France will preside over the Security Council in August.

There will be one debate during the month, on Kosovo and the work of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Briefings, to be followed by consultations, are expected on:
- the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), most likely by the head of UN peacekeeping, Hervé Ladsous and possibly also by the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan;
- the Middle East, by the Secretariat; and
- options for possible steps to ensure the full restoration of constitutional order in and territorial integrity of Mali, possibly by the Deputy Secretary-General, and likely also by representatives of the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- issues of concern, by the Department of Political Affairs (reviving the practice of “horizon scanning”);
- Sudan and South Sudan, twice, by the Secretariat in line with resolution 2046 that calls for briefings every 15 days;
- the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) and the Secretary-General’s most recent report;
- the work of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), by its head, Miroslav Jenča; and
- the work of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee by its Chair, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal).

In addition, consultations are planned on:
- the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL);
- the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL);
- Syria, prior to the 19 August expiry of the mandate of UNSMIS; and
- Somalia, right after the scheduled 20 August political transition in the country.

A formal session will be needed to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of UNIFIL.

UNSMIS (Syria)

Expected Council Action

The mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) ends on 19 August. The Council will hold two rounds of consultations on UNSMIS in August which will likely focus on the Secretary-General’s assessment of the security situation in Syria and recommendations for the mission’s future. (Resolution 2059 renewed UNSMIS for a final period of 30 days and requested reporting within 15 days.)

It seems likely that peacekeeping head Hervé Ladsous—who visited Syria in late July to assess the situation—will brief the Council in early August. It was unclear at press time if UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan would also brief and whether the UNSMIS mandate would be renewed for a further period.

Key Recent Developments

The overall level of violence in Syria has continued to escalate, with the government increasing its military operations in population centres and armed opposition groups intensifying attacks against government forces and installations, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo. On 14 July the ICRC determined that the fighting in Syria met its threshold for an internal armed conflict, i.e. civil war. The UN estimates 10,000 killed since the crisis began in March 2011, while other monitoring groups report figures as high as 17,000.

On 11 July, Council members were briefed by Annan on his mediation efforts, including his 9 July meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Annan said neither the government nor the opposition had embraced his six-point plan and asked Council members to endorse the Action Group communiqué of 30 June and insist on consequences for Syria’s non-compliance with Council decisions. (The communiqué called for all parties to recommit to the six-point plan and mapped out steps for a Syrian-led political process.)

After Annan’s briefing, the UK circulated a draft resolution co-sponsored by France, Germany, Portugal and the US that, under Chapter VII, endorsed the communiqué.
Status Update since our July Forecast

- **Israel/Palestine**: High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, briefing Council members in consultations on 2 July, said the settlement of Israeli citizens in the occupied territories is prohibited by international law and that settlement activity is linked to discriminatory policies and practices applying only to Palestinians. On 25 July, Special Coordinator Robert Serry briefed the Security Council prior to its quarterly open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.6816). Serry reiterated his warning that negative trends regarding the peace process, the Gaza blockade, the solvency of the Palestinian Authority, and Israeli settlement policy consistently undermined the common goal of a negotiated two-state solution. In remarks to the press after the debate, the Arab Group expressed concern over the diminishing chances for peace, deplored the unwillingness to react to the deteriorating situation and encouraged the Council to visit Palestine to inspect the facts on the ground as “the least the Council can and should do.”

- **Libya**: On 2 July Pillay also briefed Council members in consultations on Libya. On 10 July the Council issued a press statement welcoming Libya’s 7 July elections (SC/10704). On 18 July, Special Representative Ian Martin briefed the Council for the last time in his capacity as the head of UNSMIL, saying the elections were an “extraordinary accomplishment” marred by some violent incidents, mostly in the east (S/PV.6807). The Libyan permanent representative also addressed the Council, stating that “according to all observers, the elections were free and fair and met all international standards.” The briefing was followed by consultations.

- **Tribunals**: On 5 July the Council issued a press statement (SC/10700), welcoming the commencement of the functioning of the Arusha branch of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on 1 July 2012. The Council also recalled the contribution of the ad hoc and mixed tribunals, the ICC, as well as chambers in national tribunals in the fight against impunity, and called on states to cooperate with these judicial bodies.

- **Burundi**: On 5 July, the Council heard a briefing by Karin Landgren, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and outgoing head of BNUB (S/PV.6799). Chairperson of the Burundi PBC configuration, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), also briefed. The briefing was followed by consultations attended by Landgren and Council members.

- **DRC**: On 10 July, the Council held consultations on the DRC, and heard a briefing by Special Representative and head of MONUSCO, Roger Meece, via video-teleconference on the escalating violence in North Kivu. On 16 July the Council issued a press statement (SC/10709), condemning all outside support to all armed groups in the DRC and demanding that all forms of support to them cease immediately. The Council was briefed by Meece in consultations again on 30 July regarding the situation in the DRC.

- **UNOWA (West Africa)**: On 11 July, Said Djinnett, the Special Representative and head of UNOWA, introduced the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2012/510) on West Africa to Council members (S/PV.6804). He noted that the recent coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, armed insurrection and continuing instability in parts of Côte d’Ivoire, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, terrorist threats and attacks in the region, and the increase in illicit drug trafficking meant that the security situation presents a new wave of challenges to governance, peace consolidation and conflict prevention. The UNOWA report provides considerable detail on events in Mali and the wider Sahel since the 22 March coup, emphasising the mediation efforts of ECOWAS and the complexity of the situation in the region.

- **PBC**: On 12 July, the Council held an open debate to discuss the fifth annual report of the PBC (S/2012/70), which was published on 30 January (S/PV.6805). The open debate was chaired by Maria Angela Holguin, the Foreign Minister of Colombia (which held the Council presidency in July). Among the briefers were the Secretary-General; the current PBC Chair, Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh); and the former PBC Chair, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda). Joachim von Amsberg of the World Bank participated in this meeting, as did representatives of 29 member states. On 13 July, in response to a request by the UK, Council members held an interactive dialogue with the chairs of the PBC country-specific configuration.

- **Yemen**: On 17 July, Special Adviser on Yemen Jamal Benomar briefed Council members in consultations noting that several political, humanitarian and security challenges continued to hamper the transition process and described interference from former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his kinsmen as a key obstacle to stability. Benomar also updated the Council on preparations for the national dialogue conference which is hoped will feed into the constitution-making process enabling general elections by February 2013.

- **Cyprus**: On 19 July, the Council adopted resolution 2058 extending the mandate of UNFICYP until 31 January 2013. The resolution passed with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (Azerbaijan and Pakistan). Negotiations on the text were contentious, particularly with respect to how a future review of UNFICYP might be referenced in the preambular paragraphs. In its explanation of vote (S/PV.6809), Azerbaijan said the resolution did not place the required emphasis “on a results-oriented process,” and that its proposal to reflect a sense of urgency of the review had not been given “due consideration.” Pakistan said not enough time was given to all Council members to engage in open and transparent negotiations and that the final language was not fully reflective of the Secretary-General’s recommendations.

- **Iraq**: On 19 July, UNAMI head Martin Kobler briefed the Council (S/PV.6811) on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2012/535). Martin noted that seven years after the adoption of the constitution, key institutions had yet to be established and fundamental legislation remained outstanding, including the establishment of the Federation Council, the strengthening of the judicial system, legislation on revenue-sharing and hydrocarbons and the protection of minorities. The permanent representative of Iraq also addressed the Council. The briefing was followed by closed consultations. On 25 July, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2061 renewing UNAMI for a further year.

- **Counter Terrorism**: On 19 July the Council issued a press statement (SC/10717) condemning the terrorist attack aimed at Israeli
tourists in Bulgaria on 18 July, causing several deaths of Israeli and Bulgarian citizens and numerous injuries.

- **Afghanistan:** The Council issued a press statement (S/2012/554) on 23 July welcoming the 8 July “Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan” and the conclusions of the conference.

- **Sudan/Darfur:** On 24 July, the Council held a briefing (S/PV.6813) followed by consultations among members on Darfur. Ibrahim Gambari, the Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, addressed the Council. On 31 July the Council adopted resolution 2063 renewing the mandate of UNAMID for a year.

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### UNSMIS (Syria) (continued)

renewed UNSMIS for 45 days and threatened sanctions if the Syrian government did not cease the use of heavy weapons and withdraw from population centres within ten days. Russia had also circulated a draft resolution endorsing the communiqué, renewing UNSMIS for three months but making no reference to any consequence for non-compliance. There were numerous rounds of negotiations regarding the UNSMIS renewal up to the vote on 19 July, when the UK draft resolution was vetoed by Russia and China with Pakistan and South Africa abstaining. (Russia did not call for a vote on its draft.)

On 20 July the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2059, which renewed the UNSMIS mandate for a final period of 30 days and took into consideration the Secretary-General’s recommendations to reconfigure the mission in light of the deteriorating security situation in Syria. The resolution also conditioned any further renewal of UNSMIS on the cessation of the use of heavy weapons by the government and a reduction in violence by all sides. (On 25 July, Ladsous announced the drawdown of half of the 300 authorised military observers. On 24 July, Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye of Senegal took over as acting head of UNSMIS after Maj. Gen. Robert Mood of Norway ended his tour on 20 July.)

There were three particularly significant developments during the Council’s negotiations on the UNSMIS renewal:

- **Côte d’Ivoire:** On 26 July, the Council adopted resolution 2062 renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013. The resolution adjusted the military component to 8,837 personnel, in line with the Secretary-General’s recommendation. On 18 July, Special Representative and head of UNOCI Albert Gerard Koenders briefed the Council and said “it is important that the UN continue to play its supportive role to assist the government’s efforts to stabilise the security situation, protect civilians, restore state authority, promote reconciliation, and undertake post conflict development assistance” (S/PV.6808).

- **Guinea-Bissau:** On 26 July, Special Representative and head of UNIOGBIS Joseph Mutaboba introduced the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2012/554) on Guinea-Bissau to Council members (S/PV.6818). Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti (Brazil), chair of the Guinea-Bissau PBC configuration, also briefed. Representatives of the ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries made statements. Portugal introduced a draft press statement after the briefing and consultations, but at press time, the statement had not been issued.

Media reports indicate continuing defections from the Syrian military, bringing the number of generals who have fled to Turkey to approximately 27 as well as an undisclosed number of regular soldiers. In addition, a Syrian parliamentarian and Syria’s ambassadors in Cyprus, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates defected.

The defection by Brig. Gen. Manaf Tlass on 6 July has been perceived as significant since he is considered a former member of Assad’s inner circle. Tlass made his first public statement on 24 July, when he said it was “the duty of Syrians to unite, to build a free, democratic Syria.” (Some analysts note that Tlass has been flagged for a leadership role in any post-Assad transition.)

The Arab League hosted a Syrian opposition conference with some 250 participants in Cairo on 2 July, during which general agreement was reached on support for the Free Syrian Army and the exclusion of Assad from any transition process. However, there was no agreement on forming a body to represent a unified opposition. There continue to be rifts over views on the credibility of internal versus external opposition groups, military intervention and Islamic political parties. The Arab League ministerial committee on Syria (chaired by Qatar and including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Sudan) met in Doha on 22 July, calling on Assad to “renounce power” for “a safe exit.” The statement also called on the Free Syrian Army rebels and the opposition to form a transitional government. On 24 July, Arab
League Secretary-General Nabil el-Araby said the emphasis must be on a peaceful transfer of power in Syria. Syria rejected the demand for Assad to renounce power.

The conclusions from the 6 July Friends of Syria meeting in Paris — which involved 107 states, but not China or Russia — also emphasised that Assad must relinquish power.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay briefed Security Council members in consultations on Syria on 2 July. Pillay reported deliberate targeting by the government of medical facilities and use of some of those facilities as detention centres; the arbitrary arrest, detention and systematic torture of detainees by government authorities; and rape and sexual violence against men, women and children in detention or during house raids. (On 16 July, the acting Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict echoed such reports of sexual violence by government forces and their armed militias, or Shabiha, describing them as “alarming.”)

On 6 July the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution (A/HRC/RES/20/22) condemning the gross human rights violations and indiscriminate targeting of civilians in Syria by government authorities and the Shabiha. The resolution also expressed concern about the reports it received from its Commission of Inquiry about human rights violations by both government and opposition forces.

**Key Issue**

The key issue for the Council is that Syria is now in a state of civil war, and the conflict has become militarised to such a degree that it seems there is currently little political space remaining to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis. (On 19 July, Mood said that the escalation of violence had reached an unprecedented level.)

**Underlying Problems**

The military balance of power in Syria is not shifting away from the government despite the defections from the military and more organised armed rebel groups (which lack both central military and political strategic control) demonstrated by the regime’s ability to regain control relatively quickly of positions captured by the opposition.

It seems that while the Syrian government believes it can prevail in the conflict militarily there appears to be some acknowledgement that in any post-conflict situation the regime will be unable to govern Syria credibly.

It is unclear when and whether military or political considerations will finally tip the crisis towards its end game. Nevertheless, it seems both the government and armed opposition groups are fully intent on the military option. Meanwhile, the negative impact on regional security is manifesting itself with serious spillover effects, including pockets of violence in northern Lebanon; the military build-up by Turkey on the border, increasing tension with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and revived talk of “safe zones”; the late July spike in terrorist attacks in Iraq potentially linked to the Syrian crisis; the risk for insecurity on the border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; and heightened international rhetoric about chemical weapons.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- maintaining the mission at its currently reduced level of 150 military observers and a civilian component;
- reducing the mission to a small political office with liaison tasks and limited verification and reporting capacity; or
- withdrawal or non-renewal of the mission.

It seems the most likely option—if both sides continue to pursue the military option—would be not to renew the UNSMIS mandate. It is also possible that the Secretary-General may make the operational decision to withdraw the mission prior to the mandate’s expiry due to security considerations.

If UNSMIS is not renewed then the Secretary-General could maintain the “added value” of the reporting capacity under the UN Country Team.

A further option for the Council is to request a de-briefing from both Mood and Annan’s former deputy Jean-Marie Guéhenno as “lessons learned” exercise.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council members will continue to be unanimous in their concern about the devastating level of violence in Syria. Nevertheless, few believe the situation will improve in the coming weeks to sufficiently meet the conditions set out in resolution 2059 for a further renewal.

A significant majority of Council members seem to share the view of the P3 that there is no role for UNSMIS given the current situation in Syria. The mission was to support Annan’s six-point plan and observe a reduction in violence, neither of which have occurred. On the other hand, a few members may agree with China and Russia, preferring to have the mandate renewed for a further period to allow more time for a political solution and to lend support to Annan’s plan. (However, Council members are mindful that Annan has not made any public statements following the 19 July veto. It is unclear what, if any, outcome there might be vis-à-vis Annan’s mediation efforts following his 27 July meeting with the Secretary-General in London.)

Given the current deadlock in the Council it appears that active management of the Syrian crisis is poised to pass out of Council hands in the near term. After the veto, France, Germany, the UK and the US said they would continue to find ways to pressure the Syrian government outside of the Council. In addition, during the 25 July open debate on the Middle East, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, announced a forthcoming General Assembly draft resolution calling for political transition in Syria.

It seems the next juncture for active Council involvement will likely be an endorsement of any possible post-conflict assistance.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/2059 (20 July 2012) extended UNSMIS for a final period of 30 days.

**Security Council Withdrawn and Vetoed Resolutions**
- S/2012/538 (19 July 2012) was the UK draft UNSMIS resolution vetoed by China and Russia with abstentions by Pakistan and South Africa.
- S/2012/547/Rev.2 (17 July 2012) was
the withdrawn Russian draft resolution renewing UNSMIS for three months.

**Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2012/523 (6 July 2012) included options for the UNSMIS renewal.

**Security Council Letters**

- S/2012/542 (13 July 2012) was from Special Envoy Kofi Annan regarding the Tremseh attacks.
- S/2012/522 (5 July 2012) was the final communiqué of the 30 June meeting of the Action Group for Syria in Geneva.

**Lebanon**

**Expected Council Action**

In August the Security Council is expected to extend the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further year. This will be the sixth renewal since the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel in 2006. Given the increased tension and an uncertain political climate in the region, in particular spill-over effects from the Syrian crisis in northern Lebanon, it is possible that the resolution might reflect some of these developments. The mandate expires on 31 August.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 17 July, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly briefed Council members in consultations on developments and the Secretary-General’s 28 June report, which portrayed the situation in UNIFIL’s area of operations as stable. However, it underscored that full respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon was undermined by instability in the region, in particular the Syrian crisis and the lack of a durable peace with Israel.

Plumbly informed Council members that some Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops in southern Lebanon would redeploy north due to instability on the Syrian-Lebanese border. As a consequence, UNIFIL had increased its operational activities to compensate for the temporary loss of LAF capacity. Concurrently, UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is working towards implementing recommendations for troop reductions to approximately 11,200. (A decrease from approximately 11,800 troops a year ago.)

Council members issued a press statement on 18 July, expressing concern over cross-border exchanges of fire, incursions, abductions and arms trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border. (This was the first Council pronouncement on the implementation of resolution 1701 since April 2008.)

The press statement also welcomed the reconvening of Lebanon’s National Dialogue, which on 11 June committed the 8 March and 14 March coalitions to Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s policy to “disassociate” Lebanon from major international decisions on Syria. Mikati, who heads a Hezbollah-led cabinet, has emphasised the policy’s importance to maintain stability within Lebanon.

However, the 24 July session of the National Dialogue was postponed until 16 August because the 14 March opposition coalition decided not to attend. (14 March is headed by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of Rafiq Hariri—a former prime minister assassinated in 2005.) According to Lebanese media reports, 14 March boycotted the meeting because in its view the National Dialogue process had failed to adequately address the issue of Hezbollah’s arms in addition to concerns that the 8 March-held telecommunications ministry was reluctant to release information to Lebanese security bodies regarding alleged assassination attempts of 14 March coalition members. (On 5 July two detonators were found on top of an elevator in the building where parliamentarian Butros Harb has his office. On 4 April there was an assassination attempt on Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese forces. Both Harb and Geagea are aligned with 14 March and are critical of the Syrian government.)

On 24 July, Plumbly met with Mikati in Beirut and expressed his concern over the cross-border incidents in the north, particularly in the Wadi Khaled area. Lebanon decided to increase LAF deployment on the northern border with Syria with authorisation to return fire shortly after a 7 July incident in which Syrian shelling into Lebanon caused two deaths and several injuries.

UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry said during the 25 July open debate on the Middle East that the crisis in Syria had the potential to exacerbate sectarian tension in Lebanon, citing the intensification of cross-border incidents and the 18 July clashes in Tripoli in northern Lebanon between Sunni and Alawi communities. The clashes followed a terrorist attack in Damascus earlier that day, which left four top Syrian political and military officials dead. Lebanese media reports indicate there was also an incident the same day in Sidon in southern Lebanon, during which three Syrian nationals were severely beaten after reportedly expressing support for the Damascus attack.

Also on 18 July, Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah, in a speech to mark the sixth anniversary of the Israel-Hezbollah war, reiterated support for the Syrian government and warned Israel against any attack on Lebanon.

On 22 July, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the “great threat” to Israel from the Syrian conflict is that the Damascus government might collapse and its stock of chemical weapons and missiles could fall into the hands of Hezbollah. The same day Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak said Israel would not tolerate the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.

On 11 July, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon received Lebanon’s 2012 contribution — 49 percent of the Tribunal’s budget. On 19 July the pre-trial judge set 25 March 2013 as a tentative start date for the trial in absentia of those accused in the assassination of Hariri and 22 others in 2005.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is how to encourage Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo of the last six years—cessation of hostilities—toward a ceasefire. But the current regional political climate makes the likelihood of near-term progress on this issue remote.

The temporary redeployment of the LAF to the north is an issue potentially impacting UNIFIL’s capacity.
Other issues include the regular Israeli overflights and the fact that Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to simply renew the UNIFIL mandate as it currently stands for another year.

A further option available to the Council could be to re-energise its working processes with TCCs, perhaps by inviting them, along with the UNIFIL force commander, to meet with the Council Working Group on Peacekeeping prior to the formal meeting with TCCs in the Council. In particular, there could be a focus on DPKO's plans for a leaner force while maintaining UNIFIL's full capability to discharge its mandated tasks.

Council Dynamics
Council members agree that UNIFIL is an important stabilising factor between Israel and Lebanon—especially in light of the Syrian crisis and increasingly belligerent rhetoric between Israel and Hezbollah. However, achieving a permanent ceasefire seems remote and Council members realise that continued calm in Lebanon may at present be the only achievable goal. In this regard, Council members remain highly supportive of the National Dialogue process.

Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key concerns but seem to accept that progress is only likely in the nexus of the recently revived inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track, which seems indefinitely postponed given the current Syrian crisis.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Coordinator for Lebanon
Derek Plumbly (UK)

Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559
Terje Rod-Larsen (Norway)

UNHCR figures for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon as of 25 July 2012
31,596 Syrian refugees registered by the UN in Lebanon with an additional 2,500 being assisted pending registration.

UNIFIL Force Commander
Maj. Gen. Paolo Serra (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 30 June 2012
Authorised: 15,000 troops
Current: 11,571 military personnel

Troop Contributors: Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Timor-Leste and Turkey

Duration
March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2012

Cost
1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012: $545.47 million (A/C.5/66/14)

Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2012/502 (28 June 2012) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2012/244 (20 April 2012) was the latest report on resolution 1559.

Security Council Press Statements
- SC/10712 (18 July 2012) welcomed the reconvening of the National Dialogue and expressed concern over border violations in the north.

Security Council Letters
- S/2012/477 (13 June 2012) was Lebanon’s declaration from the 11 June National Dialogue meeting (the first since November 2010).

Key Recent Developments
The Council maintained its intensive focus on Sudan/South Sudan issues in July. On 3 July, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay briefed Council members in consultations. She expressed concern about the detention and maltreatment of protesters imprisoned in Khartoum and other cities since mid-June for rallying against the regime. Pillay also highlighted human rights violations occurring in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan. Regarding South Sudan, Pillay commended the efforts of the Juba-based government with respect to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration but also noted that sporadic human rights violations by South Sudanese soldiers had been reported during the disarmament process in Jonglei state.

On 10 July, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council in consultations on Sudan and South Sudan. Ladsous reportedly said that there had been a lack of progress in establishing the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), which the two countries had agreed to set up along their disputed border in 29 June 2011 and 30 July 2011 agreements. He noted that Sudan continued to reject the map that the AU proposed as a basis for discussions about establishing the mechanism.

The Council held consultations on 26 July on Sudan and South Sudan. During the consultations, Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Sudan and South Sudan, reportedly noted that while he did not expect the parties to come to agreement on all issues separating them by the 2 August deadline set by the Council.
in resolution 2046 for the conclusion of the negotiations, he was hopeful that there might be some progress on the establishment of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone and the JBVMM by the deadline.

Sudan and South Sudan held negotiations in Addis Ababa from 21 to 28 June. The discussions focused primarily on their efforts to define the territory of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone and establish the JBVMM. No progress was made on these issues.

On 25 June, South Sudan forwarded a letter to the Council (S/2012/482) that Pagan Amum, its chief negotiator, had sent to Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), which is facilitating the peace talks. In the letter, Amum said that South Sudan found “deeply troubling” the fact that an agenda for negotiations on several issues of contention between the countries—including oil wealth sharing, nationality issues, and the status of Abyei—had not been established. Amum suggested that AUHIP’s failure to set an agenda for negotiations was problematic, given the 2 August deadline established by the Council for the parties to conclude their negotiations on these outstanding matters. He added that either AUHIP did not grasp the urgency of resolution 2046 or that the Panel decided that discussion of these issues should wait until after the settlement of security matters which, according to Amum, was Sudan’s preference.

Sudan and South Sudan continued peace talks throughout July. During negotiations on 6 and 7 July in Addis Ababa, the parties agreed to adhere to a “comprehensive strategic approach” that is based on principles such as non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, non-aggression and transparency in their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues separating them.

The negotiators reconvened in Bahir Dar, a resort town in northwestern Ethiopia, on 12 July. The agenda focussed on the major unresolved issues separating Sudan and South Sudan, most notably border demarcation, oil wealth sharing and Abyei’s final status.

President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and President Salva Kiir of South Sudan met on the margins of the AU summit in Addis Ababa on 14 July. During the meeting, Bashir reportedly said that South Sudan should cease its support for rebel groups in Sudan, while reiterating objections to the AU map as a basis for negotiations on border mechanisms. Kiir allegedly offered to help mediate an end to the fighting between Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLM-N), the rebel group that was the northern branch of the South Sudanese army before South Sudan became independent in July 2011.

On 22 July, South Sudan presented a proposal to resolve outstanding differences with Sudan on, *inter alia*, border demarcation, the status of Abyei, and oil wealth sharing. It proposes that international arbitration be used to determine the border in disputed areas. It also proposes that the UN and AU organise an Abyei referendum by the end of 2012, with voter participation eligible to all Ngok Dinka residents of the Abyei, as well as people who have lived in the region “for three…continuous years immediately prior to 9 January 2005.”

With regard to oil wealth sharing, South Sudan offered in the proposal to restart oil production. As part of a package deal, it would also offer Sudan $4.968 billion in debt forgiveness and $3.245 billion in compensation to help it make up lost revenue resulting from South Sudan’s succession, which cost Sudan 75 percent of its oil reserves. South Sudan also offered Sudan fees of $9.10 and $7.26 per barrel for transit of oil from South Sudan through Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company pipeline and its Petrodar pipeline, respectively.

Khartoum rejected South Sudan’s offer on 23 July, citing the need to resolve security issues along the Sudan-South Sudan border before considering a proposal that dealt with oil wealth sharing. However, at press time, media reports indicated that Sudan had changed its stance and had expressed willingness to discuss South Sudan’s offer on oil matters in the negotiations.

Refugees have continued to flee conflict and hunger in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan, making their way to Ethiopia and South Sudan. On 16 July, UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres reiterated an appeal that his agency had made on 22 June to international donors, asking for enhanced humanitarian assistance to serve the needs of the more than 200,000 refugees from Sudan now residing in South Sudan and Ethiopia. According to Guterres, malnourishment and the risk of contracting water-borne diseases are among the burdens facing the refugees.

Protests against the regime continued in July in Khartoum and other towns and cities. Sudanese security forces have used tear gas, batons, and rubber bullets to disperse the protestors, and Sudanese activists have alleged that approximately 2,000 people have been detained since the protests began in June, according to an 11 July Amnesty International-Human Rights Watch statement demanding the release of those arrested. The statement also accuses Sudanese security forces of torturing detainees through sleep deprivation and beatings.

Sudan and South Sudan traded accusations of military transgressions in July. Sudan sent a letter to the Security Council on 9 July (S/2012/526) in which it claimed that South Sudanese forces remained in three areas within Sudan’s borders—Samaha in South Darfur state; Bahr Alarab Station, South Mairam in South Kordofan state; and the Lake Abiad area, also in South Kordofan. On 20 July, AUHIP released a statement indicating that it had received a letter from Amum alleging that South Sudanese troops had been attacked by Sudanese forces in Northern Bhar El Ghazal state, a part of South Sudan that borders South Darfur state. Denying the incident, Sudan said that its forces had attacked Justice and Equality Movement rebels in Darfur.

**Key Issues**

A key issue are the difficulties that Sudan and South Sudan have faced at the negotiating table.

A related issue is how the Council chooses to respond to the slow pace of progress in the negotiations, given that it set a three-month deadline for the parties to resolve fundamental issues separating them, which expires on 2 August.
Another related issue is the apparent ongoing border skirmishes between Sudan and South Sudan; although these incidents have subsided in recent months, they continue to arouse security concerns among the parties.

Another important and continuing issue is the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. A related issue is the plight of the refugees who have fled these two regions for South Sudan or Ethiopia, where aid agencies and NGOs are struggling to address their basic needs.

A further important issue is the allegations of human rights violations committed by Sudanese security forces in response to the recent protests against the government.

With respect to Abyei, a continuing issue is the inability of UNISFA to carry out its mandated border verification and monitoring support role because the parties have not been able to make the agreements necessary to establish the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone and the JBVMM.

Options
Options for the Council include:

- commending progress that has been made by the parties since the adoption of resolution 2046 on 2 May, including the reduction of violence between them, the withdrawal of most security forces from Abyei and the return to the negotiating table;
- extending the 2 August deadline established in resolution 2046 for Sudan and South Sudan to comply with the resolution, as it appears they will be unable to meet this deadline;
- dispatching a Council delegation to the region to impress upon the parties the critical importance of making progress in their negotiations;
- acting under article 36(3) of the Charter, recommending that the parties refer the border disputes to the International Court of Justice, or alternatively to the Permanent Court of Arbitration; and
- considering the imposition of measures under article 41 of the UN Charter (i.e., sanctions), in keeping with resolution 2046, if they fail to meet the 2 August deadline.

The Council might also consider employing its ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa as a forum to develop strategies to stimulate constructive negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N.

With respect to UNISFA, the Council may consider working directly with the parties and the AUHIP to determine the geographical parameters of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone. (It appears that there has been a stalemate on establishing the buffer zone due to Sudan’s unwillingness to accept the map proposed by AUHIP as a basis for negotiations of this issue.)

Council Dynamics
While Council members seem relieved that violence between Sudan and South Sudan has decreased and that the two parties have been negotiating with one another over the past several weeks, there is nonetheless concern that progress in the negotiations has been limited. At press time, with the 2 August deadline approaching for compliance with resolution 2046, several members have begun to consider what steps could (or should) be taken to exert maximum leverage on the parties.

Several Council members increasingly view the situation in Abyei and the activities of UNISFA in the broader context of Sudan-South Sudan relations. It appears that there are a couple of reasons for this perspective. First, the final status of Abyei continues to be one of the key challenges that the parties need to resolve. Second, UNISFA is mandated with a border-monitoring support role along the Sudan-South Sudan border that it has thus far not been able to carry out because of lack of progress by the parties in implementing the JBVMM.

The US is the lead country on Sudan-South Sudan issues and on UNISFA.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2047 (17 May 2012) renewed the mandate of UNISFA.
- S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations.

Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2012/583 (25 July 2012) was the most recent Secretary-General’s report on UNISFA.

Letters

- S/2012/569 (23 July 2012) contained a summary of South Sudan’s 22 July proposal to resolve pending issue with Sudan, which is called the “Agreement on Friendly Relations and Cooperation.”
- S/2012/526 (9 July 2012) was from Sudan to the Council claiming South Sudanese forces remained in three areas within Sudan’s borders.
- S/2012/482 (25 June 2012) contained a letter from South Sudan to Mbeki, regarding the negotiations.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
Somalia will be on Council members’ minds as the country approaches the 20 August deadline for the transition to permanent federal institutions. It is likely that the Council will request a briefing on the political situation in Somalia following the transition. A press statement is also possible.

The authorisation for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expires on 31 October.

Key Recent Developments
Council members received a briefing in consultations on 24 July from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga who addressed current political developments in Somalia. As part of the same consultations, the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee chair, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India) briefed Council members on the work of the Committee and presented two separate reports of the Sanctions Monitoring Group (on Eritrea and on Somalia).

From 2 to 3 July, the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia met in Rome. In its communiqué, the ICG “reiterated its firm determination that the Transition ends on 20 August.” The ICG expressed concern over missed deadlines, but commended the advances made by AMISOM and others against the Islamist rebel group Al-Shabaab. The communiqué also noted that Mahiga and Hussein Arab Issie, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), had signed an action plan for halting recruitment and use of children by the armed forces.

In Mogadishu, the transitional process faced delays after the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) failed to convene on schedule.
According to news reports, the 135 traditional leaders responsible for selecting the 825 members of the NCA had withheld their selections due to concerns over the draft constitution. On 18 July, the TFG announced that the leaders had agreed on changes to the constitution. On 23 July, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU urged Somali leadership and other stakeholders to meet the 20 August deadline and demanded the immediate convening of the NCA. On 25 July, the NCA convened and began 9 days of discussions on the constitution. Ratification of the draft constitution is expected in early August.

At press time Council members were scheduled to hold an interactive dialogue with the Somali Foreign Minister Abdullahi Haji Hassan on 31 July, to be updated on political developments in Somalia.

Also on 25 July, the Council adopted resolution 2060, renewing the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia for a period of 13 months and extending the humanitarian exemption to the sanctions regime for a period of 12 months. The resolution continued measures added to the Monitoring Group’s mandate by resolutions 2002 and 2023, as well as the charcoal ban contained in resolution 2036. Additionally, the resolution provided an exception to the arms embargo in Somalia for military equipment for the support of or use by the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), and to the arms embargo in Eritrea for non-lethal weapons or equipment intended for humanitarian or protective use, in both cases as approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee. The resolution also reiterated that the transition will not be extended beyond 20 August, and welcomed the recommendation of the Monitoring Group that a Joint Financial Management Board be established for Somalia.

In its report on Eritrea (S/2012/545), the Monitoring Group said it found no evidence that Eritrea was directly supporting Al-Shabaab. Nonetheless, the report argued that in all other respects Eritrea had failed to comply with Security Council resolutions and remained a destabilising force in the region.

In its report on Somalia (S/2012/544), the Monitoring Group called attention to the behaviours of spoilers, highlighting “pervasive corruption within the transitional federal institutions.” The report reiterated the findings of the World Bank that nearly 70 percent of TFG revenue between 2009 and 2010 was unaccounted for. In response, President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed accused the Monitoring Group of being “against peace in Somalia.” The report also related that the pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Aweyne” had been found travelling on a diplomatic passport issued by the TFG with the full knowledge of the President. At press time the Foreign Minister of Somalia, scheduled to address Council members on the political situation in Somalia on the morning of 31 July, was also expected to brief the Sanctions Committee that afternoon.

The Secretary-General’s report on resolutions 1844, 1862, 1907 and 2023 (S/2012/412), which demanded that Eritrea cease all efforts to destabilise other states and engage constructively to resolve its border dispute with Djibouti, was originally published on 8 June before being withdrawn and has not at press time been re-released (for more details please refer to our July Monthly Forecast.)

In an 11 July communiqué, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) “expressed concern on the possible proliferation of reports on Somalia,” and asked that any reports be held in abeyance until after the transition.

On 29 June the AU and Uganda signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the deployment of a Formed Police Unit consisting of 140 police personnel to Somalia as part of AMISOM. On 11 July, the AU signed an additional Memorandum of Understanding with Djibouti to deploy a reinforced battalion of 1,000 troops to AMISOM. A car bomb in Mogadishu on 16 July killed a former minister and injured six others. On 17 July, TFG troops supported by AMISOM attacked an Al-Shabaab camp in the Gedo region, killing four militants and recovering a cache of weapons.

In remarks to the press in advance of the 20 July anniversary of the declaration of famine in Somalia, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Mark Bowden, warned that more than 2.5 million people remained in need of aid. The same day, the UN refugee agency reported the Somali refugee population in neighbouring countries had surpassed 1 million people. The Emergency Relief Coordinator’s report (S/2012/546), transmitted to the Council on 13 July, cautioned that “the non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption might result in delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by non-state armed groups.”

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 5 July in a resolution on human rights assistance to Somalia, the Human Rights Council (HRC) expressed its continued serious concern at the human rights and humanitarian situation in Somalia. The HRC resolution, adopted without a vote, strongly condemned grave and systematic human rights abuses committed against the population, in particular by Al-Shabaab and its affiliates, and called for all parties to take immediate steps to protect women and children. The HRC also extended the mandate of the UN Independent Expert on human rights in Somalia for one year in order to support the efforts of the TFG and Somali sub-national authorities to build respect for human rights into preparations for the post-transition period. The independent expert will report to the HRC at its twenty-fourth session, in September 2013.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is how best to support the transitional process in the lead up to 20 August, and how best to support a new administration in Somalia after the transition.

Related major issues are the problem of spoilers and corruption within the TFG, especially as a new government develops. (Many on the Council are worried that the transition will be a change in name only and that substantive changes to the composition of the Somali government will not take place.)

The continued implementation of AMISOM’s new strategic concept (endorsed in resolution 2036) is likely to remain an issue for the Council as well.
Options
Main options for the Council include:

- simply receiving a briefing on the political situation in Somalia and taking no action;
- issuing a presidential or a press statement on the political situation in support of the transitional process; and
- specifically addressing potential spoilers and the corruption issue.

Council Dynamics
The Council enjoys general consensus on issues relating to the end of the transition in Somalia, though some differences of opinion may develop as the 20 August deadline (which all agree should remain as a hard deadline) approaches. Developments in the first weeks of August are likely to influence how warm or critical the Council might be toward Somali stakeholders. Should the signatories to the roadmap for Somalia agree, there are likely to be differences of opinion as to whether or not the deadline should be extended.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council, while India chairs the Sanctions Committee and Russia has taken the lead on legal issues related to piracy.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2060 (25 July 2012) extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea for 13 months, as well as the humanitarian exemption to the Somalia sanctions regime for 12 months.
- S/RES/2036 (22 February 2012) authorised an increase in AMISOM’s troop strength as well as a further expansion of its UN support package and imposed a ban on importing or exporting Somali charcoal.
- S/RES/2023 (5 December 2011) imposed new measures to prevent Eritrea from using the diaspora tax or revenues from its mining sector to commit further sanctions violations.
- S/RES/2002 (29 July 2011) was the last renewal of the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2012/412 (8 June 2012) was the Secretary-General’s report requested by resolution 2023.

Other

- S/2012/546 (13 July 2012) contained the report of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia.
- S/2012/468 (20 June 2012) contained a 60-day AU report on AMISOM requested by resolution 2036.

Mali

Expected Council Action
In August the Council is expected to consider options set out by the Secretary-General on possible steps to ensure the full restoration of constitutional order and territorial integrity in Mali, including the deployment of military forces by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in line with resolution 2056. It is likely that the Deputy Secretary-General will brief the Council. Representatives of ECOWAS and the AU are also likely to brief.

No Council action is expected immediately after the briefing.

Key Recent Developments
On 5 July, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2056, expressing its full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the transitional authorities to attempt to re-establish constitutionality and the territorial integrity of Mali.

The resolution declared the Council’s readiness to consider backing a military deployment in Mali as proposed by ECOWAS “once additional information has been provided regarding the objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged deployment and other possible measures.” It called on the Secretary-General to support ECOWAS and the AU in preparing the deployment plans and to report to the Council by 31 July on “possible steps” to restore constitutionality and the territorial integrity of Mali.

Resolution 2056 was the culmination of intense diplomatic activity since 22 March, when young officers, led by Capt. Amadou Sanogo, overthrew the civilian government of President Amadou Toumani Touré, ahead of presidential elections scheduled for 29 April in which Touré was not participating. That same day, the Council issued a press statement (SC/10590) condemning the forcible seizure of power and calling for the “immediate restoration” of the deposed government.

The soldiers had abandoned a faltering campaign against Tuareg rebels in the north of the country. The Tuareg, under the banner of the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), seized the northern half of the country and declared it independent of Mali shortly after the coup. The situation was further complicated by the strong presence among the Tuareg members of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which by July had gained ascendancy and effectively sidelined MNLA. AQIM—and its ally, the Islamist group Ansar Eddine—imposed a regime of terror in the vast area, including extrajudicial killings, the destruction of historic monuments in Timbuktu, and the oppression of women, triggering the flight of an estimated quarter of the population.

On 26 March, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/7) expressing “serious concern” about the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region “which is further complicated by the presence of armed groups and terrorist groups.”

On 6 April, ECOWAS brokered a framework agreement resulting in the military junta’s promise to give up power in return for an amnesty and the lifting of the sanctions ECOWAS had imposed. The junta also agreed to a timetable for a return to constitutional rule and elections.

During their visit to Côte d’Ivoire on 21 May, Council members held a high-level meeting with ECOWAS in Abidjan. The participants included ECOWAS Commission Chair Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, as well as the Foreign Ministers of Côte d’Ivoire (current chair of ECOWAS), Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal. Benin also attended as the current chair of the AU.

On 12 June, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting in New York on the
The next day, at the sixth consultative meeting between the two councils, Mali was prominently discussed. A communiqué (S/2012/444) issued at the close of the meeting acknowledged “the efforts of ECOWAS to explore options to restore peace and security in Mali in the context of upholding its territorial integrity.”

This was followed by an informal interactive meeting on Mali, requested by Togo, held on 15 June in New York between Council members and representatives of the AU PSC and ECOWAS. The Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, Djibril Yipéné Bassolé, who is leading ECOWAS’ mediation efforts on Mali, provided an update on his efforts and requested a mandate from the Council for the planned ECOWAS military deployment in Mali.

On 18 June, the Council issued a press statement (SC/10676) taking note of the request by ECOWAS for the Council to authorise the deployment of a “stabilisation force” in Mali and expressing Council members’ readiness to further examine the request “once additional information has been provided regarding the objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged deployment and other possible measures.”

ECOWAS deployed a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM), led by Brig-Gen. Mohammed Lai, Chief of Staff of the ECOWAS Standby Force, from 7-18 July, to assess the feasibility of deploying troops in Mali.

On 25-26 July, the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) held an emergency meeting on Mali in Abidjan to consider the report of the TAM, which would later have to be endorsed by the Heads of State of ECOWAS.

The situation in Mali, meanwhile, has continued to deteriorate, with reports of massive human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings. On 25 July, Human Rights Watch reported that soldiers loyal to the 22 March coup leader Captain Sanogo had “forcibly disappeared” 20 soldiers alleged to have been linked to a failed counter-coup in April. The situation in the northern half of the country has been even more critical. There have been reports of massive human rights violations and inter-factional killings as well as of kidnappings and ransom demands.

In view of the situation, the Justice Minister in the transitional government, Malick Coulibaly, formally requested on 18 July that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate atrocities being committed by the various Islamists and rebel groups in the north of the country. The request stated that the crimes committed in northern Mali since January involved “grave and large-scale violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law.”

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to assess the feasibility of the ECOWAS proposed approach and the degree to which this is echoed by the Secretary-General.

Determining the appropriateness and level of support for ECOWAS’ troops to be deployed in Mali and the mandate of that force would be the next key issue.

An important issue will be whether the upcoming proposals would be addressing the situation in Bamako-controlled parts of the country only or the entire Malian territory, including the renegade north.

Massive human rights violations, especially against women and non-Muslims in the Tuareg-controlled parts of Mali, are an issue of concern.

A related issue is dealing with the growing threat of terrorism in Mali and the wider Sahel region.

A further issue is the use of the ICC to address some of the violations in Mali, both by the radical Islamists in northern Mali and by the military in Bamako.

Options
Options for the Council include:

- receiving the briefing and options from the Secretariat as well as the conclusions from the ECOWAS-led military assessment team and postponing action until a further careful consideration of ECOWAS’ military plans; or
- receiving the briefing and then adopting a resolution authorising the deployment of an ECOWAS’ force in Mali.

An immediate option could be requesting the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Special Envoy on Mali as a step towards forging a more effective approach to the complex issues relating to the country.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus among Council members that the situation in Mali is intolera ble and should be reversed. Council members are unanimous in their condemnation of the
22 March coup, in insisting on the re-establishment of constitutionality and in rejecting the secessionist pretensions of the northern rebels. The Council, however, has not given serious consideration around an approach towards resolving the complex issues relating to the north of the country, though the presence of radical Islamists there and their activities, including kidnappings of westerners and other terrorist acts, are of particular interest. It appears that France, which is leading on this issue in the Council, is in principle interested in supporting actions that would curb the problem, including deployment of the ECOWAS stabilisation force. Togo, the only ECOWAS member on the Council, has a strong interest in getting a Council resolution on the troop deployment in Mali as well. But Council support for such an action will depend largely on a number of factors, including a specific request from the transitional authorities in Mali and the provision of a credible military plan by ECOWAS.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**

- S/RES/2056 (5 July 2012) was a resolution expressing the Council’s full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the transitional authorities in Mali trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity.

**Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2012/7 (26 March 2012) expressed concern about the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region.

**Security Council Letters**

- S/2012/466 (20 June 2012) transmitted the conclusions of the first meeting of the AU’s Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali.
- S/2012/439 (13 June 2012) was from President Boni Yaya of Benin, Chairman of the AU, on the situation in Mali.
- S/2012/444 (13 June 2012) was from Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa) containing the joint communiqué issued after the sixth consultative meeting between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2012/510 (29 June 2012) was on UNOWA.

**Press Statements**

- SC/10590 (22 March 2012) was on the “forcible seizure” of power in Mali and called for the restoration of the constitutional order.
- SC/10676 (18 June 2012) was on ECOWAS’ request to the Council to authorise the deployment of a “stabilisation force” in Mali.

**Kosovo**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council in August is scheduled to hold its third debate this year on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Farid Zarif, the Special Representative and head of UNMIK, is expected to brief the Council on developments and the latest Secretary-General’s report, which was due by 27 July.

No Council action is expected. Resolution 1244 (1999), which established UNMIK, stipulated that the mission would continue until the Council decided otherwise.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 17 July, Council members held consultations on UNMIK. Russia called the previously unscheduled meeting to discuss specific concerns, namely the killing of two Serbs in Kosovo and reports that Libyan and Syrian rebels had visited Kosovo for training purposes. Hervé Ladsous, head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, briefed members providing an update on attacks against minorities—including Serb returnees—in Kosovo. The number of incidents targeting minorities, including attacks against Orthodox churches in Kosovo, had increased since the publication of the Secretary-General’s report of 27 April (S/2012/275). Ladsous noted, although this was not necessarily part of a broader trend. He also observed that figures for the first half of this year pointed to a decrease in the number of returnees to Kosovo, relative to the equivalent period last year.

Regarding the shooting of the two Serbs on 6 July, Ladsous said that an investigation into the killings was underway and that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was involved.

It seems that Russia addressed the issue of Kosovo possibly being used as a training ground for rebels, pointing to reports in the media that Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian opposition figure, had visited Kosovo in late April. Those articles had reported an Associated Press interview with Abdulhamid in which he was quoted as saying, “We come here to learn”, making linkages between the Kosovo Liberation Army’s experiences and Syrian opposition groups.

The response of the P3 in particular seemed to be that if there was substance to these allegations then hard evidence should be presented. (Another Council member opined that, if the accusations were true, the Council should be concerned.) Several Western members had questioned whether it was necessary for the Council to discuss this matter in the first place.

Other violent incidents in Kosovo occurred in recent months. On 28 June, more than 50 people were injured in clashes between Kosovo police and about 70 young Serbs who were travelling to the historic site of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. In response, the head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Kosovo strongly condemned the violence, calling for a thorough investigation into the events, including into allegations of excessive use of force by some police officers.

On 1 June, two NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeepers were injured as they attempted to remove roadblocks erected by local Serbs north of Mitrovica in predominantly Serb northern Kosovo. In a press release, KFOR said that the activity was to improve freedom of movement not only for KFOR but “for all people in Kosovo.” At least three Kosovo Serbs were also reportedly injured.

Serbs in Kosovo voted peacefully in a runoff to the Serbian presidential election on 20 May. (The OSCE had brought voting materials to polling stations in Kosovo and returned them to the Serbian electoral commission for counting.) President Tomislav Nikolić assumed office on 31 May. Nikolić—a former extreme nationalist and now leader of the Serbian Progressive Party—has said that he is in favour of accession to the EU but would never renounce Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.

On 24 July, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Kosovo as part of a regional
trip, which included Belgrade the day before. In Kosovo, Ban met with UNMIK and international partners, including KFOR, EULEX and the OSCE, in addition to the authorities in Pristina. (It was the first time that the Secretary-General had visited Kosovo—which is not a UN member—since its declaration of independence in 2008.) Ban reiterated upon arrival in Kosovo that an overriding theme of his regional visit was the importance of dialogue and mutual respect.

During the consultations on 17 July, Russia apparently said that it hoped the Secretary-General’s visit would be in line with resolution 1244 (it was). The resolution, which remains the authoritative Council resolution on the issue, reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of what is now Serbia, and called for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo.”

Human Rights-Related Developments

Briefing the Security Council on 14 May, Zarif stressed that there should be no let-up in the combined efforts of UNMIK and the Kosovar authorities on human rights issues that are fundamental to reconciliation and to the protection of the rights of minority communities throughout Kosovo. These, he said, particularly included progress in determining the fate of the missing, creating conditions for safe voluntary returns, the fair adjudication and resolution of property claims and full and effective implementation of the legal frameworks for the protection and preservation of cultural and religious heritage.

Key Issues

Important issues that Council members are likely to address during the debate include:
- the freedom of movement of KFOR and EULEX personnel in northern Kosovo;
- the seeming increase in attacks against minorities in Kosovo; and
- the declining numbers of Serb returnees to Kosovo.

Another issue is the role of the Kosovar authorities in northern Kosovo and the refusal of Kosovo Serbs to recognise Pristina. Related to this is the next phase of the Belgrade-Pristina talks, following the formation of a new Serbian government in July.

A further issue is the decision on 2 July of the International Steering Group for Kosovo—comprising 23 European countries, Turkey and the US—to end Kosovo’s “supervised independence.” This will entail the closing of the International Civilian Office in September.

A broader issue for the Council is the implications of developments in Kosovo for the wider region, where neighbouring countries also have sizeable ethnic minorities.

Options

As on previous occasions, the Council could receive the briefing from Special Representative Zarif but take no action.

Alternatively, the Council could issue a statement acknowledging the decision to end Kosovo’s “supervised independence” while expressing the concerns of various members vis-à-vis the situation in Kosovo. Such a statement could place a premium on adherence to the rule of law in Kosovo.

Council members might choose to elaborate on the reported presence of Syrian and Libyan armed opposition members in Kosovo and discuss whether measures should be taken to investigate the matter further.

Council Dynamics

The Council is deeply divided on the issue of Kosovo. Strained relations among the P5 on other Council agenda items in recent months are unlikely to improve the prospects for anything approaching Council unity on the issue.

Six Council members have recognised Kosovo—the current four EU members, the US and Colombia. These countries often emphasise the need to be forward-looking and realistic about its status as a sovereign country. They have also pointed to the importance of the freedom of movement in northern Kosovo, including the fulfilment of KFOR’s and EULEX’s lawful mandates, and rejected the support of parallel structures in the north.

Conversely, Russia has consistently reiterated that resolution 1244 remains the international legal basis for a settlement in Kosovo. It emphasises that any attempt by Pristina to exert authority over the Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo could destabilise the situation. Other members, including those who joined the Council this year, have sought to encourage both sides to avoid action and rhetoric that would inflame tensions. It seems some of these members will be keen to emphasise the need for the Kosovar authorities to protect the rights of non-ethnic Albanians, including guaranteeing the safety of religious and cultural sites.
This year’s final report states that the DPRK continues to “reject and violate” Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). (These resolutions, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang, were respectively adopted following the DPRK’s two nuclear tests.) The PoE report notes ongoing investigations into several illicit shipments of arms-related materiel originating in the DPRK, some of which date back several years. Two of these shipments were reportedly destined for Syria. One of the cases involved containers of chemical protection equipment that “bore clear traces of manufacture” in the DPRK. The report notes that the US has designated the intended recipient in Syria for suspected involvement in Syrian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes.

A second case was reported by France in April this year following the seizure in November 2010 of an illicit shipment of goods used to manufacture artillery munitions, originating from the DPRK. The shipment, which the PoE report said contained “aluminium alloy tubes usable for making rockets”, was also destined for Syria.

Regarding the transfer to or from the DPRK of prohibited nuclear or other WMD and ballistic missile items, the PoE notes that there have been no new reported incidents of non-compliance. However, it states that investigations of previous incidents continue, including possible military cooperation with Myanmar, prohibited under resolution 1718.

The report also refers to the military parade on 15 April in Pyongyang, which showcased several ballistic missiles. One newly revealed missile was on an eight-axle transporter erector launcher, which the DPRK had “not previously demonstrated its capacity” to build. The panel said it would further examine the issue. Although not mentioned in the report, the launcher is believed to be of Chinese origin. How the matter was referenced in the report seems to have been a matter of discussion; it appears that the equipment was exported to the DPRK Ministry of Forestry for civilian-use activities.

Under resolution 1718, the Council also decided that member states should not sell or transfer “luxury goods” to the DPRK. The PoE’s recent report notes that the implementation of this sanction “remains deeply problematic.” Because there is no definitive list of what constitutes “luxury goods”, it is left to member states’ discretion. The DPRK is accordingly able to exploit differences in member states’ interpretations to acquire desired goods.

Concerning the panel itself, in a letter of 27 June (S/2012/493) the Secretary-General noted that—after consulting the Committee—he had reappointed the seven experts. During the reappointment process, Pakistan noted that it would be desirable to have broader geographic representation on the panel—a point supported by Guatemala. (At present, the panel comprises nationals from each of the P5 countries, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK).)

On 22 June, the US and the ROK conducted military exercises near the latter’s border with the DPRK. The land manoeuvres, which were accompanied by three-day naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, were the allies’ biggest since the Korean War. In response, Pyongyang asserted that it would “further bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defence” and said that the use of its flag in the exercises to represent an enemy command post was “an extremely grave military action and politically motivated provocation.”

On 30 May, English-language media reports indicated that changes made to the DPRK’s constitution earlier this year for the first time proclaimed the country a “nuclear-armed” nation.

The DPRK announced on 18 July that its leader, Kim Jong-un (who is in his late twenties), had been given the title of “Marshal.” This top military rank in the country was held by both his predecessors. The announcement came shortly after news that Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, who had been promoted to Chief of the General Staff and Politburo under Kim Jong-il, had been dismissed from his posts due to “illness”. Analysts speculated whether the high-level reshuffle was part of a wider move by Kim Jong-un to establish his own leadership style and embark on a generational shake-up of the military, which has had a dominant role in the political and economic direction of the country.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In her opening statement to the June session of the Human Rights Council, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay observed that the situation in the DPRK remained of serious concern particularly the issue of political prison camps, public executions and persisting food shortages. She called on the authorities in Pyongyang to allow access to independent experts and organisations. Noting that there had been reports of DPRK citizens forced to return to their country after seeking international protection, Pillay also urged neighbouring countries to respect the principle of non-refoulement (which protects refugees from being returned to places where their lives or freedoms could be threatened).

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is the DPRK’s flouting of previous Council resolutions and the threat of an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

A related issue is whether Kim Jong-un is steering the DPRK in a different direction from that of his father and if this path might be compatible with reinvigoration of talks with the international community concerning the country’s nuclear programme.

Options

Council members could receive the briefing in consultations and make statements but take no action at this point.

One option might be discussing the benefits of the chair of the 1718 Committee briefing the wider membership later in the year on the work of the Committee and the PoE, similar to the briefing on 9 July by the chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee.

Council Dynamics

Long-standing divisions exist among the P5 on how front-footed the Council should be in condemning the DPRK’s continued violation of the sanctions regime against it. These differences manifested themselves following Pyongyang’s failed missile launch on 13 April, when the US and China in particular had divergent views as to the scope of additional sanctions measures. In the absence of a third nuclear test by the DPRK or further similarly provocative action, it
seems unlikely that the Council would agree to action designating additional DPRK entities or individuals.

Council members are likely to closely follow signs coming out of the DPRK in the coming months. These may indicate whether the country’s long-standing military-first emphasis and premium on the principle of self-reliance are still being promoted, or if the youthful new leader might focus more on economic reforms, as has been reported.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/2050 (12 June 2012) extended the mandate of the PoE until 12 July 2013.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK’s 25 May 2009 underground nuclear test, expanded the sanctions regime and established a PoE.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up the 1718 Committee.

Presidential Note
- S/2012/422 (14 June 2012) contained the PoE’s 2012 final report.

Letter
- S/2012/493 (27 June 2012) was from the Secretary-General reappointing the PoE.

UNRCCA (Central Asia)

Expected Council Action
In August, Council members are expecting a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Asia and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), Miroslav Jenča. This will be Jenča’s eighth briefing since his appointment in May 2008 and will provide Council members with an update on the Centre’s activities since the last briefing.

Key Recent Developments
Jenča briefed the Council on the work of UNRCCA three times in 2011: 13 January, 15 July and 19 December. Each briefing was in consultations and was followed by a Council press statement. Through these statements, the Council expressed its appreciation for the efforts of UNRCCA in responding to regional challenges and its contributions to the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The statements also highlighted the Centre’s engagement in addressing challenges in Kyrgyzstan.

Jenča visited Kyrgyzstan on 7 September 2011 with Pierre Morel, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, and Adam Kobieracki, Director of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Conflict Prevention Centre. A joint statement issued on the same day reaffirmed the commitment of the UN, the OSCE and the EU “to support efforts towards stabilization, reconciliation, economic and social development and democratization in Kyrgyzstan.”

The first-ever report of the Secretary-General on the use of preventive diplomacy (S/2011/552) was released on 26 August 2011. The report noted that key elements to maximise preventive diplomacy’s chances of success were: early warning, flexibility, partnerships, sustainability, evaluation and resources.

During the period since the last briefing by Jenča, intermittent political and crime-related violence in different parts of the region continued to flare up.

Background on UNRCCA
UNRCCA was inaugurated on 10 December 2007 as a special political mission by the Department of Political Affairs with the aim of assisting the countries of the region in building their conflict-prevention capacities. The Centre’s latest programme of action for 2012 to 2014 identifies three priority areas:

- impact of trans-boundary threats facing the region (terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking);
- implications of national developments on regional stability; and
- management of common natural resources and environmental degradation.

Key Issues
An issue for Council members is whether opportunities may exist for better use of preventive diplomacy tools in the region.

Another issue is the general security situation in the region, including threats posed by ethnic conflict, resource management concerns, terrorism and general instability.

An emerging issue is the potential impact for the region and UNRCCA’s role in this context of the upcoming withdrawal of most of the international troops from Afghanistan.

Options
One option for Council members is to simply receive the briefing.

Another option for Council members is to issue a press statement, as it has done on several occasions in the past, and reaffirm its support for UNRCCA’s activities in the region.

Council Dynamics
Some Council members are concerned about the recent fighting in the region, in particular the Gorno-Badakhshan province of Tajikistan adjacent to Afghanistan. Moreover, they feel that Afghanistan should also be included in the UNRCCA scope due to its regional significance.

UN Documents

Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2011/552 (26 August 2011) was the first-ever report on the use of preventive diplomacy.

Press Statements
- SC/10495 (19 December 2011) appreciated the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
- SC/10327 (15 July 2011) appreciated the efforts of the UNRCCA as a UN mechanism for preventive diplomacy.
- SC/10151 (13 January 2011) welcomed the most recent briefing by Jenča and expressed appreciation for the work of UNRCCA in responding to challenges in the region, in particular in the context of recent developments in Kyrgyzstan.

Letter
- S/2007/280 (15 May 2007) and S/2007/279 (7 May 2007) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council about the establishment of UNRCCA.
### Notable Dates for August

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Security Council Report is supported by the Governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. It is incorporated as a not for profit Organisation and operates in affiliation with the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York.

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