

# Monthly Forecast

- 2 Status Update since our February *Forecast*
- 3 Afghanistan
- 5 Iran
- 7 Iraq
- 8 Lebanon
- 9 UNDOF (Golan Heights)
- 11 Yemen
- 12 Somalia
- 13 Sudan and South Sudan
- 15 South Sudan
- 17 Libya
- 18 Mali
- 20 Guinea-Bissau
- 21 Liberia
- 23 Sierra Leone
- 24 Haiti
- 26 Cyprus
- 28 Notable Dates

## Overview

The Russian Federation will preside over the Security Council in March.

An open debate on [Afghanistan](#) is planned, to be presided over by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Yury Fedotov, are expected as briefers.

A debate on [Haiti](#) is planned with a briefing by the acting head of MINUSTAH, Nigel Fisher. Also expected is the quarterly debate on [Kosovo](#) (originally scheduled for February and postponed until March), with a briefing by Farid Zarif, the Special Representative and head of UNMIK.

A briefing is expected on the work of the [1737 Iran Sanctions Committee](#) by its chair, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia).

Also expected is a briefing on cooperation between the UN and the [OSCE](#), by its Chairperson-in-Office Leonid Kozhara (Ukraine).

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:

- the [DRC Framework Agreement](#) by the Secretary-General who witnessed the 24 February signing ceremony between the DRC and Angola, Burundi, CAR, Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia;
- [South Sudan](#) and UNMISS, most likely by the Special Representative and head of mission, Hilde Johnson;
- [Sierra Leone](#) and UNIPSIL, by its head Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, and by the chair of the PBC country configuration, Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada);
- [Libya](#) and UNSMIL, by the Special Representative and head of mission, Tarek Mitri;
- the work of the [1970 Libya Sanctions Committee](#) by its chair, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda);
- [Liberia](#) and UNMIL, by the Special Representative and head of mission, Karin Landgren, and by the chair of the PBC country configuration, Staffan Tillander (Sweden);
- [Iraq](#) and UNAMI, by the Special

Representative and head of mission, Martin Kobler;

- developments in the [Middle East](#), most likely by the head of DPA, Jeffrey Feltman; and
- [Mali](#), also by Feltman.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- the situation in [Guinea-Bissau](#) and the latest report on the restoration of constitutional order, most likely by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé-Brook Zerihoun;
- the most recent report on resolution 1701, most likely by the Special Coordinator for [Lebanon](#), Derek Plumbly;
- the most recent Secretary-General's report on UNDOF ([Golan Heights](#)), most likely by the head of DPKO, Hervé Ladsous;
- the situation in [Yemen](#), by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar;
- the situation between [Sudan and South Sudan](#), by DPKO on one occasion and by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios on another; and
- the work of the [751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee](#), by its chair, Ambassador Kim Sook (Republic of Korea).

Also possible is a briefing in consultations by Alexander Downer, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on [Cyprus](#), on the prospects for progress in negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Formal sessions will need to be held to adopt resolutions to reauthorize [AMISOM](#) (Somalia) and renew the mandates of [UNAMA](#) (Afghanistan), [UNIPSIL](#) (Sierra Leone), [UNSMIL](#) (Libya) and the [Panel of Experts supporting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee](#).

Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely developments in [Syria](#) and a meeting on this issue may be scheduled.

**28 February 2013**  
This report is available online at [securitycouncilreport.org](http://securitycouncilreport.org).

For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please subscribe to our "What's In Blue" series at [whatsinblue.org](http://whatsinblue.org) or follow [@SCRtweets](https://twitter.com/SCRtweets) on Twitter.

## Status Update since our February Forecast

### Terrorism

On 1 February, Council members issued a press statement condemning in the strongest terms a terrorist attack against the US embassy in Ankara, Turkey (SC/10906). The attack resulted in one death and several injuries.

### DRC

On 5 February, Council members were briefed in consultations by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on developments on the ground and on MONUSCO. The Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet, Susana Malcorra briefed on the Secretary-General's diplomatic efforts to obtain a political framework agreement. On 22 February, the Council was briefed (S/PV.6925) by Roger Meece, the Special Representative and head of mission, on the Secretary-General's 15 February MONUSCO report (S/2013/96). On 24 February, Council members issued a press statement welcoming the signing of the framework agreement in Addis Ababa that same day by the Secretary-General and the chairpersons of the AU Commission, the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (SC/10924). In the statement, Council members also supported the swift designation of a UN Special Envoy to support implementation of the framework agreement. Council members also expressed concern about the worsening security and humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC, reiterating their demand that the M23 cease attempts to create a parallel administration and that the M23, FDLR and all other armed groups cease violence and destabilising activities.

### DPRK (North Korea)

In a 12 February press statement, Council members strongly condemned the DPRK's nuclear test that day as a grave violation of resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2087 (SC/10912). They recalled that resolution 2087 expressed the Council's determination to take "significant action" in the event of a further nuclear test by the DPRK and said they would begin work immediately on an appropriate response in a resolution. During consultations on 21 February, Council members received the regular quarterly briefing by the 1718 Sanctions Committee chair,

Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), on the work of the Committee over the previous three months. The briefing was Ambassador Lucas' first since assuming the chairmanship of the Committee on 1 January.

### Protection of Civilians

On 12 February, the Council held its semi-annual open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/PV.6917 and Resumption 1). The meeting was chaired by Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan of the Republic of Korea and featured briefings by the Secretary-General, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and the International Committee for the Red Cross Director for International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri. More than 70 member states also spoke. The Council adopted a presidential statement reconfirming its commitment to the protection of civilians, focusing in particular on the need to fight impunity for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, the humanitarian impact of conflict and implementation of peacekeeping protection mandates (S/PRST/2013/2). The statement expressed the Council's particular concern about attacks against medical personnel and facilities and schools, teachers and other protected school personnel as well as violence against journalists and other media professionals. It requested the Secretary-General to submit his next report on the protection of civilians by 15 November and for reports to be submitted every 18 months thereafter. It also asked that the next report include an assessment of concrete measures taken by peacekeeping missions to implement their mandate to protect civilians and the impact of those measures.

### Burundi

On 13 February, the Council adopted resolution 2090, extending the mandate of BNUB until 15 February 2014 (S/PV.6918). The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing by the end of July 2013 and a report by 17 January 2014 on the implementation of BNUB's mandate.

### Cooperation between the UN and Regional and Subregional Organisations

On 13 February, Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy of the EU, briefed the Council (S/PV.6919). She discussed a range of issues of recent significance: the EU's engagement in Somalia and anti-piracy efforts; the EU's financial and logistical support to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali; nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the context of the E3+3 negotiations with Iran and the EU's opposition to recent tests by the DPRK, EU facilitation of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo; and the evolving situation in Syria and the Middle East. Ashton also stressed "the EU's strong and long-standing commitment" to "effective multilateralism with the United Nations at its core" and specifically affirmed the regional organisation's support for the Security Council in fulfilling its mandate.

### Sudan/Darfur

On 14 February, the Council adopted resolution 2091 extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 17 February 2014 (S/PV.6920). Earlier in the month, the chair of Committee, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina), circulated to the Council the 5 February report of the Panel of Experts assisting the Committee (S/2013/79). The report outlined several violations by Sudan of resolution 1591. It also indicated that during 2012 the Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel group in Darfur, had operated a large base around Bentiu in South Sudan's Unity State.

### Climate Change

On 15 February, Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (UK) and Ambassador Masood Khan (Pakistan) co-chaired an Arria formula meeting on the "Security Dimensions of Climate Change". Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made remarks at the opening of the meeting. A panel of speakers included the Honorable Mr. Tony deBrum, Minister in Assistance to the President of the Marshall Islands; Professor Hans Schellnhuber, Head of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impacts Research; Ms. Rachel Kyte, World Bank Vice-President for Sustainable Development; and Mr. Gyan Acharya, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states. During the meeting, a video message

---

## Status Update since our February *Forecast* (con't)

---

from President Anote Tong of Kiribati and Foreign Minister Bob Carr of Australia on the security implications of climate change was shown. In addition to interventions by Security Council members and other member states, Wael Hmaidan, Director of Climate Action Network-International, spoke on behalf of civil society.

### Israel/Palestine

On 26 February, the Council received a briefing from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on the situation in the Middle East (S/PV.6926). Feltman said there was heightened risk across multiple fronts in the region. On Israel/Palestine, he said there were no hopes of negotiations on the horizon and characterised 2013 as the year which could preserve or extinguish hopes for the two-state solution. Regarding Syria, he said the destructive military spiral threatens to pull Lebanon into its vortex. Feltman also said efforts by the Security Council and its members could make a difference while there is still time to do

so. Closed consultations followed the briefing where it seems Morocco suggested elements to the press expressing concern about the circumstances surrounding the detention and death on 23 February of Arafat Jaradat, a Palestinian man in Israeli custody. No agreement was reached.

### Syria

Council members were briefed on 27 February in closed consultations by Valerie Amos, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, on the humanitarian situation in Syria. In addition, High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres and Zainab Hawa Bangura, the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, also briefed. As of 24 February, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had registered more than 740,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, while elsewhere the UN has estimated that up to 70,000 people have died in the Syrian conflict. A draft press statement proposed by Russia on 21 February

regarding a series of bombings in Damascus that killed at least 50 people failed to achieve consensus following objections from the US that the statement should also make reference to attacks on civilians conducted by the government of Syria. Similarly, Council members were also unable to agree to a draft press statement proposed by France on 1 February on the humanitarian situation, in particular a call for cross-border humanitarian access to areas under the opposition's control. Russia, while supportive of OCHA's efforts, appeared to have a problem with the Council making a public statement on the cross-border issue.

### Working Methods/Wrap-Up Session

On 28 February, the Council held a "wrap-up session" of the Republic of Korea's February presidency under the agenda item "Implementation of Note S/2010/507 (Wrap-up Session)". Non-Council members were invited to attend the private meeting.

---

## Afghanistan

---

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council is scheduled to renew the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which expires on 23 March. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Ján Kubiš, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA are expected to brief during the quarterly debate on the situation in Afghanistan. It is possible that Yuri Fedotov, the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, may brief as well. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is expected to chair the debate, which is likely to be held at the ministerial-level.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council held its last debate on the situation in Afghanistan on 19 December 2012. Kubiš noted that the Independent Election Commission had set 5 April 2014 as the date

for the presidential and provincial council elections and indicated the importance of establishing "a credible and robust electoral architecture" that "ensure[s] the broadest possible enfranchisement of Afghan actors across the country and create[s] conditions for the fullest possible participation". He also underscored the need for inter-Afghan reconciliation and welcomed resolution 2082, which made travel-ban exemptions possible for individuals who are willing to negotiate but have been listed under the 1988 Taliban sanctions regime.

Following Kubiš's briefing, Ambassador Zahir Tanin (Afghanistan) spoke about the government's efforts to enhance its security responsibilities, as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) winds down its current mission. He also argued that Afghanistan needs to create a comprehensive political framework to stabilise the country. To

implement this framework, he highlighted the importance of fostering national reconciliation, holding successful elections in 2014 and ensuring continued cooperation between Afghanistan and regional and international actors.

Violent incidents have continued in Afghanistan in recent months. According to an article published by the *Times* on 27 December 2012, at least 86 Afghan security personnel had been killed during 2012 by their colleagues in so-called "green-on-green attacks", many of which were carried out by Taliban who infiltrated the security forces or by security personnel who shifted their loyalties to the Taliban. Two separate suicide bombing incidents, on 26 December targeting Forward Operating Base Chapman, a US military base in Khost province in the eastern part of the country, and then on 16 January targeting a National Directorate of Security

---

**UN DOCUMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN** Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2069 (9 October 2012) renewed the mandate of ISAF in Afghanistan until 13 October 2013. S/RES/2041 (22 March 2012) renewed UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2013. **Secretary-General's Report S/2012/907** (6 December 2012) was the latest UNAMA report. **Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6896** (19 December 2012) was the latest UNAMA debate. **OTHER** A/HRC/22/37 (28 January 2013) was a report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared in cooperation with UNAMA.

facility in Kabul, left four Afghans dead and 40 wounded.

On 24 February, three car bombs were detonated by the Taliban: one targeted the intelligence service in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province; a second, the compound of the Baraki Barak district governor in Logar province; and a third, a police facility in Logar province. A police officer and two security guards died in these attacks.

Also on 24 February, a man driving a vehicle filled with explosives, who was targeting a National Directorate of Security facility in Kabul was shot to death by a guard before the explosives were detonated.

Preparations for the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections continued. On 23 January, Afghanistan's Independent Election Council (IEC) announced that voter registration would begin by the end of April. A UN electoral needs assessment mission visited Afghanistan from 18-28 January to study the electoral situation and offer proposals for UN assistance. (A previous such mission took place from 27 November to 5 December 2012.)

On 11 January, US President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai met in Washington. During a joint press conference, they noted that Afghan security forces would assume a leading role in the country's security by mid-2013, with ISAF forces operating in more of an advisory and training capacity. They also released a joint statement indicating that "they would support an office in Doha for the purpose of negotiations between the High Peace Council (the body entrusted by the Afghan government to promote reconciliation) and the authorised representatives of the Taliban," calling on the insurgents to take "those steps necessary to open a Taliban office." (On 4 February, UK Prime Minister David Cameron hosted a meeting between Karzai and President Asif Ali Zadari of Pakistan, during which the three leaders also gave their support for such an office, although further details about this office were unclear at press time.)

On 20 January, UNAMA and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report entitled *Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: One Year On*, which found that torture remains a widespread challenge

in detention centres throughout Afghanistan. Based on interviews with 635 detainees between October 2011 and October 2012, the report noted that 326 of these individuals had "experienced torture and ill-treatment in numerous (Afghan) facilities". It highlighted in particular the need to strengthen accountability mechanisms in order to combat effectively the use of torture. (The current report follows a similar report produced by UNAMA and OHCHR in October 2011, which also found widespread use of torture in Afghan detention facilities.)

The Afghan government took steps to respond to the allegations in the report. On 11 February, Abdul Qadir Adalatkhwā, the director of a panel investigating the accusations, confirmed that of 284 detainees interviewed in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat provinces, 136 had been tortured or mistreated. However, he said that this misconduct had occurred during the arrest or interrogation of these individuals rather than during their detention. Adalatkhwā added that many of those interviewed had not had access to defence counsel. On 17 February, Karzai issued a statement in which he required the videotaping of interrogations, ordered that those who had committed torture be prosecuted and mandated that defence attorneys be provided to detainees.

In recent weeks, the Afghan government has placed restrictions on the operations of foreign troops in Afghanistan. On 16 February, Karzai said that he would prohibit Afghan security forces from requesting NATO airstrikes to support their military operations. (His comments came only days after the 12 February NATO-Afghan joint operation in Kunar province that killed three Taliban commanders but also claimed the lives of ten civilians, including five children.)

The Afghan government also announced on 24 February that it would no longer allow US special forces to operate in Maidan Wardak province, which is adjacent to Kabul province. The restriction, which was scheduled to take place within two weeks of its announcement, apparently stems from concerns in the Afghan government that US special forces had collaborated with Afghans in the area who had allegedly murdered and tortured civilians.

On 10 February, US General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. assumed command of ISAF and

US forces in Afghanistan, replacing US General John R. Allen, who had led ISAF since July 2011.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

On 20 March, during its 22nd session, the Human Rights Council will consider the 28 January report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, which was prepared in cooperation with UNAMA. The report noted that between 1 January and 30 November 2012, anti-government elements increasingly targeted civilians and civilian locations and increasingly used improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks. Children continued to suffer disproportionately from the conflict, with more than 20 children killed and injured on average per week. The report also voiced concerns about lack of due process and mistreatment of conflict-related detainees and deplored the executions of 14 prisoners last November, the first since June 2011. Finally, the report noted that while the government took steps to strengthen the implementation of laws designated to protect women, entrenched discrimination and harmful practices have continued to marginalise women and girls. (Further details on civilian casualties are contained in UNAMA's annual report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in Afghanistan released on 19 February. The report notes the continuing high human cost of the conflict. Although in 2012 there was a 12 percent decline in the overall number of civilian deaths compared to 2011, the report documents a 108 percent increase in civilian casualties from targeted killings by insurgents and a 700 percent increase in deliberate targeting of government employees compared to the previous year.)

### Key Issues

A key issue is the importance of enhancing the capacity of the Afghan security forces so they can take on more responsibility from ISAF as it draws down and assumes more of an advisory and training role.

Another key issue is how much progress will be made with respect to reconciliation, given apparent divisions within the Taliban regarding whether or not to seek peace.

Also an important issue is helping to ensure that preparations for the 2014 elections are managed effectively, as UNAMA is mandated to provide electoral support upon the request of the government.

Another important issue is whether the measures outlined by Karzai to address torture will be implemented effectively and will have an impact in eradicating this problem.

An additional key issue is what effect the recent cuts in UNAMA's budget, determined

## Afghanistan (con't)

by the General Assembly, will have on the effectiveness of the mission. (In part because of funding constraints, several UNAMA provincial offices have been closed, restrictions have been put on recruitment for the mission and jobs in the mission have been eliminated.)

### Options

The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of UNAMA for an additional year. The Council is also likely to update the resolution in light of developments over the past several months related to electoral preparations, the reconciliation process and the transition to Afghan ownership in the development, security and governance spheres.

The Council may also consider language in the resolution:

- expressing concern at the findings of the recent UNAMA-OHCHR report on

torture and emphasising the importance of implementing measures to eradicate torture of detainees in Afghan facilities;

- highlighting the need for consistent resources to enable UNAMA to conduct its mandate, given recent cuts in the UNAMA budget; and
- emphasising the importance of inclusive and fair electoral planning processes between now and April 2014, including in the selection of the chair of the IEC.

Given the importance of the upcoming elections to the transition process in Afghanistan—and the significant controversies that surrounded the 2009 elections—the Council may also consider requesting a report specifically on electoral preparations by the end of 2013.

### Council Dynamics

There is widespread support on the Council for UNAMA's core mandate as it relates to

issues such as reconciliation, electoral assistance, human rights, counteracting drug trafficking, and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law.

Several members seem eager to start planning for UNAMA's presence in 2014 and beyond, and some appear concerned about what they perceive as uncertainty about UNAMA's future role in Afghanistan. Although negotiations on the UNAMA draft resolution had not begun at press time, it does not seem that there is an appetite among several Council members to make significant changes to the resolution at this point. It seems that several Council members believe that next year will be the time to consider more significant adjustments to the mandate, especially given the completion of ISAF's current mission in 2014.

Australia is the lead country in the Council on Afghanistan.

## Iran

### Expected Council Action

In March, the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee is due to present the quarterly briefing on the work of the Committee to the Council. This will be the first briefing by Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia) since he assumed the chairmanship of the Committee on 1 January.

No Council action is expected.

### Key Recent Developments

In the last Council briefing on the 1737 Committee, held on 13 December 2012, then-chair Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia) said that the Committee had continued to discuss the 12 June 2012 final report (S/2012/395) by its Panel of Experts (PoE) and that some members had proposed that the Committee adopt a series of implementation assistance notices that could help member states in implementing the sanctions measures. Some members had also asked the PoE to make a compilation for

the Committee's review of publicly available statements made by Iranian officials regarding potential violations of the arms embargo.

Subsequently, on 20 December, as recommended by the PoE in its report, the Committee added two companies—Yas Air and SAD Import Export Company—to the sanctions list, for their role in transporting and supplying prohibited arms from Iran to Syria, in violation of Council resolutions (SC/10871).

On 28 December, also in response to the PoE's recommendations, the Committee issued an implementation assistance notice on conventional arms and related materiel, which noted a number of sanctions violations involving prohibited arms transfers from Iran, reminded member states of their obligations under the existing sanctions and urged them to maintain a high level of vigilance and cooperate fully with the PoE.

Talks continued between the IAEA and Iran aimed at reaching agreement on a plan

(referred to as a "structured approach") to resolve outstanding issues on the possible military dimension of the latter's nuclear programme. The two sides met in Tehran on 13 December, 16-17 January and 13 February. In a 21 February report to the IAEA Board of Governors (S/2013/103), transmitted to the Council on the same day, the agency's Director-General said no agreement had been reached and that there had been no progress on clarification of outstanding issues. The report noted with concern that the IAEA, despite repeated requests, had not been granted access to Parchin, a military site southeast of Tehran that Iran is believed to have used for nuclear activities.

In a 2 February speech at the Munich Security Conference, US Vice President Joe Biden reiterated that the US would be willing to engage in direct bilateral talks with Iran, an offer that supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dismissed in a 7 February statement.

**UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAN** Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1929 (9 June 2010) imposed the fourth and most recent round of sanctions on Iran and established the Panel of Experts. S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) was the first round of sanctions on Iran, which also established the Sanctions Committee. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6888 (13 December 2012) was the most recent quarterly briefing by the chair of the Sanctions Committee. OTHER S/2013/103 (21 February 2013) was the latest IAEA report on Iran. S/2013/88 (12 February 2013) was the letter from Iran responding to Yemen's allegations against it. S/2013/53 (25 January 2013) was the annual report of the Sanctions Committee to the Council. SC/10871 (20 December 2012) was the Sanctions Committee press release announcing the listing of two additional entities. S/2012/395 (12 June 2012) was the final report of the Panel of Experts.

## Iran (con't)

On 6 February, the US announced a further tightening of its unilateral sanctions against Iran. The new provisions will restrict Iran's ability to use oil revenues held in foreign financial institutions and prevent repatriation of those funds to Iran. The US also announced that one individual and four entities had been targeted for sanctions for their involvement in the Iranian government's censorship activities.

The 1737 Committee met with the PoE on 13 February. Discussions mainly focused on a notification letter the Committee had received from Yemen concerning its interdiction on 24 January of a consignment of weapons believed to be from Iran. PoE members informed the Committee that they would travel to Yemen to conduct an investigation at the end of the month. The PoE also submitted the compilation of statements referred to by Osorio in his 13 December 2012 briefing.

In a 12 February letter to the Council, Iran categorically rejected Yemen's allegations about the arms shipment. It also said, however, that it was prepared "to fully cooperate and investigate the case by providing necessary information and evidence" (S/2013/88).

On 26 and 27 February, the "P5+1"—comprising the Council's permanent members and Germany—and Iran met in Almaty, Kazakhstan for a new round of high-level talks on the nuclear programme. (These were the first such high-level talks since a meeting in Moscow on 18 and 19 June 2012 ended without any progress.) At the talks, the P5+1 offered an easing of US and EU restrictions (reportedly on trade in gold and other precious metals) if Iran would agree to significantly restrict its uranium enrichment. While Iran said it needed more time to consider the offer, the Iranian foreign minister expressed optimism that an agreement could be reached. The two sides agreed to meet again at technical level on 18 and 19 March to discuss the proposal and then resume high-level negotiations in Almaty on 5 and 6 April.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

On 22 January, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed deep dismay at the execution of a

juvenile offender on 16 January for a crime allegedly committed when he was 17 years old. This was the first juvenile execution since September 2011, but more than 400 people were reportedly executed in Iran in 2012, the majority for drug-related offences. OHCHR also expressed concern about five other individuals at risk of imminent execution who were allegedly subjected to torture in detention and were convicted following unfair trials.

On 4 February, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, the Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran called on the government to immediately stop journalists' arrests and release those already detained. Security forces had raided five newspaper offices the previous week and arrested at least 17 journalists.

On 11 March, during its 22nd session, the Human Rights Council will consider the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, Ahmed Shaheed. On 20 March, it will consider the interim report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Iran.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is Iran's defiance of its resolutions and inconsistent cooperation with the IAEA, including its continuing refusal to allow access to the Parchin site.

A fundamental issue for the Council is whether to support the dual-track approach—pressuring Iran to comply with existing resolutions and obligations through sanctions while at the same time pursuing a diplomatic solution—advocated by the US and its EU partners or whether, as argued by China, Russia and others, further punitive measures will be counterproductive at this stage.

At the 1737 Committee level, a key issue is ensuring implementation of the existing sanctions. This includes whether to respond to any of the recent incidents reported to the Committee or taking up any of the remaining recommendations submitted by the PoE.

### Options

Developments at the Council level in the foreseeable future are unlikely as long as diplomatic attempts to resolve differences between the P5+1 and Iran continue.

At the Committee level, however, members could follow up on those PoE recommendations that have not yet been implemented, such as addressing the discrepancies

between the lists of individuals originally designated under Council resolutions (such as the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and those who currently hold those positions identified in the designations. It could also issue additional implementation assistance notices to help guide member states. Additionally, the Committee could consider for designation the Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group as suggested by the PoE or make additional designations proposed by Council members.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Council dynamics continue to be driven by a fundamental difference in approach between those who favour the dual-track approach (including Australia, the US and EU members) and those who oppose further punitive measures (such as China, Pakistan and Russia) and are critical of the increasingly stringent sanctions being imposed by the US and the EU. (Russia has warned of the "extraterritorial effect" of such sanctions.)

Council members also appear divided over alleged violations of the arms embargo. While France, the UK and the US in the last Council meeting condemned transfers of arms from Iran to Syria and non-state armed groups in Gaza, Russia asserted that the 1737 Committee had not recently received any reports "of any implication of Iran in the illegal trafficking of conventional weapons". These differences are also evident in the Committee, where discussions continue over how to respond to some recent incidents.

The outcome of the 26-27 February high-level talks is likely to set the tone for the March meeting. Although the focus of the meeting will be on the work of the 1737 Committee, it will also provide an opportunity for members to express their views on the larger issues and the way ahead. In its statement to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting last November, the US said that if there is no progress by March in resolving outstanding issues with Iran, it would pursue appropriate action, including reporting the lack of progress to the Security Council.

The US has the lead in the Council on Iran.

# Iraq

## Expected Council Action

In March, Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), will brief the Security Council on the Secretary-General's most recent report on UNAMI. No outcome is expected.

UNAMI's mandate expires on 24 July.

## Key Recent Developments

Kobler last briefed the Council on the work of UNAMI on 29 November 2012. In that briefing, he highlighted the ongoing political stalemate, including an Arab-Kurdish rift, that has endangered the progress towards provincial elections scheduled for 20 April and the strengthening of state institutions. Kobler also noted the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, continuing issues related to Iranian refugees in Camp New Iraq and Camp Hurriya (formerly Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty) and tentative progress on improving bilateral relations between Iraq and Kuwait and the former's fulfilment of its Chapter VII obligations.

Since the briefing, the political situation in Iraq has not improved. On 18 December, President Jalal Talabani suffered a stroke and was transferred soon after to Germany for treatment, where he remains. Talabani had played a mediating role between various political constituencies, especially between the Arabs and the Kurds, and his absence has reportedly exacerbated an already tense political situation.

Also in late December, the arrest of bodyguards for Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi, a Sunni, sparked demonstrations against the Shi'a-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The protests have continued in the weeks since, spreading to multiple provinces and expressing a variety of grievances, including over human rights violations, perceptions of mistreatment of Sunnis by the security forces and an unequal distribution of power in the government among various communities. On 8 January, Kobler called on those taking part in the protests to refrain from violence and on security forces to show restraint in maintaining law and order. (Four people were killed on 25 January when Iraqi troops opened fire on protestors in Fallujah.)

On 6 February, Muqdad al-Sharifi, the chief electoral officer of the Independent High Electoral Commission, expressed concern that the demonstrations could hamper efforts to conduct the 20 April provincial elections.

The security situation in Iraq has also significantly worsened in recent months, with 39 pilgrims killed during the Shi'a festival of Arba'een on 31 December. Ifan al-Issawi, a member of parliament, was assassinated on 15 January in an attack that killed five others. A suicide bomber killed at least 35 individuals in an attack on a Shi'a mosque in Tuz Khurmato in northern Iraq on 23 January. Kobler issued individual statements following each attack condemning the violence.

On 25 January, the Secretary-General released a statement strongly condemning "the recent wave of terrorist attacks across Iraq, which have killed hundreds of people and left many more wounded". An attack on a police headquarters in Kirkuk on 3 February killed at least 36 people and injured 105. Multiple bombings on 8 February that killed at least 26 people prompted a statement from Kobler appealing to Iraqi leaders to prevent sectarian violence from spreading. Most recently, on 17 February, a string of car bombs targeting outdoor markets in Baghdad killed at least 37 people and injured more than 100.

On 9 February, a mortar attack on Camp Hurriya—temporary home to more than 3,000 exiles belonging to the *Mujahedin-e Khalq Iran* (an organisation opposed to the government in Tehran)—killed six people and injured several others. The same day the Secretary-General issued a statement calling on the government to investigate the incident and bring the perpetrators to justice.

There has been some progress in recent months on the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. Gennady Tarasov, then High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property, briefed the Council in consultations on 18 December on the Secretary-General's latest report on this issue (S/2012/931). The report noted that "Iraq continues to make steady progress towards regaining its rightful place in the region... and the broader international community". Funding for the High-Level Coordinator

position expired on 31 December. The Secretary-General is expected to report by June on the issues previously covered by the High-Level Coordinator's mandate. On 15 January, the long-delayed Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project, the subject of a 1 December 2012 Council press statement (SC/10843), reportedly began; it is expected to be completed by the end of March.

## Human Rights-Related Developments

The report on the human rights situation in Iraq, prepared by UNAMI in cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and covering the period from January to June 2012, was released on 19 December 2012. High Commissioner Navi Pillay called on the government to address the serious human rights violations highlighted in the report and in particular to declare a moratorium on all executions, with a view to abolishing the death penalty in the near future.

## Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how UNAMI can continue to contribute to the stability of Iraq and play a role in facilitating an end to the current political stalemate.

The worsening security situation and its impact on the political situation and upcoming elections also constitutes a significant issue for the Council.

The issue of Camp New Iraq and Camp Hurriya, and the future disposition of the more than 3,000 exiles housed there, will likely also be of major concern to Council members in the wake of the attack on 9 February.

## Options

The most likely option is for the Council to receive Kobler's briefing and take no action. However, the Council could issue a statement on any number of issues, including:

- encouraging reconciliation between various political factions and urging national dialogue;
- supporting elections slated for April; and
- given the recent escalation in sectarian violence, condemning recent attacks and calling on all parties to do what they can to prevent further strife.

**UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ** Security Council Resolution S/RES/2061 (25 July 2012) renewed UNAMI for a period of 12 months. **Secretary-General's Reports** S/2012/931 (14 December 2012) was a report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property. S/2012/848 (16 November 2012) was a report of the Secretary-General on UNAMI. **Security Council Press Statements** SC/10843 (1 December 2012) welcomed the joint request of Iraq and Kuwait to reactivate the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project. SC/10680 (20 June 2012) renewed the funding for the High-Level Coordinator for Iraq-Kuwait missing persons and property to 31 December 2012. **Security Council Meeting Record** S/PV.6875 (29 November 2012) was a briefing from the head of UNAMI, Martin Kobler.

---

## Iraq (con't)

### Council Dynamics

The Council is generally cautious in its approach to Iraq and is reluctant to make pronouncements on the issue. Regarding UNAMI, there is general consensus that the mission is contributing to the stability of the country, and the consideration of the Secretary-General's report on UNAMI is viewed as a routine issue for the Council. However, some Council members interested in looking ahead to the renewal of UNAMI's mandate in July may be interested in discussing

ways in which its mandate to provide good offices and facilitate political dialogue might be sharpened or focused.

Divisions on the Council regarding Iraq/Kuwait issues were apparent in December when some Council members supported adding the mandate of the High-Level Coordinator to the responsibilities of UNAMI, while others saw a need for renewing the position or developing some other interim mechanism to replace it. Council members appear unwilling to address this issue again in the near term

(given how contentious it had become) and will likely wait until they receive the Secretary-General's next report on the subject, expected by June, before taking it up again. If progress continues to be made on the Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project, most Council members will take this as evidence of Iraq's good intentions and may allow the Council to formally end the mandate previously assigned to the High-Level Coordinator.

The US is the lead on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq-Kuwait issues.

---

## Lebanon

### Expected Council Action

In March the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Derek Plumbly, is expected to brief Council members in consultations on the most recent report of the Secretary-General on resolution 1701 (which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006), due by the end of February. Though no outcome is expected, a press statement following the meeting is possible.

The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August 2013.

### Key Recent Developments

Council members last considered Lebanon on 29 November 2012 when they received briefings in consultations from both Plumbly and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, on the November report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (S/2012/837). That report welcomed the general calm that prevailed in UNIFIL's area of operations but also drew attention to the lack of progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah and the destabilising effects of a 19 October car bomb assassination that killed Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan (the intelligence

chief of Lebanon's Internal Security Forces) and several others.

Though the political consequences of that incident have not been as dire as many speculated they might be, the effects of the assassination have continued to contribute to tensions in Lebanon. On 20 February, a military court judge in Lebanon brought charges against Michel Samaha, a former Lebanese government minister, and Brigadier General Ali Mamlouk, a senior Syrian military official, alleging that they had conspired to kill Lebanese political and religious leaders and encourage sectarian violence. (Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati has suggested that the 19 October assassination could be related to the arrest of Samaha in August 2012.)

More significantly, the National Dialogue—the ongoing talks that began in 2006 between Lebanon's political leaders and that often focus on the issue of Hezbollah's arms—has not convened since before the assassination. Talks scheduled for November 2012 and subsequently for the first week of January were cancelled following boycotts by the 14 March political coalition. As a prerequisite for returning to talks, the coalition has called for the resignation of Mikati's cabinet and the installation of a neutral cabinet to oversee preparations for parliamentary

elections currently scheduled for June. (The 14 March coalition takes its name from the date of the "Cedar Revolution", which followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005, and is considered to be anti-Syria.)

There remains some risk that the June elections could be delayed. On 19 February a parliamentary joint committee approved a draft electoral law known as the orthodox proposal that would allow voters only to vote for candidates from their own religious denomination. (Lebanese parliamentary seats are allocated to a variety of Christian and Muslim denominations, though voters have previously voted for each seat regardless of their own affiliation.) On 20 February, Dory Chamoun, the leader of the opposition National Liberal Party, accused Hezbollah and others of introducing the controversial law in an effort to delay the elections. Previously, on 18 February, Plumbly met with EU representatives and others to discuss logistical preparations and the registration process related to the June elections. Speaking to the press following the meeting, Plumbly asserted that, "holding the elections on time is a must for stability and democracy in Lebanon".

The ongoing conflict in Syria has also

---

**UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON** **Security Council Resolutions** S/RES/2064 (30 August 2012) extended the mandate of UNIFIL for 12 months. S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government's control over all Lebanese territory. **Security Council Presidential Statement** S/PRST/2008/8 (15 April 2008) concerned the implementation of resolution 1701. **Security Council Press Statement** SC/10799 (19 October 2012) condemned the 19 October terrorist attack in Beirut. **Secretary-General's Reports** S/2012/837 (14 November 2012) was a report on the implementation of resolution 1701 and covered the reporting period from 29 June to 30 October 2012. S/2012/773 (17 October 2012) was the most recent report on resolution 1559. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** **Special Coordinator for Lebanon** Derek Plumbly (UK) **Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559** Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway) **UNIFIL Force Commander** Major General Paolo Serra (Italy) **Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 December 2012** **Authorised:** 15,000 troops **Current:** 11,003 military personnel **Troop Contributors (as of 31 January 2013):** Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Turkey **Duration:** March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2013. **Cost:** 1 July 2012-30 June 2013: \$524 million (A/C.5/66/18)



---

## Lebanon (con't)

continued to negatively impact the political and security situation in Lebanon. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 26 February there are more than 314,000 Syrian refugees either registered with UNHCR or awaiting registration in Lebanon, more than in any other of Syria's neighbours. In October, UNHCR began registering Syrian refugees in south Lebanon (though not within UNIFIL's area of operations), and the upcoming report on resolution 1701 may thus pay increased attention to the Syrian refugee situation and its impact on UNIFIL.

On 17 February, Lebanese security forces reported the worst fighting near the Syrian border with Lebanon since the start of the Syrian conflict. Three Hezbollah fighters and 12 Syrian rebels were reportedly killed in the clashes near the Syrian town of Qusayr, while two artillery shells fired by Syrian opposition forces reportedly landed in the Lebanese town of Qasr without causing any casualties. Following the fighting, multiple news sources reported that elements of the rebel Free Syrian Army had issued a statement threatening to target Hezbollah in Lebanon with mortars in retaliation for Hezbollah's support of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.

Sectarian violence related to the Syrian conflict has also continued to plague the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli: in the first week of December 2012, at least 19 people were killed in clashes between residents of the predominantly Alawite neighbourhood of Jabal Muhsin and the predominantly Sunni neighbourhood of Bab al-Tabbana.

On 21 February, Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon issued a ruling postponing the start of the trial in absentia of four individuals charged

in the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri because the prosecution had not yet met requirements that it disclose all evidence to the defence. The prosecution supported the decision to postpone. The trial had previously been set to begin on 25 March; no new date has been decided.

### Key Issues

A key current issue impacting the implementation of resolution 1701 continues to be the spillover of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon.

An ongoing issue has been the Israeli occupation of areas north of the Blue Line (the border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon), including the village of Ghajar, in violation of resolution 1701.

The fact that Hezbollah maintains a significant military capacity beyond the control of the Lebanese Armed Forces is also a key issue.

Finally, regular Israeli over-flights in Lebanese airspace continue to be a source of concern.

### Underlying Problems

Prime Minister Mikati and other government figures officially practice a policy of disassociation from the Syrian crisis. However, events like the 19 October assassination, sectarian violence in northern Lebanon and the burgeoning refugee situation throughout the country all provide evidence of the pressures such a policy must withstand. Achieving a formal ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is unlikely so long as the Syrian conflict continues to both destabilise Lebanon and derail the Israel-Syria peace track.

### Options

The most likely option for the Council is to take no action on the 1701 report. The last

Council pronouncement on a 1701 report was a 15 April 2008 presidential statement.

However, the Council could adopt a statement that addresses a number of issues, including:

- urging a resumption of the National Dialogue;
- encouraging the political process in advance of parliamentary elections scheduled for June; or
- reaffirming the international community's commitment to Lebanon in light of spillover from Syria and related refugee situation by calling on states to honour humanitarian aid pledges made at a January donor conference.

### Council Dynamics

Council members continue to agree on a variety of issues related to Lebanon. There is consensus on the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon and that the Council must remain vigilant regarding the effects of spillover from the Syrian conflict into UNIFIL's area of operations.

Regarding the political situation, Council members also agree that even though there have been no advances with regards to the National Dialogue or disarmament, the fact that the situation has not significantly worsened in light of spillover from Syria is rather positive.

Regarding the Tribunal, Council members have generally underscored the importance of its independence and foresee no Council role in relation to its activities.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

---

## UNDOF (Golan Heights)

### Expected Council Action

In March, Council members will receive a briefing in consultations from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on the Secretary-General's most recent report on the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). This will be the first

report on UNDOF under a more frequent reporting cycle following the adoption of resolution 2084 on 19 December 2012. No outcome is likely.

The mandate of UNDOF expires on 30 June.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council renewed UNDOF for six months in resolution 2084. In response to the deteriorating situation in the area of operations, including incidents across the ceasefire line and the presence of both armed opposition fighters and Syrian Arab Armed Forces in the area of separation, resolution

## UNDOF (Golan Heights) (con't)

2084 also changed the reporting requirement on UNDOF, requesting a report from the Secretary-General every 90 days rather than every six months. The resolution also strengthened language regarding the safety and security of UN personnel and the need for all parties to respect their obligations under the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

During the most recent open debate on the situation in the Middle East on 23 January, several speakers made passing reference to the situation in the Golan Heights. Ambassador Bashar Ja-afari (Syria) called for the restitution of the Golan Heights to Syria and expressed alarm that Robert Serry, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, had not addressed the situation in his briefing.

An Israeli airstrike on 30 January reportedly targeting a convoy of anti-aircraft weaponry, thought to be in transit to Hezbollah in Lebanon, also damaged the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre, allegedly Syria's primary research centre for work on biological and chemical weapons. On 31 January, the Secretary-General expressed grave concern over the airstrike and called on all parties in the region to prevent any escalation of the situation.

Syria summoned the UNDOF force commander to protest the incident. Syria also sent a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, asserting that it had a "right to defend itself, its territory and sovereignty" and that it held Israel "fully responsible for the consequences of this aggression". On 3 February, President Bashar al-Assad cited the incident as evidence that Israel was actively supporting the insurgency in an effort to destabilise the country.

In recent months, spillover from the conflict in Syria has continued to affect the situation in the Golan Heights. Minor incidents continued throughout the period, and Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) sources quoted in

multiple news reports indicated that such incidents were becoming increasingly frequent. On 16 February, seven wounded Syrians who approached Israeli positions within the Golan Heights were transported by the IDF to an Israeli hospital for treatment. Though it appeared the seven had been wounded in the ongoing Syrian conflict, authorities did not reveal whether the injured were members of the Syrian armed forces, the opposition or civilians. Speaking to the press a day later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that such border crossings would only be allowed in "exceptional cases".

### Key Issues

A key issue will be how Council members can best take advantage of the increased attention the Golan Heights will receive due to the more frequent reporting.

The spillover from the Syrian crisis into UNDOF's area of operations will continue to be of primary concern for the Council. Syrian rebel forces control many of the villages within the area of separation, where Syrian military forces are prohibited from entering (Syrian civilian authorities are responsible for policing and administering the area).

Related issues include the deteriorating relationship between Israel and Syria following the 30 January airstrike and ongoing concern over the safety and security of UN personnel in the region. (On 29 November 2012, four UNDOF personnel were wounded near Damascus International Airport while rotating out of the mission. Since the incident, mission personnel have been travelling to and from the mission via the airport in Tel Aviv. On 25 February the UN confirmed that an UNDOF staff member was unaccounted for, but provided no further details.)

### Options

The most likely option is for the Council to receive the report and briefing and take

no additional action. One additional option would be for the Council to adopt a statement reiterating the need for cooperation between Israel and Syria and for all parties to exercise restraint or expressing concern for the safety and security of UNDOF personnel, or both.

### Council Dynamics

The Council generally agrees on the necessity and utility of UNDOF in contributing to stability in the region in the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. (Regarding the Israel-Syria peace track, Turkey mediated the last attempt at talks in early 2008. Turkey suspended its efforts after Israeli incursions into Gaza in December 2008. Previously, the last attempt was in 2000.)

Though the US holds the pen on the Golan Heights, the last two resolutions renewing UNDOF (resolutions 2052 and 2084) have been jointly authored by the US and Russia, suggesting some surprising consensus on an issue that is increasingly impacted by the highly divisive conflict in Syria. Most Council members strive to keep the Syrian conflict and the Golan Heights as discrete issues—a position that remains difficult in practice.

The most recent effort to achieve a press statement on the Golan Heights (in November 2012) featured a US draft that faced opposition from Russia and failed to achieve consensus. Some Council members feel a Council statement would not do much to impact the situation on the ground in the Golan Heights and that any necessary messages to the parties involved could and should be communicated bilaterally. Additionally, many Council members view the changed reporting cycle as a caution to Syria regarding the escalating incidents in the region. That the situation has been relatively calm since December suggests that the message may have been effective.

**UN DOCUMENTS ON UNDOF** [Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2084](#) (19 December 2012) renewed UNDOF until 30 June 2013, requested reporting every 90 days and strengthened language regarding the security of UN personnel. [S/RES/2052](#) (27 June 2012) extended UNDOF for six months and noted spillover from the Syrian crisis. [S/RES/350](#) (31 May 1974) established UNDOF. [S/RES/338](#) (22 October 1973) called for a ceasefire and comprehensive peace. [S/RES/242](#) (22 November 1967) called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories. [Security Council Letter S/2013/70](#) (31 January 2013) was a letter from Syria protesting an Israeli airstrike on a convoy and research centre north of Damascus. [Secretary-General's Reports S/2012/897](#) (27 November 2012) was a report on UNDOF covering the period from 1 July to 31 December 2012. [S/11302/Add.1](#) (30 May 1974) contained the Agreement on Disengagement between Syrian and Israeli Forces. [Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6906 and Resumption 1](#) (23 January 2013) was the most recent quarterly open debate on the Middle East. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** [UNDOF Force Commander](#) Major General Iqbal Singh Singha (India) [Size and Composition of Mission](#) 1,013 troops (as of 31 December 2012), assisted by 77 military observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation's Observer Group Golan (as of 20 November 2012) [Troop contributors](#): Austria, Croatia, India, Japan and the Philippines [Approved Budget](#) 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013: \$46 million ([A/C.5/66/18](#))

# Yemen

## Expected Council Action

In March, the Council expects a briefing in consultations on Yemen by Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the situation in Yemen. No outcome is expected.

## Key Recent Developments

The Council was briefed on 7 February by Ambassadors Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco) and Mark Lyall Grant (UK), co-leads of the Security Council visit to Yemen on 27 January. Both confirmed the achievement of the mission's objectives, which were to evaluate implementation of resolution 2051 and to assess progress on political transition. Following this, the Council received a briefing in consultations from Benomar.

On 15 February, after negotiations on references to reports of money and weapons being brought into Yemen from outside the country to undermine the transition, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/3). Welcoming the announcement by Yemeni President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi that the National Dialogue Conference would start on 18 March, the statement highlighted the importance of inclusivity during the transition process and stressed that it was important that the transition proceed according to the original timeline, ensuring the National Dialogue leads to a constitutional referendum followed by elections by February 2014. The statement also sent a strong message to potential spoilers, singling out former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and former Vice President Ali Salim Al-Beidh, and reiterating Council members' readiness to consider sanctions against individuals who interfere in the political transition process.

In a report published in February focusing on Yemen's response to the "Friday of Dignity" killings of protesters on 18 March 2011, Human Rights Watch called on the Security Council to impose sanctions on current and former officials implicated in the attack. It cited the immunity law—passed by

parliament in January 2012 in exchange for Saleh's resignation—as an obstacle to bringing those responsible to justice.

The question of what will happen to Saleh remains unclear. In a speech delivered to supporters in Sana'a on 19 February, Saleh reportedly stated that leaving Yemen is not an acceptable option for him.

Many are concerned about the influence of the former president and close associates, such as Major General Mohsen Ali al-Ahmar and the al-Ahmar family more generally, in the political transition currently underway. With extensive networks of patronage and tribal influence—including among the armed forces—they are reportedly contributing to a sense of mistrust across the country. While Hadi issued presidential decrees in December 2012 aiming to centralise the armed forces, many agree that he has yet to unify and maintain them under his control.

Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the election of Hadi, two parallel demonstrations were held in Aden on 21 February: one by members of the southern separation movement and a second by members of the Islah party, in support of national unity and Hadi. Security forces fired on protesters calling for southern independence, killing four and wounding nearly 30.

On 23 January, the Yemeni coast guard—in coordination with the US Navy—intercepted a ship carrying missiles and rockets allegedly sent by Iran for the purpose of undermining the transition. Iran denies any connections to the weapons. Following a request from the Security Council, the Panel of Experts that monitors compliance with the 1737 Iran sanctions regime arrived in Sana'a on 22 February to investigate the incident. Concerns about the impact of such weapons being brought into the country were reflected in the 15 February presidential statement.

The humanitarian situation in Yemen continues to be dire, with food insecurity and malnutrition levels across the country deteriorating. According to the World

Food Programme, the food security outlook for the first half of 2013 is expected to be slightly worse than in 2012, aggravated by the impact of poor prospects for local agricultural production.

The fifth ministerial-level meeting of the Friends of Yemen is to be held on 7 March in London, hosted by the UK and co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

## Key Issues

A key issue for the Council remains the National Dialogue and the transition process and for both to proceed according to the original timeline in preparation for general elections scheduled for February 2014.

The roles of Saleh, Al-Beidh and other potential spoilers to the political transition continue to be an issue and cause concern among Council members.

A related issue involves reports of money and weapons entering Yemen, threatening Yemen's stability.

## Options

A likely option is for the Council to receive the briefing and take no action, preferring to wait and see how the discussions of the National Dialogue evolve.

Another option is to hold further discussions related to the imposition of sanctions on spoilers to the transition, following up on the Council's repeated warnings (in resolution 2051, during the visit to Yemen, and in its presidential statement of 15 February).

## Council Dynamics

Council members continue to follow the situation in Yemen closely, remaining firm in their support for the National Dialogue and the political transition process. Council members have demonstrated their unity and consistency on the issue of sanctions and seem to be prepared to carry through with their threat to consider measures against potential spoilers.

The UK is the lead country on Yemen.

**UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN** Security Council Resolution S/RES/2051 (12 June 2012) focused on the second phase of the transition. **Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/3** (15 February 2013) welcomed the announcement of the launch of the National Dialogue Conference and reiterated the Council's readiness to consider imposing sanctions against spoilers to the transition. **Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6916** (7 February 2013) included briefings by Morocco and the UK on the Security Council mission to Yemen. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** Special Adviser to the Secretary-General and UN Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar (Morocco)

# Somalia

## Expected Council Action

In March, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing the authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and endorsing one of the Secretary-General's options for the reconfiguration of the UN presence. AMISOM's current Council authorisation ends on 7 March, while its AU mandate expires on 14 July.

Also in March, the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Kim Sook (Republic of Korea), is due to present his 120-day report to the Council on the work of the Committee.

## Key Recent Developments

On 14 February, the Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé Brook Zerihoun on the Secretary-General's 31 January report on Somalia (S/2013/69). In his briefing, Zerihoun presented the Secretary-General's recommendations for the future UN presence and provided an update on recent political developments, the security situation and human rights issues. On the political front, he emphasised that the liberation of new areas had created an opportunity for the government to expand its control but noted recent tensions over the establishment of local administrations in Kismayo and Baidoa as examples of some of the challenges involved.

Zerihoun also addressed Somalia's request for lifting the arms embargo, emphasising the importance of a calibrated approach to avoid "the proliferation of uncontrolled weapons". He said the Monitoring Group assisting the Sanctions Committee was ready to provide technical advice for the development of options in this regard. As for the human rights situation, Zerihoun expressed particular concern about the prevalence of sexual violence and ongoing threats against journalists and called on the government to develop a framework to ensure the implementation of its international human rights obligations.

Presenting the Secretary-General's recommendation for the establishment of a new

UN assistance mission in Somalia to replace the UN Political Office, Zerihoun emphasised that it was based on extensive consultations with major stakeholders and was the best option under current circumstances. (In his report, the Secretary-General also presented three other options: a joint AU-UN mission, a fully integrated UN peacebuilding mission and a UN peacebuilding mission with a separate UN Support Office for AMISOM [UNSOA].) Zerihoun noted, however, that the objective should be to move towards an integrated mission as soon as security conditions allowed. Pending further guidance from the Council, the Secretary-General intends to deploy a technical assessment mission to Somalia and would report back to the Council in May.

Somali Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fausia Yusuf Haji Adan also spoke, stressing that Somalia now had a well-functioning government and that political infighting was a thing of the past. The government had taken several initiatives to implement its six-pillar policy framework (stabilisation through the rule of law and good governance; economic recovery; peacebuilding and reconciliation; public service delivery; improved international relations; and national unity).

Adan presented several specific requests to the Council. Underlining that a top priority for the government was to defeat the Islamist rebel group *Al-Shabaab* and improve security, she said a lifting of the arms embargo was a prerequisite to achieve this goal. The government would put in place the necessary mechanisms to prevent weapons from ending up in the wrong hands. She also reaffirmed her government's support for the Council's ban on import and export of Somali charcoal and asked that violators be punished.

Furthermore, she voiced her government's strong opposition to a maritime component for AMISOM, noting that the recommendation for such a component had been removed from the final report to the AU on the strategic review of the mission, and emphasised that the priority must instead be

to build the capacity of Somalia's own forces. Additionally, Adan asked that a reference to the UN human rights due-diligence policy, which says the policy applies to AMISOM and "allied forces", be removed from the Secretary-General's report. (The policy guides UN support for non-UN armed actors.)

Adan expressed her government's strong preference for an integrated UN presence and asserted that the benefits of integration would far outweigh the concerns raised by humanitarian actors about the possible impact on their perceived neutrality. She concluded by extending an invitation to the Council to visit Mogadishu in the near future.

On 9 February, AMISOM announced the results of the investigation of the 15 January incident in which seven civilians, including five children, were killed during military operations near the southern town of Leggo. The investigation found that AMISOM troops were not to blame but had acted within internationally accepted rules of engagement when they responded to an *Al-Shabaab* ambush.

On 5 February, a Somali journalist who had been arrested on 10 January and a woman he had interviewed were sentenced to one year in prison by a local court. The woman had alleged that while living in a camp for internally displaced persons she had been raped by armed men in government uniforms. Although the journalist never published the interview, he was charged with offending the honour of a state institution and with filing a false report. The sentencing was widely condemned. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called on the government to re-open the case and launch a full inquiry into what had happened. She expressed concern about the freedom of expression in Somalia and also about the impact of the verdict on the fight against impunity in sexual violence cases, citing recent reports of an increase in such violence.

Somali government forces supported by AMISOM continued to expand their control (on 14 February, they captured three strategic

**UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA** [Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2073](#) (7 November 2012) renewed AMISOM's authorisation until 7 March. [S/RES/2060](#) (25 July 2012) extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea for 13 months as well as the humanitarian exemption to the Somalia sanctions regime for 12 months. [S/RES/2036](#) (22 February 2012) renewed AMISOM's authorisation and imposed a ban on importing and exporting Somali charcoal. [Secretary General's Report S/2013/69](#) (31 January 2013) was the latest regular report on Somalia. [Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6921](#) (14 February 2013) was the latest Council meeting on Somalia. [S/PV.6854](#) (7 November 2012) was the adoption of resolution 2073 with explanations of vote. [Security Council Letters S/2013/93](#) (13 February 2013) was from Iran concerning the reports of arms transfers to Al-Shabaab. [S/2013/56](#) (25 January 2013) contained the most recent 60-day AU report on AMISOM, requested by resolution 2036. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** [Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga](#) (Tanzania) [Size and Composition of AMISOM Current strength as of 25 January](#): 17,709 total uniformed personnel. Main troop contributors are Burundi (4,432 troops), Kenya (4,652 troops), Uganda (6,223 troops) and Djibouti (960 troops). [Special Representative of the AU and Head of AMISOM Mahamat Salah Annadif](#) (Chad)

**USEFUL ADDITIONAL SOURCE** [AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia](#), Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, 13 February 2013.

---

## Somalia (con't)

towns from *Al-Shabaab* located southwest of Mogadishu), but February also saw a new series of terrorist attacks. In one such attack, on 16 February, a car bomb exploded outside a popular restaurant in Mogadishu, killing at least two people and injuring seven others.

On 15 February, the Monitoring Group presented its mid-term briefing to the Sanctions Committee. It confirmed, reportedly for the first time, that there was a link between *Al-Shabaab* and piracy activities. The group also confirmed the Islamists' expansion into other areas and its infiltration of the Somali security sector. Furthermore, it reported that the charcoal ban had not been effective and that *Al-Shabaab* was still benefitting from and controlling the trade.

In a 13 February letter to the Council, Iran complained about media reports that the Monitoring Group had presented allegations of illegal arms transfers from Iran to *Al-Shabaab*. It said the allegations were baseless and also regretted that they had been leaked to the media "for propaganda purposes" while asking the Sanctions Committee to "remedy the situation by making the necessary corrective measures".

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council in March is which of the Secretary-General's options for the future UN presence in Somalia to endorse. A related issue is how to strengthen human rights monitoring.

Another key issue is the re-authorisation of AMISOM. This includes the question of how to respond to the requests that the AU is expected to submit to the Council based on the strategic review. Sustainable funding is likely to be one of them.

Related issues include how to ensure coordination and coherence in approach by AMISOM and the new UN mission, as well

as implementation of the UN's human rights due-diligence policy and protection of civilians. (The Council's informal expert group on protection of civilians met on 20 February in preparation for the AMISOM renewal and was briefed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on key protection issues to consider for the upcoming resolution.)

Another issue is whether to review the arms embargo as called for by the government to facilitate the delivery of arms and other military equipment to the Somali National Security Forces.

A further issue is whether additional steps are needed to strengthen implementation of the ban on export and import of Somali charcoal.

### Options

The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a resolution that would renew the authorisation for AMISOM and endorse one of the Secretary-General's options for the future UN presence. Other options include:

- addressing some or all requests and recommendations resulting from the AU's strategic review;
- asking the Monitoring Group for advice on the calibrated lifting of the arms embargo on the government or granting a partial lift;
- considering additional measures to ensure effective implementation of the charcoal ban; and
- sending a visiting mission to Mogadishu, possibly with the participation of just some Council members, in response to the invitation by the government.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

With regard to the reconfiguration of the UN presence, there seems to be a range of views

among Council members, but most favour either option B (a fully integrated peacebuilding mission) or option C (the assistance mission recommended by the Secretary-General), with the Council split between the two. Dynamics seem to be driven both by the Somali government's support for option B as well as concerns raised by the humanitarian community about the risks of structurally integrating the UN country team. Those who support option C seem to agree that integration should be the end goal and also acknowledge that the views of the government deserve serious consideration. Yet they share the Secretary-General's assessment that conditions are not yet right for a fully integrated mission.

A further complicating element is the fact that there are also different views on whether UNSOA should be integrated into a new UN structure. In particular, it seems the US, while favouring the creation of an integrated peacebuilding mission, is keen on keeping UNSOA as a separate entity.

There also seem to be some differences over how the Council should respond to Somalia's request for a lifting of the arms embargo. While the US has publicly supported at least a partial lifting of the embargo, other Council members, including European and Latin American members, seem much more hesitant about any easing of the arms embargo at this stage, citing concerns about command and control of the Somali forces and also pointing out that Somalia is already overflowing with weapons. They seem willing to consider some revisions to the embargo, however, as a gesture towards the Somali government.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council, while the Republic of Korea chairs the Sanctions Committee.

---

## Sudan and South Sudan

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council is scheduled to hold two meetings, likely in consultations, to discuss relations between Sudan and South

Sudan, in accordance with resolution 2046.

At press time, the Council had been negotiating a draft presidential statement since mid-February. (It seems that the statement

is in large part meant to express concern about the lack of implementation of the 27 September 2012 agreements on security, oil wealth-sharing, nationalities and other issues

---

**UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN** Security Council Resolution S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Security Council Press Statement SC/10779 (28 September 2012) welcomed the 27 September agreements. Secretary-General's Report S/2012/877 (26 November 2012) was a report on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6917 (12 February 2013) was the recent Council debate on Protection of Civilians.

## Sudan and South Sudan (con't)

and underscores the importance of compliance with resolution 2046.) However, it was unclear if and when Council members would be able to achieve consensus on the draft statement.

### Key Recent Developments

On 7 February, the Council held consultations on Sudan and South Sudan. Haile Menkerios, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Sudan and South Sudan, briefed Council members in consultations on relations between the two countries, while Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Menkerios reported that Sudan and South Sudan had yet to agree on the scope of the Mile 14 area along the Darfur (Sudan) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (South Sudan) border. (This has prevented the parties from establishing the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, or SDBZ along their mutual border, as they have agreed to include the Mile 14 area within the SDBZ.) Menkerios also noted that Sudan has reiterated its insistence that security arrangements be implemented prior to other agreements. Mulet reported that UNISFA has helped to maintain calm between the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka communities in Abyei during the Misseriya migration through the area.

Majak D'Agoot, the Deputy Defence Minister of South Sudan, alleged on 12 February that Sudan had amassed troops near disputed areas of the border, and South Sudan television reported that President Salva Kiir had ordered the movement of military and police to border regions in response. Sudan has denied the allegation.

Negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan appear to have stalled in recent weeks. Press reports indicate that the parties were scheduled to reconvene in Addis Ababa on 13 February to discuss security and political matters. However, these talks were cancelled. In mid-February, a delegation from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led by Lazarus Sambeiyu—a former Kenyan military officer who served as an IGAD mediator in the lead-up to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement—travelled to Juba to meet with South Sudanese politicians and civil society actors to hear their

perspectives on how to resolve the pending issues separating Sudan and South Sudan.

Conflict continued in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in southern Sudan. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) claimed on 9 February that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), a South Sudanese rebel group that is supported by Khartoum, crossed the border from South Sudan into South Kordofan state and killed 17 civilians in Abujibeiha county. Lam Akol, the head of the SPLM-DC, denied the accusation.

From 14-17 February, heavy fighting occurred in the Muffa area of Blue Nile, with the SPLM-N alleging that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had targeted civilians through air and ground operations. Sudan claimed that 66 SPLM-N troops were killed in the fighting, while the SPLM-N alleged that it had killed 86 SAF troops. The SPLM-N has also claimed that the fighting displaced 8,000 civilians.

An Antonov plane operated by the SAF reportedly dropped eight bombs in Luwere, South Kordofan, on 17 February with one of the bombs apparently killing three people—two children and a woman—who were gathering food in a field. Four other civilians were also wounded in the attack.

The SPLM-N stated on 20 February that it was fighting with SAF in Kurmuk, a Blue Nile town that is 12 miles from Muffa, and that it had taken control of the town's airport. Sudan denied the claim that the SPLM-N had fought its way to Kurmuk.

The Council again held consultations on Sudan and South Sudan on 21 February, with Menkerios briefing. Menkerios said that rhetoric between Sudan and South Sudan had escalated in recent days and indicated that there was a need for the parties to demonstrate the political will necessary to make progress in their relations. He said that the SPLM-N had expressed a willingness to participate in negotiations with Sudan scheduled for 5 March but that Sudan had not indicated whether it would engage in the talks.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

During the 12 February open debate on the protection of civilians, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay urged the Council to provide for a stronger human rights-monitoring capacity in UNISFA.

### Key Issues

The underlying issue is how Council members can overcome their differences and coalesce around a common strategy that has an impact on the calculations of the parties.

A related issue is the lack of progress made by Sudan and South Sudan in implementing the 27 September agreements and negotiating the final status of Abyei.

Another related issue is how to facilitate a ceasefire and peace talks between the SPLM-N and Sudan and how to address the severe humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

### Options

There are several options for the Council to help break the current stalemate and encourage direct talks between the parties involved in hostilities in Sudan and South Sudan:

- using the ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa as a forum to develop strategies to address the crisis between Sudan and South Sudan (meetings of the Working Group to discuss Sudan and South Sudan could also include representatives of both countries, as well as other representatives from other countries in the region);
- holding an “informal interactive dialogue” with representatives of all parties to the conflict—including Sudan, South Sudan and the SPLM-N—to get their perspectives on the issues dividing them (the “informal interactive dialogue” is a closed meeting that could allow a party or parties to a dispute to meet with Council members outside the Council's formal chambers);
- travelling to the region to meet with officials from both countries to impress upon them the importance of honouring prior agreements;
- acting on its threat to impose measures under article 41 (i.e. sanctions) on one or more of the parties for not abiding by resolution 2046; or
- mandating the Secretary-General to launch a commission of inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

### Council Dynamics

There is a palpable sense of frustration among several Council members about the

---

## Sudan and South Sudan (con't)

lack of progress by the parties in implementing the 27 September agreements and in resolving other pending issues. Some members are likewise extremely concerned about the poor state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan.

Divisions in the Council on how to address the crisis in Sudan-South Sudan

relations, as well as the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, have also had a negative impact on the Council's effectiveness on these issues. The negotiations on the draft presidential statement have reflected the differences of view among some Council members. Some members are highly critical of Sudan for its difficulties with

South Sudan and for denying humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Others are more inclined to take what they perceive as a more balanced approach that is less critical of Sudan.

The US is the lead country on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

---

## South Sudan

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council expects to hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General's most recent report on the situation in South Sudan and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). No outcome is expected at press time.

The mandate of UNMISS expires on 15 July 2013.

### Key Recent Developments

On 28 November 2012, Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council on the Secretary-General's 8 November report on South Sudan (S/2012/820). Ladsous said that the lack of progress in implementing the 27 September agreements on security, oil transport and revenue, cross-border trade and other issues could negatively affect South Sudan's economic stability, especially if oil exports were delayed. (There has been slow progress in implementing the security agreements, and Sudan has been unwilling to export oil from South Sudan until security arrangements are finalised.) Ladsous also expressed concerns about the human rights situation, inter-communal violence and the delays in the constitutional review process in South Sudan.

Ambassador Francis M. Deng (South Sudan) addressed the Council after Ladsous, stating that a comprehensive and sustainable peace with Sudan is South Sudan's "number one priority". He also emphasised South Sudan's concern with the situation in Jonglei state, alluding to his government's

efforts to facilitate inter-communal dialogue and to conduct disarmament in a responsible manner.

On 21 December 2012, South Sudan shot down an UNMISS helicopter on a reconnaissance mission in Jonglei state, resulting in the deaths of four UNMISS crewmembers from the Russian Federation. Later that day, the Council issued a press statement in which it strongly deplored the downing of the helicopter, expressed condolences to the families of the victims and strongly urged a thorough and swift investigation (SC/10873). (South Sudan has initiated an investigation and Russia is conducting an analysis of the flight data recorder, or "black box". South Sudan has claimed that it shot at the helicopter because it mistook it for a Sudanese aircraft supplying rebels in the area.)

On 21 January, President Salva Kiir issued a decree dismissing Chol Tong Maya, the elected governor of Lakes state, for his alleged inability to effectively combat recent inter-clan violence. While some have questioned the legality of the decision, parliament determined that the decision was constitutional on 28 January. (One parliamentarian, Ayen Maguat, pointed to article 101(r) of the transitional constitution, which states that the president can dismiss a state governor "in the event of a crisis in the state that threatens national security and territorial integrity".)

Kiir made key changes within the military in January and February. On 21 January, he dismissed 35 generals and placed them on reserve. He appointed six generals

as deputies to the General Staff Chief James Hoth Mai and three generals as sector commanders for Wau, Malakal and Torit, while promoting nine other generals. On 14 February, Kiir dismissed more than 100 additional high-ranking officials, including the governors of Unity (Taban Deng Gai), Eastern Equatoria (Louis Lobong Lojore), Western Bahr el Ghazal (Rizik Hassan Zachariah) and Upper Nile (Simon Kun Puoc) states.

Also on 21 January, Justice Minister John Luk Jok presented a bill to the Legislative Assembly seeking to extend by nine months the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC). (In January 2012, Kiir appointed the NCRC to consult throughout South Sudan and prepare a new draft constitution by January 2013. The bill was proposed because the NCRC was unable to meet the deadline.)

On 15 February, the Legislative Assembly's Judicial and Constitutional Committee held a public hearing in which it discussed potentially reducing the size of NCRC (which currently has 55 members), the need to ensure that sufficient funds are provided for its work, and the length of its mandate. At press time, the Legislative Assembly was still considering the bill on the NCRC.

More than 100 people were killed in a cattle raid on 8 February in Jonglei state when members of the Murle ethnic group attacked members of the Lou-Nuer ethnic group, who were approaching the Sobat River in the midst of their annual migration. Fourteen soldiers, who were trying to protect the Lou-Nuer,

---

**UN DOCUMENTS ON SOUTH SUDAN** [Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2057](#) (5 July 2012) renewed UNMISS until 15 July 2013. [S/RES/1996](#) (8 July 2011) established UNMISS. [Security Council Press Statement SC/10873](#) (21 December 2012) deplored the shooting down of an UNMISS helicopter by the Sudan People's Liberation Army. [Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6874](#) (28 November 2012) was the Council's most recent briefing on UNMISS. [Secretary-General's Report S/2012/820](#) (8 November 2012) was the most recent Secretary-General's report on UNMISS. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** [Special Representative of the Secretary-General Hilde Johnson](#) (Norway) [UNMISS Force Commander Major General Delali Johnson Sakyi](#) (Ghana) [Maximum Authorised Strength](#) Up to 7,000 military personnel Up to 900 civilian police personnel [Strength \(as of 31 December 2012\)](#) 7,157 total uniformed personnel (including 6,473 troops, 140 military liaison officers and 544 police) 831 international civilian personnel and 1,375 local civilian staff (as of 31 October 2012) Mission also includes 391 UN volunteers.

---

## South Sudan (con't)

were among those killed. Dozens of children were abducted as well during the assault. Goi Joyal—who serves as the commissioner in Akobo County, where the attack occurred—alleged that the perpetrators were affiliated with Murle rebel leader David Yau Yau.

On 5 December 2012, Diing Chan Awol, a journalist who wrote under the name Isaiah Abraham and who had frequently criticised the government, was shot and killed outside his home in Juba by unidentified assailants. On 10 February, Hilde Johnson, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and head of UNMISS, declared that South Sudan would become the first country to adopt the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. (According to UNESCO, the plan is designed to develop mechanisms and strategies to create “a free and safe environment for journalists and media workers in both conflict and non-conflict situations”.)

Johnson held a press conference in Juba on 15 February on the situation in South Sudan. She said that nation-building efforts had been limited because South Sudan had been focused on its relations with Sudan. Johnson recognised progress made by South Sudan, such as the passage of key electoral legislation and the creation of a programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. However, she added that UNMISS was disturbed by reports of threats, intimidation, harassment and attacks against journalists, civil society and human rights activists.

Refugees continue to arrive in Unity and Upper Nile states, fleeing the fighting and hunger in Sudan's South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. On 15 February, OCHA reported that there are nearly 113,000 refugees in Upper Nile and over 67,000 refugees in Unity. On 15 February, UNHCR reported that 111 refugees had died from Hepatitis E, and 6,017 had been infected since July 2012.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

During the 12 February open debate on the protection of civilians, Navi Pillay, the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights, said that the expulsion in November 2012 of an UNMISS human rights officer had set “a dangerous precedent” and once again urged South Sudan to reconsider its decision (S/PV.6917). (Pillay had called on South Sudan to reverse the expulsion order on 9 November 2012.) In late January, two UNMISS human rights staff were detained and interrogated for several hours regarding inquiries involving a journalist. Johnson on 10 February said that such acts are grave violations “of the agreements the government has signed and the privileges and immunities of United Nations personnel”.

### Key Issues

One key issue is how to facilitate implementation of the 27 September agreements, as efforts to promote internal development and economic stability in South Sudan are severely curtailed without oil revenue or cross-border trade.

Also an important issue is whether and how Kiir's dismissal of high-ranking officials will affect the effectiveness and stability of the government.

Another key issue is how the Council can encourage progress in the constitutional review process, which has experienced delays in the past year.

An additional key issue is how to strengthen efforts to prevent inter-communal violence and promote inter-communal reconciliation in Jonglei state and elsewhere in South Sudan. A related issue is the need to address violence committed by Yau Yau's rebel group.

Also a key issue is how to ensure that protocols and procedures are developed and implemented so that incidents such as the shooting down of the UNMISS helicopter in Jonglei are not repeated.

### Options

Options for the Council include:

- listening to the briefing but taking no action at the current time;
- inviting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to brief the Council on the humanitarian situation,

especially challenges facing refugees in Unity and Upper Nile states; and

- holding an Arria formula meeting focusing on the sources of inter-communal violence in South Sudan with the participation of experts capable of providing the Council with informed analysis of the violence and suggesting potential strategies for addressing this violence.

The Council may also wish to adopt a statement that, *inter-alia*:

- expresses concern with the ongoing incidents of inter-communal violence and highlights the importance of reconciliation;
- encourages efforts to investigate the 21 December downing of an UNMISS helicopter, while underscoring the importance of developing and implementing rules and procedures to prevent similar incidents in the future; and
- underscores the need for progress in the constitutional review process, while emphasising that it be conducted in an inclusive manner throughout the country.

### Council Dynamics

The Council has been focused largely on Sudan-South Sudan relations in recent months. Deliberations on South Sudan in March will, for the first time since November 2012, provide Council members with an opportunity to engage substantively with the domestic situation in South Sudan and the activities of UNMISS. It will likewise mark the first time that the new Council members have discussed an UNMISS report.

There has been widespread concern in the Council for several months about inter-communal violence, especially in Jonglei state, and the difficult humanitarian situation in South Sudan, exacerbated by the austerity measures the government put in place after shutting down its oil production in early 2012. Some members also appear to be particularly troubled by the human rights situation in South Sudan.

The US is the lead country on South Sudan.



## Expected Council Action

In March, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNSMIL, is expected to present the Secretary-General's latest report on UNSMIL and brief the Council on the latest developments on the ground. Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan is also likely to address the Council.

The Council will also likely renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. At press time, the Council will have received the Panel's final report and is expecting the periodic briefing by the chair of the Committee, Ambassador Eugene-Richard Gasana (Rwanda).

The mandates of both UNSMIL and the Panel expire on 16 March.

## Key Recent Developments

As highlighted by Mitri during his last Council briefing on 29 January, there have been a number of developments on the political front in Libya, including, after two frustrated attempts, the swearing-in of the first democratically elected government.

On 6 February, the General National Congress (GNC) decided, after a considerable delay, to endorse election as the process by which the members of the Constituent Assembly will be chosen. The Assembly will have 60 members, with 20 members representing each of the three historical regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan, and they will be chosen through direct election as stated in the Draft Constitutional Declaration. Due to the characteristics of the electoral process, this decision will further delay the constitutional drafting process but will ensure its regional inclusiveness. Mitri characterised the GNC's decision as an "important milestone".

The security situation continues to be precarious. On 3 January, the president of the GNC, Mohamed el-Magariaf, survived an assassination attempt, as did the Italian consul in Benghazi on 12 January. Security

officials continue to be the targets of attacks, mainly in the east. Furthermore, there have been reports of armed clashes between tribes and clans and the army, mainly in the south.

The security sector reform continues to present serious challenges. Currently, there are about 7,000 conflict-related detainees in the custody of militias that refuse to transfer them to state-controlled correctional facilities. Despite improvements in the security forces, such as conversion of more than 20,000 former militia troops into security officers, due-process guarantees and basic rights of these detainees continue to be violated.

On 12 February, an international ministerial conference on support to Libya was held in Paris, focusing on cooperation in the areas of security, justice and rule of law. The conference included regional and international organisations, EU and Arab League members, the US and Turkey. In a communiqué, the participants pledged their political, technical and material support for the government's work on such issues as the national security architecture; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; arms and border control; and defence and security sector reform. The conference adopted development plans for national security and the justice and rule of law, to be implemented by the government with the assistance of international partners.

One of the main challenges regarding the security situation in Libya is the porous nature of the borders. On 12 January, Zeidan met with the prime ministers of Algeria and Tunisia in the town of Ghadames and agreed on joint measures to combat organised crime, terrorism and smuggling across borders. Although steps have been taken to enhance border control, recent developments in Mali and terrorist attacks in Algeria show the need for better border-control mechanisms. For the second anniversary of the beginning of Libyan uprising in February, the borders with Egypt and Tunisia were closed for five days amid fears of new violent clashes.

Relations between Libya and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have become increasingly tense after the Court ordered Libya on 7 February to surrender former

intelligence chief and ICC indictee Abdullah al-Senussi. Another ICC indictee likewise held in Libya, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, appeared before a local court in January tried on charges of undermining state security and attempting to escape from prison. At press time, he had not been tried yet for charges related to the crimes allegedly committed during the Libyan uprising.

In February, the GNC discussed the drafting of a "political isolation" law, which calls for the exclusion of those linked to the former regime from the current government. Human rights organisations in Libya and abroad have criticised the law for penalising affiliation instead of misdeeds and for hampering the reconciliation process.

The Secretary-General's most recent report highlights UNSMIL's engagement with the government in addressing "the complexities of the post-conflict democratic transition" (S/2013/104). The report identified the absence of an accountable institutional framework (including in the security and defence sectors), the underdevelopment of the private sector (which provides few opportunities for demobilised combatants) and the presence of tribal and regional tensions as the main challenges Libya is facing. The report suggested refocusing UNSMIL's work on providing support to the constitution-making process, inclusive national dialogue and improving institutional capacity in the areas of defence sector reform, transitional justice and rule of law.

## Key Issues

An overarching issue is the fragile security situation and the impact of regional instability on Libya due to the deficient control of its porous borders. (There has been some progress in security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, but much more remains to be done.)

Issues for the Council vis-à-vis the UNSMIL mandate renewal may be to signal the importance of the Libyan government managing key challenges such as:

- ensuring the inclusiveness of the

**UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA** Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2040 (12 March 2012) extended the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts assisting the Sanctions Committee by 12 months. S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a Panel of Experts. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC and established a Sanctions Committee for the arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze imposed by the resolution. Secretary-General's Report S/2013/104 (21 February 2013) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6912 (29 January 2013) was the latest briefing by Special Representative Tarek Mitri. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL Tarek Mitri (Lebanon) UNSMIL Size and Composition Strength as of January 2013: 137 international civilians; 23 local civilians; two police officers. UNSMIL Duration 16 September 2011 to present

---

## Libya (con't)

constitutional process;

- establishing an institutional framework for the reconciliation process; and
- managing the expectations of the population who seem to be growing impatient with the slow path towards democracy and reform.

A related issue for the Council are the current conflicting views between Libya and the ICC regarding the trial of the two ICC indictees (the Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC in resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011).

### Options

In the resolution extending UNSMIL and the mandate of the Panel, options for the

Council may include:

- incorporating some of the suggestions raised by the Secretary-General in his report; and
- incorporating some of the recommendations in the report of the Panel of Experts to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions, namely the ones regarding the arms embargo and the travel ban.

### Council Dynamics

Council members generally agree that the principal elements of UNSMIL's mandate as outlined in resolution 2040 remain relevant. They are also aware of the important role UNSMIL can play now that the constitutional drafting process has been unblocked

after the decision of the GNC to hold elections for the assembly.

Arms proliferation in Libya and the region has been a source of contention among Council members since the end of the revolution, and that might come up again in closed consultations.

Regarding the ICC referral, some Council members would prefer the ICC indictees to be tried in The Hague, whereas other members tend to be more sympathetic with Libya's desire to hold the trials in the country exercising its right to prosecute any crimes over which it has jurisdiction.

The UK is the lead country on Libya.

---

## Mali

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council is expected to be briefed in consultations by Under-Secretary-General of Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, and will discuss the upcoming report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012.

The report will likely focus on UN support for the political and security efforts to address the crisis in Mali as well as the deployment and activities of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). It is also likely to include recommendations of a technical assessment mission to Mali scheduled for mid-March.

The Council is expected to start discussing a possible transition from AFISMA to a full-fledged peacekeeping operation in March and a new resolution establishing such an operation is possible in the coming months.

AFISMA's authorisation expires on 20 December.

### Key Recent Developments

On 29 January, the National Assembly unanimously approved the roadmap for a transition presented by the interim government. This

roadmap established the three main priorities for the authorities in the transition process: the restoration of the territorial integrity of Mali; the establishment of a dialogue with groups that respect this territorial integrity and reject armed struggle; and the holding of free and fair elections. On 14 February, the interim government announced that presidential elections would be held on 7 July and legislative elections on 21 July, along with a presidential run-off if required.

French President François Hollande visited Mali and met with interim President Dioncounda Traoré on 2 February. In Timbuktu, which was liberated on 27 January, Hollande declared that military efforts under *Opération Serval* were ongoing, as there were still areas in the north controlled by terrorist groups, but that the objective was to pass the baton to AFISMA when the situation on the ground allows it.

On 5 February in Brussels, the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali held its third meeting. The meeting was hosted by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and was co-chaired by the

AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra; Feltman; and the President of ECOWAS, Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Pierre Buyoya, and three ministers representing the interim government in Mali, also attended the meeting. The group's conclusions commended France, Mali and AFISMA for the "remarkable progress made on the ground" and welcomed positive developments, such as the adoption of the roadmap for a political transition, the decision of the government to establish a dialogue and reconciliation commission and the deployment of an EU training mission to build the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). Also, the conclusions of the group pointed to some of the challenges Mali is facing, such as the existence of terrorism and other criminal networks, the dire humanitarian situation, weak border-control mechanisms, reported acts of retaliation and other abuses in the recovered areas, as well as underlying problems such as governance deficit and poverty.

Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé-Brook Zerihoun briefed

---

**UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI** [Security Council Resolution S/RES/2085](#) (20 December 2012) authorised the deployment of AFISMA for one year. [S/RES/2056](#) (5 July 2012) expressed support for the joint efforts of the AU, ECOWAS and the transitional authorities in Mali trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity. [Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/9](#) (4 April 2012) strongly condemned assaults by rebels in northern Mali and the seizure of power in the capital by elements of the armed forces. [Security Council Press Statement SC/10878](#) (10 January 2013) expressed grave concern over the attacks by terrorist and extremist groups in northern Mali, in particular their capture of the city of Konna. [Security Council Letters S/2013/113](#) (25 February 2013) was a letter from the interim president of Mali requesting the rapid deployment of AFISMA. [S/2013/37](#) (20 January 2013) contained the Secretary-General's funding and logistical support options for AFISMA. [Secretary-General's Report S/2012/894](#) (29 November 2012) contained the Secretary-General's recommendations for an international force in Mali. **OTHER** [A/HRC/22/33](#) (7 January 2013) was the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in Mali.

## Mali (con't)

Council members on 6 February in consultations on political developments on the ground and the progress in setting up a UN office in Bamako. This “multidimensional UN presence” (which an advance UN team began to set up after it arrived in Mali on 19 January) will support the ongoing political process and assist in the planning, deployment and operations of AFISMA. France provided an update on *Opération Serval* and there were some initial discussions about the idea of a future UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. Some Council members raised the need to put in place human rights observers, given the increasing allegations of violations of human rights in the country. (As a result of these requests the Secretariat boosted the human rights capacity of the UN presence in Bamako with the deployment of a mobile team.)

On 8 February, an advance team of 70 EU military instructors arrived in Mali. This mission, which will ultimately comprise 500 personnel, is meant to build the capacity of the MDSF in military training, human rights issues and protection of civilians.

In spite of the important military gains in Mali, the security situation still presents serious challenges. Almost 250,000 internally displaced persons and more than 165,000 refugees have fled to neighbouring countries. The terrorist threat continues in northern Mali, where there were reports of several suicide attacks in February. Furthermore, there have been reports of violent clashes among different units of the army, mainly between the Presidential Guard loyal to former President Amadou Toumani Touré (red beret) and those loyal to the current unelected government (green beret).

On 20 February, a meeting involving Malian officials as well as senior officials of the AU and ECOWAS, the EU military advisers in Mali, and UN military and civilian planners, concluded the revision of the harmonised joint concept of operations for AFISMA. The objective of this discussion was integrating a more robust military component with substantial police and civilian components. (The latter will include political affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, gender advisers and public information units.)

A letter from Traoré, dated 12 February, addressed to the Secretary-General was circulated among Council members

on 26 February. It requested rapid deployment of AFISMA to restore state authority and sovereignty prior to AFISMA’s possible transformation into a UN stabilisation and peacekeeping operation. It also said that a high-level delegation from Mali will be travelling to New York for meetings with the Secretary-General and Security Council members.

At press time, Council members were expecting a briefing by Feltman on 27 February in consultations. France was also expected to provide an update on the security situation in the north and Council members were likely to hold initial discussions about the establishment of a peacekeeping operation.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

On 1 February, Adama Dieng, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide, warned of the risk of reprisal attacks against ethnic Tuareg and Arab civilians. He mentioned instances of allegations of serious human rights violations committed by the Malian army against these communities. On 15 February, a spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights said that three human rights experts were already in Bamako to support the human rights activities undertaken by the UN Office in Mali. She added that a four-person team will be deployed to Mali on 17 February for a two-week fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of human rights abuses, including allegations of retaliatory violence. The findings of this mission and of the first mission deployed last November will be presented by the High Commissioner to the Human Rights Council (HRC) at its 22nd session. During this session, the HRC will also consider the January report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the north of Mali.

### Key Issues

A key overarching issue is to stabilise the security situation in the north in order to minimise the threats to a future peacekeeping operation.

A related issue for the Council—in case a counterinsurgency effort is still required—will be to define if such operations will fall under the mandate of any future UN peacekeeping mission.

Ensuring AFISMA has the basic financial and logistical support to fulfill its mandate in any transition towards a UN peacekeeping operation is another key issue. A closely related issue is the need for donors to quickly honour their pledges made in support of Mali,

AFISMA and its troop-contributing countries at the 29 January Addis Ababa donor conference.

Emerging issues for the Council as it begins its discussions on a UN peacekeeping mission may be:

- considering a role for the mission to address both the divisions within the government and the MDSF in parallel with the need to facilitate a wider negotiation process with minority groups; and
- addressing the difficulty of providing sufficient capacity in a timely manner to support elections currently anticipated for July.

Addressing the potentially destabilising spillover effects from Mali to an already fragile regional will be an ongoing issue.

### Options

If the Council is to adopt a new peacekeeping resolution in the coming months it will need to continue to take into account recent developments in order to respond to the quickly changing situation on the ground.

Immediate options for the Council include:

- asking the Secretary-General to provide in his upcoming report on Mali options regarding the transition from AFISMA to a UN peacekeeping operation;
- adding some of the terrorist groups and individuals operating in Mali to the list of the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee; and
- reiterating its call to the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy to finalise as soon as possible the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region, encompassing governance, security, humanitarian, human rights and developmental issues, as requested by resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012.

Future options for the Council include:

- establishing a full-fledged peacekeeping operation in the north of Mali aimed at ensuring the stability and security of the recovered areas in the north (AFISMA forces, as well as a reduced French presence, could be re-hatted and remain in the country under a UN chain of command);
- assigning the French forces to conduct counterterrorism operations, under a chain of command separate from the UN (as in *Opération Licorne* in Côte d’Ivoire, where they support the UN peacekeeping

## Mali (con't)

mission but are not a part of it); or

- assigning the French and other rapid reaction forces to support peacekeepers by conducting counterterrorism operations in Mali while based in any of the neighbouring West African countries.

Another future option for the Council when discussing the set-up of such a peacekeeping operation would be to include in its mandate a role in facilitating the political process in the whole of the country, including dialogue with minorities as well as supporting the development of electoral management capacities.

### Council Dynamics

The Council appears to be unified regarding the need for a peacekeeping operation to ensure the stability of northern Mali. The idea of a hybrid military operation seems to have been discarded by both the Council and the Secretariat. The widespread assumption seems to be that a mission under the UN flag would be more predictable and would rely on a clearer set of resources from the beginning. The US has a strong preference for this option, being wary of directly funding AFISMA or the MDSF. However, there are divergences regarding the timing as well

as the assessment of the security situation on the ground.

Among Council members, views also differ regarding the establishment of part of the future mission in Bamako or focusing mainly on securing the north. Some members are sympathetic to the interim government's unwillingness to have a heavier UN presence in Bamako and its concerns regarding the UN's potential impact on the political process in the country.

France is the lead country on Mali.

## Guinea-Bissau

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council will be briefed in consultations on the quarterly report on efforts to restore constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April 2012 coup, possibly by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. No outcome is expected.

The mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) expires on 31 May 2013.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council received a briefing by Zerihoun on 5 February that focused on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and activities undertaken by UNIOGBIS. Zerihoun highlighted key elements of the Secretary-General's report of 11 January, noting that while there has been some progress in the transition process, impunity remains a major concern in the country (S/2013/26).

Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil), chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), also briefed the Council on 5 February, noting

the continued suspension of projects under the Peacebuilding Fund since the coup.

In line with the recommendation of the Secretary-General, resolution 2092 was adopted on 22 February renewing UNIOGBIS's mandate for an additional three months. While there is new language reflecting issues that have emerged since the adoption of the previous mandate in resolution 2030 (21 December 2011), the mandate itself remains largely unchanged to allow José Ramos Horta, the incoming Special Representative of the Secretary-General, time to conduct an assessment of the situation on the ground, which will be reflected in the Secretary-General's next report. After the three-month period, a new resolution will be negotiated that is expected to result in a new and significantly different UNIOGBIS mandate.

On 17 January, the main opposition party, the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), and four other parties, joined the political transition pact and the political agreement that had been signed by the military junta and 17 political parties on 16 and 18 May 2012 respectively.

The signing of these documents is expected to facilitate the parliamentary review of both documents, as well as the drafting of a new transitional regime pact. It is also expected to facilitate consensus on a roadmap that would clarify the modalities of the transition, including its duration and the timeline for elections, which were originally scheduled for April but have been postponed.

An AU-led joint assessment mission visited Guinea-Bissau from 16-21 December and brought together five key international, regional and subregional players—the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), the EU and the UN—all of whom are closely following the situation in the country. The mission met with a wide range of national actors, with the objectives of assessing the political and security situation, exploring avenues for building consensus and promoting cooperation among the participating organisations.

At an AU meeting on 26 January, mission participants agreed on the need to undertake

**UN DOCUMENTS ON GUINEA-BISSAU** **Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2092** (22 February 2013) renewed the mandate of UNIOGBIS until 31 May 2013. **S/RES/2048** (18 May 2012) imposed foreign travel bans on coup leaders and set up a sanctions committee. **Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/15** (21 April 2012) was on the coup in Guinea-Bissau. **Secretary-General's Report S/2013/26** (11 January 2013) was the Secretary-General's report covering developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of UNIOGBIS. **Sanctions Committee Documents S/2012/975** (31 December 2012) was a letter transmitting the annual report of the Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee. **SC/10721** (20 July 2012) was a press release concerning the addition of six army officers to the list of individuals subject to a foreign travel ban. **Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6924** (22 February 2013) was on the adoption of the resolution renewing UNIOGBIS's mandate. **S/PV.6915** (5 February 2013) was on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of UNIOGBIS. **Security Council Press Statement SC/10857** (13 December 2012) expressed serious concern over the lack of progress in the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. **Letters S/2012/974** (31 December 2012) was regarding the appointment of José Ramos Horta as Special Representative and head of UNIOGBIS. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS José Ramos Horta (Timor-Leste)** **UNIOGBIS Size, Composition and Budget** Strength as of 31 December 2012: 61 international civilians; 53 local civilians; two military advisers; 16 police; seven UN volunteers **UNIOGBIS Duration** 1 January 2010 – 31 May 2013 **Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee** Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco) **Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the PBC** Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil) **ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) Size and Duration** Strength as of 6 November 2012: 629 soldiers and police (contributing countries: Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Senegal); March 2012 – 17 May 2013

---

## Guinea-Bissau (con't)

a second joint assessment mission following the adoption of the transition roadmap by the People's National Assembly.

At press time, the final report of the joint assessment mission had yet to be issued. It seems that the report's recommendations will focus on a number of key areas, including the need for strong and coordinated international community engagement to ensure an inclusive transition as well as political, financial and technical support towards the adoption of a new transitional regime pact and the holding of free and fair elections. The development of two action plans—one on defence and security sector reform and the issue of impunity and one on drug trafficking—is also likely to be raised in the recommendations.

As noted in the 31 December report issued by the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee, violations of the travel ban by two individuals were recorded and confirmed by the Committee (S/2012/975). The possibility of imposing further sanctions—such as an assets freeze—continues to be discussed within the Committee.

Some progress has been made since the Secretary-General's calls, in his reports of 27 November 2012 (S/2012/887) and 29 September 2008 (S/2008/628), for the Security Council to consider establishing a panel of experts to conduct an investigation into drug trafficking and organised crime in Guinea-Bissau. Council members have experienced difficulties reaching consensus on this issue in the past; however, resolution 2092 raises the issue of drug trafficking in no less than three preambular and two operative paragraphs. While it is unlikely to be addressed in the immediate future, there remains a possibility that such a panel may be established by amending the existing sanctions regime.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

Addressing the issue of impunity during the 5 February briefing Zerihoun noted that none of the individuals involved in the violations that followed the alleged counter-coup of October 2012 have been brought to justice—although there are reports that 17 detainees were charged by the Military Court and are awaiting trial. He also pointed out that UNIOGBIS staff have visited detention centres and have confirmed inadequate detention conditions including detainees' lack of access to medical care, food and water.

### Key Issues

The overarching issue for the Council remains the restoration of constitutional order through free and fair elections.

A related issue of concern for Council members is the role key international and regional stakeholders will play in the country's transition, including support for the transition roadmap.

Ongoing issues include drug trafficking, organised crime and impunity related to numerous political assassinations, of which several actors have been accused dating back to before the 12 April coup.

### Options

A likely option for the Council is to receive the briefing and take no action at the current time, while awaiting the finalisation of the joint assessment mission report and the Secretary-General's next report—which will draw on the findings of the Special Representative's assessment—due in May.

Further options that could be discussed in March, for consideration at the subsequent briefing and consultations expected in May, include:

- harmonising the reporting cycles of both UNIOGBIS and resolution 2048;
- establishing a Panel of Experts to assist

the 2048 Sanctions Committee in monitoring sanctions' implementation;

- delinking in resolution 2048 the designation criteria listed in operative paragraph seven from operative paragraph six to enable the Sanctions Committee to take further action against those involved in drug trafficking and organised crime in Guinea-Bissau as hinted in resolution 2092; and
- mandating an independent commission of inquiry to investigate political assassinations not covered by the 2008 amnesty law (which applies to acts committed up to 6 October 2004) in light of the weak state of the national judiciary.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members' discussions of Guinea-Bissau continue to be based on the balancing of their international and regional interests, which for some members includes not fraying relations with key partners such as ECOWAS to ensure effective cooperation on Mali and the Sahel.

Meanwhile, it appears that the AU may be warming to ECOWAS's requests (on 11 November 2012 and on 19 January) for the AU to lift its suspension of Guinea-Bissau.

While it seems that ECOWAS and CPLP have put their differences of opinion aside in the spirit of collaboration, reflected by their participation in the joint assessment mission, there remain concerns that these differences may re-emerge at any time.

Council members and other key stakeholders have expressed support for the appointment of Ramos-Horta as Special Representative; however, some may harbour concerns about his close CPLP connections.

Togo is the lead country on Guinea-Bissau, and Morocco is the chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee.

---

## Liberia

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council expects a briefing by Karin Landgren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Liberia and head of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), on the situation in Liberia, followed by consultations. In line with Council practice, Staffan

Tillander (Sweden), Chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), may also brief the Council following the recent PBC mission visit to the country.

No outcome is expected.

The mandate of UNMIL expires on 30 September.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council last discussed UNMIL on 11 September 2012 (S/PV.6830), following which resolution 2066 was unanimously adopted on 17 September (S/PV.6834), renewing its mandate for another year. On 12 December the Council unanimously

## Liberia (con't)

adopted resolution 2079 renewing the mandate of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee as well as its Panel of Experts until 12 December 2013.

There has been increasing attention to the issue of the reduction of UNMIL troop levels and the drawdown of the mission. Resolution 2066 stipulates that UNMIL's current military strength will be reduced from almost 8,000 to 3,750 troops by July 2015, with the first phase—consisting of a reduction of 1,990 troops—to be implemented by September 2013. The resolution nevertheless mandates an increase in UNMIL's police component to a total of 1,795 police to support the transition. While the government supports the drawdown, media reports suggest there is some apprehension over how it will fill the gaps in security following UNMIL's departure.

On 27 November 2012, the Secretary-General appointed Aeneas Chapinga Chuma (Zimbabwe) as his new Deputy Special Representative for Recovery and Good Governance as well as UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative. On 7 February, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Tamrat Samuel (Eritrea) as his Deputy Special Representative for Rule of Law.

### Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

From 11-15 February, a PBC mission visited Liberia with the aim of meeting with different stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding in the country. The mission specifically focused on the issues of police reform in the context of the UNMIL transition, PBC contributions to security sector reform, rule of law and national reconciliation, including the reconciliation roadmap developed in April 2012. It also reviewed progress made on the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme as well as on the implementation by the government and the international community of commitments contained in

the Statement of Mutual Commitments.

The inauguration of the first of five regional justice and security hubs in Gbarnga on 12 February was a notable milestone in the decentralisation of the justice and security sector. Supported by the Peacebuilding Fund, the hubs represent a step forward in the peacebuilding process and are expected to increase access to justice and security by co-locating police, courts and immigration departments, serving as a "one-stop shop" for their services.

Following the scathing resignation of Leymah Gbowee—co-winner of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf—as head of the Peace and Reconciliation Commission on 8 October 2012, Sirleaf appointed former opposition presidential candidate George Weah to the position in early December. A popular national figure due to his success in football, his appointment may add legitimacy to Sirleaf's claims to be acting on behalf of all Liberians by demonstrating her willingness to work with past opponents.

Despite continuing allegations of corruption and nepotism within the Sirleaf administration, Liberia has become less corrupt according to Transparency International, an international anti-corruption watchdog group, coming in 75th place in 2012 compared to 91st in 2011 out of 176 countries surveyed.

The issue of security along the border with Côte d'Ivoire remains a concern, with governments and peacekeeping missions in both countries working together to address the issue. Inter-mission cooperation between UNMIL and the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire continues, including sharing assets such as helicopters and monitoring security along and across border areas. Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, head of ECOWAS, met with Sirleaf on 18 December, with both agreeing on the need for concerted measures to secure border areas and praising coordination efforts between the two countries to date. On 8 January, Liberian Defence Minister Bernie Samukai announced that army units would be withdrawn from border posts by 13 January—where they had been deployed since June 2012 following repeated raids by armed gangs—declaring the border safe and secure.

Vulnerabilities persist among both Liberians and Ivorian refugees in Liberia, resulting in unrelenting humanitarian needs for half a million people at risk of hunger and illness. The UN launched an appeal on 19 February calling for \$36.7 million

to implement the 2013 "Critical Humanitarian Gaps" response plan, prompted by a funding shortfall in a 2012 humanitarian appeal.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is the drawdown of UNMIL and its transition to a smaller presence, while ensuring sufficient national capacity to fill any gaps, particularly in the security sector.

A related issue is that of reconciliation and the peacebuilding process, ensuring that such initiatives continue during and beyond the drawdown of UNMIL.

### Options

One option is for the Council to receive the briefing and take no action.

A second—and less likely—option is for the Council to issue a press statement highlighting the importance of reconciliation and peacebuilding, and calling on the government to take on increasing security responsibilities.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members are largely in agreement on the issue of Liberia and are keen to see through the implementation of the drawdown plan. There are, however, some divisions among the permanent members on the pace of UNMIL's drawdown, with those more heavily invested in Liberia preferring a more gradual withdrawal.

While there has been some progress, Council members are of the view that this progress is not as swift as it could be and feel that it is time to apply pressure on the government to assume more responsibility for security, thereby relying less on UNMIL, which clearly still plays an important stabilising role.

The US is the lead on Liberia in the Council.

**UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBERIA** Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2079 (12 December 2012) extended both the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 December 2013. S/RES/2066 (17 September 2012) extended the UNMIL mandate until 30 September 2013. **Secretary-General's Report S/2012/641** (15 August 2012) was the report of the Secretary-General on UNMIL, providing an update on developments since 16 April 2012. **Security Council Letters S/2013/12** (10 January 2013) was on the appointment of three members of the Panel of Experts. S/2012/886 (27 November 2012) was on the appointment of Major General Leonard Muriuki Ngondi of Kenya as the Force Commander for UNMIL. **Sanctions Committee Document S/2012/980** (31 December 2012) was the annual report of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIL Karin Landgren** (Sweden) **UNMIL Size, Composition and Budget Strength as of 31 December 2012:** 7,430 troops; 126 military observers; 1,306 police; 230 UN volunteers; 470 international civilians; 989 local civilians **Budget:** \$496,457,800 **UNMIL Duration** September 2003–30 September 2013 **Chair of the Liberia Sanctions Committee** Ambassador Masood Khan (Pakistan) **Chair of the Liberia Configuration of the PBC** Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden)

# Sierra Leone

## Expected Council Action

The Council expects a briefing in March by Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). In line with Council practice, Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), may also brief following the recent PBC visit to the country. The briefings are to be followed by consultations.

A likely outcome is the adoption of a resolution renewing UNIPSIL's mandate which expires on 31 March. At press time, the duration of the renewed mandate was unclear.

## Key Recent Developments

The Council was last briefed in consultations by Toyberg-Frandzen on 28 November 2012, shortly after the elections in which President Ernest Bai Koroma was re-elected for a second five-year term. Two days later, the Council issued a presidential statement, commending Sierra Leone on the holding of successful presidential, parliamentary, district and local elections and calling for national dialogue and reconciliation (S/PRST/2012/25). The statement also urged the international community to continue its support to the country, requesting the Sierra Leone configuration of the PBC to provide support in the way of resource mobilisation and coordination of development partners.

In the preceding months, the Council received briefings on 11 September and 9 October 2012. During the former, Toyberg-Frandzen presented the Secretary-General's ninth report on UNIPSIL of 31 August 2012 (S/2012/679), and the Council was briefed by Rishchynski and heard a statement by Ambassador Shekou M. Touray (Sierra Leone). This was followed by the

adoption of resolution 2065 on 12 September 2012, renewing UNIPSIL's mandate until 31 March 2013. The latter was a briefing on the Special Court for Sierra Leone by Justice Shireen Avis Fisher and Brenda Hollis, President and Prosecutor of the Special Court, respectively. Following the briefing, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/21) reiterating its strong support for the Special Court and commending the progress it had achieved as noted in its report of 4 October (S/2012/741).

As requested in resolution 2065, the Secretary-General deployed an inter-agency technical assessment mission (TAM) to Sierra Leone from 14-25 January. The objectives of the TAM were to conduct a review of progress made in the implementation of UNIPSIL's mandate, containing detailed proposals and making recommendations for UNIPSIL's transition to a regular presence, as well as assessing possible options for UN support beyond UNIPSIL's withdrawal.

While most expected the TAM to provide a clear timeline for the conclusion of UNIPSIL activities—expected to conclude by the end of 2013—meetings during the mission suggested that there is widespread concern regarding the UN's departure, with representatives from the government, civil society and other groups voicing their resistance to a quick withdrawal. At press time, the official findings of the TAM were not available and were expected to feed into the Secretary-General's report due on 28 February.

The 17 November elections were monitored by approximately 300 international observers—including representatives from the AU, EU, the Economic Community of West African States, the Commonwealth of Nations and the Carter Center—with all hailing the elections as reflecting the will of voters. However, EU observers did note some irregularities, and the opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) said

that the elections were marred by irregularities and fraud. Nevertheless, the SLPP conceded defeat and recognised Koroma as the winner. Koroma was officially inaugurated on 22 February, in the presence of former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

On 14 December, during a speech at the state opening of the Sierra Leone parliament, Koroma made reference to his intention to conduct a review of the constitution which has been in effect since 1991.

On 4 January, Koroma announced the appointment of a new cabinet, with some ministers maintaining the same portfolios as the previous cabinet while other portfolios were reshuffled. The overwhelming election victory of Koroma's All People's Congress party gave it a clear and strong mandate, allowing for continuity from the previous administration and promoting political stability in Sierra Leone.

On 29 January, Koroma announced the launch of an Anti-Corruption Commission investigation into allegations of misuse of donor funds, as well as the suspension of ten officials in the Ministry of Health in relation to the matter. An audit of funds from a grant provided by the Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization—an international non-governmental organisation that promotes access to immunisation—revealed concerns that more than \$1 million may have been misused between 2008 and 2011.

Nine months after his conviction by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 26 April 2012, Charles Taylor appealed his 50-year prison sentence during a hearing that took place on 22-23 January. Appeals judges are expected to make a decision on the Taylor case by 30 September, the anticipated end of its mandate. A Residual Special Court is expected to be created following its closure.

**UN DOCUMENTS ON SIERRA LEONE** [Security Council Resolution S/RES/2065](#) (12 September 2012) extended UNIPSIL's mandate until 31 March 2013. [Secretary-General's Report S/2012/679](#) (31 August 2012) was the Secretary-General's report on UNIPSIL. [Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2012/25](#) (30 November 2012) commended Sierra Leone for the conduct and successful conclusion of elections. [S/PRST/2012/21](#) (9 October 2012) reiterated its strong support for the Special Court and commended the progress the Special Court had achieved. [Letters S/2013/16](#) (11 January 2013) and [S/2013/15](#) (9 January 2013) was an exchange of letters regarding an extension of the Secretary-General's report. [S/2012/892](#) (28 November 2012) was a letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General regarding the Secretary-General's proposal on alternate means of financing the Special Court for Sierra Leone. [S/2012/741](#) (5 October 2012) was a letter from Rishchynski (in his capacity as chair of the management committee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone) to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a letter from the President of the Special Court and the report of 4 October on the Special Court and requesting that they be issued as a document of the Council. [Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6876](#) (30 November 2012) was the adoption of a presidential statement on the elections in Sierra Leone. [S/PV.6844](#) (9 October 2012) was the briefing on the Special Court. [S/PV.6829](#) (11 September 2012) was the briefing by Executive Representative Toyberg-Frandzen on the Secretary-General's latest report and by Ambassador Rishchynski, chair of the PBC configuration for Sierra Leone. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** [Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIPSIL](#) Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen (Denmark) [UNIPSIL Size and Composition](#) Strength as of 31 December 2012: 36 international civilians; 33 local civilians; seven police; eight UN volunteers [UNIPSIL Duration](#) 1 October 2008 – 31 March 2013 [Chair of the Sierra Leone Configuration of the PBC](#) Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada) [President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone](#) Justice Shireen Avis Fisher (USA) [Special Court of Sierra Leone Duration](#) 2 December 2002 – 30 September 2013

---

## Sierra Leone (con't)

### Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

From 15-20 February, a PBC mission visited Sierra Leone with the aim of meeting with different stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding in the country. The mission specifically focused on the political and economic outlook for Sierra Leone over the post-election phase and outstanding peace consolidation issues, as well as the role of the UN with a focus on UNIPSIL's transition and the support that the PBC could potentially provide. During the visit, the mission engaged with the Mano River Union—a regional association that fosters economic cooperation among Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea—to discuss further collaboration towards the adoption of a regional approach to peacebuilding.

The Sierra Leone configuration of the PBC can potentially play a key role in UNIPSIL's transition,

working alongside UN funds and programmes. Such a role could include absorbing peacebuilding-related residual tasks from UNIPSIL.

### Key Issues

A key issue of concern for the Council is the timeline for UNIPSIL's withdrawal and how its responsibilities should be transferred to a regular UN presence.

A related issue is the future role of the Sierra Leone configuration of the PBC in the country, including its possible assumption of UNIPSIL's peacebuilding-related responsibilities.

### Options

The main option is for the Council to renew UNIPSIL's mandate for twelve months to

continue its role providing political support—particularly for the constitutional review—and to implement the transition strategy according to the timeline recommended by the TAM.

Renewing the mandate for a shorter period is another option.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Sierra Leone is a non-contentious issue for the Council, with members remaining like-minded on the transition and withdrawal of UNIPSIL.

The UK is the lead on Sierra Leone in the Council, and Canada is the chair of the PBC country configuration for Sierra Leone.

---

## Haiti

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council will consider the Secretary-General's semi-annual report on the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The report is expected to include a plan for the consolidation of MINUSTAH based on a set of stabilisation benchmarks. A debate with a briefing by Nigel Fisher (Canada), acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of mission, is expected. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

Ahead of the debate, the Council is expected to convene a meeting with MINUSTAH's troop-contributing countries. The mission's mandate expires on 15 October.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council's last debate on Haiti was held on 3 October 2012. The then Special

Representative of the Secretary-General, Mariano Fernández, briefed the Council on the 31 August MINUSTAH report (S/2012/678), which contained recommendations for a further drawdown of the mission.

Subsequently, on 12 October the Council adopted resolution 2070, renewing the mandate of MINUSTAH until 15 October 2013 and authorising a reduction by June of 1,070 military personnel (from 7,340 to 6,270) and 640 police personnel (from 3,241 to 2,601) as recommended by the Secretary-General. (This will bring the total troop level down to approximately where it was before the 12 January 2010 earthquake, but with an increased ratio of police to military personnel.)

Among other things, the resolution called for the installation of the Permanent Electoral Council (a necessary step for the holding of legislative, municipal and local elections postponed since November 2011) and also called for the elections to be held. In addition, it emphasised the importance of strengthening the Haitian National Police, recognising police capacity-building as "a most critical task" for MINUSTAH.

On the third anniversary of the 2010 earthquake, President Michel Martelly said in a speech that international aid to Haiti after the earthquake had failed in helping rebuild the country. Noting that most of the resources had been used on emergency

operations rather than reconstruction, he asserted that a new approach was needed.

Before leaving his post, Fernández gave a final briefing to Council members—at the initiative of Guatemala—in consultations on 22 January. His assessment of the situation in Haiti was perceived as markedly less positive than at the Council meeting in October. In particular, Fernández said there had been no progress towards establishing a functioning Permanent Electoral Council and that the political situation had deteriorated significantly. In the ensuing discussions, he called on the Council to react to the situation.

The Group of Friends of Haiti in New York (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay and the US) issued a joint statement on 23 January, recognising Fernández for his work as Special Representative, emphasising the importance of maintaining the focus on strengthening the rule of law, reiterating their support for the development of a consolidation plan for MINUSTAH and strongly encouraging all political actors in Haiti to enhance cooperation and move forward with elections.

---

**UN DOCUMENTS ON HAITI** [Security Council Resolution S/RES/2070](#) (12 October 2012) renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH until 15 October. [Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/7](#) (6 April 2011) was the latest presidential statement on Haiti. [Security Council Press Statement SC/10901](#) (28 January 2013) was a Council press statement on Haiti, calling for the holding of elections by the end of 2013. [Latest Secretary-General's Report S/2012/678](#) (31 August 2012) [Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6842](#) (3 October 2012) was the most recent debate on Haiti. [Other A/HRC/22/65](#) (7 February 2013) was the report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** [Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH Nigel Fisher \(Canada\) Size and Composition of Mission Current strength as of 31 December:](#) 9,464 total uniformed personnel, including 6,809 troops and 2,655 police (including formed units); the uniformed personnel are supported by 451 international civilian personnel and 1,317 local civilian staff. [Useful Additional Source](#) *Governing Haiti: Time for national Consensus*, Latin America and Caribbean Report No. 46, International Crisis Group, 4 February 2013.



## Haiti (con't)

In a 28 January press statement (SC/10901), Council members reaffirmed their support for Haiti, urged political actors to redouble their efforts to preserve progress made over the past year and underscored the importance of holding elections by the end of 2013.

In a press briefing on 15 February, Fisher expressed concern about the continuing impasse over the elections. He said this was also one of the predominant concerns raised in recent meetings in New York he had with Council members and the Friends of Haiti. Additionally, Fisher noted that economic growth had been much slower in 2012 than predicted (GDP grew by only 2.5 percent instead of the foreseen 8 percent) and that there were concerns about the independence of the judiciary.

On 21 February, former President Jean-Claude Duvalier failed to appear for the third time at a court hearing in Port-au-Prince relating to accusations against him of crimes against humanity. In January 2012, a court ruled that Duvalier could not be prosecuted for such crimes because of the statute of limitations. The hearing was intended to consider an appeal filed by alleged victims of abuses committed under the Duvalier regime. It was postponed until 28 February.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in January that the cholera epidemic was still of great concern, with the number of new cases and deaths for the first two weeks of 2013 exceeding the 2012 numbers for the same period. As of 15 January, the total number of deaths since the epidemic started had reached 7,965. Meanwhile, the UN on 21 February announced that it had formally rejected compensation claims brought by victims of the epidemic, referring to the claims as “not receivable” under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. A lawyer for the cholera victims said, however, that they would challenge the UN’s right to immunity from Haitian courts on the grounds that it had not established an alternative mechanism for dealing with accountability issues, as stipulated in its agreement with the government.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

On 20 March, during its 22nd session, the Human Rights Council will consider the report of the independent expert on the situation of

human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, who last visited the country from 25 November to 1 December 2012. His latest report, issued on 7 February, addresses progress and obstacles in reforming the justice system. It highlights the link between extended pre-trial detention and prison overcrowding while deploring poor detention conditions. The report also underlines the importance of police reform and expresses concern about illegal and arbitrary detention, harassment, ill treatment and impunity. The report furthermore notes the ratification of the 1993 Hague Convention on Adoption and addresses the issues of child domestic servants and trafficking of children. As for economic, social and cultural rights, the report focuses in particular on the right to food, education and access to health, as well as living conditions in camps, including gender-based violence.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is the difficult political situation and in particular the current impasse relating to the establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council. (While a compromise was reached in December to establish a Transitional College for a Permanent Electoral College, disputes have continued over its implementation.) A related issue is what role the Council can play in encouraging the political parties to agree on a way forward.

A second key issue in March is the expected MINUSTAH consolidation plan. Outstanding questions include what kind of priorities and benchmarks should be part of the plan and what the time frame should be. (There seems to be general agreement that the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2016, will be an important milestone in this regard.)

A continuing issue is the need to keep up progress in building the capacity of the Haitian National Police to reach the goal of increasing the number of police officers from 10,000 to 15,000 by 2016.

### Options

The most likely option is for Council members to listen to the briefing and express their national positions but take no further action at this stage.

Another option would be to adopt a presidential statement that would:

- welcome the conditions-based consolidation plan for MINUSTAH;
- emphasise the importance of holding the elections and urge the political leaders to

avoid further delays;

- highlight the ongoing need to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian police;
- express concern about the impact of the cholera epidemic and urge the international community to support the Secretary-General’s initiative to eradicate cholera in Haiti launched last December;
- emphasise the importance of ensuring accountability for crimes against humanity; and
- request more regular briefings from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the situation in Haiti (in addition to the customary semi-annual briefings coinciding with the Secretary-General’s reports).

### Council Dynamics

It seems a few Council members were somewhat taken aback by Fernández’s change in tone at the 22 January briefing and the more negative outlook he presented in comparison with the October briefing. While there is general concern about the impasse over the elections, some Council members, in particular the US, found his assessment to be too negative and did not immediately see the need for any Council action. This seems to explain why it took almost a week for Council members to agree on a press statement in response to the briefing.

With regard to MINUSTAH, some differences remain among Council members as to what the mission’s main priorities should be as well as their longer-term perspectives, but they seem less pronounced than in the past. While the UK in particular is perceived as eager for MINUSTAH to leave, Latin American members and the US are generally more cautious. All agree, however, that MINUSTAH must stay until Haiti has the capacity to ensure its own security. The upcoming debate will likely bring more clarity as to Council members’ current positions since the consolidation plan for MINUSTAH is expected to be a key focus.

The US is the lead country on Haiti. MINUSTAH mandate renewals are normally negotiated in the Group of Friends of Haiti before being circulated to all Council members.

## Expected Council Action

In March, Council members may be briefed in consultations by Alexander Downer, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, on the prospects for progress in negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The mandate of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) expires on 31 July.

## Key Recent Developments

The briefing will likely focus on the presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus. On 17 February, Nicos Anastasiades, of the centre-right party Democratic Rally, won the first round with 45 percent of the vote. Satvros Malas, of the incumbent Progressive Party of Working People (outgoing President Demetris Christofias did not stand for re-election), received 27 percent of the vote. As neither candidate won outright, a run-off election was held on 24 February. Anastasiades won that election with 58 percent of the vote.

Anastasiades was a supporter of the “Annan Plan” in 2004, which proposed the establishment of a federated United Cyprus Republic comprising two component states. However, that plan was decisively defeated in a referendum by the Greek Cypriot community by a 76 percent majority and it is unclear how Anastasiades’s position on a settlement might have evolved since. While previous presidential contests in the Republic of Cyprus have tended to focus on the reunification of the island, the campaign this year focused instead on economic concerns. (Cyprus has been seeking a bailout of 17.5 billion euros from the EU for months.)

Downer completed his most recent visit to Cyprus on 17 January, meeting separately with Christofias for the last time before the elections and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroğlu. Both sides expressed their wish to see renewed developments in the hopes of achieving a settlement. On 22 January, Downer announced his intention to visit the island again in March following Greek Cypriot elections and his intention to brief the Council on his visit soon after.

Turkey transmitted a letter to the Security Council on 31 January from the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus at the UN that “reiterate[d] the Turkish Cypriot side’s readiness to engage with the Greek Cypriot side, following elections in the South”. (Turkey is the only country that recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.)

Through resolution 2089 of 24 January, the Council renewed UNFICYP for a period of six months with an abstention by Azerbaijan (S/PV.6908). The text closely resembled resolution 2058, the most recent renewal of UNFICYP, on which both Azerbaijan and Pakistan had abstained. In its explanation of vote, Azerbaijan said that it fully supported the renewal of UNFICYP, but references to the move towards “intensive” negotiations were obsolete as talks had come to a substantive halt by mid-2012. It also claimed that the resolution contained references which were “no longer an issue” and lamented that the bulk of its proposals had not been taken into account.

The adoption of resolution 2089 followed a briefing in consultations on the latest UNFICYP report (S/2013/7) by Special Representative and head of mission, Lisa Bittenheim, on 17 January. The report noted “the continuance of a low level of military violations committed by the two opposing forces” during the reporting period but described the situation along the ceasefire lines as relatively calm and stable.

## Human Rights-Related Developments

On 20 March, during its 22nd session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) will consider the 1 February report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the question of human rights in Cyprus covering the period from 1 December 2011 to 30 November 2012 (A/HRC/22/18). Based on recent findings of international and regional human rights mechanisms, the report documents instances of human rights concerns and recent developments with regards to the question of missing persons, the principle of non-discrimination, freedom of movement, property rights, freedom of religion and cultural rights, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to education. The report also highlights the importance of adopting a gender perspective

when negotiating and implementing peace agreements in line with resolution 1325. OHCHR concludes that the persisting division of the island “continues to constitute an obstacle to the full enjoyment... by the whole population of Cyprus of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

The HRC will also consider on 5 March the report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, on his mission to Cyprus.

## Underlying Problems

Since high-level negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots broke down in April 2012, there has been very little progress made towards a political settlement, due in part to Cyprus’s assumption of the EU presidency from 1 July to 31 December 2012 and in part to the ambiguity attendant on a possible change in Greek Cypriot leadership following the February elections. Though both of these conditions have passed, leaders from the two sides continue to hold the other responsible for the lack of progress in the high-level negotiations.

## Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to re-energise high-level negotiations between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that stalled in April 2012. Council members will be interested in hearing Downer’s assessment of how the February elections will impact his efforts to restart negotiations towards finding a solution to the Cyprus issue.

## Options

One option for the Council is to simply receive the briefing and take no action. However, should the Council decide to adopt a statement, that statement could do one or more of the following:

- welcome the recent elections and encourage the new Greek Cypriot president to seek agreement with the Turkish Cypriots;
- encourage both sides to be constructive in their approach to negotiations; or
- establish a deadline for renewed negotiations to underscore the urgency of achieving a settlement, and call for a possible review of UNFICYP in light of the continuing lack of progress towards a political

**UN DOCUMENTS ON CYPRUS** Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2089 (24 January 2013) renewed UNFICYP for six months. S/RES/2058 (19 July 2012) extended UNFICYP’s mandate until 31 January 2013. **Secretary-General’s Reports** S/2013/7 (7 January 2013) was the most recent report on UNFICYP. S/2012/149 (12 March 2012) was the most recent report on the status of negotiations in Cyprus. **Security Council Meeting Records** S/PV.6908 (24 January 2013) was a meeting on Cyprus at which resolution 2089 was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention by Azerbaijan. S/PV.6809 (19 July 2012) was a meeting on Cyprus at which resolution 2058 was adopted. **Human Rights Council Documents** A/HRC/22/18 (1 February 2013) was the OHCHR report on the question of human rights in Cyprus covering the period from 1 December 2011 to 30 November 2012. A/HRC/22/51/Add.1 (24 December 2012) was the report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, on his mission to Cyprus. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** UNFICYP: Budget Appropriation (1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013): \$54.192 million (one-third of which is funded by the government of Cyprus, with \$6.5 million from Greece).

---

## Cyprus (con't)

solution. (The possibility of a review has been contentious in the past and remains an unlikely option.)

### Council Dynamics

Over the past year or so, Cyprus has become a controversial matter in the Council in comparison to previous years. Differences became evident during negotiations on resolution 2058 in July 2012 and centred on the inclusion of language referring to a potential review of UNFICYP. Several members considered such a call to be equivalent to asserting that the situation on the island no

longer constituted a threat to international peace and security and so there was no longer any need for the mission. Several Council members, and the Republic of Cyprus, consider the question of a review to be anathema. Negotiations over resolution 2089 were not as divisive as those last July but still demonstrated that some divisions remain on the question of Cyprus.

Some Council members have expressed interest in establishing a new negotiating timetable for Downer to present to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, such a proposal is also likely to be very divisive among

Council members, as the Greek Cypriot side seems to be especially opposed to the establishment of such deadlines and Council members who are more sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot position (such as France and Russia) are likely to press their case.

Nonetheless, most Council members agree that the elections constitute an opportunity for a new beginning for negotiations and renewed attention from the Council on the issue.

The UK is the lead on Cyprus.

# Notable Dates for March

REPORT DUE	REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN MARCH	REQUESTING DOCUMENT
15 February	Panel of Experts final report to the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee	S/RES/2040
20 February	SG report on UNSMIL (Libya)	S/RES/2040
28 February	SG report on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau	S/RES/2048
28 February	SG report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (UNIFIL/ Lebanon)	S/RES/2064
28 February	SG report on UNMIL (Liberia)	S/RES/2066
28 February	SG report on UNIPSIL (Sierra Leone)	S/RES/2065
late February	AU report on AFISMA (Mali)	S/RES/2085
7 March	SG report on UNAMA (Afghanistan)	S/RES/2041
11 March	SG report on UNMISS (South Sudan)	S/RES/2057
12 March	SG report on MINUSTAH (Haiti)	S/RES/2070
13 March	SG report on UNAMI (Iraq)	S/RES/2061
19 March	SG report on UNDOF (Golan Heights)	S/RES/2084
20 March	SG report on Mali	S/RES/2085

MANDATES EXPIRE	RELEVANT DOCUMENT
7 March	AMISOM authorisation
16 March	UNSMIL (Libya)
16 March	Panel of Experts to the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee
23 March	UNAMA (Afghanistan)
31 March	UNIPSIL (Sierra Leone)

## OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

- 7 March ..... The next meeting of the Friends of Yemen is expected to be held in London.
- 18 March ..... The opening of the National Dialogue Conference is expected in Yemen.
- 20 March ..... It seems possible that Council members may be briefed in consultations by Alexander Downer, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus.

## Security Council Report Staff

**Bruno Stagno**  
Executive Director

**Joanna Weschler**  
Deputy Executive Director & Director of Research

**Amanda Roberts**  
Coordinating Editor & Senior Research Analyst

**Shamala Kandiah Thompson**  
What's in Blue Editor & Senior Research Analyst

**Astrid Forberg Ryan**  
Senior Research Analyst & Development Officer

**Victor Casanova Abos**  
Research Analyst

**Charles Cater**  
Research Analyst

**Nicole Rencorel**  
Research Analyst

**Paul Romita**  
Research Analyst

**Eran Sthoeger**  
Research Analyst

**Robbin VanNewkirk**  
Publications Coordinator

**Dahlia Morched**  
Research Assistant

**Laura Coquard-Patry**  
Research Assistant

**James Reed Ball III**  
Research Assistant

**Maritza Tenerelli**  
Administrative Assistant

**Stevenson Swanson**  
Editorial Consultant

Security Council Report is a non-profit organization supported by the Governments of Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, International Development Research Centre and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

Design Point Five, NY

**Security Council Report**  
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza  
885 2nd Ave at 48th St, 21st Floor  
New York NY 10017

**Telephone** +1 212 759 6394  
**Fax** +1 212 759 4038  
**Web** securitycouncilreport.org  
whatsinblue.org

The material in this publication is subject to copyright ownership. Material in this publication may be freely used as in the public domain. You are free to copy, distribute, or make derivative works of the work under the following conditions: you must attribute the work to Security Council Report, Inc.; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one.