministries – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Secretariat, the Ministry of Finance, or the National Development Planning Agency – similar to the models adopted by India and South Africa. The second involves creating a new agency with a specific function of managing international cooperation with developing countries, akin to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Agency for Brazilian Cooperation. There has also been an initiative for the Ministry of Social Welfare to act as a national coordinator to consolidate potential actors to contribute to CIVCAP as well as to raise awareness about CIVCAP to potential contributing agencies/institutions in Indonesia. However, since an initial meeting held in mid-2012, there has been little movement in that regard.

Russia

Russia’s Development Assistance Concept Note outlines procedures and basic principles of establishing a national system of international development assistance. The action plan, adopted in 2007 and originally set for implementation between 2008 and 2010, has included legal regulation, effectiveness and monitoring, and management and realization of institutional changes. An Interagency Working Group was tasked with implementing the plan, but has done so only partially. The legal basis for institutional frameworks was established, but the scope of responsibilities for the various involved governmental agencies remains unresolved.

South Africa

South Africa is the only partner country currently developing a policy on civilian participation in peace operations. The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) plays the lead role in the development of the policy. The policy aims to provide better guidance on enhancing the country’s participation in the African Standby Force, as well as other multilateral frameworks. The policy under development would, for instance, define modalities of deployments of civilians in varying bilateral, triangular and multilateral arrangements. The specific policy for civilian capacities is part of a wider effort by the government to achieve more coherent implementation of its foreign policy that is centred on managing and resolving the continent’s conflicts. The emphasis on national civilian capacities is in part a reflection of the fact that South Africa has directed its efforts in support of sub-regional (SADC) and regional (AU) actors, who have been grappling with these issues.

DIRCO is the main ministry with overall responsibility for South Africa’s engagement in post-conflict settings. The newly established South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), a dedicated agency for national aid and development, falls under the remit of DIRCO. The creation of SADPA, which will administer the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund, is an important first step in moving the country’s
development aid strategy beyond financial assistance. It shows the growing recognition of the relevance of a technical cooperation programme that draws upon civilian capacities. It also recognizes that a more holistic and comprehensive approach would entail a greater mix of actors, among different government departments and stakeholders, and require a more robust and institutionalized coordination efforts. SADPA is envisaged to coordinate the relevant stakeholders – the Parliament, Department of Finance, the President’s Office, and the South African Reserve Bank. While strategic clarity has improved, it is not clear whether the country’s breadth of national capacity is being tapped, or whether domestic stakeholders are sufficiently aware of the opportunities for providing civilian assistance.

Turkey
The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), set up in 1992, has implemented Turkey’s technical and South–South cooperation activities. However, it does not hold decision-making powers or budgetary control. Currently, decisions regarding CIVCAP are made by the Office of the Prime Minister, and by senior cabinet posts at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, Defence, Education and Health. TIKA’s programmes and activities are funded by a central budget, by special project-specific funds appropriated by the Prime Minister’s Office, funds from other line ministries, and funds from international commitments. Increasingly, it seems likely the Ministry of Development will assume a larger role in guiding the work of TIKA. In general, TIKA does not deploy its own personnel (even though the staff have expertise in the niche sectors of health, agriculture and construction) other than maintaining small administrative and liaison offices in countries where there is a significant programme. Occasionally TIKA staff will be seconded or deployed, for short periods and only for large projects. TIKA does not have institutionalized rules and regulations for deployment, pre-deployment training, in-country support, or post-deployment monitoring and evaluation. These processes are ad hoc and depend on the sending entity in question. Although the Turkish experience in Afghanistan has led to the development of well-advanced mechanisms both pre- and post-deployment, it is unclear if these can now be taken up more broadly.
5. Issues, Challenges and Opportunities

The case studies give rise to a range of questions and considerations regarding the Global South’s interactions with CIVCAP.

**Broader conceptualization of CIVCAP**

The CIVCAP concept focuses primarily on the need of the UN, as a deploying entity, to mobilize the right blend of civilian personnel in the right timeframes. Seen from the perspective of the countries studied, however, their interest in and conceptualization of CIVCAP seems considerably broader. They include long- and short-term training programmes, study tours or exchanges as well as short-term expert missions (in addition to longer-term deployments), but most have had less focus on long-term bilateral deployments of personnel in conflict-affected countries.\(^{29}\) The starting point for the UN is the recognition that the quality and quantity of in-country support is insufficient, and is imbalanced in favour of a supply-driven approach from a too limited number of countries.

The countries studied appear to focus on leveraging their national experiences to support partners in later stages of post-conflict situations, and are more focused on activities that support long-term development and transition. As such, these countries may be less inclined to provide civilian personnel to countries in immediate crisis or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, preferring instead to focus on longer-term peacebuilding engagement, through multilateral or bilateral channels. None of the countries studied has yet developed specific policies focused on working in crisis settings *per se*. The focus appears to be on long-term bilateral relationships, irrespective of whether the countries happen to be in crisis.

**Bilateral preferences**

For each of the countries studied, there appears to be a clear policy preference for bilateral cooperation in the provision of CIVCAP. This is not unlike the case for many actors working in international cooperation, and this higher priority for bilateral action does not exclude working with multilateral institutions as well. Countries may feel a legitimate interest in achieving a good level of national visibility from these international cooperation programmes, and bilateral cooperation is often designed explicitly to strengthen relations between recipient and provider countries. These are not seen as ‘aid’ programmes, and South–South cooperation is viewed as a mutually beneficial partnership between developing countries. By contrast, multilateral arrangements bring transaction costs that can diminish national visibility and introduce a third party into activities intended to build bilateral relations. In addition, it is not clear that either multilateral institutions or the rel-

\(^{29}\) Turkey and India are the notable examples in the situations of Afghanistan and Somalia.
relevant regional organizations have yet prepared themselves to absorb the significantly increased capacities that could be provided by the Global South.30

**The need for clear demand-side requirements**

The case studies have indicated that, as regards bilateral cooperation, it has been relatively easy for countries to obtain clear requirements for assistance from recipient countries. Whether the requests come to their embassies in the recipient countries or from political contacts during ministerial or head of state visits, the systems for receiving these requirements appear to work relatively effectively. This is contrasted with the confusion that some countries have expressed about whether and how requests will be received through CIVCAP, and whether formal requests for support from the UN (e.g., for specialist capacities to support a peace mission) will be solicited through CAPMATCH, or will come directly from the UN through a different procedure. This in part reflects some continuing dissonance over the role of CAPMATCH, as to whether it is to be a proactive ‘match-making’ service, a mechanism for formally soliciting support, or a repository of requests for and offers of assistance (both in principle and actual) that are then transacted outside of CAPMATCH. The UN Secretariat has repeatedly clarified that it does not have the resources for running CAPMATCH as a proactive brokering service; however, several countries have continued to indicate that unless there can be a proactive ‘guiding hand’, it is unclear how much CAPMATCH will be used.

**Modalities for multilateral deployment**

Several countries have indicated that their ability to commit greater resources in support of UN field missions is constrained by the lack of knowledge about how the UN solicits government-provided personnel and how the onboarding process works. At regional consultations and in bilateral dialogue some countries have requested the UN to articulate clearly its procedures for soliciting government-provided personnel from member states. Some have proposed that a civilian capacity contributing country (CCC) mechanism be established, similar to the existing UN modalities for troop-contributing countries and for police-contributing countries.31 It is argued that such a mechanism could enhance transparency, and that such a system is needed before some countries can be in a position to develop their own procedures for handling government-provided personnel requests, or to make concrete offers of support. The UN Secretariat is working to elaborate workable modalities for receiving such government-provided personnel, and proposals will be made in the coming year.32

Few of the countries studied appeared to have easy access to data on their nationals serving in UN field missions. This is primarily because direct recruitment has remained the main mechanism for the staffing of civilian positions in UN field missions. The countries studied have comparatively few civilian personnel deployed with the UN (see table in Annex 1 for

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30. Unlike, for example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the European Union, which have much clearer interests and established modalities for utilizing the capacities of their member states.

31. For example, formal requests to all governments through *notes verbales*, or solicitations for Letters of Assist, that request support for government-provided personnel or other capacities based loosely on the current Force Generation / Police Generation processes used by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

32. See in particular Section IV (B) of the Secretary-General’s 2012 Report on CIVCAP (A/67/312-S/2012/645).
the largest nationalities of international civilian personnel in UN field missions). Those personnel have almost invariably been recruited directly into the UN system as short-term or long-term staff: their recruitment has not been the result of offers of national capacity provision through an official process. There is no reason to believe that the current direct recruitment system will undergo any significant shift away from the UN’s current open recruitment model. The opportunity for significant and structured expansion of the numbers of government-sponsored personnel appears to be in the ‘experts on mission’ category of UN personnel. These government-provided personnel are already being mobilized in the justice and corrections sectors, and are likely to expand into other areas. Already in the government-provided personnel category, more than 80 per cent of the personnel currently deployed are from the Global South, although – notably – none of these are from the countries studied. This makes it even more important for the UN to elaborate further its plans for engaging government-provided personnel in missions. The African Union, which pursues a similar direct recruitment model, may encounter similar challenges, although it draws its candidates from only one continent.

**Partnership arrangements**

The case studies reveal that all countries reviewed have worked with triangular cooperation arrangements in multiple forms. South Africa, for example, has worked with funding from Germany to support the DRC, while also using the ARF to finance Cuban doctors working in Sierra Leone. South Africa’s ARF is explicitly designed to provide an avenue for third-party financing to receive funds from a donor to support South African work abroad, and to enable South Africa to support third countries in providing assistance. Brazil, India and Turkey have each worked with the United Nations Development Programme to extend their South–South cooperation with recipient countries. In the case of India, electoral experts have been deployed under an agreement with UNDP, while Brazil and Turkey have both used the UNDP presence to expand or enable aspects of their South–South cooperation programmes.

Although all partner countries have significant resources of their own, there appears to be a general openness to triangular support arrangements where these can bring niche resources to bear, or provide a funding mechanism or administrative modality that had not existed bilaterally, or if these can help broker new relationships. However, it is also recognized as likely to be more administratively complicated than bilateral activities. For smaller coun-

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33. This category provides the existing framework for mobilizing significant levels of civilian staffing, including for individual police officers in UN peace missions.

34. For example, the German GIZ and South Africa for example have cooperated to establish a five year trilateral cooperation fund that supports South African initiatives in Africa, and has included several projects in the DRC focused post-conflict support, police oversight and anti-corruption work.

35. In October 2012, the Election Commission of India and the UNDP signed an MOU for cooperation in election management under which it is envisaged UNDP will support the deployment of IEC expertise to support electoral processes abroad.

36. Brazil has worked with the UNDP Country Office in Brazil to use UNDP administrative mechanisms to support the deployment of Brazilian experts and the provision of funds in some of its South–South projects. The UNDP Country Office in Turkey has provided capacity support to the Turkish MFA and TIKKA to support South–South cooperation.
tries, with less capacity to administer a bilateral cooperation programme, the option of working with multilateral entities can prove valuable.  

Public–private partnerships

Several of the case studies have shown that private-sector interests can be an important component of CIVCAP. For example, Turkey has demonstrated in Somalia a relatively comprehensive approach to combining the work of private entities (religious, academic, non-governmental organizations, businesses) and that of the Turkish government, and high-level delegations of government and interest groups have travelled together to visit the country. The India and South Africa case studies indicate there is a real possibility to reach into and to mobilize professional services (for example legal or consultancy services) from the private sector. In the case of South Africa, private contractor companies might even be used in a ‘managing contractor’-type model to deliver some CIVCAP-related services. Russia has had considerable success in competing for civilian contracts with UN peacekeeping. Russian commercial companies have worked to develop specialized niches for providing goods and services for UN missions. In 2011, the total volume of contracts for Russian companies was USD 382 million, or 14 per cent of the total UN procurement within the peacekeeping budget. Some 99 per cent of these contracts were for civilian air-lift (air cargo) contracts. The Indonesia government has expressed the ambition to harness the potential of NGOs such as Muhammidya as key elements in its national CIVCAP ‘toolkit’.

The challenges of providing CIVCAP at scale

Deploying ‘scaled-up’ levels of civilian capacity brings new challenges. With the exception of Turkey’s and India’s contributions of civilian expertise in Afghanistan, none of the other countries studied have yet deployed civilian personnel to countries in crisis or to post-conflict countries on a large enough scale for them to become fully aware of all the inhibiting factors or challenges that accompany long-term, large-scale CIVCAP deployments. Most national deployments through bilateral technical assistance programmes have been relatively short-term, or on a very small scale and for specific, short-term tasks. That stands in contrast to the longer tours of duty expected of, for example, personnel serving as experts with UN missions.

Several of the partner countries have now experienced or have started contemplating the challenges that face all countries deploying significant numbers of civilians over long distances, for lengthy tours of duty in crisis-affected countries. Already some of the administrative challenges that come with longer-term deployments are being tackled with, such as back-stopping of domestic duties, pension preservation, family benefits and remuneration.

37. The example of the IGAD-UNDP twinning and mentoring initiative in South Sudan, whereby Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have sent 164 civil servants from the partner countries and paired them with their counterparts across the civil service in South Sudan, has become a high-profile example of cooperation between a sub-regional entity, South Sudan and the UN. Initial studies indicate that the project is cost-effective and is strongly owned. See e.g. Kristoffer N. Tarp and Frederik R. Rosén, ‘South Sudan: a New Model for Civilian Capacity in Post-Conflict Settings’, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Statebuilding* 6 (2) (2011).

38. The average tour of duty for a UN ‘expert on mission’ is generally expected to be for a minimum of one year. A sustained commitment from a member state would see several of those one-year minimum rotations. For groups of experts deployed together, this could mean multiple rotating deployments of five to ten personnel for one year at a time, over three to four years.
In addition, for larger numbers of people deploying for longer periods, important systems are needed for selection and preparation and training of those personnel, not least because some experts may not have been exposed to international work or hardship conditions. Also issues of in-field logistical support, duty of care, and risk management have started to surface, as they do in all countries deploying personnel abroad, and are being dealt with.

Where national cooperation programmes are scaling up, there has been recognition that planning and coordination institutions may need to be strengthened, in order to manage the increasing volume of requests but also to manage domestic constituencies.

Several country case studies have indicated that the lack of specific legislation and policy frameworks could be an inhibiting factor for scaling up CIVCAP engagement. An equally important challenge to the CIVCAP enterprise is the issue of financing. To date, the funding mechanisms and budget lines have been limited to actual programmes and activities, and do not appear to cover all of the standing costs associated with a system for the ongoing deployment of CIVCAP. Dealing with how to finance or fund national CIVCAP efforts will be central to the sustainability of the efforts. Some hope that CAPMATCH could prove a useful tool for facilitating or ‘matching’ trilateral cooperation with partners, although trilateral cooperation may be seen as administratively burdensome for the countries studied, as most of them have significant national resources available.

Another challenge is cultivating an ‘international civil service’ culture at the domestic level (beyond the foreign and defence ministry structures), so that the line ministries responsible for identifying and releasing civilian experts see the value in doing so. In the cases of Russia and Brazil for example, there exist significant barriers for individuals in civil service to take up positions in international organizations. Such a culture would require built-in systems to provide career, remunerative or other incentives (or at least eliminate the disincentives) for the best individuals to deploy on overseas missions, responding to the concerns of the individuals deploying and their releasing managers. Systems are also needed to help ensure that the best-qualified personnel are deployed. The credibility of national CIVCAP contributions, and the political risks that can go with poor performance on the international stage, will place a premium on identifying good candidates and ensuring monitoring of how they perform. This has been a continuing challenge for all countries involved in deploying large numbers of personnel abroad; in particular it has been a constraint as regards the overall numbers of civil service personnel that can be deployed by many countries.

At present, in several countries there appears to be a disconnect between the political commitment to CIVCAP at the global level and the investment required in national systems to put CIVCAP into practice. This may indicate that future contributions will initially be small, and that the upscaling of CIVCAP contributions may be quite slow, characterized by trial-and-error approaches when new challenges are encountered. However, experience has also shown that a country can respond to the challenges of providing larger contributions of personnel in post-conflict settings in a relatively short time. In Turkey, for example, rapid strides were made for supporting their larger-scale Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) contributions in Afghanistan. Such measures to support longer-term CIVCAP deployment could include more robust coordination, mobilization, pre-deployment preparation, handover and debriefing processes, as well as an in-country managerial framework. As countries
transition from *ad hoc* deployments for short missions to the provision of longer-duration tours of duty and multiple rotation deployments, there comes a need for systems to sustain a systematic deployment schedule of well-prepared personnel who are supported for functioning under operationally challenging conditions.

**CIVCAP and managing risk**

The risk tolerance of most countries for deploying civilians in high-risk locations is as yet unclear. Nonetheless, India and Turkey have engaged personnel in high-risk settings such as Afghanistan and Somalia, and others have engaged in potentially insecure settings, as with South Africa’s support to elections in the DRC, or Brazilian health officials working in post-earthquake Haiti. The official deployment of personnel into insecure or difficult settings can give rise to a range of political and ‘duty of care’-related risks. While true for military deployments too, civilian deployments appear to accentuate the political risk calculus. Harm to personnel can put at risk popular support for such endeavours, and call into question the government’s decisions to deploy civilians. It can also undermine the effectiveness of the programme. Similarly, poor discipline or poor professional performance on the part of deployed personnel can entail reputational risk for the country deploying the support. Providing personnel through international organizations can mitigate against some of these risks, or at least help government efforts to explain or defend decisions to deploy. In addition, international entities may be willing to assume some administrative, logistical support and security management burdens for deployed personnel. Assurances about burden-sharing or support to managing administrative challenges and other risks are potential factors that may influence decision-making around civilian deployments.

**CIVCAP synergies between military and civilian deployments**

Experience from international peace operations is another foundation stone that has informed national thinking and decisions about deploying national capacities in peace-building contexts. There may be a potential for leveraging national peacekeeping experiences into the provision of civilian capacities in or alongside peace missions. Many of the UN missions in which these personnel serve are multidimensional in mandate and multi-functional in nature, with significant civilian tasks in their mandates. This presents opportunities, in principle, for these countries to provide civilian government-provided personnel in addition to their extant military and police deployments within the same country and deploying institution. To take one example, Brazil has military and/or police personnel deployed in 14 UN field missions (peacekeeping operations or special political missions). From among those same countries, Brazil also has active, albeit small-scale, cooperation activities in nine: Afghanistan, the DRC, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, South Sudan, Syria and Timor-Leste. In principle, these could be countries where the UN and Brazil might explore whether civilian government-provided personnel from Brazil could

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39. For example, by including personnel in the UN Security Plan, or provision of office space, access to facilities, or even in some cases access to the full logistical support infrastructure of a deployed organization, and the extension of certain privileges and immunities for ‘experts on mission’.

40. For example in Timor Leste during the UNTAET mission (2000–2003) Portugal and Australia provided military and police personnel but also civilian teams in technical assistance roles ranging from budget management to postal administration and port management, to translators and interpreters. Malaysia too was a significant source of translation and interpretation services contracted by the mission in addition to its uniformed police and military deployments.
address some of the important functions that the UN has been unable to fill through its normal recruitment process. In addition, there may be additional opportunities at the national level for identifying synergies by combining pre-deployment trainings, briefings and debriefings amongst the military, police and civilian personnel deploying to the same UN missions or to the same countries.

**Regional organizations**

Most of the partner countries in the CIVCAP Network do not operate in a setting where a regional organization plays a significant role in deploying civilian capacity to crisis or post-conflict settings. Turkey has provided civilian personnel to EU-led missions in the Balkans[41] and PRT contributions to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). South Africa is a strong supporter of both the African Union and SADC but it has not yet deployed CIVCAP-type support via these organizations. To date, South Africa’s CIVCAP engagement with SADC and the AU has focused on policy development, participating in training and contributing civilian personnel to peacekeeping exercises. The AU, like the UN, currently hires most of its civilian staff for its missions through direct recruitment rather than sourcing government-provided civilian personnel from member states. These limited experiences reveal no discernible current trend towards significant CIVCAP provision through regional organizations. Along with the European Union, the African Union remains well ahead of other regional organizations in developing a civilian dimension to its operations going as far as developing a roster for civilian capacities.[42] Recent initiatives such as the AU’s African Solidarity Initiative – a combination of capacity-building, in-kind sharing of expertise, approaches and best practices, training, and funding support for peace-building efforts in Africa – suggests that regional organizations may look beyond deploying civilian personnel to assist countries emerging from conflict.[43] Although it is possible that the Organization of American States or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (which is currently exploring options regarding regional peace operations models[44]) or other regional/sub-regional entities might wish to mount future civilian operations, there are no indications of such developments in the short term. As and when regional organizations better organize their own CIVCAP approach and capabilities, there may be a potential for competition between these entities and global institutions such as the UN. As yet, however, such competition cannot be expected at the operational level.[45]

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41. Turkey has deployed policing experts as well as a judge in support of the EULEX mission in Kosovo.
42. See for example the AU Standby Force civilian dimension website: http://civilian.peaceau.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&catid=34&Itemid=1
44. For example, as a follow up to the Hanoi Plan of Action, the ASEAN Regional Forum is undertaking research on lessons learned and best practices on regional peacekeeping operations, including civilian dimensions. However, it is unlikely this will move rapidly toward a regional operational capacity.
45. The African Union has significant operational deployments underway, however, the number of civilians in these missions is relatively small – the AU has had approx. 50 civilians in each of its three peace-support operations missions to date (Burundi, Darfur & Somalia), although the number of civilians in the AMISOM mission in Somalia may expand to 150 in 2013.
6. Baseline Findings and Observations

The CIVCAP Network’s baseline research on CIVCAP points to several areas of common experience and common interest among the partner countries. This section aims to identify general observations or ‘baseline’ (starting point) findings that emerge from this synthesis report and the country case studies. It may be possible for the CIVCAP Network to track some of these baseline findings over time, so as to monitor developments nationally and internationally. The Network may also wish to react proactively to some of these early observations to try to influence developments.

The following baseline findings are suggested for further discussion:

1. **There is a good level of general support for CIVCAP among partners.** The countries studied are supportive partners of the CIVCAP process. In particular, they support its emphasis on national capacity, the call for greater South–South engagement and the efforts to provide an open and transparent approach to improving the quality of CIVCAP support to recipient countries, through bilateral cooperation and through international organizations. However, whilst countries of the Global South provide approximately 60 per cent of all civilian personnel in UN peace operations, and approximately 80 per cent of all government-provided personnel to these missions, the low number of civilian personnel they currently provide to UN peace operations stands in contrast with their significant military and police contributions (see Annex 2).

2. **CIVCAP needs to move from the theoretical to the practical, quickly.** To sustain this level of principled support, there must be concrete progress with CIVCAP in the coming year and measurable results from tools such as CAPMATCH. Countries all noted that until actionable requests for CIVCAP expertise are received, it remains unclear exactly what is needed. Similarly, until it is made clear what level and nature of CIVCAP support is needed on an ongoing basis, and under what arrangements government-provided personnel can be deployed, countries will not be in a position to calibrate their systems to upscale CIVCAP deployments. This makes it difficult to assess the interest in supporting actual CIVCAP deployments, and the capacity to do so, in the short term.

3. **The UN CIVCAP concept is not sufficiently broad.** The current definition and focus of UN CIVCAP (on deploying specialist personnel) does not fully capture the extent of activities identified by CIVCAP Network countries when they describe their CIVCAP contributions, which also include capacity support activities such as trainings, study tours, workshops, etc. The focus of UN CIVCAP on crisis-affected situations limits the ability to reflect fully the larger-scale technical cooperation undertaken by these countries.

4. **Countries are likely to remain ‘reactive’ with regard to UN CIVCAP deployments until mechanisms are clearly articulated.** Global South providers are likely to remain
in a ‘reactive’ posture regarding deploying CIVCAP via multilateral channels. For the UN’s overtures on CIVCAP to progress beyond initial dialogue with the Network partners, the UN should ‘move first’ by elaborating specific mechanisms for bringing government-provided personnel on board. There is otherwise a danger of priming the supply side and raising expectations, without also preparing the demand side to better articulate needs and to generate mechanisms to identify, request and deploy government-provided personnel. When the onboarding modalities have been worked out, CIVCAP providers will need to ensure that national offers of CIVCAP assistance are well-aligned to what is needed. As shown by recent CAPMATCH experience, it can be expected that there will be a period of confusion, with trial and error on all sides, and thus a need for a more proactive ‘guiding hand’ approach if new mechanisms are to take root.

5. **Bilateral assistance is likely to remain the predominant approach.** CIVCAP appears to be understood primarily as a component of bilateral technical cooperation. As such, CIVCAP is likely to be viewed – at least in the short to medium term – primarily through the lens of bilateral, South–South cooperation. As with all countries providing international cooperation activities, the countries studied here are likely to continue to prioritize countries and situations on the basis of their own bilateral foreign policy interests. In the short term, CIVCAP deployments seem more likely on a bilateral or trilateral cooperation basis rather than through UN channels. There is potential scope for expanding the interest in multilateral channels if external resources are made available and, more importantly, when a clearer framework for engagement can be developed by multilateral institutions. There is also scope for ensuring that bilateral and multilateral activities are better coordinated with each other in support of shared peacebuilding objectives.

6. **The CIVCAP community is small: strong formal as well as informal networks are needed both internationally and domestically.** National resources available for engaging with CIVCAP are limited, so relations among the few individuals working on it are very important. This places a continuing premium on establishing and maintaining the small but strong network of relationships with the relevant individuals in countries that support CIVCAP. These networks need to be established and maintained among the national stakeholders of contributing countries, but also networks would be extremely valuable among countries which support CIVCAP. In most countries, few domestic stakeholders are aware of CIVCAP beyond the peak coordinating ministries/departments. As civilian capacity activities grow in each country, it will be important to expand and sustain the network of domestic stakeholders who understand and can mobilize capacities for CIVCAP. At the international level, the total global number of players working on CIVCAP issues is low; networks to facilitate contact and cooperation among them should be relatively simple, and could build on existing dialogues created in the CIVCAP consultation and the development of the CAPMATCH tool.

7. **Recognized need for strengthened coordination and deployment support systems, but technocratic tools for managing larger scales of civilian capacity deployment are not yet a high priority.** The challenges of deploying and sustaining personnel in crisis and post-conflict settings are considerable. Yet, on the whole there has been limited focus on the administrative and logistical challenges as well as political and security management risks of deploying personnel in crisis and post-conflict settings. In countries
more experienced in higher-risk deployments, there is a growing recognition of the need for tools such as training, pre-deployment briefings, evaluation requirements etc., so as to more effectively prepare personnel for work in sensitive political conditions and to work with international partners. Where national cooperation programmes are scaling up, it has been recognized that planning and coordination institutions may need to be strengthened, in order to manage the increasing volume of requests but also to manage domestic constituencies. However, tools for managing larger-scale civilian deployments are unlikely to develop until there is a clearer understanding of the overall volume and scope of demand for CIVCAP from the UN and others, and until the options for deploying government-provided personnel through the UN and other multilateral channels are better elaborated. As a result, some of the labour-and-resource intensive work such as systematic national CIVCAP mapping, roster systems or standing training and pre-deployment arrangements are unlikely to be initiated until the scale of actual deployments can generate the political will to allocate the necessary resources.

8. New funding for encouraging CIVCAP through multilateral institutions could generate support from smaller countries with limited financial resources, but not from the larger players. Financial resources for stimulating CIVCAP engagement through multilateral channels may encourage the more interested but lesser-resourced countries to participate. Funding sources such as through the UN Peacebuilding Fund (as is being tested in Côte d’Ivoire) or trilateral cooperation may well continue to be necessary to engage the wider Global South. However, countries with more significant domestic resources (as in the case of many CIVCAP Network partners) are less driven by concerns about the availability of external funding. Despite openness to multilateral channels for deployment, they are likely to remain more interested in the delivery of civilian assistance through bilateral modalities.

9. Trilateral cooperation arrangements are potentially important mechanisms for building CIVCAP relationships, but they have been ad hoc. Trilateral cooperation arrangements in support of CIVCAP appear to be ad hoc. The interest in creating CIVCAP ‘matches’ at the level of Permanent Missions in New York and at UN agency headquarters has not necessarily filtered down to national cooperation agencies or UN country offices. CAPMATCH may become an important aspect of this initial CIVCAP phase, but more proactive support for making triangular cooperation ‘matches’ will probably be required.

10. Regional organizations are not yet playing a significant role in CIVCAP, although the AU is making strides. As yet, regional organizations do not feature highly as significant partners for CIVCAP Network partners in the short term. This is in part because only the African Union is working to deploy significant operational capacity in this area, while the other partners do not have similarly active regional players to engage with. The AU is developing structures for civilian peace operations like the emerging African Stability Initiative, which will provide a stronger framework to engage with. Experiences like the UNDP-supported IGAD programme in South Sudan demonstrate the potential for regional and sub-regional entities to help mobilize CIVCAP resources, but could also be a source of competition for the same pool of civilian capacities.
ANNEX 1: Civilian Personnel in UN Field Missions

Top 20 Nationalities of International Civilian Personnel in PKOs and SPMs (August 2012)

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<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>382</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>340</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>265</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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Source: UN DFS Data 2012
Government-provided ‘Experts on Mission’ in the Justice Sector in UN peacekeeping operations (September 2012)

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Source: UN DPKO data, September 2012
**Government-provided ‘Experts on Mission’ (Corrections Personnel) in UN peacekeeping operations (September 2012)**

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Source: UN DPKO data, September 2012

Source: UN DPKO/DFS data (snapshot data for 31 August in 2010, 2011, 2012)